ML17053C945

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IE Insp Rept 50-220/81-27 on 811001-31.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Log Recirculation Pump Runback in Control Room Log Book
ML17053C945
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1981
From: Doerflein L, Sharon Hudson, Kister H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17053C942 List:
References
50-220-81-27, NUDOCS 8112010546
Download: ML17053C945 (30)


See also: IR 05000220/1981027

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE

OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Report No.

81-27

Region I

Docket No.

50-220

License

No.

DPR-63

Prior ity

Category

Licensee:

Niagara

Mohawk Power Corporation

300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse,

New York

13202

Facility Name:

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit

1

Inspection at:

Scriba,

New York

Inspection conducted:

October 1-31,

1981

Inspectors:

S.

D. Hudson,

Resident

Inspector

L. T. Doerflein, Res dent Inspector

ti

9'ate signed

9

Ev

ate signed

Approved by:

date sig

ed

H.

Kister,

ef,

R

Sec ion

1C

ctor Projects

a esig

ed

Ins ection

Summar

Ins ection

on October 1-31,

1981 (Ins ection

Re ort No. 50-220/81-27

Areas Ins ected:

Routine, onsite regular

and backshift inspections

by the

ress

en

snspec

ors

(145 hours0.00168 days <br />0.0403 hours <br />2.397487e-4 weeks <br />5.51725e-5 months <br />).

Areas inspected

included:

licensee

action

on previous inspection findings, operational

safety verification, physical

security, plant tours, surveillance tests,

maintenance activities, radioactive

waste shipment, safety

system verification, review of plant operations,

followup on significant events,

TMI action plan items,

and review of periodic

reports.,

Results:

Of the twelve areas

inspected,

no items of noncompliance

were

~i ent>1.>ed in eleven areas.

One item of noncompliance

was identified in one

e

area.

(Failure to log recirc

pump runback in the Control

Room Log Book)

Region I Form 12

(Rev. April 77)

I Sfi20f0546 Sffif3

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DETAILS

1.

Persons

Contacted

R. Abbott, Supervisor,

Operations

K. Dahlberg, Site Maintenance

Superintendent

J. Duell, Super visor, Chemistry

and Radiation Protection

E. Leach, Superintendent

of Chemistry

and Radiation

Management

R. Orr, Supervisor,

Nuclear Security

T. Perkins,

General

Superintendent,

Nuclear Generation

T.

Roman, Station Superintendent

B. Taylor, Supervisor,

Instrument

and Control

P. Volza, Emergency Planning Coordinator

The inspector also interviewed

and talked with other licensee

personnel

during the course of the inspection including shift

supervisors,

administrative,

operations,

health physics, security,

instrument

and control,

and contractor personnel.

2.

Licensee Action On Previous

Ins ection Findin s

(Closed)

UNRESOLVED ITEM (220/78-03-01):

Changes

to procedures

to

incorporate inspection findings.

The inspector

reviewed the following

procedures

to verify that the changes

had

been- completed.

a ~

b.

Nl-ST-C5, "Secondary

Containment

Leak Rate

and Reactor

Building

Ventilation Operability Test," Revision 3, dated

March 6, 1981.

This procedure

was revised to specify the local gages

as the

source, of the data

and to record the data in the proper units.

Nl-ST-M4, "Emergency Diesel Generators

Manual Start

and

1 Hour

Rated

Load Test," Revision 8, dated

June 25, 1981.

This procedure

has

been revised to specify the minimum diesel fuel oil requirements

in the acceptance

criteria section of the procedure

and to verify

operation of the fuel oil transfer

pump.

c.

Nl-ST-gl, "Core Spray

Pumps

and Motor Operated

Valves Operability

Test," Revision 8, dated

June

10, 1981.

This procedure

has

been

revised to include monitoring the differential temperature

across

the core spray

pump motor cooler to certify cooler operability.

d.

Nl-ST-DO, "Daily Checks,"

Revision 7, dated

September ll, 1981.

This procedure

was revised to include the acceptable

numerical

values for the Suppression

Chamber Water Temperature,

Primary

Containment

Pressure,

and the Downcomer low and high submergences

in conformance with the Technical Specifications.

(Closed)

UNRESOLVED ITEM (220/78-21-05):

Inclusion of reporting

requirement

reference in LER cover letter.

In September

1979, the

licensee started to identify the particular reporting requirement in

the

LER cover letter.

