MNS-16-008, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima

ML16041A173
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	02/04/2016
From:	Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
MNS-16-008
Download: ML16041A173 (64)

Text

Steven D. Capps

~Vice President DUKE McGuire Nuclear Station SENERGY.

Duke Energy MG01VP I112700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 o: 980.875.4805 f: 980.875.4809 Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com 10 CFR 50.54(f)

February 04, 2016 MNS-1 6-008 Attention: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)

McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Subject:

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai~ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340).

2.

NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.

3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13I106A331.

4. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Final Report 3002000704, dated May 2013, Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic.

5. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated December 17, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML15005A085.

frPI

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 04, 2016 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference i to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Reference 2 requesting NRC agreement to delay submittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening, as well as endorsement of the guidance. The delay and industry guidance was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 3).

In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance of the final EPRI Seismic Evaluation Guidance Report 3002000704, dated May 2013, (Reference 4), the ESEP Report for MNS was provided by a letter dated December 17, 2014 (Reference 5). Pursuant to Actions #1 and #2 in Section 8.4, Table 8-1 of Reference 5, the modifications, identified in the ESEP Report have been completed.

In addition, a revised copy of the MNS ESEP Report is provided in the enclosure. The revised report incorporates the walkdown and evaluation information that was not available at the time when the original ESEP report was submitted.

There are no regulatory commitments associated with this letter.

• Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact George Murphy at 980-875-5715.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 04, 2016.

Sincerely, Steven 0. Capps : MNS Revised Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 04, 2016 Page 3 XC:

C. Haney, Region II Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 J.P. Boska, Project Manager (NRR/JLD/JOMB)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 13 F15 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.E. Miller, Project Manager (CNS & MNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 8 G9A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 J. Zeiler NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station Justin Folkwein American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453

ENCLOSURE I MNS REVISED EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT February 02, 2016 Revision 1 Duke Energy McGu ire Nuclear Station REVISION

SUMMARY

REVISION#

DESCRIPTION 0

INITIAL ISSUE 1

REVISED APPENDICES A AND B TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL FLEX COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC EVALUATION RESULTS Page Ilof 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE........................................................................ 4 2.0 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES................... 4 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL................................................... 6 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL.................................................... 6 3.1.1 ESEL Development....................................................................... 7 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves................................................................. 8 3.1.3 Pull Boxes................................................................................. 8 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets.................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators..................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections.............................................. 9 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation.............................................................................. 9 4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS)............................................ 9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee...................................................9 4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)........................................ 11 5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM).................................................... 13 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected............................................................. 13 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)............................. 15 6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH................................................... 15 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used......................................................... 16 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process................................................................... 17 6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination............................................................ 18 6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL.................................. 18 6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach.............................................................. 19 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach................................................................... 19 6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys..............................................................

20 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings........................................................ 21 6.6 H CLPF C alculation Process................................................................. 21 6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays.......................................................... 21 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes).......................... 24 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS, ADDITIONAL ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH FLEX STRATEGY CHANGES AND NEW COMPONENT INSTALLATION.......................................... 24 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns............................... 24 7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations....................................... 24 7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out.................................. 24 8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS............................................................ 25 Page 2 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 8.1 Supporting Information.................................................................... 25 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications.................................................. 26 8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Component Walkdowns/Evaluations..................................................... 26 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments................................................... 27

9.0 REFERENCES

..................................................................................... 28 APPENDICES APPENDIX A MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX C MNS FLEX Flow Paths FIGURE'S Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4]........................................ 10 Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [4]...................................... 11 Figure 4-3. MNS 5SFE (5% Damping) - Graphical Format..............

............................... 12 Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping)...................................... 12 Figure 5-1. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)................................................................. 15 Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE................................................ 17 TABLES Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4]............................................ 11 Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (i to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)........................ 13 Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping).................................................................. 14 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.......................................... 22 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.......................................... 23 Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions............................................... 27 Page 3 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The MNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.

This summary is derived from the MNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3] (as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]), and Duke Energy MNS Calculation M CC-1612.00-00-0012, Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) [18].

Simplified flow diagrams which depict the FLEX strategy flow paths are included in Appendix C.

Page 4 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Steam Generator (SG) heat removal is achieved during Phase 1 and 2 via the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (TDAFWP) with suction from buried Condenser Circulating Water (RC) system cross-over header (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-i). Later stages of Phase 2 and 3 strategy entails SG cooling water make-up via a portable diesel powered pump with suction from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) and discharge aligned to new SG FLEX supply connections. Refer to Appendix C, Figures C-2, C-4, C-5, and C-6 for FLEX connection locations. The TDAFWP flow control valves and Main Steam (SM) Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are also required to provide SG heat-removal capability (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-3). The Phase 2 SG heat removal is achieved via the credited B.5.b connection (primary) or via the new FLEX mechanical connections located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) doghouses (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-6). The FLEX strategy with steam generators unavailable (i.e., refueling outage) relies on reactor coolant system feed and bleed for Phase land 2. The ESEL was populated with the components credited for Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation.

Reactor coolant system borated make-up during normal operation and outage conditions includes the following primary make-up connections!

High pressure primary make-up via the Safety Injection System (NI) mechanical connection near 2/2NI-152B (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-4).

Low pressure primary make-up via the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system mechanical connection upstream of 2/2ND-35 (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-5).

Borated water suction source FW system mechanical connection (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-2).

Reactor coolant system inventory control relies upon FLEX pump make-up as accommodated by reactor coolant system shrink, passive reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and additional letdown capability via reactor vessel head-vents. The reactor coolant pump seal return outboard containment isolation valve is manually isolated to conserve inventory and maintain leak-off flow within the Reactor Building. To ensure SG continued heat removal capability, the cold-leg accumulator (CLA) block isolation valves are electrically closed during the cooldown to prevent Nitrogen injection into the reactor coolant system.

There are no required Phase 1 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity. The primary Phase 2 FLEX strategy for containment integrity entails repowering one train of Hydrogen igniters. Phase 2 and/or 3 entails repowering of select compartment fans inside of containment.

Later in the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event, the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system must be aligned to maintain containment temperature. This action is accomplished by powering a train of ND and Component Cooling (KC) pumps with a portable generator form the Regional Response Center (RRC). For ND and KC system heat removal, a portable diesel powered FLEX pump is interfaced with the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system to provide a heat sink from the Standby Nuclear Service Page 5 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Water Pond (SNSWP). The portable pump is connected via the bonnet of an RN pump discharge check valve. Cross-train KC and RN isolation valves are credited with manual closure, in order to minimize components exposed to the credited FLEX flow path pressure boundary. Similarly, manual isolation of RN heat-exchangers not required for the FLEX strategy is credited where possible (e.g., Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water (KD) heat-exchangers, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air compressor, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) motor coolers, etc.).

Necessary attendant electrical components are outlined in the MNS FLEX OIP submittal [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [20], [21],

and [22], and primarily entail 600 VAC essential motor control centers, vital batteries, equipment installed to support FLEX electrical connections, and monitoring instrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containment integrity. During the latter stages of Phase 3, the 4.16 kV switchgear is powered up to support residual heat removal (RHR) operation.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively.

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the MNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3],

as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]. The OIP and subsequent updates provides the MNS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21],

and [22]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704.

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core Page 6 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5.

Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:

Structures (e.g., containment, Rx Building, Control Building, AB, etc.)

Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

Manual valves and rupture disks.

Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates

[20], [21], and [22] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc.

Page 7 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that

"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the MNS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power-operated valves:

Powered-operated valves that remainl energized during the ELAP events (such as DC-powered valves) were included on the ESEL, with the exception of various air-operated valves which fail to the required position as a result of the ELAP event.

Power-operated valves not required to change state' as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

Page 8 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."

Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports..." are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEX strategy.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee The MNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) was included in the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. Digitized GMRS frequency and acceleration values from the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. The MNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.

Page 9 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at control poit for McGuire (5% of critical damping 100 1.92E-01 6.48E-O1

-3.05E-01 90 1.95E-01 6.60E-01 3.10E-O1 2.01 E-01 6.86E-.01 3.22E-01 70 2.16E-01 7.50E-01 3.51E-01 60 2,56E-01 9.10E-01 4.24E-01 50 3,37E-01 1.22 E+00 5.65E-01 40 4,03E-01 1.44E+00 6.70E-01 35 4,11E-01 1.45E+00 6.76E-01 S 30 4.06E-01 1.41E+C,0 6.60E-01 25 3.93E-01 1.34E+00 6.29E-01 20 3.84 E-01 I.28E+00 6.03E-01 15 3.65E-01 1.18E+00 5.59E-01 12.5 3.49E-01 1.11E+(03 5.28E-01 10 3,26E-01 1.02E+00 4.86E-01 9

3.09E-01 9.50E--01 4.55E-01 8

2.90E-01 8.75E-01 4.21E-01 7

2.68E-01 7.96E-O1 3.84E-01 6

2.45E-01 7.I1E-01 3.44E--01 5

2.17E-01 6.16E-01 3.00E-01 4

1.80E-O1 4.91E-01 2.41E-01 3.5 1.59E-01 4.24E-0I 2.09E-01 3

1.37E.-01 3..58E-01 1.77E-01 2.5 1.14E-01 2.88E-01 1.43E-01 2

1.05E-.01 2.5-8E.-01 1 29E-01 1.5 8.66E-02 2.06E-01 1.04E-01 1 25 7.49E-02 1.75E-O1 8.86E-02 1

6.47E-02 I.47E-01 7.49E-02 0.9 6.25E-02 1.42E-Ol 724E-02 0.8 6.05E-02 1.38E-O1 7.00E-02 0.7 5.77E-02 1.31E-01 6,69E-02 0.6 5,35E-02 1,.22E-01 6.20E-02 0.5 4.70E-02 1.07E-01 5.4.4E-02 0.4 3.76E-02 8.55E-02 4.35E-02 0.35 3.29E-02 7.48E-02 3.81 E-02 0.3 2.82E-02 6.41E-02 3.26E-02 025 2.35E-02 5.35E-02 2.72E-02 0,2 1.88E-02 4.28E-02 2.18E-02 0.15 1.4LE-02 3.21E-02 1.63E-02 0.125 1.17E-02 2,67E-02 1,.36E-02 0.1 9.39E-03 2.14E-02 1.09E-02 Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [41.

Page 10 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS GMRS 0.8 0.

0.6........

o0

.o..........

U*

i---GM RS U

0.0 0.1 1

10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [41.

The MNS Control Point is located at Elevation 716'-6", which is at the base of the mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings.

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)

A description of the MNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included in Section 3.1 of the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE is tabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.

A comparison of the MNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.

Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4].

Frequency (Hz)

Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.33 0.06 2

0.36 6

0.36 35/PGA 0.15 Page 11 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS SSE 5% Damping 0.40 0.35

~0.0 1/0 0

Figure 4-.MN S (-Dmpn)5SrphclFomt MNS GMRS vs SSE 0.8 rt '7 UJ.I 0.6-0.5

• 0.4 U*0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0

./.......

I I-SSE

--GMRS 0.1 1

10 Frequency (Hz) 100 Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).

Page 12 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [21. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectral acceleration values for the 5%-damped 'SSE horizontal ground response spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectral accelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE ground response spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.

The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown in Table 5-1. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the i to 10 Hz range is at 10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 1.74. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.74. Digitized RLGM frequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-2. The MNS RLGM is plotted in Figure 5-1.

Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)

Frequency SSE GMRS Ratio (Hz)

(g)

(g)

GMRS/SSE 1

0.180 0.075 0.416 2

0.360 0.129 0.358 3

0.360 0.177 0.492 4

0.360 0.241 0.669 5

0.360 0.300 0.833 6

0.360 0.344 0.956 7

0.333 0.384 1.151 8

0.312 0.421 1.349 9

0.294 0.455 1.546 10 0.279 0.486 1.740 Page 13 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)

Frequency Acceleration (Hz)

(g) 0.333 0.104 0.5 0.157 1

0.313 2

0.626 3

0.626 4

0.626 5

0.626 6

0.626 7

0.580 8

0.543 9

0.512 10 0.486 11 0.464 12 0.444 13 0.427 14 0.411 15 0.397 17.5 0.368 20 0.345 22.5 0.325 25 0.308 27.5 0.294 30 0.282 35 0.261 100 0.261 Page 14 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS RLGM S0.4.

• 0.3-R M

0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 1

10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 5-1. MNS RLGM (5% Damping).

5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)

ISRS for the ESEP were estimated by scaling the MNS design-basis SSE ISRS by the RLGM scale factor of 1.74.

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) [7].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [81.

Page 15 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Seismic capacity screening was done using information from the MNS Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9] and supporting documentation (M CC 1535.00-00-0004, Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations [191).

MNS used a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to address the IPEEE.

The SPRA is described in the IPEEE submittal.

Prior to the IPEEE, Duke Energy had performed a SPRA for MNS. The SPRA utilized fragilities calculated in 1981-1983 using the separation of variables methodology, which is one of the methods in EPRI TR-103959 [8]. The calculated fragilities were based on the MNS SSE spectral shape. The IPEEE submittal states that these fragilities were updated where needed based on plant walkdowns and used in the IPEEE SPRA. The fragility calculations are documented in Volumes 4 and 5 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004. Table 3-1 of the IPEEE submittal gives the fragilities used in the IPEEE SPRA. Equipment items listed in the IPEEE Equipment List, contained in Attachment 24 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004, that were not included as fragilities in the SPRA had been screened out on the basis of the median capacity being greater than 2.0g.

The equipment fragilities were based on plant design information, including equipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes considered were functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. The original anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMA walkdowns described below. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMA walkdowns.

Duke Energy also performed a SMA in 1993. The SMA is documented in Volumes 1 and 2 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004 [19]. The SMA consisted of screening walkdowns and anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used the screening tables from Chapter 2 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers trained in EPRI NP-6041-SL (the engineers attended the EPRI SMA Add-On course in addition to the Seismic Qualification Users Group Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course), and were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Seismic demand was the IPEEE Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for SMA (mean NUREG/CR-0098 [11] ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA). A relay review, beyond searching for low-ruggedness relays, was not included in the SMA.

Figure 6-1 shows the mean NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum used as the RLE for the SMA, compared to the RLGM response spectrum. It is seen that the RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 2.0 Hz. The RLE is slightly less than the RLGM at frequencies below about 2.0 Hz. This may be disregarded as there are no MNS SSCs in this frequency range.

Page 16 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS RLGM vs IPEEE RLE 0.1 RLGM IPEEE RLE 0.1 1

10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.

6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The SMA was based on the RLE, which was anchored to 0.3g PGA. The RLE is equal to the RLGM at frequencies from about 2.0 Hz to about 6.0 Hz, and greater than the RLGM at frequencies above about 6.0 Hz. Therefore, any components whose SMA-based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from HCLPF calculations. The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration. The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSE floor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the AB for which new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE [111. Therefore ESEL components which were evaluated in the IPEEF SMA, met the screening caveats, and had anchorage capacity exceeding the RLE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceeds the RLGM.

Most of the non-valve components in the ESEL were screened out based on the SMA results. A few components that did not have CDFM anchorage calculations were screened out on the basis of the HCLPF calculated from the SPRA fragility.

In the SMA, valves were documented as a group rather than as individual components with individual documentation. The screening for valves proceeded differently.

Page 17 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i The Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESEL contain approximately 220 valves in total, both power-operated (MOV and AOV) as well as relief valves. Per Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g peak spectral acceleration without any review other~than looking for valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping, and anchorage is not a failure mode. Therefore, valves on the ESEL which are listed in the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List may be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination. Power-operated valves were addressed both in the IPEEE fragility calculations and in the SMA. In the fragility calculations, all of the valves on the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List were screened out on the basis of median capacity exceeding 2.0g. In the SMA, the valves were found to meet EPRI NP-6041-SL, Figures F-25 and F-26 (thus meeting the 1.2g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria) or to exceed the RLE floor response spectra on the basis of vendor seismic qualification reports. The IPEEE SMA covered approximately 360 valves in Unit 1. The walkdowns focused on MOVs on small diameter piping and valves at high elevations in the plant. Comparison with Unit 2 showed that the conclusions of the Unit 1 review applied to the corresponding Unit 2 valves. Relief valves were not explicitly included in the IPEEE review except for PORVs, both steam (SV) and reactor coolant (NC), which met the criteria. Spring-operated relief valves are considered to meet the EPRI NP-6041-SL 0.8g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria without explicit review. On the basis of the above, most of the ESEL valves were screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1 ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were not screened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministic EPRI NP-6041-SL CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/or anchorage evaluations.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, and seismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determined using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF anchorage capacities were determined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF seismic interaction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL The components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL, Table 2 4. For components not located on the basemat of the Auxiliary or Reactor Buildings, the ISRS were used for the screening; therefore, the screening levels of EPRI NP-6041-SL were increased by a factor of 1.5 per EPRI 1019200, Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update [17]. Thus, the accelerations for the screening levels were 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.

Page 18 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i The SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.74 throughout the frequency range and were then clipped (per EPRI 1019200), using the methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q, and the North-South and East-West clipped peaks were averaged.

6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for the SMA process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open.cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component for each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner.

For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the Page 19 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI [Seismic Interaction1]

problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection."

6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys Many of the components were walked down previously during IPEEE evaluations and have documented Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) recording the results. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed by qualified Seismic Review Teams. A walk-by of these components was performed and documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that the component and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown and to verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may have developed since the original walkdown.

Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previously walked down during the IPEEE and for some ESEL items which did not have a specific SEWS in the IPEEE documentation.

Masonry walls in the AB were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet the RLE demand; therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity of masonry walls to ESEL components were noted on the SEWS forms. Masonry walls in proximity to ESEL equipment were verified to have been included in the IPEEE evaluation and determined to not be a credible failure mode for the ESEP.

1 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."

Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]."

Page 20 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings All of the ESEL components were determined to have an existing capacity greater than the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. These components require modification in order to have a capacity greater than the RLGM.

6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the following steps:

• Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included in previous seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions;

• Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL as described in Section 6.2; and

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in MCM-1612.00-0059.001 [10]. HCLPF results and key failure modes for ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations are included in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays There are no relays on the ESEL that provide seal-in/lock-out capability for Phase 1 equipment; therefore, no functional evaluation of relays was required.

Page 21 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.

Problem Description Unit ESEL ID Equipment #

Bldg Modification/Recommendation 1

23 EHM-HR-TB27 RB Flex Conduit running between Required Modification: Add metal ties to EHM-HR-TB29 igniter boxes not supported for band cable to overhead cable tray.

approximately 15 ft.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 23 EHM-HR-TB29 RB Flex conduit from TB29 not tied Required Modification: Add metal ties to into cable tray.

band cable to horizontal and vertical potions of this wall-mounted tray near 900 bends.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 24 EHM-TB-0589.

AB Secure load path:

Required modification:

Cabinet mounting tabs do not span Install Unistrut washers under mounting Unistrut.

tabs.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

i 48 1SV-VA-00019AB AB Interaction issue:

Required modification:

A test or vent off port at top of Modify to achieve adequate clearance.

subject valve has been rubbing on side of support structure.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 AB Secure load path: Pressure Required modification:

indicator PI-937 on MC11 is missing Install hold down clip on instrument.

hold down clip.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 67 EQ.B-PN-DGLSA AB Potential interaction:

Required modification:

Unistrut between DGLSA and ATC7 Adjacent cabinets cross-braced together.

results in negligible clearance.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

AR = Auxiliary Building DH =DogHouse RB = Reactor Building Page 22 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.

Unit ESEL ID EDB ID Bldg Problem Description Modification/Recommendation 2

18 NI-VA-OO65B RB Potential interaction: Conduit and Required modification:

connecter to motor are in contact with Modify to achieve adequate adjacent structural support, clearance.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

2 51 SV-CV-OOO1AB DH Soft target:

Required Modification:

Position indicator cable is tight and Trim grating away from cable.

rubbing against floor grating.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

2 78 NC-RD-5870 RB Cable support:

Required modification:

Loop of signal cable supported by Move coil back and support from resistance temperature detector (RTD).

structural member or cable tray to Subject RTD tubing is bent due to weight remove load on RTD.

_______of cable.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

AB = Auxiliary Building DH = DogHouse RB =Reactor Building Page 23 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Appendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables:

• For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."

• For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] screening tables, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per EPRI N P-6041."

For items where interaction with masonry walls controls, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction - Block Wall s."

For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional."

For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."

.7.0 Inaccessible Items, Additional Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New Component Installation 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns All ESEL items were accessible for walkdowns except the Units 1 and 2 diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. These tanks are not accessible for visual inspection since they are buried below grade. Walk-bys of the yard areas above the tanks were performed to check for visible outliers or potential seismic interaction hazards.

7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations Seismic capability walkdowns and screening evaluations remain outstanding for components which were added to the ESEL as a result of subsequent changes to the FLEX mitigation strategy, and associated with new FLEX component installations. These outstanding walkdowns and evaluations are denoted as "to be done" (TBD) in Appendices A and B.

