ML17264A017
| ML17264A017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/18/2017 |
| From: | NRC/OCIO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17264A007 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2017-0068 | |
| Download: ML17264A017 (67) | |
Text
OFFICIAL USEONtVm SENSI 1 IVEINTERN)!;L INFORM)!; I ION November 13, 2014 MEMORANDUM TO: Michael I. Dudek FROM:
SUBJECT:
Executive Technical Assistant Office of the Executive Director for Operations Douglas A. Broaddus /RA/
Plant Licensing IV~2 and Decommissioning Transition Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OED0-14-00765 - BRIEFING PACKAGE FOR DROP-IN VISIT ON NOVEMBER 20, 2014, BY EXECUTIVES OF ENTERGY NUCLEAR WITH COMMISSIONERS SVINICKI AND OSTENDORFF, CHIEF OF STAFF ZORN, AND MARK A. SATORI US, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (TAC NO. MF5112)
Enclosed is the briefing package in support of the November 20, 2014, drop-in visit by Messrs. Jeff Forbes, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Timothy G. Mitchell, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, and John F. Mccann, Vice President, Nuclear Safety, Emergency Planning & Licensing, of Entergy Nuclear, with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Christine L. Svinicki, Commissioner William C. Ostendortf, Commissioner Baran's Chief of Staff Jason C. Zorn, and Executive Director for Operations, Mark A. Satorius regarding Jan1es A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Verrr1ont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Palisades Nuclear Plant, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, River Bend Station, Unit 1. and Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3_
This inforrnation has been coordinated with Regions I, Ill, and IV. If you need any additional information, please contact Alan Wang at 301~415~1445 or email: Alan.Wang@nrc.gov or Russell Haskell at 301~415~1129 or email: Russell.Haskell@nrc.gov.
Docket Nos. 50-271, 50-293,50-003, 50-247, 50-286, 50-255, 50-313, 50-368, 50-416, 50-458, 50-382, 50-333, and 50-155
Enclosure:
Briefing package cc w/encl:
W. Dean, NRR J. Uhle, NRR B. Holian, NRR M. Evans, NRR L Lund, NRR G. Wilson, NRR E. Williamson, OGC R. McKinley, RI A Burritt, RI E. Duncan, Rll I R. Lantz, RIV G. George, RIV OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSIIt\\IEJNTERN*L INFORMATION
Pkg ML14303A673. lncorning ML14303A672, Briefing ML14314A094: Closeout Email ML14325A089
'via email OFFICE NRRIDORLILPL4* 1 IPl-1 NRRIDORLILPL4-21PM NRRIDORLILPL4-11LA RllDRPIPB51BC NAME RHaskell AWarig JBurkhardt RMcK1~ley*
DATE 11113114 11113/14 11112/14 11113113 OFFICE Rl1DRPIPB2/BC RllllDRP/63/BC RIVIDRP/RPB-EIBC RIV1DRPIRP6-CIBC NAME TSetzer for ABurriu'
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GGeorge' DATE 11113/14 11/13114 11113114 11113/14 OFFICE NRR/DORLILPLI
- 118C NRR/DORL/LPL3* 1/BC NRRIDORLJLPL4* 118C NRR/DQRLILPL4* 21BC NAME BB"Jasley*
DPeltori' MMarkley*
DBroad11us DATE 11113114 11113114 11113/'14 11113114
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERM*L INFORMATION MEMORANDUM TO: Michael I. Dudek dated November 13, 2014
SUBJECT:
OED0-14-00765 *BRIEFING PACKAGE FOR DROP-IN VISIT ON NOVEMBER 20, 2014, BY EXECUTIVES OF ENTERGY NUCLEAR WITH COMMISSIONERS SVINICKI AND OSTENDORFF, CHIEF OF STAFF ZORN, AND MARK A. SATORIUS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (TAC NO. MF5112)
DISTRIBUTION: OED0-14-000765 NON-PUBLIC LPL 1-1 R/F LPL3-1 RIF LPL4*1 RIF LPL4-2 R/F RidsEdoMailCenter Resource RidsNrrDlr Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl 1-1 Resource RidsNrrDorllpl3-1 Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl4-1 Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl4-2 Resource RidsNrrLAMHenderson Resource RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource RidsNrrLAKGoldstein Resource RidsNrrLAPBlechman Resource RidsNrrMailCenter Resource RidsNrrOd Resource RidsNrrPmANO Resource RidsNrrPmFitzPatrick Resource RidsNrrPrnGrandGulf Resource RidsNrrPmlndianPoint Resource RidsNrrPmPalisades Resource RidsNrrPmPilgrim Resource RidsNrrPn1RiverBend Resource RidsNrrPmVermontYankee Resource RidsNrrPmWaterford Resource RidsRgn1 MailCenter Resource RidsRgn3MailCenter Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION
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OFFICIAt:*usi:**ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION
.. /}U.S.NRC l::t<ITED STATI!S 1'TCLE.AR REGULATORY C O~SION DROP-IN VISIT BY ENTERGY NUCLEAR CHAIRMAN MACFARLANE COMMISSIONER BURNS COMMISSIONER OSTENDORFF COMMISSIONER SVINICKI COMMISSIONER BARAN MARK A. SATORIUS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS November 20, 2014 ADAMS Accession No. ML14314A094 OFFICIAL USE Of~LY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMAIJ,~ON,.____
- OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION DROP-IN VISIT BY ENTERGY NUCLEAR llcoNTENTs II Page number AGENDA................................................................................................................ 1 JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Facility Data.................................................................................................. 2 Reactor Oversight Process Information....................................................... 3 Current Issues.......................................................................................... 4-6 PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION Facility Data.................................................................................................. 7 Reactor Oversight Process Information....................................................... 8 Current Issues........................................................................................ 9-12 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION Facility Data............................................................................................... 13 Reactor Oversight Process Information.................................................... 14 Current Issues...................................................................................... 15-18 INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NOS. 1, 2, AND 3 Facility Data............................................................................................... 19 Reactor Oversight Process Information.................................................. 20 Current Issues...................................................................................... 21-24 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Data............................................................................................... 25 Reactor Oversight Process Information.................................................... 26 Current Issues...................................................................................... 27-33 OFFICIAL.USJii.. ONLY SENSITIVE INTERPIAL INFORMATION
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 Facility Data............................................................................................... 34 Reactor Oversight Process Information..........
.. 35 Current Issues...................................................................................... 36-38 GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Facility Data............................................................................................... 39 Reactor Oversight Process Information.................................................... 40 Current Issues...................................................................................... 41-43 RIVER BEND STATION Facility Data............................................................................................... 44 Reactor Oversight Process Information............................................... 45-46 Current Issues...................................................................................... 4 7-48 WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 Facility Data............................................................................................... 49 Reactor Oversight Process Information.................................................... 50 Current Issues...................................................................................... 51-52 MANAGEMENT DATA Entergy Nuclear Operations Overview...................................................... 53 Topics of Discussion............................................................................ 54-56 Facility Organization.................................................................................. 57 Biographical Data of Principal Managers............................................. 58-60 OfFICIAL USE ON! Y - SENSITIVE INTERNAbtNFORMATIOW---
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OFFICIAL USE ONt:V*** SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION TIME 9:00 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.
11 :00 a.m. - 11 :30 a.m.
2:00 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.
2:30 p.m. **** 3:00 p.m.
3:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.
3:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
Drop-In Visit Agenda November 20, 2014 ITINERARY PERSON VISITED CONTACT PERSON Chairman Macfarlane Catina Goode Commissioner Burns Kathleen Blake Jason Zorn, Chief of Staff Commissioner Ostendorff Linda Herr Commissioner Svinicki Janet Lepre Commissioner Baran Renee Taylor Mark A. Satorius, Executive Jane Kreuter Director for Operations (EDO)
VISITORS REPRESENTING ENTERGY NUCLEAR EXTENSION 301-415-1820 301-415-8420 301-415-1759 301-415-1855 301-415-1839 301-415-1700 Jeff S. Forbes, Executive Vice President, Nuclear Operations & Chief Nuclear Officer Timothy G. Mitchell, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer M Indian Point, Palisades, and Cooper Entergy Nuclear John F. McCann, Vice President Regulatory Assurance TOPICS OF DISCUSSION
Introductions
Entergy Senior Management Changes Current Fleet Performance Nuclear Oversight Review Board Process Plants currently in Comprehensive Oversight Recovery Plans Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee) Shutdown and Decommissioning Shutdown Schedule Emergency Plan Changes Public Outreach OFFtclAt:USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Facility Data James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket No.
License No.
Full Power License Commercial Operation Operating License (OL)
Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Vendor Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
6 Miles Northeast of Oswego, New York (NY)
Oswego County 50-333 DPR-59 10/17/1974 07/28/1975 10/17/2034 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 Mark I 2536 Megawatts thermal (MWt) (852 Megawatts electric (MWe))
-o1'1'1C1AL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE "ITERNAl. INFORMAIION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITlllF INTERNAi INEORMAILO~N __ _
Reactor Oversight Program Information James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Mid-Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determined that overall, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick) was operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives. The NRG determined the performance at FitzPatrick during the most recent quarter was within the Regulatory Response Column (Column 2) of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix, because all inspection findings had very low safety significance (Green) and one performance indicator was of low to moderate safety significance (White) in the Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, the "Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours" performance indicator exceeded the Green/White threshold value in the fourth quarter of 2012. From January 20 through 24. 2014. NRC inspectors conducted the onsite portion of a supplemental inspection for the White performance indicator in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 95001, 'Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." The NRG inspectors concluded that the corrective actions taken by FitzPatrick to preclude repetition of the unplanned power changes were not sufficient ta meet the inspection objectives. As a result, the inspection was not closed and remains open until additional corrective actions, including the replacement of the condenser tubes during the current refueling outage, have been completed. The NRG will review Entergy Nuclear's (Entergy's) implementation of these additional corrective actions during a future inspection. The performance indicator will continue to be a White ROP Action Matrix input until the performance indicator results allow it to transition below the Green/White threshold.
The latest mid~cycle assessment letter (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14241A040) was issued on September 2, 2014.
The following uniforrn resource locator is for the FitzPatrick ROP Performance Summary web page:
http:/ in rr10. nrc.gov/N RR/OVERSIGHT I ASS ESS/FITZ/fitz chart. html OFFICIAi llSE ON! Y-SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION OFFiCIAL USE ONLV:CSENSI I IVE IN I ERN)!;LINFORMAI ION Current Issues James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant A
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Main Condenser Tube Leakage: Since the fall 2010 refueling outage, FitzPatrick has experienced numerous main condenser tube leaks. Entergy staff has identified two aging management failure modes: 1) wastage of the tubes near the tube sheet outlet which produces relatively small holes, and 2) linear defects along the tube axis which results in larger 'fishM mouth' ruptures. During the 2012 refueling outage, the licensee took the interirn corrective action to install 18~inch sleeves at the outlet of the tube sheet in the admiralty brass tubes (the tube bundle is a mix of admiralty brass and titanium tubes). Inspectors peliormed a 95001 supplemental inspection associated with the degraded unplanned down powers performance indicator the week of January 20, 2014. The condenser was replaced during the August September 2014 refueling outage.
Weapons Preemption: The FitzPatrick security force currently uses weapons and large~
capacity magazines that are banned by State and local laws. Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRC to preempt State, local, and certain Federal firearms laws to perrriit such use. Order EA~13~092, "Order Designating an lnterirr1 Class of NRC~Licensed Facilities that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authorization to Use the Authority Granted under the Provision of Section 161 A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," designated FitzPatrick as eligible to apply for weapons preemption. By application dated August 30, 2013, Fitz Patrick submitted a Title 1 O of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 O CFR) Section 50.90 license amendment application to apply for weapons preemption, The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) has the technical lead for this review and is currently reviewing it. The final products will be a confirmatory order and conforming license amendment.
The confirmatory order and conforming amendment will permit security personnel at FitzPatrick to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use certain firearms and large capacity ammunition feeding devices not previously permitted to be owned or possessed under Commission authority, notwithstanding certain local, State, or Federal firearms laws, including regulations that prohibit such actions.
Current Status Unit reporting 100 percent of reactor power.
Labor/Management Issues None.
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- OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION License Renewal Activities None.
Escalated Enforcement. Non~Green Findings and Non~Green Performance Indicators FitzPatrick currently has one (1) White performance indicator (Pl) in "Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours," due to down powers associated with main condenser tube leaks. This Pl became white in the 4th quarter of 2012. A 95001 inspection was pertormed onsite during the week of January 20, 2014; however, this inspection currently remains open.
The NRC will close this inspection after reviewing Entergy's implementation of additional corrective actions (condenser replacement) during a future inspection.
The current projection is that this Pl will remain White through the 2nd quarter of 2015. The condenser was replaced in the summer of 2014. The staff will evaluate this Pl at the 2014 end of cycle meeting.
