ML17298A325
| ML17298A325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1983 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298A324 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8305160179 | |
| Download: ML17298A325 (62) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFOR1ANCE PAIO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION APRIL 1983 8305160i79 8305i0 PDR ADOGK 05000528 8
PDR L
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
~Pa e
I.
Introduction II.
Summa of Results 1-3 III. Criteria IV.
Performance Anal sis 0 erations 0.1. Plant Operations 0.2. Radiological Controls 0.3. Maintenance Construction C.l.
C.2.
C.3.
C.4.
C.5.
c.6.
C.7.
C,8.
Soils and Foundations Containment and Other Safety Related Structures Piping Systems and Supports Safety Related Components Support Systems Electrical Power Supply and Distribution Instrumentation and Control Systems Licensing Activities 8
8 9
10 10ll 12 12 V.
Su ortin Data and Summaries 14 l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Construction Deficiency Reports Inspection Activities Investigation Activities Enforcement Actions Management Conferences 14 14 14 14 15 TABLES Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Reportable 10 CFR 50.55(e)
Reports Inspections Conducted Summary of Inspection Activities Enforcement Items Enforcement Summary - Operations Enforcement, Summary - Construction 16-19 20-24 25 26-27 28 29
T 1
P, l
I.
Introduction a.
Pur ose and Overview The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations on a periodic basis and evaluate licensee performance based on those observations with the objectives of improving the NRC Regulatory Program and Licensee performance.
The period of this assessment was July 1, 1981 through February 28, 1983.
Evaluation criteria used during this assessment are discussed in Section IIX.
Each criterion was applied using the "Attributes for Assessment of Licensee Performance" contained in NRC Manual Chapter 0516.
b.
SALP Attendees SAIP Board Meetin April 13, 1983, Region V Office Board Members:
D. M. Sternberg, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No.
1 (Board Chairman)
T. Young Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects Section No.
2 G. Fiorelli, Senior Operations Resident Inspector, PVNGS L. Vorderbrueggen, Senior Construction Resident Inspector, PVNGS P.
H. Johnson, Principal Operations Inspector, RV P. Narbut, Principal Construction Inspector, RV J. Eckhardt, Former Principal Construction Inspector, RV E. Licitra, Project Manager, NRR H. North, Radiation Specialist, RV O. Shackleton, Chief Investigator, OI c ~
~Back round (1)
Previous S stematic Assessment of Licensee Performance The previous Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station SALP covered the period June 1,
1980 through June 30, 1981.
The meeting with license management was held on October 6, 1981.
The overall NRC evaluation concluded that the licensee had achieved.
improvements in previously identified areas of weakness and, in
- general, good performance in design and construction activities.
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4 (2)
Licensee Activities The following major construction/operations activities were performed during the appraisal period:
Unit 1 Completion of containment post-tensioning system Completion of containment structural integrity test and integrated leak rate test Essential completion of piping and electrical cable installation Completion of reactor vessel internals installation Completion of ASME Section III preservice examinations Completion of safety related water tank installations Completion of battery installation in control building Completion of repairs to steam separator/dryer supports and fasteners in steam generators Continuing system turnover to licensee for prerequisite testing Completion of rubber lining of water reservoir and evaporation pond Completion of primary,and secondary system hydrostatic testing Achievement of condenser vacuum Receipt of reactor fuel Unit 2 Completion of containment dome concrete Commencement.
of containment post-tensioning system installation Completion of reactor vessel internals installation Completion of safety related water tank installation Completion of spray pond Completion of underground diesel oil storage tanks Continuing piping and electrical cable installation Completion of battery installation in control building Completion of repairs to steam separator/dryer supports and fasteners in steam generators Commencement of systems turnover to startup
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Unit 3 Installation of reactor vessel Installation of steam generators Installation of safety injection tanks and pressurizer Installation of diesel generator Continuing piping installation Completion of containment dome liner Commencement of containment dome concrete Commmencement of spray pond Commencement of safety related water tank installation Construction Com letion Pro ress Date Unit 1
Unit 2 Unit 3 July 1, 1981 Feb.28, 1983 88/
99%
62%
95/
22%.
56/
(3)
Inspection Activities:
The senior construction resident inspector was onsite for the entire SALP period.
The senior operations resident established residency in August 1981.
A second operations resident inspector was assigned in April 1982.
Regional inspections were conducted by construction, operations, and radiological safety personnel.
A total of 61 regional and resident inspections were conducted involving 5,171 inspector hours.
Seven investigations by Office of Investigation personnel, were conducted involving 843 investigator hours.
Additional audits by NRR were conducted during this SALP period but are not captured in this report.
No inspections were conducted in the operations areas of surveillance, fire protection, emergency preparedness, security and safeguards or refueling since these activities are not in effect during the preoperational phase.
II.
Summar of Results:
The summary of results for each operations and construction functional area are provided in tabular form below.
