ML17300A965
| ML17300A965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1987 |
| From: | Ball J, Fiorelli G, Ivey K, Richards R, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300A961 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-87-17, 50-529-87-18, 50-530-87-19, NUDOCS 8708100487 | |
| Download: ML17300A965 (39) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1987017
Text
'0
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License
Nos:
Licensee:
50-528/87"17,
50"529/87"18, 50-530/87-19
50"528, 50-529,
50"530
NPF"65
Arizona Nuclear Power Project
P. 0.
Box 52034
Phoenix,
AZ. 85072-2034
Ins ection Conducted:
May
0,
987 -
une 20,
1987
Inspectors:
si ent Inspector
C.
Approved By:
G. Fiorelli, Resident
Inspector
Ivey, Resident
nsp
or
R. Z'rman, Senior Resident Inspector
S.
Richards,
Chief, Engineering Section
at
ig ed
z
g7
D te
igned
7
Date
S gned
Date Signed
Summary:
Ins ection
on
Ma
10
1987 - June
20
1987
Re ort Nos. 50-528/87-17
50-529/87-18
and 50-530/87-19.
Areas Ins ected:
Routine,
on site, regular and backshift inspection
by
the four resident
inspectors.
Areas inspected
included:
followup of
previously identified items;
review of plant activities; plant tours;
engineered
safety feature
system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant
maintenance;
licensee
event report followup; temporary instructions;
refueling water tank gravity flow into containment;
refueling water tank
gravity flow into the auxiliary building; auxiliary operator/radiation
technician
communication problem;
system train outages;
blowdown sample valve operating experience;
periodic and special
reports
review.
During this inspection the following Inspection
Procedures
were covered:
I
25573,
25587,
30703,
61302,
62700,
61726,
62703,
70441,
71707,
71709,
71710,
71881,
90712,
90713,
92700,
92701,
92702,
92703,
93701,
93702.
8708100487
876724~
ADQCK 05000528
8
Results:
Of the thirteen areas
inspected,
one violation (paragraph
7)
and one deviation (paragraph
10) were identified.
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted:
The below listed technical
and supervisory
personnel
were
among
those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear
Power Pro ect
~R.
Adney
- J. Allen
L. Brown
R. Buckhalter
J.
R.
Bynum
J.
Dennis
- D. Gouge
"J.
G.
Haynes
~M.
E.
Ide
- R. Nelson
"G. Perkins
"J. Pollard
F. Riedel
"T. Shriver
L. Souza,
"E.
E.
Van Brunt,
"R. Younger
"0. Zeringue
Operations
Superintendent,
Unit 2
Operations
Manager
Radiation Protection
and Chemistry Manager
Outage
Management
Superintendent,
Unit 3
PVNGS Plant Manager
Operations
Supervisor,
Unit 1
Operations
Superintendent,
Unit 3
Vice President,
Nuclear Production
Corporate guality Assurance
Manager
Maintenance
Manager
Radiological Services
Manager
Operations
Supervisor,
Unit 2
Operations
Supervisor,
Unit 3
Compliance
Manager
Assistant guality Assurance
Manager
Jr.
Executive Vice President
Operations
Superintendent,
Unit 1
Technical
Support Manager
The inspectors
also talked with other licensee
and contractor
personnel
during the course of the inspection.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on June 18,
1987.
2.
Previousl
Identified Items
Unit 1
a.
Closed
Followu
Item
528/84-15-02
- "All Units -
U date
Documentation
To Reflect Desi
n Chan
e In Number of RV Holddown
Bolts."
This item concerned
the completion of design
changes
committed
to by Combustion Engineering
(CE) in CE letter V-CE-10727 of
July 1, 1980.
Completion of the changes
was verified in
inspection report No. 50-528/86-04.
However, this item
remained
open pending
a review of CE's timeliness
in completing
the changes.
The licensee
and
CE have exchanged
correspondence
on this item
and the inspector
concluded that the changes
were completed
as
requited.
This item is closed.
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The following items were previously left open pending
review and acceptance
of the licensee's
submittals
on the
associated
subjects.
The inspector discussed
these
items with
the
NRR Project Manager
and cognizant
NRR fire protection
personnel
to verify the acceptance.
From the discussions
and
reviews of the Palo Verde Safety Evaluation Report
(SER), the
inspector determined that each item had been reviewed
and the
acceptance
was either documented
or implied by references
in
various supplements
to the
SER.
Therefore,
these
followup
items are closed:
(1)
528/84-62-01:
"Auxiliary Building Firewater
Modification."
(2)
528/84"62-03:
(3)
528/84-62"04:
"NRR To Document Preaction
System
As
Acceptable."
"APS To Resolve With NRR About The Spray
Chemical
Accumulator Room."
(4)
528/84"62-05:
(5)
528/85-06-01:
"APS To Resolve Actuation Method of
Preaction Sprinklers With NRR."
"Spurious Actuation Analysis For Fire In
Containment"
(6)
528/85"06-04:
"Evaluation of Fire Detectors
Extended
From
Ceiling Bays To Be Submitted
To
NRR For
Review."
(7)
528/85-06-06:
"Commitment To Achieve Cold Shutdown Within
72 Hours To Be Submitted to NRR."
C.
Closed
Followu
Item
528/84-62-06
"APS Trainin
Needs
~Udatin ."
FSAR Section 13.2. 1.5 contains
commitments to provide certain
fire protection training for station personnel
and security
personnel.
The training program at the time of the previous
inspection
needed to be updated to reflect the plant situation
after fuel loading and cover the handling of offsite fire
department personnel.
The inspector
reviewed the training program and lesson plans
for general
employee training (GET) and security training on
vehicle access
controls for the protected
area.