Open Investigations None.
Open Allegations There is currently one ( 1) open allegation.
Congressional Interest NRC staff briefed a staffer to Representative Dan Maffei (Democrat (D)-NY) on responses to letters dated January 24, 2014, and November 14, 2014, from Senator Markey and Senator Sanders on financial requirements for merchant plants, particularly how it may affect FitzPatrick.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions EDO # G20130211 - Alliance for a Green Economv etaL !March 18. 2013)* The petitioner requests that the NRG immediately suspend the operating licenses of the Vermont Yankee and FitzPatrick, stating that Entergy, the licensee, no longer meets the financial qualifications requirements to possess the licenses and operate the plants. The petitioner also requested that the NRC begin an investigation to determine whether the operating license for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) must also be suspended.
On June 2, 2014, the NRG issued a voluntary request for information to Entergy in order to evaluate the petition. The letter requested 5~year pro~forma cost and revenue projections for FitzPatrick and Pilgritn. Entergy did not submit all of the requested information and instead directed the NRC to Entergy Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. The NRC staff is currently reviewing the response to the request for information.
OFFICIAL 1 ISE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAI:LJSEOI'1LY=SENS1TIVEINTERNALINFORNIATION EDD# G20130561 - David Lochbaum (July 25, 2013): The petitioner requests that the NRC impose a regulatory requirement that all the condenser tubes be replaced at FitzPatrick prior to the reactor restarting from its fall 2014 refueling outage.
On October 17, 2014, the Director's Decision was issued (ADAMS Accession No. ML14247A318) denying the enforcement action.
EDD# G20120172-Beyond Nuclear et.al. (March 9, 20121: The joint petitioners requested that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended because they believe the operator relies on non-conservative and wrong assumptions for the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners requested that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushirna Dai-ichi nuclear accident Tile joint petitioners did not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi.
The NRC staff conducted an integrated review of Fukushima-related 2.206 petitions to identify opportunities for closure of identified issues. On June 26, 2014, the petition manager informed the petitioner that the Petition Review Board (PRB) is still waiting on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process regarding FOIA 2013-0010 to be completed. The next step is to schedule a second public meeting or teleconference between the PRB and petitioner after the petitioner receives and reviews FOIA information for FOIA 2013-0010.
Significant Reportable Events None.
Selected News Articles None.
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- OFFICIAt:*US!: ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket No.
License No.
Full Power License Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level NSSS Vendor Facility Data Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
4 Miles Southeast (SE) of Plymouth, Massachusetts (MA)
Plymouth County 50-293 DPR-35 06/08/1972 12/0111972 06/08/2032 BWR-3 Mark I 2028 MW! (688 MWe)
General Electric OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION
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OFFICIAL USE ONtV SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Reactor Oversight Program Information Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Mid~Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC deterrnined the perforrnance at Pilgrim during the most recent quarter was within the Degraded Cornerstone Column (Column 3) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because two White performance indicators were crossed in the Initiating Events cornerstone, In the third quarter of 2013, the unplanned SCRAMS with complications performance indicator crossed the Green to White threshold, which moved Pilgrim to the regulatory response column from the licensee response column. Due to a SCRAM on October 14. 2013, Pilgrim crossed the Green to White threshold for a second performance indicator far unplanned Scrams per 7000 critical hours.
Therefore, in addition to ROP baseline inspections, the NRC is conducting a supplemental inspection in accordance with IP 95002, "Supplemental Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area".
The latest mid-cycle assessment letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14241A398) was issued on September 2, 2014.
The following uniform resource locator is for the Pilgrim ROP Performance Summary web page:
http://nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/PILG/pilg chart.html
.OFFICIAL USE ONlY-SEl4SITIVE INTERl~At:*JNFORMAI ION
\\JFFICIAL USE ONL't' *SENSITIVE ltffERNAl INFORMATION Current Issues Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Containment Venting: The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) Venting Strategy for Extended Loss of Alternating Current Power scenarios does not envision venting until approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown. Opening the Hardened Containment Vent System (HCVS) Torus Vent at this time provides effective Containment Heat Removal at a rate sufficient to preclude additional rise in the torus temperature, which stabilizes and then begins to slowly drop over the subsequent hours. The reliable operation of HCVS can be met because the HCVS is fully qualified and powered by the 125 volt direct current (DC) system and will be provided with an independent pneumatic system supplied from nitrogen bottles to operate the HCVS valves. Critical instruments associated with containment and the HCVS are DC powered and can be read locally and in the main control room. The HCVS provides sufficient Containment Heat Removal for a prolonged station blackout event, while maintaining containment pressure well below the design value. The HCVS is intended for use as one element of a comprehensive core damage prevention strategy.
Relations with the Local Community: There are individuals and groups in the general vicinity of the plant who actively engage the NRC and Entergy with concerns and questions. The Region I office provides responses to the public by telephone and email. In addition, the NRG holds public meetings in the area and remains available to answer the Board of Selectman's requests.
Primarily these groups are Pilgrim Watch and Ecolaw.
Emergency Planning Zone: The Emergency Planning Zane (EPZ) around Pilgrim has received considerable attention from public stakeholders who feel that the EPZ should be expanded from the current requirement of 10 miles. This issue arose after Chairman Jaczko recommended evacuating U.S. citizens to 50 miles from the plant, following the accident at Fukushima.
(Recent Offsite Activities) Entergy provides funds to the surrounding towns for their emergency preparedness programs. This is not required under NRC regulations and the NRC does not make comment on these contractual agreements between the licensee and offsite agencies.
These contractual agreerr1ents appear to be a source of contention between the licensee and the town's emergency response agencies. For example, last year, the Town of Taunton was seeking to purchase a cover for their new basketball court. The gym is used as a reception center during an emergency_ According to Entergy, they believe there has been a good faith effort in the negotiations of these contracts. The offsite agencies may not support that view.
Cape Cod is located just outside the 1 O~mile EPZ. Non~government organizations representing the island have been soliciting the expansion of the 1 Q.m ile EPZ to include the evacuation of the island. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has ownership of this issue and supports shadow evacuation with respect to the Cape. The State has held several public meetings on this topic OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL IN FORMAT.ION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSlTIVE IN I ERNAllNF'ORMATION and has recently conducted (with the assistance from Entergy) a traffic study of the Cape. The study is to be used in evacuation time estimates to assist the Commonwealth in their protective action decision making.
The Region I State Liaison Officers have conducted outreach initiatives with the Town of Plyrnouth. There have been two occasions the Town Select Board has invited the NRG to attend: (1) a meeting/briefing in 2012 with the Town Chairman and {2) a public meeting in 2013 to address questions from the Board of Selectmen. The NRC has accepted and supported these invitations.
Current Status Unit reporting 100 percent of reactor power.
Labor/Management Issues Pilgrirn has four unions and has labor agreements in place with all four of these unions.
However, a prolonged job action (lockout) occurred in 2012 when an agreement could not be reached with Pilgrim radiation protection, chemistry, operations and maintenance personnel.
This contract was extended on May 16, 2012, and then again on May 25, 2012, to provide more time for contract negotiations. On June 5, 2012, contract negotiations failed and Entergy locked out the union. The lockout lasted for 33 days until July 8, 2012, when Entergy and the union reached an agreement on a contract through May 15, 2016. During the lockout, the NRC provided 24-hour coverage and oversight at the site. Replacement crews operated the plant safely, including performing a number of power manipulations. Reintegration activities were observed to ensure safe transition back to norrnal crew operations. Also, the United Government Security Officers of America, Local 25, and Entergy recently reached a contract agreement to extend their contract through October 1, 2017.
License Renewal Activities None.
Escalated Enforcement. Non-Green Findings and Non-Green Performance Indicators None.
Open Investigations None.
Open Allegations Three allegations are currently open. In Calendar Year 2014, seven allegations have been received regarding activities at Pilgrim, two which were licensee supplied wrongdoing. This number is not a significant number of allegations relative to the industry median. The nun1ber of allegations has slightly increased this year (seven) as compared to average of 3.4 for the previous 5 years.
OFFICIAL I !SE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Congressional Interest There is an increasing level of congressional attention to the emergency evacuation plans for the areas surrounding Pilgrim and a 2.206 petition submitted by Pilgrim Watch related to emergency preparedness (EP) concerns. Representative Bill Keating (D-MA) sent a letter to the Chairman in April with concerns about onsite and offsite emergency plans. Senator Markey*s office also has been engaged on this issue. Chairman Macfarlane had a courtesy visit to Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) in July 2014 and discussed seismic and flooding issues.
Senator Warren wrote to the Chairman about these issues in an April 18, 2014, letter. Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) has been active in the media in criticizing the decisions made by the NRC to relicense Pilgrim before all efforts to improve nuclear and environmental safety at Pilgrim since the Japan tsunami have been resolved. Senator Markey's office inquired about Entergy's request to withhold information from public disclosure on responses to NRC staff questions related to Holtec casks.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions On March 18, 2013, Mr. Tim Judson on behalf of Alliance for a Green Economy, Citizens Awareness Network, and Vermont Citizens Action Network ("the petitioners), requested that the NRC immediately order Entergy to suspend operations at Vermont Yankee and FitzPatrick and commence a proceeding per 10 CFR 50.33(f)(5) with respect to Pilgrim, to determine Entergy's "ability ta continue the conduct of the activities authorized by the license and to decommission the facility**. The petitioners assert that Entergy is not financially qualified to continue to operate Vermont Yankee and FitzPatrick and that the same may be true of Entergy's qualifications to operate Pilgrim. The immediate enforcement action requested by the petitioner was not granted by the NRC petition review board. The petition is currently being evaluated by the NRC staff.
On August 30, 2013, Ms. Mary Lampert of Pilgrim Watch requested that the NRC take enforcement action to ensure that Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Plan and Standard Operating Procedures/Guidelines are based on accurate and credible evacuation time estimates {ETEs). The petitioner maintains that Entergy's ETEs for Pilgrim are based on inaccurate assumptions and simply are not credible. The petitioner further stales that the ETE's fundamental assumptions and data were flawed, which explains the ETE's conclusion that even in the worst case scenario, everyone in the emergency planning zone will be evacuated in about 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The petitioner discussed the results of the Cape Survey and maintains that it was not properly used to determine Pilgrim's ETE. The PRB's initial recommendation was to reject the petition for review based on the fact that the updated ETE, in question, was prepared in accordance with the NRC guidance. The PRB has made a final recommendation to management.
On September 16, 2014, Ms. Mary Lampert on behalf of Pilgrim Watch and Cape Downwinders requested that the NRG take some enforcement action against Pilgrim's operating license to ensure that sufficient land*based security at Pilgrim is in place to provide reasonable assurance of the protection of the public health and safety. The petitioners assert that owner-controlled area protections are eroded at Pilgrim and insufficient to thwart a potential attack.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE IN1'ERNAl INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONtY=SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATIOM Significant Reportable Events None.
Selected Nows Articles Voters Approve Larger Emergency Planning Zone Around Pilgrim Plant. The Cape Cod (MAI News (11/6/14) reports, "Voters in the Cape and Islands senate district voted strongly in favor of a non-binding question to expand the radiological Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone around the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth." Supporters of the ballot question want to "extend" the Pilgrim plant EPZ to "include Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket counties, which would cover Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket" The question was "placed on the ballot by the group Cape Downwinders," which believes that "Cape Codders will be in jeopardy in the event of a nuclear accident because current plans call for Cape Codders to shelter in place while residents closer to the plant in Plymouth will be allowed to evacuate."
The Cape Cod (MAl Times (11/5/14, Legere, 86K) reports, "Voters in 12 Barnstable County towns, along with those in Nantucket and Dukes counties, were asked to support" the nonbinding Pilgrim plant referendum question calling for expansion of the "emergency planning zone around the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth ta include the Cape and Islands."
Currently, Cape and Islands residents "would be expected to 'shelter in place' in the event of a radioactive release, at least until residents within the 10~mile radius of Pilgrim, known as the emergency planning zone, have cleared out.
The Martha's Vineyard Times (11/5/14, 47K) adds that in the "non-binding referendum to expand the emergency planning zone around the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant to include all of Barnstable County, Martha's Vineyard, and Nantucket, Island voters overwhelmingly approved the measure, 4,693 to 1,510."
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY.. =.. SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION Facility Data Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket No.
License No.
Full Power License Commercial Operation License Renewal Issued OL Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containn1ent Type Power Level NSSS Vendor Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Vernon, Vermont (VT) (5 Miles South (S) of Brattleboro, VT)
Windham County 50-271 DPR-28 0312111972 1113011972 03/21/2011 0312112032 BWR-4 Mark I 1912 MWt (612 MWe)
General Electric OFFICIAt* USE ONLY - SENSITIVEINTERPIAL INFORMAT.IOJll OFFICIAL USE ONI Y SENSLILVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Reactor Oversight Program Information Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Mid~Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC deterrnined that overall, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (Vermont Yankee) operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives. The NRG determined the performance at Vermont Yankee during the most recent quarter was within the Licensee Response Column (Column 1) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because all inspection findings had very low {i.e., Green) safety significance, and all performance indicators demonstrated that their performance was within the nominal, expected range (Le., Green).