The inspector reviewed the cover letters for

LER's 79-19 through 81-43 and noted that all cover letters contained

the reference

and description of the specific reporting requirement.

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(Closed)

INSPECTOR

FOLLOWUP ITEM (220/79-22-01):

Operation with

less than four recirculation

pumps.

Amendment

No. 39, effective

December

12,

1980, revised the Technical Specifications to specify

plant restrictions with less

than four operable recirculation

pumps.

(Closed)

UNRESOLVED ITEM (220/80-05-04):

Inconsistency in Nl-SOP-17

and Nl-OP-12 on the Standby Liquid Control System

(SLCS).

Special

Operating Procedure

No. 17,

"Emergency Shutdown With SLCS," was

superceded

by Special

Operating

Procedure

No. 32, "Failure of Reactor

to Scram".

Nl-SOP-32 addresses

when to initiate SLCS and refers to

Operating

Procedure

No. 12, "Liquid Poison System," for operation of

the system.

(Closed)

UNRESOLVED ITEM (220/77-04-06):

Traversing incore probe

shear valve squib replacement.

The inspector

reviewed maintenance

procedure

Nl-IMP-TIP-2, "Explosive Shear Valve," Revision 1, dated

February

1978,

and verified, based

on a record review, that the shear

valve squibs

were replaced

on February 22, 1978.

Using Nl-IMP-TIP-2,

the shear valve squibs

are replaced

every five years,

and the removed

squibs

are test fired to ensure they were operable.

(Open)

UNRESOLVED ITEM (220/80-01-03):

Revision to Markup procedure.

The licensee

has drafted

a proposed

change to APN-7,"Procedure for

Control of Equipment Markups,

ETC."

This item remains

open pending

- approval

by the Site Operations

Review Committee

and subsequent

NRC

re-inspection.

3.

0 erati on Safet

Verification

a ~

Control

Room Observations

Routinely throughout the inspection period, the inspector

independently verified plant parameters

and equipment availability

of engineered

safeguard

features

against

a plant specific checklist

to ensure

compliance with the limiting conditions for oper ation (LCO"'s).

The plant specific checklist

has

been

developed to assist

the

inspector in ensuring the following items were observed:

'roper control

room manning;

Availability and proper valve line-up of safety systems;

Availability and proper alignment of'onsite

and offsite

emergency

power sources;

Reactor control panel indications

and bypass

switches;

Core thermal limits;

Primary containment temperature

and pressure;

Drywell to suppression

chamber differential'ressure;

Stack monitor recorder, t'races;

and

Liquid poison tank level

and concentration.

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Selected lit annunciators

were discussed

with control

room

operators

to verify that the reasons for them were understood

and corrective action, if required,

was being taken.

Shift turnovers

were observed to ensure

proper control

room and

shift manning

on both day and back shifts.

Shift turhover

checklists

and log review by the oncoming

and off-going shifts

were also observed

by the inspector.

The inspector directly observed portions of routine power

operations to ensure

adherence

to approved procedures.

b.

Review of Lo s and

0 eratin

Records

The inspector reviewed the following logs and instructions for

the period October

1 through October 31, 1981:

Control

Room Log Book

Station Shift Supervisor's

Log Book

Station Shift Supervisor's

Instructions

Licensee

Event Report

Log

Reactor Operating

Log

The logs

and instructions

were reviewed to:

Obtain information on plant problems

and operation;

Detect

changes

and trends in performance;

Detect possible conflicts with technical specifications

or regulatory requirements;

Determine that records

are being reviewed

as required;

Assess

the effectiveness

of the communications

provided

by

the logs

and instructions;

and

Determine that the reporting requirements

of technical

specifications

are met.

(0'ne item~ of noncompliance,upas

identi'fied. The item ys discussed

in

paragraph

11.

4.

Observation of Ph sical Securit

The inspector

made observations

and verified during regular

and

off-shift hours that .selected

aspects

of the plant's physical security

system were in accordance

with regulatory requirements,

physical security

plan and approved

procedures.

The following observations

relating to

physical security

were made:

The security force on both regular

and off-shifts were properly

manned

and appeared

capable of performing their assigned

functions.

Protected

area barriers

were intact - gates

and doors closed

and

locked if not attended.

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Communication

checks

were conducted.

Proper communication devices

were available.