The inspector
verified that the following topics are covered in the training
program:
- 0
'o.
0
0
0
Fire Alarm Sounds
Evacuation
Plan and Postings
Fire Reporting
Ignition Source. Control
. ',<<Va.n h av vv:';a, aaviv
va;v-v.
~ s% aa,,~~ .; iv,a.
~ .s
v v..v;
.. vv .
o,
Security Verification of Emergency Vehicles
o,
Escorting Firemen
The inspector concluded that the training program had been
updated to reflect the plant situation after fuel load and to
cover the handling of offsite fire department
personnel.
This
item is closed.
Closed
Followu
Item
528/85-20-01:
"Inservice Testin
of
Pum
s and Valves - Procedural
Meaknesses.
This item relates to weaknesses
identified in some procedures
used to perform required
ASME Section
XI periodic inservice
pump and valve tests.
During this inspection,
the inspector
reviewed changes
to the procedures
that, were previously
reviewed to determine if comments
regarding these
procedures
had been incorporated into the current revisions.
The
inspector
found that the licensee
had incorporated
the comments
which had previously been
made.
At the conclusion of this
inspection,
the licensee
was,
however, evaluating the need for
additional
improvements in the surveillance test procedures
in
light of problems
experienced
during recent test performances.
The licensee stated that the contemplated
changes will not
effect the technical
content of the procedures.
Additional
changes
to the licensee's
program and procedures will be
reviewed
as
a part of future routine inspection efforts.
This
item is closed.
Closed
Followu
Item
528/85-20-02
- "Inservice Testin
.Pum
Test Records.
'his
item relates
to the
need for the licensee
to develop,
formalize and finalize summaries
of inservice testing of pumps
in order to permit proper engineering evaluation
and trending.
Meaknesses
in documentation clearly detailing reference
values
and the date/source
of their development
were also noted.
During this inspection,
the inspector
reviewed the status of
the licensee's
efforts with regard to compiling the needed
data.
The licensee
has developed
or is in the process
of
developing
an "Inservice Test Plan and
Pump Record" for each
pump included in the licensee's
Section XI program.
The
inspector reviewed draft copies of a number of these test plans
and records
and found them to contain information which was
previously considered
lacking.
The licensee's
efforts to date
were found to be satisfactory although additional effort needs
still to be expended in this area.
Review of the licensee's
continuing efforts in this area will be conducted in the future
as
a part of the routine inspection
program.
This item is
closed.
Closed
Fol'lowu
Item
528/85-20-03
- "Inservice Testin
Valve Test Records."
This item relates
to some weaknesses
noted in Section
XI valve
inservice testing records.
The need for developing detailed
summaries of valve testing
was identified as
a particular
weakness.
Tracking of main stream
and pressurizer relief
valves
by serial
number was also found to be a needed
program
improvement.
During this inspection,
the inspector
reviewed
the status of the licensee's
efforts in these
areas.
The
licensee
has developed or is in the process
of developing
an
"Inservice Test Plan
and Valve Record" for all valves included
in the licensee's
test program.
Changes to the licensee's
program were also,
found to have been
made which require
tracking of relief valves
by serial
number
as well as system
designation.
Review of the licensee
s continuing efforts in
developing detailed
summaries of valve testing will be
conducted in the future as
a part of the routine inspection
program.
This item is closed.
Closed
Followu
Item
528/85-31-07
- "Licensee
To Determine
Size of Fuses."
Temporary Modification (TM) 1-85-SA-134 installed
a temporary
cooling fan in an electronic cabinet
and provided fuse
protection between the fan and a cabinet power supply.
The
documentation
was confusing in that one section of the
paperwork indicated the fuse size to be 1/2
amp while another
section indicated
1 amp fuses
were to be used.
The licensee
was still reviewing this apparent
discrepancy at the conclusion
of the previous inspection.
The licensee's
review determined that the fuse size
was to be
1/2
amp initially but was changed
by the system engineer to
1 amp before the
TM was approved or installed.
The
TM was
installed using 1 amp fuses
and associated
documentation
reflected the correct fuse size.
This item is closed.
Closed
Fol 1 owu
Item
528/85-31-10:
"Inser vice Testin
of
Pum
s and Valves - Relief
Re uests."
This item related to the need for the licensee to seek
NRC
approval of certain relief requests
from ASME Section XI
inservice
pump and valve testing requirements.
On May 28,
1987, the licensee
met with the
NRC staff and its consultants
to discuss
the status of the licensee's relief requests
and to
answer questions
regarding these requests.
During this
meeting, substantial
agreement
was reached
on most points of
the licensee's
proposed
program implementation.
The licensee
has committed to respond formally to the staff's request for
additional information by September
1, 1987.
Although the
staff's review is ongoing,
based
on the efforts of the licensee
to date, this item is closed.
Unit 2
Closed
Ins ector Fol 1 owu
Item
529/85-20-01:
"Check
Licensee's
Verification Sam le For Bulletin and Circulars."
Based
on inspector findings related to the licensee's
"incomplete followup actions associated
IE Circular 80-14, the
licensee's
gA staff selected
a sample of 14 completed
Bulletins. and Circulars to determine whether a programmatic
problem exists.
The inspector
observed that the audit reports
dealing with the circulars
and bulletins indicated
no further
followup actions
were necessary.
The licensee
concluded
a
programmatic
problem did not exist.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed
Ins ector Followu
Item
529/86-32-02
- "Cooldown
Problem with Two Char in
Pum
s In Meetin
Technical
S eci-
fications."
C.
A Technical Specification
change
request
was submitted to the
NRC on May 6, 1987,
by the licensee.