The cateory 1,
2 or 3 ratings are explained in Section III of this report.
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Performance Anal sis Summar Operations No Basis Category 1
Category Category 2
3 0.1. Plant Operations 0.2. Radiological Controls 0.3. Maintenance 0.4. Surveillance 0.5. Fire Protection 0.6.
Emergency Preparedness 0.7. Security and Safeguards X
X X
X X
Construction C.1. Soils and Foundations C.2. Containment and Other Safety Related Structures X
C.3. Piping Systems and Supports C.4. Safety Related Components C.5. Support Systems K
X X
C.6. Electrical Power Supply and Distribution X
C.7. Instrumentation and Control C.8. Licensing Activities III. Criteria The following evaluation criteria were applied to each functional area:
1.
2.
3.
4.
'5.
6.
7.
Management involvement in assuring quality.
Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
Enforcement history.
Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
Staffing (including management).
Training effectiveness and qualification.
ill
To provide consistent evaluation of licensee performance, the characteristics applicable to Cagegory 1, 2, and 3 performance were applied as defined in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, Part II and Table l.
The NRC Manual Chapter definitions of the categories are:
management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such
- that, a high level of performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appeared strained o'r not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety and construction is being achieved.
IV.
Performance Anal sis - Jul 1
1981 - Februar 28 1983 0 erations O.l. Plant 0 erations (Prep erational Testin
)
During this period approximately 1,000 resident inspection hours were applied to the review and observation of startup testing in Unit 1.
Two violations were identified.
One involved the failure to follow administrative controls governing temporary modifications and process chemistry and the other violation involved failure to maintain proper plant cleanliness.
Inspections conducted during the early stages of startup testing identified the following:
a.
Frequent changes in the administrative controls governing the conduct of the testing program caused difficulties in communication of program requirements.
b.
Lack of definition of responsibilities related to organizational interfaces caused delays in system completion and problems in the development of startup testing procedures.
c.
Inadequate reviews of startup testing documentation for conformance to requirements required a significant amount of electrical retesting.
While some additional effort is still being expended by the applicant, the definition, development and implementation of startup controls and the achievement of project milestones have advanced significantly since the beginning of the period.
Organizational structure and staffing improvements were made during this period.
Included in these changes was the formation of a new quality assurance/quality control organization reporting directly to the Executive Vice President.
This action resulted in the increased independence of the QA/QC organization from the operating organization.
Adjustments were also made to the administrative controls; for example; an independent review of prerequisite test data, the lack of which required the interuption of testing and the retesting of electrical systems.
These actions indicate concern for the establishment of proper planning and assignment of priorities and for the control of activities through the use of defined procedures.
Enforcement history has been limited to minor programmatic problems.
Progress was made during this assessment period in the development and implementation of administrative controls,
- programs, and procedures for the operating phase.
However, the process to be used fo'r reviewing and approving plant procedures has not yet been completely defined.
Methods for tracking the status of procedure development and review are also needed.
Attention by the applicant will be required to ensure that necessary procedures and controls are implemented prior to fuel load.
Staffing in the plant operations area has been essentially completed, except that the Operations Superintendent position has been vacant for an extended period.
Strong management support for training of the operating staff has been evidenced in a plant-specific simulator and a sizeable and well qualified training staff.
Conclusion Category 2
Board Recommendation The Board recommends no change in the inspection effort.
0 erations 0.2. Radiolo ical Controls A total of 170 inspection hours was expended in this functional area; 166 on Unit 1 and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> each on Units 2 and 3.
Management exhibited a
continuing involvement in assuring quality as evidenced by the care in selection of personnel and in support of staffing.
Further evidence is supplied by the level and quality of the commitment to training in this area.
No technical -issues involving safety have been identified.
The licensee's prompt and considered attention to other matters identified by the inspector provides assurance that safety is of primary concern.
The preoperational tests observed have been conducted in a professional and workmanlike manner in accordance with approved procedures and FSAR commitments.
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Delays in completion of the Auxiliary Building prevented timely occupancy by the radiation protection and chemistry staff and have consequently delayed portions of the inspection program.
There have been no items of noncompliance, deviations or reportable events identified in this functional area.
Inspection of certain radwaste system components identified apparent departures from the FSAR equipment descriptions.
The licensee stated that these matters would be examined and inconsistencies between the installed equipment and the FSAR description resolved shortly.
Additionally certain gaseous effluent sampling systems do not appear to meet the required standards.
The licensee had not responded concerning these matters at the conclusion of the evaluation period.
The licensee has exceeded the staffing levels specified in the FSAR and is recruiting to fillstaff positions that exceed FSAR commitments.
Management has been responsive to staff requests for increases in staffing levels based on functional group evaluations.
The qualifications and abilities of functional group management appear to be appropriate.
The licensee is progressing well in the development of radiation protection and chemistry procedures.
