ML17300B052
| ML17300B052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1987 |
| From: | Cicotte G, North H, Tenbrook W, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300B050 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-87-24, 50-529-87-25, 50-530-87-26, NUDOCS 8709150336 | |
| Download: ML17300B052 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1987024
Text
'
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
Nos.
50-528/87-24,
50-529/87-25,
and 50-530/87-26
Docket Nos.
50-528,
50-529,
and 50-530
License
Nos.
and NPF-65
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service
Company
P.
0.
Box 21666
Phoenix,
85836
Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1,
2 and
3
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site - Wintersburg,
Inspection
Conducted:
July 13-17 and August 3-6,
1987
Inspected
by:
H.
S. North, Senior Radiation Specialist
G.
R.
Ci cot e, Radiation Specialist
Date Signed
f~g p7
ate Signed
W.
K. TenBrook, Radiation Specialist
Date
igned
G.
P.
Yu as,
Chief
Facili
s Radiological Protection Section
ate Signed
~Summar:
Ins ection durin
the
eriod of Jul
13-17 and
Au ust 3-6
1987
Re ort No.
50-528/87-24
50-529/87-25
and 50-530/87-26
previous inspection findings,
on site followup of events at operating
reactors,
radiation protection,
chemistry and radwaste
organization
and
management,
radiochemical
measurements,
transportation,
control of radioactive
materials,
contamination
surveys
and monitoring and review of licensee
reports.
Inspection procedures
30703,
92701,
93702,
65051,
83722,
86721,
83726,
84725 and 92700 were addressed.
Results:
Of the seven
areas
addressed,
no violations or deviations
were
identified in 6 areas.
In one a'rea,
two apparent violations of Technical Specifications, 3.3.3.9 related to satisfaction of an action statement
at Unit
2 and 6. 12. 1 related to control of access
to high radiation areas at Unit 1
(Report Section 3).
8709i 5033h 870828
ADOCK 05000528
8
'
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Arizona Nuclear
Power Pro ect
¹J.
G.
Haynes,
Vice President,
Nuclear Production
¹J.
D. Driscoll, Assistant Vice President,
Nuclear Production Support
"¹J
~
Bynum, Plant Manager
~¹R.
R.
Baron, Supervisor,
Compliance
Commitments
- ¹L. E.
Brown, Manager,
Radiation Protection
and Chemistry
- ¹J.
B. Cederquist,
Manager,
Chemical
Services
W.
H. Doyle, Unit 2 Radiation Protection Supervisor
¹T.
P. Hillmer, Manager,
Radioactive Material Control
"K. Oberdorf, Unit 1 Radiation Protection Supervisor
- R.
G. Johnson,
Unit 2 Chemistry Supervisor
"J.
Mann, Supervisor,
Corporate
Health Physics
and Chemistry
¹R.
L. Selman,
ALARA Supervisor
"¹J.
M. Sills, Senior Compliance
Engineer
"T.
D. Shriver,
Manager,
Compliance
"W.
E.
Sneed,
Unit 3 Radiation Protection Supervisor
"¹L. A, Souza,
Assistant Director, Corporate
gA/gC
¹J.
Vorees,
Manager,
Nuclear Safety
"R. Younger, Unit 1 Operations
Superintendent
"I. Zeringue,
Manager,
Technical
Support
NRC
- ¹J.
R. Ball, Acting Senior Resident
Inspector
- Denotes attendance
at the exit interview on July 17, 1987.
¹Denotes
attendance
at the exit interview on August 6, 1987.
In addition to the individuals identified above,
the inspectors
met and
held discussions
with other members of the licensee's
staff and
contractor personnel.
Licensee Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin s
0 en
Followu
50-528/87-04-01
- Spiked samples
sent to Palo Verde for
submittal to contract laboratories.
Two spiked samples
were sent to the
licensee
by the Radiological
and Environmental
Sciences
Laboratory
(RESL)
to test the licensee's
capabilities to obtain accurate
measurements
involving chemical
separations,
soft X-ray counting,
and beta counting.