This change would permit
the licensee to achieve
a cold shutdown condition in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />
without the need for reaching
a hot standby condition in six
hours
when entering into a 3.0.3 action statement.
The
existing Technical Specification cooldown requirement is
extremely difficult to achieve with only two operable
charging
pumps.
This item is closed.
C'losed
Ins ector Followu
Item
529/86-33-02
- "Cable Tra
Su
ort Desi
n Criteria Evaluation."
This item pertains to discrepancies
which were found to exist
between the maximum span criteria as stated in the design
criteria for cable tray supports
and the actual
layout of
installed cable trays.
As a result of the noted discrepancies,
the licensee
committed to review the basis for the
maximum span
criteria and to evaluate
on a sampling basis
the acceptability
of deviation from the stated criteria.
During this inspection,
the inspector
reviewed the licensee's
evaluation.
In all cases
the deviations
from the criteria were found to be acceptable
with all tray spans
and associated
hangers
found to be within
the allowable design stress criteria
The licensee
determined
that the maximum span criteria had been
added to the design
criteria manual
subsequent
to the completion of plant design
work and as
such
need not have
been included.
The licensee
has
removed the specific reference to a maximum allowable distance
between tray supports
since this criteria was not included in
the original plant design.
This item is closed.
Closed
Ins ector Followu
Item
529/86-33-11):
"Trouble-
shootin
Procedure Criteria."
The licensee
was requested
to review work control procedures
so
as to enhance
the quality of work instruction associated
with
troubleshooting activities.
Procedure
30AC-9ZZ01, "Work
Control" was revised to include additional
guidance
and
direction to assist in the development of work procedures
involving troubleshooting activities.
This item is closed.
e.
Closed
Ins ector Followu
Item
529/87-01-01:
"Licensee
Followu
of Emer enc
Li htin
S stem."
This matter deals with a licensee
commitment to conduct
an
evaluation of emergency lighting systems to confirm that proper
system testing
was completed to meet regulatory commitments.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee
had conducted
an
independent, evaluation of the emergency lighting systems
and
has
documented
the findings in an internal report.
The report
concluded the emergency lighting system
has
been successfully
tested to demonstrate
conformance with regulatory commitments.
The report also lists recommendations
for possible
program
improvements
and has
been forwarded to ANPP management for
review.
The report has also
been reviewed by operations
engineering for comments
and followup actions.
This item is
closed.
f.
Closed
Ins ector Followu
Item
529/87-11-02
- "Pressurizer
Level Erratic 0 erations."
This matter was discussed
by the licensee with Region
Y
management
during their meeting
on May ll, 1987.
The
discussions
did not result in the need for fur ther licensee
or
regulatory actions.
This item is closed.
Unit 3
Closed
Unresolved
Item
530/86-03-20
- "Masonr
Block Wall
Adecduacy."
During this inspection,
the inspector verified the completion of
modifications to the masonry block wall located at elevation
74 feet
in Unit 3 as committed to by the licensee
by letter
dated
October 31,
1986,
and as accepted
by the
NRC by letter dated
December
19,
1986.
The inspector
reviewed the work documentation
associated
with the modifications
and visually inspected
the wall
modifications for conformance to design.
No discrepancies
were
noted.
This item is closed.
3.
Review of Plant Activities
a 0
Unit 1
The unit operated at full power until May 22,
when power was
reduced to 80K for core protection calculator
(CPC)
computer
software changes.
Power was increased
to 100K on May 25.
On
May 30 a reactor
power- cutback
(RPCB) occurred
when the "A"
train main feedwater
pump turbine
(FWPT) tripped during weekly
testing.
The
FWPT tripped when
a failed limit switch
prevented
the lockout of the test trip signal.
The reactor
e
~ ten
7'hen
tripped on variable overpower
(VOPT), as anticipated,
due
to the power increase that results
from the negative
moderator.
temperature coefficient (MTC) following a
RPCB actuation.
Near
the end of core life, the rate of power increase is greater
than the rate at which the
VOPT trip setpoint
can increase,
resulting in a reactor trip.
The licensee
has submitted
a
Technical Specification
change to prevent unnecessary
reactor
trips during
RPCB events.
The unit returned to power on May 31 and operated at full power
for the remainder of the reporting period.
n.
Unit 3
On May 10, Unit 2 experienced
a turbine generator trip as
a
result of a loss of power to the generator protection circuitry
cabinet during the testing of the power system stabilization
circuit.
Unrelated to the turbine generator trip, the unit was
required to shutdown
by Technical Specification 3.8.3. 1 due to
the failure of the channel
"C" 120V AC vital inverter the
previous
day.
The inability to return the inverter to service
within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> required the unit to be shutdown to Mode 5.
The inverter was found to have several silicon controlled
rectifier units which were not positioned properly, causing the
inverter fuse to blow.
This condition was corrected
and the
unit returned to 100K power on May 17.
The plant operated at 10(C until June 4,
when the reactor
tripped as
a result of low steam generator level.
The low
level was caused
by a malfunction in the
automatic feedwater control system during system
troubleshooting/testing.
A subsequent
overcooling of'he
(RCS) resulted in low pressurizer
pressure
causing
a safety injection and containment isolation
actuation.
During the recovery to power on June
7 a turbine trip occurred
as
a result of an
EHC leak.
This condition was corrected
and
the unit returned to 100K power on June
8.
The plant has
operated at 100K power throughout the remainder of the report
period.
C.
Unit 3
The plant remained in Mode 5 throughout the reporting period.
Initial fill and venting of the reactor coolant system
was
completed during this period.
