ML17264A812
| ML17264A812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1997 |
| From: | STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17264A813 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-45, REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, RTR-NUREG-1407, TASK-A-45, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR GL-88-20, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEB-80-11, IEB-80-21, NUDOCS 9702040336 | |
| Download: ML17264A812 (96) | |
Text
Rochester Gas 8 Electric Robert E. Ginna Station IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Report January 1997 Prepared by Stevenson 8 Associates 10 State Street Woburn, Mass. 01801 617-932-9580
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'1 INTRODUCTION5
SUMMARY
1.1 Overall Approach 1.2 Seismic Review Team 1.3 Summary of Results 2 SYSTEM ANALYSIS 3 PLANT SEISMIC DESIGN BASIS 3.1 Structures 3.2 Piping 3.3 Mechanical Equipment 3.4 Electrical Equipment 10 13
-4 ANALYSISOF STRUCTURE RESPONSE 4.1 Seismic Margin Earthquake Selection 4.2 Development of Seismic Margin Earthquake Demand 15 15 6 EVALUATIONOF SEISMIC CAPACITIES OF COMPONENTS AND PLANT 5.1 CivilStructures 5.1.1 Containment Shell 5.1.2 Inner Containment Structures 5.1.3 Interconnected Building Complex 5.1.4 Standby AuxiliaryFeed Water Pump Building 5.1.5 Screen House 5.1.6 Masonry Block Walls 5.1.7 Impact Between Structures 5.1.8 Class II Structures with Safety Equipment or with the Potential to Fail Class I Structures 5.1.9 Dams, Levees, and Dikes 5.1.10 Soil Failure and Soil Liquefaction 5.2 NSSS Equipment 5.2.1 NSSS Primary Coolant System 5.2.2 NSSS Supports 5.2.3 Reactor Internals 5.2.4 Control rod drive housing and mechanisms 5.3 Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 5.3.1 Scope 5.3.2 Screening Procedure 17 17 17 18 l9 20 20 21 21 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 23 23 23 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 1/59
5.3.3 Screening Results 5.4 Relays 5.5 Distribution Systems 5.5.1 Category I piping 5.5.2 HVACDucting and Dampers 5.5.3 Cable Trays and Electrical Conduit 5.6 Other seismic issues 5.6.1 Seismically Induced Flooding 5.6.2 Seismic / Fire Interaction 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 27 6 ANALYSISOF CONTAINMENTPERFORMANCE 7 OTHER SEISMIC SAFETY ISSUES 7.1 USI A-45 7.2 GI-131 7.3 The Eastern U.S. Seismicity Issue 7.4 USIA6 28 29 29 29 29 8 REFERENCES
-9 TABLES AND FIGURES 30 32 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 2/59
1 Introduction & Summary 1.1 OvERaLLAppRoacH R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna), which received its construction permit in 1966 and started commercial operation in 1970, is one of the oldest operating nuclear plants in the United States. During its life, Ginna has undergone a number of programs addressing seismic design issues, namely:
SEP, (Systematic Evaluation Program,)
IE Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts, IE Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems, IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design, IE Bulletin 80-21, Anchorage of Safety Related Electrical Equipment, USI A-46, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Equipment in Older Operating Nuclear Plants.
These programs started in the late 1970s; most were completed by the mid 1980s, except for USI A<6, which is ongoing.
In response to these programs, RG&E has conducted extensive reevaluations of, and made upgrades to, Ginna's structures, systems, and electrical and mechanical equipment.
These efforts have extended Ginna's seismic capacity beyond the original seismic design basis, which is based on a 0.2g Housner safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) design response spectrum [UFSAR Section 3.7.1.2).
One of the objectives of the SEP was to develop a site-specific ground response spectra for the SEP sites. However, when SEP started at Ginna in 1979, the site-specific spectra were not available, so a 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum was used.
The development of site-specific spectra was completed in 1981 (NUREG /CR-1582). A 0.17g site-specific spectrum was provided to RG&E by the USNRC. Per the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Ginna's SEP [11, 12]:
"..This site specific spectrum is appropriate for assessing the actual safety margins present for any structures, systems, and components that have been identified as open items".
The 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum was used for all of the programs listed above; however, the later developed site-specific spectrum was used for a few specific evaluations within some of these programs.
By letter dated November
- 8. 1995 [28], RG&E committed to perform a reduced-scope seismic evaluation of Ginna to meet the requirements of Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 5. This reduced-scope seismic evaluation would be performed for all safety-related:
structures, active mechanical and electrical equipment, tanks and heat exchangers, piping, electrical raceways, and ductwork.
In addition, RG&E agreed to evaluate relay chatter for all "bad actor" relays (as described in NUREG-1407) associated with equipment in the Ginna Safe Shutdown Equipment List, perform a capacity evaluation for equipment previously identified in the IE Bulletin 80-11 response, and evaluate safety-related flat bottom tanks.
The performance, of the reduced-scope seismic evaluation was accomplished via the Seismic Margins Methodology described in NUREG-1407[1]. Specifically, the EPRI methodology for a reduced scope plant was used except for the following conservatisms applied by RG8 E:
~
A 0.3g spectrum was initiallyapplied per NUREG-CR-0098[2). This value is greater than the SSE design response spectrum as required by NUREG-1407 and consistent with the requirements for a focused -scope plant. Ifa component fails to meet the 0.3 g spectrum, compliance with existing requirements is based on previous seismic evaluations (Ref. 30). RG8 E does not intend to perform any modifications to improve the components response to the 0.3 g equation.
Allsafety-related components were walked down instead of a specified subset of equipment expected to be required following a seismic event. Also, relay chatter was considered along with block wall interactions.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 3/59
Therefore, the reduced scope seismic evaluation consisted of selecting seismic margins earthquake and walkdowns of safety-related equipment, using the procedure contained in NP-6041 [6].-
Per NUREG-1407 [1], the Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) for Ginna is a NUREG/CR-0098 [3] median spectrum anchored at 0.3g. This spectrum has a slightly different shape based on whether the subject location is a rock site or a soil site. The buildings at Ginna are founded in rock, therefore the rock site shape applies.
Figure 1 compares all of the spectra introduced above: the 0.2g Housner spectrum which is the original design basis, the 0.17g site specific spectrum provided by the USNRC for SEP, the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum which was used for most reevaluations, and the 0.3g SME. The following observations can be made:
- ~
The 0.2g Housner and the 0.17g site-specific spectra are similar. The site-specific spectrum falls below the Housner for frequencies above 20 Hz, but envelopes the Housner for frequencies below 20 Hz, which are usually more critical for nuclear plant structures and equipment.
- ~
The 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 and 0.3g SME spectra are similar and are significantly higher than the 0.2g Housner and the 0.17g site-specific spectra.
The 0.3g SME spectrum envelopes the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum (except for very low frequencies), but the two spectra differ by less than 20% for frequencies below 10 Hz, where most of the power resides.
The screening criteria is summarized in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 of NP-6041 [6]. These tables present criteria for assigning a component a seismic capacity based on three seismic levels. These seismic levels, expressed in the tables in terms of 5% damped peak spectral acceleration (psa), are 0.8g, 0.8g to 1.2g, and >1.2g.
In terms of peak ground acceleration (pga), the common practice is to convert these levels to 0.3g, 0.3g to 0.5g, and >0.5g. Since Ginna is a 0.3g pga plant, a component that satisfies the screening criteria for the first earthquake level can be screened.
As described above; safety-related structures, active mechanical and electrical equipment tanks and heat exchangers, piping, electrical raceways and ductwork were evaluated.
The screening of major structures is based on a review of the original design bases and the SEP evaluations.
The screening of mechanical and electrical equipment is based on the USI A-46 walk downs and evaluations [8]. Generally, equipment that meets A-46 requirements (i.e., is not an A<6 outlier), also meets the NP-6041 [6] screening criteria for a 0.3g pga SME, with the caveat that the equipment anchorage needs to be evaluated for the SME input. Allsafety-related equipment at Ginna was evaluated during the USI A<6 walk downs in accordance with the procedures contained in the GIP [7] (note, however, that the USI A-46 report [8] includes only the subset of that equipment required to perform the system functions specified in the GIP [7]). For the SMA, instead of performing additional system evaluations, all safety-related equipment is included as described above.
Distribution systems included piping, electrical raceways, and ductwork. The seismic capacity of the raceways is based on the A-46 raceway evaluations.
Piping is evaluated based on a review of the original design bases and the Seismic Piping Upgrade Program.
Ductwork is evaluated based on walk downs.
1.2 SEISMIG REVIEwTEAM The Seismic Review Team for this effort was the same as the A-46 Seismic Review Team.
Resumes and certifications can be found in Appendix A of Reference 8.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 4/59
1.3
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS The significant findings from this assessment are as follows:
1.
All major structures were screened for the 0.3g SME, largely on the basis of the analyses and modifications performed during the SEP.
2.
No potential for seismically induced external flooding - such as failures of dams or dikes - could be identified.
3.
Masonry walls with the potential to impact safety-related equipment were screened for the 0.3g SME based on the following:
~
In the initial phase of the IE Bulletin 80-11 program, all block walls with the potential to impact safety-related equipment were identified, modified so that their edges are restrained, and qualified (as unreinforced walls) for the 0.2g Housner ground response spectrum - no amplification due to building response was considered.
. ~
In the next phase of the IE Bulletin 80-11 program, the block walls in the control building - which are reinforced - were qualified, using a nonlinear analysis, for a 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 ground response spectrum, including the effect of building amplification. The number of block walls of concern outside the control building - which are unreinforced - was decreased by defining a reduced set of equipment required for safe shutdown, and then either demonstrating that unreinforced block wall could withstand a 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 event (including the effects of building amplification), or protecting the vulnerable safe shutdown equipment.
- ~
For the seismic IPEEE, the control building block walls were screened based on the 80-11 non-linear analysis.
Because the IPEEE review considered all safety-related equipment (not just the reduced set used in the 80-11 evaluation), all of the walls designated as safety-related in the initial phase of the 80-11 effort were included. As a result, there was potential for block walls to fall on safety-related equipment of concern.
A rocking model, displacement based analysis was used to screen these walls for the 0.3g SME. Allblock wall interactions are listed in Table 4.
4.
All NSSS components, including the control rod drive and drive housing, were screened for the 0.3g SME either based on the screening tables in NP-6041 [6], or based on the evaluations performed for SEP.
5.
A total of 908 items of mechanical and electrcial equipment were reviewed for the 0.3g SME. The review was based on the A46/IPEEE walk downs, the screening tables in NP-6041 [6], and equipment-specific anchorage evaluations.
Seismic issues were identified for,. 52 items of equipment; these are listed in Table 3. Approximately 90 items of equipment were identified as being vulnerable to block walls; these are listed in Table 4 - per the argument presented for screening block walls, these items of equipment can also be screened.
6.
Category I piping was screened for the 0.3g SME based on the Ginna Seismic Piping Upgrade Program performed in response'to SEP and IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14.
7.
Electrical raceways were screened for the 0.3g SME based on the screening tables in NP-6041 [6],
and the raceway walk downs and evaluations performed for USI A-46 [8].
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 5/59
8.
Allducts in safety-related areas outside of containment were screened based on walk downs. Two issues were identified for the ducts inside containment:
- ~
Large, rod-hung, butterfly valves used as dampers on the ducts in the Containment basement may swing and damage the attached ducts.
~
The post-accident charcoal filterunits on elevation 300'n Containment may shift and damage the attached ducts.
9.
The major risk for seismically induced flooding is flooding of the Auxiliary Building basement due to the number of tanks in the building. This issue was addressed during SEP [24] and was found to be satisfactory by showing a sufficient volume of tanks could withstand the 0.17g site specific ground spectrum to prevent flooding in the basement from reaching the bottom of the safety injection pumps.
The 0.3g SME is a signiTicantly higher spectrum than 0.17g site specific spectrum, so the tanks were reevaluated.
Allof the same tanks were found adequate for the 0.3g SME, therefore the SEP flooding assessment holds.
Note that the RWST - by far the largest tank - was found to be adequate only because it had been recently upgraded to meet GIP acceptance criteria using the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 floor response spectra.
- 10. A fire/seismic evaluation was performed to assess the potential for the release of combustible fluids, inadvertent actuation of fire suppression systems, and the seismic vulnerability of fire barriers. 'The following vulnerabilities were identified:
~
The house heating boiler, which is located near the service water pumps in the Screenhouse, is not anchored.
It could shift and damage the attached natural gas line.
~
There are several locations where block wall failures could result in the release of combustibles:
an oxygen line in the Auxiliary Building, a hydrogen line and valve station in the Intermediate Building, and hydrogen cylinders in the Turbine Building.
~ ~
There are two fire suppression systems that could be actuated by block wall failures: the manual deluge system in the Relay Room, and both a manual deluge system and a pre-action sprinkler system on elevation 253'n the Intermediate Building.
Block walls are used as fire barriers throughout the plant. The walls whose failure could impact the fire protection of safety related equipment are those separating the Service Building from the Intermediate Building (column line 3), and those separating the Turbine Building from the Intermediate Building (column line F).
- 11. The containment design was assessed with the purpose of identifying any vulnerabilities that could lead to a seismically induced early failure. None were identified.
In.conclusion, all safety-related equipment and structures successfully screened for the 0.3 g SME except as follows:
~
52 items listed in Table 3
~
Ductwork and post accident charcoal filter units in the Containment Building.
~
Fire/Seismic interactions issues.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997, page 6/59
0
The components in the first two bullets meet their existing licensing basis as documented in the NRC's August 22, 1983 SER [30] closing out seismic design issues (with the exception of items deferred for SQUG review, which are included in 8). No further work willbe performed by RGB E with respect to seismic issues outside of these related to A-46 closeout.
Items in the last bullet willbe reviewed as part of the Fire PSA for Ginna scheduled for completion by 9/30/97.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 7/59
2 System Analysis Rather than performing a system analysis to define the scope of the review, this assessment includes all safety related components in the plant. This includes buildings, active mechanical and electrical equipment, tanks and heat exchangers, piping, electrical raceways, and ducting.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 8/59
(
3 Plant Seismic Design Basis Ginna's seismic design basis is described in Section 3.7 of the UFSAR [5]. Further detail is provided in Sections 3.8 (structures), 3.9 (piping and mechanical equipment), and 3.10 (instrumentation and electrical equipment).
The UFSAR discusses the original design and the subsequent reevaluations.
This information is summarized below, organized in four sections: Structures, Piping, Mechanical Equipment, and Electrical Equipment.
.3.1 STRUCTURES For the original design:
1.
Structures were classified as Class I or Class III. Class I structures are the auxiliary building, containment, control building, diesel generator building, intermediate building, and the service water portion of the screen house.
Allother original structures are Class III and were designed per the 1961 New York state building code.
- 2. 'The original design acceptance criteria for Class I structures is:
Primary stresses plus seismic stresses due to a 0.08g ground acceleration acting in the vertical and horizontal plane simultaneously are maintained within allowable working stress limits (ACI 318 for reinforced concrete and AISC for structural steel),
Primary stresses plus seismic stresses due to a 0.20g ground acceleration acting in the vertical and horizontal plane simultaneously are limited so that the function of the structure shall not be impaired.
3.
The ground motion is defined by the Housner response spectrum.
4.
The seismic analysis method is a static analysis using either the peak of the spectra or the spectral value based on the natural frequency of the structure.
5.
Damping is 2% for prestressed concrete, 5% for reinforced concrete, and 1% or 2.5% for steel frame structures.
The SEP seismic reevaluation was conducted by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under contract to the USNRC [9]:
1.
Only one earthquake level was considered - a Reg Guide 1.60 shape anchored to 0.2g.
2.
The containment shell was analyzed by constructing a fixed-base, cantilever beam model, and performing a response spectrum analysis using 7% damping.
3.
The containment's internal structures were analyzed using a lumped mass model that modeled the internal concrete structures (plate and beam elements), the crane structure (beam elements and rigid links), the weight of the major equipment, and the containment shell (cantilevered beam with lumped masses
- the containment shell was included because it laterally supports the top of the crane.) A response spectrum analysis was performed using 10% damping.
4.
The auxiliary, control, diesel generator, and intermediate buildings were analyzed as part of a single large, three dimensional model which also included the Class III turbine building, service building, and the facade structure surrounding the containment.
This model was constructed because all of these structures are interconnected.
Allsteel framing was modeled by beam elements; floors were modeled as rigid diaphragms.
The concrete portions of the auxiliary, control and diesel generator buildings R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 9/59
'ere modeled by equivalent beams or springs.
Only the mass of the service building was modeled.
A response spectrum analysis was performed using 10% damping.
Welded Steel Bolted Steel Reinforced Concrete Prestressed Concrete NSSS Equipment and Piping 5.
No formal acceptance criteria was presented.
The analysis results were presented and conclusions made as to acceptability.
Briefly, all structures were found to be acceptable except for steel bracing in portions of the auxiliary and turbine buildings, which showed stresses as much as 25% above yield.
This bracing was upgraded.
Subsequent to the SEP evaluation, RGLE contracted Gilbert &Associates to again model and analyze the structures using the Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum as the ground motion. The Gilbert analysis was done to provide a veriTied and traceable analysis that could be used for subsequent evaluations.
The Gilbert analysis was similar to the SEP analysis in that the same approach was used in modeling the buildings:
separate models were constructed for the containment shell and the containment interior structures, and a detailed model was developed for the interconnected building complex. They differed in that Gilbert developed floor response spectra for both the OBE (0.08g peak ground acceleration) and the SSE (0.20g peak ground acceleration), and Reg Guide 1.61 structural damping values were used, namely:
4 4
7 4
7 2
5 2
3 The Gilbert floor response spectra were used for subsequent reevaluations of piping, equipment anchorages, and for the USI AA6 program.
3.2 PIPlMG In the original design, seismic Category I piping was divided into 3 groups:
, 1.
Reactor Coolant Piping: qualified using a combination of plastic model testing and analysis.
2.
>2" Nominal Size and Larger: qualiTied by static analysis using an acceleration of 0.8g - the peak of the 0.5% damped, 0.2g Housner spectrum.
The load was applied separately in both horizontal and the vertical direction. Stresses at critical locations were calculated; the maximum horizontal load case stress was combined with the vertical load case stress by direct addition. The acceptance criteria was as shown in Table 3.9-1 of the UFSAR, which is duplicated here in Table 1. To increase confidence in this approach, two lines were dynamically analyzed (RHR line from RCS Loop A to Containment, and Steam Line from SG B to Containment); both analyses showed stresses less than the allowables.
3.
< 2" Nominal Size and Smaller: qualified using support spacing tables.
Subsequent to the original design, in response to IE Bulletin 79-07, the large bore lines dynamically analyzed in the original design, and the charging lines from the charging pumps to the discharge filters, were reanalyzed using the as-built condition and actual support stiffnesses.
The seismic input was again the 0.5% damped 0.2g Housner spectrum.
Stresses were obtained using B31.1-1973 Summer Addenda, Formula 12. Both the piping and the pipe supports were found to be seismically qualified.
Starting in 1979, as a result of the preliminary SEP review, IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14, RG8,E initiated the Seismic Piping Upgrade Program, to upgrade Category I piping to then current NRC review requirements.
The major features of this program are described below:
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 10/59
1.
The program included main runs of Seismic Category I piping 2-1/2" and larger (and critical 2'iping) that provide the flow path for equipment required for safe shutdown and loss-of-coolant-accident mitigation based on SEP, and selected additional main runs.
Branch lines were included as necessary to determine the local effects of the branch lines on the main runs, and to ensure adequate flexibilityin the branch line. The specific lines included are listed in Section 3.7.3.7.3 of the UFSAR.
2.
The piping code used was ANSI B31.1, Summer 1973 Addenda, with the exception of the stress intensification factors for butt and socket welds, which were based on the original design basis 1967 B31.1 code.
3.
The analysis procedure consisted of developing three dimensional static and dynamic models which included the effects of supports, valves, and equipment, and performing a response spectra analysis for the simultaneous occurrence of two horizontal and one vertical earthquake.
For piping systems supported on different elevations and/or structures, the envelope of the respective floor response spectra were used.
Earthquake direction and modal responses were combined by the square-root<f-the-sum-of-the-squares, including adjustments for closely spaced modes.
4.
The response spectra used were floor response spectra developed by Gilbert 8 Associates (see above).
5.
The damping values used in the piping analyses were:
< 12" piping 1
2 a 12" piping 2
4 6.
Allpipe supports for these systems were analyzed and modified if necessary to meet IE Bulletin 79-02 criteria. The effect of the new pipe support loads on building structures was evaluated.
3.3 MECKANICALEQUIPMENT The original design basis for Class I mechanical equipment was as summarized in Table 3.9-1 of the UFSAR (duplicated here as Table 1).
No in-structure response spectra were used; equipment was qualified on an individual basis.
Selected mechanical equipment was reviewed as part of SEP.
As part of this review, floor response spectra were calculated using the SEP structural models described above under the discussion on structures (note that these are not the same floor response spectra developed by Gilbert). The major NSSS components had existing qualification documentation which was reviewed.
