ML16342E122
| ML16342E122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1998 |
| From: | Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9806150034 | |
| Download: ML16342E122 (40) | |
Text
REGULATE Y 1NFORMATION DXSTRIBUTXOh SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESS1ON NBR:9806150034 DOC.DATE; 98/06/08 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Pacific,Ga AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WONG,H.J.
Region 4 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RUEGER,G.M.
Pacific Gas
& Electric Co.
DOCKET 05000275 05000323
SUBJECT:
Advises of planned insp effort resulting from Diablo Canyon plant performance review. Details of insp plan for next 8
months encl.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE40D COPIES RECEIVED:LTRj ENCL t
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TITLE: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report NOTES:
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011-8064 June 8, 1998 Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Power Generation Bus. Unit Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B14A 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - DIABLOCANYON
Dear Mr. Rueger:
On May 15, 1998, the NRC staff completed the semiannual Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Diablo Canyon.. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance.
The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources.
The PPR for Diablo Canyon involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period September 24, 1997, to April 22, 1998.
PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) and Senior Management Meeting (SMM) reviews.
The SALP for Diablo Canyon was recently completed and will be forwarded to you shortly.
It reflects the detailed results of our recent assessment.
There was improvement noted in each of the four'functional areas assessed.
Based on the results of this assessment, no change in inspection resources for review of your performance was identified.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred.to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), which was considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
The PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. is a general description of the PIM table labels.
This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Diablo Canyon PPR review.
It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts.and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. details our inspection plan for the next 8 months.
The rationale or basis for each 980 DOCK 0500027>
hi50034 980608 PDR A
PDR 8
Pacific Gas and Electric Company inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. Ifyou have any questions, please contact Howard Wong at 925-975-0296.
Since Docket Nos.:
50-275 50-323 License Nos.: DPR-80 DPR-82 Howard J.
ong, Chi Project Branch E Division of Reactor Pro ects
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/enclosures:
Dr. Richard Ferguson Energy Chair Sierra Club California 1100 ltth Street, Suite 311 Sacramento, California 95814 Ms. Nancy Culver San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Pismo Beach, California 93448 Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Room 370
'ounty Government Center San Luis Obispo, California 93408
. ~
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Mr. Truman Burns)Mr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 San Francisco, California 94102 Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee 857 Cass Street, Suite D Monterey, California 93940 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234 Christopher J. Warner, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 Robert P. Powers, Vice President and Plant Manager Diablo Canyon Power Plant P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, California 93424 Managing Editor Telegram-Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, California 93406
Pacific Gas and Electric Company E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
WCFO File Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File DOCUMENT NAME: S:)PPRLTR)PPR98-01>spprltr.dc To receive py of d mont, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclos res "E" = Copy with endo ures "N"= No copy RIV::D P/E HJ D
A ell D:DRP TPG nn C:DRP/E W ng 06 06/ /98 06/ /98 06/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD C PY
ry
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bcc to DGD (+III) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
WCFO File DOCUMENT NAME: S:>PPRLTRLPPR98-01>spprltr.dc To receive pyofd ment,indiceteinbox:"C"=Cop withoutenctos res "E"=Cop withenclo ures "N"=Nocopy RIV: :D P/E HJ 06 D
A ell 06/ /98 D:DRP ':DRP/E TPG nn W ng 06/ /98 06/ /98 OFFICIALRECORD C PY
EN L
RE1 PLANT I UE MAT DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE 03/28/98 VIO SL IV 03/28/98 NCV
. IR 98-07 IR 98-07 NRC OPS 2B SELF OPS 3C 3A Aviolation was identified for failure to provide a midloop procedure appropriate to the circumstances that required proper stowage of a nonseismically qualified hoist. The hoist was left in an unstowed condition above the operating residual heat removal pump during a reduced inventory condition.