Retesting of the Train "B"
Diesel Generator which was
damaged
during preoperational
testing in December,
1986 was also started during this period.
On June 5, 1987 the "B" Diesel Generator failed to start during
its second post maintenance
run.
Licensee investigation
identified a through wall crack in both the
8R cylinder head
and piston liner.
Cause of the
damage is still under review by
the licensee.
The damaged piston liner and cylinder head were
replaced
by licensee
and
a successful
22 hour2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> run at 100K rated
load followed by a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> run at llOX load were completed
on
June ll, 1987.
On June 12, 1987, during the first of a planned
35 consecutive start attempts,
the diesel
generator tripped on
high main bearing temperature.
The No.
2 main bearing
was
removed from the engine for the purpose of conducting further
examinations
and replaced with a new bearing.
The licensee
again ran the engine
on June 18, 1987.
The engine ran
successfully
unloaded for 15 minutes;
however,
the engine
tripped again
on high bearing temperature
on the
No.
2 main
bearing.
The licensee is continuing to review the cause for
the No.
2 main bearing problem.
Initial criticality is currently scheduled
to occur in August,
1987.
Plant Tours
The following plant areas
at Units 1,
2 and
3 were toured by
the inspector during the course of the. inspection:
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Auxiliary Building
Containment Building
Control Complex Building
Oiesel Generator Building
Radwaste
Building
Technical
Support Center
Turbi ne Bui 1 di ng
Yard Area and Perimeter
The following areas
were observed
during the tours:
1.
0 eratin
Lo s and Records
Records
were reviewed against
Technical Specification
and administrative control pro-
cedure
requirements.
2.
Monitorin
Instrumentation
Process
instruments
were
observed for correlation
between
channels
and for con-
formance with Technical Specification requirements.
observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical
Specifications,
and administrative procedures.
4.
E ui ment Lineu
s
Valve and electrical
breakers
were
verified to be in the position or condition required
by
Technical Specifications
and Administrative procedures
for
the applicable plant mode.
This verification included
routine control board indication reviews
and conduct of
partial
system lineups.
5.
E ui ment Ta
in
Selected
equipment, for which tagging
requests
had been initiated,
was observed to verify that
6.
7.
tags were in place
and the equipment in the condition
speci fied.
General
Plant E'i ment Conditions
Plant equipment
was
observed for indications of system leakage,
improper
lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the
system from f'ulfillingtheir functional requirements.
Fire Protection
Fire fighting equipment
and controls were
observed for conformance with Technical Specifications
and
administrative procedures.
8.
9.
for conformance with Technical Specifications
and admin-
istrative control procedures.
~Secorit
Activities observed for conformance with
regulatory requirements,
implementation of the site
security plan,
and administrative
procedures
included
vehicle and personnel
access,
and protected
and vital area
integrity.
10.
Plant Housekee
in
Plant conditions
and material/
equipment storage
were observed to determine the general
state of cleanliness
and housekeeping.
Housekeeping
in
the radiologically controlled area
was evaluated with
respect to controlling the spread of surface
and airborne
contamination.
The inspector
noted during tours of Unit 2, the existence
of excessive
amounts of boric acid crystals
on insulation,
piping, and valves in the Train "B" HPSI
pump room,
as
a
result of valve packing leaks.
Also noted
was the
requirement that anti-contamination clothing be worn for
entry into the mechanical
wrap-around
rooms.
This
condition also exists at Unit 1.
Licensee
management
was
informed that it. would be prudent to cleanup the areas to
prevent increased potential for the spread of
contamination,
as well as eliminate the impediment to free
access
to the mechanical
wrap-around
rooms
so as to
facilitate the checking of the equipment conditions in the
rooms.
Radiation Protection Controls
Areas observed
included
control point operation,
records of licensee
surveys
within the radiological controlled areas,
posting of
radiation
and high radiation areas,
compliance with
Radiation
Exposure Permits,
personnel
monitoring devices
being properly worn, and personnel
frisking practices.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
4.
En ineered Safet
Feature
S stem Walk Down - Units 1
2
and 3.
Selected
engineered
safety feature
systems
(and systems
important to
safety) were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the
systems
were aligned in accordance
with plant procedures.
During
the walkdown of the systems,
items
such
as hangers,
supports,
electrical cabinets,
and cables
were inspected to determine that
they were operable,
and in a condition to perform their required
f'unctions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves were
in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and
remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in
the required position and operable.
Unit 1
Accessible portions of the following systems
were walked
down on the
indicated date.
~Setem
Containment
Spray System,
Trains "A" and "B"
Date
May 14
High Pressure
Safety Injection,
~ Trains "A" and B"
May l4
125V
DC Electrical Distribution,
Channels
"A" and "B"
May 19
Chemical
Spray System,
Channels
"A" and "8"
May 19
Essential
Cooling Water System,
Trains "A" and "B"
May 19
Essential
Chilled Water System,
Trains "A" and "B"
June
4
Diesel Generator
System,
Trains "A" and "B"
June
13
Essential
Trains "A" and "B"
June
13
System,
Trains "A" and "B"
June
19
Unit 2
Accessible portions of the following systems
were walked down on the
indicated dates.
~Setem
Shutdown Cooling, Train "A"
Essential
Trains "A" and "B"
Date
May 14
May 18,
June 12-13
System,
Train "A"
May 28
Diesel Generator
System,
Trains "A" and "B"
June
13
System,
Train "A"
June
18
Unit 3
Accessible portions of the following systems
were walked down on the
indicated dates.