The mid-cycle assessment letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14241A029) was issued on September 2, 2014.
The following uniform resource locator is for the Vermont Yankee ROP Performance Summary web page:
http://nrr10.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/VY/vv chart.html OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNALINFORMATtoN OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION Current Issues Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Refer to page 55 for Vermont Yankee decommissioning discussion.
Current Status Unit reporting 86 percent of reactor power.
Unit scheduled to cease power operations during fourth quarter of 2014.
Labor/Management Issues None.
License Renewal Activities None.
Escalated Enforcement. Non-Green Findings and Non-Green Periormance Indicators None.
Plant Operation Planned work sometimes reveals more degradation than expected, such as water in the underground cables, resulting in increased corrective maintenance and 0L1tage times. In addition, Entergy has identified an increasing number of preventive maintenance tasks being in deep grace periods and has developed a recovery plan partially consisting of reconsidering preventive rr1aintenance in order ta reduce or eliminate any unnecessary tasks.
Open Investigations None.
Open Allegations There is one open allegation related to the licensee's fitness-for-duty program.
Current Events Entergy has been successful in maintaining morale and expectations within the work force with respect to continued station operation; however, there has been an increased emphasis on financial concerns due to electricity markets and regulatory costs. This has resulted in OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSI I IVEINTERNAL ll~FORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONL't' SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION evolutions that require a power reduction to take place overnight and a l1uman capital management process that will result in changed staffing, Congressional Interest The VT delegation, particularly Senator Bernie Sanders (Independent (1)-VT), has been interested in Entergy's plans to retire Vermont Yankee in December 2014. Senator Sanders (along with Senators Markey, D-MA, and Boxer, D-California (CA)) sponsored legislation (S.2326) to allow states and tribal governments have more input/participation on the decommissioning plans for reactors. Other topics of interest include the timeline for the entire decommissioning process, spent fuel pool safety and the transfer of spent fuel to dry storage, and the level of funding accumulated in the decommissioning trust fund.
Senator Boxer's staffer (who also works for Senator Markey) was briefed in April 2014 on NRC's decommissioning funding formula and actual decommissioning costs for Vermont Yankee. The staffer also met with Dan Donnan in September and discussed Vermont Yankee's pending closure. Staff to Senator Markey and Senator Sanders were briefed by NRG staff in October 2014 on ernergency preparedness exemption requests during decommissioning.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions None.
Significant Reportable Events None.
Selected News Articles Vermont Yankee has had a long history of significant media interest in the day-to-day operations of the plant. Media interest continues at a high level.
Entergy Says Cut In Emergency Planning Necessary. The Rutland (VT) Herald (11/1, Smallheer, 38K) reports, "Officials from Entergy Nuclear defended their request to federal regulators to drop much of their emergency planning efforts once Vermont Yankee ceases generating electricity, saying the staffing would cost the plant's decommissioning trust fund
$100 million until 2020." According to the Herald, Entergy VP T. Michael Twomey "told the state's Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Board that unless the company's request is granted, the money will have to come out of the plant's $640 million decommissioning trust fund." Twomey said "that would fL1rther delay the actual cleanup and dismantling of the plant, estimated to cost $1.24 billion."
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel To Meet Again Thursday. The Brattleboro (VT) Reformer (10/28, 22K) reports, the Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel "will hold its second meeting Thursday, Oct. 30, from 6 to 9 p.n1., at Vernon Elementary School."' Panel members will "discuss the Vermont Yankee" nuclear plant site assessment study that was released last week, in which Entergy "announced it would be placing the plant into SAFSTOR following its permanent shutdown at the end of this year."
Panel members "will also receive an update on changes Entergy is requesting to the plant's emergency response plan." A "portion of the meeting has been set aside for public comment.
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERM*L INFORMATION Vermont Yankee Shutdown Expected To Cost $1.24B. Friday, Vermont Yankee nuclear plant officials revealed "it could cost up to $1.24 billion to decommission the reactor," the AP (10/18, Gram, 2.47M) reported. Authorities indicated that "they currently have about half that much in a fund dedicated to paying for that work." Bill Mohl, president of Entergy Wholesale Commodities, a subsidiary of Vermont Yankee owner Entergy Corp., revealed that "the tally is based on federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules allowing a reactor owner to mothball the plant for up to 60 years to allow radioactive components to become less so and to allow the fund to grow."
In its announce111ent, Entergy Vermont Yankee said it had selected the "SAFSTOR remediation option authorized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," the Brattleboro (VT)
Reformer (10/20, Audette, 22K) reports. Entergy said its study revealed that the "earliest clean-up of the site could begin is 2053, but Mike Twomey, Entergy vice president for external affairs, said that date is a worse~case scenario using the conservative estimates" the NRG "requires the industry to use when estimating a timeline for decommissioning activities." The state "had hoped Entergy could begin decommissioning of the site perhaps as soon as all the fuel was moved out of the spent fuel pool, in 2020, but the site assessment released Friday punctured that notion."
On its website, Vermont Public Radio (10/17, Keese, 1K) reported that the newly released Site Assessment Study "predicts a price tag of about $1.24 billion," which is twice the "worth of the plant's decommissioning trust fund, which currently has about $640 million." Those numbers are important "because of a 2013 settlement between Entergy and the state. In the deal, Entergy agreed not to delay dismantling the plant for the 60~year 'SAFSTOR" period allowed by regulators after the plant closes in December." Instead, Entergy agreed to "begin decommissioning when it has enough money to complete the process."
Vermont ANR Issues Thermal Discharge Permit for Yankee Nuclear Plant. The Brattleboro IVTI Reformer (10/14, 22K) reports, "On Oct 13, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources issued the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System thermal discharge permit for Vermont Yankee in Vernon." ANR, "acting on Vermont Yankee's Sept. 30, 2005, application, permitted Vermont Yankee's thermal discharge through Dec. 31, 2015." The "two-year permit properly addresses the discharge from the facility while it is generating power, allows the company time to establish a post-closure operation regime, and allows ANR time to evaluate and permit the facility's post-closure discharge." Agency of Natural Resources Secretary Deb Markowitz said "In issuing this permit, the Agency's responsibility to address Vermont Yankee's thermal discharge has been met."
The Burlington IVTI Free Press (10/13. Hallenbeck. 88K) adds that David Deen of the Connecticut River Watershed Council, which sought higher standards than had been allowed, said, "This is a much better permit.., The permit "governs how much the discharges are allowed to raise the river's water temperature." Meantime, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources Secretary Deb Markowitz, said, "We tried to strike a balance between meaningful protection for fisheries while acknowledging this is temporary. Our goal is not to overburden them with new rules." The new "discharge permit shortens the amount of time the nuclear plant can discharge water to 85 degrees, the highest temperature allowed during the warmest part of the year, Deen noted."
Entergy Outlines Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant Shutdown Plan. An Entergy official detailed some of the company's plans to shut down the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant during a Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel meeting on Thursday, the AP {9/28, 2.47M) reported. The Entergy official claimed that "the company expects to have the plant's OFFICIAi I ISE ONLY.SENSITIVli INTliRNl\\b INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE*lNTERNAL INFORMATION spent fuel moved into dry cask storage by the end of 2020." The representative "also said the company would complete a decommissioning site assessment in the next 30 days, ahead of the deadline."
VTDigger (9/26, Herick, 1 K) reported that Entergy Nuclear said last week that "spent radioactive fuel will be removed from the reactors at the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant by 2020." But the company also said it does "not know when it will begin tearing down Vermont Yankee after it stops producing power in December." Yankee plant has "already begun to slow power production and plans to cut 40 percent of its workforce by January. Entergy VP Mike Twomey said the cornpany will "release a report outlining the preliminary cost of decommissioning by October," but it will begin the process "only when it has enough money in a special trust fund to complete the operation."
Vermont Yankee Citizens Decommissioning Panel to Meet September 25. The Brattleboro
{VTl Reformer (9/23, 22K) reports, the first meeting of the Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel, which was created to succeed the Vermont State Nuclear Advisory Panel, will be held September 25, at Brattleboro Union High SchooL The agenda includes a "discussion of the mission of NDCAP; an overview of the Settlement Agreement reached between Vermont and Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee; and Vermont Yankee decommissioning and stakeholder assessment findings." Additionally, Vermont Yankee representatives will "present a summary of current decommissioning activities at the plant's site in Vernon." The Reformer includes a list of all 19 members of the Vermont Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel.
Vermont Yankee Begins Coastdown Period Toward December Shutdown. The Bennington (VT) Banner (9/18, Faher, 22K) reports, Vermont Yankee plant operators have "officially" begun their march toward shutting down the plant. Entergy announced Tuesday that Yankee plant has "started a 'planned gradual reduction of plant energy output-a so~called coast~down period."'
Plant officials said there has not yet been "any significant decrease in staffing, as the plant's
'engineers and technicians continue to focus on safe plant operations as their highest priority."'
The Banner adds that Vermont state and local officials "have been working to brace for the impact" of the plant's closure, and Entergy has "agreed to contribute millions toward economic development and renewable energy efforts locally." In a statement, Entergy said, "Reactor power level and associated electrical generation will gradually decrease during this period due to the depletion of the fuel in the reactor and will culminate with the plant shutdown targeted for late Decernber."
NRC Questions Request To Reduce Vermont Yankee Emergency Planning. Vermont Public Radio (10/23, Keese, 1K) reported on its website that the NRC is questioning Entergy's assertions that the risk of accidents is negligible after Vermont Yankee stops operating and its spent nuclear fuel has been moved ta its spent fuel pool. Entergy made the assertion in a request to the agency to "scale back emergency planning" once the fuel is moved. But the NRC said some of Entergy's assertions are "inaccurate." Acknowledging the low possibility of a fire, the NRC "said that the warst~case scenario of a fire warrants a post~shutdown protective action plan for the public in the vicinity of the plant." NRG spokesman Neil Sheehan said, "We want to understand why their license amendment request does not speak clearly to what would happen if there were to be a severe accident involving the spent fuel pool."
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Facility Data Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Units 1, 2, and 3 Utility:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Location:
County:
Buchanan, NY (24 Miles North of New York City)
Westchester County Docket Nos.
License Nos.
OL Issuance Date Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date Ceased Power Operation PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level NSSS Vendor UNIT 1 50-003 DPR-5 0312611962 0811962 NA 1013111974 UNIT 1 pressurized water reactor (PWR)
Dry Volume 615 MWt (257 MWe)
Babcock & Wilcox UNIT2 50-247 DPR-26 0912811973 0810111974 0912812013 UNIT2 PWR (4-Loop)
Large Dry 3216 MWt (1020 MWe)
Westinghouse OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERN Al INFORMATION
" 19 "
UNIT3 50-286 DPR-64 1211211975 08/3011976 1211212015 UNIT3 PWR (4-Loop)
Large Dry 3216 MWt (1025 MWe)
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITlllF INTERNAi INEQRMAI!QtL Reactor Oversight Program Information Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Units 1, 2, and 3 Mid-Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC determined that overall. Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station (Indian Point) was operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives. The NRC determined the performance at Indian Point, Units 2 and 3, during the most recent quarter was within the Licensee Response Column (Column 1) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because all inspection findings had very low (i.e., Green) safety significance, and all performance indicators demonstrated that Indian Point's performance was within the nominal, expected range (i.e., Green). Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct ROP baseline inspections at the facility.
The latest mid~cycle assessment letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14239A518) was issued on September 2, 2014, The following uniform resource locators are for the Indian Point ROP Performance Summary web pages.
http://nrr10.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/IP2/ip2 chart.html (Unit 2) http:!/nrr1 O.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT /ASSESS/IP3/ip3 chart.html (Unit 3)
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION Current Issues Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Units 1, 2, and 3 A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Indian Point Unit 2 Entry to the Period of Extended Operation: Unit 2 entered the period of extended operations at midnight September 28, 2013. Unit 2 and 3 license renewal applications meet the timely renewal provision of 10 CFR 2.109(b). The current operating license of Indian Point 3 will expire in December 2015.
Spectra Energy's Proposed Natural Gas Pipeline (AIM Project): Spectra Energy (Spectra) approached Entergy during the summer of 2013 about plans to expand their natural gas pipeline capacity across the Hudson River with a new 42-inch diameter pipeline. On February 28, 2014, Spectra filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG) for a certificate to build a new 42-inch natural gas pipeline. The new pipeline would cross the southeast portion of the owner controlled property and would be approximately one*half mile further south of the existing 30*inch and 26-inch natural gas pipelines.