A noncited violation, per Section VII.B.Iof the NRC Enforcement Policy, was identified for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for switching of power supplies between the units. The switching of the power supply without clearly understanding ~
the outcome resulted in unexpected alarms, loss of power to equipment required by Technical Specifications, and unnecessary disruption in both control rooms. The immediate response of the Unit 1 control room operators was very good, with timely and appropriate response to each alarm 03/28/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC OPS 3A 3B Several significant operator evolutions were performed well. Shutdown and startup evolutions were conducted well~ in a professional manner, in accordance with procedures, and with a focus on safety. Licensee preparations, including the operations pre-evolution briefings for hot mid-loop operations were conservative and reflected a focus on safety. The rellood of the emergency core cooling systems evolution was well coordinated and cOntrolled.
03/28/98 VIO SL IV IR 9847 NRC OPS 3A A violation was identified for failure to restore the 'High Flux at Shutdown annunciator when the required number of fuel assemblies was installed in the core. The responsibility to perform the actions was not clearly assigned prior to the evolution.
03/28/98 Weakness IR 98-07 NRC OPS 2B 3C The control of refueling activities indicated unclear procedural guidance and management expectations.
The lack of procedural guidance for performing signal to noise ratio calculation, the lack of acceptance criteria in the procedure for fuel assembly ciearances, and the confusing procedure format contributed to these concerns.
The method used to calcula inverse count rate ratio and the method used to perform the post core load verification was inconsistent with the methods described in the procedure.
The lack of separate signatures in the controlled copy of the procedure for verifying that the signal to noise ratio was greater than 2 was an example of poor documentation of procedurally required activities.
03/28/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-07 LICENSEE OPS 2B 3A A violation was identified for several examples of failure to properly implement the clearance procedure.
Several significant errors were not found or prevented by the clearance process and resulted in the potential for work to be performed without the required isolation from sources of energy to allow safe work. However,'the number and significance of clearance errors in 2R8 was less than the number of errors in the previous outage.
May 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
e
PLANT ISS ES MA R DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 03/28/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC OPS 3B The training provided for unit 2 outage preparation was implemented well and provided valuable lessons learned and necessary procedural changes.
The inspectors noted, in particular, that the simulator training was professional, well executed, and identified a vulnerability in the abnormal operating procedures.
03/28/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-07 LICENSEE OPS 4C 5A A violation was identified for failure to translate the design of the reactor vessel refueling level indicatinn system into abnormal operating procedures.
The licensee exhibited good attention to detail in identifying this issue during simulator training. Documented corrective
~
actions at the end of the inspection period for this violation failed to address deficiencies in the procedure preparation and approval process.
03/20/98 Strength IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1C 5A 5C Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant had a good corrective action program and condition reporting process.
In general, conditions adverse to quality were being effectively identified, resolved, and corrected.
03/20/98 Strength IR 98-04 03/20/98 Strength IR 9844 NRC OPS 5A NRC OPS 5A 5C Nudear quality services performed good oversight of the corrective action process.
Operations department personnel had a good understanding ofthe corrective action process and used the process to effectively identify and obtain corrections to deficient plant conditions.
03/20/98 Strength IR 9844 03/20/98 Strength IR 98-04 03/20/98 Strength IR 98-04 NRC NRC OPS 5B NRC OPS 5A 5B 5C Plant staff review committee was effective in performing its required functions. The nuclear safety oversight committee was composed of highly qualified individuals and provided good oversight of Diablo Canyon Power Plant activities.
The quality assurance audits that were reviewed provided meaningful results, and presented conclusions that were consistent with observations.
OPS 5A 5B 5C The Operations department performed good assessments that generally resulted in effective corrective actions.
03/20/98 Strength IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1C Control room deficiencies and operator work-arounds were well managed, based on the decreasing number and character ofthe deficiencies.