Other mechanical equipment was selected and evaluated by the reviewers.
The results are summarized below:
The SEP review was based on a generic stress report written by Westinghouse in 1975. The replacement steam generators were analyzed by Babcock 8 Wilcox (31] using a design response spectra with a ZPA = 0.8g (horizontal) and 0.56g (vertical). The peak accelerations were 3.57g (horizontal) and 2.62g (vertical) so the design was considered to be adequate.
Pressurizer: The SEP review was based on a Westinghouse report. That report documented a 1973 analysis of the pressurizer for an SSE load of 6.7g. The combined (by SRSS) peak of the relevant SEP horizontal floor response spectra is 0.81g, so the design was concluded to be adequate.
Reactor Coolant Pumps: The SEP review was based on a Westinghouse report. That report documented a 1973 analysis of the reactor coolant pump for an SSE load of 0.8g. The combined (by SRSS) peak of the relevant SEP horizontal floor response spectra is 0.78g, so the design was concluded to be adequate.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 11/59
Control Rod Drive Mechanism:
The SEP review was based on a.Westinghouse report. That report document an analysis in which the control rod drive mechanism and the seismic support at the top of the rod housing was evaluated for a static load of 0.8g. The combined (by SRSS) peak of the relevant SEP horizontal floor response spectra is 0.85g.
The Westinghouse report showed that the calculated stresses were well within the allowable values, so the design was concluded to be adequate.
Reactor Coolant System Reports: The pressurizer evaluation described above included the supports, but the steam generator and reactor coolant pump evaluations did not. The SEP reviewers evaluated a Gilbert report on reactor coolant system supports which showed that the support loads are dominated by pipe rupture loads. The reviewers concluded that the supports were therefore adequate for seismic loads.
Service Water Pumps:
The SW pumps are vertical pumps with a 36.5'ong shaft.
Using the peak of the 7% damped Reg Guide 1.60 ground spectrum, 0.52g, the SEP reviewers concluded that the shaft needed to be braced to prevent overstressing the anchor bolts and the flange connecting the discharge head to the intake pipe. This brace was installed in 1984.
Component Cooling Wafer Heat Exchanger. The CCW heat exchanger is a horizontal heat exchanger supported on two saddles at elevation 581'n the Auxiliary Building. The SEP reviewers evaluated the heat exchanger using the ZPAs of the relevant floor spectra, 0.60g and 0.36g, and concluded that the heat exchanger and its anchorage was adequate.
Component Cooling Surge Tank: The surge tank is a horizontal tank supported on two saddles at elevation 581'n the Auxiliary Building. The SEP reviewers evaluated the lateral loads using the ZPA of the relevant floor spectra, 0.75g, and concluded that the tank and its anchorage was adequate.
In the longitudinal direction, the reviewers noted that the tank was unanchored; the anchorage was subsequently modified so that one saddle would provide longitudinal restraint (the other saddle was left unrestrained longitudinally to allow for thermal movement).
Diesel-Generator AirTanks: The air tanks are vertical tanks located at grade in the diesel generator building. The SEP reviewers evaluated the tanks for the ZPA of the ground response spectrum, 0.2g, and found the tanks and their anchorage to be adequate.
Boric Acid Storage Tank: The BAST is a pressure vessel supported on steel column legs. The SEP reviewers evaluated the tank, legs, and anchor bolts and found them adequate.
Refueling Wafer Storage Tank: The RWST is 26.5'iameter, 81'all, flat-bottom vertical tank founded at elevation 235'n the auxiliary building. The SEP reviewers evaluated the tank using the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 ground response spectrum and found that the tank wall and anchor bolts were overstressed.
RG&E subsequently conducted an analysis using the 0.17g site-specific response spectrum and found the tank to be adequate.
Motor Operated Valves: The SEP reviewers raised a concern that motor operated valves on lines s 4" in diameter may, under seismic loads, cause excessive stresses in the pipe.
The valves were explicitly modeled in the piping analyses performed for the Seismic Piping Upgrade Program which either found the stresses to be acceptable or modified the pipe's support.
Allsafety related mechanical equipment (excluding NSSS components) was evaluated as part of the USI A<6 effort. This evaluation is discussed below in the section on screening of equipment.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 12/59
3A ELECTRICALEQUIPMENT The seismic design basis of Class I electrical equipment at Ginna has been evolving since the plant was built. Some of the original equipment was qualified on a case-specific basis at the time of construction, or at some time later. When making modifications at Ginna, RG8 E has maintained a policy of seismically qualifying to the current standard.
Therefore, there is equipment at Ginna that has been qualified to IEEE 344-1971 and to IEEE 344-1975.
Several programs have also been used to address seismic qualification of electrical equipment, including SEP, RG8 E's Seismic Action Plan - undertaken in response to SEP and IE Bulletin 80 and USI A-46. These programs are summarized below.
The SEP reviewers selected a number of items of electrical equipment for review. Those items are listed below, along with the reviewers'onclusions:
Battery Racks:
The wooden battens laterally restraining the batteries should be strengthened or replaced.
Motor Control Centers 1L and 1M: The MCCs are adequate based on a comparison of the relevant Reg Guide 1.60 floor response spectra used for SEP to IEEE-344 1971 tests performed in 1972 at Wyle Labs.
Westinghouse Type DB-50 Switchgear. The switchgear are adequate based on a comparison of the relevant Reg Guide 1.60 floor response spectra used for SEP to sine-beat testing performed in 1974 at Westinghouse Astronuclear Laboratory.
Constant Voltage Transformers:
The CVTs are adequate based on a comparison of the Reg Guide 1.60 floor response spectra used for SEP to vibration testing performed in 1970 at Batelle Columbus Laboratory.
Control Room Electrical Panels:
No evaluations were performed during SEP due to a lack of information.
Electrical Raceways: No evaluations were performed during SEP due to a lack of information.
Subsequent to the SEP review, RG8 E upgraded the battery racks. The USNRC reviewed the modified racks and found them acceptable.
RG8 E also evaluated the main control board using a combination of in-situ modal testing and computer analysis.
This evaluation indicated that the board would survive the SSE, however, RG&E elected to enhance the board by the adding stiffeners and supports.
The Seismic Action Plan was initiated to address IE Bulletin 80-21 and concerns about the anchorage of electrical equipment raised by the SEP reviewers. The major features of the plan are summarized below.
The scope of the plan included all Class 1E electrical equipment, except those installed in accordance with IEEE 344-1975.
As-built drawings were prepared for all equipment which is floor, wall, or structural steel mounted, including the location and type of existing anchorages.
Weights were calculated based the enclosures and internally mounted components.
Anchorage loads were calculated using 1.5x the peak of the relevant floor response spectra.
The floor response spectra used were those calculated by Gilbert, described above under the discussion for the seismic design basis of structures.
Ifthe anchorage capacity was more than 10x the calculated load, no further work was performed.
If the anchorage capacity was less than 10x, but greater than the calculated load, all accessible anchors R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 13/59
were tested for the calculated load. Ifthe anchorage was inadequate, new anchorage was designed and installed.
As a result of this evaluation, almost every free-standing item of safety-related electrical equipment had its'nchorage upgraded.
- ~
Allcable tray and conduit supports in safety-related buildings had their anchorages inspected, tested, and, ifrequired, reworked. Anchorages fell into three categories:
shell anchors, embedded anchors (embedded Unistrut, Q deck inserts, and poured-in-place anchors), and Unistrut connections that rely on friction (this included critical connections in the anchorage load path of the supports).
25% of all tray supports and 10% of all conduit supports using shell anchors were tested by loading the anchors to 2000 lb. 74 anchors were tested, 73 held the load.
The embedded anchors were tested by finding convenient, open anchors in various parts of the plant and testing those anchors to 2000 lb. 36 anchors were tested - 12 poured-in-place, 10 embedded Unistruts, and 14 Q deck inserts.
Allheld the load.
Allcritical, accessible Unistrut friction connections were tested by torque testing the bolts to the installation torque specified by Unistrut. 2680 bolts were identified, 2404 held the installation torque, 49 bolts were not accessible with a torque wrench but were hand wrench tightened, and 227 bolts were not accessible.
Allsafety related electrical equipment, and all tray and conduit supports in safety-related buildings were reevaluated as part of the USI A<6 effort. This evaluation is discussed below in the section on screening of equipment.
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I I
I
-4 Analysis of Structure Response 4.1 SEISMIc MARGIN EARTHQUAKESELEGTIQN Per NUREG-1407 [1], Section 3.2.2 and Table 3.1, the Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) for Ginna is a NUREG/CR-0098 [3] median rock or soil spectrum anchored at 0.3g. The buildings at Ginna are founded on rock, so the CR-0098 rock spectrum applies.
The SME is derived as follows:
1.
The peak ground acceleration is defined to be 0.3g.
2.
Per Reference 3, Section 7.2:
v/a
= 36 in/sec/g, therefore peak velocity
= 0.3 x 36
= 10.8 in/s ad/v' 6.0, therefore peak displacement
= 6.0 x 10.8'/0.3/386
= 6.04 in 3.
Using the values from Reference 3, Table 3, the median, 5% damped, response spectrum peak values are:
acceleration
= 2.12 x 0.3
= 0.636g velocity
= 1.65 x 10.8 = 17.8 in/s displacement
= 1.39 x 6.04 = 8.40 in 4.
The frequency control points occur where the displacement and velocity match, and where the velocity and acceleration match:
f,
= v /2nd
= (17.8) / (2n x 8.40)
= 0.34 Hz f, =a/2nv =(0.636x386)/(2nx17.8)
=2.2Hz 5.
Consistent with Reference 3, Figure 3, the peak acceleration value of 0.636g is linearly interpolated (on a log-log plot) starting at 8 Hz down to the peak ground acceleration value of 0.30g at 33 Hz.
The resulting SME is shown in Figure 1.
4.2 DEYELoPMENToj SEISMIc MARGINEARTHQUAKEDEMAND As shown in Figure 1, the 0.3g CR0098 Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) ground response spectrum is approximately equal - particularly for frequencies below about 10 Hz - to the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum used for the SEP evaluations, the seismic upgrade programs, and USI A-46. As a result, rather than develop floor response spectra for the SME, the SME evaluations are based on scaling the results from the existing evaluations using the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum.
The details of the scaling are discussed in the sections of this report which address the evaluation of specific structures and components.
As discussed earlier, two seismic analyses of Ginna using a 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum have been performed: one by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory [9] for SEP, and the other - subsequent to the SEP analysis - by Gilbert. The Livermore analysis was used only by the SEP reviewers for their evaluations.
The Gilbert analysis was done to provide a verified and traceable analysis that could be used for subsequent evaluations.
The Gilbert floor response spectra were used for all of the seismic upgrade evaluations discussed above, and for the USI A-46 evaluations.
The two analyses are similar, but do have a couple of significant differences.
They are similar in that the same approach was used in modeling the buildings: separate models were constructed for the containment shell and the containment interior structures, and a detailed model was developed for the R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 15/59
interconnected building complex - the combined structure that includes the auxiliary, control, diesel generator, intermediate, service and turbine buildings, and the containment facade.
The major differences are in the damping values used, and the procedures used to calculate floor response spectra.
The Livermore analysis used higher damping values - 7% for the containment shell and 10% for the containment internal structures and the interconnected building complex, compared to 5% and 7% for the corresponding structures in the Gilbert analysis.
The Livermore dampings are the same as those recommended in Table 4-1 of NP-6041 (6] for IPEEE SMA evaluations.
The Gilbert dampings are those specified in Reg Guide 1.61.
In the Livermore analysis, the containment floor response spectra were calculated using a time history analysis, but the interconnected building complex floor response spectra were calculated using a direct generation method.
In the Gilbert analysis, all floor response spectra were calculated using a time history analysis satisfying the requirements of Reg Guides 1.60, 1.61, and 1.122.
The floor response spectra from the two analyses are compared in Figure 2 for several locations.
Note that the Livermore spectra are for 5% equipment damping, but the Gilbert spectra are for 4% equipment damping. The spectra are quite similar; the Gilbert spectra are higher than the Livermore spectra - this is attributable to both the difference in equipment damping (4% v. 5%) and the difference in structural damping (7% v. 10%).
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5 Evaluation of Seismic Capacities of Components and Plant 5.1 CIYILSTRUGTURES This section discusses the screening of all civilstructures.
The. sequence of topics follows that in Table 2-3 of NP-6041 [6].
For the reader's reference, the layout of the major structures at GINNAis shown in Figure 3.
5.1.1 Containment She/I The containment shell consists of a vertical concrete cylinder, 3.5'hick, 99'igh, and 105'n diameter, capped with a 2.5'hick hemispherical dome.
The cylinder is vertically prestressed and horizontally reinforced. The dome is reinforced concrete.
The cylinder is founded on rock and anchored with post-tensioned rock anchors.
Three analyses of the containment shell have been performed:
In the original design, the containment was classified as seismic Class I. An original equivalent static analysis using an inverted triangular load distribution, with a base shear equal to the weight times 0.46g (the peak of the 2% damped, 0.2g Housner spectrum).
This was the design basis analysis.
- ~
An original response spectrum analysis using a lumped mass stick model and the 2% damped, 0.2g Housner spectrum.
This analysis produced loads less than the original equivalent static analysis.
'This analysis produced a fundamental mode frequency of 7 Hz.
An SEP response spectrum analysis using a lumped mass stick model and the 7% damped, 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum.
This analysis produced loads greater than the original response spectrum analysis, but less than the original equivalent static analysis.
This analysis also produced a fundamental mode frequency of 7 Hz.
The containment shell can be screened for the 0.3g SME because:
Table 2-3 of NP-6041 [6] states that a concrete containment can be screened for a 0.3g SME without any analysis, The fundamental frequency of the containment, 7 Hz, is in the frequency range where the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum and the 0.3g SME spectrum are approximately equal, and the SEP analysis using the 0.2g Reg Guide spectrum analysis produced loads less than those produced by the original, design basis equivalent static analysis.
5.1.2 Inner Containment Structures Containment internal structures include the concrete reactor vessel support, concrete floors and shield walls, steel crane support structure, the NSSS, and other equipment.
The internal structures are supported entirely on the base slab. There is no connection between the internal structures and the
= containment shell except at the top of the crane rail, where, at four locations, the rail can bear on neoprene pads attached to the containment shell.
In the original design, the inner containment was classified as seismic Class I. The original seismic design consisted of modeling the internal structures as cantilever beams with all mass lumped at the center of gravity, calculating a frequency, selecting the corresponding acceleration from the design-basis 0.2g Housner spectra, and performing a static analysis.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 17/59
The SEP reevaluation consisted of a STARDYNE model which included the major concrete structures, the crane structure, the crane rail I containment shell constraint (the containment was explicitly modeled as a cantilever), and the major NSSS components as lumped masses.
A response spectrum analysis was performed using a 10% damped, 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum.
Stresses were found to be low.
The containment interior structures can be screened for the 0.3g SME because:
- ~
Table 2-3 of NP-6041 [6] states that Category I structures can be screened for a 0.3g SME ifthey were designed for an SSE of at least 0.1g.
- ~
The SEP reevaluation, using a 10% damped, 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum, concluded that the stresses in the containment interior structures are low.
5.1.3 Interconnected Building Complex The interconnected building complex consists of the following structurally connected buildings (see Figure 3):
The auxiliary building, which,was designated seismic Class I in the original design, is founded on rock at elevation 235'. This building is reinforced concrete up to elevation 271'there are floor slabs at elevation 253'nd 271'). Above 271', there is a braced steel frame supporting a low roof at 312'nd a high roof at 328'.
In the original design, the auxiliary building was designated seismic Class I.
The control building, which was designated seismic Class I in the original design, is founded on lean concrete fillor compacted backfill at elevation 253'the rock elevation in this area is approximately 240'). The battery rooms are elevation 253', the relay room is at elevation 271', and the control room is at elevation 289'.
The control building adjoins the turbine building on the north side, and is exposed on the other three sides. The north wall is a curtain wall consisting of armor plate, stiffeners, and siding. The south and west walls and the roof slab are reinforced concrete.
The floors are concrete slabs supported by steel beams. The original east wall is of mixed construction.
Due to tornado issues, a new, seismic Class I, reinforced concrete east wall was built as a result of the Structural Upgrade Program.
The diesel generator building, which was designated seismic Class I in the original design, is a single story reinforced concrete structure founded on lean concrete fill. The south wall is connected to the turbine building and is constructed of armor plate, stiffeners, and siding. The other three walls are reinforced concrete supporting a built-up roof. Due primarily to tornado issues, a new, seismic Category I, reinforced concrete north wall and roof were built as part of the Structural Upgrade Program.
The existing structure remained in place; wing walls and a parapet were built to extend the east and west walls to the new wall and roof.
The intermediate building, which was designated seismic Class I in the original design, is a four story braced steel frame structure. The basement, at elevation 253', is a reinforced concrete slab supported by a reinforced concrete retaining wall and concrete columns, which are founded on rock at elevation 236'. The upper floors consist of a 5" concrete slab and steel girders. The north part of the building has floors at elevations 278', 298', and 315', and a roof at 335'. The south part has floor slabs at elevations 271'nd 293', and a roof at 318'.
The turbine building, which was designated seismic Class III in the original design, is a braced steel frame with concrete slab floors at 253'basement),
271'mezzanine),
and 289'operating floor) and a roof truss at 342'.
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- ~
The service building, which was designated seismic Class III in the original design, is a two story steel structure with steel columns, spread footings, and a steel supported concrete fioor and roof. The basement is at elevation 253', the floor at 271', and the roof at 287'.
In the original analysis, the seismic Class I structures were evaluated independently; no seismic evaluation was performed for the Class III structures other than what was required in the state building code.
No details of the original analyses are available.
In the SEP reevaluation, the entire interconnected building complex was modeled.
Steel framing and bracing was explicitly modeled (except for the service building, which was modeled only using masses) and concrete structures were modeled as equivalent beams or springs.
The modal analysis produced 40 modes between about 2 Hz and 33 Hz, with the first 25 modes below 10 Hz.
A response spectrum analysis was then performed, using a 10% damped, 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum in both horizontal directions.
Modal and directional responses were combined by the square root of the sum of the squares.
Vertical seismic response was considered by adding 13% (0.2g x 2/3) to the dead load.
The SEP analysis produced the following results:
- ~
In the auxiliary building, the bracing in the east wall was above yield (f/f = 0.8). This bracing was subsequently upgraded as part of the Structural Upgrade Program.
- ~
In the turbine building, the bracing above the operating deck was above yield, particularly in the south wall adjacent to the control building (f/f = 0.7). This bracing was subsequently upgraded as part of the Structural Upgrade Program.
= ~
In the facade structure, the braced frames were slightly overstressed (f/f = 0.9). It was determined that these structures have sufficient ductility and reserve capacity, and no upgrades were made.
- ~
The maximum shear stresses in the concrete shear walls were less than 50 psi in the auxiliary building, about 170 psi in the control building, and about 120 psi in the diesel generator building.
The interconnected building complex can be screened for the 0.3g SME because:
The complex was analyzed using a 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum, which, as shown in Figure 1, is about equal to the 0.3g SME spectrum, particularly for frequencies below about 10 Hz - note that the structures'irst 25 modes are below 10 Hz.
The analysis showed overstress in some steel bracing members, which were subsequently upgraded.
Section 6 of NP-6041 [6] recommends a ductility reduction factor of at least 1.25 be applied to the seismic loads on ductile steel structures, so it may have been possible to screen these structures even without the upgrades.
- ~
The concrete shear wall stresses are about 3.5 ', or less.
The simplified ACI formula allows a shear stress of 2 jf,, but this known to be conservative for shear walls. Per equation L-4 of NP-6041 [6],
an appropriate SMA allowable for a concrete shear wall is at least 5.4 Jf,'
Note also that, due to tornado issues, the control building was upgraded subsequent to the SEP evaluation.
5.1.4 Standby AuxiliaryFeed Water Pump Building The standby auxiliary feed water pump building is a one story reinforced concrete building supported on 12 caissons socketed into competent rock. This structure was built about 1980 and was designed as a seismic Class I structure to a 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 earthquake in 3 directions.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 19/59
'The standby auxiliary feed water pump building can be screened for the 0.3g SME because, per Table 2-3 of NP-6041 [6], it is a seismic Class I structure that was designed for an SSE of at least 0.1g.
5.1.5 Screen House The screen house is a reinforced concrete structure with two steel superstructures
- one over the circulating water system and the other over the service water system.
The concrete structure and the service water superstructure were designated seismic Class I in the original design, and was designed for the design basis 0.2g Housner spectrum.
As the structure is founded in bedrock, no significant amplification over the ground spectrum willoccur.
The screen house can be screened for the 0.3g SME because, per Table 2-3 of NP-6041 [6], it is a seismic Class I structure that'was designed for an SSE of at least 0.1g.
5.1.6 Masonry Block Wa/is Per Table 2-3 of NP-6041 [6], masonry block walls require evaluation for a 0.3g SME.
The masonry block walls at Ginna were evaluated in response to IE Bulletin 80-11 as outlined below:
~
In 1980-81, the initial response to IE Bulletin 80-11 [17, 18, 19) identified approximately 150 masonry block walls in the auxiliary, control, intermediate and turbine buildings, and in containment.
