ML17298B345

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Tech Specs,To Complete Review

ML17298B345
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/06/1984
From:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
References
NUDOCS 8410170181
Download: ML17298B345 (18)

Text

Docket No.:

50-528 OCT 6

1984 Mr. E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Vice President - Nuclear Projects Arizona Public Service Company Post Office Box 21666

Phoenix, Arizona 85036

Dear Mr. Van Brunt:

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NRC PDR ACRS (16)

Local PDR NSIC PRC System LB3 Reading JLee EALicitra NGrace EJordan

Attorney, OELD

Subject:

Request for Additional Information - Palo Verde Unit 1 Technical Specifications In order to complete our review of the Palo Verde Unit 1 technical specifications, we need additional information.

The specific information required is identified in Enclosure 1 and has been discussed with Mr. Terry quan and Mr. Steve Frost of your staff.

We ask that you provide expeditious responses to the enclosed request so that we may complete our review in a timely manner.

If you have any questions regarding'this letter, you should contact Manny Licitra, the Licensing Project Manager.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

As stated cc:

See next page George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No.

3 Division of Licensing DL:LBg3gg DL YNerses~

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Palo Verde Mr. E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

Vice President - Nuclear Projects Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.

Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.

Snell 8 Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Mr. James M. Flenner, Chief Counsel Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Charles R. Kocher, Esq. Assistant Counsel James A. Boeletto, Esq.

Southern California Edison Company P. 0.

Box 800

Rosemead, California 91770 Ms. Margaret Walker Deputy Director of Energy Programs Economic Planning and Development Office 1700 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Mr. Rand L. Greenfield Assistant Attorney General Bataan Memorial Building Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503 Resident Inspector Palo Verde/NPS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0.

Box 21324 Phoenix, Arizona 85001 Ms. Patricia Lee Hourihan 6413 S. 26th Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Regional Administrator - Region V

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Kenneth Berlin, Esq.

Winston

& Strawn Suite 500 2550 M Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Ms. Lynne Bernabei Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies 1901 gue Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 Ms. Jill Morrison 522 E. Colgate Tempi, Arizona 85238

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Palo Verde Unit 1 Request for Additional Information on Technical Specifications (RSB) 1.

Reactor Protective Instrumentation Set pints (Table 2.2-1, Section 2.2, page 2-3 and 2-4) a)

Provide basis for the trip setpoint of the high pressurizer pressure on the Supplementary Protection System (SPS).

b)

Table 15.0-4 of the FSAR indicates that the analysis setpoint of the high pressurizer pressure is 2450 psia.

Explain how the SPS pressurizer pressure-high with an allowable setpoint value of < 2439 psia plus.instrument uncertainty could ensure the plant operation within the conditions covered by the safety analysis.

c)

Confirm that the overpower setpoint in Table 15.0-4 of FSAR will be modified to 117X.

d)

Provide basis of the variable overpower allowable setpoint value of 11.0%%uo/min in light of the safety 'analysis assumptions.

2.

Reactor Coolant S stem Process Variable LCOs Are the values used for process variable LCOs indicated values from the instrumentation or the actual values in the systems?

If they are actual

values, please explain how instrument uncertainly is accounted for when determining if an LCO is met or exceeded.

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3.

Moderator Tem erature Coefficient (Section 3.1.1.3, page 3/4 1-4)

The Technical Specification (3. 1. 1.3 and Figure 3.1-1) permit pl'ant operation at Modes 1 and 2 with a moderator temperature coefficient

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-4 range of between 0.22 x 10 and -3.5 x 10 The single reactor coolant pump rotor seizure with loss of offsite power event was analyzed at full power with a moderator coefficient of 0.0.

Mould the event analyzed at full-power with a moderator coefficient of.0.0 be more limiting than operating at lower power level with a moderator coefficient of a value specified in Figure 3. 1-1.

4.

Boron In'ection Flow Paths (Section

4. 1.2.2.b, page 3/4 1-8)

Provide basis for the minimum flow of 26 gpm to the RCS from the boron injection flow path specified in the surveillance requirements.

5.

Boron Dilution (Section 3.1.2.7, page 3/4 1-16 through 3/4 1-16d)

Provide basis for the monitoring frequencies for boron dilution detection listed in Tables '3.1-1 through 3.1-5.

6.

RPS/ESF Res onse Times (Table 3.3-2, page 3/4 3-9 and 3.3-5, page 3/4 3-24 through 3/4 3-26)

Provide the basis for RPS/ESF response times listed in these tables or refer to the assumptions made in chapter 15 of FSAR.

Also, explain why main feedwater isolation response time has not been included in Table 3.3-5.

7.

Over ressure Protection S stem (Section 3.4.8.3, page 3/4 4-32)

Figure 3/4 3'-2)should be".modified to add a curve of Pressure/

Temperature limits for RCS cooldown at a rate of 40'F/hour which is used as the basis of the LCO in Section 3.4.8. 1

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8.

Steam Generator Mater Level (Section 3/4.4)

Explain why there is no LCO on the steam generator water level.