03/20/98'CV IR 98-04 LICENSEE OPS 1A The licensee-identified failure to perform a conditional offsite power verification within one hour of declaring Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3, as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action b, and reported by Licensee Event Report 50-323/97-01, Revision 0, was identified as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 ofthe NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-323/9804%1).
May 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
LANTIS UE MA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 03/20/98 NCV IR 94-04 LICENSEE OPS 1A The licensee-identified unplanned start and loading of Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 (engineered safety feature actuation) due to personnel error and inadequate work control reported by Licensee Event Report 50-275/97-09, Revision 0, was identified as a non-cited violation consistent viith Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-275/9804-01).
02/14/98 VIO SL IV IR 9842 02/14/98 Positive IR 9842 02/14/98 Strength IR 9842 02/14/98 Negative IR 98-02 NRC OPS 3A NRC OPS 3A 3B NRC OPS 3C NRC OPS 1B An operator was not aware that he was expected to closely monitor reactor coolant Pump 2-2 parameters, and ifflowwas greater than 6 gallons per minute to take action, including tripping the reactor.
This was indicative of a poor turnover of information between operators in that the operator was not aware of the applicable limitfor seal leakoff flow.
Several examples of failure to implement the sealed valve program. The widespread examples of failure to seal safety-related valves properly indicated weaknesses in training of nonlicensed operators.
The operations department displayed good sensitivity to the potential impact of control room modifications. The modifications were well planned and had a minimal impact on safety.
The licensee took conservative action in response to adverse weather conditions by reducing power when high swells were noted.
In addition, the licensee provided continuous management coverage and extra operators to ensure emergency response capability was not degraded when severe weather conditions existed.
01/03/98 NCV IR 97-23 LICENSEE OPS 1A 2A LER LER 1-96-009 Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was inoperable due to blockage of a ventilation flow path. Event occurred in May 1996.
11/22/97 Strength IR 97-19 LER 2-97-005 11/22/97 Positive IR 97-19 11/22/97 Strength IR 97-19 11/22/97 Positive IR 97-19 NRC OPS 1B 3A NRC OPS 3A 3B NRC OPS 1A 3A NRC OPS 1B 5B Operators performed well in response to a Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection event.
Actions were well coordinated, and plant equipment responded as expected.
The operating~
crew took timely and effective actions to terminate safety injection and control the plant to prevent the pressurizer from going solid.
The shift foreman maintained excellent command and control with frequent, informative shift briefings..
The operation of the reactor trip bypass breaker was performed well in that the activity was conducted in accordance with the procedure; the operator was knowledgeable and cautious; and good selfMecking practices were demonstrated.
Operators demonstrated conservative decision making by decreasing reactor power when the moisture separator reheaters were isolated. The operators manipulated the plant well while power was lowered.
The licensee performed an excellent root cause analysis ofthe reactor trip and safety injection event.
May 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT I E
Im I
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 10/11/97 Strength IR 97-16 10/11/97 Negative IR 97-16 10/11/97 Positive IR 97-16 10/11/97 Strength IR 97-16 NRC OPS 1A 3A NRC OPS 1A 3A NRC OPS 3A 4A NRC OPS,1A 3A In general, operations were conducted in a conscientious, competent, and professional manner, with focus on safety and procedural compliance.
Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and activities, and responded quickly and properly to annunciators Observations were made which were indicative of a lack of attention to detail in log keeping in the control room. Operation logs in some instances lacked sufficient information, did not document why an action was taken or the outcome of the action, and clerical errors were found.
Operations was effective in maintaining appropriate configuration control of the six emergency diesel generators and their subsystems and supporting systems.
The systems were correctly aligned and in compliance with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), and applicable plant procedures.
The material condition of the equipment was good with only a few minor equipment problems, which were documented in Action Requests (AR).
Operators demonstrated good performance in the October 3 decrease in Unit 1 turbine load from 50 percent to 38 percent to repair a steam leak. The down power was well coordinated, with continuous and diligent monitoring of the plant conditions, and timely response to alarms and indications. The shift foreman was dearly in control ofthe evolution and constantly aware of plant conditions.
