ML17219A691
| ML17219A691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1987 |
| From: | JUNO NUCLEAR ENERGY SERVICES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17219A690 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707170323 | |
| Download: ML17219A691 (185) | |
Text
pgp 0>>3 870710 8
~DO+4 OSOOOasq FLORIDA POWER
&, LIGHT COMPANY I'DR 700 UNIVERSE BLVD.
LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT P.O.
BOX 128 FT.
PIERCE, FLORIDA 33454 UNIT 1 1987 ISI
SUMMARY
REPORT IMER M
CE PREPARED BY-JUNO NUCLEAR ENERGY SERVICES CODES AND PROGRAMS GROUP
Page 1 of 10 FORM NIS-I OWNERS'ATA REPORT FOR INSERVICE INSPECTIONS As required by the Provisions of the ASME Code Rules Florida Pcwer 6 Light Co.
700 Universe Blvd., Juno Beach, FL.
33408 (Name and Address of Owner)
- 2. Plant St-Lucie Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 128, Ft. Pierce, FL.
33454 (Name and Address of Plant)
- 3. Plant Unit
- 4. Owner Certificate of Authorization (ifrequired)
- a. Commercial Service Date 12/221/76 6, Nationai Board Number for Unit
- 7. Components Inspected Component or Appurtenance Manufacturer or Installer Manufacturer or Installer Serial No.
State or Prov>nce No.
National Board No.
RPV Clos.
HD Cambustion Engineering CE-67209 N/A N/A Pressurizer Cambustion Engineering.
CE-67604 N/A N/A Stm.
Gen.
1A Combustion En ineerin CE-67508 Stm.
Gen.
1B Combustion En ineerin CE-67509 N A NA N/A R C Pump 1A1 Byron Jackson R C Pump lA2 Byron Jackson R C Pump 1Bl Byron Jackson 681-N-.445 681-N-446 681-N-447 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A R C 1B2 n Jackson 681-N-448 N A N A 1&actor Cool Ebasco 8 of 10 N A N A Saf In'L 1 Ebasco 8 of 10 N A N A Feedwater 8 of 10 N A N A a
In 2
Pcr N A Note: Supplemental sheets in form of lists, sketches, or drawings may be used provided (1) size is 8'n. x 11 in.,
(2) information in items 1 through 6 on this data report is included on each sheet, and (3) each sheet is numbered and the number of sheets is recorded at thc top of this form.
This form (E00029) may be obtained from the Order DeptASME, 345 E. 47th St., New York, N.Y.
10017
Page 2 of 10 FORM NIS-I (back) 22l12lIf CUD Inspection period fnxn 6 2/3 yrs to 10 yrs.
- 10. Abstract of Fxaminations. Include a list of examinations and a statement concerning status of work required for current interval.
Defined on Page 3 of 10
- 11. Abstract of Conditions Noted.
Defined on Page 4 of 10 thru page 6 of 10
- 12. Abstract of Corrective Measures Recommended and Taken Date We certify that the statements made in this report are correct and thc examinations and corrective mea-sures taken conform to the rules of thc ASME Code Section XI.
5'lorida Power a
19 87 signed Liaht Co.
By Owner Certificate of Authorization No. (ifapplicable)
Expiration Date CERTIFICATE OF INSERVICE INSPECTION I, the undcrsigncd, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors and/or the State or Province of O~O and employed by of has performed examinations and taken corrective measures described in this Owners'ata Report in accordance with thc requirements of thc ASME Code,Section XI.
By signing this certificate neither thc Inspector nor his employer makes any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the examinations and corrective measures described in this Owners'ata Report. Furthermore, neither the Inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.
July 9, 87 19 Date NB-7719 Commissions Inspector's Signature National Board, State, Province and No.
- Arkwright Boston Mfg's 14xtual Insurance Cbnpany Factory Itutual System
NIS-1 REPORT Page 3 of 10 1.
Owner-Florida ower and Li ht Co.
700 Universe B vd. Juno Bch.FL.33408
- 2. Plant-St.
Lucie Nuclear Power Plant P.O.Box 128 Ft. Pierce FL 33454 3.Plant Unit ~ 1 4.Owner Certificate of Authorization~N A 5.Commerical Service Date=21 December 1976 6.Unit National Board No.~N A Abstract of Examinations The Inservice Examination of selected Class I and II 'components and piping systems of Florida Power and Light Companies't.Lucie Plant, Unit 1,was performed during the refueling outage which began on 7 Febuary 1987. This constituted the Third Outage of the Third 40 Month Period. The last scheduled outage for the first 10 year Inspection Interval. Program B
The components and.piping systems examined were selected in accordance with the LONG TERM PLAN which was prepared per the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code,1974 Edition and addenda through Summer of 1975.
Manual Ultrasonic, Liquid Penetrant, Magnetic Particle, and Visual Nondestructive techniques were used in the examination of the selected components, piping systems,and their supports.
Eddy Current examinations were conducted by Combustion Engineering from February 17,1987 thru March 4,1987 on 1A and 1B Steam Generators.
8104 tubes were examined in Steam Generator 1A, and 8191 tubes were examined in Steam Generator 1B.See the attached NIS-BB report for the summary of examination results.
The augmented Feedwater Nozzle follow up examination program continued this outage.
100K of the area from the nozzle ramp out to a point of one (1) pipe diameter on the elbow side was'subjected to'an ultrasonic examination.
Snubber functional testing and visual examinations were conducted in accordance with PSL-1 Plant Technical Specification 4 '.10.
Examination Services supplied by Paul-Munroe Energy Products.
System pressure tests were conducted by the plant to applicable Plant Tech.
Specifications and Procedures.
The Instrumented Inspection Technique was used in the testing of some of the systems with the assistance of H.A.F.A. Inter-national Inc.
Page 4 of 10 NIS-1 REPORT 1.
Owner:
F orida Powe and L't Co.
700 Universe Bl d. Jun Bch.FL.33408
- 2. Plant=St.
Lucie Nuclea Power Plant P.O.Box 128 Ft.
P erce FL. 33454 3.Plant Unit-g 4.
0<< ner Certificate of. AuthorizationsA 5.Commerical Service Date:21 December 1976 6.Unit National Board No.~N A CONDITIONS NOTED DISPOSITION AND ACTION TAKEN CLASS I REACTOR VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD Visual (VT-1) and manual ultrasonic examinations were conducted on two (2) merdional welds and on two thirds (2/3) of the head to flange weld.No recordable indications were noted.
RPV CLOSURE HEAD STUDS, NUTS,AND FLASHERS
~e Surface (MT) and volumetric (UT) examinations were conducted on closure head studs and nuts (36 thru 54).No recordable indications were found. Visual(VT-1) examination of the closure head washers revealed light surface corrosion. This surface corrosion was removed prior to installation.
STEAM GENERATOR 1A Visual (VT-1) and volumetric (UT) examinations were conducted on two(2) stay cylinder welds.No recordable indications were noted.
PRESSURIZER Visual(VT-1), surface(PT),
and volumetric(UT) examinations were conducted on one(1) nozzle to flange weld.No recordable indications reported.
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEELS The flywheels on all four(4) reactor coolant pumps were volumetrically exam-ined per the requirements of Reg.
Guide 1.14.
No recordable indications were noted.
REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS Bolting on pumps 1A1 and 1B2 was visually examined(VT-1) in place.Per Relief Request ¹8,a visual examination was conducted on pump 1A2 top casing weld.
No recordable indications were found.
The welded support lugs (L3 Ec L4) on pump 1A2 received a surface (PT) examination.
No recordable indications noted.
NIS-1 REPORT Page 5 of 10 1.
Owner-Florida Power and L't Co.
700 Un ve se B vd. Juno Bch.FL.33408
- 2. Plant=St.
Lucie Nuclear Power ant P.O.Box 128 Ft.
ierce FL.
33454 3.Plant Unit-1 4.0euer Certificate oi'uthorizationsA 5.Commerical Service Date=21'December.
1976 6.Unit National Board No.~N A CONDITIONS NOTED DISPOSITIO AND ACTION TAKEN MAIN REACTOR COOLANT PIPING Visual (VT-1), surface (PT),
and volumetric (UT) examinations were conducted on one (1) circumferential weld and four (4) longitudinal welds.A laminar in-dication located the base material adjacent. to the circumferential weld was noted.
REACTOR COOLANT Visual, surface,and volumetric examinations were conducted on selected piping welds,valves, and supports.No recordable indications noted.
SAFETY INJECTION Visual, surface,and volumetric examinations were conducted on selected piping welds,valves,and supports.
Visual examination revealed two (2) sliding base supports with damage to the base clip angles.
Both supports were located on Safety injection line CI-6"-SI-112.
The damaged supports were repaired per the engineering evaluation and disposition report.
In addition the supports adjacent the damaged supports and other supports of the same or similar design and function were examined with no rejectable conditions noted. Sixteen (16) additional supports were examined.
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL
- Visual, and surface examinations were conducted on selected piping welds, valves,and supports.No recordable indications were noted.
CLASS II STEAM GENERATOR 1B Visual (VT-1) and volumetric (UT) examinations were conducted on 100K of the shell upper transition weld.No recordable indications noted. Visual (VT-1) and surface(MT) examinations were conducted on three(3) upper vessel support lugs with no recordable indications noted.
MAIN STEAM Visual(VT-1) and volumetric(UT) examinations were conducted on one (1) weld with no recordable indications noted.
NIS-1 REPORT Page 6 of 10 1.
Owner-F or d ower and Li ht Co.
700 Un verse B vd. Juno Bch.FL 33408
- 2. Plant-St.
Lucie Nuclear Power Plant P.O Box 128 t. Pierce FL. 3345 3.Plant, Unit,:i
'.Owner Certificate of Authorization~N A 5.Commerical Service Date=21 December 1976 6.Unit National Board No.~N A COND TIONS NOTED ISPOSITIO AND ACTION TAKEN MAIN FEEDWATER Visual(VT-3) examination on one (1) pipe support identified the a recordable condition, misalignment of the structural assembly. accept as is per engineering disposition.
Augmented feedwater nozzle examinations revealed no recordable indications.
Several geometric indications were recorded and determined to be due to root geometry and nozzle transition.
SAFETY INJECTION Visual and volumetric examinations were conducted on selected piping walds valves and supports.No recordable indications were noted.
SNUBBER EXAMINATIONAND TESTING Visual examination was conducted on 100% of the Plants'nubber population per the Plant Technical Specifications.
Of the original 10K sample selected for functional testing one (1) snubber failed. An addition 10% sample was then tested with no failures reported. Complete examination and test results are on file at the Plant.A summary of the functional test results are included with this report.
SYSTEM LEAKAGE / PRESSURE TESTING The system leakage tests and visual (VT-2) examinations of class I systems were performed by the Plant prior to plant startup.
The system leakage test was conducted during Reactor Coolant (RCS) overpressure.Documentation for the system leakage test and all pressure tests are on file at the Plant Site.
All the above conditions were dispositioned in accordance with Plant Procedures.
NIS-1 REPORT Page 7 of 10 1.
Owner-Florida Power and Li ht Co.
700 Universe Blvd. Juno Bch.FL.33408
- 2. Plant=St.
Lucie Nuclea Power F ant P.O.Box 128 Ft. Pierce FL. 33454 3.Plant Unit-1 4.Owner Certii'icate of Anthorization~N A
5.Commerical Service Date-21 December 1976 6.Unit National Board No.~N A INSERUICE PRESSURE TEST SUN%MY TEST NUMBER TEST DESCRIPTION TEST TYPE RESULTS 1-IPT-07 1-IPT-08 1-IPT-09 1-IPT-10 1-IPT-11 1-IPT-12 1-IPT-13 1-XPT-14 1-IPT-15 1-XPT-20 1-IPT-21 1-XPT-22 1-XPT-23 1-XPT-24 1-IPT-25 1-XPT-28 1-XPT-31 1-XPT-32 1-XPT-35 1-XPT-39 RCS SYSTEM LEAKAGE BORIC ACID PP DISCH.
SI PUMPS SUCTXON"A" CCW "A 8c C" CCH "B" "A"LPSI SUCTION "B"LPSI SUCTION "A"CONT.SPRAY HDR "B"CONT.SPRAY HDR A
Sc B LPSI DISCH.
"A"HPSI SUCTION B
8c, C HPSI SUCTION HPSX PP TO AUX HDR HPSI PP TO DISCH HDR SI PUMPS SUCTION"B" BAM PUMP SUCTION "A"ICW PP DISCH.
ICH PUMP B&C DISCH.
FUEL POOL COOLING A,B,C AUX.FEED.TO CST SYS.
LEAK IIT HYDRO HYDRO HYDRO IIT IIT XIT XIT IIT IIT IXT IIT IIT HYDRO IIT HYDRO HYDRO IIT IIT SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT.
SAT ~
SAT.
SAT ~
SAT.
SAT.
NIS-1 REPORT Page 8 of 10
.1.
Owner-Florida Powe and Li ht Co.
700 Universe Blvd. Juno Bch.FL.33408 2.. Plant
~ St. Lucie Nuclea Power Plant P.O.Box 128 Ft. Pierce FL.
33454 3.Plant Unit:1 4.Owner Certificate of AuthorizationsA 5.Commerical Service Date-21 December 1976 6.Unit National Board No.~N A Line numbers for piping systems with items selected for nondestructive examination this outage.
CLASS I REACTOR COOLANT SAFETY INJECTION CHEMICAL 8c VOLUME CONTROL 30"-RC-115 30"-RC-121 12"-RC-147 12"-RC-153 12"-RC-154 4"-RC-103 3"-RC-109 3"-RC-141 2.5"-RC-156 2"-RC-142 2"-RC-125 2"-RC-149 12"-SI-151 6"-SI-110 6"-SI-112 6"-SI-113 2"-CH-145 2"-CH-146 2"-CH-147 CLASS II SAFETY INJECTION MAIN STEAM MAIN FEEDWATER 12"-SI-406 12"-SI-408 12"-SI-410 12"-SI-414 12"-SI-475 I 10"-SI-406A 10 SI 420 I 10"-SI-422 6"-SI-463 34"-MS-29 6"-MS-63 18"-BF-52
>,n
NIS-1 REPORT Page 9 of 10 1.
Owner-F o 'da Power and Li ht Co.
700 Universe Blvd. Juno Bch.FL.33408
- 2. Plant-St.
Luc e Nuclear Power ant P.O.Box 128 Ft. Pierce FL.
33454 3.Plant Unit:1 4.Owner Certificate of Authorization N~A 5.Commerical Service Date-21 December 1976 6.Unit National Board No.~A REPORT NUMBER MCI-PSL-87-100-10 1-IPT-07 THRU 1-IPT-15 1-IPT-20 THRU 1-IPT-25 1-IPT-28, 1-IPT-31 1-IPT-32, 1-IPT-35 1-IPT-39 ORGANIZATION FPL FPL FPL FPL DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES INSERVICE INSPECTION FINAL REPORT EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION OF STEAM GENERATORS FINAL REPORT EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATION OF STEAM GENERATORS SNUBBER VISUAL EXAMINATION AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING FINAL REPORT TEST DOCUMENTATION FOR INSERVICE PRESSURE TESTING
0 h
Page 10 of 10 FORM NIS-BB OWNERS'DATA REPORT FOR EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATIONRESULTS As required by the provisions of the ASME CODE RULES EDDY CURRENT EXAMINATIONRESULTS PLANT-St. Lucie Unit ¹ 1
II EXAMINATIONDATES=
17 Febuary 1987 thru 4 March 1987 STEAM TOTAL GENERATOR I
TUBES NUMBER
)
INSPECTED"
'OTAL INDICATIONS OR =
OR =
20K
)
20'X 39K') 40K 100K TOTAL TUBES PLUGGEID AS PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TOTAL TUBES PLUGGED 8104
)
527 i
323
)
49 8191 I
360
)
235
)
29 0
47 0
30 LOCATION OF INDICATIONS
(
OX 100K
)
~
STEAM i
BAT WINGS GENERATOR
,'1 TO 5 I
I 12 13 EGGCRATES
)
DRILLED SUPPORTS
)
TOP OF TUBE SHEET 1
TO 8
,'9 TO 10
,'TO ¹ 1
EGGCRATE H/L
)i C/L i
H/L i
C/L I)HOT LEG i
COLD LEG I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
'i 48
,'4
,'82 82
,'338
))49 I
4 i
38 i
61 I
247 I
93
,,* Line 124 Bow 16 was plugged by mistake on the cold leg only during the Spring 1986 outage.
This tube will be added to the plugging list for this outage which makes the total tubes to be plugged for S/G B = 30
',DATE JULY 09 1987 BY CERTIFICATION OF RECORD We certify that the statements in this record are correct inspected were tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code.
Flo ida Power Sc Li ht I
I II and the tubes of Section XI I
I Com an I
I I
I I
I II 10
S EAM Gr'NERATOR' LOCATION: ALL CRI>ERIA:
48%
TO 18M 82/87, CUMULATIVE REPORT ST.
LUCIE S/G A, UNIT 1
PAGE:
DATE:
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55 I 1 I 42I il 45 I 11 FLORIDA POWER 4 LIGHT COMPANY
STEAN GENERATOR:
A LOCATION: ALL CRITERIA:
4W TO 100'A CUMULATIVE REPORT 08/87, ST.
LUCIE S/G A. UNIT 1
PAGE:
8 OF DATE:
05/li/87 TINE:
ie:03:20 I
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47 NO TREND ANALYSIS REOUESTED 1 e 0 I I 107 I
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FLORIDA POWER 4 LIGHT COMPANY
STEAM GENERATOR:
B LOCATION: ALL CRITERIA) 4W TO 188%
82/87, CUMULATIVE REPORT ST.
- LUCIE, S/G Bq UNIT 1
PAGE:
1 OF 1
DATE:
85/li/87 TIME:
18: 1 1! 88 I
I I
I I LIN I ROW I HEATS I I
I I
151 71000111 I
301 681999991 I
351 511999991 I
371 231999991 I
391 31999991 I
461 701999991 I
471 631999991 I
481 701999991 I
541 1221999991 I
581 361088601 I
601 61000111 I
611 471999991 I
621 1041080601 I
651 491000221 I
681 1381000501 I
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0401580SNI09H+
0591580SDI01H-0031588SMI02K+
837 158SSN I 01K+
8351580RMITSC+
0281580SF109H+
0231580SMIOiH-I I
IEXTENT I
I I
I LEGIREQITSTIREMIREELIPROBEI LOCATION 0.8 0.8 8.8 5e8 Oe3 5.5 5.3 4e7 8.8 5.8 1e0 0.5 0.0 6e0 10s 9 6e5 Se7 0.0 5s3 Se8 So 5 So 8 0.8 So 4 Se6 Se4 5e9 Se0 Se5 I
CURRENT IVOLTSIMILIDEGI I
I I
I I
Se 81 11121 I
- i. 21 11161 I
- i. 41 11211 I
le 11 11151 I
Oe 51 11211 I
2e41 I
941 I
1 e 91 11081 I
1e 01 11191 I
1 81 11801 I
5>> 91 11211
- 1. 71 11221 I
1 e 0 I 11861
- 0. 61 11201 I
ie51 I
971
- 1. 01 11081 I
is 31 I 1041 I
1 a 11 11161 I
2e 81 11161 I
3e 01 11081 I
- 2. 11 11171 I
- 1. 31 11131
- 0. 61 11221 I
is 71 11181 I
ie61 I
991 I
Oe 41 11191 I
Se 91
. 11861 I
- 1. 31 11081 I
ie91 I
941 I
1 71 11201 I
I I
I 491 471 441 501 441 681 521 421 561 411 431 501 401 591 531 5%i 471 411 551 481 461 431 421 591 431 531 581 461 411 I
ilililililil 11 11ilililililil 11ililllilllll 11ilil 11il 11 51il I
I
'A ICHI I
I NUMBER OF TUBES SELECTED FROM CURRENT OUTAGE>,
29 NO TREND ANALYSIS REQUESTED
- Line 124 Row 16 was plugged by mistake on the cold leg only during the Spring 1986 Outage.