Based on discussions with licensee personnel, review of training and qualification programs and observation of selected portions of the training program the licensee is considered to be committed to a quality training and qualification effort.
Conclusion Category 1
On the basis of the preoperational inspection findings to date.
Board Recommendation No change in inspection activity.
0 erations 0.3. Maintenance Approximately 50 resident inspector hours were applied to examining the applicant's maintenance programs.
At present the applicant is in the process of developing procedures necessary for the support of corrective or major maintenance activities.
The efforts of the maintenance staff in the support of preoperational test activity is diluting the effort to develop these procedures.
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The preventative maintenance program at present is adequate for equipment where the facility is undergoing a preoperational test program.
The program has been carried over somewhat from the construction program and reflects the fact that much equipment is 'in a layup condition.
The program is currently defined, and training and qualification of personnel contribute to an adequate understanding of assigned work.
Audits of maintenance activities are generally complete and through.
Conclusion Category 2
Board Recommendation The Board recommends no change in inspection effort.
Construction C.l. Soils and Foundations There were no, items of noncompliance in the soils and foundations area during this SAI,P period and this work has essentially been completed.
There were two construction deficiency reports during this review period dealing with voids in the backfill under the south-east corner of the Auxiliary Building of both Units 1, 2 and 3.
These were caused by breaks in the temporary firewater lines in those locations.
Based on inspection and review of the activities to evaluate and correct this situation, the involvement of senior licensee management was apparent.
They required a
thorough feasibility study of the various repair options and a detailed procedure for the selected repair method, with permission to proceed only after prior management approval.
In this and other technical issues with potential safety impact, the licensee has demonstrated clear understanding and conservatism with technically sound approaches in their resolutions.
Conclusion Category l.
Board Recommendation The Boa'rd recommends no expenditure of inspection effort in this area beyond completion of the currently identified inspection program.
Construction C.2.
Containment and Other Safet -Related Structures The containment and other safety related structures were examined during portions of sixteen inspections during the SALP period.
Two items of noncompliance were identified in the area; fai'lure to follow procedure regarding washer size on structural steel bolting and failure to follow drawing requirements regarding structural steel fillet welds.
None of these items were considered major and were not repetitive or indicative of a programmatic breakdown.
Licensee corrective action concerning these items was prompt and effective.
One construction deficiency report was submitted by the licensee in this
- area, dealing with Unit 2 fuel building roof truss bolts elongating before reaching required torque.
The licensee's corrective action was technically sound and thorough.
The lessons learned during construction of Unit 1 containment and other safety related structures appear to have been effectively used by the licensee's management to minimize problems during the construction of Unit 2 and 3 containments and other safety related structures.
Conclusion Category l.
Board Recommendation The Board recommends no change in inspection effort.
Construction C.3. Pi in S stems and Su orts Piping systems and supports were examined in portions of twenty inspections.
Five items of noncompliance were identified in the following areas;. failure to follow procedure for weld filler metal oven use; failure to meet requirements for capping pipe ends; failure to follow procedure for documenting an out of calibration condition of an automatic welding machine; performance of an unauthorized weld in a safety related drain line and an engineering failure to provide supports for a vertical piping segment connecting to a safety related drain line.
None of these items were major or repetitive, however, the number of items indicates a possible programmatic weakness.
The licensee's corrective action was timely and appears effective.
The licensee submitted twelve reportable constructi:on deficiency reports in this area.
Five were due to vendor supplied hardware problems; five were due to site construction, and two were engineering problems.
The licensee's corrective action for the deficiencies was technically sound,
- thorough, and generally timely.
Conservatism was generally exhibited in resolving the issues.
Conclusion Category 2.
Board Recommendation The Board recommends no change in inspection effort.
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10 Construction C.4. Safet Related Com onents Safety related components were examined in portions of eight inspections during this review period.
Two items of noncompliance were identified; one regarding a departure from a specified requirement pertaining to welding of the main control panels to the floor embedments in the Unit 1 control room, and the second regarding failure to follow the procedure for access control during reactor vessel internals installation.
The licensee submitted one construction deficiency report regarding a
leak in a reactor coolant pump pressure tap nozzle weld.
This was apparently due to sensitization of the stainless alloy resulting from stress relief heat treatment activities in an adjacent area.
In this functional area, events have been properly identified, analyzed and appropriately reported.
Corrective actions have been effective as indicated by prompt personnel retraining, procedure upgrading and lack of repetition.
The nonconformance items were minor violations and were not considered indicative of a programmatic breakdown.
Conclusion Category 1.
Board Recommendation The Board recommends no change in the inspection effort.
Construction C.5.
Su ort S stems One inspection was conducted in this area (specifically, HVAC) in response to an allegation that non-safety class instruments were being installed where safety class instruments were specified.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
The licensee did not submit any construction deficiency reports in this area during this review period.