10/11/97 Strength IR 97-16 LICENSEE OPS 5A'B Quality assessments of operations during the Unit 1 refueling were effective. Improvements in control room formality were noted and the continuing problems with dearances were documented.
Areas for improvements were identified, induding performance of risk assessments, and operators understanding ofthe Maintenance Rule. These assessments were consistent with the findings ofthe NRC Maintenance Rule inspection.
INay 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
N I
EMA I
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 03/28/98 NCV IR 98-07 03/28/98 Negative IR 98-07 NRC MAINT 5C SELF MAINT 2B 3B The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions for violation 50-275;323/96014-03 were sufficiently directed towards ensuring that control board action request stickers were removed when the work was complete, but did not appear to fullyaddress the need to closely control these deficiency tags. The inspectors found six additional deficiencies concerning control board action requests.
Therefore, the licensee's programs to ensure that the control board action requests stickers reflected the licensee's tracking list and the up-to-date plant configuration still required improvement.
A noncited violation was identified for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for ground buggy installation. The improper ground buggy installation had the potential to have caused significant damage to safety-related equipment and injure two workers.
03/28/98
- Positive, IR 98-07 NRC MAINT 2B 4B 5A The license's approach to the inspection of part length control rod drive mechanism welds was sound and aggressive. The inspectors found the ultrasonic testing showed the seven motor tubes'pper and tower transition welds were free of the type ofdefect found at Prairie Island on the G-9 motor tube.
03/28/98 Negative IR 98-07 03/28/98 Positive IR 98-07 03/28/98 Positive IR 98-07 SELF MAINT 3A NRC MAINT 3A NRC MAINT 3A 2B Maintenance personnel did not exercise appropriate care during penetration seal work and stepped on a valve, that when repositioned, challenged operators by causing a leak in the chemical and volume control system.
Anumber of maintenance activities were observed and were performed in accordance with the procedural requirements. Good coordination between technical maintenance, mechanical maintenance and radiation protection was observed in performing several maintenance tasks concurrently.
The inspectors observed a number of surveillance tests and found that the surveillances observed were performed in a cautious manner viith selfwhecking and proper communications employed.
The procedures governing the surveillance tests were technically adequate and personnel performing the surveillances demonstrated an adequate level of knowledge.
The inspectors noted that test results appeared to have been appropriately dispositioned.
May 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 03/20/98 Weakness IR 98-04 NRC MAINT 5C Licensee personnel involved in maintenance activities had an adequate understanding of the corrective action process and generally used action requests and nonconformance reports effectively. However, previous corrective actions implemented in the areas of material control, rework, work clearance errors, and procedure adherence, had not completely resolved those problems.
02/14/98 NCV IR 9842 NRC MAINT 3A 3B Failure to properly implement the dearance tagging procedure by hanging a red danger tag on the wrong component.
This item was indicative of the continuing weakness in the licensee's implementation ofthe clearance process.
02/14/98 Strength IR 98-02 02/14/98 Negative.
IR 98-02 NRC MAINT 2A 4A NRC MAINT 3A Improved design and maintenance of intake structure components contributed to good response of the plant to high ocean swells.
Technical maintenance personnel did not reflect a questioning attitude in dealing with a problem during Solid State Protection System.
01/03/98 NCV LER IR 97-23 LER 1-96-002 LER 1-96-004 LER 1-85-043 LICENSEE MAINT 1A 2B 3A Failure to meet surveillance requirements due to personnel errors and inadequate procedures.
Three events occurring in January and February 1996.
01/03/98 Negative IR 97-23 01/03/98 Positive IR 97-23 NRC MAINT 2B NRC MAINT 2A 11/22/97 NCV LER 11/22/97 Strength IR 97-19 'RC MAINT 2A 2B IR 97-19 LICENSEE MAINT 2B LER 1-97-017 Auxiliarysalt water vault check valve maintenance procedures did not include a post maintenance test to demonstrate that the valve was properly installed.