Boron Injection Flow Paths
125V DC Electrical Distribution,
Channels
"A" and "C"
May 20
May 27
Diesel Generator
System,
Train "A"
Low Pressure
Safety Injection Aligned
for Shutdown Cooling, Train "A"
June
3
June
10
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testin
- Units 1
2
and 3.
ae
Surveillance tests
required to be performed by the Technical
Specifications
(TS) were reviewed
on a sampling basis to verify
that
1) the surveillance tests
were correctly included
on the
facility schedule;
2) a technically adequate
procedure
existed
for performance of the surveillance tests;
3) the surveillance
tests
had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS;
and 4) test results satisfied
acceptance criteria or were
properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances
were observed
by the
inspector
on the dates
shown:
Unit 1
Procedure
Oescri tion
Dates
Performed
Diesel Generator
"A" Test -
May 14
4.8.1.1. 2.a.
36ST" 1SE06
41ST" 1ZZ33
41ST" 1ZZ23
Unit 2
Log Power Functional Test.
Mode 1 Surveillance
Logs.
CEA Position Data Log.
May 21
June 18-19
June
19
Procedure
36ST"2SE03
Descri tion
Excore Safety Linear
Channel Quarterly
Calibration.
Dates
Performed
May 13
36ST"9SB02
Containment Ventilation
Purge Isolation Valves.
PPS Bistable Trip
Functional Test.
May 18
May 28
Unit 3
PPS Transmitter Time
Response
Test
18 Month Surveillance
of Station Batteries-
Channel
"B"
Dates
Performed
May 13
June
17
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance
Unit 1
2
and 3.
a4
During the inspection period, the inspector
observed
and re-
viewed documentation
associated
with maintenance
and problem
investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory
requirements,
compliance with administrative
and maintenance
procedures,
required
QA/QC involvement, proper
use of safety
tags,
proper equipment alignment
and use of jumpers,
personnel
qualifications,
and proper retesting.
The inspector verified
reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance
activities:
Unit 1.
Descri tion
Dates
Performed
o
Rework Fuel
Rack Lever Linkage
on Diesel Generator "A".
May 12
13
o
Monthly PH Inspection of Battery
Charger "B".
o
Remove/Replace
AFN-P01 Due To Test
Failure.
May 19
June
3
o
Troubleshoot/Replace
K-111 Relay-
CSAS Valve Activation Logic.
o
PM - Inspect/Adjust
Breaker "D".
June
4
June
12
o
Remegger
Reactor Trip Breaker "D".
June
12
Unit 2
Descri tion
o
"C" Channel
Inverter Transfer
Switch Troubleshooting.
Dates
Performed
May 14
o
PM of Loose Parts
and Vibration
May 21
Instrumentation.
o
Replace
"0" Rings
on Multi Stud
Hay 28
Tensioner Hydraulic Unit.
Unit 3
Dates
Performed
o
Pump Journal
Bearing
and Seal
Replacement.
May 14 and 29
o
Maintenance of Medium Voltage
Switchgear - Train "B" High
Pressure
Safety Injection Pump
Breaker 3EPBB-S04E.
May 18
o
Motor Operated
Valve Testing of
Hay 27
Isolation
Valve - 3AFA HV-0034.
o
Troubleshoot
Diesel Generator
"B" To Find Jacket Mater Leak.
June
5
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
7.
Refuelin
Mater Tank Gravit
Flow Into Containment - Units 1 and 2.
On May 19, 1987, in Unit 2, during the performance of ASME
Section
XI valve stroke timing per procedure
approximately
270 gallons of water drained
from the refueling water
tank
(RMT) to the containment building through the containment
spray
14
located below the
140 foot elevation.
This occurred
during testing of the
valves
(SIA-UV672 and
SIB-UV671), when associated
upstream
valves in the spr ay lines
(SIA-HV687, - HV688, and SIB-HV693,
HV695) were not closed to
isolate the header valves from the
RWT.
The licensee
determined
the cause of the event to be the failure of
the operator to follow a caution step
and the use of action tasks
within caution statements,
which was contrary to 70AC-OZZ01
"Procedure Writers Guide".
Procedure
73ST-2ZZ10 contains detailed
instruction appendices
for each train of spray valves to be tested
(M or N).
Each appendix contains
a caution statement
to ensure
the
closure of associated
upstream
spray line valves before opening the
discharge
valve.
However, the operator
used Appendix "S" during the
performance of the test
as it is used to record the test data
and
contains
an abbreviated
set of instructions.
Appendix "S" does not
contain the caution to ensure
the closure of the associated
spray
line valves.
The licensee's
event investigation report recommended
changing
(73ST-1ZZ10 for Unit 1 and 73ST-3ZZ10 for Unit 3) prior
to the next performance of the surveillance in any unit by adding
action steps,
with sign-offs, to assure that the spray header would
remain isolated during the performance of the test.
The procedure
revision was given
a due date of May 26,
1987.
The inspector
noted
that the Unit 1 Surveillance Test Schedule for June,
1987,
issued
on
May 20,
had 73ST-1ZZ10 scheduled for performance
on June l.
On June 1, 1987,
an almost identical event occur red in Unit I.
During the performance of surveillance test 73ST-1ZZ10,
approximately
100 gallons of water drained from the
RWT to the
containment building when
an upstream
spray line valve (SIB-HV695)
was left open during stroke timing of the "B" train header
discharge
valve (SIB-UV671).
A review of this event revealed that the
procedure revision recommendations
had not been
made
and the
operator
had not been counseled
on the procedure
concerns.
The
inspector
noted that the licensee
provided immediate corrective
action by issuing
a Temporarily Approved Procedure
Change Notice
(TPCN) to change the closure of the associated
spray line valves
from a caution to required action steps with sign-offs.
This TPCN
was issued
on June 2, 1987;
one day after the event.