Of these, approximately 80 were classified as safety-related due to the proximity of safety-related equipment.
Modifications were made to all of the walls classified as safety-related to secure their boundaries.
The safety related walls were analyzed and qualified using the 5% damped, 0.2g Housner ground response spectrum.
~ ~
In 1983, the USNRC issued a request for additional information with respect to RG8 E's original, submittal [20]. One of the issues raised was the fact that the walls had been analyzed for the ground response spectrum - no amplification of the ground motion by the buildings was considered.
In 1984, RGLE responded to the request for additional information [21]. Based on the systems analysis developed for the Structural Reanalysis Program [14), the number of safety-related walls were reduced to 37: 2 in the auxiliary building, 15 in the control building, 6 in containment, and 14 in the intermediate building. The walls in the control building are reinforced (a vertical ¹3 bar every 32"),
the other walls are unreinforced.
All 37 of the walls were reanalyzed using the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 floor response spectra developed by Gilbert, and treating all of the walls as unreinforced.
One of the 2 walls in the auxiliary building, all 6 of the walls in containment, and 8 of the 14 walls in the intermediate building were qualified.
RG8E then contracted Computech Engineering Services to reanalyze the walls in the control building, including the effects of the reinforcing. Computech reported their results in 1985 [22] - 3 of the walls were qualified using a linear analysis, and the other 12 walls were qualified using a nonlinear analysis in which the compressive strain in the masonry and the tensile strain in the reinforcing steel were taken past linear design allowables.
The results of the nonlinear analyses were verified by comparison to test results performed by Computech for the San Onofre nuclear plant.
The remaining unreinforced walls in the auxiliary and intermediate buildings were resolved by protecting the equipment identified by the system analysis.
In 1986, the USNRC issued a safety evaluation report stating that RG&E had adequately addressed the concerns of IE Bulletin 80-11 [23).
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 20/59
During the A-46/IPEEE walk downs, the Seismic Review Team documented all equipment and raceways that could be affected by block walls. Equipment that had been protected as a result of the 80-11 effort was deemed acceptable.
Equipment in the control building was deemed acceptable based on the Computech evaluation.
For the A-46 evaluation, all equipment on the seismic safe shutdown equipment list (seismic SSEL) that was outside the control building, identified by the SRT as potentially affected by a block wall and unprotected, was designated an outlier. Allsuch safety-related equipment (whether or not on the A<6 seismic SSEL) is identified in Table 4.
For the SMA, the control building block walls are evaluated based on the Computech study [22). This evaluation showed that the frequency of the walls after the masonry first cracks is between 1.6 Hz and 1.9 Hz, and the frequency after the reinforcement yields drops to about 1.3 Hz. Allthe walls had masonry strains, steel strains, and maximum deflections well within the stated acceptance criteria. As shown in Figure 1, the 0.2g Reg Guide spectrum and the 0.3g SME spectrum are approximately equal in the low frequency ranges, therefore the control building block walls can be screened for the 0.3g SME.
For the SMA, the other block walls are evaluated based on the rocking model shown in Figure 4. This model assumes the wall spans vertically and is restrained along the top and bottom edge - this is the case for essentially all of the walls in safety-related areas at Ginna because of the boundary upgrades installed in 1980-81 as part of the initial response to IE Bulletin 80-11. The wall is assumed to crack at mid-height and then rocks. The wall's frequency, mode shape, and peak displacement can be calculated as shown in the figure. Failure occurs when the mid-height displacement exceeds the width of the wall.
Based on this model, the displacement as a function of wall height is shown below for all of the 5%
damped ground spectra relevant to Ginna. The ground spectra can be used for this evaluation because the wall frequencies are quite low (< 1 Hz); the dynamic response of the buildings willnot amplify the ground spectrum in this frequency range.
Maximum Mid-Height Displacement (inches)*
Height (ft)
Freq (Hz) 0.3g SNIE 0.2g RG 1.60 0.17g Site Specific 0.2g Housner 25 20 15 0.44 0.49 0.57 9.6 8.6 7.4 11.3 9.9 8.4 5.5 49 4.3 6.9 6.1 5.3
- all spectra 5% damped Allof these are 12" thick, most are about 20'igh, a few are up to 25'igh, some are shorter, As shown in the table, the mid-height displacement for the 0.3g SME is about 9", slightly higher for the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60, and about 5" to 6" for the 0.17g site specific and 0.2g Housner.
Since the mid-height displacement is less than the width of the wall, this model predicts that the walls willnot collapse.
The displacement prediction may be somewhat conservative - because the walls were constrained at their boundaries, and, in most cases, the masonry is continuous across the boundaries, some arching action willoccur both horizontally and vertically, which willstiffen the walls and reduce the defiection.
Based on the above, the masonry block walls were screened for the 0.3g SME.
5.1.7 Impact Between Structures Per Table 2-3 of NP-6041 [6], no evaluation of impact between structures is required for a 0.3g SME.
5.1.8 Class II Structures with Safety Equipment or with the Potential to Fail Class I Structures Some safety-related equipment is located in the turbine building, which, in the original design, was designated a seismic Class III structure.
However, the turbine building has been evaluated as part of the interconnected building complex, and has been screened for the 0.3g SME (see the discussion above).
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 21/59
Structures that were designated seismic Class I in the original design are connected to structures that were designated seismic Class III. However, these structures have been evaluated as part of the interconnected building complex, and have been screened for the 0.3g SME (see the discussion above).
5.1.9 Dams, Levees, and Dikes Ginna is located on the southern shore of Lake Ontario. This is the only major body ofwater near the plant. Average lake level is 246'sl. The highest recorded stillwater level was 250.2'. The site is protected from Lake Ontario by a revement with a top elevation of 261'.
Grade on the north (lake) side of the plant is 253.5'.
Safety related areas accessible from this elevation are the screen house, the diesel generator building, battery rooms (bottom elevation of the control building), and the lower elevations of the intermediate building. Grade on the south side of the plant is 271'. Safety related areas accessible from this elevation are the auxiliary Building, standby auxiliary feed water pump building, and the upper two elevations of the control building.
As minimum plant grade is at least 3.3'bove normal lake levels, and the site is also protected by a revement that is at least 10'bove normal lake levels, the plant is not susceptible to flooding due to seismically induced failures of any dikes, dams, or levees.
5.1.10 Soil Failure and Soil Liquefaction Reference 2 removed the evaluation of soil-related failures from the scope of the seismic IPEEE for focused scope plants.
5.2 NSSS EQUIpMENT This section discusses the screening of the first four items in Table 2A of NP4041 [6].
5.2.1 NSSS Primary Coolant System Per Table 2-4 of NP-6041 [6], the NSSS primary coolant system can be screened for the 0.3g pga SME, with no further evaluation (Ginna is a PWR, so intergranular stress corrosion cracking does not apply).
Also note that, as part of the Seismic Piping Upgrade Program, the primary loop, surge line, and the pressurizer spray lines were qualified to current criteria for a 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 SSE.
Based on the above, the NSSS primary coolant system is screened for the 0.3g pga SME.
5.2.2 NSSS Supports Per Table 2-4 of NPW041 [6], the NSSS supports can be screened for the 0.3g pga SME, with no further evaluation, ifthe supports are designed for combined loadings of SSE and pipe break.
According to Table 3.9-1 of the UFSAR [5], the supports were originally designed for SSE and pipe break loads separately, but not in conjunction.
However, the SEP evaluators reviewed the design calculations for the supports [9, Section 5.3.1.12], and concluded that the support design is heavily dominated by pipe break loads and are therefore adequate for SSE loads acting alone (note that the SSE for SEP was the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60)
Based on the above, the NSSS supports are screened for the 0.3g pga SME.
5.2.3 Reactor Internals Reference 2 removed the evaluation of reactor internals from the scope of the seismic IPEEE for focused scope plants.
5.2.4 Control rod drive housing and mechanisms Per Table 2-4 of NP-6041 [6], the control rod drive housing and mechanisms can be screened for the 0.3g pga SME, with no further evaluation, ifthe control rod drive housing is laterally supported.
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The control rod drive housing has a lateral seismic support.
The seismic capacity of the control drive mechanism, housing, and seismic support was reviewed in the SEP [9, Section 5.3.1.11]. As noted in this review, the control rod drive system was originally designed for a static lateral load of 0.8g (peak of the 2%
damped, 0.2g Housner spectrum).
Per the SEP evaluation, the peak of the in-structure response spectrum at the control rod drive location for the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum is 0.6g (10% structural damping, 7% equipment damping), and the system was concluded to be adequate.
Based on the above, the control rod drive housing and mechanisms are screened for the 0.3g pga SME.
5.3 MEGHANIGALAND ELEGTRIGALEQUIPMENT 5.3.$
Scope The list of mechanical and electrical equipment was developed as follows:
~
A list of all safety-related equipment was obtained from the plant's master equipment list
~ ~
The list was reviewed to screen out NSSS components (discussed above), and inherently rugged and/or passive equipment (e.g., fuses and check valves).
~
The list was reviewed to screen out "rule-of-the-box" items such as individual motor controllers or breakers (covered by the associated motor control center or switchgear), motors (covered by the associated pump, valve, etc.), and instrumentation and control equipment mounted in control cabinets.
The subsequent walk downs also served to identify other "rule-of-the-box" items such as mechanical equipment mounted on pump and engine skids and solenoid valves mounted directly on the associated air operated valve.
The final SMA equipment list contains 908 items, which are listed in Table 2.
In broad categories, the SMA equipment list consists of:
~
358 motor, air, or solenoid operated valves,
~
299 instruments, mostly flow and pressure transmitters and temperature elements.
The number is high because, at Ginna, most instruments are individually mounted, rather than mounted in racks.
~
162 items of electrical equipment such as MCCs, switchgear, transformers, distribution panels, battery racks, chargers/inverters, and control cabinets,
~
55 items of mechanical equipment (pumps, air handling equipment, and the diesel generators),
1
- ~
34 tanks and heat exchangers - tanks include atmospheric fluid storage tanks, pressure vessels and air tanks.
5.3.2 Screening Procedure All908 items of equipment were evaluated using the USI AA6 seismic evaluation procedures specified in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) [7], using the Gilbert SSE floor response spectra.
The bulk of the walk downs and evaluations were performed prior to the development of the USI A-46 Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), so the Seismic Review Team did not distinguish between USI A-46 and non USI A-46 equipment.
The USI A-46 seismic SSEL is a subset of the SMA equipment list - the equipment on the USI A-46 seismic SSEL is flagged in Table 2.
A GIP evaluation examines three topics: equipment specific caveats based on performance of that type of equipment in past earthquakes, anchorage, and interaction with adjacent equipment or structures.
This R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 23/59
evaluation meets the SMA screening requirements contained in NP-6041 [6] Table 2-3, Sections 5 and 6, and Appendix F, except for several differences in evaluating anchorage. These differences are discussed below:
The GIP evaluations use the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 floor response spectra developed by Gilbert. The SMA evaluations should use floor response spectra based on the 0.3g SMA spectrum.
As discussed above, the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 and the 0.3g SMA ground spectra are approximately equal, particularly for frequencies below about 10 Hz, where the spectra are the highest. There is also some.
additional conservatism in the Gilbert floor response spectra as they were calculated using 7%
structural damping, while Table 4-1 of NPW041 [6] allows structural damping as high as 10% for an SMA. Therefore, the GIP anchorage evaluations were used for the SMA screening, but with some adjustments as described in the following points.
Due to the difference in the zero period accelerations (ZPAs) of the Reg Guide 1.60 and SMA ground spectra (0.2g v. 0.3g), the GIP evaluations could underestimate the SMA anchorage loads for rigid equipment (e.g., horizontal pumps on skids).
In the cases were the GIP anchorage evaluations assumed an item of equipment to be rigid (and used the ZPA of the floor response spectrum), the calculated factor of,safety was reduced for the SMA screening by 1.5.
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The GIP [7] allows two options for the floor response spectra: the actual floor response spectra, or, if certain conditions are met, 1.5x the ground response spectrum.
This second option is not used in an SMA. The Ginna GIP evaluations were reviewed; where the second option was used, the anchorage capacity was recalculated for the SMA screening using the actual floor response spectrum.
~
In certain areas, the GIP [7] is more conservative in calculating anchor bolt capacities than required for an SMA. In particular, the GIP procedures for calculating capacities for cast-in-place bolts can be more conservative than ACI-349 procedures (specified for SMA evaluations in Section 6 of NP-6041
[6]) by a factor of 1.5 to 2. For the SMA screening, GIP evaluations that showed low anchorage capacities were reviewed and adjusted as appropriate.
5.3.3 Screening Results Of the 908 items of electrical and mechanical equipment screened.
seismic issues were identified for approximately 150 items. These are listed in Table 3 and Table 4. Of these 150, approximately 90 were identified because they are located near block walls in the intermediate building or turbine building - this issue is discussed above in the section on masonry block walls. The remaining were identified for a variety of issues as detailed in Table 3.
5.4 RELAYS Per Item 7.17.5 in Appendix D of NUREG-1407 [1], ifno low ruggednesses relays were identified during the USI A-46 relay reviews, then no further relay reviews are required for IPEEE. As no low ruggedness relays were identified at Ginna during the USI A<6 reviews [8], relays are screened for the 0.3g SME.
5.5 DIsTRIBUTIQNSYSTEMS 5.5.1 Category Ipiping As discussed above in the section on the plant's seismic design basis, Category I piping at Ginna was reevaluated to current criteria as part of the Seismic Piping Upgrade Program.
This reevaluation included consideration of the as-built configuration, effects on branch lines, explicit modeling of valve offsets, and dynamic analyses using the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 floor response spectra developed by Gilbert.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 24/59
Based on the similarity between the 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum and the 0.3g SMA spectrum, and the level of conservatism in the analyses compared to that used for SMA analyses, the Category I piping was screened for the 0.3g pga SME.
5.5.2 HVACDucting and Dampers Per Table 2A, Section 5, and Appendix A of NP-6041 [6), HVAC ducting and dampers can be screened for the 0.3g pga SME based on a walk down of typical systems.
Awalk down of ducts in all safety related areas was performed.
The Seismic Review Team (SRT) concentrated on the following factors:
~
Duct supports and duct anchorage.
- ~
Attached equipment (fans, AHUs, etc) which have the potential to shift and damage the duct.
In general, the ducts were found to be supported similarly to electrical raceways - support spacings are typically 10'r less, the supports are steel angles or threaded rod that are attached to building steel by welding, bolting, or beam clamps, or to building concrete with expansion anchors or Q-deck inserts.
Because the duct supports are similar to the raceway suppors, and the load on the duct supports is less than that on the raceway supports, the SRT screened the duct supports and anchorage for the 0.3g SME.
The SRT identified two areas where equipment connected to the duct has the potential to shift and may damage the attached duct:
Containment elevation 235'basement) contains 3.5'iameter duct hung on 2"x2" steel angles welded to building steel.
There is a series of dampers attached to these ducts - these dampers are large, air-operated, piston-driven, Pratt butterfly valves. They are heavy - the SRT estimated the weight as 2000 Ib I valve. Each valve has a dead weight support consisting of 6'ong rod hangers that are well secured to building steel. The hangers are flexible in both horizontal directions - under lateral seismic loads the valves can swing and may damage the attached duct. Note that, due to this issue, the dampers are also listed as equipment outliers in Table 3 (EINs 5871 through 5880).
- ~
The post-accident charcoal filterunits (EINs ACP06 and ACP07) are located on elevation 300'n containment.
These are rectangular steel filter units of substantial construction, approximately 10'ong in each dimension.
They are supported on steel framing, but are not postively anchored.
Because of their low aspect ratio they will not uplift, but they may slide. Ifthey do shift, they may damage the attached duct. Note that, due to this issue, the filter units are also listed as equipment outliers in Table 3 (EINs 5871 through 5880).
5.5.3 Cable Trays and Electrical Conduit Per Table 2-4 of NP-6041 [6), cable trays and conduits can be screened for a 0.3g pga SME without further evaluation.
Allcable trays and conduits in safety-related areas were walked down as part of the USI A-46 evaluation
[8]. The major finding from this walk down is that the unreinforced masonry walls in the auxiliary and intermediate buildings may be an interaction hazard from the trays and conduit in these areas.
The walls are discussed in detail in the section of this report on Masonry Block Walls.
6.6 OTHER SEISMIC ISSUES 5.6.1 Seismically Induced Flooding The Seismic Review Team (SRT) considered seismically induced flooding during the plant walk downs.
The SRT identified the number of tanks in the auxiliary building as a potential concern.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 25/59
This issue had been addressed during SEP [24]. The auxiliary building tanks, their volume, and their seismic classification are listed below.'ank (number)
Seismic per Screened for Capacity (gal)
Reference 24 0.3g SME Refueling Water Storage Tank Reactor Makeup Water Tank Volume Control Tank Boric Acid Storage Tank (2)
Monitor Tank (2)
Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Waste Holdup Tank CVCS Holdup Tank (3)
Boric Acid Batch Tank Chemical Mixing Tank Sodium Hydroxide (Spray Additive)Tank Waste Evaporator Condensate Tank (2)
Concentrates Holding Tank 338,000 75,000 1,500 3,600 7,500 2,000 21,438 31,154 400 3
5,100 600 700 Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Per Reference 24, the RHR pit (auxiliary building 219') can be completely flooded, and the auxiliary building basement (235') can be flooded up to the bottom of the safety injection pump motors - 20" above the floor slab. The RHR pit has a volume of 70,000 gallons, and the basement has a net free area of 4813 ft', so the total available volume is 130,000 gallons. The tanks designated "Yes" in the column labeled "Seismic per Reference 24" were found to be seismically adequate during SEP. The tanks designated "No"were not evaluated as their total volume of 94,000 gallons is less than the available volume.
The tanks that had been found seismically adequate during SEP, plus the Volume Control Tank, were reviewed for the SMA:
For SEP, the RWST was evaluated using the 7% damped, 0.17g site specific spectrum, and the acceptance criteria described in Reference 25. The RWST is on the A<6 seismic SSEL, so it was reevaluated using the 4% damped, 0.20g Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum, and the procedures and acceptance criteria specified in Section 7 of the GIP [7]. The change in the input spectrum increased the seismic demand by approximately a factor of 3. The change in acceptance criteria (particularly the "elephant's foot" buckling criteria) decreased allowables by approximately a factor of 2. The factor of safety in the SEP evaluation was approximately 1.5, so the tank's capacity is well below GIP requirements.
As a result, RG8 E decided to modify the tank to meet A-46 requirements using the Gilbert 0.2g Reg Guide 1.60 floor spectra.
The modification was designed and installed in 1995 - 96.
Based on this modification, the RWST was screened for the 0.3g SME.
- ~
The Volume Control Tank was not evaluated during SEP, but is on the A-46 seismic SSEL.
It was evaluated using GIP requirements, found adequate, and screened for the 0.3g SME.
-. ~
The Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the Spray Additive Tank are not on the A-46 seismic SSEL, but, because they are safety related tanks, they were evaluated using GIP requirements.
Based on this evaluation, they were screened for the 0.3g SME.
~
For SEP, the Waste Holdup Tank and the CVCS Holdup Tanks were evaluated using the 7% damped, 0.17g site specific spectrum [26, 27]. These are not safety-related tanks and are not on the A-46 seismic SSEL, so they were not initially reviewed as part of the A<6/IPEEE effort. As a result of this flooding issue they were reevaluated using the 0.3g SME. They were both found to be adequate.
Based on the above, seismic induced flooding is screened for the 0.3g SME.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 26/59
J~
5.6.2 Seismic IFire Interaction The seismic / fire interaction evaluation considered the following issues related to the areas of the plant containing SMA equipment:
~
the release of combustible fluids due to a seismic event,
~
inadvertent actuation of fire suppression systems,
~
and seismic vulnerability of fire barriers.
The evaluation consisted of first reviewing the Fire Response Plan Drawings (33013-2540 through 2582) to identify all combustible sources, fire suppression systems, and fire barriers in the areas of the plant containing SMA equipment.
Awalk down was then performed to assess the seismic vulnerability of these systems.
'The walk down results for the release of combustibles is summarized in Table 5. The following vulnerabilities were identified:
- ~
The house heating boiler is located in the screen house, north of the service water pumps. It is a horizontal, gas-fired boiler, approximately 6'n diameter and 20'ong, supported on two saddles.
The boiler and saddles are well constructed, but the saddles are not anchored to the floor. The boiler could shift and damage the attached natural gas line, which is threaded pipe.
There are several locations where non-safety related block wall failures could affect combustibles: an oxygen line that penetrates a block wall on the south side of the auxiliary building (elevation 271',
column lines Q /5A), a hydrogen valve station and piping on the north side of the intermediate building (elevation 253', column line H), hydrogen cylinders in the turbine building (elevation 253, column line F3).
The walk down results for fire suppression systems is summarized in Table 6. Allof the identified vulnerabilities are related to block walls:
The pull boxes and valve station for the manual deluge systems in the relay room are located next to a non-safety related block wall in the turbine building. The piping in the relay room is dry until the system is activated.