Plant material condition was generally good and continued to improve during this inspection period. Minor leaks and concerns were noted such as leakirig centrifugal charging pumps, leaking electro-hydraulic control fluid on Unit 1 ~ and degraded Unit 2 turbine end seals.
Failure to vent the, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) high points and pump casings.
Overall material condition of the plant was good and was improved over the past year. The licensee has been aggressive in reducing the number of open corrective maintenance items and control room deficiencies by 50 percent over the past year.
11/22/97 NCV LER 11/22/97 Weakness IR 97-19 LER 2-97-005 NRC MAINT 1A 3A IR 97-19 LICENSEE MAINT 2B LER 1-97-016 Failure to properly test the solid state protection system.
Personnel removing scaffolding did not exercise sufficient caution when working near the main steam isolation valves and caused a reactor trip and safety injection. In addition, a procedure weakness was identified in that the personnel were not cautioned on the equipment before performing their work.
May 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
LANTI S E
MATR DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 11/22/97 Weakness IR 97-19 10/11/97 Positive IR 97-16 10/11/97 Strength IR 97-16 10/11/97 Positive IR 97-16 NRC MAINT 1A 28 NRC MiAINT 3A 38 NRC MAINT 2A NRC MAINT
.1A 28 Initial preparations for the Unit 2 startup transformer replacement became adequate after NRC discussions; the plans did not provide for supplemental operator training. Replacement of the transformer was performed in a conservative manner and in accordance with licensee procedures.
Management's decision to defer the second transformer outage because of weather conditions was prudent.
Maintenance personnel were effective in the performance of maintenance activities.
Personnel were knowledgeable of the equipment, procedure, and tasks to be performed, th~
work documents and procedures were in use at the work site, and required clearance tags ~
were hung.
The plant equipment was well maintained, viith an appropriate focus on deficient conditions.
Existing equipment problems were identified by AR tags and new problems were reviewed daily and priorities set to ensure quick response to those problems that could degrade safety-related equipment.
The priorities were generally based on sound conservative judgement.
Aspecial surveillance test was conducted in a high quality manner.
Procedure Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) M-75, "4KV-Vital Bus Undervoltage Relay Calibration," previously performed only during shutdown, was performed at power. The management briefing covered management's expectations, such as the need to exercise caution and conservatism.
The procedure had been thoroughly reviewed to ensure the test had no unexpected impact on the plant.
May 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
V
PLANT I X
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 04/17/98 URI 04/17/98 URI IR 98-05 IR 98-05 NRC ENG 4A NRC ENG 4A The deletion of procedural steps to separate trains of the auxiliary saltwater and component'ooling water systems, when transferring to hot leg injection during a loss of coolant accident recovery appeared to constitute an unreviewed safety question.
This unresolved item was left open pending additional review by the NRC.
The discovery of a design vulnerability that could result in loss of containment spray during the recirculation phase (of a loss of coolant accident recovery) appeared to constitute an unreviewed safety question.
This unresolved item was left open pending additional review by the NRC.
03/28/98 Positive IR 98-07 02/14/98 NCV IR 98-02 LER LER 1-94-021 02/14/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC ENG 4A NRC ENG 4B NRC ENG 1A 4B The inspectors concluded that the design change package and associated safety evaluation for replacement of the Unit 2 recirculation sump screens was comprehensive, and the conclusions were reasonable.
The design change was effective in improving the containment sump's ability to screen out debris that could block safety injection flowpaths.
Failure to provide a 10 CFR 50.72 report for identifying that greater than 1 percent of the steam generator tubes in Unit 1 were defective.
The operability assessment associated with a decrease in the limiton component cooling water temperature was timely and technically sound.