7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out The remaining ESEL component walkdowns and screening evaluations were completed within the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

The outstanding modifications listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 will be completed and closed-out in accordance with the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

Page 24 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information MNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall MNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismic hazards show that there [...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants..." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]

concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the G1-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in G1-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for MNS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [14] also apply to MNS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

Page 25 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Safety factors applied in design calculations; Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs; Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations; Broadening criteria forlISRS; Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications; Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis; Bounding requirements in codes and standards; Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel);

Bounding testing requirements; and Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the 5SE.

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications Tables 6-1 and 6-2 identify the remaining modifications to be made in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2] to enhance the seismic capacity of the plant.

8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Component Walkdowns/Evaluations Plant modifications will be completed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13], which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.

Completion of the remaining ESEL component walkdowns and evaluations will be completed within the same timeframe outlined for modification completion.

Page 26 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments The actions Listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.

Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions.

Action #

Action Description Completion Date 1

Complete remaining modifications, Follow-up actions will be completed as ESEL walkdowns/evaluations for follows:

Unit 1 components listed in a

December 31, 2016 (if action Table 6-1.

completion does not require a refueling outage) 2 Complete remaining modifications, The end of the second planned ESELwaldown/evluatonsforrefueling outage after December 31, Unit2 coponnts iste in2014 (if action completion requires Table 6-2.

outage) 3 Submit a letter to NRC confirming Within 60 days following completion of ESEP implementation of modifications activities for items 1 and 2.

associated with items 1 and 2.

Actions 1 and 2 have been completed.

Page 27 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i 9.0 References

1)

Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.

2)

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.

3)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With Regard To Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

4)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

dated March 20, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

5)

Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

6)

USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-10 CFR 50.54(f),"

June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

7)

A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

8)

Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

9)

Letter from T. C. McMeekin to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370; Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal," dated June 1, 1994, Duke Power, Huntersville, NC.

Page 28 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1

10)

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at McGuire Nuclear Station, Appendix D, "HCLPF Calculations," dated October 2014, Rev. 1, ARES Corporation Report No. 030319.13.02.11-001, Duke Energy Document No. MCM-1612.00-0059.001.

11)

Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-O098.

12)

Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.

13)

Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.

14)

Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.

15)

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 2013, EPRI 1025287.

16)

Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations,"' May 7, 2013.

17)

Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.

18)

Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL), Revision 2, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, Calculation MCC-1612.00 0012.

19)

Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations, 1994, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, 1994, Calculation No. MCC-1535.00-00-0004.

20)

Letter from Steven Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

Page 29 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i

21)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

22)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

Page 30 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Appendix A MVNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 31 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPP Results ESEL ID 1.

2 3

4 5

7 8

10 11 EQUIPMENT EDB Description SFW-VA-0532B Refueling Water Rocirn Pump Suction Isolation SPW-VA-0055A Refueling Water Recirn Pump Suction Isolation 1FW-VA-t051A Refueling Water Recirn Pump Suction Isolation aND-VA-tO05t ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs 1ND-VA-O06l ND Relief-Hetlegs 1ND-VA-O064 ND Relief - 'B' Coldiegs SNI-VA-0lSB NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg SNI-VA-Si51 NI Relief-B' Train Hotleg SNI-VA-OlBS NI Relief-Coldieg 0RN-VA-5507A SNSWP Supply to Units 1 &, 2 SNV-VA-OS95B NC Pumps SealIWater Return Coot AUN AUX AUX AUX AUN AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 750 750 733 733 733 733 750 733 716 733 Rm 611 KK/S3 Rm 815 J /Si Rm 730 GG/52 EE/52 tRa 730 HH/S2 Rm 602 GG1/52 Rmn 617 HH/52 Rm 730 JJl51 tRa 601 AA/63 Rm 602 EE/52 AUX 760 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By jul5s1 Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Cloned Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open/Closed Closed OPERATING STATE Walkdown or Bldg EL Locution Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS?

Screening Notes HCLPF**

Key Failure Mode**

Walk-By Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By Walk-By p

7 7 2 Included in ]PE6E, p 772 p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772 p 772 Included in IPEER, p 772 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL., Rev. 1.,

Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, AppendiuC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, AppendiuC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 77B p

7 7 5

Included in IPEEE, p 775

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLG3M

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>R1GM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-B541 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPERE 12 1CV-22CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Ro Cavity' Wisdom Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, Rev. 1, vRM ScendprERN-64 Isolation Valve R

77BCSieCoe OpnadCsd Wlkwn Appendix C Table 2-4 275° 176 13 1CV-23CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Ru Cavity' Wisdom Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, vLMSree e PR Isolation Valve R

77B-SieCoe OpnadCsd Wakwn Appendix C Table 2-4 273' 176 14 1NC-A-OO34ANC System Pressurizer PDRV RX 88 Pressurizer Cavity lsd Oe n

lsd Wl-y p73 Icue nIEE 7

RG cendprER P64 Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls RN BBy0lsd OpnadClsd WlkB 773nlde5nREEp 7

15 1NI-VA-O43SA 1NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply RN 756 SA CLA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPREEE, p 775

>RLI3M Screened per IPEEE from SA CLA (MDV) 46° 466 Reference it, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Structural 16 1FW-TK-OS01 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard

>760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461).

Meets RLGM Screened per IPEEE 17 1NI-VA-O054A lA CLA Block Valve (MDV)

RN 733 Pipe Chase Oe

-4 Coe akB 7

nlddi PEp74>LM Sree e

PE 421'V-O5B1 L

lckVle{O)

X 73 Pp 47Rs Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE lB 1NI-VA-OO765 lB CIA Block Valve (MDV)

RN 733 PieCae Oe

-4 Coe akBy p74 Icue noEE 7

RLGM Screened per [PEEE 224'V-OBB1 L

lckVle(O)

X 73 Pp 486s Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE 21 iEHM-TP-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUN 750 CC/46 Off Functional Walk-By p 74 Neeqien-upadIEESWSvlato.

>LMcrneprIPE 22 SEHM-PN-HMPPA H2 Igniter Power Panel AUN 750 CC/46 Standby Punctinnal Walkdown

'eeec R0 ounded by evaluation of 1EHM-TB-SBB.

>RL0M Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C SEHM-HR-TBO3A'TanHgotrReeec10Noinepreedaabs.TsetoSUT 25 thru TB71 (Odd A'rio2Intr RLGM Undetermined Nmesol)(35 Igniters per Train)

RN Various Various Do-energized Punctional Walkdown ReeecAppendix 0C TRO.N~

neprec aabs.Tse oSUT 2B 1HMSX-MBA oltgeRe Byas Sitc AX 50 BD Deenegied Funtina WakdwnReference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 23 a1EHMSN-HBPA oltae Re Bypss SitchAUN 30 TD Deenerized PuncionappaednwiAppedix Tabe22-Page 3,2 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MINS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID BOB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS*

Screening Notes H-CLPF**

Key Failure Mode***

Rfrne Screens out based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, ten. 1, 23 b 1EIHM-VR-HRMA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 TED Dc-energized Functional Walkdown Apeni Tablevati CLFbsdonUit2vlenn.ve02 untoa Appendix C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 iCA-HX-BOS0 TDCAP tearing Dii Cooler AUX 716 BB/Si Idle Fonctional Walk-By p 542

>RLGM Screened per ]PEEE 27 1A-PU503 TOCAP (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine 27 1AP-03 Driven Pump)

AUX 716 BB/Si Idle Functional Walk-By p 242

>tL.GM Screened per FREEE 27 a iSA-TB-OSS3 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By tale-of-the-boo with 1CA-PU-0OO3, which has an

>BLGM Screened per PEEt IPEEE SEWS 27 b 1SA-VA-t554 TDCAP Steam Control Valve AUX 716 BR/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rueo-h-o ib1AP-5S>hc oo RLGM Screened per IPEEE PEEt SEWS 27 c iSA-SGV-lOSS TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-PU-5OO3, which bosoan

>RLGM Screened per FREEE IPEtE SEWS 27 d iSA-GS-tOO3 Gear Reducer AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Punctional Walk-By Rueo-h-o>ihiA-USSwihhsa RLGM Screened per IFPEEE IPEER SEWS 28 1CA-PN-AFTP TDCAF Control Panel AUX 716 BB/52 n/a Available Walk-By p 1B7

>ELGM Screened per IPEEB TOCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 77P/OClndDe WakB p77 IcudinPEp77tLMSrndprIEE 29 lSA-VA-SS4BABC (ADV)

(DH2) 76FFSClsdOe Waky p77 InlddiIPEp77>LMcrndpr EE 29 a iSA-SV-5480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve InerDoh2us to F5 nrie e-nrie akon Rforence 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 InerDoHous 77P/SEegzd D-nrid Wakon Appendix C Table 2-4 29 b 1SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Inner Dohue 77F/Eegzd D-nrie akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, 9ev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B541 Rm BOG 55 iSA-VA-tOSS TDCAP Trip-Throtile Valve AUS 716 Dpen Dpen Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEER, p 771

>RLGM Screened per IPEBE AA/B2 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 54 iVl-VA-O032 1AV9setawHrSpl rm G AX 73R 719 ClsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1,

>R1GM Interaction - Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig)

AUFF3p/53 ClsdCoe akon Appendix C Table 2-4 55 iVl-VA-t534 in le Rseltief (115 puigy)roV AUX 733 GG/54 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Itrcin-BokWl Inle Relef (15 pig)Appendix C

Table 2-4 Re1I-A012 1

le (115 psig)Isr ntArTn AUX 733 Pp/OS1 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 1,>RM SrenderEINP64 Relif (15 psg)

F/B3AppendixC Table 2-4 37 1 V-14 A VI Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUrn~i Clse1loe9Wk Reference 13, Screens out based on EPtI NP-6S4i-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprERN-Bi Relief (115 psig)

FP/S3 AppendixC Table 2-4 31ii-AQiS i

VI Auo Bldg Instrument Air Tank Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-BS4i-SL, Rev. 1,

>RM ScendprPlN-B4 Relief (115 psig)

AU 3

GS lndCoe akon AppendiuC Table 2-4 39 llV-0S EBVl Aun Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 GG/S5 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL. Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-tt41 Relief (115 psig)

AppendiuC Table 2-4 lSM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Duter Doghouse D/4CoeCd Wkd Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 5,

>LG ScendprERN-04 40 iiV-59 (120 puig)

(DHi) 70Appendix C

Table 2-4 Page 33 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and H-CLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg iSM-7AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 41 1iV-55 (120 psig)

(DHi)

SSM-3ABC VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 42 11V-05 (120 psig)

(DH2) 15W-SAG Vi Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 43 iiV-05 (120 psig)

(DH2)

TDCA Flow control to 1A SI and 44 1CA-VA-1564AB AUX Associated Pneumatic Controls 44 a SCA-ML-5540 Manual Loader AUX 44 b iCA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 44 c 1CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX 44 d iCA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 44 a 1CA-SV-5540 Solenoid Value AUX 44 f iCA-SV-5641 Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flow Control to lB SG and 43 1CA-V-SIS2ARAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU 45 a 1CA-ML-5525 Manual Loader AUX 45k S CA-SS-1521 Selector Switch AUX 450 1CA-MT-5S20 Misc Transmitter AUX 45 d iCA-VP-0520 Valve Fositioner AUX 45 a iCA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUXt 45Sf 1CA-SV-0B21 Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flaw Control to 1C SG and 46 iCA-V-OS4BABAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU 460 i CA-ML-5460 Manual Loader AUX 46Gb iCA-SS-5480 Selector Switch AUX 45 c SCA-MT-54R5 Misc Transmitter AUX 46 d 1CA-VP-54B0 Valve Positioner AUX 45 e iCA-SV-t480 Solenoid Value AUX 46Sf 1CA-SV-g4Ri Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flaw Control tol ID S and 47 iCA-V-OSOSARAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWSa Screening Notes HICLPF**