The relay room could be sprayed ifthe block wall fell and activated the system without rupturing the piping.
- ~
There is a manual deluge system and a pre-action automatic sprinkler system on elevation 253'n the intermediate building. The pull boxes and valve stations for these systems are located in the turbine building, adjacent to block walls. These systems are dry until activated.
The intermediate building could be sprayed ifa block wall fell and activated the system without rupturing the piping.
There are a number of areas of the plant where block walls are used as fire barriers.
Many of these walls were designated non-safety related during the 80-11 program, and may be susceptible to seismically induced damage.
The major areas that may affect safety related equipment are the walls along column line 3 that separate the service building and the intermediate building, and the walls along column line F that separate the turbine building and the intermediate building. Block walls are used as fire barriers in the control building, but all block walls in the control building have been seismically evaluated and found to be adequate.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 27/59
6 Analysis of Containment Performance A review of containment integrity was performed.
The purpose of the review was to identify any vulnerabilities associated with early containment failure due to the postulated seismic event. This includes the integrity of the containment itself, isolation systems such as valves, mechanical and electrical penetrations, bypass systems and plant-unique containment systems such as igniters or active seals.
Allsafety-related, air, motor, and solenoid operated valves were reviewed as part of the mechanical equipment evaluation, and no concerns associated with containment isolation were identified.
'The design of the electrical and mechanical penetrations, the personnel and equipment hatches, and the fuel transfer canal were reviewed. Allpenetrations are of the double barrier type. A steel sleeve is embedded in the containment wall and welded to the containment liner - the liner weld is enclosed with a leak test channel.
The penetrating item passes through the sleeve and the resulting annulus formed between the member and the sleeve is sealed on both ends, typically with welded steel plate.
Piping penetrations that require allowance for differential displacement are equipped with a bellows type expansion joint.
The personnel and equipment hatches are of rugged design with no credible seismic vulnerabilities. No "active" isolation systems are utilized.
No early containment failure features were identified by this review.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 28/59
7 Other Seismic Safety issUes 7.1 USIAP5 A detailed evaluation of USI A-45 is provided in Section 9.2 in the Ginna PSA Final Report [29],
Essentially, the following means of removing heat from the reactor core are evaluated:
Secondary cooling through the SGs using MFW, AFW, or SAFE; Bleed and feed cooling utilizing the Sl pumps and pressurizer PORVs; RCS injection and recirculation provided by Sl and RHR pumps during small, medium and large LOCA; and Shutdown mode of operation after the RCS has been cooled down and depressurized.
The third bullet is ignored for the purpose of the seismic IPEEE since no concurrent LOCA is assumed to occur. With respect to the remaining bullets, there are several relevant items listed on Table 3. However, only items 13 and 18 (related to the CCW and RHR heat exchangers and RHR pumps) are outside the A-46 scope.
These items meet their existing licensing requirements such that no further evaluation is necessary.
7.2 GI-131 The moveable in-core detector seal table and the surrounding equipment were examined by the A-46/IPEEE Seismic Review Team (SRT) during the containment walk down. There is a movable tube-guide structure above the seal table - this strcuture is basically a steel trolley on wheels that can slide along a pair of rails. This arrangement was carefully examined by the SRT and found not to be seismically vulnerable.
The wheels are locked to prevent movement when the seal tubes are in place, the wheels and rails are configured so that the wheels cannot "jump" out of the rails during a seismic event, and the general construction and anchorage is sound.
7.3 THE EASTERN U.S. SEIsMIGITY ISSUE This issue has been entirely subsumed by the IPEEE.
No additional licensee actions or reporting is required.
7.4 USIC6 R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station is an A46 plant. The seismic portion of the IPEEE and the A-46 evaluations were tightly coordinated to maximize efficiency. Details are provided in the body of the report (6]
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 29/59
8 1.
2.
3.
4 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
References USNRC, NUREG-1407 "Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities", June 1991.
USNRC, "NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 5", September 8, 1995.
USNRC, NUREG/CR-0098 "Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, May 1978.
USNRC, "Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants", USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.60, Revision 1, December 1973.
RG&E, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant".
Jack R. Benjamin 8 Associates, et. al., "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Rev 1)", EPRI NP-6041-SL, August 1991.
SQUG, "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment", Revision 2, Corrected, 2/14/92.
Stevenson 8 Associates, "R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report",
January 1996.
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, "Seismic Review of the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant as Part of the Systematic Evaluation Program", NUREG/CR-1821, November 1980.
I
- 10. USNRC, Docket No. 50-244, LS05-81-1-002, Letter from Dennis M. Crutchfield (USNRC) to John E Maier (RG&E) transmitting NUREG/CR-1821 and a list of open items, January 7, 1981.
- 11. USNRC, Docket No. 50-244, LS05-82-01-070, Letter from Dennis M. Crutchfield (USNRC) to John E Maier (RG&E) transmitting the draft evaluation report for SEP Topics III-6and III-11, January 29, 1982.
- 12. USNRC, Docket No. 50-244, LS05-82-02-069, Letter from Dennis M. Crutchfield (USNRC) to John E Maier (RG8 E) stating that the SER for SEP Topics III-6 and III-11 transmitted as a draft on January 29,1982 is the final SER, February 17, 1982.
- 13. Letter from Dennis M. Crutchfield (USNRC) to John E. Maier (RG&E) dated January 24, 1983, transmitting Franklin Research Center, "Design Codes, Design Criteria, and Load Combinations", TER C5257-322, May 27 1982.
- 14. RG&E, "Structural Reanalysis Program for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant", Apdl 1983.
- 15. USNRC, Docket No. 50-244, Letter from Carl Stahle (USNRC) to Roger W. Kober (RG8E) transmitting the Safety Evaluation Report on the Structural Upgrade Program, Mar 24, 1987.
- 16. USNRC, Docket No. 50-244, Letter from Allen Johnson (USNRC) to Robert C. Mercredy (RG&E) transmitting the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report in the Structural Upgrade Program, November 15, 1989.
- 17. RG&E, Letter from L. D. White, Jr. (RG&E) to Boyce H. Grier (USNRC) transmitting RG&E's initial response to IE Bulletin 80-11, July 7, 1980.
- 18. RG&E, Letter from John E. Maier (RG8E) to Boyce H. Grier (USNRC) transmitting RG&E's 180 day response to IE Bulletin 80-11, November 4, 1980.
- 19. RG&E, Letter from John E. Maier (RG8E) to Boyce H. Grier (USNRC) transmitting a supplement to RG&E's 180 day response to IE Bulletin 80-11, January 30, 1981.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 30/59
i
Maier (RG&E) transmitting a Request for Additional Information on IE Bulletin 80-11, September 21, 1983.
- 21. RG&E, Letter from Roger W. Kober (RG&E) to Dennis M. Crutchfield (USNRC) transmitting the response to the Request forAdditional Information on IE Bulletin 80-11, July 13, 1984.
- 22. RG&E, Letter from Roger W. Kober (RG&E) to George E. Lear (USNRC) transmitting Computech Report No. R562-N4, December 19, 1985.
- 23. USNRC, Docket No. 50-244, Letter from Dominic C. Dilanni (USNRC) to Roger W, Kober (RG&E) transmitting the Safety-Evaluation for IE Bulletin 80-11, December 12, 1986.
Seismic Qualification ofTanks", June 16, 1983.
- 25. Stevenson &Associates, "Seismic Qualification Report for the Refueling Water Storage Tank at the R.
E. Ginna Plant", August 1983.
- 26. Stevenson
&Associates, "Seismic QualiTication Report for the Vertical Waste Holdup Tank at the R.
E. Ginna Plant", September 1983.
- 27. Stevenson
&Associates, "Seismic Qualification Report for the Horizontal Holdup Tanks at the R. E.
Ginna Plant", September 1983.
- 28. RGE Letter from Robert C. Mecredy (RG&E) to Allen R. Johnson (USNRC) transmitting response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 5, November 7, 1995.
- 29. RGE, PSA Final Report, January 1997.
- 30. USNRC, Docket No. 50-244, Letter from Dennis Crutchfield (NRC) to John E. Maier (RG&E) dated August 22, 1983, transmitting the Safety Evaluation closing out seismic design issues.
- 31. RG&E Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, "Replacement Steam Generators Seismic Loading Report", BWI Report No. 222-7705.SR-11, Rev 0, May. 1985.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 31/59
9 Tables and Figures Table 1 Original Design Loading Combinations and Stress Limits (Table 3.9-1 in the UFSAR)
Normal + design earthquake loads Normal + maximum earthquake loads Normal+ pipe rupture loads lahraah P sS Pi + Ps 6 1.5 S~
P s1.2 S Pi+ Ps s12(1 5S P 51.2S PL + Pe 6 1 2 (1.5 Sm) pjgjg P 512S Pi + Pe 612S P
5 1.2S PL+ Ps <1.2 (1.5S)
P 5 1.2S Pi + Ps 5'.2 (1.5S)
Guauprta Working stresses Within yield after load distribution Within yield after load distribution Pm PL PB Sm S
= primary general membrane stress or stress intensity
= primary local membrane stress or stress intensity
= primary bending stress or stress intensity
= stress intensity value from ASME BBPV Code,Section III
= allowable stress from USAS B31.1 Code for Pressure Piping R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 32/59
i
'able 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment DESCRIPTION EIN Cl Bldg Elev A46 1
1003A 2
1003B 3
1020561 4
1020961 5
10211 S1 6
1021361 7
1021461 8
10215S1 9
104 10 105 11 112B 12 112C 13 123 14 130 15 133 16 14102S 17 14104 S 18 142 19 14204S 20 14231 S 21 14281 S 22 14282 S 23 14284 S 24 14285S 25 142876 26 14288S 27 14289S 28 142906 29 14291 S 30 142926 31 14293 S 32 14305S 33 143066 34 14308S 35 143096 36 14310S 37 14311 S 38 144006 39 14426 S 40 14427S 41 14428 S 42 14501 S 43 14501S1 44 145036 45 1450361 46 14531S 47 14532S 48 1490061 49 1490062 50 1490161 51 1490162 52 1490261 53 1490262 54 1490361 55 1490362 56 149226 57 14924S RCDT OUTLET ISOL VALVEAOV-1003A RCDT OUTLET ISOL VALVEAOV-1003B H2 PILOT LINE SOLENOID OPERATED ISOL VLVTO RECOMBINER A H2 MAINFUEL LINE SOLENOID OPERATED ISOL VLVTO RECOMBINER A H2 PILOT LINE SOLENOID OPERATED ISOL VLVTO RECOMBINER B H2 MAINFUEL LINE SOLENOID OPERATED ISOL VLVTO RECOMBINER B 02 LINEA SOL OPERATED ISOL VLVTO CNMTVENT DUCT (CNMT ISOL) 02 LINE B SOL OPERATED ISOL VLVTO CNMTVENT DUCT (CNMT ISOL)
BA PUMP A RECIRC CONTROL HCV-104 BA PUMP B RECIRC CONTROL HCV-105 EMERG MAKEUPRWST TO CHARGING PUMP LCV-112B VOLUMECONTROL TANKTCH04 AOVTO CHARGING PUMPS PCH01A & PCH01B LOOP A EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET FLOW CONTROL AOV NRHX LTDN OUTLETTEMPERATURE CONTROL TCV-130 RHR LETDOWNTO CVCS HCV-133 IASOV TO AOV951 (PRZR STM SPACE SAMP ISOL)
IASOV TO AOV955 (LOOP B HOT LEG SAMP ISOL)
CHARGING FLOWTO REGEN HX HCV-142 I/ASOV TO AOV 371 (LETDOWN CNMT ISOL)
IASOV VLVTO AOV 17 (CCW SURGE TKVENTAOV)
IASOV TO AOV 1003B (RCDT PMP B SUCT)
IASOV TO AOV 1003A (RCDT PMP A SUCT)
IASOV TO AOV 1721 (RCDT PMPS SUCT)
IASOV TO AOV 1786 (RCDT GAS TO VENT HDR)
IASOV TO AOV846 (N2 INLETTO ACCUMULATORS)
IASOV TOAOV508 (RMWPMP DISCH TO PRT)
IA SOV TO AOV 1787 (RCDT GAS TO VENT HDR)
IASOV TO AOV 1789 (RCDT TO GAS ANALYZER)
IA SOV TO AOV745 (EXCESS LETDOWN HX CCW OUTLET)
IASOY TO AOV 1728 (CNMT SUMP A SAMP PMP DISCH)
IA SOV TO AOV 1723 (SUMP PMP DISCH TO WHT)
I/ATHREE WAYSOV FOR CHARGING PUMP C I/ASOLENOID OPERATED ISOL VLVFROM MANUALLOADER (CHG PMP C)
I/ASOLENOID OPERATED ISOL VLVFROM MANUALLOADER (CHG PMP B)
I/ATHREE WAYSOV FOR CHARGING PUMP B I/A SOLENOID OPERATED ISOL VLVFROM MANUALLOADER (CHG PMP A)
I/ATHREE WAYSOV FOR CHARGING PUMP A IASOV TO AOV4562 (CNMTVENT OUTLET FCV)
IASOV TO AOV 1599 (CNMT RAD MONITOR OUTLET ISOL)
IASOV TO AOV 1597 (CNMTAIRSAMPLE INLET)
IASOV TO AOV 1598 (CNMT RAD MONITOR OUTLET ISOL)
I/A SOV TO DAMPER ADD01A(D/G RM A SUPPLY)
I/ASOV TO DAMPER ADD01B (D/G RM A SUPPLY)
I/ASOV TO DAMPER AAD02A(D/G RM B SUPPLY)
I/A SOV TO DAMPER AAD02B (D/G RM B SUPPLY)
IASOV TO PY-5150 & PY-5151 (CONTROL RM AH INSTR)
IASOV TO VLVS 9906G & 9906J & PY-5158 (CONTROL RM AH INSTR)
SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED CONTROL VLV4271 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4271 (6/G A FW CNTRL AOVBYPASS)
SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED VLV4269 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4269 (S/G A FW CNTRL)
SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED CONTROL 4272 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4272 (S/G B FW CNTRL AOV BYPASS)
SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED CONTROL 4270 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4270 (S/G B FW CNTRL)
IAACTUATIONSOV TO DAMPER AKD02 (CONTROL RM LAVATORYEXH)
I/ASOV TO AKDOS (EXHAUSTAIR DAMPER) 7 AB 219 7
AB 219 8
IB 253 8
IB 253 8
IB 271 8
IB 271 8
IB 271 8
IB 271 7
AB 271 7
AB 271 7
AB 235 7
AB 235 7
RC 235 7
AB 235 7
RC 235 8
RC 274 8
RC 235 7
AB 235 8
AB 253 8
AB 271 8
AB 219 8
AB 219 8
AB 219 8
AB 253 8
AB 253 8
AB 253 8
AB 253 8
AB 253 8
AB 253 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 8
IB 253 8
IB 253 8
IB 253 8
IB 278 8
DG 253 8
DG 253 8
DG 253 8
DG 253 8
CB 253 8
CB 253 8
TB 271 8
TB 271 8
TB 271 8
TB 271 8
TB 271 8
TB 271 8
TB 271 8
TB 271 8
CB 289 8
TB 253 58 14925S PY-5157 SIGNAL ISOL SOV FROM TC-5145 CB 253 59 14926S I/ASOV VLVTO AKD10 (OUTSIDE AIR DAMPER TO CONTROL BLDG) 8 TB 253 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 33/59
~ 'll
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment EIN 60 1597 61 1598 62 1599 63 17
'4 1721 65 1723 66 1728 67 1786 68 1787 69 1789 70 1802 71 1813A 72 1813B 73 181 5A 74 1815 B 75 1817 76 200A 77 200 B 78 202 79 203 80 270A 81 270 B 82 283 83 284 84 285 85 294 86 296 87 310 88 312 89 313 90 314 91 3410 92 3411 93 3504A 94 3505A 95 3508 96 3509 97 3510 98 3511 99 3512 100 3513 101 3514 102 3515 103 3516 104 3516S1 105 351662 106 351663 107 351664 108 3517 109 3517S1 110 351762 111 351763 112 351764 113 371 114 386 115 392A 116 392B DESCRIPTION CNMTAIR SAMPLE ISOL VLVAOV-1597 CONTAINMENTAIRSAMPLE ISOL VLVAOV-1598 CONTAINMENTAIR SAMPLE ISOL VLVAOV-1599 CCW SURGE TANKVENTRCVC17 RCDT OUTLET ISOL VALVEAOV-1721 CONTAINMENTSUMP A SAMPLE PUMP DISCHARGE ISOL VLVTO PASS WHUT CONTAINMENTSUMP A SAMPLE PUMP DISCHARGE ISOL VLVTO PASS WHUT PRT RCDT ISOL TO VENT HEADER ISOL VALVEAOV-1786 PRT RCDT ISOL TO VENT HEADER ISOL VALVEAOV-1787 RCDT OUTLET ISOL AOVTO GAS ANALYZER SPRAY ADDITIVETANKRELIEF VLVTO ATMOSPHERE RCDT PUMP SUCTION FROM SUMP B MOV-1813A RCDT PUMP SUCTION FROM SUMP B MOV-1813B SI PUMP C SUCTION VALVEMOV-1815A SI PUMP C SUCTION VALVEMOV-1815B SI PUMP C SUCTION RELIEF VLVTO CNMT SPRAY PUMP DISCHARGE LOOP B LETDOWN ORIFICE OUTLETAOV LOOP B LETDOWN ORIFICE OUTLETAOV LOOP B LETDOWN ORIFICE OUTLETAOV LOOP B LETDOWNTO NRHX RELIEF VLVTO PRT RCP A SEAL OUTLETVLVAOV-270A RCP B SEAL OUTLETVLVAOV-270B CHARGING PUMP C DISCHARGE RELIEF VLVTO VCT CHARGING PUMP B DISCHARGE RELIEF VLVTO VCT CHARGING PUMP A DISCHARGE RELIEF VLVTO VCT CHARGING LINE INLETAOVTO LOOP B COLD LEG (RCS)
CHARGING LINEAUXSPRAY ISOL AOVTO PRESSURIZER (OMB)
LOOP A INLETISOL AOVTO EXCESS LETDOWN HX LOOP A EXCESS LETDOWN DIVERSIONAOV SEAL WATER RETURN ISOL MOV SEAL WATER RETURN RELIEF VLVTO PRT ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE(ARV) STEAM GENERATOR EMS01B ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE(ARV) STEAM GENERATOR EMS01A S/G B MS MOVTO TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP S/G A MS MOVTO TURBINE DRIVENAUXFW PUMP S/G B MS SAFETY VLV S/G A MS SAFETY VLV S/G B MS SAFETY VLV S/G A MS SAFETY VLV S/G B MS SAFETY VLV S/G A MS SAFETY VLV S/G B MS SAFETY VLV S/G A MS SAFETY VLV SG EMS01B MAINSTEAM AIR-ASSISTED STOP CHECK VALVE(MSIV)
INSTRUMENTAIR SOV TO AOV3516 (SG EMS01B MSIV)
INSTRUMENTAIR SOV TO AOV3516 (SG EMS01B MSIV)
INSTRUMENTAIR SOV VENT VALVEFOR SG EMS01B MSIV3516 INSTRUMENTAIR SOV VENT VALVEFOR SG EMS01B MSIV3516 SG EMS01A MAINSTEAM AIR-ASSISTED STOP CHECK VALVE(MSIV)
INSTRUMENTAIR SOV TO AOV3517 (SG EMS01A MSIV)
INSTRUMENTAIR SOV TO AOV3517 (SG EMS01A MSIV)
INSTRUMENTAIR SOV VENTVALVEFOR SG EMS01A MSIV3517 INSTRUMENTAIR SOV VENTVALVEFOR SG EMS01A MSIV3517 LETDOWN CONTAINMENTISOL AOV RCP A & B SEAL Ij1 BYPASS CONTROL AOV CHARGING LINE INLETISOL AOVTO LOOP B HOT LEG (RCS)
ALTERNATECHARGING LINECONTROL AOVTO LOOP A COLD LEG (OMB)
CI Bldg Elev 7
IB 253 7
IB 278 7
IB 253 7
AB 271 7
AB 219 7
AB 235 7
AB 235 7
AB 253 7
AB 253 7
AB 253 "7
AB 235 8
AB 219 8
AB 219 8
AB 235 8
AB 235 7
AB 235 7
RC 235 7
Rc 235 7
Rc 235 7
RC 253 7
RC 252 7
Rc 252 7
AB 235 7
AB 235 7
AB 235 7
Rc 235 7
Rc 235 7
RC 235 7
RC 235 8
AB 235 7
Rc 253 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 8
IB 278 8
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 7
IB 278 8
IB 278 8
IB 278 8
IB 278 8
IB 278 7
IB 278 8
IB 278 8
IB 278 8
IB 278 8
IB 278 7
AB 253 7
RC 235 7
RC 235 7
Rc 235 AQ6 117 3996 TDAFWPUMP DISCHARGE VLVMOV-3996 8
IB 253 118 4000A AFW CROSSOVER VLVMOVAOOOA 8
IB 253 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 34169