Isolation zones

were free of visual obstructions

and objects that

could aid an intruder in penetrating

the protected

area

and during

periods of darkness,

the protected

area

had sufficient illumination.

Persons

and

packages

were checked prior to entry into the protected

area.

Vehicles were properly authorized,

searched,

and escorted

or

controlled within the protected

area.

Persons within the protected

area displayed photo-identification

badges,

persons in vital areas

were proper ly author ized,

and

persons

requiring escort were properly escorted.

Compensatory

measures

were implemented during periods of equipment

failure.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

5.

Plant Tours

During the inspection period, the inspector

made multiple tours of plant

areas to make

a independent

assessment

of equipment conditions,

radiological conditions, safety

and adherence

to regulatory requirements.

The following areas

were

among those inspected:

Turbine Building

Auxiliary Control

Room

Vital Switchgear

Rooms

Yard Areas

Radwaste

Area

Diesel Generator

Rooms

Screen

House

Reactor Building

The following items were observed

or verified:

a ~

Radiation Protection:

Personnel

monitoring was properly conducted.

Randomly selected

radiation protection instruments

were

calibrated

and operable.

Area surveys

were properly conducted

and the Radiation

Work

Permits

were appropriate for the as-found conditions.

Radiation

Work Permits

(RWP) requirements

were being followed.

Personnel

monitoring was properly conducted.

Randomly selected

radiation protection instruments

were

calibrated

and operable.

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Work Permit requirements

were being followed.

Area surveys

were properly conducted

arid the Radiation

Work Permits

were appropriate for the as-found conditions.

The inspector witnessed

the performance of radiation survey

f/59779 in the TIP room on October 9,

1981

and 860157

on the

Refueling Floor on October 29, 1981.

On October 29, 1981, the inspector noticed that

an air sample

taken at 1:35 p.m. for survey

860153

showed

an airborne activity

level of 25,535 percent of the

sum of the individual Maximum

Permissible

Concentration

(MPC) for each isotope detected.

The

major isotope present

was cobalt-60.

The air sample

was taken

in the Spent

Resin Tank

Room while shoveling resins that had

overflowed onto the floor.

Full face particulate filter type

masks

were worn as required

by Radiation

Work Permit 85377.

The

duration of the job was approximately

15 minutes.

Although a negligible amount of radioactive material

was ingested,

the inspector stated that the airborne activity could have

been

reduced

by wetting the resins prior to shoveling.

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspector's

concern

and stated that this

technique

would be investigated for future use.

The licensee

also stated that the individuals involved would receive whole

body counts.

b.

Fire Protection:

Randomly selected fire extinguishers

were accessible

and

inspected

on schedule.

Fire doors were unobstructed

and in their proper position.

Ignition sources

were controlled in accordance

with the

licensee's

approved procedures.

Combustible material

was promptly removed.

c.

Equipment Controls:

Jumpers

and equipment tag outs did not conflict with

Technical Specification requirements.

Conditions requiring the use of jumper s received

prompt

licensee attention.

Selected

jumper s had

been properly installed

and removed.

d.

Yital Instrumentation:

Selected

instruments

appeared

functional

and demonstrated

parameters

within Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for

Operation.

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Radioactive

Waste

System Controls:

Gaseous

releases

were monitored

and recorded.

The inspector reviewed the Weekly Stack

Gas Isotopic Analysis

and Offgas Isotopic Analysis performed

on October

19 and 26,

1981

to determine that gaseous

releases

were periodically sampled

and did not exceed Technical Specification limits.

On October 8, 1981, the inspector witnessed

portions of the

loading of a cask with radioactive filter sludge.

The

shipment

was designated

by the licensee

as shipment 81081-037A.

The operation

was performed in accordance

with Waste Handling

Procedure,

WHP-4, "Cask Loading Procedure,"

Revision 0, dated

January

30, 1981.

f.

Housekeeping:

Plant housekeeping

and cleanliness

practices

were in accordance

with approved licensee

programs.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

6.

Surveillance

Tests

During the inspection period, the inspector witnessed

the performance

of various surveillance tests.

Observations

were made to verify that:

Surveillance

procedures

conform to technical specification

requirements

and have

been properly approved.

Test instrumentation is calibrated.

Limiting conditions for operations for removing equipment from

service are met.

Testing is performed

by qualified personnel.

Surveillance

schedule

is met.

Test results

met technical specification requirements.