This tube will be added to the plugging list for this Outage.
which makes the total tubes to be plugged for S/G B
30.
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SU)(t(ARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL) THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CO)(POt(ENTS PAGE:
REACTOR VESSEL HEAD
SUMMARY
EXANIttATION AREA ttU)(BER
!DENTIFICAT!DN L
FIGURE/
O ASNE Ast)E ISOMETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xi NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM ITEN 8
CATGY LOCATIOtt SCHEDULE t(ETHDD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
N I 8
ONGT RSEH E I OE C 8 tt R
!NSTRUCTIONS RPVCH 000023 RPV-CH-209-03C NERID.
MELD D !80 8l. 2 8-B A-06 RCB UT-0 UT-45 UT-60 VT-I NDE 5.14 NDE 5.14 NDE 5.14 NDE 4.1 C
C I
C 1
C EXANINE 10X OF MELD.
87 -
10X OF MELD !.ENGTH EXANINED 000026 RPV"CH-209-03F itERID.
MELD 8 0 81.2 B-B A-06 RCB U'!-0 NDE 5.14 UT-45 NDE 5 ~ 14 UT-60, NDE 5.14 VT-1
.')DE 4.1 1
C I
C 1
C C
EXAt(INE 10X OF MELD:
87 - 10/
OF itE!.D LENGTH EXAMINED 000028 RPV-CH-?09-02 CLOSURE HD.TO FLANGE 81.3 8-C A-05 RCB UT-0 UT-45 UT-60 VT-1 NDE 5.14 NDE 5.14 NDE 5.14 ttDE 4.1 1
C C
I EXAMINE FROit STUD IQ TO 54.
87 - SEE DATA SHEET FOR SCAN LINITATIONS.
000045 RPV"CH-Sl-S54 RPV STUDS
- 81. 7 8-8-1 A"06 UT-60 t(DE 5.7 1
C NT NDE 2. 1-6,7,8 C
t(T NDE 2.1 9s10 C
EXANINE STUDS 36 THRU 54 ONLY 87 - STUDS 36 THRU 54 EXA)(it(ED THIS OUTAGE'00047 RPV-01-Nl - N54 81.8 B-s-l A-05 UT-45 NDE 5.10 1
C RPV t(UTS 36 THRU 54 NT NDE 2.1-1,2,3 C
RCB t)T NDE 2 ~ 1-4,5 C
87 - U)NBLE TO PLACE TRAt(SDUCER ON CASTELLATED PORTION OF THE NUTS ~
EXAMINE NUTS 36 THRU 54 VT-!
NDE 4.!
3 C
000049 RPV-01-Ml-M54 81,10 B-s-l A-06 RPV MASHERS RCB 87 - LIGHT SURFACE CORROS!ON NOTED. EXANINED MASHERS 36 THRU 54 ONLY.
000056 RPV-CRD-H-67 Bl. 18 B-0 A-05 CRD HOUSING - PERIF.
NDE 5,20 C
OUTER PERIL ONLY (10X)
FC-?,ti3 RCB 87 " COMPLETED IN 1983 DATA SHT, 4 300042.
FIELD CHANGE, t)2:CORRECTED NDE PROCEDURE FROM NDE 5.23 I'0 NDE 5.20.
FIELD CHANGE 43:CORRECTED THE 4 OF PERIF.
CRD)( HOUSING FROM 28 TO ACTUAL ttUttBER 12
\\
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I PLANT ST.LUCIE UttlT I INSERVICE INSPECTIOt( SUttNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (!987)
CLASS 1
CONPONENTS PAGE:
2 STEAN 6ENERATOR 1A SUNNARY EXANINATION AREA ttUttBER IDENTIFICAT!DN L
FIGURE/
0 ASttE AcHE ISOttETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xi NUNBER SIIE/
EXAN P
ITEN tt CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHDD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
NI 0
ON6T RSEH E I OE C 6 N R INSTRUCTIOttS SG-IA 000098 SG-IA-2:102 EXT. RING TO STAY CYLINDER A 83.1 B-B A-13 RCB UT-60 UT-0 L'T-45 VT-I NDE 5.21 NDE 5 ~ 21 NDE 5.21 NDE 4.1 1
C 2
C C
r EXANINE 100X OF THE NELD 000099 SG-IA-2-111 STAY CYLINDER TO STAY RING A 83.
1 B-B A-13 RCB 87 - L!NITAT!Ott: ONE SIDED EXAN DUE TO STAY BASE 6EONETRY.
UT-60 NDE 5.21 1
C UT-0 NDE 5.21 2
C UT-45 NDE 5.21 3
C V'I"1 ttDE 4.1 2
C EXAtt!NE 100X OF THE NELD
( ~
DATE:
07/08/87 REVIS IGtt:
1 PLAHT ST ~ LUCIE UHIT 1
INSERViCE INSPECTION SUMttARY FOR THE FIRST iHTERVAL, THiRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COHPOHENTS PASE:
3 HAIN REACTOR CDGLANT PIPIN6 - COLD LE6 LGGP -
1A2 S(JttttARY EXAttIHATIOti AREA ttUttBER I DEHT IFICATIGti L
FiSURE/
0 ASttE AsttE isottETRIC/
0 SEC.X!
SEC ~ Xi HUHBER SiZE/
P lTEN I CATOY LOCATION SCHEGL(LE EXAtt ttETHDD N I 0
OHST RSEH NDE USED E I 0 E
PROCEDURE HO, C 6 tl R IHSTRUCTiGtiS RCS 000265 30'-RC-I!5 " 10 AFE EHD TO PiPE A 84.1 8-F A-16A 30'CB 87 -LAtllNAR REFLECTOR FOUttD.SEE DATA SHEET:87-5.3"l,t( IA. 10 FIELD CHAtiSE f2:CORRECTED UT PROCEDURE FRON NDE 5,23 TO HDE UT 0 UT 45-S.E.
UT 60-S.ED UT 45-P,ST UT O-S.E.
DES.EXAN) 5.3 ~
HDE 5 ~ 3-1(IA HDE 5.3-2 NDE 5'-4 HDE 5.3-6 NDE 5.3-8 C
USE CAL.BLK.PL-CCSS-3.0-44-SLC C
C C
C C
000266 30'-RC-115 " 10LD-1 A 84.5 8-J PIPE LGNS SFA('1 A-16A 30'CB UT-0 UT-45 UT-45 VT"1 NDE 5 3 - 3 HDE 53 - 4 NDE 5.3 - 6 NDE 4.1 -!1 EXANIHE 12" OF LONG SEAN 000267 30"-RC-115 -10LD-2 A 84,S 8-3 A-16A 30" UT-0 PIPE LONG SEAN UT-60 RCB UT-45 VT-1 HDE S.3-3 HDE 5.3-4 NDE 5.5-6 HDE 4.1-11
~e EXAtlINE 12'F LOH6 SEAN
DATE:
07/08/87 RLV!S ION:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE ltttli 1 INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FQR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COttPONEHTS PAGE:
4 tfAIN REACTOR COOLANT PIPING - COLD LEG LOOP - 181 SUNNARY EXANINATION AREA HUt(BER IDENTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
0 AStlE ASNE ISQt(ETRIC/
0 SEC.XI
- SEC, Xi NUt(BER SIZE/
EXAN P
ITEN tt CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE tlETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE HO ~
Hl 0
ONGT RSEH EIQE C 6 H
R INSTRUCTIONS tl RCS 000309 30'-RC-121-10 8 84.1 8-F A-18A 30'AFE END TQ PIPE RCB 87 - EXANittATIQN DONE DURIHG THE 1978 OUTAGE.
DATA SHEET tt FIELD CHAI(BE tt2;CORRECTED UT PROCEDURE,FROt(
ttDE 5,3 TO NDE 000310 30'-RC-.121-10LD-l 8 84.5 8-J A-18A 30'IPE LONG SEAN RCB 300009,(Nflli 5,20.
UT-O UT-45 UT-60 VT-I WDE 5.20 ttDE 5.3 - 7 NDE 53 " 5 NDE 5 3 - 5 NDE 4 ~ 1-10 C
CONP.
FIRST OU'TAGE.
EXAttittE 12'F LONG SEAM HDE 5.3 - 7 NDE 5 3 - 5 HDE 5.3 - 5 HDE 4.1 - 10 000311 30'-RC-!2l-10LD-2 8 84 '
8-J A"18A 30'T-0 C
PIPE LQHG SEAtt UT-45 C
RCB UT-60 C
VT-1 C
EXANINE 12'F LONG SEAN
~e
DATEl 07/08/87 REVISION:
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD ()987)
CLASS 1
CG!(PQNENTS PAGE:
REACTOR COGLAMTKSAFETY INJECTION L
F 16URE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISONETRIC/
SUNNARY EXAMINATIONAREA 0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI HUNBER SIZE/
cXAN NDE USED NUNBcR IDENTIFICATION P
ITEN 0 CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD PROCEDURE t(O HI 0
OH6T RSEH E I OE C 6 N R INSTRUCTIONS RCKSI 000383 12'"RC-147-1 8 84. 1 8-F A-21 BRANCH CGN!t.
TO SAFEEND RCB 87 " UT:
SCANtiED FRQii PIPE SIDE ONLY DUE TO 0.0.
12'T-0 / 45 HDE 5.20 - 3 PT t(DE 3.1 - I VT-I NDE 4,1 - 8 COHF16URATIGN ~ (PIPE TQ SAFE END)
EXANIt(E 100X Qc THE MELD 000387
)2'-RC-(47-4 8 84.5 B-J A-21 PIPE TO REDUCER RCB 87 - UTl SCANNED FROM REDUCER SIDE ONLY DUE TO 0 180 DESREES (BRANCH CGNt)ECTION), (.5'RON TQE OF 12'T-0 HDE 5.20 - 3 C
UT-45 NDE 5.20 - 3 VT-1 NDE 4. 1 - 8 C
.D.COMF16URATIOH. (REDUCER TO PIPE),OBSTRUCTIOH AT MELD~
EXAMINE 100X OF THE MELD RCSKSI 000402 12"-RC-153-5 SAFE TO BRANCH CONN, UT-0 / 45 PT RCB VT-1 87 - FIELD CHANGE 4 2:
CORRECTED UT PROCEDURE FRON NDE 5.2 TO NDE 5.20.
iHDE 5.20 - 7 C
NDE3.1-8 C
t(DE 4.1 -
13 C
EXAMINE 100X OF THE MELD 000403 12'-RC-154-1 A 84.5 8-0 A-25 12'lT-0 / 45 HDE 5 ~ 20 - 2 C
VLV CV-3217 TO ELBOW VT-I HGE 4, 1 - 12 C
RCB 87 - UT:
SCAM LINITED DUE TO THE LOCATION OF A BRANCH CONNECTION.
EXAMINE 100X OF THE MELD
DATE:
07/08/87 REV IS 10th:
1 PLANT cT.LUCIE UtlIT I INSERVICE INSPECTIOH SUttttARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL> THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COHPOtiENTS PRESSURI.'ER HEAD NOZZLE DETAIL L
F IBURE/
0 ASttE AcNE ISOttETRIC/
SUtlttARY EXAtilNATION AREA 0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUHBER SIZE/
EXAH HUttBER IDENT IF I CATION P
ITEas tt CAT6Y LOCATION SCHEDULE t!ETHDD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO ~
N I 0
ON6T RSEH E I DE C 6 H R
IHSTRUCTIOHS 0421 PRZ-SV-4I5/B-415C C 84 ~ 1 B-F A-10 6'T-0 / 45 ttDE 5.20 - 6 NOZZLE TO FL6.9 305 PT NDE 3.1 - 6 RCB VT-I NDE 4.1 - 17
'87 -FIELD CHAN6E 8 2:
CORRECTEO THE PROCEDURE FROH NDE 5.2 TO HDE 5.20.
RCS 00 C
C C
DATE.'7/08/87 REVISION:
I PI.ANI'T~ LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTIOtt SUNNARY FOR'THE FIRST lttTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COtfPOHE!tTS PAGE:
7 PRESSURIIER SPRAY LINE SUHNARY EXANINATION AREA NUttBER IDENTIF ICATION L
FIGURE/
O ASttE ASNE ISOttETRIC/
0 SEC;XI SEC.
XI NUttBER SIEE/
EXAN P
ITEN 4 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE ttETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
il I 0
OHBT RSEH E I OE C 6 N
R iNSTRUCTIONS RCS 00043b 4-RC-103-5PR-2 PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 8-K-2 A-28 VT"3 HDE 4 '
- 2 C
J
s ~
I DATE:
07/08/87 REV IS IOtt:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE iNSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CONPONEtiTS PASE:
8'RESSURIZER SPRAY PIPINS TO COLO LEB LOOP 181 SUNttARY EXAi",INATIQNAREA NUNBER IDENTIFICATION L
FISURE/
0 ASttE AStiE ISOMETRIC/
0 SEC.X!
SEC.
Xi NUNBER 'IZE/
EXAN P IIEtt I CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHDD N I 0
ONST RSEH NDE USED E I 0 E PROCEDURE ND.
C S N R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 000453 3-RC-109-7 ELBOtt TO BEND 8 84.5 8-J A-29 3
~
UT-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 -
10 VT-1 ttDE 4.1 - 15 C
EXAttINE 100X QF THE MELD.
000458 3-RC-109-I lPR PIPE RESTRAINT 8 84'0 8-K-2 A-29 RCB VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 3 C
000461 3-RC-109-13PR PIPE RESTRAItti 8 84.10 8-K-2 A-29 VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 4 C
000469 3-RC-109-19 ELBOM TO ELBON 8 84.5 8-3 A-29 3'T-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 -
10 C
160 VT-I NDE 4.1 -
15 C
RCB EXANINE 100X OF THEJIELD
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUMttARY FOR THE FIRST IN'IERVAl., THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CONPQNENTS PA6E:
9 PRESSURIZER SPRAY PIPING TO COLD LEB LOOP 1B2 SUttttARY EXANINATION AREA NUttBER IDENTIFI CATION L
F 16URE/
0 ASttE ASNE ISONETRIC/
G SEC,XI SEC.
Xl NUHBER SIZE/
EXAN NDE USED P
ITEN tt CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE ttETHOD PROCEDURE ND.
N I 0
QNBT RSEH E I OE C 6 N
R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 000475 3-RC-141-1 8 84.
1 8-F A-30 BRAtiCH CONN.
TO S.ED 000479 3-RC-141-4PR PIPE RESTRAiiiT NDE 4.3 -
11 C
UT-0 / 45 ttDE 5.20 - 8 PT NDE 3.1 -
7 RCB VT-1 NDE 4.1 -
14 87 - FIELD CHAN6E 4 2:
CORRECTED UT PROCEDURE FROH NDE 5.2 TO NDE 5.20.
8 84. !0 B-K-2 A-30 VT-3 EXANINE 100X OF THE MELO 000484 3-RC-141-9 PIPE TO VLV 1250 8 84.5 B-J A-30 3'T-O / 45 tiDE 5'0 - ll C
160 VT-1 NDE 4.1 -
18 C
RCB EXAttlhE 100X OF THE 4ELD 000488 3-RC-141-12PR PIPE RESTRAINT 8 84.10 8-K-2 A"30 RCB VT-3 tiDE 4.3 - 18 C
000500 3-RC-141-20PR PIPE RESTRAINT 8 84;10 8-K-2 A-30 RCB VT-3 NDE 4 '
- 5 C
000501 3-RC-141-21 VLV 1252 TO PIPE EtiD 8 84.5 8-J A-30 RCB 3$
UT-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 -
11 C
VT-I NDE 4.1 - 18 C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION SUtlNARY FGR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CONPONENTS PAGE:
10 PRESSURIZER RELIEF LINE SUNttAP(Y. XAtt!NATION AREA NUNBER IDEttT'IFICATIOtt FIGURE/
0 SttE ASNE ISGHETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC ~ Xl NL'HOER SIIE/
EXAN P
iTE<N 0 CATBY LGCATIDN SCHEDULE ttETHOD MDE USED PROCEDURE ttO.
.tt I 0
ONST RSEH E I OE C 6 N
R IttSTRUCTIOttS RCS 000503 2 '-RC-l56-5PR PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 8-K-2 A-27 RCB VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 27 C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVI6 IOt<:
I PLANT ST.LUCIE UttIT 1
IhSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FDR THE FiRST INTERVALED THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COtlPONLNTS PA6E:
11 PRESSSURIZER RELIEF LINE SUNtlARY EXANIttATION AREA WUNBER IDENTIFICATION L
FiEURE/
0 AStlE ASHE ISGNETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUttBER SIZE/
EXAN P
ITEN tt CAT6Y LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
N I 6
ON6T RSEH E I OE C 6 N R INSTRUCTIONS
- 84. 11 8-P A-27 2
CS 000509 2.5-RC-15b-5BC BRANCH CONN ~
RCB 87 -COtlPLETEO IN 1985,DATA SHLET tt II-85-7486.
NDE 4 '
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UN!T !
INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (!987)
CLASS ! COMPO!tEttTS PASE:
!2 PRESSURI IER RELIEF LINE
SUMMARY
EXAMINATIOtt AREA
, ttUMBER IDENTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
0 ARNE ASME ISOMETR IC/
O SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUMBER SIZE/
EXAtt P
ITEM 5 CATGY
!.OCATION SCHEDULE ttETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO ~
Nl O
ONGT RSEH E I OE C
S M R INSTRUCTION"-
RCS 0005!9 2.5-RC-!56-11 ELBON TO FLANSE 8'
8-J A-27 2T-0 ttDE 5'0 - 4 C
UT-45 NDE 5.20 - 5 C
16 C
87 - UT:45 DEGREE>SCAtt LIMITED DUE TO O.D.SEOMETRYsFLAtlGE TRAttSITION PRDHIBITS PROPER TRAttSDUCER POSITIONINS.
DATE'.
07/OB/87 REVISION:
I PLAtiT ST.LUCIE UtilT 1
INSERV!CE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST ItiTERVAi... THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COMPONENTS PASE:
15 2'CHARSIN6 LINE TO LOOP 181 COLD LE6
SUMMARY
EXAMINATION AREA tiUMBER I DENTIFICATION L
FI6URE/
G ASME ASME ISOMETRIC/
O SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM P
ITEM 4 CAT6Y LGCATIGN SCHEDULE tlETHOD HDE USED PROCEDURE HO ~
N I 0
OHST RSEH E I OE C 6 ti R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 000552 2-RC-142-BPR PIPE RESTRAINT 87 - PLANT :DOtiE PER 79-14 B B4.10 B-K-2 A-TI RCB VT"3 PLT.
PROC.
DATE:
07/0B/87 REVISION:
I PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FiRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COMPONEttTS PAGE:
14 MAIN REACTOR CDOLAttT PIPINS - COLD LEG LOOP - 182
SUMMARY
EXAMlttATION AREA NUMBER IDENTIFICATION L
F ISURE/
0 AS,",=
ASME ISOMETRIC/
G SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM P
ITEM a CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE METHOD tt I G
ONBT RSEH NDE USED E I 0 E
PROCEDURE NO.
C 6 M R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 000556 2-RC-125-2 SAFE END TG PIPE B B4 ~ 5 B-J A-19 2
~
UT-0 / 45 NDE 5;20 - 9 C
VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 22 C
USE CAL. BLK. 2-SS-160-344-59
DATL:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COMPONENTS PABE:
!5
"'CHARBItt8 LitsE TO LOOP 181 COLD LEG SUMt(ARY EXAMINATIGt( AREA NUMBER IDENTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
0 ASME ASME ISOMETRIC/
G SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM P
ITEM 4 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE METHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NG.
N I 0
ONBT RSEH EIOE C 6 M R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 000574 2-RC-142-10PR-2 PIPE RESTRAINT 87 - PLANT :DONE PER 79-14 8 84 ~ 10 B-K-2 A-31 RCB VT-3 PLT PROC.