The licensee did, however, submit a
report of a potentially reportable deficiency on December 22, 1982 and subsequently determined the item to be reportable after the close of this review period.
The deficiency dealt with the same subject as the allegation mentioned above.
HVAC installation is one of the few activities subcontracted by the licensee's constructor (Bechtel),
and which is not given in-depth surveillance by Bechtel's QC group.
This may have been a contributing factor in the safety/non-safety instrumentation situation identified above.
Although licensee management has demonstrated awareness in all areas in the past and has exercised appropriate control in other support systems
- areas, the HVAC situation appears to be one that may not have been given thorough review and consideration.
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11 Conclusion Category 2
Board Recommendation The Board recommends increased NRC inspection in the HVAC area.
Construction C.6. Electrical Power Su l and Distribution The electrical power supply and distribution area was examined in portions of ten inspections.
One item of noncompliance was identified for failure to follow the procedure for rework of a conduit support.
This item was considered of a minor nature.
Additionally, allegations in the electrical area were investigated.
The inspection reports for those inspections of allegations covers a period of time extending beyond the end of this SALP period.
As a result of the allegations, the NRC reexamined certain aspects of electrical termination crimping.
In response to the NRC investigation in this area, the licensee identified a deficiency in their hydraulic crimper calibration program.
Even though their evaluation concluded that the resultant terminations were adequate, the licensee considered the item was a reportable construction deficiency due to the program breakdown.
In addition, the licensee initiated an examination of other crimping in the plant and identified three other reportable construction deficiencies dealing with vendor problems (these were crimping problems in vendor supplied hardware).
The licensee's actions in this area are an example of the agressive management involvement in resolving potentially significant safety issues.
In addition to the four reportable construction deficiencies noted above, the licensee identified eight other reportable construction deficiencies in the electrical area, one being an engineering problem dealing with sizing of DC motor feeder cables.
Although there is evidence of agressive management involvement in correcting both licensee and NRC identified problems in the electrical
- area, the NRC considers that continued emphasis by the licensee's management, and quality assurance organization is required to prevent the types of problems identified and correct those that are identified.
Conclusion Category 2
Board Recommendation The Board recommends no change in the inspection effort.
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12 Construction C.7. Instrumentation and Control S stems Instrumentation and Control Systems were examined. in portions of four inspections.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
The licensee submitted eleven construction deficiency reports in this area.
Three were engineering related problems, three were field construction problems, four were vendor related problems including termination crimping and one was related to testing errors.
The deficiencies related to engineering and field construction indicate a
minor weakness in the attention given to detail in the review of engineering documents for clarity of requirements and satisfaction of code provisions, as well as minor errors which may have resulted from omissions or weaknesses in the training/indoctrination of personnel in their job requirements.
Conclusion Category 2
Board Recommendation The Board recommends no change in the inspection effort.
Construction C.8. Iicensin Activities The applicant's performance evaluation was based on a consideration of seven attributes as given in the NRC Manual Chapter.
For most of the licensing actions considered in this evaluation, only three or four of the attributes were of significance.
Therefore, the composite rating was heavily based on the following attributes:
- Management involvement
- Approach to resolution of technical issues
- Responsiveness
- Staffing For the remaining three attributes, there was no basis for evaluation of Enforcement History and Reportable Events, and only a limited basis for evaluation of Training.
The evaluation was based on review of the following licensing activities:
- Emergency Planning
- Equipment Qualification
- Ultimate Heat Sink Tornado Missile Protection
- Control Room Design
- Resolution of Open Issues
- Independent Quality Assurance Evaluation Management Involvement and Control in Assuring Quality.
II
l3 The overall rating for this attribute is Category 1.
There is strong evidence of management involvement in all aspects of licensing activities.
As an example, Arizona Public Service
- Company, on its own initiative, made a corporate decision to engage the services of an independent company for the purpose of performing a quality assurance evaluation of the. Palo Verde project.
Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues from a Safety Standpoint The overall rating for this attribute is Category 1 with a few individual licensing actions identified as Category 2.
The applicant has demonstrated a clear understanding of the issues resulting in technically sound approaches and generally provides timely resolution.
Responsiveness The overall rating for responsiveness is Category 2.
The applicant generally provides timely responses and there are only a few longstanding licensing issues attibuted to the applicant.
Acceptable resolutions are generally proposed.
Staffing Category 1 is assigned for this criterion although the ratings for individual licensing activities were equally divided between Categories 1 and 2.
The individual ratings were based primarily on the NRC staff's perception of the applicant's staff capabilities in understanding and resolving technical issues.
Training There is a very limited basis during the report period to permit an overall rating of this criterion.
Only one branch provided a rating (Category 1)'.
Conclusion Cateogry 1
Based on the evaluation of Arizona Public Service Company's performance for a number of significant activities in the functional area of licensing with respect to the seven criteria, on overall performance rating of Category 1 is determined.