The failure to provide effective corrective actions to preclude the
reoccurrence
of a significant condition adverse to quality is a
violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective
Action" (528/87-17-02).
Refuelin
Water Tank Gravit
Flow Into The Auxiliar Buildin
Unit 1.
On May 29, 1987, during refilling of the "A" train containment
spray
(CS) system,
approximately
9000 gallons of water drained from the
refueling water tank
(RWT) into the
70 foot and 40 foot elevations
of the auxiliary building through two open vent valves
(SIA-V089 and
15
SIA-V807, located in the shutdown cooling heat exchanger
room on the
70 foot elevation).
The "A" train
CS had been
removed from service
and drained
on May 26 for a planned maintenance
outage.
The two
vent valves were removed
and replaced
during the outage
and were,
therefore,
not tagged out on the system clearance
log or identified
on the system status
drawings.
This led to the valves being
overlooked during the clearance
release
and system restoration
following completion of the outage.
The licensee
has performed
an investigation into this event
and
initiated corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
The licensee
has also decontaminated
the affected areas
of the auxiliary
building.
This item will remain unresolved
pending further review
of this event
and the licensee's
corrective actions
(528/87-17-03).
Auxiliar
0 erator/Radiation
Technician
Communication Problem-
Unit 1
On May 29, 1987,
an auxiliary operator
was observed entering the
40'levation
of the Unit 1 auxiliary building.
Major portions of the
elevation
had been contaminated
about eight hours ear1ier
when
approximately 9,000 gallons of water from the refueling water tank
was inadvertently spilled in the auxiliary building and temporarily
overfilled the
(documented
in paragraph
8).
Virtually no
standing water remained
on the 40'levation at the time of the
operator's
entry to conduct
a check of the public address
system.
The individual, who was dressed
out in protective clothing,
was
noted to not be wearing a respirator.
The radiation exposure permit
that the operator
signed in on required
him to contact Radiation
Protection for entry requirements.
Based
on the inspector's
conversation with the auxiliary operator
and members of the
department, it was determi,ned that poor communication
between
the
personnel
involved resulted in the operator
entering the
40'levation
without a respirator,
which would have
been required by
RP.
A subsequent
whole body count of the operator did not indicate
any internal or external
contamination.
The inspector
informed
plant management
that this was the second
instance
observed
by NRC
inspectors
in the past six months at Unit 1, where
an auxiliary
operator
was in a specific portion of the radiologically controlled
area
Although no radiological
problems
resulted
from either instance,
the inspector stated that better
communication
between the
RP department
and the auxiliary operators
appeared
warranted.
The licensee
has planned several
corrective
actions including: steps to reduce periods of congestion
in the
office; ensuring the shift supervisor is fully aware of changes
in
radiological status;
enhancing postings in the
RCA, particularly
with regard to differentiating between "airborne" and "respiratory
protection required" postings;
and meeting with the auxiliary
operators to stress
the need for good communication with RP.
These
actions which are planned at all three units are expected to be
completed
by August 1, 1987.
The inspector will follow the
licensee's
action through general
observations
as part of the
routine inspection
program.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
Closed
Tem orar
Instruction 2515/88 - "Ins ection of Licensee's
Actions Taken to Im lement
NRC Guidelines for Protection
from
Floodin
of
E ui ment
Im ortant to Safet ".
Units 1
2 and
3
The purpose of this inspection
was to verify actions
committed to by
the licensee to insure that equipment important to safety would not
be damaged
due to the rupture of a non-safety related
system
component or pipe to the extent that engineered
safety features
would not perform their design functions.
As a part of this
inspection,
the inspector
reviewed applicable sections of the
licensee's
FSAR and
NRC staff SER's in order to ascertain
the nature
of the licensee
s commitments in this area.
This review identified
design features
committed to by the licensee to include separation
of redundant
equipment in different subcompartments,
sealing of
between
subcompartments,
installation of floor drains
and curbing and water level alarms
and sealing of equipment
enclosures.
The presence
of these
features
was verified on a sample
basis in each of the three units by the review of system drawings
and inspection of various areas within the plants.
In addition, the
licensee
committed in response
to
NRC
FSAR questions
410.4
and 410.5
by letter dated
March 8, 1982, to include specific features for
termination of blowdown of the auxiliary steam line should
a break
occur in any of a number of areas
in the auxiliary building through
which it passes.
The staff's review of the licensee's
response
is
documented
in Supplement
2 to NUREG-0857 "Safety Evaluation Report
related to operation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station",
Section 3.6. 1.
Design modifications committed to by the licensee
added differential pressure
switch actuated, air operated
redundant
isolation valves in the auxiliary steam line upstream of the
auxiliary building.
These modifications are indicated
on system
drawing 13-M-ASP-001,
Revision 12.
The inspector
sought to locate
these features initially in Unit 3.
During this inspection,
the inspecto~ identified 6 of 20 installed
differential pressure
switches to be inoperable in that plastic
plugs installed on the end of the sensing
tubes for protection from
intrusion of debris during construction
had not been
removed.
Consequently,
the required actuation of the redundant isolation
valves would not have occurred
had a break occurred in the auxiliary
steam line in three different areas.
Subsequently,
inspections
by
the licensee identified a number of inoperable
switches in Units 1
and
2 which rendered portions of the actuation
systems in those
units inoperable
as well.
The failure to assure
the operability of
the auxiliary steam line isolation actuation
systems
is considered
a
deviation from the licensee's
commitment to include these
design
features
(Deviation 530I87-19-01).
At the end of this inspection,
the licensee
had returned the
isolation system to operable status
in each of the units.