000575 2-RC-142-10PR-3 PIPE RESTRAINT 87 - PLAtii:DONE PER 79-14 8 84.10 B-K-2 A-31 RCB VT-3 PLT.
PROC'00584 2-RC-142-14PR-2 8 B4,10 8-K-2 A-31 PiPE RESTRAINT RCB 7 - BACKFIT Q.C.IN 1985:DATA SHEET 4 I.R ~ 85-7159,EXANINED RC-2-3333.(ONLY SUPPORT ON THE LINE)-
DELETE 2-RC-142-14PR-2.DOES NDT EXIST:PLANT VERIFIED 000589 2-RC-! 42-16PR-3 8 84 ~ 10 8"K-2 A-31 PIPE RESTRAIt)T
!)DE 4.3 RCB 87 - BACKFIT Q.C.it( 1985:DATA SHEET 4 85-7159,EXAMINED SUPPORT RC-2-3333 (ONLY SUPPORT ON THE Lit(E)
DEL TE 2 RC 142"16PR 3sDOES NOT EXIST'PLANT VERIFIED 000591 2-RC-142-17 8 84.8 B-J A-31 2'T NDE 3. 1 - 4 C
PIPE TO VLV 2519 VT-I NDE 4.1 - 24 C
RCB 87 - FIELD CHANGE 4 3:VALVE I.D.
CHANGED FRDM '2464'O
'2519',VERIFIED 000596 2-RC-142-20PR 8 84'0 B-K-2 A-31 PiPE RESTRAINT RCB 87-BACKFIT Q.CD IN 1985:DATA SHEET 4 85-7)59,EXAMINED RC-2-3333,(ONLY SUPPORT ON THE LINE)
DELETE 2-RC-142-20PR,DOES NDT EXIST:PLANT VERIFIED'
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST ~ LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUKHARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COHPONENTS PASE:
16 PRESSURIZER SPRAY LINE SUNiHARY EXAHIHATIOM AREA NUNBER IDENT IFICATION L
FISURE/
0 ASNE ASNE
!SONETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN HDE USED P
ITEN 8 CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE vETNOD PROCEDURE NO H I 0
OHST RSEH E I OE C 6 H R IHSTRUCTIONS RCS 000609 2-RC-149-1 VLV(CV-243!J TO BEND
- 84. 8 8-J A-28 2
RCB PT HDE 3 1 - 5 C
VT-1 NDE 4.! - 44 C
DATE!
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLAHT ST.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE IHSPECTIOH SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COttPONEHTS PASE:
!7 PRESSURE SPRAY LINE SUNNARY EXANINATIOH AREA NUNBER IDEMI'IFICATIOtt FIGURE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISONETR IC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN P
ITEN 4 CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE ttETHOD NDE USED
'ROCEDURE HD.
HI 0
ONST RSEH E I OE C 6 N
R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 000bI2 2-RC-149-2PR2 PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 B-K-2 A-28 RCB VT-3 NDE 4.3 - I C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FiRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COMPONENTS PAGE; 18 2'CHAR6ING LINE TO LDOP lA2 COLD LE6 L
FI6URE/
0 ASME ASME ISOMETRIC/
SUMMARY
EXAMINATION AREA 0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM NUMBER IDENTIFICATION P
ITEM tt CAT6Y LOCATION SCHEDULE tlETHQD NDE USED PROCEDURE ttO.
Nl 0
ON6T RSEH EIOE C 6 M R INSTRUCTIONS NDE 4.3 RCS/CH 000613 2-RC-149-2PR-3 A 84. 10 B-K-2 A-28 PIPE RESTRAINT RCB 87 - PROGRAM ERROR:THIS PIPE RESTRAINT IS LOCATED ON DN6.A-28,EXAM NOT DONE.
I
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION'.
1 PLANT ST ~ LUCIE UNIT l INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987>'LASS I COtlPONEttTS PAGE:
19 CttEMICAL 5 VOLUt!E COttTROL SL'tlttARY EXAMItlATIOttAREA NUMBER IDENTIFICATION FIGURE/
0 ASME ASME ISOMETRIC/
O SEC.XI SEC.
Xl NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM
?
ITEM 5 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDUI.E METHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
tt I 9
ONGT RSEH E I OE C
G M R INSTRUCTIONS CVCS 000640 2-CH-145-12 ELBOtt TO PIPE 8 84.8 B-J A-EIA 2'CB PT NDE Z.I - 2 C
VT-l NDE 4.1 - 6 C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COttPONEttTS PAGE:
20 AUX'RESSURIZER SPRAY LiNE SUNttARY EXANINATION AREA Mut!BER IDEMTIFICATIOrt L
FISURE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISDNETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xl NL'NBER SIZE/
EXAN P ITEtt 0 CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHDD N I 0
ONST RSEH NDE USED E I 0 E
PROCEDURE NO ~
C 6 t! R INSTRUCTIONS CH 000654 2-CH-146-4PR PIPE RESTRAINT 84,10 B-K-2 A-28A VT-3 NDE 4.3 -
10 C
RCB 87 - FIELD CHANSE 4 1:CORRECTED ASNE ITEN 4 FROM 84. 1 TO 84.10.
000665 2-CH-146-llPR
- 84. 10 8-K-2 A-28A PIPE RESTRAINT RCB 87 - VERIFIED AS A NHIP RESTRAIttT,ttO EXAM.
NDE 4,3 000675 2-CH-146-16PR-1 PIPE RESTRAIttT 84'0 8-K-2 A-28A RCB VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 7 C
000680 2-CH-!46-!BPR-2 PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 8-K-2 A"28A RCB VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 6 C
000682 2-CH-146-20 CGUPLINS TO PIPL 84.8 8-J A-28A 2'CB PT tlDE3 ~ 1-11 C
DATE.'7/08/87 REVIS~O~:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE It(SPECTION SUM!(ARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COMPONENTS PAGE:
21 2'CHARGING LINE TO LOOP IA2 COLD LEG SUM"iARY EXAMINATION AREA NUMBER IDENTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
O cEC,XI
- SEC, Xi NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM P
ITEM D CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE ilETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
N I 8
ONGT P.
S E
H E I OE C 6 M R it)STRUCTIOttS RCc'CH 000708 2-CH-147-9PR-2 A 84.10 8-K-2 A-33A PIPE RESaRAliNT RCB 87 - VERIFIED MHIP RESTRAINT,NO EXAM 000713 2-CH-147-11PR-3 A 84. 10 B-K-2 A-33A PIPE RESTRAINT RCB 87 - SNUBBER Il-142,COMPONENT MARK t)CH-141"74:DOttE DATA SH":ET 4 I"142(87) 000718 2-CH-147-13PR"2 A B4. 10 B-K-2 A-33A PIPE RESTRAINT RCB 87 - VERIFIED:NHIP RESTRAINT,NO EXAM 000725 2-CH-147-17PR A 84. 10 8-K-2 A-33A PIPE RESTRAINT RCB 87-VERIFIED: )(HIP RESTRAINT,NO EXAM NDE 4.3 VT-3 PLT.
PROC.
DA'TE:
Q7/QB/87 REVISION:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT !
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CONPONENTS PAGE:
22 CHENICAL h VOLUNE CONTROL L
FIGURE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISONETRIC/
SU"NARY EXANINATION AREA 0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN NDE USED NUNBER IDENTIFICATION P
ITEN 0 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE kETHDD PROCEDURE ND.
NI 0
ONGT RSEH E I OE C
G N R INSTRUCTIONS CVCS 000735 2-CH-147-26 BEND TO COUPLING
- 84. 8 8-i A-33 RCB 87 -
DOES NOT EXIST: VERIFIED 2
~
NDE 3.1
OATc:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLAttT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTIOH
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
C'SS I COMPONEHTS I
PABE:
23 REACTOR COOLANTXSAFETY INJECTION
SUMMARY
EXAMINATION AREA ttUMBER IDENTIFICATID' F ISURE/
0 ASME AcME ISOMETRIC/
0 SEC.XI
- SEC, XI NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM P iTEN 0 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE METHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE HO.
H I 0
ONBT RSEH E I OE C 6 H R INSTRUCTIONS RCSiSI 000868
!2-S!-I'51-BPR-!
PIPE RESTRAINT 8 84.10 8-K"2 A-24 N/A VT-3 ttDE 4.3 - 29 C
RCB
DATE.'07/08/87 REV IS I Qtt:
I PLANT ST.LUCIE UHIT 1
INSERVICE IHSPECTIOH SUNNARY FQR THE FIRST IHTERVAI., THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CONPONEHTS PAGE:
?4 SAFETY INJECTION SUNNARY EXANINATIOH AREA HUNBER IDEHTIFICATION FIGURE/
8 ASNE ASNE ISOttETR IC/
Q SEC.XI SEC.
XI HUNBER SIZE/
EXAN P
ITEN 4 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD HDE L'SED PROCEDURE HO.
H I 8
OHGT RSEH E I OE C
G tt R
IHSTRUCTIQttS SI 000902 6-Sl-110"BAPR PIPE RESTRAINT 84 F 10 B-K-2 A-35 RAB ttDE 4.3 87 -
DOES NOT EXIST: VFRIFIEO B4. 10 8-K-2 A-35 000917 6-S I-110-17PR-2 PIPE RESTRAlttT RAB 87 SNUBBER'LANT PROGRAN)NEED DOCUNENTATIQN IF DONE VT-3 ttDE 4.3 - 25 C
00102!
6-S!-112-12PR PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 8-K-2 A-37 RAB VT-3 HDE 4.3 - 28 C
001022 6-SI-112-12PS-1,2 PIPE RESTRAINT IttTGRATTACH~
87 - VISUAL PER R,R.
0 3 8'
9 RAB VT-3 HDE 4.3 - 26 e
% PER R.R.
43 :PT OR VT ONLY 001032 6-Si-112-18 PIPE TO PIPE 84.5 8-J A-37 RAB 6'T-0 / 45 ttDE 5.20 -
14 C
VT-1 ttDE 4.1 - 40 C
EXANINE 100X OF THE WELD 001036 6-S I-112-20PR PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 8-K-2 A-37 VT-3 NDE 4 '
- 22 C
OnlO45 6-Sl-112-25> R PIPE RESTRAINT 87 - SWIVEL BEARING PAINTED
- 84. 10 8"K-2 A-37 RCB VT-3 NDE 4.3 " 12 001051 6-81-112"30 PIPE TO PIPE
- 84. 5 8-J A-37 6'CB UT-0 / 45 HDE 5.20 - I C
VT"1 HDE 4.1 " 7 C
EXANINE 100X OF THE WELD
l
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I PLANT ST ~ LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUHNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD ll987)
CLASS 1
CONPONENTS PAGE:
25 SAFETY INJECTION SUNaaARY EXANINATION AREA NUt>DER IDENTIF ICATION L
FIGURE/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xi NUNBER SIlE/
EXAN P
ITEN 0 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
NI 0
ONGT RSEH E I OE C
G tt R INSTRUCTIONS Si 001055 6-Si-112-32PR-2 PIPE RESTRAINT 84'0 8-K-2 A-37A RCB VT-3 PLT.PROC.
EXAHINE PER LANT PRG 87 -
SNUBBER 4 1-062:DONE I.R.
t) 1-062(87) 001057 6-Si-112-33PR PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 B-K-2 A"37 VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 17 C
001063 6-S I-112-37PR PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 B-K-2 A-37A VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 16 RCB 87 - SLIDDINS FOOT RETAINER ANGLE BENT UP 2'ROtt FLOOR)
NCR 4 87-02,CLOSED 001065 6-Si-1!2-38PR-1 P!PE RESTRAINT
'4. 10 8-K-2 A-37A RCB VT"3 tJDE 4 '
- 19 C
001068 6-SI-112-39PR PiPE RESTRAINT 001070 6-SI-!12-40PR PIPE RESTRAI)IT 001072 6-SI-112-41PR PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 8-K"2 A-37A RCB
- 84. 10 8-K-2 A-37A RCB
- 84. 10 B-,K-2 A-37A VT-3 NDE 4 '
- 8 C
VT-3 NDE 4,3 " 20 C
VT-3 NDE 4.3 -
14 RCB 87 - BASE PLATE GOIDE IS >NISALIGttED,SEE SKETCH ON PAGE 2 OF 2 DATA,SHEET 4.3 - 14 t>CR 4 1-091:CLOSED 001073 6-81-112-42 PIPE TO PIPE B4. 5 8-J A-37A 6'CB UT-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 -
1 C
VT-I NDE 4.1 - 7 C
EXAHINE 100X OF THE BELD
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I Pt.ANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERiOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CGHPONENTS PAGE:
26 SAFETY itt3ECTION SU,'(NARY EXAitINA;IGM AREA NUNBER IDENT IF!CATIOtt L
FIGURE/
0 ASttE ASNE ISONETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC ~ Xi NUttBER SIZE/
EXAH P
ITEN I CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NG.
H I 0
OHGT RSEH E I GE C
G N
R INSTRUCTIONS Si 001074 6-SI-!12-42PR PIPE RESTRAIHT
- 34. 10 8-K-2 A-37A RCB VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 21 87 BORiC ACID RESIDUE Ott BASE PLATE 001076 6-SI-112-43PR PIPE RESTRAINT B4. 10 8-K-2 A-37A VT-3 NDE 4.3 - 9 C
001106 6-S I-113-12APS PIPE RESTRAINT INTEGRAL ATTACH.
87 - VISUAL PER R.R.
4 3
84 ~ 9 8-K-1 A-37A RAB V'T-3 ttDE 4.3 - 23 C
43 001107 6-Si-113-12APSS PIPE RESTRAINT
- 84. 10 8-K"2 A-37A VT-3 PLANT PROC.
FIELD CHANGE 42 RAB 87 - BACKFIT D AC.: 1985,DONE I,R.
4 N507020
DATE:
07/08/87 REVIS IQtl:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UtlIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION SUttMARY FQR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CQNPOHENTS PASE:
27 REACTOR COOLANT PUNP -IA2 f SUNMARY EXAHINATIQN AREA NUNBER IDEHTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
0 ASltE ASl'iE iSONETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUMBER SiZE/
EXAN P
ITEH 0 CATBY LOCATIDN SCHEDULE NETHOD N I 0
OHST RSEH NDE USED E I OE PROCEDURE HO ~
C 6 tt R
INSTRUCTIOtlS RCP 00125b RCP-1A2 CASING TOP HELD A 85.6 8-L-!
A-3'V A-40 RCB VT-1 HDE 4.1 - 27 C
EXAttINE PER RELIEF REQUEST 4 8
DATE:
07/08/87 REV IS IOtl:
I PLAHT ST.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION SUHHARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL) THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CQHPONENTS PASE:
28 REACTOR COOLANT PUN& -lA1 SUHtlARY EXAHIHATION AREA HUHBER IDEHTIFICATIQH FIGURE/
0 AStl ASHE ISONETRIC/
Q SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUHBER SIZE/
EXAH P
ITEtt tt CATBY LOCATION SCHEDULE HETHDD HDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
N I 0
OHBT RSEN E I QE C
G H R IHSTRUCTIONS RCP 001257 RCP"lhi GAS IH8 INTERIOR A B5 F 7 8-L-2 A-39 A-40 RCB 87 EXAH NOT'QNEiPUHP HAS HOT DISSASSEttBLEDfR ~ R ~ 48 NDE 4.3 I
EXAttINE WttEH DISSASSEtlB'LED 001259 RCP"lA1 FLYMHEEL A N/A H/A A-39 A-40 RCB UT-25 NDE 5.15 - 2 C
UT-20 NDE 5 ~ 15 - 3
~
C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I PLANT ST.LUCIE Ut(IT I INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CL~SS I CDMPDt;EHTS PAGE:
29 REACTOR COO'ANT PUMP -IA2 SUt(MARY EXAMINATION AREA NUMBER IDENT IFI CATION L
F 16URE/
O ASME ASME ISOMETRIC/
0 SEC ~ XI SE.".
Xi NUMBER SIZE/
'XAM P
ITEM tt CATGY LOCATIOH SCHEDULE METHOD HDE USED PROCEDURE NO, NI O
ON6T RSEH E I OE C 6 M R INSTRUCTIONS RCP 001261 RCP-IA2 PUMP BOLTING A 85,2 8-6-1 A-E9 A-40 RCB 87 - NOT EXAMINED,(PUMP HAS HOT DISSASSEMBLED)
HDE 5.7/2 ~ I X
EXAMIHE HHEH DISSASSEMBLFD
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLAHT ST ~ LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTIOtt SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST IHTFRVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987>
CLASS I CONPONENTS PA6E:
30 REACTOR COOLANT PUNP -1A}
SUNttARY EXANIHATION AREA NUNDER IDEHTIF I CATION L
FI6URE/
0 ASNE ASl!E ISOi!ETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI tiUMBER SIEE/
EXAN P
ITEN tt CATGY LOCATIOtt SCHEDULE ttETHOD E
iNOE USED PROCEDURE NO.
H I 0
OHST RSEH' I OE C 6 t! R I!ISTRUCTIONS RCP OD I262 RC?-1A1 PUNP BOLTINB 87 - EXANINED IN PLACE.
A 85.3 8-6-2 A-39 A-40 RCB VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 25 C
EXAttIttE IN PLACE
DATE.'7/08/87 REV IS IOtt:
1 PLANT ST ~ LUCIE UttIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST INTERVA!., THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COMPONEHTS REACTOR COOLANT PUMP -!A2
SUMMARY
EXAMINATIOH AREA NUMBER IDENT IFICAT IOt<
FIGURE/
, 0 AStlE ASME ISOMETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xi NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM P ITEtl 0 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE METHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE tt0.
HI 0
OHBT RSEH E I OE C 6 N
R INSTRUCTIONS RCP 001263 RCP-lA2-L3 5 L4 ttELDED SUPPORT LUS A 85.4 8-K-I A-39 A-40 RCB 87 - FIELD CHANSE 4 3:ADO LUG 4 FOR RCP " 1A2 PT NDE 3 ~ 1-
'9 C
10 C
VT-I NDE 4.1 - 28 C
001268 RCP-IA2 FLYWHEEL A H/A tt/A A-39 A-40 RCB UT-25 NDE 5. 15 - I UT-20 NDE 5. 15 - 3 C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I PLAHT ST.LUCIE UNIT I IHSERVICE INSPECTIOH SUHHARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THiRD P RIOD (1987)
CLASS I
COHPONENTS PASE:
32 RFACTOR COOLAHT PUNP -181 SUGARY EXAHIHAI'ION AREA NU)1BER IDENTIFICATION FIGURE/
0 AS)1E ASHE ISOHETR IC/
0 SLC.XI SEC.
Xi NUHBER SIZE/
EXA)I P
ITFN 0 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE HETHOD HDE USED PROCEDURE NO, H I 0
ONGT RSEH E I OE C 8 )!
R INSTRUCTIONS RCP 001270 RCP-IBI PUHP BDLTING 8 85.2 87 - EXAHIHATION HOT DON,PUHP HAS it-5-1 A-39 A-40 RCB NOT DISSASSEHBLED THIS OUTAGE, NDE 5.7/2.
1 X
NHEN DISSASSEHBLED 001>77 RC -181 FLYNHEEL 8 H/A N/A A-39 A-40 RCB UT-25 UT-20 HDE 5.15 - 2 C
HDE 5.15 - 3 C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION SUHNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVALED THIRD PERIOD (19873 CLASS 1
CQttPQHEtiTS PAGE:
33 REACTOR COO'NT PUN>
-182 SUttNARY EXANIHATIQN AREA ttUttBER IDENTIF ICATION L
FIGURE/
0 ASHE ASHE ISOMETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC
~ Xl NUMBER SIZE/
EXAN P ITEtt 4 CAT6Y LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHQD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
Nl O
OHGT RSEH E I OE C 6 N R iittSTRUCTIONS RCP 001278 RCP-IB2 PUttP BOt.TING 87 - EXAiNINED IH PLACE 8 85.2 8-6-1 A-39 A-40 RCB UT-0 NDE 5.7 - 2 C
EXANIHED IH PLACE 001279 RCP-182 PUMP BOLTING 8 85.2 8-6-1 A-39 A-40 RCB 87 - EXANItiATIQN ttOT DONE,PUttP MAS NOT DISSASSEttBLED THIS OUTAGE.