Specifically management attention and involvement are evident in all matters relating to nuclear safety.
Board Recommendation Continue the existing licensing regulatory relationship.
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14 ortin Data and Summaries Construction Deficienc Re orts (CDR's)
CDR's submitted as reportable 10 CFR 50.55(e) items during the reporting period are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 provides the dates of the initial notification and the written report.
The table also provides a description, the Arizona Public Service (APS) Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) number, and the applicable functional area.
The Board noted that the licensee has demonstrated a commendable willingness to report all reportable and potentially reportable construction deficiency reports.
For example, in 1982, the licensee internally evaluated 85 possible reportable items and determined that twenty-two were in fact reportable.
The licensee's threshold for identifying an item as reportable (safety significant) is considered lower than other licensees'.
Additionally, the majority of the 85 items were reported to the NRC promptly as potentially reportable items.
Ins ection Activities Inspection activities for the SALP period are provided in tabular form.
Table 2 lists the inspections conducted during the SALP period.
Table 3 provides a breakdown of NRC inspection manhours utilized at the three sites.
Investi ation Activities During the SALP period, the investigative staff of Region V, which on July 19, 1982 came, under the Office of Investigations, initiated 7 investigations involving the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
Regional inspection personnel initiated two additional investigations of allegations during the period.
Four of the investigations were closed, and five remain open.
At the close of the SALP period, one item of noncompliance had been issued pertaining to the allegations dealing with the installation of an unauthorized, undocumented weld in a radioactive floor drain system.
Enforcement Actions There were no escalated enforcement actions during the SALP period.
Items of noncompliance issued during the SALP period are listed in Table 4.
Tables 5 and 6 provide a summary of items of noncompliance for the operations functional areas and the construction functional areas respectively.
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Mana ement Conferences One management conference was held during the appraisal period which dealt, with the SALP subject of regulatory performance.
That was the 1981 SALP meeting held October 16, 1981 (described in report 50-528/81-17).
Other management meetings were held as described below.
July 8-9, 1981 - NRC management visit to the site to review the status of construction and to present the NRC inspection program for preoperational and startup testing and subsequent plant operation.
October 13, 1981 - A meeting was held at the NRC Region V
Office in Walnut Creek, California at the request of the licensee to discuss their actions involving three construction deficiencies reported under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The deficiencies involved discontinuities in vendor suipplied pipe spool welds, pipe elbow welds and failures in embedment plate bolts.
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e Verbal Notif.
Date Written R~eorr 16 REPORTABLE 10 CFR 50.55(e)
REPORTS APS DER Functional No.
Area 6/12/81 Final 7/10/81 Electrically operated circuit breakers contain a
bearing which may deform.
81-16 C6 6/18/81 7/2/81 Final 10/21/81 Revision 6/8/82 Final 7/30/81 Pullman Power Products did 81-17 C3 not provide the required weld joint preparation on pipe supports.
Redetermined Not Reportable Contrary to AS>IE III 81-20 C3 requirements, pipe support drawings for piping lugs require fillet welds in lieu of full penetration welds.
7/15/81 Final Certain Agastat relays 10/21/81 have a premature time out condition.
81-22 C6 11/3/81 Final 11/25/81 Unit 2 Fuel Building roof 81-29 truss bolts elongate before reaching required torque value.
C2 9/10/81 Final 10/15/81 Limitorque Valve Operators 81-31 require replacement of shaft keys.
C3 10/7/81 12/3/81 Final 5/20/81 Final 12/30/81 Void in backfill under Unit 1 Auxiliary Building due to break in temporary
.line.
Unit 1 Safety Injection System 8" motor operated valve by Borg Warner may fail as installed horizontally per design.
81-35 81-46 C1 12/15/81 Final 1/5/82
, 12/15/81
.Final 1/5/82 Unit 2 Diesel Generator 81-48 defective cylinder head.
NSSS Water I,evel Trans-81-49 mitters may give erroneous readings due to variations of water leg.
C6 C7 12/30/81 Final 8/23/82
- Unit, 1 Diesal Generator 81-51
'iring not separated per IREE C7
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I Verbal Notif Date 12/30/81 1/5/82 1/5/82 Written Rior t Final 5/24/82 Final 9/29/82 Final 7/6/82 Unit 1 Hain Control Panel violates separation requirements for class IE and nonclass wiring.
Unit 3 waterline leak under Auxiliary Building.
Type 191A Relays have excess uninsulated leads which could cause short circuits.
APS DER Functional No.
Area 81-53 C7 81-55 C1 81-57 C6 2/22/82 Final 3/23/82 3(3/82 Final 7/23/82 Diesel Generator Lube Oil 82-3 C7 Strainer Baskets require replacement.
" Instrument clamp drawings 82-4 C7 do not show locknuts required by ASHE III.