The root
cause for this deviation and the possibility for the existence of
similar deviations is still under review by the licensee.
17
S stem Train Outa
es - Units 1 and
2
In an effort to maintain reliability of equipment,
the licensee
periodically removes
a train of a particular safety related
system
from service in order to perform preventive
and corrective
maintenance.
The work activities are pre-planned
and appropriate
Technical Specification action statements
are voluntarily entered
'nd satisfied.
The mini-outages
appear to be well managed,
and
assist in relieving the existing maintenance
backlog.
The inspector
noted that the number of train outages
during power operation
has
increased
recently as the plant availability has
improved.
The
inspector discussed
these
outages with plant management,
and stated
that although there are safety benefits to an aggressive
maintenance
program,
there is also
an inherent risk when
a train is taken out of
service.
The licensee
acknow'ledged
the comment and stated that they
would revise administrative control procedures
to ensure that
contingency plans for quickly restaging the train to service, if
necessary,
are considered prior to removing the equipment
from
service.
Although responsible
licensee
personnel
indicated that
contingency plans,
such
as the prestoring of spare
equipment,
have
been carried out in the past, it was agreed that formalizing the
process
would be beneficial.
The licensee
stated that the
administrative controls should
be in place
by August 1, 1987.
The
inspector will review the licensee's
revised administrative controls
(528/87-.17-01).
12.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
Blowdown
Sam le Valve 0 eratin
Ex erience - Unit 2.
On June
10,
1987, the Unit 2 operating staff attempted to conduct
an'SME
Section XI stroke time test
on valve SG-UV-228.
The 1/2" valve
is one of the two Technical Specifications
(TS) identified isolation
valves in the steam generator
cold leg blowdown sample line.
Surveillance Test procedure
73ST-2ZZ10, "Section XI Valve Stroke
Timing -
SG and SI (Mode 1 thru 4)" directed that the valve be timed
closed.
The valve is timed from the moment of switch operation
until the green light on the valve hand switch goes
on.
There is no
minimum closure time required
by TS.
Ouring several
attempts to
conduct the test,
the operator noted that when the
hand switch was
operated,
the "open" red light immediately extinguished;
however,
the green "close" light did not come .on.
This valve previously
operated properly during the June 4, 1987, reactor trip and safety
injection actuation which resulted in an automatic closure of the
valve.
Several
members of the on shift staff, after discussing
the .
matter,
concluded the problem to be related to improper adjustment
of the position indication switch.
A work request to repair the
condition was written and the unsuccessful
test results
were noted
in the test procedure.
Based
on later discussions
with the plant
staff,, the inspector
was informed that a followup action to confirm
the position of the valve when placed in a closed position was not
taken
because
similar problems previously experienced
with this
valve design revealed the valves to be closed
and the problem
associated
with the position indication switches.
.18.
On June
16', the Section XI stroke times test
was again attempted.
Thi's time when the valve hand switch was operated
to close the
valve, the red "open".light. did not extinguish'and
the green "close"
light did not light up.
Based
on this observation,
the operating
staff checked that the valve had not closed,
entered
the
TS action
statement
and closed
and removed power from the second isolation
valve in the sample line.,
Following the second test attempt
a subsequent
check of the valve
position switch adjustment
was checked.
No positive conclusion
could be made because
the valve stem did not appear to move.
The
valve was then disassembled
and the spring, which presses
on the
stem to close the valve when the solenoid is deenergized,
was found
broken.
Based
on this finding and the fact that the red "open"
light extinguished during the initial test,
but did not extinguish
during the second test,
the licensee
concluded the valve was
during the initial testing.
The licensee
supports this
conclusion with the fact that the spring is required to start the
stem movement,
once the spring moves into the flow stream the stream
pressure will assist
the closure of the valve.
The licensee attributes
the spring failure to a mi,sappl'ication of
the spring material which is 17-7 ph stainl'ess
steel.
This problem
was described in a IE Information Notice No. 86-72, "Failure 17-7 ph
Stainless
Steel
Springs in Valcor Valves
Due to Hydrogen
Embrittlement".
The licensee's
engineer ing staff is reviewing this
matter
on a generic basis.
Future actions
taken by the licensee
on
this issue will be followed as part of the normal inspection
program.
In discussing this matter, the licensee
was informed that not
confirming whether the valve was closed during the first test
following the failure of .the green "close" light to come
on was
regarded
as
an non-conservative
action.
Additionally the licensee
was informed that previous operating experiences
with this valve
should not have been
used
as
a basis for concluding the valve would
close.
This action was regarded
by the
NRC staff as lacking proper
concern for equipment operability requirements,
and that the
operating staffs should
be informed that future problems of this
type should require prompt followup invest1gations
to confirm
equipment operability.
The licensee
has instructed operating staffs
of the three units of the concern.
Discussions
with licensee
management
personnel
indicated that in
.reviewing the event,
the licensee
determined that the affected
was always isolated
by a closed
manual
valve during the
period in question
and therefore the licensee
has concluded that the
technical specifications
were not violated.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
19
13.
Followu
on Disablin
of an
En ineered Safet
Feature - Unit 1
As documented
in paragraph
7 of inspection report 50-528/87-10,
on
January
20, 1987, the operating shift at Unit 1 intentionally
disabled the Main Steam Isolation System
(MSIS), while the unit was
in mode 4 and cooling down to cold shutdown conditions.
The unit
Technical Specifications
require the MSIS to be operable in mode 4,
and therefore the shift personnel
had deliberately entered into
limiting condition for operation
(LCO) 3.0.3, which provides actions
required to be taken
when
an ACTION statement
of a system specific
LCO is not met.
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
procedures
related to this event to ascertain
whether
a violation of
a regulatory requirement or a procedural
requirement
had occurred.