NDE 5.7/F 1 X
MHEN DISSASSEHBLED 001280 RCP-182 PUNP BOLTIN6 87 - EXANINEQ IN PLACE.
8 85.3 B-6-1 A-39 VT-I A-40 RCB NDE 4.1 - 26 C
EXAttiNE IH PLACE
s DATE:
07/08/87 RE V I SION.'
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE IttSPECTION SUttttARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVALs T"IRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COttPOttENTS PAGE:
34 REACTOR COOLANT PUNP - 182 SUNNARY EXANIHATION AREA NUNBER IDENTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
O ASNE ASNE ISDNETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC XI NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN P
ITEN 8 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE ttETHOD HDE USED PROCEDURE HO.
HI 0
OHGT RSEH E I OE C
G N R INSTRUCTIONS RCP 001281 RCP-! 92-L4 f 8 85.4 ttELDED SUPPORT LUG B-K"I A-39 A-40 RCB 87 -
NOT DONEs2 LUGS ON PUttP 1A2 HERE OONEs> FIELD CHAttGE 4 3.
NDE 3.1
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
ItISERVICE INSPECTION SUtttlARY FOR THE FiRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CONPOtiENTS PAGE:
55 REACTOR COOLANT PUNP -182 SUttNARY EXANINA!ION AREA NUttBER IDENTIFICATION FIGURE/
0 AGEE ASNE ISDNETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xl NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN P
ITEN tt CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE HETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
N I 0
-ONGT RSEH E I DE C 6 N R INSTRUCTIONS RCP 001286 RCP-182 FLYMHEEs 8 N/A tl/A A-59 A-40 RCB UT-25 NDE 5 ~ 15 - 2 C
UT-20 NDE 5.15 - 3 C
l I
DATE:
07/08/87 REV IS IOtt:
1 PLANT ST ~ LUCIE UHIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTIOtt SUt(t(ARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
COt(POt(Et(TS PASE:
36 REACTOR COOLAt(TXSAFETY it(JECTION SUHt(ARY EXAHIHATION AREA HUt(BER IDEN: IF ICATIOti L
FIBURE/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xl i(UHBER SIZE/
EXAH NDE USED P
iTEN 0 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE HETHOD PROCEDURE NO.
N I 0
ONST RSEH E I OE C 6 t( R INSTRUCTIONS
RCSKSI 001287 CV-3217 VALVE (INTERIOR)
A 86.7 B-t(-2 A-25 12'T-3 PLY PROC'XA)(INE NHEN DISSASSEHBLED RCB 87 DONE BY FPL BACKFIT 8 AC 1985> I ~ R t(506965 001295 HV-3614 A 86.7 8+2 A-25 VALVE (INTERIOR)
RCB 87 -
DONE BY FPL BACKFIT 9 AC.-1985, I.R.
)1506964 12'T-3 PLT PROC'XAHINE HHEH DISSASSEt(BLED 001310 iiV 3652 VALVE (BOLTIHG) 87 EXAHINED IH PLACE 8 B6.9 B-8-2 A-21 RCB VT-1 HDE F 1 - 9 C
EXAt(INE IH PLACE, OR REHOVED
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 1
CONPQNEHTS PAGE:
37 PRESSURIZER SPRAY PIPING TO COLD LEG LOOP 182 SUNNARY EXANINATIOM AREA NU!!BER IDEN: IFICATIOH L
FIGURE/
0 ASNE ASi",E ISONETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN P
ITEN 4
CATGY LOCATION SCHEDLlLE t!ETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO ~
H I O ONGT RSEH E I OE CGHR INSTRUCTIONS RCS 001327 PCV-11006 VALVE !BOLTING) 87 - EXANINED IN P~ACE ~
B Bb.9 8-6-2 A-30 RCB VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 30 C
EXANINE IN PLACE OR REHOVED 001332 CV-1248 VALVE <BOLTIHG) 87 - EXA"INED IH PLACE.
8 Bb.9 B-6-2 A-30 RCB VT-1 iNDE 4,1 - 42 C
EXANIHE IH PLACE OR RENOVED
0 DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT I IHSERVICE INSPECTION SUiNiNARY FOR THE FiRST iNTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I COHPOHENTS PAGE:
38 PRESSURIIER SPRAY PIPING TO COLD LEG LOOP 1B1 L
FIGURE/
0 ASHE ASHE ISOHETRIC/
SUt43ARY EXA)IIHATION AREA 0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI HUNBER SIEE/
EXA)I NUHBER IDLNTIFICATIOH P
ITEN t CATGY LOCATION SCH DULE HETNOD NDE USED PROCEDURE HO.
Nl 0
ONGT RSEN E I OE C 6 N R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 001335 V-1251 VALVE <BOLTING) 87 - EXAHINED IN PLACEBO B B6 ~ 9 B-G-2 A-29 RCB VT-!
iNDE 4.1 - 19 C
0 I
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST,LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUN?(ARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CI.ASS 1
COHPONENTS PRESSURIZER SPRAY PIPING TO COLD LEG LOOP 182 SUN)(ARY EXANINATION AREA NU)tBER IDENTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
0 ASNE ASi4E ISONETR IC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xl NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN P I;EN 4 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO N I D
ONGT RSEH E I OE C
G N
R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 0013ib VLV !252 VALVE (BOLTING) 87 - EXANINED IN PLACE.
8 86 '
B-G-2 A-30 RCB VT-1 NDE 4 ~ 1 - 20 C
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
I PLANI'T.LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION SUtlt(ARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL,.THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS I CONPONENTS PRESSURIEER RELIEF Llt(E SUNiNARY EXANIt(ATION AREA
!(UNDER IDENTIFICATION L
'FI6URE/
0 AStlE ASNE ISOtlETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC. XI t<UNBER SIIE/
EXAN P IlEtl lt CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
N I 0
ON6T RSEH E I OE C 6 N
R INSTRUCTIONS RCS 001338 PORV-1402 86.9 B-S-2 A-27 VALVE BOLTING RCB EXANINED IN PLACE BY PLANT Q.C.,PLAtti PROCEDURE-QI9-2,REV.II 001339 tlV-1403
- 86. 7 8-6-2 A-27 VALVE (BOLTIttG)
RCB 87 - EXANINED IN PLACE.
VT-1 NDE 4. I - 43 C
VT"I i'lDE 4.1 - 21 EXANINE INPLACE
DATE:
07/08/87 REV IS ION:
I PLAHT ST.LUCIE UNiT I It(SERVICE INSPECTION SUt(ttARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (!987}
CLASS 1
COt(PDNEttTS PA6E:
41 2'CHARGING LINE TO CO(.D LE6 LODP IA2 SUttttARY EXAttittATIOtt AREA NUttBER IDENT!F ICATION L
FIGURE/
0 ASHE ASNE ISOttETRIC/
0 SEC,XI SEC
~
XI HUHBER SIZE/
EXAtt NDE USED P ITEtt tt CATBY LOCATION SCHEDULE t(ETHDD PROCEDURE NO N I 0
OHBT RSEH E I OE C 6 t(
R INSTRUCTIONS RCSICH 001351 CV-2435 VA'E (BOLTING}
A 86.9 B-G-2 A-33A WDE 4.1 87 -
HO BOLTING:NO EXANINE REGUIREO.
DATE:
07/08/87 REV IS IQtt:
1 PLANT ST,LUCIE UNIT I INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNttARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1967)
CLASS 2 COMPONENTS PAGE:
42 STEAN GENERA'.OR B.SECONDARY SIDE L
FIGURE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISONETRIC/
SUMttARY EXANINAI'ION AREA 0 SEC.X!
SEC.
XI ttUttBER SIZE/
EXAM
'UMBER IDENTIFICATION P
ITEN 4 CAT6Y LOCATION SCHEDULE ttETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO, N I 0
ONGT RSEH E I QE C 6 N R INSTRUCTIONS S6-B 001429 SG-IB-4 TRANS.TQ UPPER SHELLCIRC.
MELD B C1.1 C-A B-01 RCB UT-0 UT-45 UT-60 VT"I NDE 5.21 - 4 NDE 5.21 - 5 ttDE 5.21 - 6 NDE 4.1
- 23 EXAMINE 100X QF THE MELD 87 - SCAN PATH LINITED BY STEAN GENERATOR SUPPORT LL'GS.
FIELD CHAtt6E 4 2:
USED CAL.
BLOCK UT-45,5-CSCL-40 MAS LISTED, 001437 SG-IB-SI - SB B CI.5 C-C B-02 UPPER VESSEL.
SUPPORTINTE6RAL ATTA RCB 87 - EXANINED LUGS 6-6,S-7,h S-B NT NT VT-I VT-I NDE 2 ~ 1 -
11 NDE 2,1 - 12 NDE 4.1 - 4 NDE 4.1 - 5
I
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION
~
I PLANT ST ~ LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTIGN
SUMMARY
FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 2 COMPONENTS PAGE:
43 REGEtiERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER
SUMMARY
EXAMINATION AREA NUMBER I DENT IF ICATIG."I L
FIGURE/
G ASME.
ASME ISOMETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM NDE USED P
ITEM it CAT6Y LOCATION SCHEDUI E tlETHOD PROCEDURE NO, Nl 0
ON6T RSEH E I OE C 6 H
R INSTRUCTIONS RHE 001438 RHE-I REDUCER TG SHELL C!.1 C-A 8-03 RCB 6
~
NDE 5.20 X
EXAMINE 20X OF
'AELD.
87 - LOCKED HIGH RADIAl'ION AREA 001440 RHE-SI-S4 Ci ~ 3 C-C 8-03 SUPPORTS INTEGRAL ATTACHMEttTS RCB 87 - LOCKED HIGH RADIATIGN AREA NDE 3.1
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISIOH:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UHIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTIOtl SUNilARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 2 COttPQNEttTS PA6E:
44 tlAIH STEANi - LOOP IB SUNi".ARY EXAHIHATIQH'REA NUttBER IDENTIFICATIQH FIBURE/
0 ASHE ASilE ISQtlETRIC/
Q SEC.XI SEC.
Xi HUHBER SilE/
EXAtl P
ITFiH tt CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHGD NDE USED PROCEDURE HD.
H I 0
OHGT RSEH E I OE C 8 H
R INSTRUCI'IQNS "ttS 00!546 34'-ttS-29-BPSS 8 C2,6 C-E-2 8-07 SUPPORT CONPOiHENT RCB 87 -
DDES HOT LXIST:VERIFIED tlDE 4.3 00I547 34'-NS-29-BPR PIPE RESTRAINT 8 C2. 6 C-E-2 8-07 VT-3 HDE 4.3 RCB 87 - SNUBBER:EXANINED UNDER PLANT PROSRAH ~
I
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNHARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL? THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 2 CONPONENTS PAS'5 HAIN STEAN RELIEF HEADER L
FIGURE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISOttETR IC/
SUNttARY EXANIHATIONAREA, 0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xi NUNBER SIZE/
EXAN NUMBER IDEHTIF ICATICN P
ITEN 0 CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE ttETHDD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO.
H I 0
ONBT RSEH EIOE C 6 tt R
IHSTRUCTIOtiS
?AS 001568 6'-HS-63"I A C2;1 C-C B-06A 6'RANCH CONti.TO FLG.
RCB 87 - LINITATIOtiS:FLANBEO.D.COtiFIGURATION UT-0 I 45 NDE 5.20 - 23 C
VT-I NDE 4.1 - 41 C
EXAttINE !00X OF THE MELD.
DATE:
07!08/87 REVISION:
I PLANT ST,LUCIE UNIT I It(SERVICE INSPECTION SUtlNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 2 CONPONENTS PAGE:
SUtlttARY EXA,"cIMATIOM AREA NUtlBER IDENTIFICATION L
FIGURE/
0 AS"lE ASNE ISOUETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUt(BER SIEE/
EXAN P
ITEN tt CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE t(ETHQD HDE USED PROCEDURE NO ~
Hi 0
OH 8 RSEN EIOE C
G N R INSTRUCTIOtlS NFN VT-3 HDE 4.3 - 15 001627 18'-BF-~2-3PLS 8 C2.6 C-E-2 8-09
<<SUPPORT RCB 87 - SUPPORT FOUND OUT OF ALIGt(NEHT (STRUT ASSENBLY),NCR 87-01,CLOSED C
DOES THIS SUPPORT EXIST?
DATE.'7/08/87 REVISION:
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERiOD
( 1987)
CLASS 2 COtfPONENTS PAGE:
47 SAFETY INJECTION SU)l<",ARY EXANINAT!ON AREA NUMBER IDENTIF ICATION L
F ISURE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISDN TRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
XI NUNBER SITE/
EXAH P
ITEN 0 CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD NDE USED PROCEDURE NO ~
N I 0
ONBT RSEH E I OE C S tl R it(STRUCTIGNS SIS 001688 12'-SI-406-18 ELBOM TD PIPE A C2. 1 C-F B"13A 12'T-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 -
15 VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 36 RAB EXANINE 100X OF THE MELD~ SUB 001694 12"-SI-406-22PR A C2.6 C-E-2 8-13A PIPE RESTRAINT RAB 87 -
DOES NOT EXIST:VERIFIED
."IDE 4.3 001732 12"-cl-408-1 A C2.1 C-F 8-15 12'DE 5'0 VLV.HCV-3657 TO PIPE RAB 87 -FIELD CHANGE 4 3:NOT DONE, SUBSTITUTED MELD 12-Sl-408"2 (ACCESSIBILITY) 001733 12'-Sl-408-2 C2. 1 C-F 8-15 12'T-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 - 21 ELBOW TQ TEE VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 34 RAB 87 - FIELD CHANGE 4 3:
SUBSTITUTION FQR 12-SI-408-1. (ACCESSIBILITY)
X EXANIttE 100X QF THE MELD.
EXANINE 100/
GF THE MELD.
FC-3 001745 12'-S1-410-1 C2.1 C-F B-lb 12'DE 5.20 VLV.)(V-3658 TO PiPE RAB 87 - FIELD CHANGE 43:NOT DONE, SUBSTITUTED ME' 12-Sl-410-4(ACCESSIBILITY)
X EXANINE 100X OF THE MELD 001749 12'-Sl-410-4 PIPE TO ELBOM 87 - FIELD CHANGE 4 C2.1 C-F 8-16 12'T-0 / 45 VT"1 RAB 3: SUBSTITUTION FOR 12-S1-410-1, (ACCESSIBILITY)
NDE 5'0 -
12 NDE 4.1 - 35 C
EXA)(INE 100X GF THE MELD.
C FC-3 001750 12'-SI-410-5 ELBOM TO PIPE C2.1 C-F 8-16 12'T-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 - 20 VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 35 RAB EXANINE 100X OF THE MELD.
001760 12"-SI "412-4PR PIPE RESTRAINT 8 C2.6 C-E-2 8-17 RCB 87 -
DOES t(QT EXIST:VERIFIED t(DE 4.3
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLANT ST ~ LUCIE UNiT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUt(MARY FOR THE FIRST It(TERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (5987)
CLASS 2 CGt(PQNEt(TS PAGE:
48 SAFETY INJECTION UNNARY EXAt(INATIQN AREA NUt(BER IDENT IFICATIOt(
L FISUREI O ASNE AS((E
!SONETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xi NUMBER SIZE/
EXAM l(DE USED P ITEtf tt CATSY LOCATION SCHEDULE i(ETHQD PRGCEDURE HO.
Hi 0
OH6T RSEH E I OE C 6 t(
R INSTRUCs!OllS SIS 001765 12'-Sl-412-6PR PiPE REcTRAI((T B C2. 6 C-E-2 B-17 RCB HDE 4.3 87 - DOcS t(DT EXIST:VERIFIED 001782 12'-S I-414-4PR PIPE RESTRAINT C2. 6 C-E"2 B-!8 RAB VT-3 t(DE 4 '
- 24 C
001796 12'-Sl-414-!4 C2. 1 C-F 8-18 12'T-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 -
19 C
PIPE TO ELBOM VT-1 NDE 4, 1 - 33 C
RAB 87 - FIELD CHAN6E 4 3:SUBSTiTUTIOH FOR MELD 12-SI-454-17,(ACCESSIBIL!TY)
EXA((INE !OOX OF THE MELD 001799 12'-Si-414-17 TEE TO REDUCER C2. I C-F B-18 12'DE 5.20 X
EXANIHE 100X OF THE MEs D RAB 87 - FIELD CHANGE (t 3:NDT DONE, SUBSTITUTED MELD 12-Sl-414-14 (ACCESSIBILITYt 005800 12'-SI-414-17PR PIPE RESTRAINT C2 ~ 6 C-E-2 B-18 RAB NDE 4.3 87 - DOES NQT EXIST:VERIFIED ci 001805
!2'-61-475-1 TEE TO ELBOM C2.1 C-F B-12 12'T-0 / 45 HDE 5 ~ 20 - 22 C
VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 39 C
EXAtflttE 100X OF THE MELD~
001816 12'-Sl-475-9 ELBOM TO ELBOM RAB C2. 1 C-F B"12 12'AB UT-0 / 45 NDE 5.20 - 13 C
VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 38 C
EXAt(INE 1007.
GF THE McLD.
001888 10'"Sl-406A-1 A C2. 1 C-F B"13 10'Hc NOZZ.N2 TO PIPE RAB 87 - UT-45:EXAMINED FRON ONE SIDE ONLY,NOZZLE CONFIGURATIONS UT"0 I 45 HDE 5'0 -
17 C
VT-1 NDE F 1 - 37 C
EXANINE 100X QF THE MELD.
QATE:
07/08/87 REVIS IQtt:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAl., THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 2 COi'tPONENTS PAGE:
SAFETY IÃ3ECTIQN SU)tilARY EXANINATIQN AREA NUtt&cR IDE)tTIFlCATION L
FIGURE/
0 ASNE ASHE ISOMETRIC/
0 ScC Xl SEC XI NUNBER SILE/
EXAN NDE USED P
ITEN i CATGY LOCATION SCHFDULE HETHOD PROCEDURE NO.
Nl 8
QttGT RSEH E I OE C
G N R INSTRUCTIONS SIS 001925 10'-SI-420-IPR-1 PIPE RESTRAINT C2. 6 C-E-2 B-21 VT-3 NDE 4.3 -13 C
RAB 87 - SNUBBER 41-075,DONE BY PLANT, 1985,c'987:DAT SHT.
4 001926 10"-Sl-420-11PR1 P IPE RESTRAIttT C2.6 C-E-2 B-21 VT-3 PLT PROC.
SNUBBER RAB 87 - SNUBBER 41-075,DONE BY PLAttT IN 1985,1987:DATA SHEET 4 1-075187) 002051 10"-Sl-422-36PR 3 C2. 6 C-E-2 B-22 PIPE RESTRAINT RCB 87 -
DOES NOT EXIST,SEE PLANT I,RE IM85-6779.
NDE 4.3 002068 10"-SI-422-46 Ploc TO ELBOM 87 - FIELD CHAttGE 4
C2.!
C-F B-22A 10'T-0 /45 NDE 5.20 -
18 C
VT-1 NDE 4.1 - 32 C
RAB 3:SUBSTITUTIQtt FQR MELO 10-SI-422-47,1ACCESSIBILITY) 002069 10'-Sl-422-47 ELBQM TO PIPE C2.