The licensee
provided
one spiked
sample to its contract laboratory
and
another to an independent
laboratory.
The results
are presented
in
Tables
1 and 2.
Table
1
Nuclide
Sr-89
Contract
Laboratory
~Ci/ml
9.52 E-5
1.10 E-4
7.91 E-5
Certificate
Value
.
~Ci/ml
9.21 E"5
1.26 E-4
1.14 E"5
Ratio
1. 03
0. 87
6. 94
Agreement
~Ran
e
0.80-1.25
0.75-1.33
0.75-1.33
Tabl e
2
Nuclide
Independent
Laboratory
~Ci /ml
Certificate
Value
Agreement
~Ci /ml
Ratio
~Ran
e
Sr-89
1.16 E"4
1.50 E-4
2. 15 E-5
1.27, E-4
1.74 E"4
1.57
E"5
0.91
0.75-1.33
0.86
0.75-1.33
1. 37
0. 75-1. 33
The results
obtained
by the independent. laboratory appear to be in
general
agreement with the certificate values.
However, the Sr-90 result
obtained
by the licensee's
contract laboratory does
not agree with the
certificate value within the error associated
with the measurement.
This
matter was brought to the licensee's
attention
and will remain
open
pending resolution.
0 en
Followu
50-530/87-17-01
Low Level Radioactive
Waste Stora
e Facilities
The facility was essentially
complete at the time of the inspection.
Final electrical terminations
and facility cleaning following
construction,
were in progress.
The exhaust vent stack from the
filtered exhaust
from the operating
area
was
due for installation in the
immediate future.
Provisions
were
made for the use of a single,
isokinetic type sampling probe.
The licensee
reported that evaluation of
the projected stack flow indicated that the fl.ow would be turbulent at
all locations
and therefore
a single sampling probe would be acceptable.
The licensee
planned to use
a fixed filter continuous air monitor for the
discharge
stack.
0 en
Followu
50-530/87-04-02
The licensee
reported that preoperational
testing
and calibration of all
but two (2)
RMS monitors was complete.
The two monitors, for which
testing
was incomplete,
were awaiting receipt of parts
from Kaman.
The
licensee
reported, that spares
were being received
from Kaman on a regular
basis.
0 en
Fo1 l owu
50-530/87-04-03
The licensee
reported that Unit 3 chemistry technicians
were receiving
PASS classroom
and simulator training on the simulator developed
by the
training staff.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Onsite Followu
of Events at 0 eratin
Power Reactors
Sub'ect
addressed
b
'Unit 1 Licensee
Event'Re ort No.87-017
~87-17- LO
On June
30, 1987,
a non-licensed
operator entered
the Unit 1 Low
Pressure
Safety Injection (LPSI) "B" pump room in order to check
valve positions to investigate possible
intersystem
leaks
from the
(RCS).
The LPSI "B" pump had been running
for shutdown cooling subsequent
to the Circulating Water System line
fai 1ur e.
The operator
had entered
the radiological controlled area
(RCA) on
radiation exposure permit (REP) 1-87-0004 (Inspection,
Tagging and
Valve Line-Ups by Operations)
early in his 12-hour dayshift.
Radiation Protection
(RP) personnel
had performed
a survey of the
LPSI "B" pump room and other areas at 1230 June
30, in order to
reverify high radiation area postings.
The last previous routine
survey of LPSI "B" pump room had been performed
on June
13, 1987,
when it was posted
as
The survey at 1230
indicated increasing radiation levels in the room,
and the posting
remained
unchanged.
A contamination
survey
was not performed at
that time,
and the door to the
room was not posted
as
a contaminated
area.
REP 1-87-0004,
under
"Special Instructions", stated,
in part:
"1.
NOTIFY R.
P.
PRIOR
TO START OF WORK."
The individual stated that
he
had done
so at the beginning of his shift.