Key Failure Mode*

0 790

~~~~~~~~Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI FJF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RM ScendprPRN-64 Appendix C Table 2-4 7O DO/S2 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based an EFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-5541 750Appendis C

Table 2-4 716 5w60Open OeThotd/

Walk-By p 771 Included in FREtE, p 771

>RLGM Screened per IPEtt BR/S0 Closed 767 716 716 716 716 716 716 757 716 716 716 716 716 716 767 716 716 716 Control Rm 623 Rm 600 Rw 600 Rm 600 BR/SI Sm 600 RB/SI Rm 600 BR/So Rm 600 RB/SI Control Rm 625 Rm BOO RB/Si Sm 600 BR/Si Rm 601 BR/Si Sm 601 RB/Si Sm 650 BR/Bi Rm BOO BR/Si Control Sm 626 Rrn 601 RB/Si Rm 600 RB/Si Sm 601 BR/Si Functional Functional Walk-Ry Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-B y Energized REnergizad Walk-By Energized Energized Walk-By Opn Open/Throttled/

WakB Functoa Fuctinloe Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-Ry Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By tnergized Energized Walk-By tnergized Energiced Walk-Ry Opn Open/Throttled/

WakB Funtina FuCtional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O Rule-of-the-bus with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-64AR Bale-of-the-boy with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-She-boo with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-64AB p

7 71 Included in IFEEE, F 771 Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O Role-of-the-boo with 1CA-S2.AR Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-S2AB Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-S2AB Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-S2AR Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2AB p 771 Included in IPEEO, p 7 7 1 Rule-of-the-boo with iMC1O Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-46AR Rule-of-the-bus with 2CA-48AB Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-4RAB Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-4SAB Rule-of-She-hon with 2CA-4OAB p 771 Included in PEtE, p 771

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened perlPtEt Screened perlP~EE Screened perliPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlFEEt Screened periFREt Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPERE Screened perlPEER Screened per PEER Screened perlFEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPFEEE Screened perlP~EE Screened perlFEEt Screened perlFEEt Screened perIPBEE Screened per PEER 7156m 0

Energized Energized Walk-By RB/Si 716 Sm60 Energized Energized Walk-By 716 SmBDOpen pe/hotd/

Walk-By 4A/43 Closed

>RLGM

>RLIM Page 34 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL. and H-CLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdowe or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPF*

Key Failure Modenee 47 a 1CA-ML-0560 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Em 925 Functional Fanctional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O

>RLGSM Screened per IPEER 47 1A-S-36 SeecorwichAU 71 E 60 untinal Fuctonl al-ByRue-f-hebo wih CAOBB RLM Srene pr00R AA/43 Em 600 47c 1CA-MT-0965 Misc Transmitter AUX 716

/Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box wish iCA-36AB

>ELGM Screened per ]PEEt Em 600 47 d 1CA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 M/3Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with SCA-S6AB

>RLGM Screened per PEtEE 47 f OCA-SV-03E1 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Em 600 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10,

>RLGSM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C lA SG Main Steaw P0EV and Outer Doghouse Open/Throttled/

48 DSV-VA-O019AB Aso5tdPe5tc otos (H) 89 GG0/44 Closed Clsd Walk-By p 294

>RLGSM Screened per IPEER 1800G Main Steam P0EV and Inner Doghouse FF5Oloe pen/Throttled/

WakB p29 49 1SV-VA-0013AB 80oFS lsd akB 9

RLGM Screened per IPEER Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2)

Closed SC SG Main Steam P0EV and Inner Doghouse Open/Thrcttled/

WakB p29 S0 SV-VA-OS7ABC 609 FF/52 Closed WakBoB24>LOM Screened per [PEER Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2)

Closed 1

S-A0 1

0B 1

SC Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse (09 G/44 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 294

>LMSree e

PE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DHi)

Closed 52 SBPL-FN-EVDA Vital Battery 120 VDC Distribution OLS cendprFE 2 1E-P-DA Panel AUX 703 DD/S4 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212>RGSrendelPE 52 a 1EP-PN-VDD Vital Battery 120 VDC Distribution Panel AUX 733 BB/07 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212

>LMSree e PE 53Rm 707 Reference 1_0

-LM 0 0 Itrcin-BokWl 53 B0PL-BA-RVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C54Functional Functional Walkdown Appendixteatin Coc Wl 5 0E-B-VS Vital Battery Charger and Charger Em 73 r 701 Eucinl Fntinl Wldw eference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,0.5Fntoa Connection Boo ECES B8/04 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 1EPE-MX-RMXA2 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 700 99/46 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE SB SEPE-MX-EMXA4 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/47 Functional Functional Walk-By p 92

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 57 OBPE-MX-EMXH 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 FF/SB Functional functional Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per FREEE Em 705 SB DBPE-MX-EMXB4 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 733 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per IFEEE BB/46 1ETp-CA-00O8 (S9 CB)

Pzr P0EV Relay/Indication AUX 750 CC/SO Standby Functional Walk-By p 216

>RLGM Screened per IPEER Main Control Board Cabinet for 60 1BOA-PN-MC9 Head-Vent Operation, HotleE AUX 767 Control Em 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 8B

>RLGM Screened per IPEREE Temperature Indication

61.

1EOA-FN-MC7 HS Igniter Control Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 929 Standby Functional Walk-By pB 86E>LGM Screened per FREEE 6 1E

-N-C0Main Control Board Cabinet for CA/

AUX 767 Control Em 923 Standby Functixnal Walk-By pB8BRG ceee e PE NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 63 SEOA-PN-MCSS System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 920 Standby Functional Walk-By FE 86 RLGM Screened per IPEER Indication Page 35 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit S ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Waikdown or ESEL Io teD Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS 0

Screening Notes H-CLPF 0

Key Failare Mode 0 00 Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 64 StOA-PN-MC2 System (PORy Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Stondby Fanctional Walk-By p 86

.>RLI3M Screened per IPEEL Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet for ICCM a 1EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 7B7 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p SB

>RLGM Screened per [PEEL ICCM Remote Display ICCM b SEIA-CA-9211 Train A Retonte Display Processor AUX 7B7 Control Sm 925 Standby Punctional Walkdnwn Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6541 behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4 ICMc II-A92 ri eoeDslyPoesr AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Waibdawn Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per SPR1 NP-6041 behind 2MC2 Appendio C Table 2-4 ICCM d 1EIA-P-9250O Train A Remote Display ICCM a 1EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display ICCM f 1LIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-S6 Cabinet ICCM g 1EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-S6 Cabinet 65 IlE-CA9010 SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Blank Valves 65 1

Closure Permissive) 66 SIPE-CA-9025 SSPS Cabinet 'B' (CLA Block Valves Closure Permissive) 67 1IEIB-PN-DGLSA Various Punctions (iLe. H2 Igniters) 120 VAC Inst and Control 65 IEPG-PN-R*KVA Pnior 69 1EPG-BI-EVlA Vital Inserter 70 1F-LT6550 Steam Generator NR Level Indication Loop 1 Steam Generator NR Level 71 1F-LT5540 Indication Loop 2 Steam Generator NR Level 72 SP-LT5570 Indication Loop S Steam Generator Nt Level 73 1P-LT6050 Indication Loop 4 74 SSM-PT-50B0 Steam Generator 61 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 740a 1CA-PN-AFPA SA CA Pump Control Panel 75 1SM-PT-5i10 Steam Generator #2 Wide Range Pressore Indication Loop 76 SSM-PT-5140 Steam Generator 63 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 760a 1CA-PN-AFPB 19 CA Pomp Control Panel 77 1SM-PT-5170 Steam Generator 64 Wide Range pmessurm Indication Loop 78 1C-RDSSSS Steam Generator 61 NC WR T-Hot Indication Loop 79a iC-CASolo Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Cabinet Train A 79 1C-RD5570 Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-Hot Indication Loop AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX RX SX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX SX Ann RX 767 767 750 750 767 767 750 733 733 739 742 741 744 7S0 716 733 735 716 750 740 767 740 Control Sm 925 Control Sm 925 CC/S s cc/S S Control Sm 925 cc/54 Control Sm 925 cc/54 Sm 503 BB/51 Sm 701 DD/54 Sm 701 CC/SO Anosm 1A Sm or° 4SR Accum SB Rrm 146° 49R Accum SC Sm 2S4° SSS Accum iD Sm 32B° SBR DD/44 Sm 560 BB/51 Rm 702 DD/53 Rm 702 DD/53 Sm 655 CC/Si Rmn 802 00/45 24° 355 86/49 164° 30R Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Nominal 120 VAC Output Nominal 120 VAC Output Indication Indication Indication Indication Indication Standby Indication Indication Standby Indication lndicat ion Standby Indication Functional Functional Fu notion a Functional Functional Punctional Funcoti onal Potnctis ona Fsnctional Indication Indication Indication Indication Indication Functional Indication Indication Functional Indication Indication Pan ctin ona Indication Walk-By Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walk-B y Walk-By Walkdonm Walk-Sy Walk-By Walkdown Walkdomn Walkdown Walkdwnn Waikdown Walk-By Walkdown Waikdown Walk-By Waibdown Walkdown Walkdwnn Walkdown Role-of-nba-boo with 1MCS, which ban an IPEEE SEWS Sole-of-the-boo with 1MC1, which has an IPEEE SEWS Reference SO, Screens oct based on EPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 511 p 11 Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6045-SL, Rev. 1, Appendis C Table 2-4 p 203 p 65 Reference 10, Screens ant based on EPSI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-5541-SL, Rev. 5, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference SO, Screens out based on EPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, AppendioC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens act based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendin C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6045-SL, Sen. 1, AppendinxC Table 2-4 p 150 Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-B541-SL, Rev. 5, Appendlo C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5, AppendisxC Table 2-4 p 150 Reference SO, Screens oct based on SPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI-NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendin C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 5, Appendin C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Screened Screened 0.29 0.29

>RLGM

>RLGM 0.29 vRLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM vRLGM 0.37

>RLGM Paunction al Functional Screened per IPEER Screened per IPSEEE Funot innnl Screened per IPSEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEER Screened per IPSEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per [PEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Functional Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Page 36 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Waikdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL.

Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPP**

Rep Failere Mode 0 0 Steam Generatorf#3 NC WR T-HotReeee10Srenou aeonERNP64-LRv.,

B0 1NC-RD-9590 RX 740 203° 30R indication Indication Walkdown Reeec>0 cen u

ae nER P64-L e.1 RLGM Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator #4 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 91 1NC-RD-5920 55 740 306° 30R Indication Indication Waibdown RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4

1. 2 OSP-50 Containment NR Pressure AU 5

DS niain Idcto akonReference 10, Screens out based on SFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprERN-64 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 NC3WRNCessT-zer2PrsAure r73302Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1.,

nRG SceedprPRN-64 NC1CPT52 WRPrssrierPesur3 R

72Indication indication Walkdown AppendixeendCpeTable P-204 indication Loop CC/46 Apni al Process Control Cabinet 1 Control Rm 925 Iniaon ndctn WlkB pB>RM B4 SEIA-CA-900AX 76Sniaio niaiolakBOp1 RG Screened per ]PEtE (7300 Cabinet)

AUA/S45

~~

~ ~~

S~A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil>RM ScendprPE 35 1DT-06Storage Tank yard

<760 N/A Intact/Availuble Intact/Available Walk-By pOSE>LM cend e

PE lB Diesel Generator Foel Oii ad

<6

/

natAalbe itc/vial akB 5

66 1FD-TK-0057 yr

<70NA nttAaiaeInatAaabe Wk-y p56>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Storage Tank 600 VAC Essential for H12 Skimmer Sm 803 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, 87 1EPE-MX-EMXA3 Pan lA Soction Isolation Valve AUX 750 Clsd Coe akon>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 1VXOA (04A)

BB/43 lsd Cosd Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4 650 VAC Essential for 112 Skimmer 86 1EPE-MX-EMXB5 Fan lB Suction Isolation Valve AUX Sm3733Closed Closed WalkdownRfrneiSresotbsdon>ER P64-SRv uLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6t41 1VX2B (01C)

BB/47 Appendix C Table 2-4 89 1EE-MXEMXC600 VAC Essential Vt/VX (04C, 06D

&SOSD) 90 1EE-MXEMXD600 VAC Essential for Vt/VS (GEE &

90 1B6-MXEMXD SOD)

H2 Skimmer Fan SA Section 91 1VX-VA-0001A Isolation Valve 92 1VX-AH-O003 Hydrogen Skimmer Pan No lA H2 Skimmer Pan 16 Suction 93 SVX-VA-OOO2B Isolation Valve 64 1VX-AH-5054 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No lB 1VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan SA 95 (1RAF-D-2)

Dumper 66 1VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Pan SA 97 1VE-XP-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan lA 66 1VE-XF-tO05 Annulus Ventilation Fan 18 99 1K-PU-003 61 Closed Cooling Water System Pump 100 1C-PU-O04 82 Closed Cooling Water System Pomp 101 1KC-TK-0059 Component Cooling Water System Surge Tank 102 1KC-VA-0OSOA KCAuoiliary Bldg Suppiy Non-Essential Isolation 103 KC-A-O30A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-103 1C-VA-230A Essential Isolation 104 1KC-VA-OoO1A KCAutiliary Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation 105 1C-VA-OO3A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation AUX AUX 5X RX tX RX 55 RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 700 733 831 616 631 610 773 773 767 767 733 733 767 710 750 733 733 Sm 603 Sm 705 66/32 265° 43R 272° 47R 279' 49R 268' 47R 270° 50R 273° 50R ilJ/Si NHH/52 HH/57 HH/57 J1J/97 li/S5 li/so HH/OS HH/SS Closed Closed Closed Off Closed Off Closed Off Off Off On On Intact/

In-Service Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Dpes On Open On Open On On On On On Iota ct/

In-Service Closed Closed Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 Walk-By p 32 Wakon Reference 10, Wakon Appendix C Wakon Reference 10, Wakon AppendixoC Wakon Reference 10, Appendix C Walkdown Reference 10, Appendix C Rule of tbe boo witb 1VX-AH-O001 which bus IPl Walk-By SEWS Walk-By p

4 3 4 Reference 10, Screens out based on SPR1 NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1, Wakon Appendix C Table 2-4 Walkdomn Reference 10, Screens out based en EPRI NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Walk-By p 255 Walk-By p 255 Walk-By p3526 Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEtE, p 7 7

S Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 Walk-By p

7 7 3

Included in ]PEER, p 773 Walk-By p 308

>RLOM

>RLGM 0.60 0.39 0.44

>RLGM

>SLGM 0.33 0.45 Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Functional Anchorage P usnctlonai Ancborage Screened perIPSEEE Screened periPEEt Anchorage Anehorag#e Screened perlIPEEE Screened perlPEtEE Screened perlPtEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPREEE Screened periPEEE

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM Page 37 of 60 Page 37 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description lOB 1KC-HX-O0055 Train A Component Cooling Water HXt 107 1NC-VA-O052B NC System Pressurizer PORV l0t 1NC-VA-OOB6B NC System Pressurizer PORV 109 1NC-VA-SSS1 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 110 iNC-VA-tOSD Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 111 iNC-VA-tOSS Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 112 1ND-PU-0551 Train A ND Pump 113 lND-PU-5O02 Train B ND Pump 114 1ND-HX-SOS0 Train A ND HO 115 1ND-HX-OO04 Train B ND HO 118 iNO-HX-SOO5 Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HO 117 1ND-VA-OBOSAC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation 118 iND-VA-OSOiB RHR Pump Hotieg Suction Isolation 119 NI-V17SA Train A RHR Isolation to the Coildegs Train B RHR Isolation to the 120 1NI-VA-Ol7tB Coldiegs 121 iNI-VA-OliSA Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegn 122 1NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs 123 1NI-VA-Ol5OB Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 124 1NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hatlegs 125 1NI-VA-O162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 128 1NI-PU-O059 Train ANI Pump 127 1NI-PU-5S1B Train B NI Pump 128 iNS-PU-BO0l Train A NO Pamp 129 1NS-PU-O002 Train B NO Pump 150 iNS-HX-SOO3 Train A NO Heat Bxchanger 131 1NS-HX-0004 Train B NO Heat Exchanger 132 OSM-VA-007AB Train A MSIV OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPF**

Key Failure Mode 0 0 0 AUO 750 BRX RX RX AUO AUX AUX AUX AUO tX tX AUO AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUO 815 801 BOB 80B 801 B95 695 7500 750 695 745 745 733 733 716 742 716 750 733 716 716 695 690 750 750 792 JiJ/SB Pressurizer Cavity 110' 329 Pressurizer Cavity l0t' 329 Pressurizer Cavity 105' 359 Pressurizer Cavity 131' SOB Pressurizer Cavity 101' SOB BRa SOS FF/54 BRa 501 GG/54 BRa 733 LL/S2 Rm 732 LL/B2 Bra 000 FF/S4 182' SOB 180' 229 BRa 602 tS1/52 Bra 730 HH/52 BRa 603 JJ/52 FF/02 BRa 603 HH/02 BRa 817 HH/S2 BRa 730 Jl/Si BRa 628 HH/54 BRa 828 GGt/S3 BRa 502 GG/SO BRa 553 GG/SO BRa 733 MM/Si Bra 732 MM/Si DD/43 Intact/

Intact/

Walkdow Reference 10, HCLPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by

>RLGM In-Serv ice In-Serv ice Appendix C Struutural Mechanics Assuciates Closed Closed Walk-By p

7 7 3 Included in IPEER, p 773

>RLGM Closed Cloned Walk-By p 773 Included in IPBEE, pT773

>RLGM Closed Cloned Walk-By p 773 Included in [P8EE, pT77S

>RLGM Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IP99E, p 773

>RLGM Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IP900, p 773

>RLGM intact Pressure WakB p27 Off WakB 23>RLGM Bvundary intact Pressure WakB p27 Off WakB 23>RLGM Boundary Intact/

Intact/

In-Service in-Service WakB p45 LO Intact/

Intact/

In-Service In-Service Wl-y p5 BO Intact ntact alk-ByRule-of-the-boo with 1ND-PU-B002, wahich has an LO IPEEE SEWS Closed/Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 775

>RLGM Cloned/Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEtE, p 773

>RLOM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEtE, p 77 4

>RLGM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 included in IPEEE, pT7 7 4

>RLGM Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEt, p 77 4

vRLGM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Open/Cloned Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPtEE, p 774

>BLGM Intact Pressure WakB p24 Off Wl-,

p25>BLGM Boundary Intact Pressure Off Bonay Walk-By p 245

>9LGM Intact Pressure Off Bonay Walk-By p 277

>RLGM Intact Pressure Off Bonay Walk-By p 277

>BLGM Intact Intact Walk-By p 431

>RLGM Intact Intact Walk-By p 451

>RLGM Open/Cloned Closed Walk-By pS300

>RLGM Screened perlPEtEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screenud perlPEEE Screened perPtEEE Screened perlPtEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened per IPBEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened perIPEEB Screened perlPEEB Screened periPtEE Screened perlPEEE Screened periPtEE Screened perlPtEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened per PEtE Screened perlPEEE Page 38 of 60 DUO AUX AUX DUO Outer Doghouse (OH21)

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNJS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPFP Key Failare Mode***

DD/S3 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300

>RLGM Screened per [PEEE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL 133 iSM-VA-OOOSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DH2) 134 1SM-VA-OSS3ABC Train C MSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DH2) 135 1SM-VA-OSOSAB Train 0 Mliv Outer Doghouse 792 (OHi) 136 1SVVA-320 Train A Main Steum Safety Belief Outer Doghouse 79 Valve (DHi) 137 1SV-VA-5021 Train A Main Steam Safety Belief Outer Doghouse 791 Valve (DH1) 135 1SV-VA-3O22 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 731 Valve (DH1) 139 SSVVA-023 Train A Main Steam Safety B elief Outer Doghouse 79 Valve (DHi) 140Train A Main Steam Safetyr Relief Outer Doghouse 79 4

SRV-VA-t024 Vave911 Valve (DH2(

142 iSVVA-alS Train B Main Steam Safety Relief inner Doghoose 79 Valve (DH2}

143Train B Main Steam Safety' Relief inner Doghouse 79 14 SSV-VA-t016 Vave(12 1VV-17 Valve (DH2) 149Train B Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 1VA-OB Valve (DH2) 149Trait C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 79 3.4 15V-VA-OOSB Vave(1i Valve (DHi) 148 iS-V-OlO Train C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 149 iSV-VA-SOilTanCManSemSfeyRle8trDgos 791 Valve (DH2) 155 1SVVA-512 Train C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 79 151 1SV-VA-552 Tan0ManSemSfeyRle0nnrDgos 791 Valve (DH2) 152 iSVVA-O~lTrain 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 Valve (DH2) 153Train 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 48 1SV-VA-004O Vave(1i Valve (0H1) 155 1SVVA-OSB Train 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 Valve (DH2) 15T-H-O ralB RN Pamp Motorm CootRlier AUXe 71gous 157 1SN-VA-053 N

upDicag CosTri2U 716 159 1BN-VA-317O CHXCoigOae2upl U

730 159 iRN-VA-OlOBO3 H

oln WtrOte U

733 isVationD2 DD/S2 DD/44 00/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 0E/53 EE/53 EE/53 0E/52 00/52 E0/52 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 00/57 FF/S6 LL/SS HH/S4 Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed In-Service Normally Open Throttled Throttled Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p 305 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p

2 9

7 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 in-Service Walk-By p 2 4 9 Closed Walk-By p 776 Open Walk-By p 77R Open Walk-By pf776

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLIGM

>RLOM

>RLOM

>RLtGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGSM

>RLGIM

>BLOM Bule-of-the-box with iRN-PU-0O04, which has an

>RLGM IPEE0 SEWS (p 249)

Included in IPEEE, p 776

>RLOM Included in IP00E, p 776

>RLGM Included in IPE0E, p 776

>RLGOM Screened perlIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perlPEtE Screened perlPOOR Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPREE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPERE Screened periPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened per]PEEE Screened perIPERE Screened per POEE Screened per[PotE Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPOEE Screened perIPEEE Screened per PEE0 Screened perlIPEEt Screened perlIPEEt Page 39 of 60 Page 39 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HOLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ES6L ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS 0

Screening Notes H-CLPP 00 Key Failare Mode**

160 1EN-VA-0213B BKCPmMooCoerooig AUX 733 NH/SB Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 77B Included in lPttB, p 776

>BLGM Screened per IPEBE Water Outlet Isolation 161 iRN-VA-OBilB 2 CPm oo Coe on AUX 733 GG/57 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 77B Incloded In [PEEt, p 776

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE WaterOutlet Isolation 162 1RN-VA-0171B EDO KCD HX Sopply MOV Isolation AUX 73B6m 0

Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Incloded in IPEEE, p 776

>RLOM Screened per IPEEB BB/45 163 1RN-VA-5174B EDO KCD HS Outlet MOV Isolation AUX 736 Rm6/45 Open Cloned Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 77B

>ELGM Screened per IPEEE 164 1RN-VA-523B6 Train B NS HX Supply Isolation MOV AUX 73 Rm 732 Closed Closed Walk-By p

7 7B Included in IPEEE, p 776

>ELGM Screened per IPEEE KK/S1 lBS5 1.RN-HX-B01B Train B NV Pomp Mtr Cooler AUX 71.6 Em 630 Standby/

Intact Walk-By p 252 Role-of-the-hon with 1NV-PU-OO1B, which has an

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE NH/SB In-Sernice IPEEE StWS (p 252)

Em 63 Soanby/

Ble-of-the-boo with 1N V-PU-O0l6, which has an 16RSN-X-630ran NSPmtBarngOidooer AU 76Intact Walk-By p

2 S

2

>RLGM Screened per IPEBE 16NR-XO2 ri VPmpBaigOlCoe U

1 H/SB In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 232) 167 1RN-HX-5022 Train B NV Pomp Gearbox Oil Cooler AUX 716 EmH635 InStardby/

InacPWl-BEE6 RoE-o-te-o wit 1N-U2152hc)oe

>LMSrendprP 166 1VA-AH-5023 Train B NI Pump AHU AUX BBS Em 303 Standby Intact Walkdown Reeec

'0 Same make/model as U2 ESEL 160

>ELGM Screened per IPEEt GG/BS Appendix C 163 1VA-AH-OO27 Train B ND Pump AHU AUX BBSEmB5 Standby Intact Walk-By p

4 1.

3

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE FF/54 17Rr-n02 ranBN upMr olrAX 70E 626 Sadyrce Wl-y p23 Role-of-the-boo with 1NI-PU-O01O, which has an LMBrendprPE 17 R-XO2 ri IPm t

olrAX6 GG/S3SadyBnat WlkB 4

IPEEE SEWS (pl245)

>LMSree e

PE 171 1EN-HX-O026 Train B NI Pump Erg Oil Cooler AUX 716 EmG626 Standby Intact Walk-By p 245 RolE-ftE-booW wit 1N-P-01,whchbso>RLGM Screened per IPEEt 172 1.RN-VA-0297B lB EN Essential Botuom Header to AUX 716 Em 602 Closed Open Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776

>BLGM Screened per IP6EE SNBWP EE/52 173 OEN-VA-5283AC 1B/2B EN Disch To BC X-Over Ieel AUX 716 REE/02 Open Closed Walk-By p77B Included in IPEtE, p 77B

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 174 SRN-VA-0152B 1B/2B EN Essential Return Header AUX 716 Em 647W Cloned Open Walk-By p776 Incloded in IPEtE, p 77B

>BLGM Screened per IPEEE to SNBWP EE/B0 1.73 SRN-VA-Ol5iB Isola Rtio n HedrCosTan AUX 733 EE/54 Closed Closed Walk-By p77B Included is IPEtE, p 776

>ELOM Bcreened per IPEtEE Emn 647W 176 2RN-VA-0297B 2B RN Eon Hdr SNSWP Return Inn AUX 716 E/OOpen Cloned Walk-By p786 Included in IPOEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per fREEE 177 iA-VAi~iB Isolation from circulating water 1770a 1CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Value 177 b 1CA-RV-1622 Relief Value 1770c 1CA-GC-1625 Control Air Gas Cylinder 177 d l.CA-GC-1621.

Control Air Gas Cylinder 1770 1 CA-PS-5360 Pressure Switch Aux Ace Aux Aun Ace Ace Cloned Energized Closed Intact Iotacot Functional Open Energized Closed Intact Intact Functional Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Ben. 1.,

Table 2-4 Screens out based on PElR Nf-6041-BL, Ben. 1.,

Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-BL, Bee. 1, Table 2-4 Bcreens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1, Table 2-4

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened per PElR NP-6041 Screened per PElR NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041.

Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1,

>LM ScendprERNP04 1776f 1CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Ace 716 Functional Punctional Walkdown Tableceeedpr P2-4-64 177 g iCA-T-B-90l Juc'n6o6 oue'ely A

n Ace 733 Functional Punctiena[

Walkdown HCLPF for relays, SEWs for remainder of cabinet 0.60 Functional Letdown Inboard Containment Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Ben. 1.,

170 1NV-VA-0035A soainRX 752 Open Cloned Walkdown Tbe24>ELGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 17 a 1N-S-0B0 SoenidVaueRE 75 Eerizd e-negied WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 178

/N-SV035 Solnoi Vave X

75 Enrgied e-enrgied alkownTable 2-4 Page 40 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL arid HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL. ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS.

Screening Notes HCLPFs Key Failure Mode**

Screens out based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprER P64 178 b 1NV-SV-OSSl Solenoid Valve RX 7 52 Energized De-energized W alkdown Table 2-4>R GSce n dprE R N -04 179 SNV-VA-5121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 tHR HtX Room Cloned Closed Walkdown Screens out bused on EPRI NF-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NF-6541 Table 2-4 179 a 1NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Waikdown Rule-of-the-bus with SMCSS

>RLGM Screened per lFEEE 180 SNV-VA-04S7A etonIbadotin ntRK 752 Closed Closed Waikdown SresotaednEP N-4-LR.1,

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Isolation 180 a iN V-S V-4570 Solenoid Valve lBS b 1NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve 181 1V-VA-458A Letdown Inboard Containment Isolation 1810a 1NV-SV-45B0 Solenoid Valve 191 b 1NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve 182 1NV-VA-t025B Excess Letdown Isolation 1820a 1NV-SV-5255 Solenoid Valve Instrument Air Blackout 183 1VI-TK-O0150 cauae 184 1VI-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief 185 iVI-l3S0 Blankout Header Relief 186 iVI-i989 US VI 8/o HDR FLEX AIR SUPPLY CNTRL 187 1ET8 4 KV Essential Swgr RX RX RK RX AUX AUK AUX Aux Aux 752 752 752 752 752 725 725 750 750 750 750 733 De-energized Dc-energized Closed Dc-energized De-energized Closed Do-energized Iota ct Closed Closed Closed Energized De-energized De-energized Closed De-energized De-energized Closed De-energized Intact Closed Closed Open Energized Walkdown Wulkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Waikdown Walkdewn Walk-By Tacle i-s Screens out based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFR1 NF-6541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NF-5541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NF-8041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on SPRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based en SPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4, Anchorage qualified for 2oSSE Screens out based on FF91 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens oat based on EFRI NF-E541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4, Design qualified for 2xSSE Included in PEEt, p 790

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM vRLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGSM Screened per EFRI NP-R541 Screened per EFRI NP-E541 Screened per tPRI NF-6t4l Screened per EFRI NF-6041 Screened per EFRI NF-6041 Screened per EPRI NF-E541 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EF91 NP-6t41 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

• Page number refers no IPEtE scanned document page.

• 0 HCLPF values of RFLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.2Bg), hut that a sp~ecific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

0*0* Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened perlIPEEE-lIndicates thatithocomponent was evaluated insthe IPEtEEand therefore weetsnthe RLGM demand.

Screened per EF91 NF-6t41 - Indicates that tbe component meets the screening criteria of SF91 NF-R041, Table 2-4usnd that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLFF.

Interaction,- Block Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLISM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLP~s exceed the reported HCLFF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