1 C-F B-22A 10" NDE 5'0 RAB 87 - FiELD CHANGE 4 3:SUBSTITUTED )tELD 10-Sl-422-46)[ACCESSIBILITY) 002150 6'-SI-463-7 PiPE TO ELBOM C2.1 C-F B-24 6'T-0 / 45 NDE 5 ~ 20 -
16 C
VT-1 NDE 4.1 " 31
.C RAB EXAttlttE 1007.
OF THE MELD.
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 MAIN STEAN RELIEF HEADER PLANT ST.LUCIE UNIT I It(SERViCE INSPECTION SUNNARY FOR THE FIRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987)
CLASS 2
CDNPONENTS PAGE:
%0 SUililARY EXANINATION AREA WUttBER IDENTIF ICATION L
FIBURE/
0 ASNE ASNE ISDNETRIC/
0 SEC.XI SEC.
Xi NUNBER S!ZE/
EXAN NDE USED P
ITEN 0 CAT6Y LOCATION SCHEDULE NETHOD PROCEDURE ND ~
N I 0
ONST RSEH E I OE C 6 tt R INSTRUCTIONS A C2.4 C-D 8-ptA NS 002172 34'-HCV-OBIA VALVE !BOLTING)
RCB 87 - EXAN!NATION CONPLETED 1985 '.R.44.5-45 NDE 4.5 C
EXA)titlE IN PLACE, OR RENDVED.
DATE:
07/08/87 REVISION:
1 PLANT ST.LUCIEUNIT 1
INSERVICE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
FQR THE FiRST INTERVAL, THIRD PERIOD (1987t CLASS 2 COtlPQttENTS PAGE:
51 ttAIH FEcDMATER SUHtlARY EXAMINATION AREA HUNBFR IDENTIFICATIQH L
FIGURE/
O ASttE ASHE ISONETRIC/
0 SEC,XI SEC
~
XI NUNBER SIZE/
cXAN NDE USED P iTEN tt CATGY LOCATION SCHEDULE ttETHQD PROCEDURE NO.
tt I 0
ONGT RSEH clOE CGHR ittSTRUCTIONS 18-BF-51 870001 18-BF-51-2A NDZZLE TO SAFE EttD 87 - AUGMENTED EXAN 870002 18-BF-51-2B SAFE END TO ELBQM 87 " AUGMENTED EXAM C5.21 C-F B-OB RCB C5 ~ 21 C-F B-08 RCB UT-45 NDE 5 ~ 16 -
1 C
UT-60 NDE 5 ~ 16 - 2 UT-45 HDE 5.16 -
1 C
UT-60 NDE 5 ~ 16 - 2 C
870003 18-BF-51"3A ELBQM TO PIPE 87 -
AUGMENTED EXAM C5.21 C-F B-08 RCB 'T-45 HDE 5.16 -
1 C
UT-60 HDE 5.16 - 2 C
!8-BF-52 870004
!8-BF-52-2A ttOZZLE TO SAF" EHD C5 ~ 21 C-F B-09 UT-45 NDE 5.!6 -
1 C
UT-60 NDE 5.16 - 2 87 - AUGMENTED EXAM 870005 18"BF-52-2B SAFE EtlD TO EI.BOM 87 - AUGttENTED EXAM C5.21'-F B-09 RCB UT-45 NDE 51.6 - I C
UT-60 HDE 5 ~ 16 - 2 C
870006 18-BF"52-5A ELBOM TO PIPE 87 -
AUGNENTED EXAN C5 ~ 21 C-F B-09 RCB UT-45 UT-60 NDE 5.16 -
1 C
NDE 5.16 - 2 C
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES PROCEDURE NUMBER NDE 2.1 REV.
3 NDE 3.1 REV.
4 NDE 4 '
REV.
0 NDE 5.3 REV.
1 NDE 5.10 REV.
1 NDE 5.14 REV.
0 NDE 5.15 REV.
1 NDE 5.16 REV.
2 NDE 5.20 REV.
0 FC-A NDE 5'1 REV. 0.. FC-A TITLE MAGNETIC PARTICLE EXAMINATION LIQUID PENETRANT EXAMINATION SOLVENT REMOVABLE VISIBLE DYE TECHNIQUE VISUAL EXAMINATION (VT-1)
VISUAL EXAMINATION (VT-3/VT-4)
ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONOF CLAD CARBON STEEL PIPING ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION'OF REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL STUDS AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP STUDS ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONOF NUTS, TWO INCHES IN DIAMETER OR GREATER MANUAL ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL WELDS ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONOF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FLYWHEELS ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION TECHNIQUE FOR THE EVALUATION OF CRACKING IN FEEDWATER PIPING ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONOF AUSTENETIC PIPING (ST.LUCIE UNIT 1)
ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONOF PRESSURE VESSEL WELDS,EXCEPT REACTOR VESSELS (ST.
LUCIE UNIT 1)
EXAMINATION PERSONNEL UT FPL EXAMINERS
- CARR, FRANK T.
III LAKE, EDWARD L.
XI NOWAKOWSKI, DANIEL C II XII III N/A N/A II N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2/10/87 N/A N/A N/A 2/27/87 N/A N/A N/A 2/27/87 PT MT ECT VT1 VT2 VT3 VT3 EYE EXAM EBASCO EXAMINERS DUBREUIL,RICHARD II LATXOLAIS,CARL II ORIHUELA,MIGUEL II PATTILLO,CHARLES II BRAY,ANDREW XT DAILY,JAMES H JR.
I NEWGARD, JERRY I
THXSTLETHWAITE,SCOTT IT XXI II'I II N/AIIII IT III N/A II II N/A II I
N/A N/A II N/A II N/A N/A N/A I
N/A N/A II N/A N/A IT N/A N/A N/A II ZI N/A II II N/A N/A N/A II II II N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3/06/87 6/19/86 9/11/86 9/22/86 12/29/86 8/20/86 1/08/87 1/28/87 PAUL MUNROE EXAMINERS MILLER;MICHAEL N/A NOTES:
= LEVEL I TRAINEE I
= LZVEL I EXAMINER XI
= LEVEL II EXAMINER
'III = LZVEL XII EXAMINER N/A N/A N/A III III III III NOT HAVE CERTIFICATION 4/01/87
CALIBRATION BLOCKS CALIBRATION BLOCK NO.
3-CSCL-41 UT-59 7-1.25"8-CS-52 10-;562-7-8-CS-51 7-CSCL-39 ET-2 UT-43P 6-SS-160-665-23 UT-35 UT-23 UT-17 2.5-SS-160-.375-GO-SLC UT-22 2-SS-160-342-20 2-SS-160-342-5 30-SS-160-434-22 12-SS-30-.328-29-SLC 10-SS-30-308-36 6-22-40-281-55 9-CS-XX-1.563-37 7-CSCL-37 UT-25 DESCRIPTION OF APPLICATION REACTOR COOLANT MAIN LOOP REACTOR COOLANT MAIN LOOP SAFE END REACTOR VESSEL STUDS(CLOSURE)
REACTOR VESSEL NUTS(CLOSURE)
.REACTOR VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD STEAM GENERATOR STAY CYLINDER RCP FLYWHEEL FEEDWATER NOZZLE (AUGMENTED) 6" SCH.
160 PIPING (SAFETY INJECTION) 12" REACTOR COOLANT PIPING 12" REACTOR COOLANT PIPING 2.5"REACTOR COOLANT PIPING 2.5" SCH ~ 160 PIPING (REACTOR COOLANT) 3" REACTOR COOLANT PIPING 2" REACTOR COOLANT PIPING 2" REACTOR COOLANT PIPING 3" REACTOR COOLANT PIPING 12" SAFETY INJECTION PIPING 10" SAFETY INJECTION PIPING 6" SAFETY INJECTION PIPING 6" MAIN STEAM PIPING STEAM GENERATOR (CLASS I)
STEAM GENERATOR (CLASS II)
, ULTRASONIC INSTRUMENT LISTING SERIAL NO.
MANUFACTURER MODEL CERTIFICATION DATE 27276-797 27276-1060 27276-1078 27593-3923 27593-3924 210692 0180453 212525 06420E 06422E 06444E 06446K KRAUTKKQKR BRANSON KRAUTKRLNER BRANSON KRAUTIGViHER BRANSON KRAUTtGUQKR BRANSON KRAUTIGRMER BRANSON KRAUTKRAMER BRANSON KRAUTIGV.MER BRANSON KRAUTIGV.MER BRANSON SONIC SONIC SONIC SONIC USK-7 USK-7 USK-7 USK-6 USK-6 USL-38 USL-38 USL-48 MK-I MK-I MK-I MK-I 2/20/87 2/20/87 2/20/87 2/20/87 2/20/87 2/12/87 2/12/87 2/18/87 2/17/87 1/17/87 1/17/87 1/17/87
1
SERIAL NO.
ULTRASONIC TRANSDUCERS MANUFACTURER SIZE
'YPE FREQUENCY A18410 A26434 C30211 C12138 E17224 F03231 F18219 F27468 H12303 H12319 H22336 H22381 H30231 J17150 J30324 JDO458 K08958 K14115 L03123 L03125 L15485 L26469 L30415 S772236 2012 2017 20671 06-648 AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH AEROTECH SONIC SWRI SWRI AEROTECH RTD
.50
.50 x 1.0
.50 1.0
~ 50 1.0
.50 x 1.0
.50 x 1.0
.25
.25
.50
.75 1.0
.75
.50
.50 x.50
.50
.50
.50 x 1.0
.50 x 1.0
.25
.50 1.0 1.0 x 1.0
.50 x 1.0
.50 x 1.0
.25
~ 25 x..25 ROUND RECT
~
ROUND ROUND ROUND ROUND RECT.
RECT.
ROUND ROUND ROUND ROUND ROUND ROUND ROUND SQUARE ROUND ROUND RECT.
RECT.
ROUND ROUND ROUND SQUARE RECT.
RECT.
ROUND SQUARE 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 1.0 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 1.0 MHz 1.0 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2;25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz 5.0 MHz 2.25 MHz 1.0 MHz 1.0 MHz 2.25 MHz 2.25 MHz
BATCH NO.
86K029 81L026 82F082 81E120 81M002 82D056 SKL-HF/S SKL-HF/S SKL-HF/S SKD-NF SKD-S PENETRANT PENETRANT PENETRANT DEVELOPER DEVELOPER MAGNETIC PARTICLE MATERIALS COMSUMABLE MATERIAL LISTING LIQUID PENETRANT MATERIALS TYPE SKC-NF/ZC-7B CLEANER/REMOVER MANUFACTURER MAGNAFLUX MAGNAFLUX MAGNAFLUX MAGNAFLUX MAGNAFLUX MAGNAFLUX BATCH 82J082 86L055 86A014 BATCH 8557 8661 TYPE ULTRAGEL II COUP LANT ULTRAGEL II COUPLANT TYPE 14AM PREPARED BATH 14AM PREPARED BATH 14AM PREPARED BATH ULTRASONIC MATERIALS MANUFACTURER MAGNAFLUX MAGNAFLUX MAGNAFLUX MANUFACTURER ECHO LABS ECHO LABS
Section 4.3 Snubber Functional Tests Conducted to Satisfy Technical Specification Requirements (Sample 41)
Snubber Functional Tests Conducted to Sarisf'y Technical Specijication Requirements (Sample ¹1) 4.3
Rorida Power 8 Ught Co.
FUNCTGNAL TESTS SATSFY Snubber Functional Test Results Summary TECHNICALSPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE <<1)
St. Lude Unit <<1 -1987 Refuelhg Outage Test Parameter:
Teneke Compression Tap 1409 Breakaway:
No Test No Test ITT-200 In5al Drag:
No Test No Test Serfal N5569 Lockup:
2.510'/min, PASS 1900'/min, FAIL, 0.100 Ipm under.
Mark NSS-1 1B Test Load:
260000 bs., 130%
260000 lbs., 130L Deviation: 64 Final Drap:
No Test No Test NCR: None Release Rate:
0.020'/min, PASS 0.064'/min, PASS The snubber exceeded the spedfied lockup vekety In the iansion mode (1 -2 ipm) by 0.51 ipm.
The referenced acceptance criteria Is for average lockup veloc5es.
The measured peak value for lockup vekicity (2.51 ipm) satisfies the peak lockup velod ty acce ptance standard of 2 ~ 4 ipm. The snubber Is acceptable.
Tap 1 010 Breakaway:
No Test No Test ITT.200 Initial Drap:
No Test No Test Serial N5571 Lockup:
1.910'/min, FAII0.090 Ipm under.
2.030'/min, PASS Mark NSS-2 1B Test Load:
196000 lbs., 98L 260000 lbs., 13%i Deviation: 66 Final Drag:
No Test No Test NCR 'None Release Rale:
0.028'/min, PASS 0.180'/min, PASS The snubber exceeded the spedfied lockup velodty h the compression mode (1 - 2 ipm) by 0.03 Ipm.
The referenced acceptance criteria is for average lockup veloc5es.
The measured peak value for lockup velodty (251 lpm) satisfies the peak lockup velodty acce ptance standard of 2-4 Ipm. The snubber is acceptable.
Tag 1 021 PSA-3 Serial N105 Mark NRC.005-34A Devta5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
15,5 Ibs, OM, PASS In5al Drag:
39.B lbs., 0.7%, PASS Activation:
0.014g, PASS Test Load:
5204 lbs., 87%
Rnal Drag: 419 lbs., 0,7%, PASS 19.6 Ibs, OZL, PASS 46,9 lbs., 0$ 'L, PASS 0.009g, PASS 5290 bs., 88'L 59.1 bs., 1.No, PASS Tap 1 022 Breakaway:
12.2 Ibs, O.PL, PASS 12.9 Ibs, 02%, PASS PSA-3 h5al Drag:
279 lbs., OW, PASS 81 4 lbs., 1.0L, PASS Serial N101 Activation:
0.012g, PASS 0.020g, PASS Mark NRC-005-34B Test Load:
5244 lbs., 87%
5120 bs., 85'L Devia5on: None Rnal Drag:
41 8 lbs., 0.7%, PASS 34.3 lbs.,
OAP%%d, PASS NCR: None The snubber activation result h compression (0.02g)!s Irxkatlve that maintenance is required to restore the snubber io optimum operating condition.
SPECIAL DISPOSITCN: Disassemble the snubber and perform deanhp/parts replacement as necessary Io reduce activation parameter value In the compression mode.
Provide AS-LEFT test data and repair report.
4.3-1
Rorida Power & Ught Co.
FUNCTCNAL TESTS SATISFY Snubber Functional Test Results Summary TECHNICALSPECIFCATGN REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE N1)
St. Lucle Unit N 1
~ 1987 Refueling Outage Test Parameter:
Tenske Compression Tag 1438 PSA-35 Serial N8456 Mark NMS449.310 Deviation: None NCR: None Brealtaway:
84.2 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS hl5ai Drag:
554.7 lbs., 1.1%, PASS Ac5va5on:
0.007g, PASS Test Load:
45099 lbs., 90%
Rnal Drag:
443.7 lbs., 09%, PASS 86.0 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS 331.0 lbs., 0.7%, PASS 0.007p, PASS 45940 lbs., 92%
396.2 lbs., 0.8%, PASS Tap 1441 PSA-35 Serial N8462 Mark NMS-548.9 Devta5on: None NCR:None Breakaway:
143.6 Ibs, 0.3%, PASS lnial Drag:
276.3 bs0.6%, PASS Ac5vation:
0.009g, PASS Test Load:
45269 lbs., 91%
Rnal Drag:
298.6 bs., 0.6%, PASS 164.1 Ibs, 03%, PASS 1084.0 lbs., 22%, PASS 0.008g, PASS 45906 Ibs., 92%
1064.0 lbs., 2.1'%, PASS Tag 1449 PSA-10 Serial N117 Mark NBF461-407 Devia5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
29.4 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS Inl5ai Drap:
131.3 lbs., 0.9%, PASS Activa5on:
0.012p, PASS Test Load:
13310 bs.,89%
Rnal Drag:
409,5 lbs., 2.7%, PASS r
28.0 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS 276.7 lbs.,
1 SYo, PASS 0.011p, PASS 13305 bs.,'89%
472.0 lbs., 3.1%, PASS 1
Tag 1476 Breakaway:
16.7 Ibs, 0.3%, PASS 15.0 Ibe, 02Yo, PASS PSA.3 Inl5al Drag:
51.8 bs., 0.9%, PASS 82.7 bs.,
1 4%, PASS Serial N19359 Ac5vation:
0.024g, FAIL, 0.0040 g over.
0.015g, PASS Mark NSI.973.6224 Test Load:
5154 lbs., 86%
5100 bs., 85%
Devia5on: 96 Rnal Drag; 289 Ibs0.5%, PASS 159.0 bs., 2', PASS NCR: None The snubber exceeded the specied accelera5on crileria of 0.02g by 0.004g In the iension mode.
Disassemble snubber and Inspect for damage!cause.
Provide report. Repair If prac5cal; othewlse, replace.
If repaired, provide AS-LEFT fuettonal test results. NOTE: This failure requires selec5on of SAMPLE N 2, PSA.1,-3 &-10) 4.3.2
Rorida Power 8 Ught Co.
FUNCTGNAL TESTS SATISFY Snubber FLrc5onai Test Results Summary TECHNICALSPECIFICATGN REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE Nt)
SL Lucie Unit N1 -1987 Refueling Outage Test Parameter:
Tension Compression Tag 1478 PSA-10 Serial N173 Mark NSI468-111 Devia5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
35.4 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS hlitial Drag:
1223 lbs., 0.8%, PASS Ac5vation:
0,011g, PASS Test Load:
14053 lbs., 94%
Rnal Drag:
1222 lbs., 0.8%, PASS 30.2 Ibs, 0,2%, PASS 155.7 bs., 1.0%, PASS 0.012g, PASS 14334 lbs., 96%
132.0 lbs., 09%, PASS Tag 1 089 PSA 3 Serial N18842 Mark NSI-V-1 Devtabon: None NCR: None Breakaway:
hitial Drag:
Activation:
Test Load:
Rnal Drag:
13.0 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS 393 lbs., 0.7%, PASS 0.006g, PASS 5738 Ibs96%
45.4 lbs., 0$%, PASS 12.3Ibs,02%,PASS 43.7 lbs., 0.7%, PASS 0.006g, PASS 5736 bs., 96%
52.9 bs., 0.9%, PASS Tag 1 090 PSA-3 Serial N19351 Mark NSPS.27 Deviation: None NCR:None Breakaway:
hltial Drag:
Ac5vation:
Test Load:
Final Drag:
18.0 Ibs, 0.3%, PASS 55.1 bs., 09%, PASS 0.008g, PASS 5301 lbs., 88%
48.4 lbs., 08%, PASS 12,5 Ibs, 02%, PASS 76.6 lbs., 1.3%, PASS 0.007g, PASS 5287 bs., 88%
50.3 bs., 0.8%, PASS Tag 1-104 PSA-10 Serial N11391 Mark NCC-21-1 Devia5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
hI5al Drag:
Ac5va5on:
Test Load:
Rnai Drag:
279 lbs, OZA, PASS 40.0 lbs., 0.3%, PASS 0.011g, PASS 13809 lbs., 92%
625 lbs., 0.4%, PASS 333 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS 78.1 lbs., 0.5%, PASS 0.012g, PASS 13992 bs., 93%
70$ bs., 05%, PASS 4.3-3
Rorida Power 4 Ught Co.
Snubber Functional Test Results Summary St. Lucle Unit N1
~ 1987 Refueling Outage Test Parameter.