Entergy performed a site hazards analysis to determine the impact of the new natural gas pipeline on the site pursuant ta 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee submitted their analysis on the docket for public inspection via letter dated August 21, 2014. In the area closest to the Indian Point site, Spectra agreed to enhance this portion of piping by burying this portion of the pipeline deeper, incorporate thicker wall piping, providing additional cathodic protection, and providing a top cover plate of concrete for increased physical protection. Considering this new robust design, Entergy concluded that the site hazards analysis for the new 42*inch gas pipeline would be enveloped by t11e existing site hazards analysis perforn1ed for the existing 30-inch gas pipeline. NRC inspectors and staff reviewed the 50.59 safety evaluation and supporting hazard analysis, conducted a walk-down of the proposed pipeline routing, and performed an independent analysis of the potential hazards associated with failure of the proposed pipeline. The results of this inspection were issued in the 4th quarter 2014 integrated inspection report (ADAMS Accession No. ML14314A052) on November 7, 2014. The new gas pipeline has gathered significant local attention.
Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis: The existing Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) criticality analysis of record takes credit for Boraflex inserts which have been observed to degrade non-uniformly. A public meeting was held on August 26, 2013, with the licensee and its contractor, NETCO. to discuss the license's long-tenn SFP management program (meeting summary at ADAMS Accession No. ML13256A079). The licensee has acknowledged that the existing Unit 2 technical specifications for SFP criticality are nonwconservalive and compensatory measures have been implemented. The licensee has initiated a 4-year SFP management program that is scheduled for completion in 2016. A new criticality analysis. which is being prepared by NETCO, will not take credit for the Boraflex inserts but will take credit for newly designed neutron absorbing inserts. The licensee plans to submit the SFP criticality
......... QFFICl.<\\L USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION analysis for NRG review and approval in late 2014. Holtec will design and install new neutron absorbing inserts that will be bounded by the criticality analysis (install of inserts should be by 2016). Following NRG review and approval of the criticality analysis. Entergy will submit a license amendment request (LAR) proposing the new neutron absorbing inserts and revised technical specifications. Entergy plans to install the new neutron absorbing inserts in two phases pursuant to 10 GFR 50.59. Phase 1 will be conducted in late 2015 and will include SFP cells showing the most Boraflex degradation. Phase 2 will be performed in late 2016. The licensee asserts that the Unit 2 SFP criticality analysis of record is being maintained through a combination of the computer program RAGKLIFE and BADGER (Boron-10 Areal Density Gage for Evaluating Racks) testing.
Weapons Preemption: The Indian Point security force currently uses weapons and large~
capacity magazines that are banned by state and local laws. Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRG to preen1pt state, local, and certain federal firearms laws to permit such use. Order EA-13-092, "Order Designating an Interim Class of NRC-Licensed Facilities that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authorization to Use the Authority Granted under the Provision of Section 161 A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," designated Indian Point as eligible to apply for weapons preemption. By application dated August 30, 2013, Indian Point submitted a 10 GFR 50.90 license amendment application to apply for weapons preemption. NSIR has the technical lead for this review and is currently reviewing it. The final products will be a confirmatory order and conforming license amendment. The confirmatory order and conforming amendment will permit security personnel at Indian Point, to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use certain firearms and large capacity ammunition feeding devices not previously permitted to be owned or possessed under Commission authority, notwithstanding certain local, state, or federal firearms laws, including regulations that prohibit such actions.
Current Status Both Unit 2 and Unit 3 reporting 100 percent of reactor power.
Labor/Management Issues None.
License Renewal Activities There are three unresolved contentions at present; additional contentions have been filed or are expected. Eleven contentions have been resolved: one was settled, two were resolved in favor of NY, and eight were resolved in favor of the Entergy and the staff.
There is no schedule at present for continuation of the evidentiary hearings on license renewal.
The schedule is likely to be set after the NRG staff issues Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
Supplement No. 2 in late 2014; the hearings will likely be held in 2015. The hearings are to address three "Track 2" safety contentions, one of which is to be addressed in SER Supplement 2. Hearings on the nine "Track 1" contentions were held in October~
December 2012. The Board issued its decision resolving those contentions on November 27, 2013. Petitions for review of the Board*s decision have been filed by Entergy, the staff. the State of NY, and Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., and are pending before the Commission.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~*SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION
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OFFICIAL US!:*ONLY SENSITlllf INTERNAi IN.EORMATION I
Supplement 2 to the SER related to the License Renewal of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 was issued on November 6, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML14310A798, ML14288A608 and ML14310A803).
Escalated Enforcement. Non~Green Findings and Non~Green Performance Indicators None.
Open Investigations There are three (3) open investigations.
Open Allegations There are eight (8) open allegations.
Congressional Interest The Indian Point delegation (particularly Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY)) have raised concerns about emergency preparedness and evacuation plans. Senator Gillibrand's staff has been briefed on aging management issues related to Entergy's relicensing application and, to a lesser degree, there is still interest in tritium sampling/groundwater contamination activities. The status of the license renewal review is of interest to the congressional offices.
Indian Point generates significant interest amongst the Congressional, State and Local government representatives. Their most recent issues of concern are those related to the Fukushima event The three main topics of interest were ( 1) the plant being located near a seismic fault, (2) the adequacy of the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) and (3) the capability of evacuating New York City should a similar event occur.
Both the Governor of NY and the Attorney General's office are on record regarding their desire that the Indian point plants cease operation. State agencies are highly engaged on all activities related to Indian Point. The licensee has an extensive outreach program with those offsitc representatives and it appears at this time, the licensee's relationship with the four surrounding counties has rr1uch irr1proved since the installation and subsequent approval of the new offsile siren system.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues There are no current open Harassment and Intimidation (H&I) issues. Four investigative H&I were closed in 2014. A separate case in which an employee alleges he/she has been retaliated against is currently being investigated by the Department of Labor.
2.206 Petitions None.
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. 23.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY=SENSlTIVEINTERNALINFORNIATION Significant Reportable Events None.
Selected Nows Articles None.
-OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE.INTERNAi INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket No.
License No.
Full Power License Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level NSSS Vendor Facility Data Palisades Nuclear Plant Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
5 Miles S of South Haven, Michigan (Ml)
Van Buren County 50-255 and 72-7 DPR-20 0312411971 1213111971 03/2412031 PWR Dry, Ambient Pressure Containment 2565 MW! (778 MWe)
Combustion Engineering (CE)
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SNSff\\VEINTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAilJSCUNLV SENSITIVE INTERNAL IMFORMATION Reactor Oversight Program Information Palisades Nuclear Plant Mid-Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC determined the performance at Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) during the most recent quarter was within the Licensee Response Column (Column 1) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because all inspection findings had very low (i.e., Green) safety significance, and all Pertormance Indicators indicated that the licensee's performance was within the nominal, expected range (i.e., Green}. Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct ROP baseline inspections at the PNP facility.
The latest mid~cycle assessment letter {ADAMS Accession No. ML14245A298) was issued on September 2. 2014.
The following uniform resource locator is for the PNP ROP Performance Summary webpage:
http//nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/PALl/pali chart.html OFFICIAL USE ONlY~ilffERNAL INFORMATION-OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Current Issues Palisades Nuclear Plant A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Entergy Participation at Public Meetings (Questions and Answers (Q&AU: Entergy's policy not to participate in the End-of-Cycle Q&A sessions at public meetings was observed by Chairman Macfarlane at a recent PNP public meeting. The Entergy corporate office was exploring a change to this policy. Resolution is currently outstanding.
Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT): In May 2011, SIRWT leakage into the control room was identified. The licensee applied an American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case evaluation to justify continued operation with a leaking SIRWT while starting up from a refueling outage in April 2012. Leakage exceeded the Operational Decision~
Making Instruction (ODMI) limit and the licensee implemented a forced outage in June 2012.
The licensee repaired the tank and restarted the PNP reactor on July 10, 2012, after developing an ODMI from ASME Code Case requirements. A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) (ADAMS Accession No. ML12199A409) was issued on July 17, 2012, which included licensee commitments to closely monitor SIRWT leakage. Leakage of about 1 gallon per day was rnonitored and continued operation was allowed until May 5, 2013, when operators shut down the plant after a SIRWT nozzle weld failed resulting in a leak of about 80 gallons from the SIRWT to the roof, down roof drains, and to drains that go to Lake Michigan. The released radioactivity was below any regulatory limits and did not impact the safety of plant workers or the public. The licensee subsequently replaced most of t11e SIRWT bottom, made other repairs, and made modifications to ensure any water leaking from the SIRWT would be collected. No leakage from tile SIRWT has been noted since t11ese repairs in 2013.
In January 2014, the licensee affirmed that permanent plant modifications made to preclude an in1pact on safety~related Structures, Systems, and Components, and to correct the adverse condition which had allowed leakage through the control rootn ceiling, were complete and the CAL could be closed. NRC follow-up inspections were performed during the May 2014 Problem Identification and Resolution (Pl&R) inspection, which concluded that all CAL commitments were satisfied and the CAL was closed on June 20, 2014.
QQ.r:!!f.QLBQQ.. Qr]Y.~.. fY.1.@gb~n.l~!n.. {Q.13.Q.Ml.21.. b.QM§LIJ.9.; The licensee shut down the plant to repair CRDM number 24 housing pressure boundary leakage on August 12, 2012, due to unidentified primary coolant leakage exceeding 0.3 gallons per minute (gpm)_ An NRC Special Inspection team investigated the issue. The cause of the leakage was a 118-inch long crack in the upper housing wall located about 2 feet above the reactor head. The licensee replaced and tested the CRDM 24 housing. Based on the location of the fault. the licensee concluded that CRDM 24 experienced a through-wall crack due to transgranular stress~corrosion cracking. The licensee conducted an extent of condition analysis and inspected eight additional CRDMs to determine if any other CRDMs had similar cracks. The inspections identified no additional cracks. In OFFICIAi llSE ONI Y - SENSITIVE INTERNAl..JNF-ORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION response to NRG questions about some of the inspections and analyses, the licensee performed additional analyses to provide reasonable assurance that the plant was safe to restart. A follow~up inspection during the first quarter of 2013 reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation and corrective actions. Non-cited violations were issued for the failure to prevent recurrence of a leak and inadequate extent of condition regarding other susceptible welds. In February 2014, follow-up testing identified cracks in or near a particular weld in 17 CROM housings. The licensee has replaced all the CROM housings (flawed and unflawed) with an improved design which eliminated the weld.
Safety Culture: The licensee contracted a safety culture assessment from an independent party in April 2012. The results of the survey indicated that 75 percent of respondents did not believe they could openly challenge management decisions, only 65 percent felt management wanted concerns reported, and 32 percent felt management tolerated harassment and retaliation for raising safety concerns. The licensee developed an action plan to address these safety culture issues.
In Noverriber 2012, the 95002 Supplernental Inspection team reviewed the site's safety culture.
The inspectors identified resources, communication challenges, alignment and coordination across departments, and trust of department level managers as the biggest challenges facing the site. Inspectors also determined that the site had many processes in place that weren't fully engrained in the organization. The site relied heavily on individuals in their respective positions instead of processes to drive key programs. The inspection team concluded the safety culture was adequate and improving.
In 2013, the NRG received several concerns related to safety culture, particularly in the area of safety conscious work environn1ent (SCWE). The NRG con1pleted a limited scope Pl&R inspection in February 2014 which focused on departments with indications of a potential negative trend in SCWE. Performance related to SCWE within the Mechanical Maintenance Work Group and Chemistry Department appeared acceptable, but the NRC identified a chilled work environment in the Security Department. The NRC inspectors concluded that the licensee's rnanagement learn did not recognize the extent of SCWE~related concerns within the Security Department until they discussed the results of this inspection with the licensee. The licensee subsequently developed the Security Department SCWE Action Plan to address the issues identified by the NRC.
In June 2014, the NRC conducted a Pl&R inspection that determined that although all the actions in the Action Plan were complete, implementation of the Action Plan had been insufficient to understand the cause of the chilled work environment within the Security Department and did not demonstrate a strong commitment to improving Security Department SCWE.
On July 18, 2014, the licensee formally responded to the NRC's request for an outline of additional actions taken or planned to improve the SCWE in the Security Department at PNP.
The Region Ill staff, in conjunction with headquarters' SCWE subject matter experts, continues to monitor this issue. A SCWE inspection is scheduled for early December 2014.
A Confirmatory Order was issued on July 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14203A082), as a result of a successful Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) session. The licensee requested the ADR session to address an apparent violation following an investigation to determine whether employees at PNP willfully failed to follow the security plan requirements, when a security manager assigned a security operations supervisor ta perform duties without confirming OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAt:*tNFORMAI ION OFF'ICIAlUSEONLV=SENSITIVEINTERNAllNF'ORMATION whether the supervisor had the appropriate qualifications. Tl1e investigation also assessed whether the security operations supervisor assumed those duties. The investigation was completed on January 9, 2014, and concluded that both the security manager and the security operations supervisor willfully violated 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B. II B., Qualification Requirements," and PNP Security Plan Section 3. 1.