ANPP procedure
"PPS Bistable Input Simulation," which
was used
by the shift to vender the MSIS feature inoperable states
the purpose of the procedure
in paragraph
1. 1 to be as follows:
"To provide direction for simulating an input to a
PPS Bistable
as warranted
by plant conditions or for testing."
Sub-paragraph l. 1. 2 provides additional amplification on the purpose
of the procedure
and reads:
"This procedure
may be used to untrip a bistable during Reactor
shutdown to allow closure of the Reactor Trip Switchgear to
allow Rod Testing.
Bistables
not required,
per Technical
Specification
LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3. 2, for the plant mode at that
time are the only bistables
which maybe simulated into an
untripped condition."
The inspector questioned
whether paragraph
1. 1.2 prohibited the
use
of the procedure to defeat the
MSIS feature, in that
requires
the MSIS feature to be operable
in Mode 4.
The licensee
stated that the paragraph
only addressed
control rod testing
and
therefore did not apply to the action'aken
by the shift.
The inspector questioned
what controls were in place to govern the
actions of the shift personnel.
The licensee
responded
that
paragraph
5.3 of the procedure
requires
(STA) to verify that the action taken by the procedure is allowed by
the Technical Specifications.
That paragraph
reads
as follows:
"Request the Shift Technical Advisor to initiate a TSCCR to
identify that the modification accomplished
by this procedure
is properly identified and has verified the Technical
Specifications
allows the modification to be performed in the
present plant mode."
The
STA stated to the inspector that
he
had verified that in taking
the action,
the unit would be complying with LCO 3.0.3.
He further
stated that
he had concluded that the
MSIS feature
was not
technically required to be operable
in the condition the unit was
20
in, because
the
TS allow the
MSIS trip setpoint to be set
200 psi
below the actual
steam line pressure.
With the unit at
approximately
25 psig when the feature
was disabled,
the trip
setpoint could have theoretically
been set at
0 psia,
which would
have effectively rendered
the feature inoperable.
The
STA also
stated that
he would not have signed off paragraph
5.3 if the steam
line pressure
was above
200 psig.
The licensee
also stated that work order 000203545
was written,
approved,
and implemented,
in accordance
with the station work
control procedure,
to provide additional administrative controls
on
the work performed to disable
the MSIS feature.
As previously
discussed
in inspection report 50-528/87-10,
the licensee
did agree
that additional controls
on intentional entry into
was
prudent
and warranted.
During this inspection,
the licensee
again
strongly reinterated their position
on entry into
The
licensee's
conduct of shift operations
procedure
has
been
significantly revised to clearly state the licensee's
policy in this
area.
The inspector closely reviewed the documentation
associated
with
this event
and concluded that the licensee
had complied with the
applicable
approved
procedures
and technical specif'ications,
and
therefore
no violation of requirements
had resulted
from the event.
As documented
in inspection report 50-528/87-10,
the inspector also
concluded that the event did not place the unit in an unsafe
condition.
Based
on these conclusions,
unresolved
item 528/87-10-01
is closed.
14.
Licensee
Event
Re ort
LER
Followu
- Units 1
2
and 3.
The following LERs associated
with operating events
were
reviewed by the inspector.
Based
on. the information provided
in the report it was concluded that reporting requirements
had
been met, root causes
had been identified,
and corrective
actions were appropriate.
The below listed
LERs are considered
closed.
Unit 1
LER NUMBER
DESCRIPTION
LER 85"66- LO/L1
LER 85"96" LO
LER 86-38-LO
Containment
Access
Inner Door.
Unanalyzed Fire Areas
Due To Engineering
Oversight.
Missed Channel
Check
On Two Radiation
Monitors Due To Personnel
Error.
LER 86"41-LO
Missed Channel
Check
On
A Radiation
Monitor.
LER 86-43-LO/Ll
Technical Specification Violation Due To
Video Camera
Use For Fire Watch Patrol.
LER 86-52-LO
HLER 86-57-LO
Low Flow Trip Set Non-Conservatively.
Fire Patrol
Performed
Late Due To Personnel
Error.
LER 86-59-LO
LER 87"03-LO
Emergency Lighting Power Supplies
Did Not
Meet New Acceptance Criteria.
Operator Error During Feedwater
Causes Trip.
LER 87"ll"LO
Firewatch Patrol
Missed
Due To Personnel
Error.
LER 87-13" LO
Entry Into Technical Specification 3.0.3
Due To Personnel
Error.
LER 87-15" LO
Surveillance Interval
Exceeded
For Three
Containment Isolation Valves
Due To
Personnel
Error.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
15.
Review of Periodic and
S ecial
Re orts - Units 1
2
and 3.
Periodic
and special
reports submitted
by the licensee
pursuant to
Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the
inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report
contained the information required to be reported
by
NRC require-
ments; test results and/or supporting information were consistent
with design predictions
and performance specifications;
and the
validity of the reported information.
Within the scope of the
above,
the following reports
were reviewed by the inspector.
Unit 1
o
Monthly Operating Reports for April and May, 1987.
Unit 2
o
Monthly Operating
Report for April and May, 1987.
No violations of NRC requirements
or deviations
were identified.
16.
Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items are matters
about which more information is re"
quired to determine whether they are acceptable,
violations or
22.
deviations.
An unresolved
item is addressed
in this inspection in
paragraph
8 of'his report.
~Ei
The inspector
met with licensee
management
representatives
period-
ically during the inspection
and held an exit on June
18,
1987.
The scope of the inspection
and the inspector's
findings,
as noted
in this report,
were discussed
and acknowledged
by the licensee
representatives.