3/26/82 Final 6/8/82 4/7/82 Final 7/7/82 Instrument clamps were installed without calcula-tions for thermal expansion and seismic requirements.
Unit 1 and 2 Instrument installation bolting was used without issue control required by ASHE.
82-12 C7 82-14 C7 4/15/82 Final 7/14/82 7/7/82 Final 8/6/82 Pipe supports are installed 82-15 C3 in Unit 1 with invalid heat.
numbers; not traceable.
Diesel Generator Control 82-36 C7 Panel wiring not crimped into terminal lugs.
7/13/82 8/6/82 Final 11/15/82 Final 12/28/82 Class IE wiring crimped with less pressure than specified due to lack of maintenance program for crimp tools.
Unit 1 Instrument AC circuit breakers were left set below allowable trip range after testing.
82-37 C6 82-40 C7
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18 Verbal Notif.
Date 8/2/82 7/9/82 Written R~eeet Final 11/12/82 Interim 8/9/82 GE Switchgear in Unit 3 has loose wires due to improperly crimped termination lugs.
Reactor Coolant Pump Pressure Tap nozzle weld leak due to overheating stainless alloy.
APS DER Functional No.
Area 82-41 C6 82-42 C4 8/13/82 Final 2/7/83 Main Control Panels in Unit 2 have improperly crimped termination lugs.
82-43 '7 8/13/82 Final 12/7/83 Load centers in Units 1, 82-44 C6 2,
3 have improperly crimped termination lugs.
8/26/82 9/1/82 Final 11/15/82 Final 12/7/82 Safety Injection System Valves installed with motor operators not qualified for inside containment.
Instrument line check valves seized open by welding heat.
82-45 C3 82-48 C7 9/8/82 9/30/82 9/30/82 Final 10/8/82 Final 2/22/83 Final 2/22/83 Unit 1 Steam Generator 82-49 C3 has pipe support incorrectly welded to sway struts instead of approved brackets.
Unit 1 Main Steam Valves 82-54 C3 have internal corrosion from exposure while removed for system hyrdrostatic test.
DC Motor feeder cable 82-55 C6 sizing may not provide sufficient voltage at full load.
10/15/82 Final 12/28/82 Auxiliary feedwater valves 82-57 C3 are carbon steel instead of stainless, purchase error.
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Date 10/21/82 Written R~eo et Final 11/22/82 Diesel generator high voltage cubicles and foundations have bolts on 3 sides, but seismic qualification test used 4 sides.
APS DER Functional No.
Area 82-58 C6 10/21/82 Final 11/22/82 Unit 3 diesel generator piston has nonconforming material certification.
82-60 C6 11/24/82 12/17/82 Final 12/23/82 Final 1/17/83 Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank Suction Strainers improperly secured due to oversize bolt holes.
Improperly crimped termination lugs in Unit 2 Water Chillers.
82-75 C3 82-78 C6 12/22/82 Final 1/19/83 Hechanical Shock Absorbers do not permit 5 degree movement.
82-82 C3 1/18/83 Final 2/16/83 Diesel gen voltage reg.
83-1.
sys. trans.
may not perform at high temperatures.
C6 2/3/83 2/3/83 Final 2/28/83 Final 2/28/83 Undersize shock suppressor accepted by QC.
Rockwell Hydrogen Recombiner Qualification Test Failure 83-6 83-8 C3 C5
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20 TABLE 2
.INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED (7/1/81 - 2/28/83)
PAIO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 50-528 50-529 50-530 Resort No.
Resort No.
Re ort No.
Dates 81-09 81-09 81-09 7/6-7/10/81 Regional Construction Piping, containment post tensioning instrumentation electrical 81-10 6/9-'7/10/81 Regional QA and admini-strative controls 7/8-7/9/81 Regional Operations Management Visit 81"12 81-10 81-10 8/17-8/21/81 Regional Construction Reactor Vessel internals, con-crete, structural steel, electrical, preservice inspec-tion, pipe supports 81-13 81-11 8/3-8/31/81 7/8-7/30/81 Resident Operations Resident Construction Training, staffing, preoperational testing.
Components, post-tensioning, piping, structural steel 81-15 81-12
'1-12 8/3-9/4/81 Resident Construction Post tensioning, internals, piping, pipe supports structure 81-16 81-17 81-18 81-13 81-13 81-14 9/1-9/30/81 10/6/81 1'0/13/81 Resident Operations Regional and Resident Regional Preoperational
- testing, QA',
maintenance, training SALP Meeting Meeting regarding piping and structural bolts 81"'19 10/19/23/81 Regional Radiation Radiation protection chemistry, training
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~ '0'-528 R~eort No.
Unit 2 50-529 R~eort No.