• 000* Component adjacentto block wall. Aue building block wails were evaluated in the IPEEE as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-1.

However block wall may have lower HCLFF than component, therefore HCLFF reported here as >RLGM.

Page 41 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Appendix B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 42 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL. and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdomn nr ESEL. ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Wl-y SEWS 5

Screening Notes lHCLPP*

Key Failure Mode**

5 1

2 3

4 S

6 7

8 8

10 11 2FW-VA-OSO32 2FW-VA-0O33A 2FW-VA-OOO1A 2ND-VA-0056 2ND-VA-SO06 2ND-VA-O064 2NI-VA-0Ou9 2NI-VA-0151 2N1-VA-0161 ORN-VA-0007A 2NV-VA-O095B Refueling Water Retire Pump Suction Isolation Refueling Water Recirc Pump Suction Isolation Refueling Water Recirc Pomp Suction Isolation ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs ND Relief - Hotlegs NO Relief - 'B' Coldlegs NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg Ni Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg Ni Relief-Coidleg SNSWP Supply to Units l and 2 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cost AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 750 750 750 733 716 733 716 750 733 716 733 Rm 626 J J/6i Rm 824 Rm 626 J J/Gi HH/60 FF/60 66/60 Rm 830 66/60 Rm 788 H H/60 Rm 601 AA/63 Rm 802A EE/G0 Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Walk-By Walk-By Walk-Gy Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Wulkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By Walk-By p 782 Included in ]PEtE, p 782 p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782 p 782 Included in IPEtE, p 782 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendio C Table 2-4 Referenun 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appoendix C Table 2-4 p 77G Included in IPEER, p 778 p785 included in IPtEEE, p 788

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened perlPEER Screened perlPEER Screened perlPEtEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-60141 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EFRI NP-6541 Screened perlIPEGE Screened per PEtEE 12 2CA22CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Caxity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,

>RM ScendprPIN-04 Isolation-OValAe RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown AppendixeendCpeTable P-204 Isolation Valve

~~117' 2CR Apni al Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Caxity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rex. 1,

>LM SceedprERN-04 13 2NC-VA-0273ACRX72-CSdCosd OeanClsd Wldw>LM SrendprPRN-64 Isolation Value RX 72B° SieCoed Oe0ndCoeRWidw Appendix C Table 2-4 NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cauity Coe pnadCoe akB 8

nlddi PEp73>LMSree e

PE 4 2N-AO3ASolenoids and Pneumatic Controls RX 806 Clsd pnan5lse°ak-y p 8 ncue5iRERp2 1.5 2N1-VA-0430A 2NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply RX 762 2A CLA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 785 Included in IPEEt, p 785

>RLGM Screexed per PEEt from 2A CIA (MOV) 45° SiR 16 2FW-TK-O000a Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard

>760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Reference 10, Included in IPtEE (p 772). Enaluated by Structural

>RLOM Screened per IPEER Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461).

43 N-AOSA 2ACABokVle MV X

73 Pp 46Rs Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEER, p 784

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 18 2N1-VA-B065B 26 CIA Block Value (MDV)

RX 733 Pipe Chase Oe 14 Coe akB 8

nlddi PEp74>LMSree e

PE 138e 47Rs Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in FREEE, p 7 8 4

>RLGM Screened per ]PEER 18 2N1-VA-0076A 2C CIA Block Value (MOV)

RX 733 Pipe Chas 20 2NI-VA-0088B 20 CIA Block Value (MOV)

RX 73 Pipe Chase 317° 49R Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in [PEER, p 784

>RLOM Screened per IPEER 21-2EHM-TP-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 730 CC/61 off Functional Walk-By p74 New equipment - updated IPEGE SEWS exaluation.

>RLOM Screened per IPEEG 22 2EHM-PN-HMPPA HZ2Igniter Power Panel AUX 750 CC/Ga Standby Punctional Walkdown ReeeclBounded by exaluation of 2EHM-TB-a589.

>RL0M Screened per tPRI NP-6041-Appendix C 2EHM-HR-TB03 A

ri 2giesRfrne1,Nti xeinedtbs.Tse oSUT 23 thru TB7a (Odd A'TanH giesRX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown Rfrne.,No nxpinedabs.TstdoSUTS

>RLGM Undetermined numbers only)

(35 igoiters per Train)

Appendix C TRS.

23 2HM-X-MBP Vltge edBypssSwtchAU 75 C/6 Deenrgied Fuctina WakdwnReference 1.0, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,

>81GM Screened per EPRI NP-8041 23 a 2EHMSX-H8PA oltae Re Bypss witc AUX 750 C/Ga De-eergied Fnctonal Wankown ppenixbCTabl22-Page 43 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPP Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or SWCSreigNtsNLPC-KyPjseMdf ESEL ID ED B D escription B ldg EL Loca tion N orm al State D esired State W alk-B ySE SSc e n g N o sH L F

• K e Fal r M d e 23 b 2EHM-VR-HMRA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 CC/Ri ce-energized Functional Walkdown Rfrne1,SensotbednEPIN-4-Sev1,0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 24 2EHM-TB-1SB9 Local Terminal Boa AUX 750 cc/el n/u Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens oat bused on RPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.60 Functional Appendio C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 2CA-HX-5003 TDCAP Bearing Oil cooler AUX 716 AA/RO Idle Functional Walk-By p 542

>RLGOM Screened per IPEEt 27 2CA-PU-0S03 TurieD rive PAu mp)ryFed e AUX 716 AA/R0 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242

>RLGM Screened per IPEER 27 a 2SA-TR-O0003 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 Ak/GO Idle Functional Walk-By RulE-ftE-booW wih2>F-03,wihbsa RLGM Screened per PEEt Rule-of-the-boo wink 2cA-pu-0003, which bus an

>LM Sree e

PE 27 b 25A-VA-0004 TDCAP Steam control Valve AUX 716 AA/60I Idle Functional Walk-By FPEEE SEWS RMScendprFE Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-PU-0003, which bus an 27 c 2SA-GV-0003 TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Wulk-By FPEEE SEWS

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 27 d 2Sk-OX-S003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By RIn-ftE-booEW wih2A>-03,wihbsa RLOM Screened per FREEE 28 2cA-PN-AFTp TDCAp control Panel AUX 716 AA/el n/u Available Walk-By p 187

>RLOM Screened per FREEE 29 25A-VA-O048ABC TDCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 Pp/SR Idle Open Walk-By p 796 Included in IPERE, p 7R6

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE (AOV)

(DH3) lo S-V08 ArSpl oeoi upVle Iner Doghouse PP F/S9 Energized ce-energized Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 2a 2A-V00 AiSppySlniDupVle (DHS) 77Appendloxc Table 2-4 Reerncn1,Scees uDbsegohERoN-641seev 1

>RLGM Screened per EFR1 NP-6041 29 b 2SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve InerDoHous 767 FF/S9 Energized De-energized Waikdown Reee~Appendlo10c TableS en2-4°u ae nER P64-L e.1 Rm 601 30 2SA-VA-0003 TDCAF Trip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 PF/eR Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEER, p 786

>RLISM Screened per IPEER 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 54 2-V-32 2A VI Essential Hdr Supply from VO U

3 Rm 726 closed closed Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLOM Interaction - Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psiE)

F/9Appendio C

Table 2-4 2B Vi Essential Hdr Supply from VG RefeencM10ISceensoutbusdno

-F1BNP604-SLWRe.l1 35 2Vl-VA-0034 AUoRLOM/8 loeInteraction efrece10

-rensou Black PR N-64WallRv.1 Inlet Relief (115 psig()U 3

PS lse lsd Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4 36 2VI-VA-0112 2AV u ~gIsrmn i

ak AX 73R 2

lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-BO41-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 Relief (115 psig)

AUF33F/SRApndxCTal 37 2IV-14 2A VI Auo Bldg Instrument Air Tank AX 73Rm 725 Closed closed Walkdow Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 pslg)

F/9Appendio C

Table 2-4 38 2VI-A S

28 VI Ase Bldg Instrument Air Tank AU 3

F5 lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 Relief (115 psig)

AU 3

PS lsdcoe abon Appendio c Table 2-4 39 2lV-16 2B VI Ace Bldg Instrument Air Tank AU 3

F5 lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on SF91 NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLOM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 2-V-16 Relief (115 psUi73P/Sglse loe aidw Appendix C Table 2-4 40 2-V-09 2SM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 790D/67 closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1, oRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 2V-A25 120 psig)

(DH4()

9 Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 44 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and H-CLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walbdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State wl-y SEWS*

Screening Notes H-CI.PFP Key Failure Mode**

25M-7A8 VI Accumulator Relief Dater Doghouse Referesce 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 41 2V1-VA-2018 g10pig D4 790 DD/68 Closed Closed Walkdown Apeni C'Tb

'24RLGM Screened per EFRI NF-6041 4 2V-A2 2

SM3B8IAcmuao eif Ine ohueReference 10, Screens out bused on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM scendprERN-64 42 2lV-09

{25M30 iAcuuao RelifgInerDoHous 790 DD/60 Closed Closed Wolkdows Appendsx C Table 2-4>RM SrendprERN-64 45 ~

2SM-SAB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 79 05 lsdCoe ld Reference 10, Screens ost based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RO cendprER F64 43 2lV-09 (120 psig)

(DH3}

70D/9 ls)Cosd Wldw Appendin C Table 2-4>RM ScenderERNP64 44 2CA-VA-0084AB OAFo oto o2 1

n AUX 718 Rm80Open peThttd/

Walk-By p 781 Included in PEEE, p781.

>RL0M Screened per FREEE Associated Pneumatic Controls B8/62 Closed 44 a 2CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-bus with 2MC1O

>SLGM Screened per PEtEE 44 b 2CA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 718Rm80 Functional Functional Walk-By Role-of-the-boa with 2CA-84AB

>RL0M Screened per PEtEE 88/62 Sm 801 44 d 2CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hon with 2CA-64A8

>RLGM Screened per PEtEE 44 e 2CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve 44 f 2CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve TDCA Flow Control to 28 50 and 45 2C-VA-052A8Associated Pneumatic Controls 45 a 2CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader 45 b 2CA-SS-0520 Selector twitch 45 c 2CA-MT-0520 Misc Transmitter 45 d 2CA-VF-0520 Valve Fositioner 45 e 2CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve 4S f 2CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve TDCA Flow Control to 2C SO and 48 2CA-VA-0048AB Associated Pneumatic Controls 48 a 2CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader 46 b 2CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch 48 c 2CA-MT-0480 Misc Transmitter 48 d 2CA-VP-0480 Valve Fositioner 46 e 2CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve 481f 2CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve TDCA Flow Control to 2D010 and 47 2C-VA-058A8Associated Pneumatic Controls AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 718 716 718 787 718 718 716 716 716 716 787 716 718 716 716 nn/oL Sm 601 Sm 601 Sm 601 BB/81 Control Sm 825 Sm 601 B8/81 Sm 601 8BB/61 Sm 601 88/61 Sm 801 Sm 801 Sm 601 CC/Bo Control Sm 925 Sm 801 CC/BO Sm 801 CC/Bo Sm 601 CC/Ba Sm 601 Energized Energized Open Functional Functional Functional Functional Energized Energized Open Functional Functional Functional Functional Energized Reference 10, Energized Walkdown Apni Reference 10, Energized Walkdown Apnl Open/Throttled/

WakB p78 Closed Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Reference 10, Energized Walkdown Apni Energized Walkdown Rernc10 Appendix C Dpen/Throttled/

Walk-By p 781 Closed Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Reference 10, Energized Walkdomn Apni Reference 10, Energized Waikdown Apni Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 781 Closed Included in IPEER, p 781 Sale-of-the-hon with 2MC1O Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-52A8 Rule-of-the-has with 2CA-52A8 Rule-of-the-hon with 2CA-52AB

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEtE Screened per PEtEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEtE Screened per FPEEE Screened per EFRI NF-6041 AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX Included in PEES, p 781 Rule-of-the-hon with 2MC10 Role-of-the-hon with 2CA-48AB Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-48AB Sole-of-the-hon with 2CA-48AB

>RLGM

>RLiM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM

>RLOM Screened per EPRI NF-B041 Screened per FPEES Screened per FPEES Screened per FPEES Screened per FPEES Screened per PEEt Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 AUX 716 Sm 601 Energized Sm 601 AUX 716 88/83 Open

>RLOM Included in PEES, p 781

>RLOM Screened per FEES Page 45 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or SW cenn oe CP e

alr oe ESELID EoDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State waSlk-eigyoe HLF*

e aiueMoe*

47 a 2CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 625 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hon with 2MCSO

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 47 b 2CA-SS-5360 Selector Switch AUX 716 6w61Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hoe with 2CA-36AB

>RLGM Screened per [FEtEE BB/63 47 d 2CA-VF-0360 VastTrFnsmitioer AUX 716 RmBaFunctional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-3eAB

>RLGM Screened per PEEt 66/63 e7 2CA-SVP-0360 SolvenPosidtVaner AUX 71.6 Rm60unergizedl Eunergizedl Walkdown Appendi-n Ct 2A3AB>LG creedpr PE 47 f 2CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reeece1,RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Appendix C 46 25VCV-OSV-31BA lniB av U

76R 0

nried Eegzd W

dw

>RLGM Screened per PEPR tE-4 48 2VC-09B26 S0 Main Steam FORV and Outer Doghouse 89FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 264

>LMSree e

PE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH4)

Closed LMScendprPt 50 25V-CV-00S7ABC 2BS6anSemPR ad OtrD os 09 FF/66 Closed OeThotd/

Walk-By p 264

>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Associated Pneumatic Controls (OH4)

Closed 20 53 Main Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse BO PS lsd Open/Throctled/

akB 6

51 2SV-CV-0501AB60 F5 lse akB 9

>RLGM Screened per PEEt 51Associated Pneumatic Controls (OH3)

Closed 52 2EPL-FN-EVOA Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution R

MScendprFt 5 2ELP-VA Panel AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212>RGSrendplPE 52 a 2EPL-PN-EVDD Vital Battery 126 VDC Distribution>6M ScendprPE Panel AUX 733 CC/57 Functional Punctional Walk-By p 212

>LMSree e

PE 63 OEPL-BA-EVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C54Functional Functional Walkdown RefreLeM0,ppInteractionndnt

- Blockstng rfertoUWall 5

54 0EPL-BC-EVCS Vt Bteyhagradhrer AX 73RmTO 70upnctional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens oct based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Ren. 1, 0.45 Functional Connection Boo ECBS BB/54 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 2EPE-MX-EMXA4 650 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 56 2EPE-MX-EMXA2 650 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32

>RLGM Screened per IPOEE 57 2EPE-MX-EMXB4 650 VAC Essential Power AUX Rm3716Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RL0M Screened per IPEtEE 66/63 2ETP-CA-0010 SB Pzr FORV Relay/Indication AUX 767 HH/SB Standby Functional Walk-By p 216

>RLGM Screened per FREEE (2ATC 10)

Main Control Board Cabinet for 56 2EOA-PN-MCS Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rrn 625 Standby Functional Walk-By p686

>RL0M Screened per FPEEE Temperature Indication Main Control Board Cabinet with 60 2EOA-PN-MC7 AX 77 onrlR92 Stny Futinl W k-y p8>RLGM Screened per PEtE H2 Igniter Control SwitchAU76 Coto6w65 Sady Fninl WlkB p6 Main Control Board Cabinet for CA 61 2EOA-PN-MC10 AUX 767 Control 6m 625 Standby Functional Walk-By p 66

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE

/ NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 62 2EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 525 Standby Functional Walk-By p686

>RLGM Screened per FPEEE Indication Page 46 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL. and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Wldw T

SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPP**

Key Failure Mode**

Walk-By Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 63 2tOA-PN-MC2 System (PORV Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p Se

>RLGM Screened per IPtEEE Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet for ICCM a 2EOA-FN-MC1 AU 6

oto m95 Sadb ucinl Wl-y p8 RLGM Screened per IPEtEE ICCM Remote DisplayAU 76 CotoSm95 Sady Fninl Wlky p6 ICCMb 2EA-CA9211 Train A Remote Display Processor behind 2MC2 ICCMc 2EA-CA9221 Train S Remote Display Processor ICCMc 25A-CA5221 behind 2MC2 ICCM d 2tIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display ICCM e 2EIA-P-9220 Train S Remote Dinsplay ICCM f 2EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-SS Cabinet ICCM g 2tIA-CA-922t Train S ICCM-SS Cabinet SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Block Valves 64 21E-CASG1S Closure Permissive) 6B 21E-CA9020 SSPS CabinetS

(CLA Block Valves Closure Permissive) 66 2EQB-FN-DGLSA Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters) 120 VAC Inst and Control 67 2EPG-PN-EKVA Panelboard 66 2EPG-Bl-EVIA Vital leverter Steam Generator NS Level 69 2CF-LT-60t nicto Lo 70 2P-LT554t Indication Loop 2 Steam Generator NS Level 71 2CP-LT-557t Indication LoopS2 Steam Generator NR Level 72 2P-LTSG~t Indication Loop 4 Steam Generator 61 WievRang 73 2SM-PT-50O Sea50eatr#

id ag Pressure Indication Loop 73 a 2CA-FN-AFFA 2A CA Pump Control Panel Steam Generator #2 Wide Range 74 25M-FT-311G Pressure Indication Loop 75 2M-PT5140 Steam Generator 63 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 75 a 2CA-PN-AFPS 26 CA Pump Control Panel Steam Generator #4 Wide Range 76 2SM-PT-5170 Pressure Indication Loop Steam Generator #51 NC WS T-Hot 77 2C-SDSSS0 Indication Loop N/A Reactor Vessel Level Indication 77 a (no EDB #)

System {RVUS) Cabinet AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX AUX 767 767 767 767 750 750 767 767 750 733 No 739 742 740 744 750 716 733 733 716 750 740 767 Control Rm 929 Control Sm 925 Control Sm 925 Control Sm 929 cc/ss cc/S s Control Sm 929 CC/S S Control Sm 625 CC/SBS Smn SOS BB/61 Sm 731 DD/54 Rm 701 cc/ss Accam 2A Sm 36' 46R Accum 26 Sm 145° SSR Accum 2C Sm 219' S6R Attain 2D Sm 326' S7S Sm 604 DD/67 Sm 601 BB/61 Sm 713 DO/59 Sm 713 DD/59 Sm 601 cc/62 Sm 6t4 00/67 24' SOR BS/63 Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference it, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Standy Funtionl Wa~down Appendis C Table 2-4>RG Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference it, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM Standy Funtionl Waldown Appendix C Table 2-4>RG Rule-of-the-box with 2MC1, which has an IPEEt Standby Functional Walk-By utWS

>RLGM Rule-of-the-box with 2MC1, which has an IPEtEE Standby Functional Walk-By SEWS

>RLGM Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference 3D, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6G41-SL, Rev. 1, 02 Appendix C Table 2-4 Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference 3D, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 02 Appendix C Table 2-4 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11

>RLGM Standby Functional Walk-By p 11

>RLGM Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6G41-SL, Rev. 1, Standby Functional Waikdown Apeni C'abe 0.29 Nmnl10VC Functional Walk-By p 209

>SLGM Output Nmnl10VC Functional Walk-By p 65 vRLGM Output indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Appendix C Table 2-4 indicaion Idicaton Wabdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM Indication Indication Walkdown Rfrne1,SresotbsdnSF1P-4-Lev1,

>RLGM Appendix C Table 2-4 Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, xLG Appendix C Table 2-4 Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sex. 1,

>R M

Indication indication Walkdown Reeec>0 cen u

ae nS5 P94-L e.1 RLOM Appendis C Table 2-4 Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM Appendix C Table 2-4 Standy Functional Walk-Sy p 180

>RLGM Indiction Indiatio Waldown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-5041-SL, Rev. 1, SO Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Indication Indication Walkdown ApenixCLabeM-Functinal Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 03 stadbyAppendix C

Table 2-4 Screened per EPSI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEE5 Screened per IPEER Functional Functional Screened per FREEE Screened per IPEtS Functional Screened per IPREEE Screened per FREEE Screened per EPRI NP-6t41 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6t41 Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Screened per PEEt Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Screened per IPSEEE Screened per SFPR1 NP-6041 Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Functional Page 47 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or SESSreigNtsHLP KeFaleMoe 5

ESEL ID EDn Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired StateSESSrennNosHLP*

KyFaleMde*

Walk-By Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 78 2CR-BO Indicatios Loop RX740 164° 3CR Indicatios Indication Walkdown ApedxCTal RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B041 79 2C080 Steam Generator #3 NC WR T-Hot RefLGM Screenednsoutbapero EEPRNP60NP-854e1 1

79 2CR-90 Indication Loop RXf 740 203° 3CR Indication Indication Walkdown Refreseni SO Screen out basedMon EPRIeNP-pe41-PRIRev.41 Steam Generator #4 NC WRT-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 80 2NC-RD-920 RX70 3o 0

niaio niain Wldw RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E041 80Indication Loop RN70 38 C niain Idcto akon Appendin C Table 2-4 1 2SP-00 Cndctaiomnt LooPresr AUX 750 00/60 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RG cendprER P64 Indcaton oopAppendin C

Table 2-4 INdCato LooPrsuie AUXssur/87 Iniaio nicto3Widw Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 82 2NC-PT-5120 IndCatWR Loprsuie PressureDRm713dcton idcton Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Process Control Cabinet 1 Control Rm 825 (32I-A91 7300 cabinet)

AUX 767 AA/54 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16

>LMSree e PE 84 2F0-TK-0558 2A Diesel Generator Fuel OilYrd

<6NA Inatvilbe nac/albe WlkB p56 84 2DT-06 Storage Tank Yr

<70NAnttAvial Inatvaabe W k-y p56>RLGM Screened per IPEER 28 Diesel Generator Puel Oil 85 2FD-TK-0O57 Strg akYard

<780 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By 556

>LMSree e

PE 800 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer 88 2EPE-MX-EMXA3 Pan 2A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 Rm85Closed Closed Walkdown Reeec'0 cen u

ae nER P64-L Re.

RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B041 2VXIA (04A) 88/86 Appendix C Table 2-4 800 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer 87 2EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 28 Suction Isolation Valve AUX 733 Rm 718 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 2VX2B (0iC) 88/65 Appendiu C Table 2-4 800 VAC Essential VE/VX (04C, 080 Rm 805 88 2OPE-MX-EMXC

&O030)

AUX 750 ta/S9 Closed Closed Walk-By p32

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE 800 VAC Essential for VE/VX (OBE &

Rm 716 88 2EPE-MX-EMXDO 5D AUX 733 B60Closed Closed Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE H2 Skimmer Fan 2A Suction Reference 10,0.0untoa 80 2VX-VA-G001A Isolation Valve RX 828 264' 45R Closed Open Walkdown Appendix C0.0Fntoa 81 2VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen skimmer Fan No 2A RX 818 272° 38R Off On Walkdown Rfrne0,0.38 Anchorage Appendix C H2 Skimmer Pan 28 Suction Refncencena0 9 2V--OOB Isolation valve RX 827 283' 489 Closed Open Walkdown Refeencex 10 0.41 Fntoa 83 2VN-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Pan No 28 RX 8186 288' 389 off On Walkdown Rfrne1,0.38 Anchorage Appendix C 2VX-DA-8125 Containment Air Return Fan 2A tale-of-the-bun with 2VX-AH-GOOB, which has an 84 RX775 27°5RCoevOe ak RL0M Screened per IPEEE (2RAF-D-2)

Damper RN20 0

lse pn Wl-yPEEE SEWS 90 2VX-AH-0051 Containment Air Return Fan 2A RX 770 270' SOR Off On Walk-By p

4 3 4

>RLGM Screened per PEtEE RB 2VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 2A AUX 767 u /OS Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-3L, Rev. 1, 0.35 Anchorage Appendis C Table 2-4 87 2VE-XF-O0005 Annulus Ventilation Fan 28 AUX 787 JJ/6S Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.30 Anchorage Appendix C Table 2-4 A82CP-0 l A Closed Cooling Water System AUX 750 GG/SO On On Walk-By p 255

>LMSree e

PE Pump 99 2CP-02 A2 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 700 PP/SO On On Walk-By p 2550MS0endpe PE Pump 100 2KC-TK-0009 Component Cooling Water System AUN 787 J /57 Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Walk-By p 528

>LMSree e

PE Serge Tank>RG ScendprPE KC Auoiliary Bldg Supply Non-101 2KC-VA-0055A Essential Isolation AUX 750 LI/S9 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEER, p 783

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE XC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-1_02 2KC-VA-0230A Essential Isolation AUX 730 LLI58 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in {PEEt, p 783 vRLOM Screened per IPEER Page 48 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description 103 2KCVA-OO KG KAuxiliary Bldg Return Non-103 2C-VA-001A Essential Isolation 104 2C-VA-OOBA KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-104 2G-VA-OOSA Essential Isolation Bldg AUX AUX EL 750 750 Location GG/5e GG/56 OPERATING STATE Normal State Desired State WaEWdom*orScreening Notes Walk-By Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEtE, p 783 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p SOB HCLPF**

>RLOM

>RLOM Key Failure Mode 0*

Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPEEE 15 2

-H-OS Train A Component Cooling Water AX 70JJ7 Inatn-eve ta/n-eie Wadon Reference 10, HICLPF based us IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by

>LMSree e PE 10HXCH-00 AU 5

J5 natI-evc nati-evc aku Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates>RM ScendprPE 106 2NC-VA-5032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 8BOB esrie Cvt Closed Closed Walk-By p 763 Included in IPEEE, p 783

>RLOM Screenhd per IPEEE 110° 32R 107 2NC-VA-OOSBB NC System Pressurizer PORV 103 2NC-VA-SO01i Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 109 2NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 110 2NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 111 2ND-PU-SOO01 Train A ND Pump 112 2ND-PU-5002 Train B ND Pump 113 2ND-HXt-OOS3 Train A ND HiX 114 2ND-HX-O004 Train B ND HX 115 2ND-HX-OO0S Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX 116 2ND-VA-SOO2AC RHR Pomp Hotleg Suction Isolation 117 2ND-VA-O001B RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation Train A RHR Isolation to the 113 2N1-VA-0173A Cilg Train B RH8 Isolation to the ie9 2NI-VA-0178B Cilg 120 2NI-vA-0118A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldiegs 121 2N1-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs 122 2N1-VA-O1SOB Train B NI Isolation to the Coldiegs 123 2NI-VA-01528 Train B NI Isolation to the Hotiegs 124 2N1-VA-0182A NI Isolation to the Codldegs 125 2NI-PU-OOO9 Train A NI Pump 126 2NI-PU-O0lO Train B NI Pump 127 2N5-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump 128 2NS-PU-0002 Train B NO Pump RX RX RXt RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX Pressurizer Cavity 806 lOS5°32R Pressurizer Cavity 784 109° 34R 82 Pressurizer Cavity 109° 34R 02 Pressurizer Cavity 30 i09= 34R Sm 506 695 Sm 507 695 PPS Sm 785 LL/6O Sm 786 Sm 508 695 746 184'°48R 743 184° 27R 733 00/60 Sm373 HH/60 Sm 646 716 Sm 646 740 0/6 Sm 646 716 0/6 Rm 830 70 HH/60 Sm 738 Sm 835 716

/5 Sm 633 716 0/5 Sm 303 68G0/57 Sm 304 695

/7 Closed Closed Closed Closed Off Off Intact Intact Intoact Closed Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Cloned Open/Closed Open/Cloned Open/Closed Open/Closed Off Off Off Off Closed Closed Closed Closed Intact Intact Intact Intact Intact Open Open Open Open Open Open/Closed Open Open/Closed Open/Closed Intact Intact Intact Intact Walk-By p 783 Included in ]PEtE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEBE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in ]PEEE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 7

S 3

>RLOM Walk-By p 273

>RLOM Walk-By p 273

>RLOM Walk-By p 458

>RLOM Walk-By p 458

>RLOM Rule-of-the-box witE 2ND-PU-tO0l, mhich has an Walk-By IPEtE SEWS

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783

>RLGM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEt, p 7

8 4

>RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in ]PEtE, p 7 8 4

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLOM Walk-By p 245

>RLOM Walk-By p 248

>RLOM Walk-By p 277

>RLOM Walk-By p 277

>RLOM Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEtEE Screened per PEtEE Screened perlPEEt Screened perlPEEE Screened perlIPEBE Screened perlPEEE Screened per PEtE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEES Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPEES Screened perlPEtE Screened perlIPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perlPEtS Screened per PEtEE Screened perlPEES Screened per PEtEE Screened perlP6EE Screened perlPEEt Screened perlPEEE Page 49 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HICLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID BOB Description Bldg EL 129 2NS-HX-1003 Train A NI Heat Exchanger AUX 750 130 2N5-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 131 25M-VA-ISS7AB Train A MliV Outer Doghouse 792 (DM4) 132 2SM-VA-S0OSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DM3) 1.33 2SM-VA-S003ABC Train C MIV Inter Doghouse 792 (DM3) 134 25M-VA-OOOIAB Train D Mliv Dater Doghouse 792

)DH4) 135 2VV-20 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 783 2VV-35 Valve (DH4) 136 2V-VAO021 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78 13 2VV-01 Valve (DH4) 137 2V-VAO022 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78 Valve (DM4) 73

138 2V-AO03 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 733 13 2VV-23 Valve (DM4) 139 2SV-VA-OO24 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 733 Valve (DM4) 140 2SVVA-~l4 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 Valve (DM3)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 11 2VV-13 Valve (DH3) 142 25V-VA-OO1B Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 Valve (DM3) 143 25V-VA-5017 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 7388 Valve (DH3) 144 2VV-lg Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 2VV-03 Valve (DM3)

Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 145 25V-VA-SSS8 Vave(D3 Train C Melt Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 16 2VV-53 Valve (DM3)

OPERATING STATE Location Normal State Desired State Walkd-Byo SEWSr Screening Notes HCLPFP*

Key Failure Mode***

Em 738>LM srendprF6 L/OIntact intact Walk-By p

4 5 1

>LM Sree e

PE Rm 736 DD/69 DO/I9 DD/B7 EE/68 EB/EB EE/SB EE/SR EE/SB E/ES5 EE/60 Intact Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Intact Walk-By p 4511 Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p 355 Closed Walk-By p 100 Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p

2 9 7

Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 237 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 237 Closed Walk-By p 237 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297

>RLOM

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>R133M

>RLGMW