Spent Fuel Storage: On February 28, 2013, the NRC issued Amendment No. 250 (AOAMS Accession No, ML13056A514). The amendment revised the Technical Specifications to allow replacing the region I main spent fuel pool storage racks and the storage racks in the SFP north tilt pit with new neutron absorber Metamic-equipped racks. Replacing the storage racks in fall 2013 recovered formerly unusable storage locations in the spent fuel pool and restored full core offload capability. Fuel assemblies stuck by old*rack neutron absorber degradation were successfully removed.
The licensee has loaded 18 Energy Solutions VSC-24 storage casks on the older of two independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pads. The licensee has loaded 11 Transnuclear (Nutech Horizontal Modular Systems) NU HOMS 32 PT and 13 Transnuclear NU HOMS 24 PTH canisters in horizontal storage modules on the newer of two pads. The VSC*
24 Certificate of Compliance expired on May 7, 2013, and is currently in a period of timely renewal. NRG is currently reviewing the submittal from Energy Solutions for renewing the Certificate of Compliance for up to 40 years. Also, the licensee is transitioning to the Holtec HI*
STORM FW system during the next loading campaign scheduled for spring 2015, Tritium: PNP has had periodic tritium leaks since December 2007 from waste receiver tanks and associated piping to site grounds, Monitoring wells have identified the leaks and the licensee has corrected several leaks. The licensee has rnade significant progress in replacing piping to eliminate the problen1. These efforts have reduced, but not eliminated the tritium source, Currently, the highest detected tritium level is approximately 108,000 pCi/I in a monitoring well. In 2013. the licensee completed re-lining an underground line suspected to have contributed to some of the tritium identified in the well samples. The licensee is monitoring san1ple results to assess wt1ether the repairs have had an irr1pacl. Monitoring wells toward the site's northern, eastern, and southern boundaries continue to show no detectable tritium. The nearest drinking water supply samples in the comrnunity of South Haven north of the plant and Palisades Park south of the plant continue to show no tritium.
Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Analysis: By letter dated December 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13346A136), the NRC staff reviewed updated fluence calculation submitted by the licensee and determined that the proposed date of August 2017 (where it was previously April 2017) for PNP to reach the 10 CFR 50.61 PTS screening criterion was acceptable. The analysis indicated the site has one of the most limiting vessels in the United States. On July 29, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14211A520), the licensee submitted an LAR for implementation of the newly developed rule in 10 CFR 50,61a, "Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events." The regulation in 10 CFR 50.61a was published in the Federal Register with an effective date of February 3, 2010, and provides fracture toughness requirements for protection against PTS events for PWR pressure vessels that are better informed and less restrictive than the requirements of 10 CFR 50.61. Section 10 CFR 50.61 a requires plant*specific examination and assessment of flaws in the reactor vessel beltline, where 10 CFR 50,61 does not. PNP performed the additional examination and assessment in 2014. The LAR dated July 29, 2014, is currently under NRC staff review and, if approved, would authorize operation though the current end*of-life of the plant in 2031.
. QFf.ICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERPIAb INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY'=SENSI I IVE IN I ERNAL INFORMATION Primary Coolant Purnp {PCPl Impeller Piece in the Reactor Vessel: PNP's PCP impellers are susceptible to cracking of the leading edge of the impeller and the subsequent generation of loose impeller pieces in the primary coolant system. One impeller piece is firmly wedged between the reactor vessel wall and the flow skirt. Attempts to remove the piece during the 2014 refueling outage were unsuccessfuL The licensee believes the cause is cavitation-induced darr1age when the PCPs are operated under low pressure, high flow conditions during plant warmup and cooldown. ln1pellers that were refurbished after prior damage are more susceptible to cracking. One of the four PCP impellers currently installed has been refurbished.
The licensee performed extensive evaluations to support operation with the impeller piece in the vessel, including a review of thermal stresses, mechanical forces, and potential for the piece to break apart. Experts from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office of Research (RES) supported Region Ill staff and the inspectors in evaluating the issue to ensure the current reactor vessel configuration is acceptable, and that if tile piece became dislodged. it would not result in an unsafe condition.
Current Status Unit reporting 100 percent of reactor power.
Labor/Management Issues None.
License Renewal Activities None.
Escalated Enforcement. Non~Green Findings and Non~Green Performance Indicators None.
Open Investigations There are three open investigations. One relates to a leak from above the control room and two relate lo allegations of discrimination.
Open Allegations There are currently eight open allegations. Five allegations are associated with Office of Investigation (01) activities and three allegations are associated with technical concerns within the security department.
From July 2013 to June 2014, the NRC received 11 allegations regarding PNP. Seven allegations pertained to safety culture in the security department and three pertained to health physics issues.
Congressional Interest Congressional interest on Palisades has been mainly focused on the SCWE issue. On March 6, 2014, NRC staff from Region Ill briefed staff from the offices of Senator Carl Levin (D-MI),
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION----
OFFICIAL USE ONLl'*=*SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATIOM Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Senator Nelson (D-Florida (FL)), Representative Fred Upton (Republican (R)-MI), staff from the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and staff from the Senate Energy and Public Works Committee on the results of the SCWE inspection report and annual assessment. The Oversight committees and the Michigan delegation were also sent the Confirmatory Order on July 21, 2014. The NRC's Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) has also been periodically updating key staff to Representative Upton on various other PNP activities.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions There are three open 2.206 petitions. The first petition requested enforcement related action against the licensee due to the ongoing issues with the PCP impeller. The second petition requested enforcement related action against the licensee due to the ongoing SCWE issues in the Security Department. Both petitions are being reviewed by the petition review boards to determine if any enforcement related action is necessary.
There is also an open 2.206 petition requesting an in1mediate shutdown of all nuclear sites which are known to be located on or near an earthquake fault line. The petition review board is currently evaluating this petition in light of the ongoing FL1kushima-related activities.
Significant Reportable Events None.
Selected News Articles FEMA Officials "Impressed" With First Responders In Simulated Attack at Palisades Plant. W..H.I~::AM. Holland, Ml (11 /1, 487) reported on its website, "Preliminary results from a three*day training exercise earlier this week, by first responders and emergency personnel frorn Allegan, Van Buron and Berrien counties, held at the Palisades nuclear power plant near Covert, were disclosed yesterday." FEMA officials "say that they were impressed with the locals' response from a sirnulated attack at the facility."
Watchdog Groups Look to Hold Events Over Palisades Plant. On its website, WWMT*TV Grand Rapids, Ml (9/22, SK) reported that a watchdog group called Michigan Safe Energy Future, is holding events all this week to educate people about the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant." The group is touring West Michigan, "hoping to educate people about what they call the dangers in their own back yard." This week the group is calling for Palisades to shut down before the plant has any type of meltdown." The article notes that last July the NRC "told Palisades to step up its safety culture in light of a security breach that happened in 2012."
There will be multiple events happening around West Michigan. Tuesday, a presentation will occur at Old Dog Tavern in Kalamazoo at 5:30pm. WWMT-TV Grand Rapids, Ml (9/22. 6:34 a.m. EDT, 34K) also broadcast the story.
NRC Lists Palisades Plant in Top Category, Despite "Chilled Work Environment." The Holland (Mil Sentinel (9/6, Hayden, 42K) reports, Palisades nuclear power plant "near South Haven was listed as one of 78 highest~peliorming reactors in the nation" in a recent NRC OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSI I IVE IN I ERNAL INFORMATIQN-OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION-assessment, even though "the 'cl1illed work environment' in t11e plant is still being investigated."
According to NRC official Eric R. Duncan, the agency "determined that overall, Palisades Nuclear Plant was operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives." Palisade's spokesperson Lindsay Rose welcomed the news: We are pleased that the NRC has agreed that we have operated safely through the year and that Palisades remains in Column One of the NRC's reactor oversight process -
it's highest safety category."
"Chilled Work Environment" Seen in Security Department at Palisades Plant. In continuing coverage of the Kalamazoo (Mil Gazette (8/27, Zipp, 55K) series on Palisades plant safety issues, the Gazette examines the plant's safety culture in light of concerns raised by former plant security officials. Chris Mikusko and Roland Ruby worked in the security department "for a combined 38 years when they were terminated at the end of 2013." In complaint filings with the US Department of Labor. the two former security shift supervisors "allege that they were laid off as retaliation for raising concerns about procedural violations and safety concerns in their department." Mikusko and Ruby's firings were "at the heart" of an NRC report of an inspection "earlier this year that found a *chilled work environrr1ent' in the security department." In that report, other security staff said they [also] believed the two men's terminations were a result of retaliation ~ a view echoed by their lawyer. On its website, WMAQ-TV Chicago (8/26, Coffey, 222K) also reported on the allegations of retaliation at Palisades plant, and notes the NRG has "identified a 'chilled work environment' within the plant's security department" after staff perceived that "two supervisors were terminated after raising concerns and that security management was unresponsive to employees' concerns."
One of the former security supervisors, Chris Mikusko, said the situation is "dangerous." When people "are afraid to raise concerns over the fear of losing their job and that's what's going on out there." Fellow former supervisor Roland Ruby said "managerr1ent should know better,"
adding that instead of acting on the concerns, "management just decided to turn the other way, to look at us as troublemakers." The NRC "said it pays close attention to safety culture issues because they can be precursors to violations of NRC regulations and a decline in plant safety or security." But, an "NRC spokesperson said it is important to note that there has been no degradation" in the deparlrnenl's ability to protect of the plant WMAQ-TV Chicago (8/26, 6:11 p.m. CDT, 94K) also broadcast the story.
2013 Said to Have Been "Turnaround" Year for Palisades Plant. In continuing coverage of the Kalamazoo (Mil Gazette (8/26, Zipp, 55K) series on Palisades plant safety issues, the article notes that NRC regulators and Palisades Nuclear Plant officials point to "2013 as a turnaround year for the plant "after a troubling 2011 and 2012, which saw eight unplanned shutdowns in two years." After those troubles, the NRC "launched two special inspections in as many months and temporarily knocked down the plant to 'Column 3' status," designating it among the worst-performing nuclear plants in the United States." But NRC Region Ill Administrator Cynthia Pederson said "We've seen improved performance at Palisades. Through our extra inspection effort, we are even more confident that is so."
Problems at Palisades Plant Detailed. The Kalamazoo Gazette published an "in-depth look at Palisades" nuclear plant, "from its physical integrity and safety record to its history and role in Southwest Michigan's economy." In the first installment, the Kalamazoo (Ml) Gazette (8/25, Zipp, 55K) notes that the plant experienced a "year of recovery in 2013, following "two problematic years that saw multiple unplanned shutdowns and the plant temporarily reclassified as among the four worst-performing reactors in the country." The article notes that NRC's administrator for Region 111, Cynthia Pederson, and other NRC regulators "say that problems with the plant have not gone away entirely and the turnaround is not yet complete."
\\JFF1CIAL USE ONLY-rn-SENSITl\\'E INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Plant's Benefits to Local Economy Abound. The Kalamazoo (Ml) Gazette (8125, Mack. 55K) notes that when the plan ta build Palisades was first announced in the mid~1960s, "fears about nuclear energy were largely offset by excitement of what the plant would mean for the local economy." Fifty years later, that dynamic persists, as "anti-nuclear activists clamor to shut the plant down," while "governrnent and business officials say the Palisades Nuclear Plant plays an important role in the region's economy. The article notes how the plant is the largest taxpayer in Van Buren County, and the second largest employer, providing "high-skill, high-wage jobs that communities crave." Losing the plant would create a huge hole in the local economy.
Troubles Began Early at Palisades. Part of the problem with the public perception of Palisades plant has been that litany of problems that have cropped up almost from the time the facility "opened on New Year's Eve in 1971 -
more than a year later than scheduled," the Kalamazoo (Ml) Gazette (8125. Zipp, 55K) reports. Palisades suffered its "first radioactive leak 13 months later, when tubes in the steam generator sprung pinhole leaks, causing the plant to be shut," an "inauspicious start to what had been heralded as an economic windfall for Southwest Michigan." In 1973 the plant experienced "mare leaks in the stcarn generator, as well as other issues," prompting regulators to order Palisades offline for 19 months. In 1974, Consumers Power Co. "replaced 27,000 tubes in the steam generator," and "sued the builders of the plant." Bechtel Power Corp.