Appropriate corrective action is initiated, if necessary.

Equipment is properly restored to service following the test.

The following tests

were included in this review:

ST-M9, "Control

Room Air Treatment

System Operability Test,"

Revision 3, dated

March 2, 1981, performed

on October 9, 1981.

ISP-RPS-TP,

"Reactor Protection

System Auto Trip System Instrument

Trip Channel Test/Calibration,"

Revision 9, dated August 28, 1981,

performed

on October 16,

1981.

ISP-IC-3-1,

"A.P.R.M. Instrument

Channel Calibration," Revision 3,

dated

November 9, 1979.'he

inspector witnessed

the calibration

of channel

813 performed

on October 22,

1981.

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"Radwaste

Discharge to Tunnel Radiation Monitor

Instrument

Channel Calibration," Revision 1, dated

September

9,

1980, performed

on October 23,

1981.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

'.

Plant Maintenance

The inspector

examined portions of various safety related maintenance

activities.

Through direct observation

and review of records,

he

determined that:

Redundant

components

were tested to ensure operability prior to

starting the work.

These activities did not violate the limiting conditions for

operation.

Required administrative approvals

and tagouts

were obtained

prior to initiating the work.

Approved procedures

were used or the activity was within the

"skills of the trade".

Appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented.

Equipment

was properly tested prior to returning it to service.

During this inspection period, the following activities were examined:

Pulling cable thru the Reactor Building wall elevation

237;

Repair of ¹11 Liquid Poison

Pump;

Troubleshooting the recirc.pump flow oscillation of October 22, 1981.

During the repair of ¹11 Liquid Poison

Pump, the inspector

independently

verified tagout

BMU ¹65744 had

been properly conducted.

After completion

of testing the repaired

pump, the inspector independently verified that

it was correctly returned to the normal standby condition.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

8.

Radioactive

Waste Shi ment

On October 29, 1981, the inspector

checked

a shipment of radioactive

waste prior to its departure

from site.

The shipment

was designated

by

the licensee

as

shipment

¹1081-040A and consisted of 15.3 curies of

solidified evaporator

bottoms.

Specifically, the inspector verified that:

The shipment

was properly classified

as low specific activity material.

A radiation

and contamination

survey had

been conducted.

(Radiation

Survey

Log Sheet ¹60088,

dated

October 29, 1981)

and that applicable

limits had not been

exceeded.

An approved shipping container

was used.

The vehicle was properly labelled

as "Radioactive - LSA".

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Shipment

Record

had been properly completed

and

signed.

The shipping container

appear ed to be steadily braced for

transportation.

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

Safet

S stem

0 erabilit

Verification

On a sampling basis,

the inspector directly examined selected

safety

system trains to verify that the systems

were properly aligned in the

standby

mode.

This examination included:

Verification that each accessible

valve in the flow path is in

the correct position by either visual observation of the valve

or remote position indication.

Verification that power supply breakers

are aligned for components

that must actuate

upon receipt, of an initiation signal.

Visual inspection of the major components

for leakage,

proper

lubrication, cooling water supply,

and other general

conditions

that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.

Verification by observation that instrumentation

essential

to

system actuation or performance

was operational.

During this inspection period, the following systems

were examined:

Containment

Spray System f12

Core Spray System

012

Control

Rod Drive Scram Discharge

System

The inspector

also conducted

a complete walkdown of the accessible

portions of the Liquid Poison

System.

In addition to the above items,

the inspector verified'hat the containment isolation function of this

system

was in the proper standby line-up.

This includes:

Manual valves are shut,

capped,

and locked as appropriate.

Motor operated

or air operated

valves are not mechanically

blocked

and power is available

as appropriate.

There are

no visual leakage

paths

between the containment

and the

isolation valves.

During the walkdown of the Liquid Poison System,

the inspector questioned

the licensee

on the purpose of a heat

lamp mounted

below the discharge

valve on the No.

11 Liquid Poison

Pump.

The licensee

stated that the

heat

lamp was

used to prevent the poison solution from crystallizing

when he

had experienced

problems with the electrical

heat tape

on the

No.

11 Liquid Poison

Pump.

The licensee

also stated that the lamp was

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no longer required.

However, the inspector noted that based

on past

observations

and discussions

with other licensee

personnel,

the heat

lamp has apparently

been inplace for a time period of approximately

one year.