01/03/98 Positive IR 97-23 LICENSEE ENG 4A 4B 01/03/98 Positive IR 97-23 LICENSEE ENG 1A 4B Engineering personnel provided a timely and technically sound response to concerns viith the design basis ofthe plant's response to a spurious safety injection signal.
The operability evaluation associated with containment fan cooler unit motor cracked welds was technically sound and had good engineering basis.
11/22/97 Negative IR 97-19 LER 1-97-018 11/22/97 Positive IR 97-19 NRC ENG 4A NRC EN G 4A 4B The licensee did not fullyrecognize the impact of the improper setpoints for the anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuating circuitry (AMSAC)system until questioned by the NRC. However, the licensee's review of AMSAC design informatio'n which led to this discovery was considered a strength.
The licensee properly translated the design basis of the safety related accumulators into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, TS, and applicable procedures.
10/24/97 Negative NRR Letter LICENSEE ENG 4C
- The licensee did not properly prepare license amendment request (LAR)9644, resulting in a followup letter eight months later to document Bases changes related to the changes in the initial license amendment.
10/11/97 Strength IR 97-16 NRC ENG 4C The Engineering backlog continued to be a challenge for the licensee.
Although the licensee's efforts had not reduced the number of open items as much as desired, there was increased confidence that quality issues had been identified and a dearer understanding of the priorityof the individual issues.
INay 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
LANTI SUE NIATRI DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 03/28/98 Positive IR 98-07 LICENSEE PS 1C Licensee management's efforts to keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable during refueling outage 2R8 appeared to be successful in that total outage exposure was improved from previous outages.
The licensee's deanup of the reactor coolant system following shutdown of Unit 2, and the use of mock-up training for several outage tasks contdbuted to the lower exposure.
02/14/98 Negative IR 98-02 01/09/98 Strength IR 98-01 01/09/98 Strength IR 98-03 01/09/98 Strength IR 98-01 01/09/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-01 01/09/98 Strength IR 98-03 NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC PS 1C PS 1C 3B PS 1C 3B PS 1C PS 1C 3A PS 1C The inspectors identified three exam'ples of failure to properly log out of the radiologically controlled area, which was indicative of inattention to detail on the part of plant personnel.
Errors in logging into the radiologically controlled area had been previously identified.
Radiation protection technicians had good, basic knowledge of health physics practices and procedures.
The licensee had a highly qualified professional staff and a good continuing training program for supervisors, professionals, and radiation protection technicians.
The licensee was moderately successful in promoting professional advancement of radiation protection technicians.
Staffing of the radiation protection organization was appropriate to ensure radiation safety.
The radiation protection department was adequately staffed with knowledgeable and experienced personnel.
Personnel involved in the transfer, packaging, and transport of radioactive materials and wastes were properly trained and qualitied. A proper organization and staff were maintained which effectively implemented the radioactive waste management and transportation programs.
An effective ALARAprogram produced good results.
The licensee's 3-year average person-rem totals continued to decline. Although the 1995 and 1996 3-year averages were above the national PWR averages, it appeared that the 1997 3-year average willbe near or below the national average.
Individuals entered the radiological controlled area without operable alarming dosimeters.
A very good solid radioactive waste management program was implemented.
The generation of diy active wastes had been reduced. Avery good transportation program for radioactive materials and radioactive waste was maintained.
Good facilities were maintained for the storage and management of solid radioactive wastes and transportation activities.
Housekeeping in tlie radioactive waste storage areas was good. Procedures established to implement the solid radioactive waste and transportation programs provided good guidance.
The licensee implemented a strong management oversight program for the solid radioactive waste management and transportation programs.
. Wlay 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT ISSUES NlATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE 01/09/98 Positive IR 98-01 12/12/97 Strength IR 97-22 12/12/97 Strength IR 97-22 12/12/97 Strength IR 97-22 12/12/97 Negative IR 97-22 12/12/97
- Strength IR 97-22 NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC PS 1C PS 1C PS SA PS 1B 3A PS 5B PS 1C Most external exposure controls were implemented properly. Proper neutron instrument calibration and neutron dosimetry programs weie implemented.