Reactor Vessel Embrittlement a Big Concern at Palisades. The Kalamazoo (Mil Gazette (8/25, Zipp, 55K) reports that while Entergy and NRC officials insist Palisades plant remains safe to operate, the reactor vessel is one of the most "embrittled" in the country, "putting it at risk of cracking." The Gazette notes that Entergy ordered ultrasonic tests of the reactor earlier this year, as it "looks to take advantage of a 2010 regulatory change that allows embrittled nuclear plants to operate longer. According to the results of those tests, which were conducted by Westinghouse and are available on the NRC's website, '*Palisades' vessel *passed all of the surveillance data statistical tests for each material.'" The NRC will now examine those results, in what Viktoria Mitlying; senior public affairs official for the NRC calls a "pretty lengthy review process."
Palisades Timeline of Events. The Kalamazoo (Mil Gazette (8/25, Zipp, 55K) assembles a timelinc of events at Palisades Nuclear Plant "chronicled using Kalamazoo Gazette archives, Associated Press reports, Nuclear Regulatory Commission reports and other news sources."
....... OFFICIAL.USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAI:LJSEOI'1LY=SENS1TIVEINTERNALINFORMATION Facility Data Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
Full Power License Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level NSSS Vendor Entergy Operations, Inc.
75 Miles NW of Little Rock, Arkansas (AR)
(Dardanelle Reservoir)
Pope County UNIT 1 UNIT2 50-313 50-368 DPR-51 NPF-6 05/21/1974 09/01/1978 12/19/1974 03/26/1980 05/20/2034 07/17/2038 UNIT 1 UNIT2 PWR PWR Large Dry Large Dry 2568 MWt 3026 MWt (883 MWe)
(912 MWe)
Babcock & Wilcox Combustion Engineering (CE)
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Reactor Oversight Program Information Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Mid~Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC deterrnined that overall, Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and 2 (ANO), were operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives. The NRC determined the performance at ANO, during the most recent quarter was within the Degraded Cornerstone Column (Column 3) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because of one or more Greater-than-Green Security Cornerstone inputs and one Yellow finding in the Initiating Events Cornerstone for both Units. In a letter dated July 29, 2014, the NRG updated its assessment of ANO, to be in the Degraded Cornerstone Column of the ROP Action Matrix beginning the first quarter of 2014 based on the inputs referenced above.
In addition to ROP baseline inspections, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection to review the actions taken to address the perforrnance issues associated with the Yellow findings in accordance with IP 95002, "Supplemental Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." This supplemental inspection will provide assurance that the root and contributing causes of risk-significant performance issues are understood, that the extent of condition and the extent of cause of risk-significant performance issues are identified, and that corrective actions for risk-significant performance issues are sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. This inspection will also determine if safety culture components caused or significantly contributed to the risk-significant performance issues. The NRG will plan this inspection activity when written notification is provided of readiness for the inspection.
The NRC has completed a supplemental inspection to review the actions taken to address the performance issues associated with the Greater-than-Green input in the Security Cornerstone.
The NRG is continuing the review of the results of the inspection and will document those results in a future inspection report.
Although plant pertormance was within the Degraded Cornerstone Column, the NRG is still evaluating potential Greater-than-Green issues related to Unresolved Item 05000313/2013011-05; 05000368/2014009-01, "Flood Barrier Effectiveness." These issues will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 2014009. The final safety significance determination for this issue may affect the NRC's assessment of plant performance and the inspection plan going forward for ANO.
The latest mid-cycle assessment letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14240A070) was issued on September 2, 2014.
The following uniform resource locators are for the ANO ROP Performance Summary web pages.
tittp;//nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/AN01 /ano1 ctiarl.html (Unit 1) http://nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/AN02/ano2 chart.html (Unit 2)
-OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION OFFiCIALUSEONl:TCSENSI I IVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Current Issues Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Hallee Spent Fuel Drv Cask (10 CFR Part 721 Exemption During spent fuel dry cask loading in the ANO Unit 1 SFP area on September 12, 2014, control room ventilation isolated. The CR isolated on a high rad reading (Kr-85) from the helium circulating through the cask for drying.
As a result, the licensee conservatively assumed a greater than pinhole leak/crack in the loaded spent fuel assembly(s). A Part 72 exemption request was submitted October 2, 2014, in order to complete dry storage of the cask and move it to the ISFSI. The licensee requested approval by November 4, 2014, in order to support planning for the January 2015 Unit 1 refueling outage and Unit 1 SFP level instrumentation installation (Order EA-12-051). NRC staff review of the request is ongoing (Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)).
ANO. Units 1 and 2. NFPA-805 License Amendment Request: ANO submitted its license amendment request to transition to an NFPA-805 fire protection progran1 for Unit 1 on January 29, 2014. The licensee's application is currently under review by the staff. ANO submitted its license amendment request to transition to NFPA~805 for Unit 2 on March 27, 2012. As part of the staffs acceptance review process, additional information was identified as required in order for the application to be accepted. A supplement to the application was submitted by the licensee on July 10, 2012, after multiple public meetings both onsite at ANO and at NRG Headquarters. After an additional supplement to the application from the licensee, dated December 17, 2012, the NRC staff accepted the application and commenced review.
The NRC staff's Safety Evaluation is in the final stages of review.
Current Status Both ANO Units 1 and 2 reporting 100 percent reactor power. The ANO Unit 1 refueling outage is scheduled during January 2015 and the ANO Unit 2 refueling outage is scheduled during fall 2015.
Labor/Management Issues None.
License Renewal Activities None.
.QFf.ICIAL.USli ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION
. OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSI I IVE IN I ERNAL llilFORMA'l IOIQ Escalated Enforcement. Non.Green Findings and Non.Green Performance Indicators Security (White): The licensee failed to ensure that safeguards information was protected against unauthorized disclosure. Specifically, it was determined that a storage disc containing safeguards information was removed from the licensee's safeguards storage container sorr1etirne in 2008 and discovered unsecure on Novernber 14, 2013. The deficiencies were promptly compensated for or corrected.
In NRC Inspection Report 2014406 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14164A059) dated June 18.
2014, the NRC documented the final significance determination for low to moderate security significance (White) findings in the Security Cornerstone for ANO.
Failed Temporary Hoisting Assembly (Yellow): The licensee failed to provide adequate oversight for the planned movement of the Unit 1 turbine stator in March 2013 using a temporary hoisting assembly. More specifically, the licensee failed to identify deficiencies in a vendor calculation and an incorrectly sized component in the north tower structure of the terriporary hoisting asserribly. In addition, the terr1porary hoisting assembly was not designed for at least 125 percent of the projected hook load, and a load test was not performed in all configurations for which the temporary hoisting assembly would be used. As a result, on March 31, 2013, while lifting and transferring the Unit 1 main turbine generator stator, the temporary overhead crane collapsed causing the 525-ton stator to fall on and extensively damage portions of the plant, affecting safety-related equipment. The deficiencies were promptly compensated for or corrected.
In NRC Inspection Report 2014008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14174A832) dated June 23, 2014, the NRG documented the final significance determination for substantial safety significance {Yellow) findings in the Initiating Events Cornerstone for ANO.
Flooding (Preliminarv Yellow): The licensee failed to protect safety-related equipment in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary and emergency diesel fuel storage buildings from flooding due to degraded flood barriers. Tt1e causes for the degraded flood barriers included inadequate design, construction, and maintenance of those barriers. Examples included over 100 unsealed or degraded penetrations, un-isolable floor drains, and open ventilation ductwork. The deficiencies were promptly compensated for or corrected.
In NRC Inspection Report 2014009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14253A122) dated September 9, 2014, the NRC documented preliminary substantial safety significance (Yellow) findings in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone for ANO. The regulatory conference was held on October 28, 2014: the final significance determination is pending.
Open Investigations There are currently two open investigations for potential willful violations. The first is for the inadequate design and review of the stator temporary hoisting assembly. The second is for inadequate maintenance of the safety analysis report description of radwaste storage.
Open Allegations There are currently three open allegation cases. Two are related to the potential wrongdoing cases referenced above that are being investigated by 0 I. A third case involves a potential m.QFj;ICIAL I !SE ONI Y - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAi I ISE ON! y SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION willful violation of station procedures involving fire watch tours, which was identified by t11e licensee.
Congressional Interest Recent congressional interest for this plant has centered on the ANO Inspection (Flooding)
Report. Specifically, congressional staff has inquired about ANo*s preliminary Yellow finding significance and plant performance. On September 12 and 17, 2014, staff to Senators John Boozman (R-AR), Mark Pryor (D-AR), and Ed Markey (D-MA) were briefed on the ANO flooding report. The briefing included a recap of the March 31, 2013, stator drop event and a thorough explanation of the degraded flood barrier violations. It is our understanding that Entergy also met and interacted with congressional staff to discuss their ANO flooding issues.
On October 28. 2014. the NRG held its Regulatory Conference with Entergy to discuss the preliminary Yellow finding. Prior to this meeting, OCA was notified that Senators Boozman and Pryor requested the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to release sensitive flood control information to the licensee in order ta support the licensee's evaluation of the safety significance of the flooding concerns. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers declined the request Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions None.
Significant Reportable Events On December 9, 2013, the Unit 2 auxiliary transformer exploded. The debris caused an electrical fault on startup transforrner 3, one of two off site power supplies. The reactor tripped and the licensee performed a natural circulation cooldown to cold shutdown using startup transformer 2, the other offsite power supply, and emergency diesel generator B for electrical power, In response to tho explosion, operators declared a Notification of Unusual Event.
terminating it after the fire subsided and taking corrective actions to stabilize the plant's power supplies. There were no radiological releases due to lhis event.
Selected News Articles None.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION
6fflCIAt:*usi:**ONt't' SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Facility Data Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket No.
License No.
Full Power License Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level NSSS Vendor Entergy Operations, Inc.
25 Miles South-Southwest (SSW) of Vicksburg, Mississippi (MS) 37 Miles North-Northwest (NNW) of Natchez. MS Claiborne County 50-416 NPF-29 1110111984 07101/1985 1110112024 BWR-6 Mark Ill 4408 MWt (1500 MWe)
General Electric OFFICIAL USE ONLY-Sl:NSITIVE INTERPIAL INFORMATION...
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITlllE INTERM*L INFORMATION Reactor Oversight Program Information Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Mid-Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC determined the performance at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (Grand Gulf) during the first quarter of 2014 (1 Q/FY14) was within the Regulatory Response Column (Column 2) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix due to the licensee's safety~significant Pl for Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours, which crossed the Green-White threshold during the first Quarter 2013 The NRC completed the supplemental inspection, in accordance with IP 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," on June 20, 2014, to address the White PL As a result of this inspection, Grand Gulf transitioned to the Licensee Response Column (Column 1) effective at the end of the second quarter 2014 (2QIFY14). Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct ROP baseline inspections at Grand Gulf In the 2013 Annual Assessment Letter dated March 4, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14063A338), the licensee's staff was informed that the NRC planned to conduct IP 92723, "Follow-up Inspection for Three or More Severity Level IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the Sarne Area in a 12-Month Period, to follow-up on four traditional enforcernenl violations that had been identified during the last assessment period. This inspection is scheduled to be performed during the third quarter 2014.*
The latest mid-cycle assessment letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14239A413) was issued on September 2, 2014.
- 1p 92723 was actually performed in the fourth quarter 2014.
The following uniform resource locator is for the Grand Gulf ROP Performance Summary web page:
http:/ In rr10. nrc.qov/N RR/OVERSIGHT I ASSESS/GG 1/gg1 chart. html OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONtY=*SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Current Issues Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Licensee's Efforts Regarding Pertormance: During 2012 and 2013, Grand Gulf was in a cycle of declining performance. On top of having a White pertormance indicator for unplanned scrams, the results of the 2013 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) assessment saw Grand Gulf drop in INPO rating. Since the INPO assessment, Grand Gulf has implemented a site recovery plan with the very clear goal of returning to Column 1 of the ROP action matrix and achieve an improved INPO rating.
A key focus of the senior leadership at Grand Gulf was putting the right people in the right positions to achieve success. They utilized the Entergy Human Capital Management (HCM) process to move people around within the organization and to bring in new people (tram outside Grand Gulf and Entergy) to fill key leadership roles. The most notable are:
General Manager - Plant Operations Maintenance Manager (non-Entergy)
Director of Regulatory and Performance Improvement (non-Entergy)
Site Projects Senior Manager (non-Grand Gult)
Training Manager (non-Grand Gulf)
Nuclear Oversight Manager Entergy has also placed licensed Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators in organizations other than Operations to help drive the various work groups to be Operations focused in their work. Examples include:
Mechanical Maintenance Manager Chemistry Manager Work Week Manager Work Control Nuclear Oversight OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERW\\b INFORMATION....
OFFICIAi llSF ON! Y..... SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION The biggest improven1ent the resident inspectors t1ave seen has been in t11e area of Quality Assurance, now called Nuclear Oversight. Since the arrival of the new Nuclear Oversight manager, the inspectors have noted a greater level of intrusiveness from the Nuclear Oversight auditors. Furthermore, the group issues trimester reports highlighting their assessment of the plant's performance.