This item is unresolved until a determination is made

on

whether or not the operability of the Liquid Poison

System is dependent

on the heat

lamp.

(50-220/81-27-01)

10.

Review of Plant

0 erations

a.

Procurement

and Stora

e

The inspector toured the licensee's

warehouse

area to ensure that

safety related

components

are traceable

and that the area is

maintained

as required

by approved procedures.

The inspector

reviewed the following procedures:

APN-14, "Procedure for Control of Material

and Service,"

Revision 4, dated April 1981.

NMPC Materials

Management

Policies

and Procedures,

Appendix A,

Sections

1.0, 4.0, 36.0.

The inspector selected

the following items in the warehouse to

verify traceability by reviewing the purchase

order, receipt

records,

location of the item in storage,

issue record

and

certification record.

P.O.

73459, 3/4" and 1" Hancock globe valves

P.O.

76208, Liquid Poison Injection Valve Replacement

Kits

P.O.

94175, Various unions, tees,

bushings,

couplings

and

reducers

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

b.

ualit

Control Ins ection

The inspector witnessed

a quality control inspection

performed

on

October 29,

1981

by the licensee's

quality assurance

organization.

The quality control inspection

was performed in accordance

with

guality Control Surveillance Checklist 8W81-01.

The inspector

also reviewed the personnel

records to 'determine that the licensee's

individual was qualified as

a Level I Inspector in accordance

with

ANSI 45.2.6, "gualification of Inspection,

Examination,

and Testing

for Personnel

for Nuclear

Power Plants".

A review of Surveillance

Report

8W81-22 will be performed

when issued

by the licensee.

(50-220/81-27-02)

No items of noncompliance

were identified.

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followu

on Si nificant Event

About 12:00 noon

on October 22, 1981, the plant experienced

a sudden

decrease

in reactor recirculation (recirc) flow.

The inspector

reviewed the Reactor Operating

Log and appropriate

instrumentation

chart recorders to determine the sequence

of events.

The plant

conditions prior to the recirc flow decrease

were:

Reactor

power = 99K

Total steam flow = 15.6xl06 ibm/hr.

Total recirc flow = 63x106 ibm/hr.

Reactor pressure

= 1029 psig

All recirc

pump controllers,

except for recirc pump 814, were in master

manual control.

The chart recorder for total recirc flow shows

a sudden

decrease

of

9xl06 ibm/hr.

During the transient,

which lasted

about ten minutes,

reactor

power

dropped to approx.

83%, total steam flow to 14.3xl06 ibm/hr.,

and reactor pressure

to 1022 psig.

After recirc flow returned to its

initial value, the other parameters

also returned to their normal values

except for a slight overshoot in reactor

pressure to 1032 psig.

Because

the only installed chart recorder monitors total recirc flow,

the licensee installed

a temporary chart-recorder

to monitor flow from

each of the five recirc pumps to help isolate the cause of the event.

During the three

day period of observation,

no abnormal flow oscillations

occurred.

The inspector

noted that this event

was not recorded in either the Control

Room Log Book or the Shift Supervisor's

Log Book.

APN-2A, "Conduct of

Operations

and Composition

and Responsibilities

of Station or Unit

Organization", Section 4.1.1, states

in part:

" "Control

Room Log Book

shall contain all information pertaining, to changing core reactivity

during all modes of reactor operation ...

Also, entries affecting

Station outputs ..., unusual

conditions ..., etc. will be entered in

this log."

The failure to log the unexplained

change in recirc flow

and the accompanying

change in reactor" power in the Control

Room Log

Book is considered

to be

an item of noncompliance.

(50-220/81-27-03)

The inspector also determined that this event is not reportable in

accordance

with Technical Specifications

or. 10CFR50.72.

Licensee Action on TMI Action Plan Items

The inspector

examined the installation of several

recently completed

modifications required

by

NUREG 0737, -"Clarification of TMI Action Plan

Requirements".

The item numbers

correspond to those given in NUREG 0737.

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Item No. II.D.3, Direct'. Indication of Relief and Safet

Valve Position

During the March 1980 outage,

the licensee installed the acoustic

monitoring system to provide direct indicat'ion of each safety

and

relief valve.

This system provided only a

common annunciator

alarm

in the control

room which indicated that any of the valves

had opened.

During the

1981 refueling outage, individual computer points were

assigned for each of the six relief valves.