21 Unit 3 50-530 R~e ort No.
Dates 81-20 81-21 81-22 81-23 81-15 81-16 81-15 81-16 10/5-10/30/81 Regional Construction 10/1/10/30/81 Resident Operations ll/2-11/30/81 Resident 8 Regional Operations 9/28-10/31/81 Resident Construction Piping, structural
- steel, components concrete electrical instrumentation, preservice Preope rational
- testing, maintenance startup testing, QA Preoperational
- testing, QA, training Piping, components, liner welding penetrations 81-24 81-17 81-17 11/2-12/4/81 Resident Construction Internals installa-tion, piping, supports 81-25 12/1-12/24/81 Resident Operations Startup testing, QA, test equipment 82-01 82-02 82-03 82-01 82-02 82-02 82-02 1/4-1/24/82 1/25-1/29/82 a
1/4-1/29/82 Resident Operations Regional Construction Resident Construction Startup testing, QA Instrumentation, structural steel welding as built configuration
- Piping, penetrations, concrete 50.55(e) items 82-04 2/1-1/19/82 Resident Operations Startup testing, maintenance and calibration TMI actions 82-05 2/16-2/19/82 Regional Radiation TLD Placement, staffing, training 82-06 82-07 82-03 82-03 1/2-2/5/82 2/1-2/26/82 Regional Operations Resident Construction Procedures,
- staffing, safety committee, QA Piping, liner
- welding, electrical records 50.55(e) items
I
22 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 50-528 50-529 50-530 R~eort No.
Resort No.
Re ort No.
Dates 82-08 82-04 82-04 3/1-4/2/82 Resident Construction Electrical 50.55 (e) 82-09 3/22-4/30/82 Resident Operations Reorganization, prerequisite
- testing, preoperational testing.
82-10 82-05 82-05 3/29-4/2/82 Regional Construction Electrical, components, Bulletins and Circulars 82-11 5/10-5/14/82 Regional Radiation Radiation protection, chemistry environmental protection, training 82-12 82-06 82-06 4/5-4/30/82 Resident Construction Piping, electrical pepetrations, instrumentation 50.55(e) items 82-13 5/3-5/28/82 Resident Operations Preoperational
- testing, QA, Maintenance 82-14 82-07 82-07 5/3-6/25/82 Resident Construction Piping, Reactor Vessel and Steam Generator Installation, 50.55(e) items 82-15 4/26-4/28/82 Regional Operations Procedures, training
)82-16 82-17 82-08 82-08 Cancelled 5/11-5/14/82 Regional Structural welding, Construction pipe welding 82-18 82-19 6/8-6/10/82 Regional Operations 6/1-6/25/83 Resident Operations Procedures, safety committee Preoperational
- testing, training
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23 Unit 1
Unit 2
'nit 3 50-528 50-529 50-530 Re ort No.
Resort No.
Resort No.
Dates 82-20 7/6-7/7/82 Regional Radiation Radiochemistry 82-21 7/1-7/16/82 Resident Operations Startup testing, maintenance 82-22 7/17-8/20/82 Resident Operations Startup testing,
- training, maintenance, QA 82-23 82-24 8/23-9/17/82 Resident Operations 9/27-10/1/82 Regional Radiation Startup testing, maintenance, QA Radiation protection, training, radwaste
- system, Circulars and Notices 82-25 82-09 82-09 82-10 8/2-8/6/82 8/30-9/3/82 Regional Construction Regional Construction Liner welding, pipe pipe supports Pipe Supports, welding 82-26 82-27 82-28 82-29 82-30 82-10 82-11 82-12 82-11 82-12 82-13 7/13-09/3/82 Resident Construction 9/20-10/15/82 Resident Operations 9/13-10/8/82 Resident Construction 10/4-10/8/82 Regional Construction, 10/18-11/19/82 Resident Operations Grouting, post tensioning, penetrations piping, electrical, 50.55(e) items Startup testing, QA, maintenance training Post tensioning, electrical, 50.55(e)
Electrical, components structural welding Startup testing, design
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Unit. 2 Unit 3 50-528 50-529 50-530 R~eort No.
R~eort No.
R~eort No.
Dates 82-31 82-13 82-14 ll/15-11/19/82 Regional Heat treatment, Construction Bulletins and Circulars 82-32 82-33 11/18-12/17/82 Resident Operations ll/22-12/17/82 Resident Operations Prerequisite testing Design changes, preoperational
- testing, verification 82-34 82-35 10/12-11/19/82 Resident Construction 12/26-12/23/82 Regional Construction Components, penetrations, pipe welding, 50.55(e) items Containment SIT, ILRT 82-36 82-37 82-15 82-16 12/8-12/10/82 Regional Operations ll/22-12/30/82 Resident Construction Procedures Allegations in HVAC, SIT penetra-tions 82-38 12/20/82-1/21/83 Resident Operations Startup testing, ILRT, (}A, fuel
- receipt, TMI Items 83-01 83-02 1/4-1/7/83 1/4-1/l7/83 Regional Operations Regional Construction Records, training Allegations in piping and welding 83-03 83-04 83-05 83-01 83-02 83-03 83-01 83-02 2/14-'2/18/83 Regional Radiation 1/24-2/18/83 Resident Operations 1/10-2/28/83 Resident Construction Material License, environmental, preoperational testing, radiation protection Startup testing, maintenance Allegation followup, piping, hangers, 50.55(e), Bulletin, Tendon Sleeve Repair Unit 2
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"25 TABLE 3 SR1MARY OP INSPECTION ACTIVITIES (7/1/81-2/28/83)
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION A~ct iv it A.