Radiation dose from neutrons was not significant.
Overall ~ the emergency preparedness program was strong. With minor exceptions, major program elements were well controlled and implemented.
An in-depth audit was performed by knowledgeable individuals with technical support from ~
other sites. The offsite interface was effectively evaluated, and a positive method was used~
to make the results available to offsite agencies.
Emergency plan implementation by both crews during the simulator walkthroughs was good.
Emergency conditions were quickly recognized and classified.
Offsite agency notifications were timely. Dose calculations and protective action recommendations were correct.
Timely response to emergency preparedness action requests was poor; the average request was nearly 2 years old. Immediate response actions to review and prioritize the list were appropriate. A lower-level action tracking system database was enhanced to allow comment trending and participant feedback The emergency preparedness training program was well implemented and tracked.
Program enhancements, including a job task analysis, lesson plan upgrades, and increased drill frequency demonstrated a high level of management support The emergency preparedness program was well supervised and staffed, and each staff member made a conscientious contribution to program implementation.
12/12/97 VIO SL IV IR 97-22 12/11/97 Strength IR 97-20 12/11/97 Strength IR 97-20 NRC PS 5A 5B 5C NRC PS 1C 3B NRC PS 1B 3B Five of five operating crew members would be required to wear special respirator glasses; however the crew members were not aware ofthe existence and/or location of the glasses.
Effective, comprehensive biennial audits of the radiological environmental monitoring and meteorological monitoring programs were performed.
Timely corrective actions were implemented.
Qualified auditors, who were assisted by experienced and knowledgeable technical specialists, performed the audits. An appropriate assessment was conducted of the licensee's laboratory responsible for performing sample analyses.
The knowledge and performance of the environmental program's management and technical staff were excellent. Trained, experienced, and qualified environmental technicians were effectively conducting the radiological environmental monitoring program.
May 15, 1998 10 DIABLOCANYON
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DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 12/11/97 Strength IR 97-20 12/05/97 Strength IR 97-21 12/05/97 Strength IR 97-21 12/05/97 Strength IR 97-21 12/05/97 Strength IR 97-21 12/05/97 Strength IR 97-21 NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC PS 1C PS 1C 3B PS 1C PS 1C PS 1C PS 1C Overall ~ good radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring programs were effectively implemented.
Environmental sampling locations were properly established and met station procedure requirements.
Environmental sampling equipment was properly calibrated and maintained.
Appropriate changes were made to the environmental sample locations described in station procedures as a result of the annual land use censuses.
Good radiological environmental monitoring program implementing procedures were maintained.
The meteorological instrumentation was properly calibrated and maintained.
The compensatoiy measures program was effectively implemented.
Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.
Avery good security training program had been implemented.
Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented.
Avery good program to protect safeguards information was in place. An excellent training video provided instructions to individuals regarding the overall protection of safeguards information.
Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were in place that would provide delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entry.
A very good records and reports program was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events.
12/05/97 Positive IR 97-21 NRC PS 1C 2A ~
PS 1C 11/22/97 NCV IR 97-19 LICENSEE PS 1B 3A 12/05/97 Strength IR 97-21 NRC Good protected area barriers and detection systems were maintained.
During performance testing of the detection system, all attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected.
A very good secunty backup power supply system was in place.
Monthly tests ofthis syste indicated that it performed extremely well.
Following the reactor trip and safety injection event, updates to state and county officials were not made, and a notification for termination of the NOUE was not timely.
11/22/97 Strength IR 97-19 'RC PS 1B During a reactor trip and safety injection event, the licensee performed well in properly dassifying the notification of unusual event (NOUE) and initiallynotifying the proper personnel and outside agencies upon activation ofthe emergency plan.