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLOM Screened perlFEtEE Screened per FEES Screened per PEEE Screened perlPFEBE Screened perlFEEt Screened per IPEEE Screened perlFEEE Screened per IFEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlFEtEE Screened perlFEtEE Screened perFEtEE Screened perlFEEE Screened per FEEE Screened perFEtEE Screened perlPSEEE Screened per IPEEE 147 2VV-lO Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 E/6O Closed Closed Walk-By p 237

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE 2VV-SS Valve (DM3) 7B Page 50 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HICLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBy SEWS*

Screening Notes NCLPF**

Key Failure Mode**

148 2SV-VA-O11l Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78E/OCoeClsd Wk-y p27>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE Valve (DH31) 78E/SClsd Coe WakB p29 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghoase 78S/SCoe lsd Wl-y p9 149 2SV-VA-0012 79E6OCoeCosd Wk-y p27>RLGM Screened per ]PEtE Valve (DH3I) 10 2VV-02Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78E/ES6 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297

>LMSree e

PE 10 2VV-52 Valve (DH4)

RMScendprPE 151 2V-VAOB03Train DMain Steam SafewyRelief Outer Doghouse 78E/8Coe lsd Wl-y p27>LM Sree e

PE 151 2SV-VA-O045 ri08 anSemSft ele ue ohue 78E/8 lsdCoe akB 9

>RL0M Screened per IPtEE Valve (DH4) 78E/nClsd Coe Waky p29 1532 S-AO5 Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788E/ES Closed Closed Walk-By p 297

>LMSree e

PE Valve (DH4) 54 2VV-06Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297

>LMSree e

PE 14 2VV-05 Valve (DH4) 78S/BClsdloe Waky p29 Rule-of-the-hon with 2RN-PU-0053, which has an

>LM Sree e

PB 155 2RN-HX-OOO5 2A RN Pump Motor Coaler AUX 716 PP/S6 In-Service In-Service Walk-By p 249 IRLGMEScreeed(per2PE)

RN Pump Discharge Cross Train 156 2RN-VA-5540A AUX 716 00/59 Normally Open Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtS, p 786

>RLOM Screened per IPESS Supply Isolation MDV 157 2RN-VA-OOS6A KC HIX Cooling Water Supply AUX 760 NH/S6 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPtEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Isolation 25S 2RN-VA-SS89A KC HX Cooling Water Outlet AUX 750 HH/B8 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included In IPSEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation 15 R-AO1Al A1C Pomp Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 00/SS Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included In IPSEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE Water Outlet Isolation 16 R-AB2AA2 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 00/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Water Outlet Isolation Sm 714 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 799

>RLOM Screened per IPSEEE 161 2RN-VA-O070A EDO 1(D HX Supply MDV Isolation AUX 736 DO/En 162 2RN-VA-0073A EDG KD0 HX Outlet MDV Isolation AUX 736 Rm0764 Open Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEt, p786

>RLOM Screened per IPSEEE 163 2RN-VA-0134A Tri SH upl'slto AUX 750 RMM/Si Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 798 RL0M Screened per IPEtE Sm 634 Standby/

Itc WakB p22 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NV-PU-O515, which has an

>RLOM Screened per IPEtEE 164 2RN-HX-0017 Train A NV Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/57 In-Service Itt WakB p25 IPEtE SEWS (p 252)

Sm 694 Standby/

Intact Walk-By p 252 Rueo-h-o ih2VP-OS hc a

n

>RIGM Screened per ]PEtEE 165 2RN-HX-0019 Train A NV Pump Bearing oil Cooler AUX 716 HH/B7 In-Service IPEEt SEWS (p 252) 16 2-H-2 Train A NV Pump Gearbos Dii AUX 716 Sm 634 Standby/

Intact Walk-By p 252 Role-of-the-boo with 2NV-PU-0S15, which has an

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 16 2NH-21 Coaler HH/57 In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 252)

Sm SO5efrnc50 167 2VA-AH-0024 Train A NS Pump AHU AUX 695 G57Standby Intact Walkdown Rfrnepndx0CSame make/model as ESEL 168

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE Sm 506 Stnb Inat Wl-y 41 169 2VA-AH-0025 Train A ND Pump AHU AUX 695 GG/59 tnb nat akB 1

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm 635 Sady Itc WakB p25 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NI-PU-0009, which has an

>LM Sree e

PE 169 2RN-HX-0023 Train A NI Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/58Sady ItcSak9 p25 IEESW p25

>LMSree e

PE Rrn 635 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NI-PU-0009, which has an

>LM Sree e

PE 170 2RN-HX-0025 Train A NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler AUX 716 HS9Standby Intact Walk-By p

2 4 5

>RPEMEScreeed(per2P5t Page 51 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDE Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBo SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPF**

Key Failure Mode**

171 2RN-VA-O279B Unit 2 Aus Bldg Ventilation Return AUX 750 Rm 830 Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEER, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEEt Isolation KM/es 172 ORN-VA-0147AC 1A/2A RN Disch to RC S-Over Isol AUX 716 Rmp60n Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included ie IPEEE, p 776

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 173 5RN-VA-0148A SA/2A RN Essential Return Header AUX 716 FF/39 Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEtEE, p776

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE to SNSWP 2A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Rm 647 174 2RN-VA-5286A Isolation AUX 733 FP/es Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786

>RLOM Screened per IPEtE lA RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return 175 1RN-VA-0286A IoainAUX 733 EE/5n Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776

>RLGM Screened per IPEER Unit 1 Non-ESS Return Isolation to Rm 6026ERO cendprPt 176 1RN-VA-5564A AUX 733F/S Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in FREEE, p 776

>LMSree e

PE SNSWPFF5 177 2EPE-MX-EMXB 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 73Rmn 724 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per IPEEt GG/B6 178 2CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Aus 716 Closed Open Walkdown Screens out based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6E41 Isolation from circulating water Table 2-4 Screens out based on EF61 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RM ScendprERNP64 178 a 2CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Value Ass 716 Energized On-energized Wulkdown Table 2-4>RM ScenderERNP64 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprERN-64 178 b 2CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve Aus 716 Closed Closed Walkdown Tableceeedpr 2-4-64 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 178 c 2CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 716 Intact Intact Walkdown Table 2-4

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604Z Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 178 d 2CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 716

.Intact Intact Walkdown Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RG ScendprERNP64 178 e 2CA-PS-5385 Pressure Switch Ass 716 Functional Functional Walkdown Tableceeedpr P2-4-64 178f CAPS-39 PessreSwtchAu 76 Fncioal untinal WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 178 CA-S-581 resure with An 76 Fnctonal Funtioal alkownTable 2-4 178 g 2CA-TB-1901 aundto BR' huesRlysA Ass 716 Functional Functional Walkdown HCLPF for relays, SEWs for remainder of cabinet 0.68 Functional Letdown Inboard Containment Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 5,

>RG SrenderPIN-64 17 N-AO3A Isolation ER 732 Open Closed Walkdown Table 2-4 Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, LM Sree prER P64 178 a 2NV-SV-535E Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScendprEINP04 Page 52 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBo SEWS.

Screening Notes H-CLPF**

Key Failure Mode t

Screens out based or tPRI NP-E045-SL, Rev. 1,

>RM ScendprPRN-E4 179 b 2NV-SV-5351 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RM ScendprPIN-64 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM ScendprtlNFE4 180 2NV-VA-t121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 RHE HtX Room Closed Closed Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScendprPRN-64 180 a 2NV-ML-1250 Mancal Loader AUX 767 control Rm 923 Functional Functional Walkdown Rule-of-the-boy with 2MC10

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 18 N-AO5A Letdown Inboard Containment X72Clsd Coe WadwnScreens out bused on EPRI NP-E041-SL, Rev. 5,

>RG ScenderEINP64 isolation E75clsd Coe WakwnTable 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NF-E041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened p)er EPRI NF-E541 191 a 2NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve EX 752 De-energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4 2NVSV451 olnod alv E

72 c-negied c-negied WakdwsScreens out based on EPRI NF-E541-SL, Rev. 5, SRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E041 581 b N-V47 oeodVleR 5

eeegzd D-nrie akonTable 2-4 18 N-AOBA Letdown Inboard containment R75Cosd Cse WadwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RM ScenderPRN-64 Isolation E75clsd coe WakwnTable 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, EO ceee e

PR PE4 182 a 2NV-SV-4585 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG SrenderEINP64 Screens oat based on EFEI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, RO ceee e

FR PE4 182 b 2NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Dc-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScenderERNP64 183 2N-V-OOSB Exes Ledon soatin X

25 loedClsed WakdwnScreens out based on EFEI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5,

>tLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E541 183 NV-A-025E toces Ltdon iolaton S

78 cosedCloed albownTable 2-4 Screens oat based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, RO ceee e

FR PE4 183 a 2NV-SV-5250 Solenoid Valve EX 725 Dc-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG SrenderERNP64 Instrument Air Blackout Screens oct based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 5, 184 2V1-TK-O0SSUX70 vnatInat Wlkon>LGM Screened per EPEI NP-E545 Accumulator AU 5

natItc akonTable 2-4, Anchorage qualified for 2xSSE 185 2V-12g lakot ccuulto Rlie AX 50 loedClsed WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, vRLGM Screened per EPRI NF-E541 185 V1-328 ElakoctAccmultorRelif AS 70 cosedCloed alkownTable 2-4 Screens oct based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 5G ceee e

PR PE4 186 2VI-1335 Elackoct Header Relief AUS 730 closed closed Walkdown Table 2-4d)r PR N-64 18 V-t8 Ul Vi B/D HDE FLEX AIR SUPPLY Au 5

lsdOe akonScreens out based on FFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6045 18 V-99 CNTRL Table 2-4, Design qualified for 2xS5E 188 2ETA 4 KV Essential Swgr Aax 750 Energized Energized Walkby Included in PEEt, p 795

>RLGM Screened per PEEt

• Page number refers to IPEtE scanned document page.

""HCLFPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLFF esceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (S.26g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened oat from further evaluation.

• • Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per PEEt - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per FFR1 NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6045, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

interaction - Elock Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evalcuated in the IPEtE and therefore the block wall meets the ELOM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage -Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - indicates that functional failure is the gocerning failure mode for the component.

• • • Component adjacent to block wall. Aax building block walls were evaluated in the PEEt as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-2.

However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.

Page 53 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Appendix C MNS FLEX Flow Paths List of Figures Figure C-i. Auxiliary Feedwater System.............................................................. 55 Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System........................................ 56 Figure C-3. Main Steam Header........................................................................ 57 Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System..................................... 58 Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System.......... 59 Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header..............................................................................

60 Page 54 of 60

Expdied eimicEvlutio PocesepoMcUXIrNuLeARY StEDATion YTE Rev. 1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM N*N-S*FETY AUXILIARY ~EE{]WATER 8URIEQ

'CDESE*

CI~Cd.LATI*O TUR~BINE DRIVEN STE*.', OENER*ATO*

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Figure C-i. Auxiliary Feedwater System Page 55 of 60

ExpeitedSeimic valatio PrcessReprt, c

6uReularE Statio RevPL1 Rev. 1 BORATE~ WATER SUPPLY REFUELING WA I ER S'~$IEW

~~%Lfl~

IfR

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Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System Page 56 of 60

MATN STEAM HEAOER Rev. 1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 MAIN STEAM HEALER CS AE S STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER (9:

RE-HEATERS (2ND STAGE; FDWPT Figure C-3. Main Steam Header Page 57 of 60

ExpdiedSeimi Ealutin rocssReort M~uREANCleaR StatioNT AE Rev. 1 REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-JP SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

~SC KOl LE~

C~L~ LL~S M~ 1421 L~

Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System Page 58 of 60

Expditd Sismc Ealutin Poces Rpor, M~uREAC NCOLeArT StatioERe.

Rev. i REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP (LOW PRESSURE~

RESIOJAL HEAT ~E~~vAL SY~TEM HOT LEG CL,,, 3)

(cONY.

Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System Page 59 of 60

S/G SECONDARY FLEX MAKE-UP PUMP CONNECTIONS FEEDWATER SYSTEM TEMPERINO HEADER Rev. I Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 S/C SECOND ARY FLEX MAKE -UP PUMP C~NNE CTIUNS FEEDWATER SYSTEM TEMPER INC H AD H I

L JTI Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header.

Page 60 of 60

Steven D. Capps

~Vice President DUKE McGuire Nuclear Station SENERGY.

Duke Energy MG01VP I112700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 o: 980.875.4805 f: 980.875.4809 Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com 10 CFR 50.54(f)

February 04, 2016 MNS-1 6-008 Attention: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)

McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Subject:

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai~ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340).

2.

NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.

3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13I106A331.

4. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Final Report 3002000704, dated May 2013, Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic.

5. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated December 17, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML15005A085.

frPI

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 04, 2016 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference i to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Reference 2 requesting NRC agreement to delay submittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening, as well as endorsement of the guidance. The delay and industry guidance was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 3).

In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance of the final EPRI Seismic Evaluation Guidance Report 3002000704, dated May 2013, (Reference 4), the ESEP Report for MNS was provided by a letter dated December 17, 2014 (Reference 5). Pursuant to Actions #1 and #2 in Section 8.4, Table 8-1 of Reference 5, the modifications, identified in the ESEP Report have been completed.

In addition, a revised copy of the MNS ESEP Report is provided in the enclosure. The revised report incorporates the walkdown and evaluation information that was not available at the time when the original ESEP report was submitted.

There are no regulatory commitments associated with this letter.

• Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact George Murphy at 980-875-5715.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 04, 2016.

Sincerely, Steven 0. Capps : MNS Revised Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 04, 2016 Page 3 XC:

C. Haney, Region II Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 J.P. Boska, Project Manager (NRR/JLD/JOMB)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 13 F15 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G.E. Miller, Project Manager (CNS & MNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 8 G9A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 J. Zeiler NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station Justin Folkwein American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453

ENCLOSURE I MNS REVISED EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT February 02, 2016 Revision 1 Duke Energy McGu ire Nuclear Station REVISION

SUMMARY

REVISION#

DESCRIPTION 0

INITIAL ISSUE 1

REVISED APPENDICES A AND B TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL FLEX COMPONENTS AND SEISMIC EVALUATION RESULTS Page Ilof 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE........................................................................ 4 2.0 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES................... 4 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL................................................... 6 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL.................................................... 6 3.1.1 ESEL Development....................................................................... 7 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves................................................................. 8 3.1.3 Pull Boxes................................................................................. 8 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets.................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators..................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections.............................................. 9 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation.............................................................................. 9 4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS)............................................ 9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee...................................................9 4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)........................................ 11 5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM).................................................... 13 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected............................................................. 13 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)............................. 15 6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH................................................... 15 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used......................................................... 16 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process................................................................... 17 6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination............................................................ 18 6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL.................................. 18 6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach.............................................................. 19 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach................................................................... 19 6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys..............................................................

20 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings........................................................ 21 6.6 H CLPF C alculation Process................................................................. 21 6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays.......................................................... 21 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes).......................... 24 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS, ADDITIONAL ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH FLEX STRATEGY CHANGES AND NEW COMPONENT INSTALLATION.......................................... 24 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns............................... 24 7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations....................................... 24 7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out.................................. 24 8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS............................................................ 25 Page 2 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 8.1 Supporting Information.................................................................... 25 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications.................................................. 26 8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Component Walkdowns/Evaluations..................................................... 26 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments................................................... 27

9.0 REFERENCES

..................................................................................... 28 APPENDICES APPENDIX A MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX C MNS FLEX Flow Paths FIGURE'S Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4]........................................ 10 Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [4]...................................... 11 Figure 4-3. MNS 5SFE (5% Damping) - Graphical Format..............

............................... 12 Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping)...................................... 12 Figure 5-1. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)................................................................. 15 Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE................................................ 17 TABLES Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4]............................................ 11 Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (i to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)........................ 13 Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping).................................................................. 14 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.......................................... 22 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.......................................... 23 Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions............................................... 27 Page 3 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The MNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.

This summary is derived from the MNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3] (as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]), and Duke Energy MNS Calculation M CC-1612.00-00-0012, Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) [18].

Simplified flow diagrams which depict the FLEX strategy flow paths are included in Appendix C.

Page 4 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Steam Generator (SG) heat removal is achieved during Phase 1 and 2 via the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (TDAFWP) with suction from buried Condenser Circulating Water (RC) system cross-over header (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-i). Later stages of Phase 2 and 3 strategy entails SG cooling water make-up via a portable diesel powered pump with suction from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) and discharge aligned to new SG FLEX supply connections. Refer to Appendix C, Figures C-2, C-4, C-5, and C-6 for FLEX connection locations. The TDAFWP flow control valves and Main Steam (SM) Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are also required to provide SG heat-removal capability (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-3). The Phase 2 SG heat removal is achieved via the credited B.5.b connection (primary) or via the new FLEX mechanical connections located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) doghouses (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-6). The FLEX strategy with steam generators unavailable (i.e., refueling outage) relies on reactor coolant system feed and bleed for Phase land 2. The ESEL was populated with the components credited for Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation.

Reactor coolant system borated make-up during normal operation and outage conditions includes the following primary make-up connections!

High pressure primary make-up via the Safety Injection System (NI) mechanical connection near 2/2NI-152B (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-4).

Low pressure primary make-up via the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system mechanical connection upstream of 2/2ND-35 (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-5).

Borated water suction source FW system mechanical connection (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-2).

Reactor coolant system inventory control relies upon FLEX pump make-up as accommodated by reactor coolant system shrink, passive reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and additional letdown capability via reactor vessel head-vents. The reactor coolant pump seal return outboard containment isolation valve is manually isolated to conserve inventory and maintain leak-off flow within the Reactor Building. To ensure SG continued heat removal capability, the cold-leg accumulator (CLA) block isolation valves are electrically closed during the cooldown to prevent Nitrogen injection into the reactor coolant system.

There are no required Phase 1 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity. The primary Phase 2 FLEX strategy for containment integrity entails repowering one train of Hydrogen igniters. Phase 2 and/or 3 entails repowering of select compartment fans inside of containment.

Later in the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event, the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system must be aligned to maintain containment temperature. This action is accomplished by powering a train of ND and Component Cooling (KC) pumps with a portable generator form the Regional Response Center (RRC). For ND and KC system heat removal, a portable diesel powered FLEX pump is interfaced with the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system to provide a heat sink from the Standby Nuclear Service Page 5 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Water Pond (SNSWP). The portable pump is connected via the bonnet of an RN pump discharge check valve. Cross-train KC and RN isolation valves are credited with manual closure, in order to minimize components exposed to the credited FLEX flow path pressure boundary. Similarly, manual isolation of RN heat-exchangers not required for the FLEX strategy is credited where possible (e.g., Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water (KD) heat-exchangers, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air compressor, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) motor coolers, etc.).

Necessary attendant electrical components are outlined in the MNS FLEX OIP submittal [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [20], [21],

and [22], and primarily entail 600 VAC essential motor control centers, vital batteries, equipment installed to support FLEX electrical connections, and monitoring instrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containment integrity. During the latter stages of Phase 3, the 4.16 kV switchgear is powered up to support residual heat removal (RHR) operation.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively.

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the MNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3],

as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]. The OIP and subsequent updates provides the MNS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21],

and [22]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704.

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core Page 6 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5.

Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:

Structures (e.g., containment, Rx Building, Control Building, AB, etc.)

Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

Manual valves and rupture disks.

Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates

[20], [21], and [22] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc.

Page 7 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that

"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the MNS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power-operated valves:

Powered-operated valves that remainl energized during the ELAP events (such as DC-powered valves) were included on the ESEL, with the exception of various air-operated valves which fail to the required position as a result of the ELAP event.

Power-operated valves not required to change state' as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

Page 8 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."

Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports..." are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEX strategy.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee The MNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) was included in the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. Digitized GMRS frequency and acceleration values from the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. The MNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.

Page 9 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at control poit for McGuire (5% of critical damping 100 1.92E-01 6.48E-O1

-3.05E-01 90 1.95E-01 6.60E-01 3.10E-O1 2.01 E-01 6.86E-.01 3.22E-01 70 2.16E-01 7.50E-01 3.51E-01 60 2,56E-01 9.10E-01 4.24E-01 50 3,37E-01 1.22 E+00 5.65E-01 40 4,03E-01 1.44E+00 6.70E-01 35 4,11E-01 1.45E+00 6.76E-01 S 30 4.06E-01 1.41E+C,0 6.60E-01 25 3.93E-01 1.34E+00 6.29E-01 20 3.84 E-01 I.28E+00 6.03E-01 15 3.65E-01 1.18E+00 5.59E-01 12.5 3.49E-01 1.11E+(03 5.28E-01 10 3,26E-01 1.02E+00 4.86E-01 9

3.09E-01 9.50E--01 4.55E-01 8

2.90E-01 8.75E-01 4.21E-01 7

2.68E-01 7.96E-O1 3.84E-01 6

2.45E-01 7.I1E-01 3.44E--01 5

2.17E-01 6.16E-01 3.00E-01 4

1.80E-O1 4.91E-01 2.41E-01 3.5 1.59E-01 4.24E-0I 2.09E-01 3

1.37E.-01 3..58E-01 1.77E-01 2.5 1.14E-01 2.88E-01 1.43E-01 2

1.05E-.01 2.5-8E.-01 1 29E-01 1.5 8.66E-02 2.06E-01 1.04E-01 1 25 7.49E-02 1.75E-O1 8.86E-02 1

6.47E-02 I.47E-01 7.49E-02 0.9 6.25E-02 1.42E-Ol 724E-02 0.8 6.05E-02 1.38E-O1 7.00E-02 0.7 5.77E-02 1.31E-01 6,69E-02 0.6 5,35E-02 1,.22E-01 6.20E-02 0.5 4.70E-02 1.07E-01 5.4.4E-02 0.4 3.76E-02 8.55E-02 4.35E-02 0.35 3.29E-02 7.48E-02 3.81 E-02 0.3 2.82E-02 6.41E-02 3.26E-02 025 2.35E-02 5.35E-02 2.72E-02 0,2 1.88E-02 4.28E-02 2.18E-02 0.15 1.4LE-02 3.21E-02 1.63E-02 0.125 1.17E-02 2,67E-02 1,.36E-02 0.1 9.39E-03 2.14E-02 1.09E-02 Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [41.

Page 10 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS GMRS 0.8 0.

0.6........

o0

.o..........

U*

i---GM RS U

0.0 0.1 1

10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [41.

The MNS Control Point is located at Elevation 716'-6", which is at the base of the mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings.