Tenske Compress kl FUNCTCNAL TESTS SATISFY TECHNICALSPECIFICATGN REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE Nt)
Tap 1-107 PSA.3 Serial N19356 Mark KH47-75 Deviation: None NCR: None Breakaway:
'nitial Drag:
Activation:
Test Load:
Final Drag; 25.6 Ibs, 0.4%, PASS 81.6 bs., 1.4%, PASS 0.010g, PASS 5244 lbs., 87%
56.1 bs., 0.9%, PASS 15.4 Ibs, OM, PASS 38.7 bs., O.OL, PASS 0.015g, PASS 5140 bs., 8Pfi 51.4 hs., 09%, PASS Tag 1-109 PSA-35 Serial N900 Mark NMS449-313 Devfa5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
117.3 hs, 02%, PASS Initial Drag:
469.2 lbs., 0.9%, PASS Activation:
0.008g, PASS Test Load:
45453 lbs., 91
%%d Rnal Drag:
456.B lbs., 0.9%, PASS 114.2 Ibs, 02%, PASS 518.B bs., 1.0%, PASS 0.008g, PASS 45633 bs., 91
%%d 460.4 lbs., 09%, PASS Tag 1-111 PSA-3 Serial $18845 Mark NSI-B76-2475A Devtaten: None NCR: None Breaksvay:
202 Ibs, OZk, PASS hltial Drag:
435 lbs., 0.7%, PASS Activation:
0.012g, PASS Test Load:
5313 Ibs89%
Rnal Drag:
39A) tbs., 0.7%, PASS 15.1 bs, 0.3%, PASS 51 4 hs., 0.9%, PASS 0.012g, PASS 5260 bs., 88%
39 4 Ibs0.7%, PASS Tag 1-112 PSA-35 Serial %464 Mark NSI476-4505 Devtatlon: None NCR: None Breakaway:
1209 lbs, 0.2%, PASS hltiai Drag:
269.0 bs., 05%, PASS
. Activation:
0.005g, PASS Test Load:
45010 Ibs90%%d Rnal Drag:
526.3 lbs., 1.1%, PASS 127,7 Ibs, 03%, PASS 3125 lbs., OP%%d, PASS 0.009p, PASS 45485 hs., 91%
326.6 lbs., 0.7%, PASS 4.3-4
l I
Roiida Power 8 Ught Co.
FUNCTIONAL TESTS SATISFY Snubber FNc5onal Test Results Summary TECHNICALSPECIFCATION REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE NI)
St. Lucle Unit St
~ 1987 Refueling Outage Test Parameter:
Tension Cotripresskl Tag 1-121 PSA-1/4 Serial <<mt32 Mark NRC.5475 Devia5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
2.3 bs, 0.7%, PASS hltial Drag:
4.2 lbs., 1.2%, PASS Ac5va5on:
0.015g, PASS Test Load:
329 lbs., 94%
Rnal Drag:
13 4 lbs., 3.8%, PASS 13lbs 04% PASS 11.1 lbs., 3.2%, PASS 0.016g, PASS 334 lbs., 95%
73 lbs2.1%, PASS Tag 1-135 PSA-1/4 Serial N19085 Mark NRC 220.105 Devla5on: None NCR; None Breakaway:
1.3 bs, 0.4%, PASS hltial Drag:
8.3 bs., 2.4%, PASS Aclva5on:
0.016g, PASS Test Load:
328 lbs.,
94%%d Rnal Drag:
9,2 lbs., 2.6%, PASS 2.2 Ibs, 0.6%, PASS 6.1 bs., 1.7%, PASS 0.015g, PASS 336 bs., 96%
9.5 lbs., 2.7%, PASS Tag 1-202 PSA-3 Serial %683 Mark NCC-1899-2200 Devta5on: None NCR Nore Breakaway:
18.8 Ibs, 0.3%, PASS Initial Drag:
41 3 lbs., 0.7%, PASS Activation:
0.004g, PASS Test Load:
5355 lbs., 89%
Final Drag:
36.1 bs., 0.6%, PASS 12.3 Ibs, 02%, PASS 62.8 lbs., 1.0%, PASS 0.004g, PASS 5395 bs., 90%
67$ bs., 1.1%, PASS Tag 1-207 BP-20 Serial f39778-30 Mark NBF459-32 Devia5on: None NCR:None Breakaway:
hltial Drag:
Lockup:
Test Load:
Rnal Drag:
Release Rate 23.0 Ibs, 0,1%, PASS 1270 lbs., 0.6%, PASS 9.900'/min, PASS 17988 lbs., 90%
1005 lbs., OS%, PASS 2.600'/min, PASS 283 bs, 0.1%, PASS 205.3 lbs., 1', PASS 9.700'/min, PASS 17691 lbs., 88%
1545 lbs., 0.8%, PASS 2.800'/min, PASS 4.3-5
Rorkfa Power 8 Ught Co.
FUNCTCNAL TESTS SATIFY Snubber Functional Test Realts Summary TECHNICALSPECIFICATCN REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE N1)
St. Lucle Unit N 1 -1987 Refuelhg Outage Test Parameter:
Tenske Compression Tag 1-208 BP-70 Serial NG.45904-A0-2 Mark NMS 649-33 Deviation: None NCR: None Breakaway:
122.0 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS hlal Drag:
503.9 bs., 0.7%, PASS Lockup: 9.500'/min, PASS Test Load:
63873 lbs., 91%
Final Drag:
497.2 lbs., 0.7%, PASS Release Rate:
8.500'/min, PASS 135.9 Ibs, 02%, PASS 623.8 lbs., 0.9%, PASS 11.900'/min, PASS 66600 bs., 95%
715.1 bs., 1.0%, PASS 5.000'/min, PASS U
Tag 1-220 PSA-1/2 Serial,010720 Mark NCH.235.H10 Devta5on: None NCR:None Breakaway:
hltial Drag:
Activation:
Test Load:
Foal Drag:
3.3 bs, 05%, PASS 118 lbs., 1$%, PASS 0.016g, PASS 568 lbs., 87%
115 lbs., 18%, PASS 14 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS 16.8 lbs., 2.6%, PASS 0.017g, PASS 576 bs., 89%
82 lbs., 1.3%, PASS Tag 1-221 PSA-1/4 Serial 419081 Mark NCH-235.H11 Deviation: None NCR: None Breakaway:
1.7 bs, 05%, PASS hltial Drag; 8.2 lbs., 2,3%, PASS Activation; 0.009g, PASS Test Load:
309 lbs., M%
Final Drag:
9.1 lbs.,26%, PASS 1S Ibs, 0.5%, PASS 8.6 lbs., 25%, PASS 0,0149, PASS 334 lbs., 95%
10.1 bs., 29%, PASS 23 Fiwctional tests performed.
4.3.6
Section 4.4 Snubber Functional Tests Conducted to Satisfy Technical Specification Requirements (Sample ¹2)
Snubber Functional Tests Conducted to Satisfy Technical Specification Requirements (Sample ¹2) 4,4
Rorfda Power a Ught Co.
FUNCTCNAL TESTS SATIFY Snubber Func5onal Test Results Summary TECHNICAL SPECIFICATCN REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE N2)
St. Lucfe Unit N1
~ 1987 Refueling Outage Test Parameter:
Tense Compression Tag 1427 PSA-3 Serfal N100 Mark NRC405 55B Devfalon: None NCR None Breakaway:
19.2 lbs, 0.3%, PASS hltlal Drag:
309 lbs., 0.5%, PASS Ac5va5on:
0.0Mp, PASS Test Load:
5319 lbs., 89%
Final Drag: 552 lbs., 0.9%, PASS 12.3 Ibs, 02Y, PASS 72.5 lbs., 1.2%, PASS 0.007g, PASS 5419 bs., 90%
612) bs., 1'/, PASS Tag 1435 PSA-3 Serial N19348 Mark NMS-1076.3164 Devta5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
13.8 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS hIal Drag:
66.5 lbs., 1.1%, PASS Ac5va5on:
0.009g, PASS Test Load:
5231 lbs., 87%
Rnal Drag:
54.9 lbs., 0.9%, PASS.
13.3 Ibs, 02%, PASS 633 bs., 1.1%, PASS 0.010g, PASS 5201 bs87%
54.3 lbs., 0 cl%, PASS Tap 1472 PSA-10 Serial N101 Mark NSI-972-1243 Devta5on: None NCR: None Breakaway:
229 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS hIal Drag:
134.6 bs., 09%, PASS Activa5on:
0.012g, PASS Test Load:
13345 lbs., 89%
Final Drag:
143.7 lbs., 1.0%, PASS 28.5 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS 140.8 lbs., 0.9%, PASS 0.012g, PASS 13639 lbs., 91%
182.7 bs., 1,2%, PASS Tag 1477 PSA-3 Serial N1 9361 Mark NSI-86844 Devia5on: None NGR 'one Breakaway:
hltial Drag:
Activation:
Test Load:
Rnal Drag:
142 lbs, 02%, PASS 72.6 bs., 1', PASS 0.007g, PASS 5335 lbs., 89%
60.5 bs., 1.0%, PASS 12.3 Ibs, 02%, PASS 665 bs., 1,1%, PASS 0.007g, PASS 5300 bs., 88%
75.8 lbs., 1M, PASS 4.4-1
Rortda Power 8 Ught Co, Snubber Rsctional Test Results Summary St. Lucle Unit N1 - 1987 Relueling Outage Test Parameter:
0 FVNCTCNAL TESTS SATSFY TECHNICAL SPECIFCATCN REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE N2)
Tension Tag 1483 PSA-3 Serial N17188 Mark NSI476-105 Devtason: None NCR: None Brealutway:
Inlal Orag:
Test Load:
Final Drag:
142 Ibs, 02%, PASS 282 bs., OS%, PASS 0.006g, PASS 5309 lbs., 88%
339 lbs., 0.6%, PASS 13.2 Ibs, 02%, PASS 38.0 bs., 0.6%, PASS 0.007p, PASS 5280 bs., 88%
37.9 bs., 0.6%, PASS Tag 1486 PSA.3 Serial N18841 Mark NSI476.129 Devfation None NCR: None Breakaway:
14.0 Ibs, 02%, PASS Inmal Drag:
36.4 lbs., 0.6%, PASS Activation:
0.005g, PASS Test Load:
311bs.,5%%d Rnal Drag:
37.0!bs., 0.6%, PASS 10.4 Ibs, 0.2%, PASS 2,6 Ibs0.0%, PASS 0.006g, PASS 5299 bsSS%
41.9 bs., 0.7%, PASS Tag 1-102 PSA-10 Serial <<14478 Mark NCC-14-2 Devtadon: None NCR: None Breakaway:
265 Ibs, 02%, PASS Initial Drag:
783 lbs., 05%, PASS Activa5on:
0.010g, PASS Test Load:
13472 lbs., 90%
Final Drag:
101.9 lbs., 0.7%, PASS 30.9 Ibs, 0,2%, PASS 92.5 bs., 0.6%, PASS 0.012g, PASS 13389 bs., 89%
108.0 Ibs0.7%, PASS Tag 1-174 PSA.1 Serial N448 Mark NCH.B5 54A Devtation: None NCR; None Breakaway:
4A Ibs, 0.3%, PASS hltial Drag:
533 lbs., 3.8%, PASS Activa5on:
0.008g, PASS Test Load:
1352 lbs., 90%
Rnal Drag:
39.4 lbs., 2 6%, PASS 6.3 bs, OA%, PASS 43.0 lbs., 29%, PASS 0.008p, PASS 1307 bs., 87%
42.B Ibs,, 2S%, PASS 4.4-2
J I
Rortda Pover 8, Ught Co.
FUNCTI0NALTESTS SATISFY Snubber Functional Test Results Summary TECHNICAL SPECIFICATCN REQUIREMENTS (SAMPLE N2)
SL Lucle Unit NI - 'l987 Refueling Dutage Test Parameter:
Tenston CompresskN Tag 1-222 PS A-10 Serial N219 Mark KS-678-1555 Devhtton: None NCR None Beakaway:
27.7 Ibs, 0~, PASS InIal Drag:
126.0 lbs., 0.8'Ir., PASS Actlva5on:
0.011g, PASS Test Load:
13179 bs.,8II Final Drag:
130.6 lbs., OWo, PASS 28.0 lbs, O.PA, PASS 260.0 lbs., 1.W, PASS 0.012g, PASS 13319 lbs., 89%
279.9 lbs., 19%, PASS 9 Functtonal tests performed.
4.4 3
St. Lucie Units I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Anticipated.Transients IUithout Scram (ATIUS) Plant S ecific Information FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST.
LUCIE PLANT - UNITS 1 & 2 ATWS MODIFICATIONS DIVERSE SCRAM SYSTEM CONCEPTUAL'DESIGN
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION i
COVER SHEET ii TABLE OF CONTENTS I'ESIGN DESCRIPTION II.
INPUTS III. OUTPUTS
~
~
IV.
LOGXC V.
COMPLIANCE WITH NRC GUXDELINES VX.
DIVERSITY ATTACHMENTS l.
INPUT WIRXNG PSL-1 (EXISTING) 2.
INPUT WIRING PSL-1 (PROPOSED) 3.
INPUT WIRING PSL-2 4.
OUTPUT WIRING MG SET PANEL 1A 5.
OUTPUT WIRING MG SET PANEL 1B 6.
ATWS BLOCK DIAGRAM 7.
ATWS LOGIC DIAGRAM 8.
ST LUCIE UNXT 1 DIVERSITY 9 ~
ST LUCIE UNIT 2 DIVERSITY
I'ESIGN DESCRIPTION On July 26,
- 1984, The Code of Federal Regulations was amended to include Section 10CFR50.62, "Requirements for Reduction of Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" (also known as the ATWS Rule).
The ATWS Rule requires specific improvements in the design and operation of commercial nuclear power facilities to reduce the likelihood of a failure to shut down the reactor following anticipated transients, and to mitigate the consequences of anticipated transients which occur without a shutdown.
The occurrence of an anticipated transient in conjunction with a failure of the Reactor Protective System (RPS) to produce a reactor trip is defined as an ATWS event.
The combination of an RPS failure and an anticipated transient is outside the present plant design basis and was analyzed by Combustion Engineering (CE) via CENPD-158. It was determined that a complete loss of feedwater combine'd with a failure of the reactor to trip would result in a primary coolant system pressure excursion well above reactor vessel service level C limits and therefore potentially challenge the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
For Combustion Engineering plants the regulations require the implementation of two methodologies for ensuring that an excessive primary coolant pressure excursion does not occur.
These methodologies are called "prevention" and "mitigation".
Prevention takes form as a
Diverse Scram System (DSS) whose purpose is to initiate a shutdown of the reactor by control rod insertion upon conditions indicative of an anticipated transient, independently and diversely from the RPS.
Hitigation is accomplished by tripping the turbine and initiating Auxiliary Feedwater to conserve steam generator inventory and to ensure that a primary coolant heat sink is available.
A combination of prevention and mitigation willlimit the peak reactor coolant system pressure rise to within acceptable values.
1)
PREVENTION The statement of considerations for the ATWS Rule contains a table entitled "Guidance Regarding System and Equipment Specification" (49FR26043, 26044).
This table establishes criteria in areas such as diversity, testability, electrical independence, etc. for a DSS design that the NRC staff believes will comply with 10CFR50.62.
In a report prepared for the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (GEOG) labelled CE NPSD-354 (Functional Design Specification For The Diverse Scram System For Compliance With The ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62),
CE recommends a minimum DSS design that conforms to the ATWS Rule and the NRC table of guidance.
0383I/0031I
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This conceptual design document provides a description of a DSS design based on CE NPSD-354 which is in compliance with the ATHS Rule and the NRC table of guidance, including the NRC QA guidance for ASS equipment, NRC Generic Letter 85-06, +ality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment That Is Not Safety-Related.
It also includes other design considerations not specified by the NRC documents such as applicability of the Technical Specifications, DSS bypass functions, diverse turbine trip systems, local indications, annunciation, etc.
The design of the Diverse Scram System (DSS) is similar for both St Lucre Units 1 and 2 with some minor exceptions in the pressurizer pressure instrument loops.
The DSS utilizes existing pressurizer pressure instruments and signal converters and takes as inputs, 1-5 Vdc signals from secondary current loops in the RPS cabinets.
These signals are wired to the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) cabinets where they are processed by DSS logic components to provide reactor trip signals.
The trip signals are used to open the control element assembly drive (CEA Drive) motor generator (MG) set output breakers upstream of the Reactor Trip Switchgear.
The consequential loss of voltage and current to the Reactor Trip Switchgear causes the reactor to shut down.
This system, diverse and independent from the RPS except at the instrument loops, satisfies the ATWS Rule requirements for ASS prevention.
It is anticipated that no additional cabinets will be required as the six existing Consolidated Controls Corporation ESFAS cabinets (MA, MB, MC, MD, SA, SB) and RTGB-106 (206 for Unit 2) will accommodate all new components shown on the block diagram in Attachment 1 to this report.
Modifications to those cabinets and RTGB-106 (206) will include new isolators, bistable and actuation modules, I/I converters, and test equipment, plus a few switches and lights. It is not anticipated that there will be any new safety-related DSS input cables since the existing cables connecting RTGB-106 (206) and the ESFAS cabinets will be utilized as is.
Output cables will be non-safety.
Fire protection as described by 10CFR50 Appendix R of the Code of Federal Regulations is not applicable to the design of the Diverse Scram System.
However, the DSS should not affect those systems required for an Appendix R safe shutdown.
The DSS is entirely contained within the control room except the outputs to the CEA drive MG set breakers.
Control room equipment is bounded by the control room fire analysis and the MG sets are not on the Appendix R Essential Equipment List.
Therefore the DSS will not affect those systems required for an Appendix R safe shutdown. 0383I/0031I
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2)
MITIGATION In response to 10CFR50. 62, the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (GEOG) issued report CEN-315 (Summary of the Diversity Between the Reactor Trip System and the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System for C-E Plants) and transmitted it to the NRC staff by letter dated September 18, 1985.
This report describes the plans for compliance with 10CFR50.62 (ATWS Rule) by participating utilities with CE designed plants, including FPL's St Lucie Units 1 and 2.
In this report, it was assumed that a DSS (Diverse Scram System) and DTT (Diverse Turbine Trip) existed in both Units and that a study demonstrating the diversity of components and design between the RPS and the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) was all that remained necessary to meet the ATWS Rule requirements for mitigation.
The NRC evaluated CEN-315 and issued a Staff Evaluation to the GEOG by letter dated August 4, 1986.
Within this evaluation, the NRC addressed only the existing RPS/AFAS diversity aspects of specific CE designed plants and did not make judgements concerning compliance with other ATWS Rule requirements (e.g. electrical independence, testing at power), nor did the NRC make approvals of any DSS or DTT design.
In general, the NRC concluded that there may be sufficient diversity between the existing RPS and the existing AFAS to satisfy the requirements for St Lucie Unit 1.
However, St Lucie Unit 2 has different components than Unit 1 and it is not apparent to the NRC that sufficient diversity exists to satisfy the requirements for St Lucie Unit 2.
To show compliance with the ATWS Rule on auxiliary feedwater initiation, an RPS/AFAS diversity study was performed for Units 1 and 2 and is submitted separately from this conceptual design document.
Inherent to the DSS design is a turbine trip independent and diverse from the RPS, which is initiated by undervoltage conditions sensed in the CEA drive control system.
This arrangement satisfies the ATWS Rule requirements for a diverse turbine trip.
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DSS INPUTS Each Unit will utilize the four pressurizer pressure transmitters and their respective current loops for the source of the DSS input signals.
These transmitters are also used for the RPS (high pressurizer pressure reactor trip and low pressurizer pressure reactor trip), indications, high and low pressurizer pressure annunciation, Emergency Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (low pressurizer pressure/safety infection actuation),
and as input to the Sequence of Events Recorder (SER).
In both Units the actual signals used for the DSS will be sent to the ESFAS cabinets, (MA, MB, MC, MD) over the existing cables from RTGB-106 (Unit 1) and RTGB-206 (Unit 2).
The cables carry 1-5Vdc
'ignals, obtained from secondary isolated current loops (which isolate the input signals to the RPS,
By using these existing cables, this deletes the requirement for new safetymelated input cables.
In Unit 1, the DSS will require the addition of a new I/I converter in each of the four pressurizer pressure instrument current loo'ps in RTGB-106.
The new I/I converters will be used solely to provide the signals required for the ESFAS and the DSS.