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 EIN 4000B 4007 4008 4013 4020 4021 4022 4027 4028 4269 427 4270 4271 4272 4291 4294 4297 4298 430 4304 4310 431A 431B 431C 4324 4325 4326 434 435 4480 4481 4561 4561S 4562 4579 4609 4613 4614 4615 4616 4620B 4651A 4652A 4653 4654 4655 4656 4657 4658 4659 4660 4663 4664 4670 4733 4734 4735 DESCRIPTION AFW CROSSOVER VLVMOVAOOOB MDAFWPUMP A DISCHARGE VLVMOV<007 MDAFWPUMP B DISCHARGE VLVMOV<008 SW INLETISOL MOVTO TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP TURBINE DRIVENAUXFW PUMP SUCTION RELIEF VLV AUXFW PUMP A SUCTION RELIEF VLV AUXFW PUMP B SUCTION RELIEF VLV SW INLETISOL MOVTO AUXFW PUMP A SW INLETISOL MOVTO AUXFW PUMP B MAINFW CONTROL AOVTO S/G A LETDOWN LOOP B COLD LEG TO RHX AOVR27 MAINFW CONTROL AOVTO S/G B FW CONTROL AOV4269 TO S/G A BYPASS AOV FW CONTROL AOV4270 TO S/G B BYPASS AOV TURBINE DRIVENAUXILIARYFW PUMP RECIRC VLVAOV4291 CONDENSATE PUMP DISCH TO AUXFW PUMPS PRESSURIZING LINEAOV TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP A CONTROL VLVAOV<297 TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP B CONTROL VLVAOV<298 PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVETO PZR RELIEF TANKTRC02 MDAFWPUMP A RECIRC VLVAOV<304 MDAFWPUMP B RECIRC VLVAOV<310 SPRAY VALVEPCVA31A SPRAY VALVEPCV<31B PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVETO PZR RELIEF TANKTRC02 TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP SW STRAINER BYPASS SOV AUXFW PUMP A SW STRAINER BYPASS SOV AUX FW PUMP B SW STRAINER BYPASS SOV PRESSURIZER RELIEF VLVTO PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK PRESSURIZER RELIEF VLVTO PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK AFW BYPASS VLVAAOV<480 AFW BYPASS VLVB AOV<481 CONTAINMENTCOOLERS SW OUTLET FLOW CONTROL AOV SIGNALSOV FOR AOV4561 (SW OUTLET FROM CNMT CLRS)
CONTAINMENTFAN COOLERS SW OUTLET FLOW CONTROL AOV BYPASS AOV SW INLETAOVTO CONTAINMENTPENETRATION COOLER (AUXBLDG)
OUTER INLETISOL MOVTO CIRC PUMPS SEALS & INTAKESCREEN WASH SW ISOL MOVTO TURBINE BLDG (TURB BLDG)
SW OUTER ISOL MOVTO TURBINE BLDG (TURB BLDG)
SWLOOP B ISOLMOVTOCCWHXB & SAFW PUMP D AUX BLDG SW LOOP A ISOL MOV(AUXBLDG)
CCW HX B REDUNDANTSW OUTLET ISOL MOV A/C WATER CHILLERA SW OUTLET CONTROL AOV A/C WATER CHILLER B SW OUTLET CONTROL AOV CCW HX A SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CCW HX B SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CONTAINMENTRECIRC FAN A COOLER SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CONTAINMENTRECIRC FAN B COOLER SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SFP HXA SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV REACTOR COMPARTMENTCOOLER B SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CONTAINMENTRECIRC FAN C COOLER SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CONTAINMENTRECIRC FAN D COOLER SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SW INLETINNER ISOL MOVTO CHILLERPACKAGES A & B SW INNER ISOL MOVTO TURBINE BLDG SW ISOL MOVTO TURBINE BLDG (D/G ROOM)
SW INLETOUTER ISOL STOP/CHECK MOVTO CHILLERPACKAGES A & B SW LOOP B INLETMOVTO CCW HX B (AUXBLDG)
SW LOOP A ISOL MOVTO CCW HX A & SFP HX A CI Bldg Elev A<6 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 TB 271 RC 246 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 RC 274 x
IB 253 IB 253 RC 274 RC 274 RC 274 x
IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 RC 274 x
RC 274 x
IB 253 IB 253 AB 253 IB 253 IB 253 AB 253 SH 253 x
TB 253 x
IB 253 x
AB 253 x
AB 253 x
AB 271 IB 253 IB 253 AB 271 AB 271 IB 253 IB 253 AB 253 IB 271 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 x
IB 253 x
DG 253 x
IB 253 x
AB 271 x
AB 253 x
176 4759 REACTOR COMPARTMENTCOOLER A SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV IB 271 177 4770 CNMT PENETRATION COOLER SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV AB '71 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 35/59
l4 J
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment EIN 178 4770A 179 4770B 180 4770C 181 4770D 182 4770 E 183 4770F 184 4770G 185 4780 186 508 187 515 188 516 189 52/BYA 190 52/BYB 191 52/RTA 192 52/RTB 193 539 194 5392 195 5490P 196 5735 197 5736 198 5737 199 5738 200 5871 201 5872 202 5873 203 5874 204 5875 205 5876 206 5877 207 5880 208 590 209 5907 210 5907A 211 5908 212 5908A 213 591 214 592 215 593 216 5943A 217 5944A 218 5947B 219 594 7C 220 5948 B 221 5948C 222 5959 223 5960 224 624 225 625 226 626 227 700 228 701 229 704A 230 704B 231 720 232 721 233 732 234 738A DESCRIPTION RHR PUMP COOLING FAN A SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV RHR PUMP COOLING FAN B SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SAFETY INJECTION PUMP COOLER A SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SAFETY INJECTION PUMP COOLER C SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SAFETY INJECTION PUMP COOLER B SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CHARGING PUMP ROOM COOLER A SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CHARGING PUMP ROOM COOLER B SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV INNER INLETISOL MOVTO CIRC PUMPS SEALS 8 INTAKESCREEN WASH RMWTO CNMT ISOL VLVAOV-508 MOTOR OPERATED INLETBLOCKVLVTO PORV 431C MOTOR OPERATED INLETBLOCKVLVTO PORV 430 REACTOR TRIP BYPASS BREAKER REACTOR TRIP BYPASS BREAKER B REACTOR TRIP BREAKERA REACTOR TRIP BREAKER B PRT SAMPLE ISOL AOVTO GAS ANALYZER(CNMT ISOL)
INSTR AIR TO CONTAINMENTISOL AOV-5392 TDAFWPUMP LUBE OIL REGULATINGVLVTO LUBE OIL COOLER S/G A SAMPLE LINE CNMT ISOL AOV S/G B SAMPLE LINE CNMT ISOL AOV S/G B BLOWDOWN LINE CNMT ISOL AOV S/G A BLOWDOWN LINE CNMT ISOL AOV A POST ACCIDENTCHAR FILTER DAMPER INLET ISOL VLV A POST ACCIDENTCHAR FILTER DAMPER OUTLET ISOL VLV A CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV B POST ACCIDENTCHAR FILTER DAMPER OUTLET ISOL VLV C CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV C POST ACCIDENTCHAR FILTER DAMPER INLET ISOL VLV D CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV 1B CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV REACTOR HEAD OUTER SOLENOID OPERATED VENT VLVSOV-590 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FUEL OIL SOV TO DAYTANK DG KDG01A FUEL OILTRANSFER PUMP SOLENOID OPERATED RECIRC VLV DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01B FUEL OIL SOLENOID VALVETO DAYTANK SOLENOID VALVEKDG01B FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP RECIRCULATION REACTOR HEAD OUTER SOLENOID OPERATED VENT VLVSOV-591 REACTOR HEAD INNER SOLENOID OPERATED VENT VLV REACTOR HEAD INNER SOLENOID OPERATED VENT VLV D/G A STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE RELIEF VLV D/G B STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE RELIEF VLV D/G A STARTING AIR RECEIVER A1 RELIEF VLV D/G A STARTING AIR RECIEVER A2 RELIEF VLV D/G B STARTING AIR RECEIVER B2 RELIEF VLV D/G B STARTING AIR RECIEVER B1 RELIEF VLV D/G A FUEL OILTRANSFER PUMP DISCHARGE RELIEF VLV D/G B FUEL OILTRANSFER PUMP DISCHARGE RELIEF VLV RHR HX B OUTLETVLVHCV<24 RHR HX A OUTLET VLVHCV-625 RHR HX BYPASS HCV-626 LOOP A HOT LEG SUCTION STOP MOVTO RHR PUMPS (IN CNMT)
RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM LOOP A HOT LEG MOV-701 RHR PUMP A SUCTION VLVMOV-704A RHR PUMP B SUCTION VLVMOV-704B RHR PUMP DISCHARGE TO LOOP B COLD LEG MOV-720 RHR PUMP DISCHARGE MOVTO LOOP B COLD LEG CCW SURGE TANKRELIEF VLVTO WASTE HOLDUP TANK CCW TO RHR HXA MOV-738A CI Bldg Elev AQ8 AB 235 AB 235 AB 235 AB 235 AB 235 AB 235 AB 235 SH 253 x
AB 253 Rc 253 x
Rc 253 x
IB 253 x
IB 253 x
IB 253 x
IB 253 x
AB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 271 x
IB 271 x
IB 253 x
IB 253 x
Rc 235 Rc 235 Rc 235 RC 235 Rc 235 RC 235 Rc 235 Rc 235 Rc DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
Rc'C 278 Rc 278 DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
AB 235 AB 235 AB 235 Rc 235 RC 235 AB 219 AB 219 Rc 235 RC 235 AB 271 AB 253 235 738B CCW TO RHR HX B MOV-738B AB 253 236 740A RHR HX A CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV AB 235 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997
. page 36159
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 EIN 740B 744 7443 7445 745 7478 747A 747B 749A 749B 754A 754B 755A 755B 758A 758B 759A 759B 766 770 774A 774B 774C 774D 774E 776 7970 7971 813 814 817 818 823 825A 825B 826A 826B 826C 826D 830A 830B 834A 834B 835A 835B 836A 836B 839A 839B 840A 840B 841 8418 844A 844B 846 850A 850B DESCRIPTION RHR HX B CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV EXCESS LETDOWN HX CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV(IN CNMT)
CONTAINMENTLEAKTEST ISOL VLVMOV-7443 CONTAINMENTLEAKTEST VLVMOV-7444 CNMT MINIPURGE SUPPLY VLVOUTSIDE AOV-7445 EXCESS LETDOWN HX CCW OUTLET CNMT ISOL AOV-745 CNMTMINIPURGE SUPPLY VLVOUTSIDE AOV-7478 CCW INLETAOVTO PASS SAMPLE COOLER PASS SAMPLE COOLER CCW OUTLETAOV CCW TO RCP A ISOL VLVMOV-749A CCW TO RCP B ISOL VLVMOV-749B CCW FROM RCP ATHERMALBARRIER AOV-754A CCW FROM RCP B THERMALBARRIER AOV-754B RCP A THERMALBARRIER CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV(IN CNMT)
RCP B THERMALBARRIER CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV(IN CNMT)
RCP A CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV(IN CNMT)
RCP B CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV(IN CNMT)
CCW FROM RCP A ISOL VLVMOV-759A CCW FROM RCP B ISOL VLVMOV-759B SEAL WATER HX CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CCW INLETTO SAMPLE HX'S RELIEF VLV WGC B SEAL WATER HX CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV BA EVAP CONDENSING UNITCCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV BA EVAP DISTILLATECOOLER CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV WGC A SEAL WATER HX CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV RELIEF CCW FROM WASTE EVAP NON-REGENERATIVE HX CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV CONTAINMENTMINIPURGE EXH VLVOUTSIDE AOV-7970 CONTAINMENTMINIPURGE EXH VLVOUTSIDE AOV-7971 CCW TO Rx SUPPORT COOLERS ISOL VLVMOV-813 CCW FROM Rx SUPPORT CLRS ISOL VLVMOV-814 CCW TO CNMT ISOL VLVMOV-817 REACTOR SUPPORT COOLERS CCW OUTLET RELIEF VLV RMWTO CCW SURGE TANKMOV-823 SI PUMP SUCTION FROM RWST MOV-825A SI PUMP SUCTION FROM RWST MOV-825B SI PUMP SUCTION FROM BA TANKS MOV-826A SI PUMP SUCTION FROM BA TANKS MOV-826B SI PUMP SUCTION FROM BA TANKS MOV-826C SI PUMP SUCTION FROM BATANKS MOV-826D LOOP B ACCUMULATORA RELIEF VLV LOOP AACCUMULATORB RELIEF VLV SI ACCUMA N2 FILUVENTVALVEAOV-834A SI ACCUM B N2 FILUVENTVALVEAOV-834B SI ACCUMULATORA FILLVALVEAOV-835A SI ACCUMULATORB FILLVALVEAOV-835B CNMT SPRAY NaOH ADDITIONAOV-836A CNMT SPRAY NaOH ADDITIONAOV-836B Sl ACCUMULATORA TEST VALVEAOV-839A SI LINE LOOP B TEST VALVEAOV-839B SI ACCUMULATORB TEST VALVEAOV-840A SI LINE LOOP B TEST VALVEAOV-840B SI ACCUMULATORA DISCH TO LOOP B MOV-841 CONTAINMENTDEMINWATER ISOL VLVAOV-8418 Sl ACCUMULATORA DRAINVALVEAOV-844A Sl ACCUMULATORB DRAINVALVEAOV-844B ACCUM N2 SUPPLY ISOL VALVEAOV-846 RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CNMT SUMP B MOV-850A RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CNMT SUMP B MOV-850B CI Bldg Elev AQ6 AB 235 Rc 235 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 AB 253 Rc 253 IB 271 IB 271 AB 253 AB 253 RC 235 RC 253 Rc 235 RC 235 Rc 235 RC 253 AB 253 AB 253 AB 235 IB 271 AB 253 AB 253 AB 253 AB 253 AB 253 AB 235 RC 253 AB 253 AB 253 AB 253 AB 253 Rc 253 AB 271 AB 235 AB 235 AB 253 AB 253 AB 253 AB 253 Rc 253 Rc 253 RC 253 RC 253 Rc 235 RC 235 AB 235 AB 235 Rc 235 RC 235 RC 235 Rc 235 RC 235 IB 253 RC 235 Rc 235 AB 253 AB 219 AB 219 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 37/59
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 EIN 851A 851B 852A 852B 856 857A 857B 857C 8608A 8608B 860A 860B 860C 860D 861 8612A 8612B 8615A 8615B 8616A 8616B 8619A DESCRIPTION RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CNMTSUMP B MOV-851A RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CNMT SUMP B MOV-851B RHR PUMP DISCHARGE TO REACTOR VESSEL DELUGE MOV-852A RHR PUMP DISCHARGE TO REACTOR VESSEL DELUGE MOV-852B RWST SUCTION MOVTO RHR PUMP RHR PUMP DISCHARGE TO SI PUMP SUCTION MOV-857A RHR PUMP DISCHARGE TO SI PUMP SUCTION MOV-857B RHR PUMP DISCHARGE TO SI PUMP SUCTION MOV-857C NITROGEN ACCUMULATORA RELIEF VLV NITROGEN ACCUMULATORB RELIEF VLV CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP A DISCHARGE VLVMOV-860A CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP A DISCHARGE VLVMOV-860B CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP B DISCHARGE VLVMOV-860C CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP B DISCHARGE VLVMOV-860D CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMPS SUCTION RELIEF VLV N2 PGV TO PGV 430 (ATRAIN)
N2 PCV TO PGV 431C (B TRAIN)
N2 INLETTO N2 SURGE TANKA RELIEF VLV(A TRAIN)
N2 INLETTO N2 SURGE TANKB RELIEF VLV(B TRAIN)
SOLENOID OPERATED INLETVLVTO N2 SURGE TANKA (A TRAIN)
SOLENOID OPERTED INLET.VLVTO N2 SURGE TANKB (B TRAIN)
SOLENOID OPERATED N2 ISOL VLVTO PCV 430 (PORV ACTUATIONA TRAIN)
CI Bldg RC Rc Rc AB AB AB AB RC Rc AB AB AB AB AB Rc Rc Rc RC Rc Rc Rc Elov 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 253 253 235 235 235 235 235 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 A<6 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 8619B 865 8681 871A 871B 875A 875B 876A 876B 878A 878B 87ec 878D 887 896A 896B 897 898 90/Mccc 90/MCCD 921 922 9227 923 924 951 953 955 959 9629A 9629B 9632A 9632B 966A 966B 966C 9701A SOLENOID OPERATED N2 ISOL VLVTO PCV 431C(PORV ACTUATIONB TRAIN) 8 SI ACCUMULATORB DISCH TO LOOP A MOV-865 SFP HX B SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SI PUMP C DISCHARGE TO LOOP A MOV-871A SI PUMP C DISCHARGE TO LOOP B MOV-871B UPPER CNMT SPRAY CHARCOALFILTER DOUSING MOV-875A UPPER CNMT SPRAY CHARCOALFILTER DOUSING MOV-875B LOWER CNMTSPRAY CHARCOALFILTER DOUSING MOV-876A LOWER CNMTSPRAY CHARCOALFILTER DOUSING MOV-876B SAFETY INJECTION PUMP A DISCHARGE TO LOOP B HOT LEG MOV-878A SAFETY INJECTION PUMP A DISCHARGE TO LOOP B COLD LEG MOV-878B SAFETY INJECTION PUMP B DISCHARGE TO LOOP A HOT LEG MOV-878C SAFETY INJECTION PUMP B DISCHARGE TO LOOP A COLD LEG MOV-878D LOOP AACCUMULATORB TEST LINE RELIEF VLVTO PRT (IN CNMT)
RWST INNER ISOL MOVTO CONTAINMENTSPRAY & SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS 8
RWST OUTER ISOL MOVTO CONTAINMENTSPRAY & SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS 8
SAFETY INJECTION TEST & RECIRC LINE ISOL MOVTO RWST SAFETY INJECTION TEST 8 RECIRC LINE ISOL MOVTO RWST MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C CURRENT LIMITINGREACTOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D CURRENT LIMITINGREACTOR H2 MONITORA INLETISOLATIONVLVSOV-921 H2 MONITORA RETURN ISOL VLVSOV-922 CONTAINMENTFIRE HOSE SUPPLY AOV-9227 H2 MONITOR B INLETISOLATIONVLVSOV-923 H2 MONITOR B RETURN ISOL VLVSOV-924 PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE ISOL AOV PRESSURIZER LIQUIDSPACE SAMPLE ISOL AOV LOOP B HOT LEG SAMPLE ISOL AOV RHR LOOP SAMPLE ISOL AOV SERVICE WATER INLETISOL MOVTO STANDBYAUX FW PUMP C SERVICE WATER INLETISOL MOVTO STANDBYAUX FW PUMP D SAFW PUMP ROOM COOLING UNITA SW OUTLET FLOW CONTROL AOV SAFW PUMP ROOM COOLING UNITB SW OUTLET FLOW CONTROL AOV PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE CONTAINMENTISOL AOV PRESSURIZER LIQUIDSPACE SAMPLE CONTAINMENTISOL AOV LOOP B HOT LEG SAMPLE CONTAINMENTISOL AOV STANDBYAUXFW PUMP C DISCHARGE MOV Rc Rc AB AB AB RC RC RC Rc RC Rc Rc RC Rc AB AB AB AB AB AB IB IB IB IB IB Rc RC RC AB AF AF AF AF IB IB IB AF 274 235 271 235 235 300 300 300 300 235 235 235 235 253 235 235 235 253 271 253 253 253 253 253 253 235 253 235 235 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
~
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 38/59
DESCRIPTION 9701B STANDBYAUXFW PUMP D DISCHARGE MOV STANDBYAUXFW PUMPS DISCHARGE CROSSTIE MOV 355 356 9703A Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Q>>
EIN Cl Bldg 8
AF 8
AF Elev 271 271 AP6 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 9703B 9704A 9704B 9709A 9709B 9710A 9710B 9746 ACA02A ACA02B ACP02 ACP03 ACP04 ACP05 ACP06 ACP07 ACPDPAB10 ACPDPAB11 ACPDPAB12 ACPDPAB13 ACPDPDG01 ACPDPDG02 ADD01A ADD01B ADD02A ADD02B ADF01A ADF01B ADF02A ADF02B AFP01 STANDBYAUXFW PUMPS DISCHARGE CROSSTIE MOV STANDBYAUXFW PUMP C DISCHARGE CNMT ISOL MOV(AUXBLDG)
STANDBYAUXFW PUMP D DISCHARGE CNMT ISOL MOV(AUX BLDG)
STANDBYAUXFW PUMP C SUCTION LINE RELIEF VLV STANDBYAUX FW PUMP D SUCTION LINE RELIEF VLV STANDBYAUXFW PUMP C RECIRCULATIONVLVAOV-9710A STANDBYAUX FW PUMP D RECIRCULATIONVLVAOV-9710B STANDBYAUX FW PUMP D DISCHARGE ISOL MOV REACTOR COMPARTMENTCOOLER A REACTOR COMPARTMENT COOLER B CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATINGFILTER ANDCOOLING UNITA CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATINGFILTERANDCOOLING UNIT B CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATING FILTERANDCOOLING UNIT C CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATINGFILTERAND COOLING UNIT D POST ACCIDENTCHARCOALFILTER UNITA POST ACCIDENTCHARCOALFILTER UNIT B PRESSURIZER HEATERS AC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL 1A1 (480 VAC)
PRESSURIZER HEATERS AC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL 1A2 (480 VAC)
PRESSURIZER HEATERS AC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL 1B1 (480 VAC)
PRESSURIZER HEATERS AC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL 1B2 (480 VAC)
DIESEL GENERATOR A HEATTRACE PANEL DIESEL GENERATOR B HEATTRACE PANEL D/G ROOM A SUPPLY AIR FAN A OUTLET DAMPER D/G ROOM A SUPPLY AIR FAN B OUTLET DAMPER D/G ROOM B SUPPLY AIR FAN A OUTLET DAMPER D/G ROOM B SUPPLY AIR FAN B OUTLET DAMPER DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A ROOM OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY FAN A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A ROOM OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY FAN B DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY FAN A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY FAN B STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLING UNITA 8
AF 8
AB 8
AB 7
AF 7
AF 7
AF 7
AF 8
AF 10 RC 10 RC 10 RC 10 RC 10 RC 10 RC 10 RC 10 RC 14 AB 14 AB 14 AB 14 AB 14 DG 14 DG 10 DG 10 DG 10 DG 10 DG 9
DG 9
DG 9
DG 9
DG 10 AF 271 253 253 271 271 271 271 271 235 235 253 253 253 253 300 300 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 271 388 389 390 AFP02 AKD02 AKF03 STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLING UNIT B 10 AF CONTROL ROOM LAVATORYEXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER TO OUTSIDE 10 CB CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLINGUNITSUPPLY FAN 9