There has also been considerable effort in improving the work environment for the employees.
This includes fresh paint around the site and new flooring, Overall, the resident inspectors have seen considerable effort and resources poured into performance improvement. The senior leadership has put a lot of focus on improving human performance and behaviors. As a result, the resident inspectors have noted a slow but steady improvement in performance around the site. Though they have a long ways to go, the inspectors believe the ship is turning in the right direction.
Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus (MELLLA+): By letter dated September 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13269A140), Entergy Operations, Inc., submitted an LAR for MELLLA+. The proposed amendment would allow operation in the expanded MELLLA+
domain. MELLLA+ expands the core power/recirculation flow window that a BWR operates with; to allow it to operate at the same licensed thermal power level, but at lower core recirculation flow levels. The operational benefit is the ability to perform control rod manoeuvers without downwpowering; BWRs that have implemented an extended power uprates frequently cannot swap rads at full power. Technically, this affects core thermal-hydraulics because the low recirculation flow reduces the total mass of liquid water that exists in the core.
Current Status Unit reporting 95 percent of reactor power.
Refueling outage scheduled for February 2016.
Labor/Management Issues None.
License Renewal Activities License renewal have been placed on hold due to the staffs need to further review and resolve issues associated with the applicant's neutron fluence analysis which is needed to determine PressurewTemperature limits. In July 2013, Region IV issued a 10 CFR 50.59 violation for the calculation of the fluence calculations because it was determined that it was based upon an unapproved methodology. The licensee has agreed to revise its calculations and submit an LAR for review and approval by the staff. This LAR is scheduled to be sub1nitted in December 2014.
Escalated Enforcement, Non-Green Findings and Non-Green Performance Indicators None.
OFFICIAL USE ON.1.¥.-.SENSITl"E INTERNAi INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONtY SENSITIVE INTERNAL IMFORM*TION Open Investigations There are two open investigations related to information provided ta the NRC and falsification.
Open Allegations None.
Congressional Interest None.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions None.
Significant Reportable Events On March 29, 2014, Grand Gulf experienced an unexpected Reactor SCRAM caused by a turbine generator trip. The plant was operating in Mode 1 at 87 percent thermal power. All safety systems responded per design. The plant was stabilized with pressure control on the main turbine bypass valves and level control on the start-up level control valve. The cause of the SCRAM was a load reject, resulting in the turbine control valves fast closure on all four channels causing a turbine generator trip. The cause of the load reject was due to failed capacitor on the Load Reject Relay.
Selected News Articles None.
OFFICIAt-t/SEONLY SENSITIVElNTERNAI INFORMATION OFF'ICJJIIUSE ONLY SENSfTIVE INTERN 11 L INFORMATION Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket Na.
License No.
Full Power License Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level NSSS Vendor Facility Data River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc.
St. Francisville, Louisiana (LA)
(25 Miles NNW of Baton Rouge, LA)
West Feliciana Parish 50-458 NPF-47 1112011985 0611611986 0812912025 BWR-6 Mark Ill 3091 MWt (1040 MWe)
General Electric OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERPIAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Reactor Oversight Program Information River Bend Station Mid*Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC determined the performance at the River Bend Station (River Bend) during the most recent quarter was within the Licensee Response Column of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because all inspection findings had very low {i.e., Green) safety significance, and all performance indicators indicated that performance was within the nominal. expected range (i.e.,
Green).
Although plant performance was within the Licensee Response Column, the NRC has not yet finalized the significance of Apparent Violation (AV)05000458/2014405-01. This finding is an input to the Security Cornerstone and was communicated to the licensee's staff on June 20, 2014. The final safety significance determination rnay affect the NRC's assessment of plant performance and the inspection plan.
In the NRC 2011 Annual Assessment Letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML120610414) dated March 5, 2012, the NRC identified a cross-cutting theme in the SCWE component of Environment for Raising Concerns. This theme resulted from the issuance of a Confirmatory Order dated August 24, 2011, that involved discrimination. The cross~cutting aspect was related to behavior and actions that encourage free flow of information related to raising nuclear safety issues such that personnel raise nuclear safety issues without fear of retaliation
[S.1/S.1 (a)]. At that time, the NRC determined that a substantive cross-cutting issue did not exist because the NRC did not have concerns with the actions the licensee committed to take to address the theme.
By letter dated August 23. 2012, Entergy notified the NRC of the actions that had been taken in response to the requirements imposed by the Confirmatory Order. Accordingly, during the week of April 29, 2013, NRC staff from the Office of Enforcement (OE) and Region IV performed an inspection at the River Bend to assess the specific actions identified in Entergy's response letter. NRC staff also verified implementation of the remaining actions required to satisfy the conditions set forth in tl1e Confirmatory Order. SL1bsequent to this inspection, the NRC staff continued to interact with Entergy regarding the adequacy of the corrective and preventive actions related to the underlying discriminatory issue. Based on these reviews, the NRC deterrr1ined that Entergy properly implerr1ented the conditions specified in the Confirrnatory Order and the associated actions were adequately implemented. Therefore, the criteria for a cross~cutting theme in the Safety Conscious Work Environment component of Environment for Raising Concerns [S.1] are no longer met The latest mid-cycle assessment letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14239A424) was issued on September 2. 2014.
The following uniform resource locator is for the River Bend's ROP Performance Summary web page:
http:/ in rr10. nrc.gov/N RR/OVERSIGHT I ASSESS/RBS 1/rbs1 chart. htm I OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSI I IVE IN I ERNAL INFORMAi ION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITlllE INTERNAi INFORMAILON....
Assessment Follow*up Letter for River Bend Station: As a result of NRC staff continuous review of plant performance, the staff updated its assessment of River Bend on October 13, 2014. The NRC's evaluation consisted of a review of performance indicators and inspection results.
On September 24, 2014, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000458/2014406, which informed Entergy of the final significance determination of a Greater*than*Green inspection finding in the Security Cornerstone, The finding was previously documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2014405, issued on July 16, 2014.
Based on issuance of a Greater*than*Green inspection finding in the Security Cornerstone, the NRC determined the performance at River Bend to be in the Regulatory Response Column (Column 2) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix beginning in the second quarter of 2014.
Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection. The assessment follow~up letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14296A082) was issued on October 23, 2014.
OFFICIAL 1 ISE ONI Y - SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION C5FF'ICJJII:USE ONL'r'*****SENSITllJE INTERNAi IN.EQRMATION Current Issues River Bend Station A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST River Bend Plant Pertormance: Station performance for the past year has improved with no plant level transients. Historically there have been above average numbers of self-revealing and NRG identified findings due to equipment reliability issues that have challenged plant operations. The resident inspector has focused on equipment reliability due to past shortfalls in the preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, and corrective action prograrn {CAP), To increase equipment reliability, the licensee has increased its focus on:
Reducing condition report backlogs, extensions and administrative burdens in CAP; Developing more effective teamwork in the work management process, and in outage preparation and execution; Re-evaluating the preventive maintenance optimization strategy for high and low critical components; Reducing the backlog number of first-time high critical preventive maintenance activities, and on-line corrective maintenance backlog; Improving work order quality:
Security Program Weaknesses: Region IV inspectors consider the River Bend security program as one of the weakest programs in Region IV as evidenced by the frequency of findings (averaging two non-cited violations per inspection over the last five inspections) and observed program performance; findings relate to equipment maintenance, search and surveillance standards, and training standards.
Merger of River Bend and Waterford Steam Electric Station. Unit 3 (Waterford 3): By letler dated June 10, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14161A698), Entergy Operations, Inc.,
submitted an application for a license transfer and conforming license arnendn)ents for Waterford 3 and River Bend. The proposed amendment would allow Entergy Corporation (acting on behalf of Entergy Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC) to undergo a series of asset and liability transfers to enable Entergy Louisiana Power, LLC, to hold the respective NRC licenses for Waterford 3 and River Bend, and allow a new entity, Entergy Utility Holding Company, LLC, to become the new owner. The NRC staff expects that this review will be completed in June 2015.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAl..JNF-ORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORM*TIOM Current Status Unit reporting 100 percent of reactor power.
Refueling outage scheduled for February 2015.
Labor/Management Issues None.
License Renewal Activities None.
Escalated Enforcement. Non-Green Findings and Non-Green Performance Indicators None.
Open Investigations There is one open investigation involving improper testing procedures.
Open Allegations None.
Congressional Interest None.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions None.
Significant Reportable Events On October 17, 2014. at 0302 River Bend automatically scrammed from 100 percent power on average power range monitor high thermal neutron flux. Pressure transient peaked at 1079 pounds per square inch gage (psig), and did not reach pressure scram setpoint of 1094.7 psig. Indications show that all four turbine control valves fast closed for approximately 6 seconds, and then reopened. The station has identified a potential cause of the turbine control valve failures as a defective Pressure Load Gate Amp card in the load control unit of the electrohydraulic control system.
Selected News Articles None.
---oFFICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE INTERNAi INFORMATION
- OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITl"E INTERNAi INFORMATION...
Facility Data Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Utility:
Location:
County:
Docket Na.
License No.
Full Power License Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containn1ent Type Power Level NSSS Vendor Entergy Operations, Inc.
20 Miles West (W) of New Orleans, LA St Charles Parish 50-382 NPF-38 0311611985 09/24/1985 1211812024 PWR Dry~Ambient 3716 MW! (1143 MWe)
CE OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Reactor Oversight Program Information Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Mid*Cycle Performance Review-July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014 The NRC determined that overall, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3), was operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives. The NRC determined the performance at Waterford 3, during the most recent quarter was within the Regulatory Response Column (Column 2) of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because of one White finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. In a letter dated April 2, 2014, the NRC updated its assessment of Waterford 3, to be in the Regulatory Response Column (Column 1) of the ROP Action Matrix beginning the fourth quarter of 2013 based on the White finding.
The latest mid-cycle assessment letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML14240A123) was issued on September 2, 2014.
The following uniform resource locator is for the Watetiord 3 ROP Performance Summary web page:
http://nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/WAT3/wat3 chart.html OFFICIAL USE ONL 1 - SENSITIVE.INTE:RNAL INFORMA I ION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Current Issues Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 A.
EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS The expected discussion topics are identified in page 1 of this briefing package, and additional information from the NRC staff regarding these topics can be found in pages 54-56.
B.
OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Merger of River Bend and Waterford 3: By letter dated June 10, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14161A698), Entergy Operations, Inc., submitted an application for a license transter and conforming license amendments for Waterford 3 and River Bend. The proposed amendment would allow Entergy Corporation (acting on behalf of Entergy Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC) to undergo a series of asset and liability transfers to enable Entergy Louisiana Power, LLC, to hold the respective NRC licenses for Waterford 3 and River Bend, and allow a new entity. Entergy Utility Holding Company, LLC, to become the new owner.
The NRC staff expects that this review will be completed in June 2015.
Current Status Unit reporting 100 percent of reactor power.
Refueling outage scheduled for October 2015.
Labor/Management Issues None.
License Renewal Activities None.
Escalated Enforcement. Non.Green Findings and Non.Green Performance Indicators A White finding was issued on March 28, 2014. as a result of the train B emergency diesel generator exhaust fan failure to function as designed because the fan separated from the fan motor. The self-revealing finding involved an inadequate test program that failed to derr1onstrate that the exhaust fan would perforrn satisfactorily in service. This resulted in the train B emergency diesel generator being inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time. The corrective actions taken were to replace the exhaust fan hub assembly and revise system operating and testing procedures. As a result of the White finding.
beginning the fourth quarter of 2013, the NRG updated its assessment of Waterford 3 to be in the Regulatory Response Column (Column 2) of the ROP Action Matrix. By letter dated September 8, 2014, the licensee informed the NRC of its readiness for the inspection required by IP 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area." The NRC completed the on-site portion of the IP 95001 inspection on October 10, 2014.
The results of the inspection are currently being evaluated. Since the IP 95001 inspection was OFFtclALUSEONlY-SENSff\\VEINfERNAllNFORMAftoN
. 51.
OFFICIAL USE ONL't' SENSITIVE*lNTERNAL INFORMATION conducted at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2014, t11e White finding continues to be open for an additional quarter until a conclusion is reached regarding the results of the IP 95001.
Open Investigations There are three open investigations related to falsification of records and inattentive security personnel.
Open Allegations None.
Congressional Interest None.
Harassment and Intimidation Issues None.
2.206 Petitions None.
Significant Reportable Events None.
Selected News Articles None.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNALINFORMATtoN---~
OFFICIAL USE**ONt:l'*=*SENSl'flVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Management Data Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Overview BACKGROUND In 1998, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), formed a nuclear business development group, headquartered in Jackson, MS, to pursue a growth strategy in areas outside the company's mid~South utility service area. The following year, the company purchased Boston Edison's Pilgrim, the first ever United States nuclear plant sale by a utility. Entergy then purchased Indian Point Unit 3 (2000) and FitzPatrick (2000) from New York Power Authority, Indian Point, Unit 2, from Consolidated Edison (2001) and Vermont Yankee from its 12 owner companies (2002). In 2003, Entergy began providing management services to Nebraska Public Power District for its Cooper Nuclear Station.