Existing I/I converters, which originally provided signals for the ESFAS, will lose that function.
In addition to providing the pressurizer pressure
Attachments 1 and 2 are provided to show the minimum required modifications for channel C to implement the DSS.
Note that existing cable F-MC remains as is and will carry the pressurizer pressure signal to both ESFAS and the DSS.
In Unit 2, implementation of the DSS requires no changes to the existing instrument and secondary current loops in RTGB-206.
The existing E/I converters which normally supply signals to the SER and ESFAS, will now also supply signals to the DSS through the existing safety~elated ESFAS cables.
Attachment 3 is provided to highlight the secondary current loop.
Note that existing cable F-MC remains as is and will carry the pressurizer pressure signal to both ESFAS and the DSS.
The following table is provided to list the ma)or components for the DSS inputs.
UNIT 1 INST NUNBEE SAFETY CHANNEL EXISTING I/I CONV NEW I/I CONV POWER SUPPLY ESFAS CHANNEL PT-1102A PT-1102B PT-1102C PT-1102D A
B C
D PY-1102A PY-1102B PY-1102C PY-1102D PY-1102A-1 PY-1102B-1 PY-1102C-1 PY-1102D-1 ES-40 ES-41 ES-42 ES-43 MA MB MC MD 03831/00311
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SAFETY CHANNEL A
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D APPLICABLE E/I CONV PY-1102A-2 PY-1102B-2 PY-1102C-2 PY-1102D-2 POWER SUPPLY INST CAB MA INST CAB MB INST CAB MC INST CAB MD ESFAS CHANNEL MA MB MC 0383I/0031I
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DSS OUTPUTS The function of the DSS outputs is to initiate a reactor shutdown by control rod insertion to prevent an ATHS event from occurring.
Outputs from the DSS logic are designed to trip open the CEA drive motor generator (MG) set output breakers.
There are 2
MG sets supplying the Reactor Trip Switchgear for each Unit, each with its own output breaker labelled as "2CB" in the vendor drawings.
The output breaker control system is designed so that each breaker is manually tripped by using either one of two pushbuttons wired directly to the trip coils.
There is no automatic trip in the circuit.
Attachments 4 and 5 are illustrations of the trip and closing circuits for both output breakers.
The trip coil is labelled TC and the closing coil is labelled CC. It should be noted that by original design, the trip coil can be picked up only by depressing pushbutton,3PB or 2PB2.
Modifications caused by the addition of the DSS will connect the DSS output contacts in parallel with the two pushbuttons.
Since both MG sets are non-safety, electrical isolation will be required between the signals to MG set control panels and the DSS in the ESFAS cabinets.
In addition, physically separated cables will be routed to the non-safety Sequence of Events Recorder and a Control Room annunciator window.
To prevent accidental initiation due to failure of the 2/4 actuation module power supplies, the DSS outputs will be designed to energize to close contacts for DSS initiation.
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DSS LOGIC The purpose of the DSS logic is to process pressurizer pressure signals to obtain a coincident initiation signal for a reactor shutdown and protect the Reactor Coolant System from overpressurization.
To perform the logic for this function diversely and independently from the RPS, new components and wiring are required.
New components for the DSS will be integrated into the circuits of the six Consolidated Controls Corporation (CCC)
ESFAS cabinets and will include bistable and actuation modules, and isolators.
Since both Units 1 and 2 are essentially similar, the following logic description applies to both.
See Attachments 6 and 7 for reference.
Pressurizer pressure signals for the DSS logic will be received at measurement cabinets MA, MB, MC, and MD where existing safety-related cables from the secondary pressurizer pressure current loops in RTGB-106 (RTGB-206 for Unit 2) are terminated.
The signals will be routed to four bistable modules, one in each measurement
- cabinet, where digital outputs (ON) will be produced from the bistable modules when the pressurizer pressure reaches 2450 psia.
This is the DSS actuation setpoint recommended by Combustion Engineering in GEOG report CE NPSD-354.
Each of the four bistable modules will produce an output for two digital isolators, an SA and an SB, located in the same measurement cabinets as their associated bistable modules.
The outputs of the four SA isolators will be routed by safety-related cables to ESFAS cabinet ESC-SA while the four SB isolator outputs will go to ESFAS cabinet ESC-SB.
In each safety cabinet (SA and SB), there will be an actuation module which accepts the four isolated digital signals and applies two-out-of-four (2/4) logic to produce a digital output.
Each 2/4 actuation module will send its output through an isolator to a CEA drive MG set output breaker, the
- SER, and to an annunciator window.
Both actuation modules must function and trip both output breakers to produce a reactor trip in a 2/2 output logic.
Internal isolators, to be located in the measurement cabinets, will electrically separate the four measurement channel signals (MA, MB, MC, and MD) from the two safety channel signals (SA, SB) and from each other.
The actuation module output isolators, to be located in the ESFAS cabinets SA and SB, will separate the safety portion (SA, SB) from the non-safety DSS actuation devices, an annunciator, and the Sequence of Events recorder.
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Both switches will have two positions, NORMAL and BYPASS, and will be controlled by keys removable only in the NORMAL position.
When in the NORMAL position, the DSS will operate as designed and will send actuation signals to the MG set output breakers to trip the reactor.
In the BYPASS position,
- however, the DSS actuation signals will be blocked to allow operators to test and maintain the DSS with the plant at power without the potential for reactor trip.
Complete testing overlap, from the sensors to the trip coils may be accomplished with the plant shut down.
There will also be four bistable bypass
- switches, one for each bistable device, each controlled by a key.
Their function will be to bypass bistable devices individually to test or maintain them without causing bistable output signals to be sent to the 2/4 actuation modules.
Since the logic of the DSS will be integrated into the ESFAS, the existing ESFAS cabinet Automatic Testing Instrument (ATI) will be utilized to check the functions of the DSS components from the bistable devices through the 2/4 actuation modules by using pulses from an auto-test generator.
ATI operates continuously as long as ESFAS circuits are energized.
If a problem is discovered by the ATI, the operators will be informed via an existing annunciator window.
A new common annunciator window will be used to indicate when a DSS actuation signal is obtained from either 2/4 actuation modules or when either of the two safety channel bypass switches is placed in the BYPASS position.
Local indicating lights on the ESFAS cabinets will perform the same functions.
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COMPLIANCE WITH NRC GUIDELINES The following paragraphs list the guidance provided by the NRC regarding system and equipment specifications and the minimum DSS design that conforms to that guidance.
It is not expected that implementation as described'erein will cause a modification of the Technical Specifications.
SAFETY RELATED (IEEE 279)
Guidance:
Not required, but the implementation must be such that the existing protection system continues to meet all applicable safety-related criteria.
Design:
Although the DSS is not required to be safety-related, since it will be integrated and installed in safetymelated ESFAS cabinets it will meet the same Class IE safety-related qualifications as the ESFAS.
In addition, implementation will be such that the existing ESFAS and RPS are separated electrically from the DSS and will not be affected by operation of the DSS.
2)
REDUNDANCY Guidance:
Not required.
Design:
The DSS will not be designed with redundancy.
3)
DIVERSITY FROM EXISTING REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM Guidance:
Equipment diversity to the extent reasonable and practicable to minimize the potential for common cause failures is required from the sensors to and including the components used to interrupt control rod power.
Circuit breakers from different manufacturers alone is not sufficient to provide the required diversity for interruption of control rod power.
The sensors need not be of a diverse design or manufacturer.
Existing protection system instrument sensing lines may be used.
Sensors and instrument sensing lines should be selected such that adverse interactions with existing control systems are avoided.
Design:
The sensor components are herein defined as the existing instrument sensing lines, sensing devices and transmitters, instrument current loops, current loop power
- supplies, and isolating devices.
In both units, the existing sensor components will be used to provide input to the DSS.
In Unit 1, an additional I/I converter will be installed in each channel to i.solate the pressurizer pressure signal to the RPS from the signal to be utilized for the ESFAS/DSS.
At'he sensor level where sensor components are shared by the RPS and the ESFAS/DSS, diversity is not a consideration.
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At the logic component level, diversity is discussed in Section VI of this document.
At the actuation device level, diversity will be accomplished by the choice of devices used to remove power from the control element assembly coils.
In a normal reactor trip, power is removed by opening the reactor trip breakers.
When the reactor is tripped by the DSS, power will be removed by opening the two output breakers for CEA drive motor generator sets using diverse breaker control circuits where DSS contacts apply existing control power directly to the trip coils.
There are no analog control systems associated with the existing ESFAS pressurizer pressure functions with which the DSS could have adverse interactions.
ELECTRICAL INDEPENDENCE FROM EXISTING REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM Guidance:
Required from sensor output to the final actuation device at which point non-safety related circuits must be isolated from safetymelated circuits.
Design:
Inputs to the DSS from the sensors will be electrically isolated from the Reactor Protection System by isolation devices installed in RTGB-106 for Unit 1 and instrument cabinets MA, MB, MC, and MD for Unit 2.
These isolation devices are labelled as I/I converters and E/I converters, respectively.
See Attachments 2 and 3.
The DSS logic circuits will be contained in the ESFAS cabinets which are independent from the Reactor Protective System.
The DSS outputs will be directed to the CEA drive MG set output
- breakers, which are not safetymelated nor associated with the Reactor Protective System trip functions.
DSS outputs will be isolated to prevent adverse electrical interactions between the non-safety actuation devices and the safety-related portion of the DSS installed in the ESFAS cabinet.
PHYSICAL SEPARATION FROM EXISTING REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM Guidance:
Not required, unless redundant divisions and channels in the existing reactor trip system are not physically separated.
The implementation must be such that separation criteria applied to the existing protection system are not violated.
Design:
Although not required, the DSS components will be physically separated from the RPS since they will be located in the ESFAS cabinets.
Non-safety output cables from the DSS will be physically separated to retain the separation criteria applied to the existing protection system. 0383I/00311
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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION Guidance:
For anticipated operational occurrences only, not for accidents.
Design:
The DSS equipment will be qualified for anticipated operational transients, although not for accidents.
An anticipated operation transient is a condition of normal operation which is expected to occur one or more times during the life of the plant and includes, but is not limited to tripping of the turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and loss of offsite power.
Since the conceptual design locates the DSS logic components in the ESFAS cabinets in the Control Rooms for both Units, they will be in mild and controlled environments.
These conditions will not change under anticipated operational transients.
SEISMIC QUALIFICATION Guidance:
Not required.
Design:
Although not required to be seismically qualified,
'omponents in the"DSS will be qualified to the same seismic Category I requirements as the ESFAS cabinets where they will be installed.
QUALITY ASSURANCE FOR TEST, MAINTENANCE, AND SURVEILLANCE Guidance:
Explicit guidance will be issued in a letter.
Design:
For those portions of the DSS design which are identified within the body of this Conceptual Design Report as being Nuclear Safety-Related, compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B will be maintained in accordance with the Florida Power and Light Company Quality Assurance (QA)
Program.
As stated previously and in accordance with Generic Letter 85-06, there are portions of the DSS system which are non-safety related.
For those non-safety related portions of the DSS, it is FPL's intent to implement a
QA program which meets the intent of Generic Letter 85-06.
This program will include the preparation of a procurement specification to ensure appropriate elements of NRC Generic Letter 85-06 are addressed.
It is FPL intent to procure the DDS, as Nuclear Safety Related since the new components will be integrated into the circuits of the Consolidated Control Corp (CCC) Nuclear Safety Related ESFAS cabinets.
FP&L Quality Assurance Program will evaluate and ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B.
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SAFETY-RELATED (lE) POLER SUPPLY Guidance:
Not required, but must be capable of performing safety functions with a loss of off-site power.
Logic and actuation device power must be from an instrument power supply independent from the power supplies for the existing reactor trip system.
Existing RTS sensor and instrument channel power supplies may be used provided the possibility of common mode failure is prevented.
Design:
The existing sensor and instrument power supplies will be used as allowed by the guidance.
Since the only change to the sensor components is the addition of an I/I converter in Unit 1 to isolate the RPS from the DSS/ESFAS
- signals, the potential for common mode failures is not increased.
The four DSS bistable devices and their associated isolators will be fed from the same power supply as the ESFAS cabinet in which they are located.
These are the MA, MB, MC, and MD uninterruptable, Class 1Z, instrument buses.
Loss of one bus would modify input logic to 2/3 high pressurizer pressure signals for DSS actuation.
Ioss of two buses would modify it to 2/2.
Neither case would cause an inadvertant reactor trip or prevent the operation of the DSS.
Both of the logic alternatives are acceptable and reliable, in that 2 channels still exist for actuation and the potential for spurious actuation is minimized.
The DSS 2/2 actuation modules will be fed from the vital, uninterruptable,'on-Class 1E, 120Vac supplies through appropriate isolation devices.
These buses are normally supplied from 125Vdc buses 1C, 1D, 2C and 2D through static inverters.
A separate battery floats on each of the 125Vdc buses.
There are backup power supplies for the 120Vac buses through 480/120Vac transformers, voltage regulators, and static transfer switches.
A reactor or turbine trip would not cause interruption of power to the DC buses.
Power to.the trip coils of the CEA drive motor generator set output breakers will continue to come from the input side of the MG sets through 460-230 Vac potential transformers.
Since the 460Vac supply drives the MG sets as well as power the trip and closing coils for the output breakers, a loss of 460Vac to one control circuit is also a loss of power to the MG set.
This will leave the other MG set supplying power to the CEA coils with the DSS still operational, albeit with 1/1 logic module output for DSS actuation logic.
Loss of control power to one output breaker control circuit will not inhibit the capability of the DSS from causing a scram. 0383I/0031I
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TESTABILITY AT POWER Guidance:
Required.
Design:
The DSS design will include the capability to test the DSS function from sensor output to and including the MG set output breakers with the plant in a shutdown condition.
Two bypass switches will allow testing of the DSS function from sensor output to, but not including,. the final actuation devices (the MG set output breakers) at power.
The bypass switches will be key locked.
In addition, the existing ESPAS cabinet Automatic Test Instrument will be employed to check internal DSS logic functions from the bistable devices through the logic modules whenever the ESPAS cabinets are energized.
11)
INADVERTENT ACTUATION Guidance:
The design should be such that the frequency of inadvertent reactor trips and challenges to other safety systems is minimized.
Design:
To reduce the chance of inadvertent reactor trips, the design will include the following three features.
- Pirst, 2/4 high pressurizer pressure signals will be required to actuate either actuation module.
- Second, each actuation module generates a signal for only one of two MG set output breakers.
Unintentional actuation of one actuation module will trip only one breaker and leave the other MG set on line.
Third, the actuation modules will use close-to-actuate contacts with a fail-open function.
Failure of an actuation module power supply or the opening of the output cable will not cause tripping of its associated MG set output breaker. 0383I/00311
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DIVERSITY Guidance for diversity between the DSS and the RPS was established by the NRC in the Statement of Considerations for the ATWS Rule described in Section V of this conceptual design document.
In this
- section, a description is provided for the minimum DSS design that conforms to that guidance for diversity at the logic component level.
Since the logic components of the DSS will be integrated into the Engineering Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
- cabinets, the circuit design will be an updated version of the existing ESFAS design and conformance to the guidance on diversity will be shown by comparing the ESFAS and RPS hardware.
The present RPS system hardware configuration for St Lucie Units 1 and 2 was defined in Combustion Engineering Owners Group report CEN-315 (Summary of Diversity Between the RPS and AFAS for C-E Plants) in terms of component or part type, manufacturer, and system application.
The block diagrams in Attachments 9 and 10 compare the RPS hardware defined in CEN-315 with the ESFAS hardware to be installed as the logic portion of the DSS.
The RPS and ESFAS hardware area completely diverse with respect to the system configuration, module assembly, and component circuit
- design, down to and including the piece parts used in component fabrication.
The RPS is a hybrid system design with solid state bistable comparators, relay logic, and relay actuation.
The ESFAS is a completely solid state system with transistor logic outputs in the reactor trip path.
Both bistable comparators are electronic modules.
However, they are diverse in circuit design, fabrication, and piece parts.
The operational amplifiers and other active parts have different part numbers supplied by different manufacturers.
These bistable modules have the maximum diversity possible using conventional solid state technology.
Power supplies are not included in the block diagrams.
However, St Lucre Unit 1 has RPS and ESFAS power supplies with different part numbers supplied by different manufacturers, and used in a different configuration.
St Lucie Unit 2 has 15Vdc. dual floating output power supplies for the RPS bistables that are from the same manufacturer (ACOPIAN) as the 15Vdc power supplies used to supply the ESFAS bistables.
Although both are 1 amp power supplies of the same basic
- design, they have been fabricated differently, each to conform to the unique requirements of the cabinets in which they are installed.
They have also been fabricated in different lots.
The RPS ACOPIAN part number is E15J100D and the ESFAS part number is TD-15-100.
Based on the above, the St Lucie Unit 1 and 2 DSS designs provide adequate diversity from the RPS to meet the ATWS Rule guidelines on diversity.
03831/00311
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ST.LUCIE OIVERQTY BEATEN EMSTINC REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ATWS. DIVERSE SCRAM.SYSTEM.
BISTABLE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM MATRIX RELAYS INITIATION RELAYS ACTUATION DEVICE
=NSOR GULF MODEL EL0240-0000-IF OMPARATOR/
CLARE RELAYS RELAY OUTPUT DOUGLAS RANDALL MODEL 378907 ELECTRO-MECHANICAL RELAY OUTPUT GENERAL ELECTRIC K" RELAY MODEL
'12 NGV
$3 A)A ELECTRO-MECHANICAL RELAY RELAY GENERAL ELECTRIC MODEL AK-2-25 ORCUIT BREAKER UV 0 SHUNT TRIP COLS REACTOR TRIP CRCUITR SAFETY FEATQRES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ALL MODULES MANUFACTURED 8Y CONSOLIDATED CONTROLS CORP)
BlSOR 2N2222 TRANSISTOR ISOLATION MODULE 8N89-3 OPTO ISOLATOR 2N2222 OUTPUT ACTUATION MODULE 6N90-1 2 OF 4 MA%IX LOGIC 2N3713'RIVER 24 VDC OUTPUT TO SAR'.TY ACTUATION RELAYS
ST.LUC OIVERSITY BHllKEN ENSTINC REACTOR DIP SYb~
AND ATWS OIVERSE SCRAM SYSTEM.
BISTABLE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM MATRIX RELAYS INITIATION RELAYS ACTUATION OEVICE INPUTS.
E-M MODEL 34880 'ELAY OUTPUT DOUGLAS RANDALL MODEL 378907 ELECTRO-MECHANICAL RELAY RELAY OUTPUT GENERAL ELECTRIC K
RELAY MODEL 12 NGV 13 A11A ELECTRO-MECHANICAL RELAY RELAY OUTPUT GENERAL ELECTRIC MODEL AK-2-25 CIRCUIT BREAKER UV 4 SHUNT
'lRIP COLS REACTOR TRIP CRCUITR SAR'.TY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ALL MODULES MANUFACTURED BY CONSOUDATED CONTROLS CORP)
INPUTS BISTABLE MODULE 6N220 2N2222 TRANSSTOR OUTPUT ISOLATION MODULE 6N221 2N2222 TRANSSTOR OUTPUT ACTUATION MODULE 6N222 2 OF-4 MATRIX LOGIC 2N5874 DRIVER 24 VDC OUTPUT TO SAFETY ACTUATION RELAYS
St. Lucie Units I and 2 Docket Nos.-50-335 and 50-389 Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Plant S ecific Information FLORIDA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST.
LUCIE PLANT - UNITS 1 6 2
ATWS MODIFICATIONS AFAS/RPS DIVERSITY STUDY
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE 1.0 2.0 3.0 Cover Sheet Table of Contents Executive Summary and Conclusions Introduction and Definitions ATWS Rule Diversity Requirements 4.0 Diversity and Resistance to Common Mode Failures 5.0 6.0 St Lucie Units 1 and 2 Reactor Protection System and Auxiliary Peed-water Actuation System Hardware Diversity System Reliability and Resistance to Common Mode Failures 7.0 Appendix (A)
NRC Staff Evaluation of CEN-315
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SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS
~Summa m The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has amended its,regulations to require improvements to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) events.