At approximately
1635, the individual entered
the
LPSI "B" pump room
to check shut SIB-692,
a motor-operated
manual override valve
located
on the lower level of the room.
According to an interview
conducted
by the inspectors,
the operator
had noticed high humidity
and moisture surrounding the pump.
After approximately
15 minutes
he exited the
room.
Upon exit from the
RCA the operator
was found
to have minor (200-400 counts per minute) skin and clothing
contamination.
guestioning
by the
RP staff at that time identified
. the operators
entry into the
LPSI "B" pump room and resulted in
additional radiation surveys
and air sampling of that area.
The
LPSI "B" pump seal
was found to be leaking and operation
was shifted
to the
LPSI "A" pump.
Surveys
by
RP staff at about 1800 on June
30, 1987, indicated
significant increases
in radioactivity and dose rates to about
1
R/hour at 18", and 21 times the
maximum permissible concentration
(NPC) of 10 CFR 20 Appendix
B Table
1 Column 1 primarily for I-131
and I-133.
The room was then posted
as high airborne radioactivity,
respiratory protection required,
and locked high radiation area,
and
the door was marked with flashing lights as
an alternative to
locking the door, in accordance
with licensee
procedures
RADIOLOGICAL POSTING,
and 75AC-9ZZOl, RADIATION EXPOSURE
AND ACCESS
CONTROL and Technical Specification 6.12.2.
The results of personnel
contamination
surveys
and bioassay
are
partially summarized
below:
Surve
c
m b
frisk
200-400 prior to
decontamination
Whole Body Count
(WBC) lung geometry
~nCi
55. 94
15. 73
8. 433
I"131
I-133
WBC Results
Thyroid geometry
~nCi
25. 12
8. 112
4. 637
less
than
100 after
decontamination
44. 40
12. 97
4. 349
6. 50
I-133
6. 50
I"133
2. 35
less than 100
after one week
11. 02
4.976
I-133,
The licensee's
dose
assessment
and survey results correlated closely
with the theoretical
lung/thyroid geometry
model
and were conducted
using established
methodology.
Based
on the ingestion of
radioactive material
the individual's exposure
was calculated to be
about 6.6 MPC-hours.
No whole body or airborne radioactive
materials
exposure limits were exceeded.
Licensee
procedure
RADIATION EXPOSURE
AND ACCESS
CONTROL
states,
in part:
"5..7.2.2
Any individual or group permitted to enter
a High
Radiation Area shall
be provided with, or accompanied
by
one or more of the following (LCTS8011132).
Radiation
dose rate meter.
Alarming dosimeter..."
Licensee Technical Specification
(T.S ~ ) 6.12.1 states:
"6. 12. 1
In lieu of the "control device" or "alarm signal"
required
by par agraph 20.203(c)(2) of 10 CFR Part 20,
each
high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is
greater
than 100 mrem/hr but less
than 1000 mrem/hr shall
be barricaded
and conspicuously
posted
as
a high radiation
area
and entrance
thereto shall
be controlled by requiring
issuance
of a Radiation Exposure Permit (REP)".
Any
individual or group of individuals permitted to enter
such
areas
shall
be provided with or accompanied
by one or more
of the following:
a.
A radiation monitoring device which'continuously
indicates the radiation dose rate in the area.
b.
C.
A radiation monitoring device which continuously
integrates
the radiation
dose rate in the area
and
alarms
when
a preset integrated
dose is received.
Entry into such areas with this monitoring device
may
be
made after the dose rate level in the area
has
been established
and personnel
have
been
made
knowledgeable of them.
A radiation protection qualified individual (i.e.,
qualified in radiation protection procedures)
with a
radiation
dose rate monitoring device
who is
responsible for providing positive control, over the
activities within the area
and shall perform periodic
radiation surveillance at the frequency specified
by
the facility Radiation Protection Supervisor or his
designated
alternate
in the REP."