In 2007, Entergy purchased Palisades in Ml from Consumers Energy. The purchase of the 798 MWe plant brought the number of nuclear units owned by Entergy to 11 and raised the company's total 0L1tput from its nuclear plants to approximately 10,000 Megawatts (MW).
Entergy is now the country's second largest operator of nuclear facilities, with five plants in the company's mid~South core business service area and six: in the northeastern and midwestern United States. In addition to buying and operating plants, the company also has expertise in decommissioning nuclear plants in its ownership of Indian Point Unit 1 and Big Rock Point facilities. Indian Point Unit 1 remains in safe storage (SAFSTOR).
Entergy Nuclear operates five units in the Entergy mid~South utility service territory including:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 - Russellville, AR Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Port Gibson, MS River Bend Station - St Francisville, LA Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 - Taft, LA Outside the traditional Entergy utility service area, the company also owns and operates:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Unit No. 1 Ply1noutll, MA James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant - Oswego, NY Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 - Buchanan, NY Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Vernon, VT Palisades Plant**** Covert, Ml Entergy also provides management support for the Coop.er Nuclear Station near Brownville, Nebraska.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Topics of Discussion Entergy Senior Management Changes: The following information was provided to the NRG staff regarding recently announced Entergy senior management changes, which were announced November 12, 2014, and will take effect around December 1, 2014:
Tim Mitchell will be promoted to Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations, and will have oversight of all Entergy nuclear power plants. He is currently Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer-Indian Point, Palisades, and Cooper Entergy Nuclear.
John Ventosa, currently Senior Vice President ~ Indian Point) will be promoted to Chief Operating Officer, Northeast.
Larry Coyle will move from Senior Vice President ~ FitzPatrick to Senior Vice President~
Indian Point.
Brian Sullivan will be promoted to Senior Vice President - FitzPatrick from his current Plant Manager position at FitzPatrick.
In addition to these management changes, Entergy had recently implemented a Human Capital Management {HCM) program to improve operating and regulatory peliormance, and address increases in operating costs. This was achieved by restructuring and reorganizing the company to realize improvements in efficiencies. Specifically, a disciplined process was used to determine necessary functions and associated organizational requirements. An extensive change management plan was put in place to ensure an orderly transition. A result of the new structure was an approximately 10°/o reduction in the employee population through separation and natural attrition. Implementation has been completed.
Current Entergy Fleet Performance Overview:
Entergy has not provided information to the NRC regarding what it plans to discuss in area of fleet performance. Provided below are parameters indicating plant performance. Additional information regarding plant performance is provided in the plant specific tabs.
ROP Action Matrix Capacity Unplanned INPO Scrams in Plant Column (Mid*Cycle Rating Factor the past Assessment)
(2013) year FitzPatrick Regulatory Response I
mmmmmmmmmmmmml -----------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim Degraded Cornerstone
[Vermont Yankee[ Licensee Response Indian Point 2 Licensee Response and 3 Palisades ANO Units 1 and 2 Grand Gulf River Bend Waterford 3 Licensee R (b)(4)
Degraded Cornerstone Licensee Response Regulatory Response R
.~
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVEINTERNAL INFORMATION Safety System Functional Failures in the past year
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITlllE INTERNAi INFORMATION..
Nuclear Oversight Review Board Process: Entergy's Oversight Review Board (ORB) is composed of corporate executives and other leaders who meet to discuss fleet and station performance and determine corporate oversight categorization for each site. The categories
("Normal Oversight," "Increased Oversight," and "Comprehensive Oversight") reflect the level of oversight needed at each site based upon several key elements that reflect operational and regulatory performance.
Specifically. Entergy will discuss the board's oversight of the declining performance at ANO.
Vermont Yankee Decommissioning: (Planned Shutdown: fall 2014) Entergy Corporation issued a news release on Tuesday, August 27, 2013, announcing plans to permanently close and decomrnission Vermont Yankee in Vernon, VT. The station is expected to cease power production after its current fuel cycle and move to safe shutdown in the fourth quarter of 2014.
In addition to the information found the press release, Entergy announced the following at its all~hands rr1eeting:
This decision was made by the Board of Directors on August 25, 2013. Vermont Yankee directors were informed on August 26, 2013.
Retention packages will be offered to maintain the current team in place. The benefit consists of a year's pay.
Plans for transitioning the workforce, staffing plans, work schedules, and planned capital work will be formulated over the next few weeks to cover the full transition period.
The overall plan will consist of operating until the next regularly scheduled outage (previously, refueling) in the fourth quarter of 2014, an approximately 30-day defueling operation to remove all fuel from the core to the spent fuel pool, officially enter SAFSTOR, an approximately 3-year period of moving all spent fuel from the spent fuel pool onto the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), and finally SAFSTOR with all spent fuel on the ISFSI pad.
Although revenues actually increased by about 8 percent, operating costs are up 15 to 20 percent, primarily due to regulatory requirements. Regulatory costs are expected to continue increasing. Of the variety of contributing factors that led to this decision, this was described as the largest contributor.
Certification lo Cease Power Operations: By letter dated Septen1ber 23, 2013, the licensee submitted a letter pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) certifying that it has decided to permanently cease power operations at Vermont Yankee. The facility will continue to operate until the end of the current operating cycle which is expected to occur in the fourth quarter of 2014.
Subsequently, the licensee informed the NRC that it will permanently cease operations on December 29, 2014, Approvals from the State of VT: The licensee has obtained approvals from the State of VT by the way of a Certificate of Public Good regarding continued plant operation through the end of the fourth calendar quarter of 2014 and an extension of the existing ISFSI pad.
OFFIGIAl USE 0Nb¥.-.SENSITl"E INTERNAi INFORMATION OFl'ICLllrUSE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORM*TIO/lL Licensing Subn1ittals to Support Plant Shutdown: A number of exemptions fron1 emergency preparedness and security requirements and license amendments reflecting permanent plant shutdown have been submitted.
Relaxation of Fukushima-Related Requirements: The licensee plans to request relaxation from rr1any of the Fukushima~related requirements.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSI I IVE IN I ERNAL INFORMAi ION*
OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATI~
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OFFICIAi I !SF ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Biographical Data of Principal Managers
!9E,
~ ntergx Jeff S. Forbes Executive Vice President, Nuclear Operations
& Chief Nuclear Officer J~ffS. Forbes President, CEO &
CbJef N11elrar Ofti;:er Entergy Nudear, 11 't1b~idi11ry of Entergy CorpoT*tion Lon Revt"*ed: Q71l51l01 l Lon Upd1!~d: Olllllll(llJ Jeff S. Forbes is the executive vice president, nuclear operations and chief nuclear officer of Entergy Nuclear, responsible tor Entergy's nuclear plants located in New York, Massachusetts, Vennont, Michigan, Louisiana, tvlississippi and Arkansas, as well as the oompany's management services to the Cooper Nuclear Station for the State of Nebraska.
He previously served as Entergy's senior vice president for nuclear operations handling the operational side of fleet manage1nent.
Earlier in his career, Forbes oversaw regional operations tOr the southern region fur mere than four years. Forbes also served as vice president of operations at Arkansas Nuclear One, near Russellville, Ark., and Grand GulfNuclear Station, near Port Gibson, Miss.
Prior to joining Entctgy in August 2003, Forbes worked as senior vice president with the Nuclear Management Company. He had full responsibility of company boiling water reactor operations at Duane Arnold Energy Center and Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. Forbes started tus career at NMC in 2001 as general 1nanager at f\\.1ontkello, 1JJ1d was pro1noted 11,* vit:e president within two months.
Forbes began his nuclrar career in 1978 as an operations engineer at Duke Energy Corporation's Oconee Nuclear. Durmg his 11 year tenure at the plar he served as general manager, pertbnnance engineering inanager. outage manager and maintenance manager. In l 989, Forbes moved to Catawba Nuclear Station as a technical service inanager Two years later, he wa.~ name<! site engineering manager.
Under his return leadership in 1998 as general manger to Oconee Nuclear, he helped achieve plant operating records in capacity factor, reduced reactor trips and significantly improved plant operating perfonnance Forbes oompletecl his bachelors of science degree in nuclear engineering from Penn State University, and holds a reactor operator*~ license, a senior reactor operator's license and a protessional engineer license. He completed Hurvard University's Advanced Management Program in October 2007.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAllNFORMA'F!GNc OFFICIAL USE ONLY Sl!!NSITl'v'I!! INTERNAL INFORMATION
-=Entergy, TIJnt;ithy (;, l\\-1ik hell Senior Vi<<l Prtsldenf/
Chief Op~r11ti1;1n OOker, IPEC. P11U111des, Cooptr Entergy Nuclear 11 $Ulnidi11ry o(
Entergy Corp<>ration Timothy G. Mitchell Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Indian Point, Palisades, Cooper Entergy Nuclear Timothy G. MitehelJ was named senior vice president and chief operating officer for lndmn Po 1nt, Paltsad<!s and Cooper in August 2011. Prior to that time, Mitchell was Entergy Nuclear's senior vice president of engineering and technical services since March 2009 Previously, he served for two years its vice president of operations for Entergy's A.rkansas Nuclear One. As ANO site vice president, he was responsible for the daily operations of the plant located in western Arkansas near the city of Russellville.
Mitchell joined Entergy at ANO in 1989 as a plant engineet. He was later promoted to BOP system engineer in 1990, system engineering 1nanager in 1993, manager in training in 1997, Unit 2 operations rtianager in 1999 and director of nuclear safety analysis in 2004. Later in 2004 he transferred 10 Waterford 3 a~
director of engineering prior to promotion to general manager of operations at ANO in 2005 Following coinpletion of his Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Missouri at Rolla in 1981, he worked as a start-up engineer for WolfCreek, Hope Creek, South Texas Proj&.'t and Comanche Peak befure joining Entergy in 1989. He also holds a Masters ofBusiness Administration degree from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock oornpleted in 1998.
-t>FRCIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORM,<>,JJ.~O~N~
OFFICIAL USE ONLY' SENSITIVE INTERNAt:*iNFORMATION
=-Entergx John Ji, McCann Vice Prnidtnl Rtguh1tory A.ssuranct Enl<lrgy Nuclear a subsidiary or Ent~rgy Corporation JohnMcCann Vice President Regulatory Assurance John Mccann is currently <1ssigned as the Vi\\::e President of Regulatory Assutancc for the Enterg~ Nuclear fleet. He is the single point of leadership for regulatory co1nplianec and licensing issue~ fur th<- l? units in
!he Erttergy Nuclear fleet He also directs the activities of the Entergy Fleet En1ployeeConcerns Programs.
McCann came to Indian Point in June, 1986, and held various management positions of increasing responsibihty in public infurmation, operations, maintenance, and licensing. lnunediately prior to this assignment, Mccann served as diree.torofnuclear safety and lkensutg fur the Entergy Nudear tleet.
McCalUl has over 32 years of experience in nuclear energy. His background includes service in the U.S. Navy submarine furce, service with the U.S_ Nuclear Regulatory Commission as Senior Resident Inspector at the Susquehanna S1eam Electric Station during initial criticality and startup of Unit 1, and with the Princeton University Plasma Phy£ics laboratory as Chief Operations Engineer on the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor proj~t. He also served on the four-n1ernber U.S. delegation to the Technical Advisory Committee for the lntentational Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project and the utility advisory panel to the U.S. Department ofEnergy magnetic confinement fusion energy program.
McCann graduated from Villanova University in J 974 with a Bachekit's degree in Elcctncal Engineering, and holds a Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering conferrOO by Manhattan College in 1996.
OFFtclAlUSEONlY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Smith, Maxwell From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Cornrniss1orier (b)(5) Attorney-Client Privilege Smith. Max\\Vl'll Wednesday Noven1be* 19 2014 1107 AM
'.:-v1n1Lki Kr1st1nt CciSllen1an >*\\;lriLk Lep'!o' ;a11et RE: Electronic Backg1ound for Cour1"'~! Visit on r-.:i\\*erTiber 20 Ente'gv
'~l:JLyou rave any ques1!ons or need addit:onal 1nforn1a!1on, pleas~ let me know.
".:_)
ThanKs
-Max from: Lepre. Janet Sent: r-1onday, November li, 2014 4:18 PM To: Sv1n1ck1, Kr1~t1ne Cc: Castleman, Patrick; Smith, Maxwell
Subject:
Electronic Background for Courtesy v1*s1t on Nove111ber 20 Entergy The background for Entergy rs attached 1n pdf. You have a blue folder for this meeting
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