A common computer point

was assigned to all of the sixteen safety valves.

The individual

points for the relief valve and the

common point and for the safety

valves will alarm and print out on the process

computer.

This design

had been determined to be acceptable

by the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

Therefore,

unresolved

item no. 50-220/80-18-01

is closed.

The inspector

reviewed 'ISP-01-VMS, "Valve Monitoring System Operating

Background Vibration," Revision 0, dated July 28, 1981, performed

on

July 29,

1981 to ensure that the operability of the computer points

had

been

checked after installation.

The inspector

noted that SOP-9,

"Solenoid Actuated Pressure

Relief Valve Opening," Revision 4, dated

March 30,

1981 did not reflect the acoustic monitor system input in

the process

computer.

The licensee

stated that the procedure

would be

changed

by December 1, 1981.

This item remains

open pending

NRC review

of changes to the above procedure.

Item No. II.E.4.2

Containment Isolation

De endabilit

The Office of NUclear Reactor Regulation

has determined that the

licensee's

position relating to diverse containment isolation signals

and automatic isolation of non-essential

systems is acceptable.

Therefore,

unresolved

item no. 50-220/80-18-02 is closed.

In a letter from D. Disc to T. Ippolito (NRC) dated January

30, 1981,

the licensee

stated that the automatic isolation valves in the

recirculation loop sample line and suppression

chamber to waste

system

line would not be completed until March 1, 1982.

This item remains

open pending

NRC review of the installation of the above valves.

Item No. II.F.1.4, Containment

Pressure

Monitor

The inspector

examined the wide range drywell pressure

instruments,

PPI-201.2-483

and 484 to determine if the licensee

had met the

commitments of hKs letter from D. Disc to D. Eisenhut

(NRC), dated

December

31, 1980.

The system consists

of redundant

pressure

transmitters,

indicators,

and recorders with a range of -5 psig to

250 psig.

The system provides

no control functions.

It receives

vital power from the Reactor Protection

System

Busses

811

and 12.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's

Safety Evaluation dated

April 29,

1981 to determine that the licensee

had properly considered

the effects of this modification on plant safety.

This Safety

Evaluation also indicated that this modification had

been reviewed

by

the Site Operations

Review Committee.

The inspector reviewed guality

Control Inspection Reports

880-425

and 81-154 to determine that

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in-progress quality control inspections

had

been performed

by the

licensee.

Instrument Calibration Reports for the pressure

transmitter

and indicator dated

February

19,

1981

and for the recorder

dated

May 21,

1981

show that the system

was calibrated after installation.

The inspector verified that the licensee

has

added these

instruments

to the periodic calibration schedule.

f

The inspector reviewed the lesson

plan for "Mitigating Core. Damage-Process

Instruments",

and selected training records to ensure that operators

had

been trained in the changes

due to this modification.

This training

also covered modifications required

by Item O'II.F.1.5, "Containment

Water Level Monitor" and Item II.K.3.27,

"Common Reference

Level for

Vessel

Level Instrumentation".

The licensee

appears

to have satisfied this item in accordance

with

his commitments to the

NRC.

Item No. II.F.1.5

Containment

Water Level Monitor

The inspector

examined the wide range torus level instruments

HALI-58-05A and 06A and recorders

8LR 201.2-307

and

308 to determine

if the licensee

had met the commitments of his letter from D. Disc

to D. Eisenhut

(NRC) dated

December

31, 1980.

The system consists of

redundant transmitters,

indicators

and recorders with a range of

15 inches from the bottom of the torus to 3 feet 8 inches

above the

normal water level of the torus.

The system provides

no control

functions.

It receives vital power from the Reactor Protection

System

Busses Ill and 12.

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

Safety Evaluation dated April 29,

1981 to determine that the licensee

had properly considered

the effects

of this modification on plant safety.

This Safety Evaluation also

indicated that this modification had

been reviewed

by the Site Operations

Review Committee.

The inspector

reviewed guality Control Inspection

Reports

881-526,

563, 507, 587, 598, 638,

641 to determine that in-progress

quality control inspections

had been performed.

Instrument Surveillance

Procedure,

ISP-N1-201.2-TL,

"Torus Water Level Instrumentation,"

Revision 3,

was issued

May 28,

1981 to include the calibration of these

new instruments.

It was performed

on May 30, 1981.