The licensee's
R.P. staff barred further access
to the
RCA by the
individual until operations
supervision
acted to prevent recurrence.
Operations
stressed
the importance of adherence
to
R. P. restrictions
and disciplined the individual, whose
RCA access
was then
reinstated.
A root cause of this event appeared
to have
been
a lack of a
definitive instruction to obtain current radiological information
prior to high radiation area entry, particularly during changing
plant conditions.
REP 1-87-0004 contained instructions to contact
R.P. prior to the start of work.
This, according to some personnel
interviewed by the inspectors,
was interpreted to mean at the start
of a shift, and by others to be prior to entry to the individual
areas.
Other
REP's
such
as 1-87-0012A, titled TOURS/INSPECTIONS
IN
HIGH CONTAMINATION AND HIGH RADIATION AREAS, contain the
instruction:
"VERIFY CURRENT CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO ENTRY."
The
problem appeared
to be restricted to generic-style
REP's,
such
as
those for tours, inspections,
walkdowns,
and other similar tasks
requiring entry to various areas with differing radiological
conditions.
The operators
entry into the Unit 1 LPSI "B" pump
room on June 30,
1987,
was contrary to the requirements
of Technical Specification
6. 12. 1 in that the operator did not satisfy the specific
requirements
of Technical Specification
6. 12.1 a.,
b. or c.
as noted
above.
B.
Sub ect addressed
b
Unit 2
LER 87-014
87-14-LO
.
On May 20, 1987, radiation monitor RU-145 was declared
and
a preplanned
alternate
sampling system
was placed in service to
0'
satisfy the requirements
of Technical Specification 3.3.3.9, Action
37.
On June
5, 1987, during
a review of Radiation Protection
Logs
it was determined that on May 31, 1987, the alternate
sampling
system
had been discovered with the on/off switch in the off
position by a radiation technician.
The technician restarted
the
system following sampling media change out and the event
was logged
but not reported to management.
Subsequent
investigation disclosed
that the sampling
system switch had been inadvertently turned off
when the switch was
bumped
by an individual working on monitor
RU-145 between
0602 and 0641 on May 31, 1987.
The subsequent
investigation established
that,
independent
of the
switching incident, the required estimation of sampler flow rate,
required
by Action 36 at 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> intervals,
had not been performed
by
the responsible
radiation protection technician at 0030
on May 30
and 0410 on May 31,
1987.
In response
to this event the licensee's
corrective actions
included
the termination of the radiation protection technician
who failed to
perform the flow verifications.
In addition
a letter from the
Executive Vice President
was circulated to all
ANPP personnel
discussing this event,
reemphasizing
the company
s position with
regard to the truthfulness of written records.
Further
a program of
random comparisons
of written records with the security computer
access
records
had also
been instituted.
The licensee
was also
'onsidering
the development of a video taped
message
from the
Executive Vice President
concerning the
need for truthfulness in the
maintenance
of records.
The failure to perform the required flow verification checks
on the
alternate
sampling
system at four (4) hour intervals
on two (2)
occasions
on May 30-31,
1987,
was contrary to the requirements
of
Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 Table 3.3-13 Action ¹36.
Pum
Fai lure
On July 4, 1987, the Unit 1 LPSI "A" pump failed during use for
The pump had been placed in service to, replace
the
LPSI "B" pump which had been
removed from service
due to seal
leakage.
The rotor/motor assembly of the
LPSI "A" pump was shipped
as radioactive material to a contractor for decontamination
in order
to allow repairs to be performed in a non-licensed facility.
At the
time of the inspection,
the
LPSI "A" pump had been
reassembled
using
components
from a pump of the
same design
from Unit 3.
Preparations
were in progress
to support repairs to the
LPSI "B" pump.
The
licensee
planned to rework the
LPSI "B" motor in a temporary
containment set
up just outside the
pump room.
In response
to this event,
and that of the improper entry to the
LPSI "B" pump room (Report Section 3), the licensee's
shipping
Controls
Problem
Re or ts,
and Personnel
Contamination
Lo s were
reviewed.
