ML17299A461
| ML17299A461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1985 |
| From: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| TAC-59412, NUDOCS 8507310389 | |
| Download: ML17299A461 (10) | |
Text
Docket Nos:
50-528 50-529 50-530 L 1g 1985 Mr. E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President Arizona Nuclear Power Project Post Office Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072 - 2034
Dear Mr. Van Brunt:
SUBJECT:
POST-LOCA STATUS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS SEAL COOLING - PALO VERDE As you know, the NRC has been reviewing the post-LOCA status of reactor coolant pumps regarding trip versus no trip.
This issue has been pursued via the CE Owners Group (GEOG).
As our review nears its conclusion, we find that one area, post-LOCA status of reactor coolant pump seal cooling, has been accorded plant-specific status by the GEOG.
Accordingly, we request that you provide your written response to the enclosed questions.
lie further request that you provide your response within thirty (30) days so that we may complete our review in a timely manner.
This request for information affects feiner than ten l'esgondents; titleYefove OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, George ll. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No.
3 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc.
See next page LB83/DISSl L883/DL MLicitra:dh GllKniohton 07//p/85 07/g/85 DISTRIBUTION
~Doc et Fi ey NRC PDR Local PDR PRC System NSIC LB83 Reading JLee ML1citra OELD Attorney ACRS (16)
JPartlow BGrimes EJordan 85073i0389 8507i9 PDR ADOCK 05000528I P
I i
- .) (r,
Mr. E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project I
Palo Verde CC:
Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Snell 8 Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Hr. James H. Flenner, Chief Counsel Arizona Corporation Comnission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Charles R. Kocher, Esq. Assistant Council James A. Boeletto, Esq.
Southern California Edison Company P. 0.
Box-800
- Rosemead, California 91770 Hr. Hark Ginsberg Energy Director Office of Economic Planning and Development 1700 West Washington - 5th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Hr. Wayne Shirley Assistant Attorney General Bataa~
Memorial Building Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503 Hr. Roy Zimmerman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0.
Box 239 Arlington, Arizona 85322 Ms. Patricia Lee Hourihan 6413 S. 26th Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Regional Administrator, Region V
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Kenneth Berl in, Esq.
Winston 8 Strawn Suite 500 2550 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Hs.
Lynne Bernabei Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 Hs. Jill Morrison 522 E. Colgate Tempi, Arizona 85238 Hr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc.
7910 Woodmont Avenue Suite 1310
- Bethesda, Haryland 20814 Hr.
Ron Rayner P. 0.
Box 1509
- Goodyear, AZ 85338
W
~l I
RE UEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP In response to Generic Letter 83-10, CEN-268 "Justification of Trip Two/Leave Two Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Strategy During Transients,"
was provided by the CE Owners Group.
The following paragraph is taken from CEN-268:
6.5 SERVICE WATER AVAILABILITY RCP cooling water will be isolated at some plants upon a containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS).
Continuous RCP operation under this condition may lead to potential RCP damage.
Low RCP cooling flow alarms are available in the control
- room, and timely operator action could be employed to restore essential water service.
Each-utility=should review the RCP cooling water service system requirements on a plant specific basis and make changes as necessary.
(page 6-5)
This information was provided in response to a specific issue in Generic Letter 83-10, I.l(e):
"Transients and accidents which produce the same initial symptoms as a
LOCA (i.e., depressurization of the reactor and actuation of engineered safety features) and result in containment isolation may result in the termination of systems essential for continued operation of the reactor
f,
~t
~ 0 W
I l,
1
)
't
coolant pumps (i.e.,component cooling water and/or seal injection water).
It was the intent of TMI Action Plan Item II.E.4.2 to have licensees reevaluate essential and non-essential systems with respect to containment isolation.
In pat ticular, if a facility design terminates water services essential for RCP operation, then it should be assured that these water services can be restored in a timely manner once a
non-LOCA situation is confirmed, and prevent seal damage or failure.
It should be confirmed that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure."
1.
Does any containment isolation signal result in the termination of systems essential for continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps'f so, identify the signals and systems effected.
2.
If essential water services are terminated, provide a description of the operator guidelines, training, and procedures in place (or to be implemented) which assure that these services are restored in a timely manner to prevent seal damage or failure, once a non-LOCA situation has been confirmed.
3.
Provide confirmation, included the technical
- basis, that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure.
~0
4.
Since RCP trip will be required for LOCA events, assurance must be provided that RCP trip, when required, will occur.
To address this concern, provide the following information:
(a)
Identify the components required to trip the RCPs.
Include relays, power supplies and breakers.
Address reliability and alternate trip methods.
(b) If necessary, as a result of the location of any critical component, include the effects of adverse containment conditions on RCP trip reliability.
Describe the basis for the adverse containment parameters selected.
~0
~
~ <.>
f f
"t
- ,