CB 271 289 253 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 AKF07 AKFOS AKF09 AKP01 AKP02 ARA1CG14 ARA1RC14 ARA2CC18 ARA2RC18 ARB1CG16 ARB1RC16 ARB2CC17 ARB2RC17 B1 B2 BCSA BCSB BTRYA BTRYB BUS14 BUS16 BUS17 BUS18 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY RETURN FAN CONTROL ROOM RETURN AIR FAN CONTROL ROOM LAVATORYEXHAUST FAN CONTROL ROOM CFU CONTROL ROOM AHU UNDERVOLTAGERElAYCONTROL CABINETBUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGERELAY-RELAYCABINETBUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGERELAYCONTROL CABINETBUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGERELAY-RElAYCABINETBUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGERELAYCONTROL CABINETBUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGERELAY-RElAYCABINETBUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGERELAYCONTROL CABINETBUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGEREIAY-RELAYCABINETBUS 17 REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENT RACK CHANNEL3 BLUE 1 REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENT RACK CHANNEL3 BLUE 2 BATTERYA LOCALMONITOR BATTERYB LOCALMONITOR BATTERYA BATTERYB BUS 14 480 VOLTPOWER BUS 16 480 VOLTAC POWER BUS 17480 VOLTACPOWER BUS 18 480 VOLTAC POWER 9
CB 9
CB 9
CB 10 CB 10 CB 20 CB 20 AB 20 SH 20 SH 20 CB 20 AB 20 SH 20 SH 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 15 CB 15 CB 2
AB 2
AB 2
SH 2
SH 253 253 289 253 253 271 271 253 253 271 253 253 253 289 289 253 253 253 253 271 253 253 253 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 39159
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment DESCRIPTION EIN CI Bldg Elev A<6 414 BYCA 415 BYCA1 416 BYCB 417 BYCB1 418 CIA1 419 CIA2 420 CIB1 421 CIB2 422 CVTA1 BATTERYCHARGER 1A BATTERYCHARGER 1A1 BATTERYCHARGER 1B BATTERYCHARGER 1B1 CONTAINMENTISOLATIONRELAY RACKA1 CONTAINMENTISOLATIONRELAY RACKA2 CONTAINMENTISOLATION RELAY RACK B1 CONTAINMENTISOLATIONRELAYRACK B2 INSTRUMENT BUS B CONSTANT VOLTAGETRANSFORMER 16 16 16 16 20 20 20 20 CB 253 x
CB 253 x
CB 253 x
CB 253 x
CB 271 CB 271 CB 271 CB 271 438 DGACP 439 DGAEC DIESEL GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL 1A DIESEL GENERATOR A EXCITER CABINET 423 DCPDPAB01A DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL AB 01 A (AUX BLDG PNL 1A) 424 DCPDPAB01B DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANELAB 01 B (AUX BLDG PNL 1B) 425 DCPDPAB02A DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANELAB 02 A (AUXBLDG PNL 1A1) 426 DCPDPAB02B DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANELAB 02 B (AUX BLDG PNL 1B1) 427 DCPDPAB03A AUXILIARYBUILDINGDC DISTRIBUTIONPANEL A2 428 DCPDPCB01B DC DISTRIBUTIONPANEL 429 DCPDPCB02A DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL CB 02 A (MAINFUSE CAB A) 430 DCPDPCB02B DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL CB 02 B (MAINFUSE CAB B) 431 DCPDPCB03A DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL CB 03 A (MAINDC PNL 1A) 432 DCPDPCB03B DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL CB 03 B (MAINDC PNL 1B) 433 DCPDPDG01A DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL DG 01 A (DG PNL 1A) 434 DCPDPDG01B DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL DG 01 B (DG PNL 1B) 435 DCPDPSH01A DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL SH 01 A (SCREENHOUSE PNL 1A) 436 DCPDPSH01B DC POWER DISTRIBUTIONPANEL SH 01 B (SCREENHOUSE PNL 1B) 437 DCPDPTB01B TURBINEBUILDINGDCDISTRIBUTIONPANEL 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 20 20 AB 271 x
AB 253 x
AB 271 x
AB 253 x
AB 271 CB 253 CB 253 x
CB 253 x
CB 253 CB 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 x
SH 253 x
SH 253 x
DG 253 x
440 DGAELCP 441 DGAIP 442 DGBCP 443 DGBEG 444 DGBIP 445 DPS-2084 446 D PS-2085 447 DPS-2094 448 EAC01A 449 EAC01B 450 EAC02A 451 EAC02B 452 EAC04A 453 EAC04B 454 EACOSA 455 EACOSB 456 EAC05C 457 EAC13 458 EAC14 459 ECH02A 460 ECH02B 461 ECH02C 462 ECH03 463 ECH04 464 ECH05 465 FAL-2045 466 FAL-2047 D/G A Emergen Local Control Panel D/G A INSTRUMENTPANEL DIESEL GENERATOR CONTROL PANEL 1B DIESEL GENERATOR B EXCITER CABINET D/G B INSTRUMENTPANEL MTR DRIVENAUXFWP CW FILTER"1A" DIFF PR SW MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1B" CW FLTR DIFF PR SW TURB DR AUX FWP CW FILTER DIFF PRESS SW CCW HEAT EXCHANGERA COMPONENT COOLING WATER "B" HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B S/G BLOWDOWNSAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER A S/G BLOWDOWNSAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER B PRESSURIZER LIQUIDSPACE SAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER RC LOOP B HOT LEG SAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER B SPENT FUEL POOL HEATEXCHANGER A REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER NON-REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER D/G "A"FO XFRDUPLEX STRNR DIFF PR LO FLO AL D/G B FO XFER DUPLEX STRAINER DIFF PRESS LO FLOWALARM 20 18 20 20 18 18 18 18 21 21 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 18 18 DG 253 DG 253 DG 253 x
DG 253 x
DG 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 AB 271 AB 271 AB 235 AB 235 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 AB 271 AB 253 RC 235 RC 235 RC 235 RC 235 AB 235 AB 235 DG 253 DG 253 467 FALL-2046 D/G A FO XFER DUPLEX STRAINER DIFF PRESS LO FLOWALARM 18 DG 253 468 469 470 471 472 FALL-2048 Fl-115 Fl-116 FI-2020 FI-2021B D/G "B"FO XFRDUPLX STRNR DIFF PR LO FLO AL SEAL WATER FLOW LOOP "A"FLO IND SEAL WATER FLOW LOOP "B" FLOWIND SFP HX OUTLET FLOW METER MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1A"DISCH FLO IND 18 18 18 18 18 DG 253 AB 235 x
AB 235 x
AB 253 IB 253 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 40/59
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 EIN FI-20228 FI-20238 FI-20248 F1403 F1405 F1407 FI410 FI414 Fl-933 FIA-2033 FIA-2034 FIA-2035 FIA-2036 FIG%09 FIG%13 FIT-175 FIT-176 FIT-177 FIT-178 DESCRIPTION MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "18" DISCH FLO IND TURB DRIVENAUX FW FLO TO S/G"1A" IND TURB DRIVENAUXFW FLO TO S/G"18" IND SAMPLE HX CCW RETURN FLOW IND SW HX CW RETURN FLOW IND CCW FROM EXCESS LTDN HX(CVCS)FLOW IND RCP 1A CCW RETURN FLO INDXMTR RCP 18 CCW RETURN FLOW INDXMTR CNMT SPRAY FLOW IND CNMTVNTCLR "1A"FLOW METER CNMTVNTCLR "18" FLOW METER CNMTVNTCLR "1G" SW FLO METER CNMTVNTCLR "1D" SW FLOW METER CGW FROM "A"RCP FLO IND CONTR CCW FROM "8" RCP FLO IND CONTR FLOW TRANSMITTERFOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP A SEAL RETURN FLOW TRANSMITTERFOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 8 SEAL RETURN FLOWTRANSMITTERFOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP A SEAL RETURN FLOWTRANSMITTERFOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 8 SEAL RETURN CI BId 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 AB 18 AB 18 RC 18 RC 18 AB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 AB 18 AB 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC Elov 253 253 253 271 235 253 235 253 235 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 A<6 492 493 FIT-179 FIT-180 FLOW TRANSMITTERFOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP A SEAL ¹1 BYPASS FLOW 18 RC FLOW TRANSMITTERFOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 8 SEAL ¹1 BYPASS FLOW 18 RC 253 253 494 495 FOX1 FOX2 FOXBORO INSTRUMENTRACK 1 FOXBORO INSTRUMENTRACK 2 20 CB 20 CB 271 271 496 497 FOXDGA1 FOXDG81 FOXBORO INSTRUMENTRACK DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A DAYTANKLEVEL 20 DG FOXBORO INSTRUEMNT RACK DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 DAYTANKLEVEL 20 DG 253 253 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 FS-2A FS-28 FS<013 FS<014 FT-2001 FT-2002 FT-2006 FT-2007 FT-2013 FT-2014 FT-2015 FT-201 5A FT-2032 FT-3-1A FT-3-1 8 FT4084 FT<085 FT<11 FT<12 FT<13 F7<14 FT<15 FT<16 FT<64 FT<65 FT<74 FT-475 FT<98 FT<99 FT+26 FT-924 FT-925 COMBUSOR LOWAIR FLOW SW COMBUSTOR LOWAIR FLOW SW STBY AUXPUMP 1A COOLING FAN FLOW SW STBY AUXPUMP 18 COOLING FAN FLOW SW MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1A"DISCH FLO XMTR MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "18" DISCH FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUXFW FLO TO S/G"1A" FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUXFW FLO TO S/G"18" FLO XMTR MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1A"DISCH FLOW XMTR MOTOR DRIVENAUX FW PUMP 18 DISCHARGE FLOW XMTR TURB DRIVENAUXFW P DISCH FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUX FW P DISCH FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUXFW P TOTALFLO XMTR COMBUSTOR AIR FLOW XMTR COMBUSTOR AIR FLOW XMTR FLOW TRANSMITTERSTANDBYAFW PUMP PSF01A DISCH INST LOOP 4084 FLOW TRANSMITTERSTANDBYAFW PUMP PSF018 DISCH INST LOOP 408S RC FLOW LOOP "A"XMTR RC FLOW LOOP "A"XMTR RC FLOW LOOP "A"XMTR RC FLOW LOOP "8"XMTR RC FLOW LOOP "8"XMTR RC FLOW LOOP "8"XMTR FLOWTRANSMITTERSG EMS01A STEAM FLOW INST LOOP 464 FLOWTRANSMITTERSG EMS01A STEAM FLOW INST LOOP 465 FLOW TRANSMITTERSTEAM GENERATOR EMS018 FLOW TRANSMITTERSTEAM GENERATOR EMS018 STEAM FLOW S/G "A"MAINSTEAM FLOW XMTR S/G "8" MAINSTEAM FLOW XMTR RHR FLOW XMTR SI LOOP 8 HOT LEG FLOWXMTR SI LOOP A HOT LEG FLOW XMTR 18 RC 18 RC 18 AF 18 AF 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 RC 18 RC 18 AF 18 AF 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 AB 18 RC 18 RC 253 253 271 271 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 271 271 235 235 235 235 235 235 278 278 278 278 274 274 235 235 235 530 FT-930 SPRAY ADDITIVETKINLETFLOWXMTR 18 AB 235 531 FT-931 A RHR REFUELING Wi'R RETURN LINEFLOWXMTR 18 AB 235 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 41/59
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment EIN 532 FT-9318 533 HMSLCPA 534 HMSLCPB 535 I/P-836A 536 I/P-8368 537 IBPDPCBA 538 IBPDPCBAR 539 IBPDPCBB 540 IBPDPCBBW 541 IBPDPCBC 542 IBPDPCBCB 543 IBPDPCBE 544 IC1 545 IC2 546 IC3 547 IC4 548 IC5 549 INVTCVTA 550 INVTCVTB 551 KDG01A 552 KDG018 553 LAH418A 554 LAL<188 555 LC-942A 556 LC-9428 557 LC-942C 558 LC-942 D 559 LC-942E 560 LC-943A 561 LC-9438 562 LC-943C 563 LC-943D 564 LC-943E 565 LIT-2050 566 LIT-2050A 567 LIT-2051 568 LIT-2051A 569 LT-102 570 LT-106 571 LT-171 572 LT-172 573 LT-2022A 574 LT-20228 575 LT<26 576 LT-427 577 LT<28 578 LT<28A 579 LT<33 580 LT<60 581 LT<60A 582 LT<61 583 LT<62 584 LT<63 585 LT<70 586 LT<71 587 LT-472 588 LT<73 DESCRIPTION RHR RETURN LINE FLOWXMTR CONTAINMENTHYDROGEN MONITORA CONTROL PANEL CONTAINMENTHYDROGEN MONITOR8 CONTROL PANEL CNMT SPRAY ADDITIVETKVLVI/P XDUCER CNMTSPRAY ADDITIVETKVLVI/P XDUCER TWINCO MQ 400A DISTRIBUTIONPANEL INSTRUMENTBUS A TWINCO MQ 4008 DISTRIBUTIONPANEL INSTRUMENTBUS 8 TWINCO MQ 400C DISTRIBUTIONPANEL INSTRUMENTBUS C TWINCO MQ 400E DISTRIBUTIONPANEL INCORE RACK 1 INCORE RACK2 INCORE RACK 3 INCORE RACK4 INCORE RACK 5 INVERTER INVTA/ CONSTANT VOLTAGETRANSFORMER CVTACABINET INVERTER INVTB/ CONSTANT VOLTAGETRANSFORMER CVTB CABINET DIESEL GENERATOR 1A DIESEL GENERATOR 18 CC SURGE TANKHI ALRMLVLSW CC SURGE TANKLO ALRMLVLSW CNMTSMP "8"¹1 LVLINDICATION CNMT SMP "8"¹1 LVLINDICATION CNMT SMP "8"<<1 LVLINDICATION CNMT SMP."8" ¹1 LVLINDICATION CNMT SMP "8"¹1 LVLINDICATION CNMT SMP "8"¹2 LVLINDICATION CNMT SMP "8"¹2 LVLINDICATION CNMT SMP "8"¹2 LVLINDICATION CNMTSMP "8"¹2 LVLINDICATION CNMTSMP "8"¹2 LVLINDICATION LEVEL INDICATINGTRANSMITTERKDG01A DAYTANKINST LOOP 2050 LEVEL INDICATINGTRANSMITTERKDG01A DAYTANKINST LOOP 2050 LEVEL INDICATINGTRANSMITTERKDG018 DAYTANKINST LOOP 2051 LEVEL INDICATINGTRANSMITTERKDG018 DAYTANKINST LOOP 2051 LEVELTRANSMITTERBORIC ACIDSTORAGE TANKTCH07A INSTR LOOP 102
'EVEL TRANSMITTERBORIC ACID STORAGE TANKTCH078 INSTR LOOP 106 LEVELTRANSMITTERBORIC ACID STORAGE TANKTCH078 INSTR LOOP 171 LEVELTRANSMIT'ERBORIC ACID STORAGE TANKTCH07A INSTR LOOP 172 CNDST STOR TK"A"LVLXMTR CDST "8" LVLXMTR PRZR LVLXMTR LEVELTRANSMITTERPRESSURIZER INSTRUMENTLOOP 427 LEVELTRANSMITTERPRESSURIZER CHANNEL3 INSTRUMENT LOOP 428 PRZR LVLWIDE RANGE-XMTR PRZR LVLXMTR-WIDERANGE STEAM GENERATOR EMS01A WIDE RANGE LEVELTRANSMITTER STEAM GENERATOR EMS01A LEVELWIDE RANGE APPENDIX R TRANSMITTER LEVELTRANSMITTERSTEAM GENERATOR EMS01A NARROW RANGE LEVELTRANSMITTERSG EMS01A NARROW RANGE INST LOOP 462 LEVELTRANSMITTERSG EMS01A NARROW RANGE INST LOOP 463 STEAM GENERATOR EMS018 WIDE RANGE LEVELTRANSMITTER LEVELTRANSMITTERSG EMS018 NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENT LOOP 471 LEVELTRANSMITTERSG 8 NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENTLOOP 472 LEVELTRANSMITTERSG EMS018 NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENTLOOP 473 CI Bldg Elev 18 AB 235 20 IB 253 20 IB 253 18 AB 235 18 AB 235 14 CB 271 14 CB 289 14 CB 271 14 CB 289 14 CB 271 14 CB 289 14 CB 271 20 CB 289 20 CB 289 20 CB 289 20 CB 289 20 CB 289 16 CB 253 16 CB 253 17 DG 253 17 DG 253 18 AB 271 18 AB 271 18 Rc 235 18 RC 235 18 Rc 235 18 RC 235 18 Rc 235 18 Rc 235 18 Rc 235 18 Rc 235 18 Rc 235 18 Rc 235 18 DG 253 18 DG 253 18 DG 253 18 DG 253 18 AB 271 18 AB 271 18 AB 271 18 AB 271 18 TB 253 18 TB 253 18 Rc 253 18 Rc 253 18 Rc 253 18 Rc 253 18 RC 253 18 Rc 235 18 RC 278 18 RC 278 18 RC 278 18 Rc 278 18 Rc 235 18 RC 278 18 Rc 278 18 Rc 278 AP6 589 LT<90A REACTOR VESSEL LEVELINDICATIONSYSTEM (RVLIS) LEVELTRANSMITTER 18 Rc 235 590 LT<908 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL LEAKOFF ALRM(LOWER) 18 Rc 235 R. E. Ginna Seismic lPEEE January 1997 page 42/59
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 645 EIN LT-504 LT-505 LT-506 LT-507 LT%18 LT-920 LT-921 LT-931 LT-932 LT-934 LT-935 LT-938 LT-939 M1 MCB MCCC MCCCABC MCCD MCCDABC MCCH MCCJ MCCK MCCL MCCM MDCDP8/6 MS V3504A MS V3505A NIS1 NIS2 NIS3 NIS4 PAC01A PAC018 PAC02A PAC028 PAC078 PAF01A PAF018 PAF03 PCH01A PCH018 PCH01G PDG02A PDG028 PHCG PI-2136 PI-2138 PI-2141 PI-2142 PI-2143 PI-2144 PI-2232 Pl-2641 Pl-2642 PI-2643 Pl<022 DESCRIPTION STEAM GENERATOR EMS01A WIDE RANGE LEVELTRANSMITlER STEAM GENERATOR EMS01A WIDE RANGE LEVELTRANSMITTER STEAM GENERATOR EMS018 WIDE RANGE LEVELTRANSMITTER STEAM GENERATOR EMS018 WIDE RANGE LEVELTRANSMITTER CC SURGE TANKLVLXMTR LEVELTRANSMITTERRWST TSI01 INSTRUMENTLOOP 920 LEVELTRANSMITTERRWST TSI01 INSTRUMENTLOOP 921 SPRAY ADDITIVETKLVLXMTR SPRAY ADDITIVETKLVLXMTR ACCUMULATOR"8" LVLXMTR ACCUMULATOR"8" LVLXMTR ACCUMULATOR"A"LVLXMTR ACCUMULATOR"A"LVLXMTR MISCELLANEOUS RELAYRACK M1 MISCELLANEOUSRELAYRACKM2 MAINCONTROL BOARD 480 VACMOTOR CONTROL CENTER C MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C AUXILIARYCIRCUIT BREAKER CABINET 480 VACMOTOR CONTROL CENTER D MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D AUXILIARYCIRCUIT BREAKER CABINET 480 VAGMOTOR CONTROL CENTER H 480 VACMOTOR CONTROL CENTER J MOTOR CONTROL CENTER K 480 VAC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER L MOTOR CONTROL CENTER M TURB DRIVENAUX FEED PUMP DISCH VLV3996 MOTOR STARTER FOR MOV-3504A MOTOR STARTER FOR MOV-3505A NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONSYSTEM RACK 1 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONSYSTEM RACK 2 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONSYSTEM RACK 3 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONSYSTEM RACK 4 RESIDUALHEAT REMOVALPUMP A RESIDUALHEAT REMOVALPUMP 8 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP A COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 8 SPENT FUEL POOL RECIRCULATIONPUMP 8 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP A AUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP 8 TURBINE DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP CHARGING PUMP A CHARGING PUMP 8 CHARGING PUMP G FUEL OILTRANSFER PUMP 1A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FUEL OILTRANSFER PUMP 18 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 PRESSURIZER HEATER CONTROL CABINET "C" CNMT CLG FAN PRESS IND "8" CNMTVNT CLR INLET PRESSIND RX COMP CLR "8" OUTLET PRESS IND "A"CNMTVNTCLR INLETPRESS IND D/G "1A"STRTNG AIR RGVR PRESSIND "D"CNMTVNTCLR PRESS IND RX COMP CLR "A"OUTLET PRESS IND D/G "1A"STRTNG AIR CMPRSR PRESS IND
~
D/G "18" STRTNG AIR RCVR PRESS IND D/G "18" STRTNG AIR CMPRSR PRESS IND TURBINE DRIVENAUXFEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL PUMP TO COOLER CI Bldg 18 RC 18 Rc 18 RC 18 RC 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 Rc 18 Rc 18 RC 18 Rc 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 1
DG 1
DG 1
CB 1
AB 1
AB 1
IB 1
IB 1
IB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 5
AB 5
AB 5
AB 5
AB 5
AB 5
IB 5
IB 5
IB 5
AB 5
AB 5
AB 5
DG 5
DG 14 AB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 DG 18 IB 18 IB 18 DG 18 DG 18 DG 18 IB Elov 235 235 235 235 271 235 235 235 235 253 253 253 253 271 271 289 271 253 253 253 253 253 271 271 253 253 278 278 289 289 289 289 219 219 271 271 235 253 253 253 235 235 235 253 253 253 253 253 271 253 253 253 271 253 253 253 253 AQ6 648 PI-6023 TURBINE DRIVENAUX FEEDWATER PUMP OIL DISCHARGE PRESSURE 18 IB 253 PI+024 TURBINE DRIVENAUX FEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL HEADER PRESSURE GAGE 18 IB 253 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 43159
Table 2 SMA IMechanical and Electrical Equipment 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 685 EIN Pl-922A PI-923A PI-933C Pl-933D PIC-629 PIT-2052 PIT-2053 PIT-510 PIT-511 PLP PS-102 PS-106 PS-171 PS-172 PS-2092 PS-2093 PS-2884 PS-2885 PSF01A PSF018 PSI01A PSI018 PSI01C PSI02A PSI028 PSW01A PSW018 PSW01C PSW01D PT-124 PT-131 PT-173 PT-174 PT-2027 PT-2028 PT<20 DESCRIPTION SI P "1A"DISCH PRESS IND SI P "18" DISCH PRESS IND UPPER CNMTSPRAY P "A"DISCH PRESS IND LOWER CNMTSPRAY P "8" DISCH HDR PRESS IND RHR LOOP PRESSIND CONTR/ALRM D/G "A"FUEL OILXFER P DISCHPRESS INDXMTR D/G "8" FUEL OILXFER P DISCHPRESS INDXMTR S/G "A"PRESS INDXMTR S/G "8" PRESS INDXMTR PRESSURIZER LEVEL& PRESSURE RACK BAST "A"N2 BUBBLER SPLY PR SWLO.LOAL BAST "8" N2 BUBBLER SPLY PR SW LO-LOAL BAST "8" N2 BUBBLER SPLY PR SW LO-LOAL BAST "A"N2 BUBBLER SPLY PR SW LO-LOAL PRESSURE SWITCH SG EMS01A ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE3411 PRESSURE SWITCH SG EMS018 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE3410 D/G "1A"STRTNG AIR CMPRSR START SW(ACS-1A)
D/G "18" STRTNG AIR CMPRSR LOAIRSW(ACS-18)
STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP C STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP D SAFETY INJECTION PUMP A SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 8 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP C CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP A CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP 8 SERVICE WATER PUMP A SERVICE WATER PUMP 8 SERVICE WATER PUMP C SERVICE WATER PUMP D RCP "8" LABYSEAL D/P PRESS XMTR RCP "A"LABYSEAL D/P PRESS XMTR RCP "A"¹1 SEAL D/P PRESS XMTR RCP "8"¹1 SEAL D/P PRESS XMTR SW PMPS 1A & 18 DISCH PRESS XMTR SW PMPS 1C & 1D DISCH PRESS XMTR PRESSURE TRANSMITTERRc HOT LEG INST LOOP 420 CI BIdg 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 DG 18 DG 18 RC 18 Rc 20 CB 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 AB 18 IB 18 IB 18 DG 18 DG 5
AF 5
AF 5
AB 5
AB 5
AB 5
AB 5
AB 6
SH 6
SH 6
SH 6
SH 18 Rc 18 Rc 18 Rc 18 Rc 18 SH 18 SH 18 RC Elov 235 235 235 235 235 253 253 274 274 289 271 271 271 271 278 278 253 253 271 271 235 235 235 235 235 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 A<6 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 PT<20A PT<208 PT<29 PT<30 PT<31 PT<49 PT<50 PT<51 PT<52 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERREACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INST LOOP 420A PRESSURE TRANSMITTERREACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INST LOOP 4208 18 Rc 18 RC PRESSURE TRANSMITTERPRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 429 18 Rc PRESSURE TRANSMITTERPRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 430 18 Rc PRESSURE TRANSMITTERPRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 431 18 Rc PRESSURE TRANSMITTERPRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 449 18 Rc PRESSURE TRANSMITTERRc OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION INST LOOP 450 18 Rc PRESSURE TRANSMITTERRc OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION INST LOOP 450 18 Rc PRESSURE TRANSMITTERRC OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION INST LOOP 452 18 Rc 253 253 253 253 253 253 235 235 235 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 PT<55 PT<56 PT<68 PT<69 PT<69A PTAS PT<79 PT<82 PT<83 PT<85 PT<86 PT-922 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERNITROGEN ACCOMULATORA INST LOOP 455 PRESSURE TRANSMITIER NITROGEN ACCOMULATORA INST LOOP 456 PRESSURE TRANSMITER SG EMS01A INST LOOP 468 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSG EMS01A PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSTEAM GENERATOR EMS01A PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSG EMS018 INSTRUMENTLOOP 478 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSG EMS018 INSTRUMENTLOOP 479 PRESSURE TRANSMITIER SG EMS01A INSTRUMENTLOOP 482 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSG EMS018 INSTRUMENT LOOP 483 TURB 1ST STAGEPRESS XMTR TURB 1ST STAGEPRESS XMTR SI P "1A"DISCH PRESS XMTR 18 RC 18 RC 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB 18 TB 18 TB 18 AB 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 271 271 235 707 PT-923 SI P "18" DISCH PRESS XMTR 18 AB 235 708 PT-936 ACCUMULATOR"8" PRESS XMTR 18 RC 253 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 44/59
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 EIN PT-937 PT-940 PT-941 PT-944 PT-945 PT-946 PT-947 PT-948 PT-949 DESCRIPTION ACCUM¹2 PRESSXMTR ACCUMULATOR"A"PRESS XMTR ACCUMULATOR"A"PRESS XMTR CNMT PRESS XMTR CNMT PRESS XMTR CNMT PRESS XMTR CNMT PRESS XMTR CNMT PRESS XMTR CNMT PRESSURE Cl Bldg 18 RC 18 RC 18 RC 18 IB 18 AB 18 AB 18 IB 18 IB 18 IB Elev 253 253 253 253 253 253 271 271 253 AQ6 718 719 720 PT-950 PXDGA01 PXDGB01 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERCONTAINMENTPRESSURE INSTRUMENT LOOP 950 18 IB DIESEL GENERATOR A CRANKCASE EXHAUSTMOTOR CONTROL TRANSFORMER 4 DG DIESEL GENERATOR B CRANKCASE EXHAUSTMOTOR CONTROL TRANSFORMER 4 DG 253 253 253 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 765 PXIB004 PXIB005 PXIB006 PXIB009 PXTB001 PXTB002 R1 RB1 RB2 RCS1 RCS2 RIL RLTR1 RLTR2 RMS1 RMS2 RMS3 RR1 RR2 RSC RVLMS1 RVLMS2 RW1 RY1 RY2 SA SAFWPCIP SAFWP DIP SD SDG01A SDG01B SIA1 SIA2 SIB1 SIB2 SWD03A SWD03B TAC01 TCD01 TCH04 480/120V HEATTRACE XMFR HYDROGEN MONITORATRANSFORMER HYDROGEN MONITOR B TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER DG B HEATTRACE TRANSFORMER 16D DG A HEATTRACE TRANSFORMER 14D REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTRACK CHANNEL 1 RED 1 REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTRACK CHANNEL 1 RED 2 AUXILIARYRELAYRACK 1 AUXILIARYRELAYRACK 2 AUXILIARYRELAYRACK 3 REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL3 BLUE 1 REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL3 BLUE 2 REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEM RACK 1 REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEM RACK 2 CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITRACK REACTOR LOGIC TEST RACK 1 REACTOR LOGIC TEST RACK 2 RADIATIONMONITORINGSYSTEM RACK 1 RADIATIONMONITORINGSYSTEM RACK 2 RADIATIONMONITORINGSYSTEM RACK 3 REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL 1 RED 1 REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL 1 RED 2 CONTROL ROD SPEED CONTROL RACK Instrument Panel Instrument Panel REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL2 WHITE 1 REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL2 WHITE 1 REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL4 YELLOW 1 REACTOR PROTECTION RELAYRACK CHANNEL4 YELLOW2 SAFETY INJECTION/AUXCOOLANT RACK Standb AuxilliaryFeedwater Pump C Instrument Panel Standb Auxillia Feedwater Pump D Instrument Panel STEAM DUMP RACK D/G EXHAUST MUFFLER D/G B EXHAUST MUFFLER SAFEGUARDS INITIATIONRACKA1 SAFEGUARDS INITIATIONRACKA2 SAFEGUARDS INITIATIONRACK B1 SAFEGUARDS INITIATIONRACK B2 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER A HYDROGEN RECOMBINER B COMPONENT COOLING WATER SURGE TANK Condensate Supply Tank VOLUMECONTROL TANK 4
IB 4
IB 4
IB 4
IB 4
DG 4
DG 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 AF 20 AF 20 CB 17 DG 17 DG 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 20 CB 10 RC 10 RC 21 AB 21 AF 21 AB 253 253 253 253 253 253 289 289 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 289 271 271 289 289 289 271 271 289 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 289 253 253 271 271 271 271 253 253 271 271 253 766 TCH07A BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKA 21 AB 271 767 TCH07B BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKB 21 AB 271 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 45/59
Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment EIN 768 TDG01A 769 TDG018 770 TDG02A 771 TDG028 772 TDG03A 773 TDG038 774 TDG03C 775 TDG03D 776 TE-122 777 TE-126 778 TE-127 779 TE-2096 780 TE<01A 781 TE<018 782 TE<02A 783 TE<028 784 7E<03A 785 TE<038 786 TE<04A 787 TE<048 788 TEAOSA 789 TEA058 790 TEA06A 791 TE<068 792 TE<07A 793 TE<078 794 TEPOBA 795 TEQOB8 796 TEA 09A-1 797 TEA 09A-2 798 TEA098-1 799 TEA098-2 800 TER10A-1 801 TEQ10A-2 802 TE<108-1 803 TE<108-2 804 TEP21 805 TE<22 806 TE<23 807 TE<24 808 TE<25 809 TE<90A 810 TE<908 811 TE<91A 812 TE<918 813 TE<92A 814 TE<928 815 TE4000 816 TE4001 817 TE<002 818 TE4003 819 TE4004 820 TE<005 821 TE4006 822 TE4007 823 TE-6008 824 TE<009 825 TE<16 826 TE-621 DESCRIPTION D/G A FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK D/G 8 FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK D/G A COOLING WATER EXPANSION TANK D/G 8 COOLING WATER EXPANSION TANK D/G A STARTING AIR RECEIVER 1A D/G A STARTING AIR RECEIVER 18 D/G 8 STARTING AIR RECEIVER 81 D/G 8 STARTING AIR RECEIVER 82 EXCESS LETDN HX OUTLETTEMP RTD(NICKEL)
REGEN HX CHARGING OUTLETTEMPELEM REGEN HX LETDWN FLO TEMP ELEMRTD(NICKEL)
S/G FW "A"TEMP TEMPERATURE ELEMENT RCS LOOP A HOT LEG INSTRUMENTLOOP 401 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT RCS LOOP A COLD LEG INSTRUMENT LOOP 401 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT LOOP A HOT LEG INSTRUMENT LOOP 402 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT RCS LOOP A COLD LEG INSTRUMENT LOOP 402 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT RCS LOOP 8 HOT LEG INSTRUMENTLOOP 403 TEMPERATURE ELEMENTRCS LOOP 8 COLD LEG INSTRUMENT LOOP 403 TEMPERATURE ELEMENTRCS LOOP 8 HOT LEG INSTRUMENT LOOP 404 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT RCS LOOP 8 COLD LEG INSTRUMENTLOOP 404 LOOP "A"HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "A"COLD LEG TEMP ELEM LOOP "A"HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "A"COLD LEG TEMP ELEM LOOP "8" HOT LEG TEMP ELEM LOOP "8" COLD LEG TEMP ELEM LOOP "8" HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "8" COLD LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "A"HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "A"HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "8" HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "8" HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT LOOP "8" HOT LEG TEMP ELEM LOOP "8" HOT LEG TEMP ELEMENT RCS LOOP 8 COLD LEG RTD TO RVLIS, TCOLD RCS LOOP 8 COLD LEG SPARED AT RCS2 RACK PRZR SURGE LINETEMP RTD PRZR SPRAY LINE LOOP "A"TEMPRTD PRZR SPRAY LINE LOOP "8"TEMPRTD PRZR LIQ TEMP RTD PRZR VAPOR TEMP RTD RVLMSTRAINA RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (SENSING LINE)
RVLMSTRAIN8 RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (SENSING LINE)
RVLMS TRAINA RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (SENSING LINE)
RVLMS TRAIN8 RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (SENSING LINE)
RVLMS TRAINA RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (SENSING LINE)
RVLMS TRAIN 8 RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR (SENSING LINE)
CCW HX 8 SW OUTLET TEMP ELEMENT CCW HX 8 INLETTEMP ELEMENT CCW HX 8 SERVICE WATER INLETTEMP ELEMENT CCW HX A SERVICE WATER INLETTEMP ELEMENT CCW HXA SERVICE WATER OUTLET TEMP ELEMENT CCW HX A CCW INLETTEMP ELEMENT SAFW PUMP D COOLER SW INLETTEMP ELEMENT SAFW PUMP C COOLER SW INLETTEMP ELEMENT SAFW PUMP D COOLER SW OUTLETTEMP ELEMENT SAFW PUMP C COOLER SW OUTLETTEMP ELEMENT CCP INLETHDR TEMP ELEM CC HX OUTLETTEMP ELEM CI Bldg Elev 21 YD 253 21 YD 253 21 DG 253 21 DG 253 21 DG 253 21 DG 253 21 DG 253 21 DG 253 19 RC 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 IB 278 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 RC 235 19 RC 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 RC 235 19 Rc 235 19 RC 235 19 Rc 235 19 RC 235 19 RC 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 253 19 RC 253 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 274 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 Rc 235 19 RC 235 19 RC 253 19 Rc 253 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 AF 271 19 AF 271 19 AF 271 19 AF 271 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 A<B R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE Janualy 1997 page 46/59
Table 2 SINA lNechanical and Electrical Equipment EIN 827 TE427 828 TE-684 B 829 Tl-104 830 TI-105 831 TI-2038 832 TI-2039 833 TI-2068 834 Tl-2069 835 TI-2070 836 TI-2071 837 TI-2072 838 TI-2073 839 TI-2074 840 TI-2075 841 TI-3067 842 TI-3072 843 TI-600 844 TI402 845 TI404 846 TI406 847 TI422 848 TI423 849 TI427 850 TI~4 851 TIM6 852 TIES 853 TI466 854 TI468 855 TI%74 856 TIW75 857 TIA-2010 858 TIA-2011 859 TIA-2012 860 TIA-2013 861 TIA-2017 862 TIC-103 863 TIC-107 864 TIC408 865 TICW12 866 TIC421 867 TIG439 868 TLO05 869 TRC03A 870 TRC03B 871 TRC04A 872 TRC04B 873 TS<011 874 TSP012 875 TS-5327 876 TS-5328 877 TS-5329 878 TS-5330 879 TSI01 880 TSI02 881 TSI03A 882 TSI03B 883 Tl-2840 DESCRIPTION RHR Rc RETURN TEMP ELEMENT RHR PMP B SUCTION TEMP IND BORIC ACIDTKATEMP IND BORIC ACIDTK B TEMP IND DIESEL GEN 1A OUTLETTEMP IND DIESEL GEN 1B OUTLETTEMP IND CHG P CLR "B"OUTLETTEMP IND CHG P CLR "A"DISCH TEMP IND SI PMP CLR "A"OUTLETTEMP IND SI PMP CLR "C"OUTLETTEMP IND SI PMP CLR "B"OUTLETTEMP IND RHR PMP CLR "A"DISCH TEMP IND RHR PMP CLR "B" DISCH TEMP IND PENETRATION CLR OUTLETTEMP IND SPENT FUEL POOL HX B TEMP IND SPENT FUEL POOL HX B TEMP IND CCW FROM NON/REGEN HX TEMP IND SAMPLE HX CCW RETURN TEMP IND SW HX CCW RETURN TEMP IND Near P124 - behind RWST RHR "1B" HX OUTLETTEMP IND RHR "1A"HX OUTLETTEMP IND TEMP RHR TO LOOP "B"COLD LEGTEMP IND GAS CMPRSR SEAL WTR HX (1B) TEMP IND GAS CMPRSR SEAL WTR HX (1A) TEMP IND WER('?) - AUXCOOLANTCOMPONENT COOLING WATER TEMP IND SPENT FUEL POOL HX B TEMP IND SPENT FUEL POOL HX B TEMP IND See PID 1247 RHR PMP B RECIRC TEMP IND See PID 1247 RHR PMP A RECIRC TEMP IND "A"CNMTVNT CLR TEMP INDALRM "B"CNMTVNT CLR TEMP INDALRM "C" CNMTVNT CLR TEMP INDALRM "D"CNMTVNT CLR TEMP INDALRM RX COMP CLR TEMP INDALRM BORIC ACIDTKA TEMP IND CONTROL BORIC ACIDTK B TEMP IND CONTROL CCW FROM "A"RCP TEMP IND CONT CCW FROM "B"RCP TEMP IND CONT CCW HX OUTLETTEMP IND CONTR CCW OUTLET FROM RX SUPPORT TEMP INDALARM TURBINE DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL RESERVOIR OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION ACCUMULATORA OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION ACCUMULATORB OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION NITROGEN SURGE TANKA OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION NITROGEN SURGE TANKB TEMPERATURE SWITCH SAFW PUMP PSF01A COOLING FAN TEMPERATURE SWITCH SAFW PUMP PSF01B COOLING FAN TEMPERATURE SWITCH DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A ROOM SUPPLY FAN A1 TEMPERATURE SWITCH DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A ROOM SUPPLY FAN A2 D/G B SUPPLY FAN 23B1 TEMP SWT D/G B SUPPLY FAN 23B2 TEMP SWT REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK SPRAY ADDITIVETANK SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORA SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORB CCW FROM BA EVAP TEMP XTMR CI Bldg flev 19 AB 235 19 AB 219 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 DG 253 19 DG 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 AB 235 19 IB 271 19 AB 235 19 AB 253 19 AB 235 19 AB 235 19 AB 235 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 253 19 AB 271 19 AB 271 19 AB 235 19 AB 235 18 IB 253 18 IB 253 18 'B 253 18 IB 253 18 IB 271 18 AB 271 18 AB 271 18 AB 253 18 AB 253 18 AB 271 18 AB 253 0
IB 253 21 Rc 253 21 RC 253 21 Rc 285 21 Rc 285 18 AF 271 18 AF 271 18 DG 253 18 DG 253 18 DG 253 18 DG 253 21 AB, 235 21 AB 235 21 Rc 235 21 RC 235 19 AB 235 A48 884 TT-2841 CCW TO BA EVAPTEMP XMTR 19 AB 235 885 TW450 LOOP A COLD LEG 19 RC 235 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 47159
DESCRIPTION Table 2 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment EIN CI Bldg Elov AQ6 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 TW451 W1 XCT/DGA-A XCT/DGA-B XCT/DGA-C XCT/DGA-CT1 XCT/DGA-CT2 XCT/DGA-CT3 XCT/DGB-A XCT/DGB-B XCT/DG8-C XCT/DGB-CT1 XCT/DGB-CT2 XCT/DGB-CT3 XPT/DGA-PTA XPT/DGA-PTB XPT/DGA-PTC XPT/DGB-PTA XPT/DGB-PTB XPT/DGB-PTC Y1 Y2 RCS LOOP B COLD LEG RTD TO OVERPRESSURIZATION PROTECTION SYSTEM ALARMAND PPCS T COLD REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTRACK CHANNEL2 WHITE 1 REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTRACK CHANNEL2 WHITE 2 DG A METERING CUR XFMR PHASE A DG A METERING CUR XFMR PHASE B DG A METERING CUR XFMR PHASE C SC-3 DG A VOLTAGE REG CUR XFMR PHASE A SC-3 DG A VOLTAGE REG CUR XFMR PHASE B SC-3 DG AVOLTAGE REG CUR XFMR PHASE C DG B METERING CUR XFMR PHASE A DG B METERING CUR XFMR PHASE B DG B METERING CUR XFMR PHASE C SC-3 DG B VOLTAGE REG CUR XFMR PHASE A SC-3 DG B VOLTAGEREG CUR XFMR PHASE B SC-3 DG B VOLTAGE REG CUR XFMR PHASE C DG A METERING POT XFMR PHASE A DG A METERING POT XFMR PHASE B DG A METERING POT XFMR PHASE C DG B METERING POT XFMR PHASE A DG B METERING POT XFMR PHASE B DG B METERING POT XFMR PHASE C REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTRACK CHANNEL4 YELLOW 1 REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTRACK CHANNEL4 YELLOW2 19 20 20 20 20 RC CB CB DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG DG CB CB 235 289 289 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 289 289 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 48/59
<<I sl li.<<t<<<<r ~
s <<r Table 3 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Eq0ipment<<Outliers EIN 1789 4297 4298 4770C 4770D 4770E 5735 5736 5871 5872 5873 5874 5875 5876 5877 5880 830A 8308 7
875A 8758 876A 8768 90/MCCC 90/MCCD 9
ACF01 ACP02 ACP03 ACP04 AKF07 AKF08 AKP02 DESCRIPTION RCDT OUTLET ISOL AOV TO GAS ANALYZER TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FW PUMP A CONTROL VLVAOV-4297 TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FW PUMP B CONTROL VLVAOV-4298 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP COOLER A SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SAFETY INJECTION PUMP COOLER C SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV SAFETY INJECTION PUMP COOLER B SW OUTLET RELIEF VLV S/G A SAMPLE LINE CNMT ISOL AOV S/G B SAMPLE LINE CNMT ISOL AOV A POST ACCIDENT CHAR FILTER DAMPER INLET ISOL VLV A POST ACCIDENT CHAR FILTER DAMPER OUTLET ISOL VLV A CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV 8 POST ACCIDENT CHAR FILTER DAMPER OUTLET ISOL VLV C CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV C POST ACCIDENT CHAR FILTER DAMPER INLET ISOL VLV D CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV 8 CNMT RECIRC FAN DAMPER ISOL VLV LOOP 8 ACCUMULATORA RELIEF VLV LOOP A ACCUMULATOR8 RELIEF VLV UPPER CNMT SPRAY CHARCOAL FILTER DOUSING MOV-875A UPPER CNMT SPRAY CHARCOAL FILTER DOUSING MOV.8758 LOWER CNMT SPRAY CHARCOAL FILTER DOUSING MOV-876A LOWER CNMT SPRAY CHARCOAL FILTER DOUSING MOV-8768 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C CURRENT LIMITINGREACTOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D CURRENT LIMITINGREACTOR CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATING FILTER AND COOLING UNIT A CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATING FILTER AND COOLING UNIT 8 CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATING FILTER AND COOLING UNIT C CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATING FILTER AND COOLING UNIT D CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY RETURN FAN CONTROL ROOM RETURN FAN CONTROL ROOM AHU A&6 ISSUE AOV on 3/4" line, SRT judged that pipe stresses need to be evaluated.