The
LPSI '" motor appears
to have
been
shipped in
accordance
with regulatory requirements.
The reports
and logs
listed above are partially summarized
below:
1.
Personnel
Contaminations
during 1987
Highest level involved
(dpm before/after
decontamination)
per probe area
Unit 1
approx.
50
30,000/less
than
1000
Unit 2
approx.
50
700,000/less
than
1000
2.
Clothing/personal
articles
75
-41
a.
IBID l.a
700,000/less
300,000/
than
1000
disposed
3.
Problems
reported
13
6
4.
Problems
caused
by lack of
6
3
adherence
to instruction
The inspectors
questioned
the licensee
concerning the
number
and
significance of problems
and contamination
events,
and were informed
that the licensee
would investigate
the matter
and respond to the
inspectors'oncerns
(50-528/87-24-02,
50-529/87-25-01).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Radiation Protection
Plant Chemistr
and Radwaste:
Or anization
and
Mana ement Controls
At the time of the first week of the inspection,
there
had been
no
changes
to the organizational
structure.
The licensee
had contracted
a
study by a consulting firm to assess
the existing staffing and
organization.
Reportedly the existing staffing levels closely matched
the results of the assessment.
Details requiring management
attention
were adequately
addressed
by pathways within and without the
organization.
Contractors
were observed in the normal organizational
structure
however the licensee
was attempting to minimize the use of
contractors for routine operations.
All those personnel
questioned
appeared
competent
and experienced.
Plant personnel
were primarily on a
12-hour shift rotation.
This schedule
appeared
to have
a minor negative
impact on cyclic training, though required training was accomplished.
No
significant unaddressed
weaknesses
were observed.
At the time of the second inspection
week the licensee
had
made
a
preliminary announcement
of major organizational
changes.
The
new
organization
was to cohsist of the directorates
of Engineering
and
Construction,
Site Services,
Nuclear Safety
and Licensing,
and guality
Assurance,
and the Vice President of Nuclear Production.
Reporting to
the Vice President of Nuclear Production were to be the three Unit Plant
0
e
Managers,
the Assistant Vice President
Nuclear Production Support
and the
Director, Standards
and -Technical
Support.
Unit Radiation Protection
and
Chemistry Managers
were
shown
as reporting to the Plant Manager.
A
Radwaste
Support
Manager
and Central Radiation Protection
Manager were to
report to the Assistant Vice President
Nuclear Production Support.
A
Radiation Protection
and Chemistry Manager
was identified as reporting to
the Director, Standards
and Technical
Support.
Complete information on
staffing the
new organization
was not available at the time of the
inspection.
The effects of the organizational
changes
on radiation
protection,
chemistry, and radwaste will be examined during a subsequent
inspection
(50-528/87-24-03).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Trans ortation
Audits and
A
raisals
The scheduled
audit in this area
had been delayed until September
1987,
due to changes
that were occurring in the radwaste
organization.
A total
of eight (8), guality Monitoring Reports related.to
hazardous
waste (2)
and radioactive materials (including waste) (6) were examined.
No
concerns
were identified.
Special attention
was directed to the shipment
of, "strong, tight packages,"
as part of the corrective action associated
with the Notice of Violation identified in Inspection Report
50-528/87-03.
Procedures
and Procurement
and
Reuse of Packa
es
The licensee's
lower tier procedures
related to radwaste
operations
and
transportation
(Guidelines
and Directives) were examined.
Radwaste
Directives
16 and 17 were being changed to be more specific with respect
Vendor
Su
lied Shi
in
Casks" incorporated Certificates of Compliance.
The licensee
had implemented the use of the
RADMAN computer program,
supplied
by Waste
Management
Groups Inc.
The licensee
had documentation
from the vendor related to installation
and testing of the program.
The
vendor supplied three (3) days of training for seven (7) persons,
in the
use of the program.