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)

A description of the MNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included in Section 3.1 of the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE is tabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.

A comparison of the MNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.

Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4].

Frequency (Hz)

Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.33 0.06 2

0.36 6

0.36 35/PGA 0.15 Page 11 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS SSE 5% Damping 0.40 0.35

~0.0 1/0 0

Figure 4-.MN S (-Dmpn)5SrphclFomt MNS GMRS vs SSE 0.8 rt '7 UJ.I 0.6-0.5

• 0.4 U*0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0

./.......

I I-SSE

--GMRS 0.1 1

10 Frequency (Hz) 100 Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).

Page 12 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [21. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectral acceleration values for the 5%-damped 'SSE horizontal ground response spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectral accelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE ground response spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.

The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown in Table 5-1. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the i to 10 Hz range is at 10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 1.74. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.74. Digitized RLGM frequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-2. The MNS RLGM is plotted in Figure 5-1.

Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)

Frequency SSE GMRS Ratio (Hz)

(g)

(g)

GMRS/SSE 1

0.180 0.075 0.416 2

0.360 0.129 0.358 3

0.360 0.177 0.492 4

0.360 0.241 0.669 5

0.360 0.300 0.833 6

0.360 0.344 0.956 7

0.333 0.384 1.151 8

0.312 0.421 1.349 9

0.294 0.455 1.546 10 0.279 0.486 1.740 Page 13 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)

Frequency Acceleration (Hz)

(g) 0.333 0.104 0.5 0.157 1

0.313 2

0.626 3

0.626 4

0.626 5

0.626 6

0.626 7

0.580 8

0.543 9

0.512 10 0.486 11 0.464 12 0.444 13 0.427 14 0.411 15 0.397 17.5 0.368 20 0.345 22.5 0.325 25 0.308 27.5 0.294 30 0.282 35 0.261 100 0.261 Page 14 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS RLGM S0.4.

• 0.3-R M

0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 1

10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 5-1. MNS RLGM (5% Damping).

5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)

ISRS for the ESEP were estimated by scaling the MNS design-basis SSE ISRS by the RLGM scale factor of 1.74.

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) [7].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [81.

Page 15 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Seismic capacity screening was done using information from the MNS Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9] and supporting documentation (M CC 1535.00-00-0004, Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations [191).

MNS used a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to address the IPEEE.

The SPRA is described in the IPEEE submittal.

Prior to the IPEEE, Duke Energy had performed a SPRA for MNS. The SPRA utilized fragilities calculated in 1981-1983 using the separation of variables methodology, which is one of the methods in EPRI TR-103959 [8]. The calculated fragilities were based on the MNS SSE spectral shape. The IPEEE submittal states that these fragilities were updated where needed based on plant walkdowns and used in the IPEEE SPRA. The fragility calculations are documented in Volumes 4 and 5 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004. Table 3-1 of the IPEEE submittal gives the fragilities used in the IPEEE SPRA. Equipment items listed in the IPEEE Equipment List, contained in Attachment 24 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004, that were not included as fragilities in the SPRA had been screened out on the basis of the median capacity being greater than 2.0g.

The equipment fragilities were based on plant design information, including equipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes considered were functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. The original anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMA walkdowns described below. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMA walkdowns.

Duke Energy also performed a SMA in 1993. The SMA is documented in Volumes 1 and 2 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004 [19]. The SMA consisted of screening walkdowns and anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used the screening tables from Chapter 2 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers trained in EPRI NP-6041-SL (the engineers attended the EPRI SMA Add-On course in addition to the Seismic Qualification Users Group Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course), and were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Seismic demand was the IPEEE Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for SMA (mean NUREG/CR-0098 [11] ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA). A relay review, beyond searching for low-ruggedness relays, was not included in the SMA.

Figure 6-1 shows the mean NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum used as the RLE for the SMA, compared to the RLGM response spectrum. It is seen that the RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 2.0 Hz. The RLE is slightly less than the RLGM at frequencies below about 2.0 Hz. This may be disregarded as there are no MNS SSCs in this frequency range.

Page 16 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 MNS RLGM vs IPEEE RLE 0.1 RLGM IPEEE RLE 0.1 1

10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.

6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The SMA was based on the RLE, which was anchored to 0.3g PGA. The RLE is equal to the RLGM at frequencies from about 2.0 Hz to about 6.0 Hz, and greater than the RLGM at frequencies above about 6.0 Hz. Therefore, any components whose SMA-based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from HCLPF calculations. The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration. The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSE floor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the AB for which new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE [111. Therefore ESEL components which were evaluated in the IPEEF SMA, met the screening caveats, and had anchorage capacity exceeding the RLE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceeds the RLGM.

Most of the non-valve components in the ESEL were screened out based on the SMA results. A few components that did not have CDFM anchorage calculations were screened out on the basis of the HCLPF calculated from the SPRA fragility.

In the SMA, valves were documented as a group rather than as individual components with individual documentation. The screening for valves proceeded differently.

Page 17 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i The Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESEL contain approximately 220 valves in total, both power-operated (MOV and AOV) as well as relief valves. Per Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g peak spectral acceleration without any review other~than looking for valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping, and anchorage is not a failure mode. Therefore, valves on the ESEL which are listed in the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List may be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination. Power-operated valves were addressed both in the IPEEE fragility calculations and in the SMA. In the fragility calculations, all of the valves on the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List were screened out on the basis of median capacity exceeding 2.0g. In the SMA, the valves were found to meet EPRI NP-6041-SL, Figures F-25 and F-26 (thus meeting the 1.2g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria) or to exceed the RLE floor response spectra on the basis of vendor seismic qualification reports. The IPEEE SMA covered approximately 360 valves in Unit 1. The walkdowns focused on MOVs on small diameter piping and valves at high elevations in the plant. Comparison with Unit 2 showed that the conclusions of the Unit 1 review applied to the corresponding Unit 2 valves. Relief valves were not explicitly included in the IPEEE review except for PORVs, both steam (SV) and reactor coolant (NC), which met the criteria. Spring-operated relief valves are considered to meet the EPRI NP-6041-SL 0.8g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria without explicit review. On the basis of the above, most of the ESEL valves were screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1 ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were not screened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministic EPRI NP-6041-SL CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/or anchorage evaluations.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, and seismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determined using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF anchorage capacities were determined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF seismic interaction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL The components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL, Table 2 4. For components not located on the basemat of the Auxiliary or Reactor Buildings, the ISRS were used for the screening; therefore, the screening levels of EPRI NP-6041-SL were increased by a factor of 1.5 per EPRI 1019200, Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update [17]. Thus, the accelerations for the screening levels were 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.

Page 18 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i The SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.74 throughout the frequency range and were then clipped (per EPRI 1019200), using the methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q, and the North-South and East-West clipped peaks were averaged.

6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for the SMA process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open.cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component for each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner.

For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the Page 19 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI [Seismic Interaction1]

problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection."

6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys Many of the components were walked down previously during IPEEE evaluations and have documented Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) recording the results. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed by qualified Seismic Review Teams. A walk-by of these components was performed and documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that the component and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown and to verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may have developed since the original walkdown.

Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previously walked down during the IPEEE and for some ESEL items which did not have a specific SEWS in the IPEEE documentation.

Masonry walls in the AB were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet the RLE demand; therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity of masonry walls to ESEL components were noted on the SEWS forms. Masonry walls in proximity to ESEL equipment were verified to have been included in the IPEEE evaluation and determined to not be a credible failure mode for the ESEP.

1 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."

Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]."

Page 20 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings All of the ESEL components were determined to have an existing capacity greater than the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. These components require modification in order to have a capacity greater than the RLGM.

6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the following steps:

• Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included in previous seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions;

• Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL as described in Section 6.2; and

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in MCM-1612.00-0059.001 [10]. HCLPF results and key failure modes for ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations are included in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays There are no relays on the ESEL that provide seal-in/lock-out capability for Phase 1 equipment; therefore, no functional evaluation of relays was required.

Page 21 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.

Problem Description Unit ESEL ID Equipment #

Bldg Modification/Recommendation 1

23 EHM-HR-TB27 RB Flex Conduit running between Required Modification: Add metal ties to EHM-HR-TB29 igniter boxes not supported for band cable to overhead cable tray.

approximately 15 ft.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 23 EHM-HR-TB29 RB Flex conduit from TB29 not tied Required Modification: Add metal ties to into cable tray.

band cable to horizontal and vertical potions of this wall-mounted tray near 900 bends.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 24 EHM-TB-0589.

AB Secure load path:

Required modification:

Cabinet mounting tabs do not span Install Unistrut washers under mounting Unistrut.

tabs.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

i 48 1SV-VA-00019AB AB Interaction issue:

Required modification:

A test or vent off port at top of Modify to achieve adequate clearance.

subject valve has been rubbing on side of support structure.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 AB Secure load path: Pressure Required modification:

indicator PI-937 on MC11 is missing Install hold down clip on instrument.

hold down clip.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 67 EQ.B-PN-DGLSA AB Potential interaction:

Required modification:

Unistrut between DGLSA and ATC7 Adjacent cabinets cross-braced together.

results in negligible clearance.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

AR = Auxiliary Building DH =DogHouse RB = Reactor Building Page 22 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.

Unit ESEL ID EDB ID Bldg Problem Description Modification/Recommendation 2

18 NI-VA-OO65B RB Potential interaction: Conduit and Required modification:

connecter to motor are in contact with Modify to achieve adequate adjacent structural support, clearance.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

2 51 SV-CV-OOO1AB DH Soft target:

Required Modification:

Position indicator cable is tight and Trim grating away from cable.

rubbing against floor grating.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

2 78 NC-RD-5870 RB Cable support:

Required modification:

Loop of signal cable supported by Move coil back and support from resistance temperature detector (RTD).

structural member or cable tray to Subject RTD tubing is bent due to weight remove load on RTD.

_______of cable.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

AB = Auxiliary Building DH = DogHouse RB =Reactor Building Page 23 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Appendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables:

• For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."

• For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] screening tables, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per EPRI N P-6041."

For items where interaction with masonry walls controls, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction - Block Wall s."

For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional."

For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."

.7.0 Inaccessible Items, Additional Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New Component Installation 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns All ESEL items were accessible for walkdowns except the Units 1 and 2 diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. These tanks are not accessible for visual inspection since they are buried below grade. Walk-bys of the yard areas above the tanks were performed to check for visible outliers or potential seismic interaction hazards.

7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations Seismic capability walkdowns and screening evaluations remain outstanding for components which were added to the ESEL as a result of subsequent changes to the FLEX mitigation strategy, and associated with new FLEX component installations. These outstanding walkdowns and evaluations are denoted as "to be done" (TBD) in Appendices A and B.

7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out The remaining ESEL component walkdowns and screening evaluations were completed within the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

The outstanding modifications listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 will be completed and closed-out in accordance with the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

Page 24 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information MNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall MNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismic hazards show that there [...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants..." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]

concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the G1-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in G1-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for MNS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [14] also apply to MNS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

Page 25 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Safety factors applied in design calculations; Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs; Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations; Broadening criteria forlISRS; Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications; Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis; Bounding requirements in codes and standards; Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel);

Bounding testing requirements; and Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the 5SE.

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications Tables 6-1 and 6-2 identify the remaining modifications to be made in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2] to enhance the seismic capacity of the plant.

8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Component Walkdowns/Evaluations Plant modifications will be completed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13], which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.

Completion of the remaining ESEL component walkdowns and evaluations will be completed within the same timeframe outlined for modification completion.

Page 26 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments The actions Listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.

Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions.

Action #

Action Description Completion Date 1

Complete remaining modifications, Follow-up actions will be completed as ESEL walkdowns/evaluations for follows:

Unit 1 components listed in a

December 31, 2016 (if action Table 6-1.

completion does not require a refueling outage) 2 Complete remaining modifications, The end of the second planned ESELwaldown/evluatonsforrefueling outage after December 31, Unit2 coponnts iste in2014 (if action completion requires Table 6-2.

outage) 3 Submit a letter to NRC confirming Within 60 days following completion of ESEP implementation of modifications activities for items 1 and 2.

associated with items 1 and 2.

Actions 1 and 2 have been completed.

Page 27 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i 9.0 References

1)

Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.

2)

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.

3)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With Regard To Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

4)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

dated March 20, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

5)

Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

6)

USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-10 CFR 50.54(f),"

June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

7)

A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

8)

Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

9)

Letter from T. C. McMeekin to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370; Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal," dated June 1, 1994, Duke Power, Huntersville, NC.

Page 28 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1

10)

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at McGuire Nuclear Station, Appendix D, "HCLPF Calculations," dated October 2014, Rev. 1, ARES Corporation Report No. 030319.13.02.11-001, Duke Energy Document No. MCM-1612.00-0059.001.

11)

Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-O098.

12)

Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.

13)

Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.

14)

Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.

15)

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 2013, EPRI 1025287.

16)

Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations,"' May 7, 2013.

17)

Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.

18)

Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL), Revision 2, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, Calculation MCC-1612.00 0012.

19)

Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations, 1994, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, 1994, Calculation No. MCC-1535.00-00-0004.

20)

Letter from Steven Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

Page 29 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. i

21)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

22)

Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

Page 30 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Appendix A MVNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 31 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPP Results ESEL ID 1.

2 3

4 5

7 8

10 11 EQUIPMENT EDB Description SFW-VA-0532B Refueling Water Rocirn Pump Suction Isolation SPW-VA-0055A Refueling Water Recirn Pump Suction Isolation 1FW-VA-t051A Refueling Water Recirn Pump Suction Isolation aND-VA-tO05t ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs 1ND-VA-O06l ND Relief-Hetlegs 1ND-VA-O064 ND Relief - 'B' Coldiegs SNI-VA-0lSB NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg SNI-VA-Si51 NI Relief-B' Train Hotleg SNI-VA-OlBS NI Relief-Coldieg 0RN-VA-5507A SNSWP Supply to Units 1 &, 2 SNV-VA-OS95B NC Pumps SealIWater Return Coot AUN AUX AUX AUX AUN AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 750 750 733 733 733 733 750 733 716 733 Rm 611 KK/S3 Rm 815 J /Si Rm 730 GG/52 EE/52 tRa 730 HH/S2 Rm 602 GG1/52 Rmn 617 HH/52 Rm 730 JJl51 tRa 601 AA/63 Rm 602 EE/52 AUX 760 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By jul5s1 Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Cloned Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open/Closed Closed OPERATING STATE Walkdown or Bldg EL Locution Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS?

Screening Notes HCLPF**

Key Failure Mode**

Walk-By Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By Walk-By p

7 7 2 Included in ]PE6E, p 772 p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772 p 772 Included in IPEER, p 772 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL., Rev. 1.,

Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, AppendiuC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, AppendiuC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 77B p

7 7 5

Included in IPEEE, p 775

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLG3M

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>R1GM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-B541 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPERE 12 1CV-22CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Ro Cavity' Wisdom Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, Rev. 1, vRM ScendprERN-64 Isolation Valve R

77BCSieCoe OpnadCsd Wlkwn Appendix C Table 2-4 275° 176 13 1CV-23CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Ru Cavity' Wisdom Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, vLMSree e PR Isolation Valve R

77B-SieCoe OpnadCsd Wakwn Appendix C Table 2-4 273' 176 14 1NC-A-OO34ANC System Pressurizer PDRV RX 88 Pressurizer Cavity lsd Oe n

lsd Wl-y p73 Icue nIEE 7

RG cendprER P64 Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls RN BBy0lsd OpnadClsd WlkB 773nlde5nREEp 7

15 1NI-VA-O43SA 1NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply RN 756 SA CLA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPREEE, p 775

>RLI3M Screened per IPEEE from SA CLA (MDV) 46° 466 Reference it, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Structural 16 1FW-TK-OS01 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard

>760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461).

Meets RLGM Screened per IPEEE 17 1NI-VA-O054A lA CLA Block Valve (MDV)

RN 733 Pipe Chase Oe

-4 Coe akB 7

nlddi PEp74>LM Sree e

PE 421'V-O5B1 L

lckVle{O)

X 73 Pp 47Rs Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE lB 1NI-VA-OO765 lB CIA Block Valve (MDV)

RN 733 PieCae Oe

-4 Coe akBy p74 Icue noEE 7

RLGM Screened per [PEEE 224'V-OBB1 L

lckVle(O)

X 73 Pp 486s Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE 21 iEHM-TP-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUN 750 CC/46 Off Functional Walk-By p 74 Neeqien-upadIEESWSvlato.

>LMcrneprIPE 22 SEHM-PN-HMPPA H2 Igniter Power Panel AUN 750 CC/46 Standby Punctinnal Walkdown

'eeec R0 ounded by evaluation of 1EHM-TB-SBB.

>RL0M Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C SEHM-HR-TBO3A'TanHgotrReeec10Noinepreedaabs.TsetoSUT 25 thru TB71 (Odd A'rio2Intr RLGM Undetermined Nmesol)(35 Igniters per Train)

RN Various Various Do-energized Punctional Walkdown ReeecAppendix 0C TRO.N~

neprec aabs.Tse oSUT 2B 1HMSX-MBA oltgeRe Byas Sitc AX 50 BD Deenegied Funtina WakdwnReference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 23 a1EHMSN-HBPA oltae Re Bypss SitchAUN 30 TD Deenerized PuncionappaednwiAppedix Tabe22-Page 3,2 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MINS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID BOB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS*

Screening Notes H-CLPF**

Key Failure Mode***

Rfrne Screens out based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, ten. 1, 23 b 1EIHM-VR-HRMA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 TED Dc-energized Functional Walkdown Apeni Tablevati CLFbsdonUit2vlenn.ve02 untoa Appendix C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 iCA-HX-BOS0 TDCAP tearing Dii Cooler AUX 716 BB/Si Idle Fonctional Walk-By p 542

>RLGM Screened per ]PEEE 27 1A-PU503 TOCAP (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine 27 1AP-03 Driven Pump)

AUX 716 BB/Si Idle Functional Walk-By p 242

>tL.GM Screened per FREEE 27 a iSA-TB-OSS3 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By tale-of-the-boo with 1CA-PU-0OO3, which has an

>BLGM Screened per PEEt IPEEE SEWS 27 b 1SA-VA-t554 TDCAP Steam Control Valve AUX 716 BR/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rueo-h-o ib1AP-5S>hc oo RLGM Screened per IPEEE PEEt SEWS 27 c iSA-SGV-lOSS TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-PU-5OO3, which bosoan

>RLGM Screened per FREEE IPEtE SEWS 27 d iSA-GS-tOO3 Gear Reducer AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Punctional Walk-By Rueo-h-o>ihiA-USSwihhsa RLGM Screened per IFPEEE IPEER SEWS 28 1CA-PN-AFTP TDCAF Control Panel AUX 716 BB/52 n/a Available Walk-By p 1B7

>ELGM Screened per IPEEB TOCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 77P/OClndDe WakB p77 IcudinPEp77tLMSrndprIEE 29 lSA-VA-SS4BABC (ADV)

(DH2) 76FFSClsdOe Waky p77 InlddiIPEp77>LMcrndpr EE 29 a iSA-SV-5480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve InerDoh2us to F5 nrie e-nrie akon Rforence 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 InerDoHous 77P/SEegzd D-nrid Wakon Appendix C Table 2-4 29 b 1SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Inner Dohue 77F/Eegzd D-nrie akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, 9ev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B541 Rm BOG 55 iSA-VA-tOSS TDCAP Trip-Throtile Valve AUS 716 Dpen Dpen Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEER, p 771

>RLGM Screened per IPEBE AA/B2 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 54 iVl-VA-O032 1AV9setawHrSpl rm G AX 73R 719 ClsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1,

>R1GM Interaction - Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig)

AUFF3p/53 ClsdCoe akon Appendix C Table 2-4 55 iVl-VA-t534 in le Rseltief (115 puigy)roV AUX 733 GG/54 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Itrcin-BokWl Inle Relef (15 pig)Appendix C

Table 2-4 Re1I-A012 1

le (115 psig)Isr ntArTn AUX 733 Pp/OS1 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 1,>RM SrenderEINP64 Relif (15 psg)

F/B3AppendixC Table 2-4 37 1 V-14 A VI Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUrn~i Clse1loe9Wk Reference 13, Screens out based on EPtI NP-6S4i-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprERN-Bi Relief (115 psig)

FP/S3 AppendixC Table 2-4 31ii-AQiS i

VI Auo Bldg Instrument Air Tank Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-BS4i-SL, Rev. 1,

>RM ScendprPlN-B4 Relief (115 psig)

AU 3

GS lndCoe akon AppendiuC Table 2-4 39 llV-0S EBVl Aun Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 GG/S5 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL. Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-tt41 Relief (115 psig)

AppendiuC Table 2-4 lSM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Duter Doghouse D/4CoeCd Wkd Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 5,

>LG ScendprERN-04 40 iiV-59 (120 puig)

(DHi) 70Appendix C

Table 2-4 Page 33 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and H-CLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg iSM-7AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 41 1iV-55 (120 psig)

(DHi)

SSM-3ABC VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 42 11V-05 (120 psig)

(DH2) 15W-SAG Vi Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 43 iiV-05 (120 psig)

(DH2)

TDCA Flow control to 1A SI and 44 1CA-VA-1564AB AUX Associated Pneumatic Controls 44 a SCA-ML-5540 Manual Loader AUX 44 b iCA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 44 c 1CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX 44 d iCA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 44 a 1CA-SV-5540 Solenoid Value AUX 44 f iCA-SV-5641 Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flow Control to lB SG and 43 1CA-V-SIS2ARAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU 45 a 1CA-ML-5525 Manual Loader AUX 45k S CA-SS-1521 Selector Switch AUX 450 1CA-MT-5S20 Misc Transmitter AUX 45 d iCA-VP-0520 Valve Fositioner AUX 45 a iCA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUXt 45Sf 1CA-SV-0B21 Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flaw Control to 1C SG and 46 iCA-V-OS4BABAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU 460 i CA-ML-5460 Manual Loader AUX 46Gb iCA-SS-5480 Selector Switch AUX 45 c SCA-MT-54R5 Misc Transmitter AUX 46 d 1CA-VP-54B0 Valve Positioner AUX 45 e iCA-SV-t480 Solenoid Value AUX 46Sf 1CA-SV-g4Ri Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flaw Control tol ID S and 47 iCA-V-OSOSARAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWSa Screening Notes HICLPF**

Key Failure Mode*

0 790