10CFR50m62 (the ATWS Rule) defines the requirements for reactors manufactured by Combustion Engineering (CE).
The requirement for CE plants to provide automatic initiation of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) independent and diverse from the existing Reactor Protection System (RPS) has been the subject of several meetings and telephone conferences between the Combustion Engineering Owner' Group (GEOG)
, ATWS Subcommittee and the NRC.
In response to the NRC staff's request for plant specific information concerning the existing degree of diversity between the RPS and AFAS
- designs, GEOG submitted for review CEN-315, "Summary of the Diversity Between the Reactor Trip System and the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System for CE Plants."
This document provided information on plant specific component hardware design.
The NRC has concluded that St Lucie Unit 1 may have sufficient diversity between the existing RPS and AFAS to satisfy the ATWS requirements.
The staff could not reach a
conclusion regarding the acceptability of diversity for St Lucie Unit 2.
This report'ddresses the NRC request for additional plant specific information concerning the St Lucie hardware potential for common mode failure mechanisms and the hardware resistance to common mode failures.
Conclusions The ATWS Rule is intended to improve reactor reliability and safety by preventing a common mode failure from disabling both RPS and AFAS.
Diversity and high reliability provide the maximum resistance to common mode failures.
Both are required to meet the intent of the ATWS Rule.
St Lucie Units 1 and 2 satisfy the ATWS Rule by providing RPS and AFAS hardware diversity and high reliability for resistance to all failure modes including common modes.
The RPS and AFAS bistable comparators on St Lucie Unit 2 are diverse in design, assembly and piece parts which gives these bistables the diversity characteristics of different manufacturers.
0381I/00311
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1.0 Conclusions (Cont'd)
The diversity between the RPS and AFAS matrix relays for both Units 1 and 2 consists not only of different part numbers but significant differences in specifications, design and materials.
The application differences include different mounting arrangement suppression
- diodes, matrix power supplies and widely spaced manufacturing lot/serial numbers.
The matrix relay predicted and measured reliabilty has been proved identical.
The measured reliability, compiled from relay operating hours and failure data, conclusively demonstrates that this relay meets the ATWS Rule requirements.
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INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has amended its regulations to require improvements to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) event.
10CFR50.62 defines the requirements for pressurized water reactors manufactured by Combustion Engineering (CE).
Paragraph (c)(1) of 10CFR50.62 states that "Each pressurized water reactor must have equipment from sensor output to final actuation device, that is diverse from the reactor trip system, to automatically initiate the auxiliary feedwater system and initiate a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS.
This equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner and be independent (from sensor output to the final actuation device) from the existing reator trip system."
The requirements of 10CFR50. 62 for CE plants to provide automatic initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) independent and diverse from the existing reactor trip system (RPS) has been the subject of several meetings and'elephone conferences between the Combustion Engineering Owner' Group (GEOG)
ATWS Subcommittee and the NRC.
In summary, the GEOG believes that a sufficient level of diversity currently exists between the RPS initiation circuitry and the AFWS actuation circuitry at CE plants to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50.62(c)(1).
In response to the staff's request for plant specific information concerning the existing degree of diversity between the RPS and AFAS
- designs, the GEOG submitted for review CEN-315, "Summary of the Diversity Between the Reactor Trip System and the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System for CE Plants."
This document provides information on plant specific hardware designs and includes a listing of electrical components used in both the RPS and the AFAS.
The NRC completed its review of CEN-315 and published the evaluation in August 1986 (Appendix A).
The NRC evaluation concluded that St Lucie Unit 1 may have sufficient diversity between the existing RPS and AFAS to satisfy the requirements of Section (c)(l) of 10 CFR50.62.
St Lucie Unit 2 has RPS and AFAS designs which utilize components from the same manufacturers.
The NRC staff could not reach a conclusion regarding the acceptability of diversity between St Lucie Unit 2 RPS and AFAS for bistable comparator and matrix relays based on the information provided.
This report addresses the NRC request for additional information concerning RPS/AFAS diversity and capability to meet the intent of the ATWS Rule for St Lucie Units 1 and 2. 0381I/0031I
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2.0 DEFINITIONS Below, are definitions of terminology used in this report.
manufacturer or equipmemt supplier.
For the RPS and AFAS systems supplied by Combustion Engineering, the piece part level consists of all mechanical, electrical and electronic items such as connectors, wires, terminals, relays, transistors, integrated circuits, resistors, capacitors, etc.
Piece parts are built from the elemental level which consists primarily of processed or formed materials such as silicon wafers for integrated circui.ts, gold leads for attachment to silicon chips, coils and contacts for relays, insulation and conducting materials.
A component or module is an assembly of piece parts such as the
'i.stable comparator printed circuit cards, matrix relay cards, power
- supplies, etc.
System level is an assembly of components and piece parts to perform a specific function in the plant such as reactor protection.
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- 3. 0 ATWS RULE DIVERSITY REQUIREMENTS The diversity required by the ATWS Rule is intended to ensure that common mode failures will not disable both existing RPS and AFAS.
The failure mechanism of concern is a common mode failure of identical components or parts within the RPS and AFAS.
Common mode failures may have their origin in a latent manufacturing defect, a design deficiency, part application error or other defects and deficiencies associated with identical components and parts.
Diversity can be achieved by incorporating, in the equipment, as many of the following NRC proposed methods as practical:
Use of components from different manufacturers.
Use of electromechanical devices versus electronic devices.
Use of energized versus de-energized trip status (for some components such as relays, this alone may not be acceptable).
Use of AC versus DC power sources.
Use of sensors employing different principles for measuring the same parameters.
Only the first two methods are applicable to present technology for
- diverse, independent and reliable instrumentation and control equipment.
The use of energized versus de-energized for reactor trip introduces the serious question of "fail safe" design.
The use of AC versus DC power sources is limited to a few electromechanical devices such as relays and breakers.
Solid state circuits are inherently DC and cannot use an AC power source.
Sensors employing different principles for measuring the same parameters have been excluded from meeting the diversity requirement.
3.1 Mechanical and Electrical S stem Diversity The RPS and AFAS are housed in separate seismically and environmentally qualified equipment enclosures.
Access to the enclosures is provided by doors and hinge-mounted panels.
Electrical cable access is provided at the top or bottom.
These are the only common features at the system level.
All other system features are diverse since there are no common mechanical, electrical or electronic interfaces.
There is no similarity in electrical cabling, cabinet structure, component mounting, electrical terminations or mechanical/electrical layout.
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 are photographs of the AFAS and RPS system cabinet arrangement for both St Lucie Units 1 and 2.
The system cabinet arrangement is diverse and there is no cabinet hardware or wiring commonality that could furnish a common mode failure mechanism.
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3.0 ATWS RULE DIVERSITY REQUIREMENTS (Cont'd) 3.2 Solid State Com onent Diversity The use of components from different manufacturers satisfies the diversity criteria, because the piece parts and electrical/mechanical configuration are usually different.
The bistable comparators used in the St Lucie Unit 2 RPS and AFAS systems are manufactured by Electro-Mechanics.
However, they have the diversity characteristics normally associated with different manufacturers.
In this case, the piece parts are different, the circuit design and layout is different, and the mechanical/electrical configuration and interfaces are different.
This is essentially the maximum diversity that can be achieved. with current solid state circuit technology.
AC power is not intrinsic to semi-conductor design technology and cannot be implemented to increase diversity in solid state components.
3.3 Diversity in Matrix Rela s and Other Electromechanical Devices
- Relays, switches, potentiometers, meters and other electromechanical devices have similar construction characteristics and moving parts that are actuated manually or magnetically.
Failures may be mechanical, electrical or magnetic.
Generic devices from different manufacturers provide a minimum resistance to common mode failures since they contain the same construction elements; coil, armature,
- contacts, magnetic material" and similar mechanical movements.
For this reason, the reliability or resistance to all failure modes is most important and must be considered before selecting a diverse manufacturer.
Piece Part Diversity The use of piece parts from different manufacturers is essentially the lowest level of diversity recognized.
Identical parts from the same manufacturer that have the highest probability of latent manufacturing defects will come from the same manufacturing lot, and the same assembly line with the same process machinery and personnel.
Any changes to these commonalities are in the area of decreasing the probability of common manufacturing defects and increasing the resistance to common mode failures.
Therefore, a level of diversity does exist below the cut off at different manufacturers.
Although this is the minimum or lowest level of diversity, most latent manufacturing defects are tracable to one or a few lots manufactured in the same time period.
Different lots depending on piece part design and operation
- history, may have sufficient diversity to meet the intent of the ATWS Rule and prevent common mode failures.
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- CR31, CR32,CR33 SE555H AH0161CD CD4011BFX LM108AH Linear IC, Timer Analog Switch Quad 2 Nand Gate Operation Amp 378907 2N3439 2N22193A 2N2905A N751A N5357 1N829 A14U HV10PA 1N914B Relay Transistor NPN Transistor NPN Transistor PNP Zener Zener Zener Diode Diode Diode MC1558G Dual Operational Amp HC11D-15VDC Relay Signetics National Semiconductors RCA National SemiConductor Motorola Potter-Brumfield Douglas Randall Generic Generic Generic Generic Generic Generic G.E.
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REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND AUXILIARYFEEDWATER D VERS TY Cont d 5.1.3 Bistable Com arator Confi uration Diversit
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The bistable card photographs, figure 5.5 show the parts layout and card configurafi.on.
The RPS card layout is completely different from the AFAS card layout.
The input/output connections, size and mechanical arrangement is also different for the single RPS card and the dual AFAS card configuration.
5.1.4 Summar of Diversity for St Lucie Unit 2 RPS and AFAS Bistable Comparators The RPS and AFAS bistable comparators manufactured by Electro Mechanics have the diversity features normally associated with different manufacturers.
The important piece parts are diverse; the circuit design is diverse; and the card configuration, layout and mechanical arrangement are diverse.
The total of these diverse features is fundamentally the maximum diversity that can be obtained without resorting to unconventional technology.
There is nothing to indicate that both components were manufactured by the same supplier.
5.2 St Lucie Unit 1 Bistable Hardware Diversit The St Lucie Unit 1 RPS bistable comparators are manufactured by Gulf Electronic Systems and the AFAS bistables are manufactured by Electro Mechanics Inc.
These bistables are completely diverse from manufacturer, component assembly, circuit design and layout down to and including the piece parts supplied by different manufacturers.
Because of this maximum diversity for a solid state component, the parts list and photographs for St Lucre Unit 1 are not included in this report.
5.3 St Lucie Units 1 and 2 Hardware Diversit for RPS and AFAS Matrix Rela s
The St Lucie Units 1 and 2 RPS and AFAS matrix relays were manufactured by Douglas Randall.
The original Clare matrix relays with mercury wetted contacts in the St Lucie Unit 1 RPS were replaced with Douglas Randall relays.
In this particular case, diverse relays were removed and relays common to the AFAS were installed.
While this reduced the diversity between Unit 1 RPS and AFAS matrix relays, the matrix relay resistance to all failure
- modes, including common mode failures was improved.
The change out eliminated an unsatisfactory relay with a serious failure mode (contacts failed closed when matrix relay de-energized to trip on open contacts). 0381I/0031I
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5.3.1 Matrix Relay Descri tion Both systems use the same type Douglas Randall dual, single pole, double throw, reed relay with two coils.
One coil is used for trip and the other for test.
The relays are high quality with the two reed capsules and coils potted in epoxy.
The specifications are tabulated below.
SPECIFICATIONS ST LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 (RPS)
DOUGLAS RANDALL REED RELAY PART NO 378907 1.
Form 2C two coils, DCR 300 ohms + 10X 8 25oC each coil.
2.
Nominal Voltage 15 VDC.
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Maximum Voltage (both coils) 28VDC.
4.
Must Operate (either coil) 12 VDC 8 50oC.
5.
Must Release (either coil) 1.2VDC 8 50oC.
6.
Two coil operations:
with either coil energized at 16.5VDC, the relay must release when a bucking voltage of 13.5VDC is applied to the other coil.
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Contact Rating lOW, 0.5A or 150VDC Maximum Resistive.
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Contact Resistance 0.2 ohm.
9.
Dielectric Strength 600VAC or 400VDC coil to coil, contact to contact and contact to coil.
10.
Life 1,000,000 operations minimum at rated load.
ll.
Maximum ambient temperature when energized with one coil at 15VDC 200oF.
SPECIFICATIONS ST LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 (AFAS) DOUGLAS RANDALL REED RELAY PART NO 29350
- 1. Form 2C two coils DCR 200 ohms + 10X 8 25 C each coil.
- 2. Nominal Voltage 12VDC.
- 3. Maximum Voltage (both coils) 28VDC. 0381I/0031I
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- 4. Must operate (either coil) 10.0VDC 8 50oC.
- 5. Must release (either coil) 1.2VDC 8 50 C.
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- 7. Contact rating 1$l, 0. 5A or 150VDC Maximum Resistive.
- 8. Contact resistance 0.2 ohms.
- 9. Dielectric strength 600 VRMS: coil to coil, contact to<
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- 10. Life 1,000,000 operations minimum at rated load.
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5.3.2 Matrix Relay Design and Application Diversit The relay reeds and contacts are hermetically sealed in a glass capsule back filled with dry nitrogen at two atmospheres pressure.
The pressurized nitrogen results in a 1000 volt DC breakdown voltage across the open contacts.
The contacts are rhodium with a 30 volt ampere maximum rating.
This reed capsule is a very high quality part that is common to both relays.
The relay coils are diverse since they are fabricated from different gauge wire with different insulation.
The epoxy casting materials are different.
The application differences include, different mounting arrangement, suppression
- diodes, matrix power supplies and widely spaced relay manufacturing lot numbers.
I Figure 5. 6 is a photograph of the AFAS matrix relay card used on St Lucie Units 1 and 2.
Four matrix relays are mounted on each card.
The card also contains the supporting circuit, transistor drivers and suppression diodes. 0381I/0031 I
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Figure 5.7 is a photograph of the St Lucie Unit 1 and 2 RPS matrix relays.
The Unit 1 relay is a replacement plug-in assembly for the previous Clare relay.
The supporting circuit and suppression diodes are mounted on the relay socket board.
The RPS matrix relay card for St Lucie Unit 2 contains a single relay with supporting circuit and suppression diodes.
5.3.3 Matrix Rela Diversity and Reliability The diversity required by the ATWS Rule is intended to ensure that common mode failures will not disable both RPS and AFAS.
The failure mechanism of concern is a common mode failure of the Douglas Randall matrix relays.
Common mode failures are a subset of all failure modes.
High resistance to common mode failure requires high resistance to all failure modes.
Therefore, the reliability of matrix relays is extremely important to the acceptance of RPS and AFAS matrix relays as satisfying the intent of the ASS Rule diversity requirement.
Diversity in design, manufacture and application of these Douglas Randall matrix relays is minimal.
However, all electro mechanical relays have identical failure modes regardless of diversity in design and manufacture.
They all contain the same functional elements (coil,
- armature, contacts) and failure modes of these elements are common.
Both RPS and AFAS matrix relays are normally energized and de-energize to actuate.
De-energize to actuate eliminates many relay failure modes.
The two predominant failure modes remaining are:
(a)
The relay coil remains energized, given that its upstream actuating circuitry has de-energized coil short to power.
(b)
The relay contacts fail to transfer (open) when t'e relay is de-energized Contacts welded closed, armature mechanical failure, etc.
St Lucie Units 1 and 2 RPS matrix relay contacts are wired to 28VDC power.
A short across the pin connections to the 15VDC coil would result in the coil's burn-out in a short time and open circuit of one of the two matrix parallel paths required for actuation.
This is a fail safe failure mode.
Both Unit 1 and 2 AFAS matrix relays have their contacts wired to 12VDC power.
A short across the pin connections to the relay coil would not result in a burn-out.
However, the relay coil may remain energized, given that its upstream actuating circuitry has de-energized.
This failure effect is a failure to trip if only two of the four identical channels are in the trip condition.
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The second predominant relay failure mode requires an unusual, if not improbable mechanical failure.
In the quiescent state it is extremely difficult to postulate a failure mode other than welded contacts.
This failure mode is also improbable given the voltage and current in the matrix relay actuation circuit.
Matrix relay contact loading is limited to a small fraction of the rated value.
This is well below the energy level normally associated with the welded contact failure mode.
One of the most demanding reliability specifications may be found in MIL-STD-1546, which relates to parts for space and launch vehicles.
Included throughout the standard is information on suspect designs.
The standard defines a suspect design as one that has "demonstrated problems which are inherent to the specific design, materials or processes utilized" and states that parts with suspect
- designs, "shall not be used in critical applications".
The Douglas Randall relays do not have any of the suspect design features noted in this standard.
The application of the Douglas Randall relays in both RPS and APAS follows the MIL-STD-1547 advice in that "Relays should not be energized for emergency operation.
They should be normally energized so they release in an emergency."
The Douglas Randall relay although not procured to applicable military specifications were procured under a unique quality program which ensures reliable products.
The only difference between the Douglas Randall relays and the MIL-SPEC equipment is the documentation and material traceability requirements.
The relay failure rates can be predicted based on MIL-HDBK-217.
%his method of component reliability prediction is widely used by the Department of Defense and its contractors for electronic equipment procured to both Military and non-Military specifications.
The preamble to this document states that the handbook has been "approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of Defense" and that "every effort has been made to reflect the latest information on reliability prediction procedures".
Users of this document recognize, however, that reliability prediction is not an exact science and that the predicted failure rates obtained from a MIL-HDBK-217 stress analysis should fall roughly within the same order of magnitude as the actual measured component failure rates obtained from field data.
NIL-HDBK-217 does not provide the capability to predict mode specific failure rates that would apply to the matrix relay logic of de-energized and open contacts to actuate.
Therefore, the failure rate computed is conservative.
The stress factors that apply to the Douglas Randall reed relay computed a failure rate of.09 failures per million hours of operation. 0381I/0031I
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Failure rates may also be predicted using IREE Standard 500 reliability data for nuclear power plants.
The failure rate using these data produce a rate of O.l failures per million hours of operation.
Both the MIL-HDBK-217 and the IEEE-STD 500 provide conservative failure rate estimates of O.l failures per million hours of operation.
This failure rate can be compared to the field data to confirm the Douglas Randall relay resistance to common mode failures.
St Lucie Units 1 and 2 have accumulated 12.2 million Douglas Randall rela o eratin hours without a failure which supports the IEEE and MIL failure rate redictions.
5.4 Diversity of AFAS Actuation Devices and RPS Bistable Com arators The NRC evaluation of GEOG CEN-315 for St Lucie Unit 2 requires additional detail information for the Electro Mechanics (EM) manufactured AFAS actuation relays and the EH manufactured RPS bistable comparators.
Although both devices are manufactured by Electro Mechanics, they are completely diverse-in design, fabrication and operating principle.
As stated in section 5.1.2 the RPS bistables are solid state printed circuit cards that compare analog input signals with the pre trip and trip set points.
The AFAS actuation devices are electromechanical relays that provide open or closed electrical contacts actuated by a magnetic armature and coil. 0381I/0031I
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TRIP COMPARATOR LOW NOISE BUFFER ANALOG SIGNAL INPUT LOW NOISE BUFFER TIME DELAY NOISE TRIP ELIMINATQR DRIVER TRIP RELAY TRIP RELAY TRIP RELAY TRIP RELAY TO TWO OF FOUR LOGIC MATRICES TO SEOUENCE OF EVENTS RECORDER PRE TRIP COMPARATOR TIME DELAY DRIVER PRE TRIP RELAY TO PRE TRIP ALARM AND ANNUNCIATOR SIMPLIFIED BISTABLE TRIP UNIT BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR RPS AND AFAS FIGURE 5.1