Construction l.
Resident 2,
Region B.
Operations 1.
Resident 2.
Region C.
Radiological Safety D.
Safeguards E.
Investigations (OI)
Total Manhours Unit 1 406 564 2663 259 166 843 4901 Manhours Unit, 2 382 198 22 0
604 Manhours Unit 3 352 155 0
509 Total for three Units:
6014
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e lw 26 TABLE 4 ENFORCEMENT ITEMS (7/1/81 - 2/28/83)
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Inspection
~Re oct No.
~Seb ect Severity Unit Functional Area 50-528/81-12""
50-529/81-10'"
Failure to follow procedural VI moisture controls for weld filler metal.
Lunch found in weld rod oven.
1/2 C.3 e
Construction-Piping Systems and Supports 50-528/81 Failure to follow procedure VI 50-529/81-10-'or access control for fuel pool area (housekeeping) 1/2 C.4 Safety-Related Components 50-528/81 Failure to follow procedure V
Insufficient sized washer C.2 Construction-Containment and other Safety Related Structures 50-528/82-02"-
Omission of fillet welds on V
structural steel required by drawing C.2 l
Construction-Containment and other Safety Related Structures 50-528/82-09 Excessive debris in battery charger rooms and in remote shutdown cabinet area (housekeeping) 0.1 Operations-Preoperational testing 50-528/82-09 Temporary modification tags not installed on certain systems where safety valves had been removed and temporary vents had been installed 0.1 Operations-Preoperational testing
-Severity levels for inspection report 82-02 and earlier are in accordance with the NRC's Interim Enforcement Policy 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980) which provided six severity levels.
Severity levels after 82-02 are in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2) Appendix C) 47 FR 9987 (March 9, 1982), which provides five severity levels.
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27 TABLE 4 (Con't)
ENFORCEMENT ITEMS (7/1/81 - 2/28/83)
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Inspection R~eort No.
~Sub ect Severity Unit Functional Area 50-528/82-10 Failure to follow procedure V
50-529/82-05 for rework of an electrical conduit support C.6 Construction-Electrical
'Power Supply and distri-bution 50-528/82-12 Pipe ends not capped contrary V
50-529/82-06 to procedure C.3 Construction-Piping Systems and Supports 50-528/82-25 50-529/82-09 Control room panels not welded to floor plates per drawing requirements IV C.4 Safety Related Components 50"528/82-25 50-528/82-30 50-528/83-02 The work performed with an out of calibration welding machine was not evaluated as required by procedure.
Water used in unplanned Sill V
of steam generator No.
1 did not meet chemistry specifi-cations Unauthorized, undocumented weld installed in radio-active drain line C.3 Construction-Piping Systems and Supports
'0.1 Operations-Preoperational testing C.3 Construction-Piping Systems and Supports 50-528/83-02 Pipe supports not provided for radioactive drain line (engineering omission)
C.3 Construction-Piping Systems and Supports
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28 TABLE 5 OPERATIONS ENFORCEMENT SR1MARY (7/1/81-2/28/83)
PAIO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION-UNIT 1" Operations Functional Area 1.
Plant Operations (Preoperational Testing) 2.
Radiological Controls 3.
Maintenance Severity Levels I
II III IV V
VI Total 4.
Surveillance 5.
Fire Protection 6.
Security and Safeguards 8.
Refueling Totals 0
0,0 0
3 0
0 0
0
"-Units 2 8 3 are not listed, there were no Operations items of noncompliance given.
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29 TABLE 6 CONSTRUCTION ENFORCE1KNT SUMHARY (7/1/81-2/28/83)
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Construction Functional Area Soils and Foundations Unit 1
Unit 2 Unit 3 Severity Levels I
II III IV V
VI Total 2.
3.
4.
Containment and Other Safety Related Structures Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Piping Systems and Supports Unit 1
Unit 2 Unit 3 Safety Related Components Unit 1
Unit 2 Unit 3 2
1 2
1 5.
6.
7.
Support Systems Unit 1
Unit 2 Unit 3 Electrical Power Supply Distribution Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Instrumentation and Contr'ols Unit 1
Unit 2 Unit 3 8.
Licensing Activities Unit 1
Unit 2 Unit 3 TOTALS 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
7 4
12
e V
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