ML17053D345

Forwards Request for Addl Info for 10CFR50,App R,Section Iii.G & Iii.L Re Safe Shutdown Capability for Fires.Contrary to 821001 Rept,Redundant Safe Shutdown Sys in Control Room Not Separated

ML17053D345
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/03/1982
From:	Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Dise D NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8211100463
Download: ML17053D345 (8)

Text

DISTRIBUTION:

Docket Fi 1 e ELJordan DEi senhut OELD NRC PDR T.

Wambach VPanciera J.

Heltemes JMTaylor NSIC ORB¹2 Rdg PPolk SNorris LPDR Gray ACRS-10 Docket No. 50-220 Mr. Donald P. Disc Vice President - Engineering c/o Miss Catherine R. Seibert Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse, New York 13202 NOV S - lS8r

SUBJECT:

APPENDIX R REVIEW OF SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS Re:

Nine flile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No.

1 By letter dated October 1, 1982 you forwarded a 'report on the above subject.

lte have completed our initial review of this submittal and consider 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.Lto be applicable to the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station.

In your submittal, as confirmed by telephone conversations with members of your staff, you indicated that 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G,2 was considered applicable.

In essence, you felt that the Nine Mile Emergency Condenser

System, was separate from the control room, would activate auto-matically, and did not require operator action for eight hours after initia-tion.

Therefore, you felt that the separation requirements of Section III.G.2 were satisfied.

'We have reviewed your position regarding III.G.2 and conclude that separation of redundant safe shutdown systems within the control room does not exist at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1.

Nine Mile does not satisfy Section III.G.2 and, therefore, Sections III.G.3 and III.Lregarding Alternate Shutdown are applicable.

Consequently, in order to complete our Nine Mile review, you are requested to provide a response to enclosed illformation request by December 1, 1982.

Your timely response is requested.

We remain available for conference calls and/or meetings.

Sincerely, DL ORB 2 S ms 11/~ /82 L:ORB¹2 PPolk:pob:MC 11/~/82 Qrlglnal sighed 5 D

Q vga w">1n DL:ORB¹2Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief Dvassallo

,operatiy g Reactors Branch ¹2 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

"As"stated OFFICEI SURNAMEQ P

0 ~ 0 ~ ~

~

cc w/enclos

""""'%5"O'Kt DATE Q NRC FORM 318 (10.80) NRCM 0240

---'2>S>00aSS 82<zoS PDR ADOCK 05000220 F

PDR i

COPY OFFlclAL REcO~D USQPO: 1981 335-960

a/

J4

~ '

I

Nr. Donald P. Disc Niagara Nohawk Power Corporation CC:

Troy B. Conner, Jr.

Esq.

Conner 8 Wetterhahn Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania Ave.,

NW Washington, D.C.

20006 T. K. BeBoer, Director Technological Development Programs State of New York Energy Office Swan Street Building CORE 1 - Second Floor Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Hr. Robert P. Jones, Supervisor Town of Scriba R.

D.

r.'4

Oswego, New York 13126 Niagara Yioha>>k Power Corporation ATTN:

ter.

Thomas Perkins Plant Superi ntendent Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O.

Box 32

Lycoming, New York 13093 John W. Keib, Esquire Niagara Mohhwk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse, New York 13202 Ronal d C.

Haynes Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coranission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 C

Resident Inspector c/o U.S.

NRC P. 0.

Box 126

Lycoming, New York 13093

~A

~

~

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFOfNATION NINE MILE POINT, UNIT 1

SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FOR

FIRES, APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G AND III.L AUXILIARYSYSTEM BRANCH j

gZ PC The responses to our April 26, 1982 clarification letter concerning the post-fire safe shutdown capability in accordance with Appendix R Section III.G and III.L provided in your October 1, 1982 report entitled "Appendix R Review", Safe Shutdown Analysis" are not complete.

Provide. the;.folioAing additional information.

1.

Provide further justification for not providing an immediately available means of reactor coolant makeup upon initiation of the emergency condenser shutdown system after control room evacuation with or without offsite power available.

This discussion should verify that an adequate water level can be maintained in the core from the time of reactor trip unti 1 a makeup capability becomes available assuming technical specifi-cation maximum allowable leakage.

No credit for repai rs can be taken to provide makeup during hot shutdown.

2.

Section VII, Supplement 3 of the above report describes "possible modi-fications" to the ADS (electromatic relief valves),

emergency condenser isolation valves, core spray system and other valves to assure safe shutdown in the event of spurious operations.

In order for us to complete our review of the alternate safe shutdown capability, describe the modifications to be incorporated to satisfy the requirements of Appendix R concerning spurious signals.

3.

Your response to Question 1(h) of our April 26, 1982 clarification letter is unacceptable.

Propose technical specifications for surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation to assure availability of the remote shutdown panels and other local control stations as necessary to assure safe shutdown.

4. 'our response to Question 1(j) of our April 26, 1982 clarification letter is unacceptable.

Describe those repairs required in order to assure the" capability of achievi ng cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Verify that the necessary equipment will be available on site.

Verify that sufficient

'anpower and time is available to effect repairs prior to the need for that equipment.

Specifically address the availability of an emergency diesel generator since it appears from 'your submittal that a diesel wi 1 1 not be available for hot shutdown following a control complex fire.

I~

5.

Verify that the remote shutdown panels are electrically isolated from the control complex in order to assure their function in event of a control complex fire, and assure availability of the control complex in event of a fire at the remote panels.

6.

Describe the actions necessary for and systems utilizeU for achieving cold shutdown from outside Chl control room.

Include discussion of avai 1 abi 1 ity of necessary support systems (cool ing.water, venti 1 ati on, etc. ).

~ ~

~

t

~ ~

II