What assurance is there that the steam generator water level will not exceed the values assumed in the safety analyses?

9.

0 erabilit of the Steam Generators (Section 4.4.1.2.3 and

4. 4. l. 3. 2, page 3/4 4-2.and 3/4 4-4)

These surveillance requirements state that the required steam generator(s) shall be determined operable by verifying the secondary side water level to be 25K of wide range indication at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Provide the basis for the 25%%d steam generator water 1 evel.

10.

Auxiliar Feedwater S stem (Section 3.7.1.2, page 3/4 7-4)

Section 4.7.1.2 should be modified to include surveillance test of each AFM pump to verify the required pump head and flow rate.

ll.

Auxiliar Pressurizer S ra S stem (Section 3/4.4)

The cur r ent Palo Verde techni cal specifications do not include a

section to address limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements on the auxiliary pressurizer spray system (APSS).

It is the staff's understanding that the APSS is required for RCS depressurization during plant shutdown per the requirement of the BTP RSB 5-1 (i.e., plant cooldown using only safety-related equipment) and during post-SGTR operation.

Does the applicant intend to develop appropriate technical specification's for the APSS.

1 If not, provide the technical basis for not doing so.

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12.

Cold Shutdown Mith Loo s Filled (Section 3.4.1.4. 1, page 3/4 4-5)

The limiting condition for operation specified in this section will permit the plant to operate in Mode 5 with the reactor coolant loops filled, only one SDCS loop in operation, plus two steam generators having 25K water level.

Explain how the plant could be maintained in Mode 5 assuming a failure of the operating SDCS loop.

Verify that sufficient natural circulation could be achieved during Mode 5.

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3.4.2.1, p

/4 4-7)

Section 3.4.2.l.b permits that the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 may be suspended for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for entering into and during operation in Mode 4.

Provide the basis for this technical speci-fication provision.

14.

Pressure/Tem erature Limits (Section 3.4.8.1, page 3/4 4-28)

,Verify and modify the temperature limits indicated in this section consistent with Figure 3/4 3.3-2.

15.

Reactor Coolant S stem Vents (Section 3.4)

The current Palo Verde technical specifications do not include a

section to address limiting conditions for operation and surveil'lance requirements on the reactor coolant system vents.

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is the staff's understanding that the applicant takes credit for RCS vents to depressurize the RCS during shutdown per BTP RSB 5-1.

Does the applicant intend to develop appropriate technical specification for the RCS vents.

If not, provide the technical basis for not doing so.

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16.

Atmos heric Steam Dum Values (Section 3/4.7)

The current Palo Verde technical specifications do not include a

section to address limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements on the atmospheric steam dump valves (ADVs).

Since the ADVs are required during initial phase of plant shutdown per the requirements of the BTP RSB 5-1 (i.e., plant cooldown using only safety-related equipment),

and we understand your FSAR Chapter 15 steam generator tube rupture analysis takes credit for these components, explain what assurances exist in the plant that these components will always be operable in accordance with the assumptions made in the safety analyses.

Similarly,, the Staff and Commission concluded 'it was acceptable to defer a decision on the need to install PORYs in your plant based, in

part, on the CE PRA study performed for your plant.

This PRA placed high reliability on the availability of the ADVs to affect decay heat removal.

It is the belief of the staff that th+DVs should have.

technical specifications to assure their operability and avail-ability. If you do not propose technical specifications for the ADVs, then please provide the technical basis for not providing technical specifications, and address how the assurances you are providing are consistent with the reliability assumptions made in your PRA.

17.

Safet In ection Tanks (Section 3.5. 1, page 3/4 5-1)

Section 3/4.5.1 describes the modes of operation for the safety injection tanks.

The basis f'r this item implies that the values in the technical specification were chosen for compliance with the

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accident analyses.

Address why there are no specifications for the coolant temperature in SIT.

Otherwise, justify why the SIT coolant temperature assumed in the ECCS analyses bounds the maximum temperature the SIT could attain.

18.

S ecial Test Exce tions Reactor Coolant Loo s (Section 3/4.10.3 page 3/4 10-3)

This technical specification permits plant operation up to 5X thermal power on fission heat without any reactor coolant pumps operating for startup or physics test.

What safety analyses have been conducted that demonstrate that transients or accidents initiated from this operating condition would be acceptable for Palo Verde Units?

Both the steady state and transient reactor coolant system temperature profiles, margin to saturation, core DNBR, and thermal-hydraulic stability should be assessed.

The acceptability of the reactor protective system setpoints during various transients and accidents initiated from this condition must also be justified.

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3/4 7 11 Section 3.7. 1. l,b in'dicates that operation in Node 3 and 4 may proceed with one reactor coolant loop and associated steam generator in operation, provided that there are no more than four inoperable main steam line code safety valves associated with the operating steam generator.

Describe any safety analysis performed to support the above plant operation.

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20.

ECCS Surveillance Re uirements (Section 4.5.2, page 3/4 5-6)

Provide the basis for flow rates of HPSI and LPSI systems in light of the assumptions used in the safety analysis.

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