Drawing Transmittal

Letter dated July 10,

1981 forwarded the as-built drawings to the plant.

The licensee

appears

to have satisfied this item in accordance

with his

coranitment to the

NRC.

Item No. II.K.3.27, Co@eon

Reference

Levels for Vessel

Level Instrumentation

On June

1, 1981, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued

Technical Specification

Amendment 845.

This authorized the change to a

common reference

level for all reactor vessel

water level instruments

addressed

in Technical Specifications.

The

common reference

level

was

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established

as

65 inches

below minimum normal water level, which is

elevation 302'".

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

Safety Evaluation dated

June 23,

1981 to determine that the licensee

had properly considered

the effects

of the modification on plant safety.

The Safety Evaluation also

indicated that this modification had been reviewed

by the Site Operations

Review Committee

(SORC).

The inspector

observed that all water vessel

level instruments,

except

the reactor

vessel

flange level meter, were modified prior to completion

of the refueling outage

ending July 3, 1981.

The reactor

vessel

flange

level meter is

a special

purpose

instrument for use only during refueling

outages.

The reference point for this meter is the reactor vessel

flange.

The inspector

reviewed Instrument Surveillance

Procedures,

ISP-RPS-XMTR,

"Reactor Protection System,"

Revision 6, dated

June 25,

1981

and

ISP-RPS-TP,

"Reactor Protection

System-Auto Trip System,"

Revision 8,

dated June 25,

1981 to determine that surveillance

procedures

used for

the calibration of reactor vessel

water instruments

had

been revised

after the modification was installed.

The inspector also reviewed

the completed data sheets for the triple low level instruments

836-05A,

B, C,

D to determine that the instruments

had

been calibrated with the

revised procedures

on June 26, 1981.

The inspector

also observed that

the following special

operating

procedures

had

been revised to reflect

changes

in various instrument setpoints

due to the

new water level

reference level:

SOP-30,

"Pipe Break Outside Primary Containment"

SOP-32, "Failure of Reactor to Scram"

The following operating

and special

operating

procedures

required

further revision

as

a result of this modification:

OP-l, "Nuclear Steam Supply System," Revision 14, dated

June 30, 1981.

OP-40,

"Reactor Protection System,"

Revision 1, dated February 2, 1981.

OP-46,

"High Pressure

Cooling Injection," Revision 2, dated

June 5, 1979.

SOP-3,

"Feedwater Malfunction (Decreasing

Feedwater

Flow)," Revision 6,

dated July 1, 1981.

SOP-4,

"Feedwater Malfunction (Increasing

Feedwater

Flow)," Revision 5,

dated July 1, 1981.

SOP-10,

"Safety Valve Opening," Revision 5, dated

March 30, 1980.

SOP-16,

"Reactor Scram," Revision 4, dated

March 30, 1980.

SOP-29,

"Pipe Break Inside Drywell," Revision 3, dated July 1, 1981.

A licensee

management

representative

stated) that these

procedure

changes

would be completed

by December

1, 1981.

This item remains

open pending

NRC review of licensee action

on the above procedures.

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Monthly Operating Report, August 1981.

Monthly Operating Report,

September

1981.

The inspector noticed that the August Monthly Operating Report addressed

the replacement of the sensor

converter unit on 5'll Reactor Building

Ventilation Monitor.

The inspector reviewed

Work Request

f/15020,

guality Control Inspection Report 0'81-1780,

dated July 20, 1981,

and

RTP-23, "Reactor Building Ventilation Monitor Calibration," performed

on July 20, 1981.

He determined that the licensee

had met the

requirements of the Technical Specifications limiting conditions for

operations

during the repair and that the monitor had

been calibrated

after replacement of the sensor converter.

The licensee

should

have

also submitted

a thirty day Licensee

Event Report since the repair is

considered

corrective maintenance

on

a safety related

system.

The

licensee

stated that

a Licensee

Event Report would be submitted.

(50-220/81-27-04)

14.

Unresolved

Items

Unresolved

items are matters

about which more information is required

to clarify whether they are acdeptable,

items of noncompliance

or

deviations.

One unresolved

item was described in paragraph

9.

15.

Exit Interview

13.

Review of Periodic

Re orts

The following reports

were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements

of the Technical Specifications

are being met and that plant operations

are being accurately reported:

At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection,

meetings

were held with senior facility management

to discuss

the inspection

scope

and findings.

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