The licensee
was supplied with documentation
of the
validated
and verified program.
A gA file to track program
use
and
changes
had been established.
The program was both unit and waste
stream
specific.
Waste stream composition
can
be revised
as required.
The use
of the program was addressed
in Radwaste Directive 11,
"Radwaste
Computer
Software Control."
The internal
Performance
Review Group does
independent verification of shipments.
Im lementation
More than 50'f the documentation
packages
of radwaste
shipments
in
1987,
and approximately
25K of nonradwaste
radioactive materials
shipments'ade
between April 1 and July 30,
1987, were examined.
No
discrepancies
were identified.
II
'
It was noted that the use of the
RADMAN program substantially
reduced
the
volume of paperwork generated
in the preparation
and dispatch of a
radwaste
shipment.
Trans ortation Incidents
The licensee
reported that no incidents
had occurred.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Control of Radioactive Material
Contamination
Surve
s and Monitorin
During the inspection tours of the radwaste,
fuel handling
and auxiliary
buildings of Units 1,
2 and
3 were performed.
Plant cleanliness
and
demarcation of controlled areas
had improved.
During the first week of
the inspection significant work was in progress
in connection with the
Unit 1 LPSI
pump repair and replacement.
During the second
week of
inspection Unit 1 had returned to operation
and the facility had largely
recovered
from the outage activity. It was noted that the extent of
contaminated
areas
had increased
from that normally observed.
The
licensee
reported that
a contractor
supported effort to reduce the number
and size of contaminated
areas
was under consideration.
This proposal
was in preparation for the first Unit 1 refueling outage
planned for late
September
or early October 1987.
During the plant tours
NRC ion chamber
survey instruments
and NRC-008985
due for calibration
respectively
on July 23 and August 19,
1987 were used.
As part of the tour of the facility, the Chemistry Department trainirig
laboratories
were inspected.
The licensee
was supporting technician
training with experienced
chemists.
A lecture/discussion
was observed in
which the instructor directed his attention to the less-experienced
personnel,
soliciting assistance
from the senior personnel
in the class.
The laboratory
was wel.l-equipped.
The licensee
was developing on-site
capability for investigation of chemical corrosion
phenomena
normally
contracted outside-the
organization.
The licensee
had a functional Post
Accident Sampling System
(PASS) simulator
on which all chemistry
personnel will be scheduled
to practice
both sampling
and surveillance.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7. 'eview of Licensee
Re orts
Licensee
records related to completed actions
on Special
Reports
(SR), and
Licensee
Event Reports
(LER) examined on-site included:
Unit 1
LER
SR
1-87-010 (87-10- LO)
1-SR-87-019
(87-10-XO)
Unit 2
0'
10
2-87" 09 (87-09-LO)
2-SR-87-13
(87"13-XO)
2-SR-87-16
(87-16-XO)
No concerns
were identified.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
A Unit 1,
LER 87-017
and
a Unit 2,
LER 87-014,
both involving violatibns
were addressed
in report section
3.
8.
Exit Interview
The scope
and findings of the inspection
were discussed
with the
individuals denoted in report section
1 on July 17 and. August 6, 1987.
The licensee
was informed that it appeared
that:
the entry of the
,"-.i
operator into the Unit 1 LPSI "B" pump room,
a high radiation area, "-
without appropriate
instrumentation
or while accompanied
by an indivfdual
trained in radiation protection procedures,
as required-by Technical
Specification
6. 12. 1;
and the failure to satisfy the requirements
of
Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 Table 3.3-13 Action 36, at Unit 2
constituted violations of regulatory requirements.
With respect
to the licensee's
announced
reorganization,
the inspector
expressed
concern that the organizational
structure did not appear to
provide for the
same level of centralized control in the areas
of
radiation protection,
chemistry
and radioactive materials control
as
had
previously existed.
The licensee
stated that the
new organization
would
provide at least the
same
and, it was expected,
an increased
level of
centralized control in these
areas.