10/11/97 Strength IR 97-'16 NRC PS 3A 3B Radiation protection technicians provided high quality support to operations personnel in performance of the venting ofthe emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The radiation protection technicians were knowledgeable of radiological protective measures, proficient in handling the vent bottle, hoses, gloves, rags and waste water, and performed numerous radiation and contamination surveys.
May 15, 1998 DIABLOCANYON
PLANT IS UES MATR X DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SELF TEMPLATE CODE ITEM 10/10/97 Positive IR 97-18 10/10/97 Strength IR 97-18 10/10/97 Positive IR 97-18 10/10/97 Strength IR 97-18 10/10/97 Strength IR 97-18 NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC PS 2B PS 1C 3B PS 2A 2B PS ic PS 5A 5B The engineered-safety feature air cleaning ventilation systems'urveillance testing program was properly implemented.
Training and qualification programs for chemistry/radiation protection technicians and non-licensed radwaste operators were properly implemented.
Chemistry personnel and non-licensed radwaste operators had an excellent understanding of the radioactive liquid and gaseous radioactive waste effluent management program, offsite dose calculations, and regulatory requirements.
Allliquid and gaseous eNuent radiation monitoring instrumentation was operable and properly maintained, tested, and calibrated.
The liquid and gaseous radioactive waste eNuent management programs were effectively implemented.
Implementing procedures for the liquid and gaseous radioactive waste eNuent management programs provided proper guidance.
Poor radiation protection sample handling techniques were used while handling potentially contaminated samples.
Between 1993 and 1995, the licensee was in the fourth quartile (worst regarding the activity contained in the eNuents released) for airborne tritium, liquid tritium, liquid mixed isotopes for pressurized water reactors.
The effluent data showed a significant reduction in the amount of eNuent radioactivity released after the removal of the Unit2 failed fuel rod in the spring of 1996.
5C An effective quality assurance program was maintained.
Management oversight of the radioactive waste eNuent management program was good. The quality assurance audits of the radiological waste eNuent management program activities were technically comprehensive and provided good program evaluation. Action requests related to liquid and gaseous radioactive waste management program activities were dosed in a timely manner.
May 15, -1998 12 DIABLOCANYON
EN L
RE2 Date ape SFA Sources ID Issue Description Codes GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLELABELS Actual date ofan event or signilicant issue for those items that have a clear date ofoccurrence, the date the source ofthe information was issued (such as the LER date), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period.
The categorization of the issue - see the Type Item Code table.
SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINTfor Maintenance; ENG I'r Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.
Identification ofwho discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
Details ofthe issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.
Template Codes - see table.
Licensing MISC TYPE ITEM CODES Enforcement Action Letter with Civil Penalty Enforcement Discretion - No CivilPenalty Overall Strong Licensee Performance Overall Weak Licensee Performance Escalated Enforcement Item - Waiting Final NRC Action Violation Level I, II,lll,orIV Non-Cited Violation Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC Individual Good Inspection Finding Individual Poor Inspection Finding Licensee Event Report to the NRC Unresolved Item from Inspection Report Licensing Issue from NRR Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc.
TEMPLATECODES Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C-Programs and Processes Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities/
Training; C-Work Environment Engineering/Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C-Resolution NOTES:
EEls are apparent vioiationsof NRC requirements that are being considered forescala~
enforcementactionin accordancewith the "GeneralStatementof Policyand Procedure i~
NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its finalenforcementdecisionon the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modilied when the final decisions are made.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licenseewill be provided with an opportunityto either(I) respond
~
to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.
However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
L RE DIABLOCANYON I
ECTI L
IP - Inspection Procedure TI - Temporary Instruction Core Inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
INSPECTION TITLEI PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF INSPECTORS OATES TYPE OF INSPECTION/COMMENTS IP81700 Physical Security Program 6/22-26/98 Core Inspection
4