Cast iron yoke, SRT judged that pipe stresses need to be evaluated.
The anchorage of the SI pump coolers is marginal. Ifthe the coolers shift, the relief valves and piping may be damaged.
x AOV on 3/4" line, SRT judged that pipe stresses need to be evaluated.
Large (48 diameter, ) 1000 Ib) AOVs supported on approximately 6'ong rod hangers'.
The valves are not seismically vulnerable, but their displacement during an earthquake may damage the duct to which they are attached - also noted as an issue for the duct evaluation.
Relief valves on short lengths of pipe coming out of the top of the accumulator tanks.
The valves are also anchored to nearby building steel.
Relative displacement between the top of the tanks and the building steel may damage the valves.
MOVs on 2" lines located high up in containment - the SRT judged that they require evaluation for pipe stress.
Each unit consists of three aluminum wound current limiting reactors (similar to distribution transformers) vertically stackedin a 20 wide x19 deep x90 tall cabinet.
The individual reactors are well secured to their supporting channels, but the SRT judged that the cabinet structure may not be adequate, particularly for loads in the plane of the latticed panels on the front and back of the cabinet.
Air handling equipment on vibration isolators.
10 ACP06 ACP07 BTRYA BTRYB POST ACCIDENT CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT A POST ACCIDENT CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT B BATTERY A BATTERY B Large filter units lapproximately 10'n each side) that are not anchored.
Because of their aspect ratios the units willnot uplift, but they may slide.
If they shift, they may damage the attached ducts.
x There are spacers on the fronts and backs of the cells, but not on the sides of the cells. The anchorage of the battery racks for side-to-side loads does not meet GIP requirements.
R. E. Gjnna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 49/59
Table 3 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Outliers EIN 12 BUS16 13 EAC01A EAC01B EAC02A EAC028 14 IC1,2,3,4,5 NIS1,2,3,4 RMS1,2,3 15 MCB 16 MCCC MCCD MCCH MCCJ 17 MCCL MCCM 18 PAC01A PAC018 DESCRIPTION BUS 16 480 VOLTAC POWER CCW HEAT EXCHANGER A CCW HEAT EXCHANGER B RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 8 INCORE RACK 1,2,3,4,5 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONSYSTEM RACK 1,2,3,4 RADIATIONMONITORING SYSTEM RACK 1.2,3 MAINCONTROL BOARD 480 VAC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER C 480 VAC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER D 480 VAC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER H 480 VAC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER J 480 VAC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER L RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVALPUMP A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVALPUMP B A%6 ISSUE x
BUS16 is adjacent, but not attached, to cabinet ARB1RC16. The clearance varies from 3/8" down to nil at exposed bolt heads.
BUS16 contains chatter sensitive relays.
The anchorage does not screen.
The anchorage evaluation included the inertial load of the heat exchanger itself and the nozzle loads from the attached piping.
Loose doors - maintenance issue x
There are unanchored mail boxes and storage cabinets near the right rear
., comer of the MCB.
x These MCCs are floor mounted and 15" deep.
Per the GIP's equipment class description, an MCC must be at least 18" deep or be top braced.
x A number of the anchors have significant exposed length, so the anchorage embedment may not meet GIP requirements.
The anchorage does not screen.
The anchorage evaluation included the inertial load of the pump itself and the nozzle toads from the attached piping.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE Januaiy 1997 page 50/59
Table 4 SMA Mechanical and Electrical Equipment - Block Wall Outliers 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 EIN 14400S 3996 4000A 4000B 4007 4008 4013 4020 4021 4022 4027 4028 4291 4294 4297 4298 4304 4310 4324 4325 4326 4480 4481 4561S DESCRIPTION IASOV TO AOV4562 (CNMTVENTOUTLET FCV)
TDAFWPUMP DISCHARGE VLVMOV-3996 AFW CROSSOVER VLVMOVAOOOA AFW CROSSOVER VLVMOV<000B MDAFWPUMP A DISCHARGE VLVMOV<007 MDAFWPUMP B DISCHARGE VLVMOV<008 SW INLETISOL MOVTO TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP SUCTION RELIEF VLV AUXFW PUMP A SUCTION RELIEF VLV AUXFW PUMP B SUCTION RELIEF VLV SW INLETISOL MOVTO AUXFW PUMP A SW INLETISOL MOVTO AUXFW PUMP B TURBINE DRIVENAUXILIARYFW PUMP RECIRC VLVAOV<291 CONDENSATE PUMP DISCH TO AUX FW PUMPS PRESSURIZING LINEAOV TURBINE DRIVENAUXFW PUMP A CONTROL VLVAOV<297 TURBINE DRIVENAUXFW PUMP B CONTROL VLVAOV4298 MDAFWPUMP A RECIRC VLVAOV<304 MDAFWPUMP B RECIRC VLVAOV<310 TURBINE DRIVENAUXFW PUMP SW STRAINER BYPASS SOV AUXFW PUMP A SW STRAINER BYPASS SOV AUXFW PUMP B SW STRAINER BYPASS SOV AFW BYPASS VLVAAOV4480 AFW BYPASS VLVB AOV<481 SIGNALSOV FOR AOV4561 (SW OUTLET FROM CNMT CLRS)
Bldg IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB Elev 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 AP6 25 4562 CONTAINMENTFAN COOLERS SW OUTLET FLOW CONTROL AOV BYPASS AOV IB 253 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 4651A 4663 4733 52/BYA 52/BYB 52/RTA 52/RTB 5490P A/C WATER CHILLERA SW OUTLET CONTROL AOV SW INLETINNER ISOL MOVTO CHILLER PACKAGES A & B SW INLETOUTER ISOL STOP/CHECK MOVTO CHILLERPACKAGES A 8 B REACTOR TRIP BYPASS BREAKER REACTOR TRIP BYPASS BREAKER B REACTOR TRIP BREAKERA REACTOR TRIP BREAKER B TDAFWPUMP LUBE OIL REGULATINGVLVTO LUBE OIL COOLER IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 34 35 DPS-2084 MTR DRIVENAUXFWP CW FILTER"1A"DIFF PR SW DPS-2085 MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1B" CW FLTR DIFF PR SW IB IB 253 253 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Fl-2021 B FI-2022B FI-2023B FI-2024B FT-2001 FT-2002 FT-2006 FT-2007 FT-2013 FT-2014 FT-2015 FT-201 5A FT-2032 MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1A"DISCH FLO IND MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1B" DISCH FLO IND TURB DRIVENAUX FW FLO TO S/G" 1A" IND TURB DRIVENAUX FW FLO TO S/G" 1B" IND MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1A"DISCH FLO XMTR MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1B" DISCH FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUX FW FLO TO S/G" 1A" FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUXFW FLO TO S/G" 1B" FLO XMTR MTR DRIVENAUXFWP "1A"DISCH FLOW XMTR MOTOR DRIVENAUXFW PUMP 1B DISCHARGE FLOW XMTR TURB DRIVENAUX FW P DISCH FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUX FW P DISCH FLO XMTR TURB DRIVENAUX FW P TOTALFLO XMTR IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB IB 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 49 MDCDPB/6 TURB DRIVENAUX FEED PUMP DISCH VLV3996 IB 253 50 51 52 PAF01B PAF03 PI-6022 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP B TURBINE DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE DRIVENAUX FEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL PUMP TO COOLER IB IB IB 253 253 253 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 51/59
DESCRIPTION Table 4 SMA Nlechanical and Electrical Equipment - Block Wall Outliers EIN Bldg Elev AQ6 53 54 55 PI%023 PI%024 PT468 TURBINE DRIVENAUXFEEDWATER PUMP OIL DISCHARGE PRESSURE IB 253 TURBINE DRIVENAUXFEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL HEADER PRESSURE GAGE IB 253 IB 253 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSG EMS01A INST LOOP 468 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 PT<69 PT<69A PT<82 TLO05 747A 747B 770 EAC04A EAC04B EAC05A EAC05B EAC05C FI-603 TI402 3410 3411 3504A 3505A MS@V3505A PS-2092 PS-2093 LT-2022A LT-2022B 14900S1 1490082 14901S1 14901S2 1490261 1490262 14903S1 1490362 4269 4270 4271 4272 PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSG EMS01A PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSTEAM GENERATOR EMS01A PRESSURE TRANSMITTERSG EMS01A INSTRUMENTLOOP 482 TURBINE DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL RESERVOIR CCW INLETAOVTO PASS SAMPLE COOLER PASS SAMPLE COOLER CCW OUTLETAOV CCW INLETTO SAMPLE HX'S RELIEF VLV S/G BLOWDOWNSAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGERA S/G BLOWDOWNSAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER B PRESSURIZER LIQUIDSPACE SAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER RC LOOP B HOT LEG SAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGER SAMPLE HX CCW RETURN FLOW IND SAMPLE HX CCW RETURN TEMP IND ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE(ARV) STEAM GENERATOR EMS01B ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE(ARV) STEAM GENERATOR EMS01A S/G B MS MOVTO TURBINE DRIVENAUXFW PUMP S/G A MS MOVTO TURBINE DRIVENAUX FW PUMP MOTOR STARTER FOR MOV-3505A PRESSURE SWITCH SG EMS01A ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE3411 PRESSURE SWITCH SG EMS01B ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE3410 CNDST STOR TK "A"LVLXMTR COST "B" LVLXMTR SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED CONTROL VLV4271 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4271 (S/G A FW CNTRL AOVBYPASS)
SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED VLV4269 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4269 (S/G A FW CNTRL)
SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED CONTROL 4272 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4272 (S/G B FW CNTRL AOV BYPASS)
SOV INSTR AIR ISOL VLVFOR FEED CONTROL 4270 SOV INSTR AIR FOR AOV4270 (S/G B FW CNTRL)
MAINFW CONTROL AOVTO S/G A MAINFW CONTROL AOVTO S/G B FW CONTROL AOV4269 TO S/G A BYPASS AOV FW CONTROL AOV4270 TO S/G B BYPASS AOV IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 253 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 271 IB 278 IB 278 IB 278 IB 278 IB 278 IB 278 IB 278 TB 253 TB 253 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 52i59
Table 5 Seismic/Fire Wajk Down - Combustion Sources Bldg / Elev Drawing ¹ Description Screened7 Comments AB 235 AB 253 AB 271 AB 271 RC 235 DG 253 IB 235 IB 253 IB 253 IB 271 33013-2543 Rev 0 33013-2546 Rev 1 33013-2552 Rev 1 33013-2552 Rev 1 3301 3-2542 Rev 0 33013-2544 Rev 0 33013-2542 Rev 0 33013-2542 Rev 0 33013-2542 Rev 0 33013-2551 Rev 1
Oxygen tanks south of the SI pumps Hz line running along the main corridor and to the VCT room Hz line north of the spent fuel pool Oz line west of the spent fuel pool and south of the decon pit RCP oil collecting tanks Diesel generator day tanks TDAFWlube oil piping Hz monitors and Oz cylinders near column line G4 Hz and Oz valve stations and piping west of containment between column lines H and K Hz and Oz lines between column lines J and N Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes The tanks are well secured.
-4 welded steel pipe - adequately supported.
-4 welded steel pipe - adequately supported.
Penetrates a block wall between the auxiliary and intermediate buildings, but this block wall is well supported between two steel beams about 4'part.
The line is protected from the block wall on the north side of the spent fuel pool by a steel grid.
The line's supports appear to be anchored to the block wall, but the supports are actually welded to a steel beam that has been faced with blocks.
-2 welded steel pipe - adequately supported.
Penetrates a block wali between the auxiliary and intermediate buildings, but this block wall is well supported between two steel beams about 4'part.
Penetrates a block wall on the south side of the auxiliary building (column lines Q /5A). This wall was not designated as safety-related in the 80-11 program.
Not walked down The day tanks are part of the diesel generator skid, which was evaluated (and found adequate) for USI A46. The piping from the day tank to the wall penetration leading the buried fuel oil tanks is well supported.
There is flex piping between the skid mounted piping and the floor mounted piping to accommodate an relative displacement.
Approximately 15'f piping supported on the underside of the 253'loor slab between the fuel tank and the pump - supports are adequate.
Allwell secured and not vulnerable to the F line or 3 line block walls.
The piping and valve stations are well supported and were judged seismically adequate.
This equipment was judged not vulnerable to the block wall on the west side (column line 3) due to intervening equipment.
The valve station and piping at the north end was judged vulnerable to the north block wall (column line H). This wall was not desi nated as safety-related in the 80-11 program.
-2 and -4 welded steel pipe, rod hung, judged adequately supported.
The lines were judged high up enough and/or far away enough to not be vulnerable to the west side block wall (column line 3).
The lines penetrate a block wall on the south side (column line N), but this block wall is well supported between two steel beams about 4'part.
SH 253 33013-2571 Rev 1
House heating boiler No Large, horizontal, gas-fired boiler (approximately 6'iameter, 20'ong) on two saddles.
The boiler and saddles are well constructed, but the saddles are not anchored to the floor. The boiler could shift and damage the attached natural gas line (threaded pipe).
SH 253 33013-2571 Rev 1 Diesel fire pump fuel oil tank Yes The tank sits on a pair of substantial concrete saddles which anchored to the floor slab. The construction of the saddles was judged adequate, but the tank is free to slide longitudinally, and may damage the sweated copper fuel lines leading to the pump. However, the tank and pump is surrounded by a 12 high concrete dike which would contain any spilled fuel ~ so the tank was screened.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 53/59
II 'rw, r i Rl Tabje 5 Seismic/Fire Wajk Dowri - Combustion Sources Bldg / Elev Drawing ff Description Screened?
Comments TB 253 TB 253 TB 253 TB 253 TB 253 TB 253 TB 271 TB 271 TB 271 Yard 253 33013-2544 Rev 0 33013-2544 Rev 0 33013-2544 Rev 0 33013-2544 Rev 0 33013-2544 Rev 0 33013-2544 Rev 0 33013-2550 Rev 3 33013-2550 Rev 3 33013-2550 Rev 3 33013-2544 Rev 0 Hz line from column lines A10 to C10 Hz cylinders at column line F3 Hz cylinders at column line A8 Seal Oit unit at column line D10 Turbine lube oil storage tank and sumps in a cubide west of the EDGs Turbine lube oil reservoir, pumps, and purifier Lube oil line from column lines D5 to D10 Hz lines from column lines A11 to D11 Hz cylinders at column line C11 and D11 Hz storage facility near column Ag Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Welded steel pipe, rod hung, anchorage sound.
Potential interaction with a 3 tier cable tray run and a large diameter condensate - line would be damaged ifeither fell - both were judged adequatel supporled.
The cylinders are adequately supported, but they are adjacent to a block walL The wall was not designated as safe
-related in the 80-11 program.
The cylinders have been removed.
Well constructed mechanical assembly on a well anchored skid. The surrounding fire wall is also sound.
The tank is a large, squat, well-constructed rectangular tank. The tank has 4 anchor bolts-they are not large enough to resist seismic loads, but the tank is too squat to upliftand friction will prevent sliding.
There are numerous unsecured storage tockers and drums for flammables.
These could tip and spill, but the room is enclosed b concrete, 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire-rated walls.
The reservoir is an 8'iameter, 25'ong horizontal tank on two saddles anchored with four 3/4 cast-in-place bolts per saddle.
Adjacent to the tank are a pair of stacked coolers, each 2'n diameter by 25'ong; the stack is about 10'all. The purifier and pumps are short and well anchored.
There is a 3'all steel dike - well constructed and well anchored - surrounding all of the equipment that willcontain any oil that ma spill.
Large diameter welded steel pipe, rod hung, hanger anchorages well engineered.
2 diameter welded steel pipe, rod hung, anchorages
- adequate, no interaction issues.
Cylinders are adequately secured.
Contains numerous Hz cylinders. The cylinders are chained to racks - the racks are adequate but the cylinders are only chained at the top; they could slide out at the bottom and fall. However, this facilit is separated from the turbine building by concrete. 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire-rated walls.
R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 54/59
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Screen house
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R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 58/59
I
Compute the kinetic energy:
Kb=2 f mw'(xgx) =mm' w'(xQx 2
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dx=mm d L/6 L
Compute the potential energy:
PE mgL d'd' mgd Compute the frequency by equating PE to KE:
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Mid-Height Displacement: w
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, iI Figure 4 Rocking Model for Unreinforced Masonry Walls R. E. Ginna Seismic IPEEE January 1997 page 59/59
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