~~~~~~~~Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI FJF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RM ScendprPRN-64 Appendix C Table 2-4 7O DO/S2 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based an EFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-5541 750Appendis C

Table 2-4 716 5w60Open OeThotd/

Walk-By p 771 Included in FREtE, p 771

>RLGM Screened per IPEtt BR/S0 Closed 767 716 716 716 716 716 716 757 716 716 716 716 716 716 767 716 716 716 Control Rm 623 Rm 600 Rw 600 Rm 600 BR/SI Sm 600 RB/SI Rm 600 BR/So Rm 600 RB/SI Control Rm 625 Rm BOO RB/Si Sm 600 BR/Si Rm 601 BR/Si Sm 601 RB/Si Sm 650 BR/Bi Rm BOO BR/Si Control Sm 626 Rrn 601 RB/Si Rm 600 RB/Si Sm 601 BR/Si Functional Functional Walk-Ry Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-B y Energized REnergizad Walk-By Energized Energized Walk-By Opn Open/Throttled/

WakB Functoa Fuctinloe Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-Ry Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By tnergized Energized Walk-By tnergized Energiced Walk-Ry Opn Open/Throttled/

WakB Funtina FuCtional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O Rule-of-the-bus with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-64AR Bale-of-the-boy with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-She-boo with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-64AB p

7 71 Included in IFEEE, F 771 Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O Role-of-the-boo with 1CA-S2.AR Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-S2AB Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-S2AB Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-S2AR Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2AB p 771 Included in IPEEO, p 7 7 1 Rule-of-the-boo with iMC1O Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-46AR Rule-of-the-bus with 2CA-48AB Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-4RAB Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-4SAB Rule-of-She-hon with 2CA-4OAB p 771 Included in PEtE, p 771

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened perlPtEt Screened perlP~EE Screened perliPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlFEEt Screened periFREt Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPERE Screened perlPEER Screened per PEER Screened perlFEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPFEEE Screened perlP~EE Screened perlFEEt Screened perlFEEt Screened perIPBEE Screened per PEER 7156m 0

Energized Energized Walk-By RB/Si 716 Sm60 Energized Energized Walk-By 716 SmBDOpen pe/hotd/

Walk-By 4A/43 Closed

>RLGM

>RLIM Page 34 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL. and H-CLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdowe or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPF*

Key Failure Modenee 47 a 1CA-ML-0560 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Em 925 Functional Fanctional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O

>RLGSM Screened per IPEER 47 1A-S-36 SeecorwichAU 71 E 60 untinal Fuctonl al-ByRue-f-hebo wih CAOBB RLM Srene pr00R AA/43 Em 600 47c 1CA-MT-0965 Misc Transmitter AUX 716

/Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box wish iCA-36AB

>ELGM Screened per ]PEEt Em 600 47 d 1CA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 M/3Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with SCA-S6AB

>RLGM Screened per PEtEE 47 f OCA-SV-03E1 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Em 600 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10,

>RLGSM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C lA SG Main Steaw P0EV and Outer Doghouse Open/Throttled/

48 DSV-VA-O019AB Aso5tdPe5tc otos (H) 89 GG0/44 Closed Clsd Walk-By p 294

>RLGSM Screened per IPEER 1800G Main Steam P0EV and Inner Doghouse FF5Oloe pen/Throttled/

WakB p29 49 1SV-VA-0013AB 80oFS lsd akB 9

RLGM Screened per IPEER Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2)

Closed SC SG Main Steam P0EV and Inner Doghouse Open/Thrcttled/

WakB p29 S0 SV-VA-OS7ABC 609 FF/52 Closed WakBoB24>LOM Screened per [PEER Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2)

Closed 1

S-A0 1

0B 1

SC Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse (09 G/44 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 294

>LMSree e

PE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DHi)

Closed 52 SBPL-FN-EVDA Vital Battery 120 VDC Distribution OLS cendprFE 2 1E-P-DA Panel AUX 703 DD/S4 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212>RGSrendelPE 52 a 1EP-PN-VDD Vital Battery 120 VDC Distribution Panel AUX 733 BB/07 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212

>LMSree e PE 53Rm 707 Reference 1_0

-LM 0 0 Itrcin-BokWl 53 B0PL-BA-RVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C54Functional Functional Walkdown Appendixteatin Coc Wl 5 0E-B-VS Vital Battery Charger and Charger Em 73 r 701 Eucinl Fntinl Wldw eference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,0.5Fntoa Connection Boo ECES B8/04 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 1EPE-MX-RMXA2 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 700 99/46 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE SB SEPE-MX-EMXA4 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/47 Functional Functional Walk-By p 92

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 57 OBPE-MX-EMXH 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 FF/SB Functional functional Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per FREEE Em 705 SB DBPE-MX-EMXB4 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 733 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per IFEEE BB/46 1ETp-CA-00O8 (S9 CB)

Pzr P0EV Relay/Indication AUX 750 CC/SO Standby Functional Walk-By p 216

>RLGM Screened per IPEER Main Control Board Cabinet for 60 1BOA-PN-MC9 Head-Vent Operation, HotleE AUX 767 Control Em 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 8B

>RLGM Screened per IPEREE Temperature Indication

61.

1EOA-FN-MC7 HS Igniter Control Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 929 Standby Functional Walk-By pB 86E>LGM Screened per FREEE 6 1E

-N-C0Main Control Board Cabinet for CA/

AUX 767 Control Em 923 Standby Functixnal Walk-By pB8BRG ceee e PE NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 63 SEOA-PN-MCSS System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 920 Standby Functional Walk-By FE 86 RLGM Screened per IPEER Indication Page 35 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit S ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Waikdown or ESEL Io teD Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS 0

Screening Notes H-CLPF 0

Key Failare Mode 0 00 Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 64 StOA-PN-MC2 System (PORy Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Stondby Fanctional Walk-By p 86

.>RLI3M Screened per IPEEL Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet for ICCM a 1EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 7B7 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p SB

>RLGM Screened per [PEEL ICCM Remote Display ICCM b SEIA-CA-9211 Train A Retonte Display Processor AUX 7B7 Control Sm 925 Standby Punctional Walkdnwn Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6541 behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4 ICMc II-A92 ri eoeDslyPoesr AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Waibdawn Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per SPR1 NP-6041 behind 2MC2 Appendio C Table 2-4 ICCM d 1EIA-P-9250O Train A Remote Display ICCM a 1EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display ICCM f 1LIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-S6 Cabinet ICCM g 1EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-S6 Cabinet 65 IlE-CA9010 SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Blank Valves 65 1

Closure Permissive) 66 SIPE-CA-9025 SSPS Cabinet 'B' (CLA Block Valves Closure Permissive) 67 1IEIB-PN-DGLSA Various Punctions (iLe. H2 Igniters) 120 VAC Inst and Control 65 IEPG-PN-R*KVA Pnior 69 1EPG-BI-EVlA Vital Inserter 70 1F-LT6550 Steam Generator NR Level Indication Loop 1 Steam Generator NR Level 71 1F-LT5540 Indication Loop 2 Steam Generator NR Level 72 SP-LT5570 Indication Loop S Steam Generator Nt Level 73 1P-LT6050 Indication Loop 4 74 SSM-PT-50B0 Steam Generator 61 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 740a 1CA-PN-AFPA SA CA Pump Control Panel 75 1SM-PT-5i10 Steam Generator #2 Wide Range Pressore Indication Loop 76 SSM-PT-5140 Steam Generator 63 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 760a 1CA-PN-AFPB 19 CA Pomp Control Panel 77 1SM-PT-5170 Steam Generator 64 Wide Range pmessurm Indication Loop 78 1C-RDSSSS Steam Generator 61 NC WR T-Hot Indication Loop 79a iC-CASolo Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Cabinet Train A 79 1C-RD5570 Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-Hot Indication Loop AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX RX SX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX SX Ann RX 767 767 750 750 767 767 750 733 733 739 742 741 744 7S0 716 733 735 716 750 740 767 740 Control Sm 925 Control Sm 925 CC/S s cc/S S Control Sm 925 cc/54 Control Sm 925 cc/54 Sm 503 BB/51 Sm 701 DD/54 Sm 701 CC/SO Anosm 1A Sm or° 4SR Accum SB Rrm 146° 49R Accum SC Sm 2S4° SSS Accum iD Sm 32B° SBR DD/44 Sm 560 BB/51 Rm 702 DD/53 Rm 702 DD/53 Sm 655 CC/Si Rmn 802 00/45 24° 355 86/49 164° 30R Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Nominal 120 VAC Output Nominal 120 VAC Output Indication Indication Indication Indication Indication Standby Indication Indication Standby Indication lndicat ion Standby Indication Functional Functional Fu notion a Functional Functional Punctional Funcoti onal Potnctis ona Fsnctional Indication Indication Indication Indication Indication Functional Indication Indication Functional Indication Indication Pan ctin ona Indication Walk-By Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walk-B y Walk-By Walkdonm Walk-Sy Walk-By Walkdown Walkdomn Walkdown Walkdwnn Waikdown Walk-By Walkdown Waikdown Walk-By Waibdown Walkdown Walkdwnn Walkdown Role-of-nba-boo with 1MCS, which ban an IPEEE SEWS Sole-of-the-boo with 1MC1, which has an IPEEE SEWS Reference SO, Screens oct based on EPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 511 p 11 Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6045-SL, Rev. 1, Appendis C Table 2-4 p 203 p 65 Reference 10, Screens ant based on EPSI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-5541-SL, Rev. 5, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference SO, Screens out based on EPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, AppendioC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens act based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendin C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6045-SL, Sen. 1, AppendinxC Table 2-4 p 150 Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-B541-SL, Rev. 5, Appendlo C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5, AppendisxC Table 2-4 p 150 Reference SO, Screens oct based on SPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI-NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendin C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 5, Appendin C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Screened Screened 0.29 0.29

>RLGM

>RLGM 0.29 vRLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM vRLGM 0.37

>RLGM Paunction al Functional Screened per IPEER Screened per IPSEEE Funot innnl Screened per IPSEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEER Screened per IPSEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per [PEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Functional Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Page 36 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Waikdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL.

Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPP**

Rep Failere Mode 0 0 Steam Generatorf#3 NC WR T-HotReeee10Srenou aeonERNP64-LRv.,

B0 1NC-RD-9590 RX 740 203° 30R indication Indication Walkdown Reeec>0 cen u

ae nER P64-L e.1 RLGM Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator #4 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 91 1NC-RD-5920 55 740 306° 30R Indication Indication Waibdown RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4

1. 2 OSP-50 Containment NR Pressure AU 5

DS niain Idcto akonReference 10, Screens out based on SFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprERN-64 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 NC3WRNCessT-zer2PrsAure r73302Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1.,

nRG SceedprPRN-64 NC1CPT52 WRPrssrierPesur3 R

72Indication indication Walkdown AppendixeendCpeTable P-204 indication Loop CC/46 Apni al Process Control Cabinet 1 Control Rm 925 Iniaon ndctn WlkB pB>RM B4 SEIA-CA-900AX 76Sniaio niaiolakBOp1 RG Screened per ]PEtE (7300 Cabinet)

AUA/S45

~~

~ ~~

S~A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil>RM ScendprPE 35 1DT-06Storage Tank yard

<760 N/A Intact/Availuble Intact/Available Walk-By pOSE>LM cend e

PE lB Diesel Generator Foel Oii ad

<6

/

natAalbe itc/vial akB 5

66 1FD-TK-0057 yr

<70NA nttAaiaeInatAaabe Wk-y p56>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Storage Tank 600 VAC Essential for H12 Skimmer Sm 803 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, 87 1EPE-MX-EMXA3 Pan lA Soction Isolation Valve AUX 750 Clsd Coe akon>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 1VXOA (04A)

BB/43 lsd Cosd Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4 650 VAC Essential for 112 Skimmer 86 1EPE-MX-EMXB5 Fan lB Suction Isolation Valve AUX Sm3733Closed Closed WalkdownRfrneiSresotbsdon>ER P64-SRv uLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6t41 1VX2B (01C)

BB/47 Appendix C Table 2-4 89 1EE-MXEMXC600 VAC Essential Vt/VX (04C, 06D

&SOSD) 90 1EE-MXEMXD600 VAC Essential for Vt/VS (GEE &

90 1B6-MXEMXD SOD)

H2 Skimmer Fan SA Section 91 1VX-VA-0001A Isolation Valve 92 1VX-AH-O003 Hydrogen Skimmer Pan No lA H2 Skimmer Pan 16 Suction 93 SVX-VA-OOO2B Isolation Valve 64 1VX-AH-5054 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No lB 1VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan SA 95 (1RAF-D-2)

Dumper 66 1VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Pan SA 97 1VE-XP-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan lA 66 1VE-XF-tO05 Annulus Ventilation Fan 18 99 1K-PU-003 61 Closed Cooling Water System Pump 100 1C-PU-O04 82 Closed Cooling Water System Pomp 101 1KC-TK-0059 Component Cooling Water System Surge Tank 102 1KC-VA-0OSOA KCAuoiliary Bldg Suppiy Non-Essential Isolation 103 KC-A-O30A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-103 1C-VA-230A Essential Isolation 104 1KC-VA-OoO1A KCAutiliary Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation 105 1C-VA-OO3A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation AUX AUX 5X RX tX RX 55 RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 700 733 831 616 631 610 773 773 767 767 733 733 767 710 750 733 733 Sm 603 Sm 705 66/32 265° 43R 272° 47R 279' 49R 268' 47R 270° 50R 273° 50R ilJ/Si NHH/52 HH/57 HH/57 J1J/97 li/S5 li/so HH/OS HH/SS Closed Closed Closed Off Closed Off Closed Off Off Off On On Intact/

In-Service Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Dpes On Open On Open On On On On On Iota ct/

In-Service Closed Closed Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 Walk-By p 32 Wakon Reference 10, Wakon Appendix C Wakon Reference 10, Wakon AppendixoC Wakon Reference 10, Appendix C Walkdown Reference 10, Appendix C Rule of tbe boo witb 1VX-AH-O001 which bus IPl Walk-By SEWS Walk-By p

4 3 4 Reference 10, Screens out based on SPR1 NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1, Wakon Appendix C Table 2-4 Walkdomn Reference 10, Screens out based en EPRI NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Walk-By p 255 Walk-By p 255 Walk-By p3526 Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEtE, p 7 7

S Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 Walk-By p

7 7 3

Included in ]PEER, p 773 Walk-By p 308

>RLOM

>RLGM 0.60 0.39 0.44

>RLGM

>SLGM 0.33 0.45 Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Functional Anchorage P usnctlonai Ancborage Screened perIPSEEE Screened periPEEt Anchorage Anehorag#e Screened perlIPEEE Screened perlPEtEE Screened perlPtEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPREEE Screened periPEEE

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM Page 37 of 60 Page 37 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description lOB 1KC-HX-O0055 Train A Component Cooling Water HXt 107 1NC-VA-O052B NC System Pressurizer PORV l0t 1NC-VA-OOB6B NC System Pressurizer PORV 109 1NC-VA-SSS1 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 110 iNC-VA-tOSD Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 111 iNC-VA-tOSS Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 112 1ND-PU-0551 Train A ND Pump 113 lND-PU-5O02 Train B ND Pump 114 1ND-HX-SOS0 Train A ND HO 115 1ND-HX-OO04 Train B ND HO 118 iNO-HX-SOO5 Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HO 117 1ND-VA-OBOSAC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation 118 iND-VA-OSOiB RHR Pump Hotieg Suction Isolation 119 NI-V17SA Train A RHR Isolation to the Coildegs Train B RHR Isolation to the 120 1NI-VA-Ol7tB Coldiegs 121 iNI-VA-OliSA Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegn 122 1NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs 123 1NI-VA-Ol5OB Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 124 1NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hatlegs 125 1NI-VA-O162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 128 1NI-PU-O059 Train ANI Pump 127 1NI-PU-5S1B Train B NI Pump 128 iNS-PU-BO0l Train A NO Pamp 129 1NS-PU-O002 Train B NO Pump 150 iNS-HX-SOO3 Train A NO Heat Bxchanger 131 1NS-HX-0004 Train B NO Heat Exchanger 132 OSM-VA-007AB Train A MSIV OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPF**

Key Failure Mode 0 0 0 AUO 750 BRX RX RX AUO AUX AUX AUX AUO tX tX AUO AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUO 815 801 BOB 80B 801 B95 695 7500 750 695 745 745 733 733 716 742 716 750 733 716 716 695 690 750 750 792 JiJ/SB Pressurizer Cavity 110' 329 Pressurizer Cavity l0t' 329 Pressurizer Cavity 105' 359 Pressurizer Cavity 131' SOB Pressurizer Cavity 101' SOB BRa SOS FF/54 BRa 501 GG/54 BRa 733 LL/S2 Rm 732 LL/B2 Bra 000 FF/S4 182' SOB 180' 229 BRa 602 tS1/52 Bra 730 HH/52 BRa 603 JJ/52 FF/02 BRa 603 HH/02 BRa 817 HH/S2 BRa 730 Jl/Si BRa 628 HH/54 BRa 828 GGt/S3 BRa 502 GG/SO BRa 553 GG/SO BRa 733 MM/Si Bra 732 MM/Si DD/43 Intact/

Intact/

Walkdow Reference 10, HCLPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by

>RLGM In-Serv ice In-Serv ice Appendix C Struutural Mechanics Assuciates Closed Closed Walk-By p

7 7 3 Included in IPEER, p 773

>RLGM Closed Cloned Walk-By p 773 Included in IPBEE, pT773

>RLGM Closed Cloned Walk-By p 773 Included in [P8EE, pT77S

>RLGM Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IP99E, p 773

>RLGM Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IP900, p 773

>RLGM intact Pressure WakB p27 Off WakB 23>RLGM Bvundary intact Pressure WakB p27 Off WakB 23>RLGM Boundary Intact/

Intact/

In-Service in-Service WakB p45 LO Intact/

Intact/

In-Service In-Service Wl-y p5 BO Intact ntact alk-ByRule-of-the-boo with 1ND-PU-B002, wahich has an LO IPEEE SEWS Closed/Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 775

>RLGM Cloned/Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEtE, p 773

>RLOM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEtE, p 77 4

>RLGM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 included in IPEEE, pT7 7 4

>RLGM Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEt, p 77 4

vRLGM Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774

>RLGM Open/Cloned Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPtEE, p 774

>BLGM Intact Pressure WakB p24 Off Wl-,

p25>BLGM Boundary Intact Pressure Off Bonay Walk-By p 245

>9LGM Intact Pressure Off Bonay Walk-By p 277

>RLGM Intact Pressure Off Bonay Walk-By p 277

>BLGM Intact Intact Walk-By p 431

>RLGM Intact Intact Walk-By p 451

>RLGM Open/Cloned Closed Walk-By pS300

>RLGM Screened perlPEtEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screenud perlPEEE Screened perPtEEE Screened perlPtEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened per IPBEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened perIPEEB Screened perlPEEB Screened periPtEE Screened perlPEEE Screened periPtEE Screened perlPtEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened per PEtE Screened perlPEEE Page 38 of 60 DUO AUX AUX DUO Outer Doghouse (OH21)

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNJS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPFP Key Failare Mode***

DD/S3 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300

>RLGM Screened per [PEEE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL 133 iSM-VA-OOOSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DH2) 134 1SM-VA-OSS3ABC Train C MSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DH2) 135 1SM-VA-OSOSAB Train 0 Mliv Outer Doghouse 792 (OHi) 136 1SVVA-320 Train A Main Steum Safety Belief Outer Doghouse 79 Valve (DHi) 137 1SV-VA-5021 Train A Main Steam Safety Belief Outer Doghouse 791 Valve (DH1) 135 1SV-VA-3O22 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 731 Valve (DH1) 139 SSVVA-023 Train A Main Steam Safety B elief Outer Doghouse 79 Valve (DHi) 140Train A Main Steam Safetyr Relief Outer Doghouse 79 4

SRV-VA-t024 Vave911 Valve (DH2(

142 iSVVA-alS Train B Main Steam Safety Relief inner Doghoose 79 Valve (DH2}

143Train B Main Steam Safety' Relief inner Doghouse 79 14 SSV-VA-t016 Vave(12 1VV-17 Valve (DH2) 149Train B Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 1VA-OB Valve (DH2) 149Trait C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 79 3.4 15V-VA-OOSB Vave(1i Valve (DHi) 148 iS-V-OlO Train C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 149 iSV-VA-SOilTanCManSemSfeyRle8trDgos 791 Valve (DH2) 155 1SVVA-512 Train C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 79 151 1SV-VA-552 Tan0ManSemSfeyRle0nnrDgos 791 Valve (DH2) 152 iSVVA-O~lTrain 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 Valve (DH2) 153Train 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 48 1SV-VA-004O Vave(1i Valve (0H1) 155 1SVVA-OSB Train 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79 Valve (DH2) 15T-H-O ralB RN Pamp Motorm CootRlier AUXe 71gous 157 1SN-VA-053 N

upDicag CosTri2U 716 159 1BN-VA-317O CHXCoigOae2upl U

730 159 iRN-VA-OlOBO3 H

oln WtrOte U

733 isVationD2 DD/S2 DD/44 00/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 0E/53 EE/53 EE/53 0E/52 00/52 E0/52 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 00/57 FF/S6 LL/SS HH/S4 Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed In-Service Normally Open Throttled Throttled Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p 305 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p

2 9

7 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 in-Service Walk-By p 2 4 9 Closed Walk-By p 776 Open Walk-By p 77R Open Walk-By pf776

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLIGM

>RLOM

>RLOM

>RLtGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGSM

>RLGIM

>BLOM Bule-of-the-box with iRN-PU-0O04, which has an

>RLGM IPEE0 SEWS (p 249)

Included in IPEEE, p 776

>RLOM Included in IP00E, p 776

>RLGM Included in IPE0E, p 776

>RLGOM Screened perlIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened periPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perlPEtE Screened perlPOOR Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPREE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPERE Screened periPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened per]PEEE Screened perIPERE Screened per POEE Screened per[PotE Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPOEE Screened perIPEEE Screened per PEE0 Screened perlIPEEt Screened perlIPEEt Page 39 of 60 Page 39 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HOLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ES6L ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS 0

Screening Notes H-CLPP 00 Key Failare Mode**

160 1EN-VA-0213B BKCPmMooCoerooig AUX 733 NH/SB Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 77B Included in lPttB, p 776

>BLGM Screened per IPEBE Water Outlet Isolation 161 iRN-VA-OBilB 2 CPm oo Coe on AUX 733 GG/57 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 77B Incloded In [PEEt, p 776

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE WaterOutlet Isolation 162 1RN-VA-0171B EDO KCD HX Sopply MOV Isolation AUX 73B6m 0

Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Incloded in IPEEE, p 776

>RLOM Screened per IPEEB BB/45 163 1RN-VA-5174B EDO KCD HS Outlet MOV Isolation AUX 736 Rm6/45 Open Cloned Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 77B

>ELGM Screened per IPEEE 164 1RN-VA-523B6 Train B NS HX Supply Isolation MOV AUX 73 Rm 732 Closed Closed Walk-By p

7 7B Included in IPEEE, p 776

>ELGM Screened per IPEEE KK/S1 lBS5 1.RN-HX-B01B Train B NV Pomp Mtr Cooler AUX 71.6 Em 630 Standby/

Intact Walk-By p 252 Role-of-the-hon with 1NV-PU-OO1B, which has an

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE NH/SB In-Sernice IPEEE StWS (p 252)

Em 63 Soanby/

Ble-of-the-boo with 1N V-PU-O0l6, which has an 16RSN-X-630ran NSPmtBarngOidooer AU 76Intact Walk-By p

2 S

2

>RLGM Screened per IPEBE 16NR-XO2 ri VPmpBaigOlCoe U

1 H/SB In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 232) 167 1RN-HX-5022 Train B NV Pomp Gearbox Oil Cooler AUX 716 EmH635 InStardby/

InacPWl-BEE6 RoE-o-te-o wit 1N-U2152hc)oe

>LMSrendprP 166 1VA-AH-5023 Train B NI Pump AHU AUX BBS Em 303 Standby Intact Walkdown Reeec

'0 Same make/model as U2 ESEL 160

>ELGM Screened per IPEEt GG/BS Appendix C 163 1VA-AH-OO27 Train B ND Pump AHU AUX BBSEmB5 Standby Intact Walk-By p

4 1.

3

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE FF/54 17Rr-n02 ranBN upMr olrAX 70E 626 Sadyrce Wl-y p23 Role-of-the-boo with 1NI-PU-O01O, which has an LMBrendprPE 17 R-XO2 ri IPm t

olrAX6 GG/S3SadyBnat WlkB 4

IPEEE SEWS (pl245)

>LMSree e

PE 171 1EN-HX-O026 Train B NI Pump Erg Oil Cooler AUX 716 EmG626 Standby Intact Walk-By p 245 RolE-ftE-booW wit 1N-P-01,whchbso>RLGM Screened per IPEEt 172 1.RN-VA-0297B lB EN Essential Botuom Header to AUX 716 Em 602 Closed Open Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776

>BLGM Screened per IP6EE SNBWP EE/52 173 OEN-VA-5283AC 1B/2B EN Disch To BC X-Over Ieel AUX 716 REE/02 Open Closed Walk-By p77B Included in IPEtE, p 77B

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 174 SRN-VA-0152B 1B/2B EN Essential Return Header AUX 716 Em 647W Cloned Open Walk-By p776 Incloded in IPEtE, p 77B

>BLGM Screened per IPEEE to SNBWP EE/B0 1.73 SRN-VA-Ol5iB Isola Rtio n HedrCosTan AUX 733 EE/54 Closed Closed Walk-By p77B Included is IPEtE, p 776

>ELOM Bcreened per IPEtEE Emn 647W 176 2RN-VA-0297B 2B RN Eon Hdr SNSWP Return Inn AUX 716 E/OOpen Cloned Walk-By p786 Included in IPOEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per fREEE 177 iA-VAi~iB Isolation from circulating water 1770a 1CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Value 177 b 1CA-RV-1622 Relief Value 1770c 1CA-GC-1625 Control Air Gas Cylinder 177 d l.CA-GC-1621.

Control Air Gas Cylinder 1770 1 CA-PS-5360 Pressure Switch Aux Ace Aux Aun Ace Ace Cloned Energized Closed Intact Iotacot Functional Open Energized Closed Intact Intact Functional Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Ben. 1.,

Table 2-4 Screens out based on PElR Nf-6041-BL, Ben. 1.,

Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-BL, Bee. 1, Table 2-4 Bcreens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1, Table 2-4

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened per PElR NP-6041 Screened per PElR NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6541 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041.

Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1,

>LM ScendprERNP04 1776f 1CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Ace 716 Functional Punctional Walkdown Tableceeedpr P2-4-64 177 g iCA-T-B-90l Juc'n6o6 oue'ely A

n Ace 733 Functional Punctiena[

Walkdown HCLPF for relays, SEWs for remainder of cabinet 0.60 Functional Letdown Inboard Containment Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Ben. 1.,

170 1NV-VA-0035A soainRX 752 Open Cloned Walkdown Tbe24>ELGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 17 a 1N-S-0B0 SoenidVaueRE 75 Eerizd e-negied WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 178

/N-SV035 Solnoi Vave X

75 Enrgied e-enrgied alkownTable 2-4 Page 40 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL arid HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL. ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS.

Screening Notes HCLPFs Key Failure Mode**

Screens out based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprER P64 178 b 1NV-SV-OSSl Solenoid Valve RX 7 52 Energized De-energized W alkdown Table 2-4>R GSce n dprE R N -04 179 SNV-VA-5121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 tHR HtX Room Cloned Closed Walkdown Screens out bused on EPRI NF-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NF-6541 Table 2-4 179 a 1NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Waikdown Rule-of-the-bus with SMCSS

>RLGM Screened per lFEEE 180 SNV-VA-04S7A etonIbadotin ntRK 752 Closed Closed Waikdown SresotaednEP N-4-LR.1,

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Isolation 180 a iN V-S V-4570 Solenoid Valve lBS b 1NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve 181 1V-VA-458A Letdown Inboard Containment Isolation 1810a 1NV-SV-45B0 Solenoid Valve 191 b 1NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve 182 1NV-VA-t025B Excess Letdown Isolation 1820a 1NV-SV-5255 Solenoid Valve Instrument Air Blackout 183 1VI-TK-O0150 cauae 184 1VI-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief 185 iVI-l3S0 Blankout Header Relief 186 iVI-i989 US VI 8/o HDR FLEX AIR SUPPLY CNTRL 187 1ET8 4 KV Essential Swgr RX RX RK RX AUX AUK AUX Aux Aux 752 752 752 752 752 725 725 750 750 750 750 733 De-energized Dc-energized Closed Dc-energized De-energized Closed Do-energized Iota ct Closed Closed Closed Energized De-energized De-energized Closed De-energized De-energized Closed De-energized Intact Closed Closed Open Energized Walkdown Wulkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Waikdown Walkdewn Walk-By Tacle i-s Screens out based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFR1 NF-6541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NF-5541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NF-8041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on SPRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based en SPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4, Anchorage qualified for 2oSSE Screens out based on FF91 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4 Screens oat based on EFRI NF-E541-SL, Rev. 1, Table 2-4, Design qualified for 2xSSE Included in PEEt, p 790

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM vRLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGSM Screened per EFRI NP-R541 Screened per EFRI NP-E541 Screened per tPRI NF-6t4l Screened per EFRI NF-6041 Screened per EFRI NF-6041 Screened per EPRI NF-E541 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EF91 NP-6t41 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

• Page number refers no IPEtE scanned document page.

• 0 HCLPF values of RFLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.2Bg), hut that a sp~ecific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

0*0* Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened perlIPEEE-lIndicates thatithocomponent was evaluated insthe IPEtEEand therefore weetsnthe RLGM demand.

Screened per EF91 NF-6t41 - Indicates that tbe component meets the screening criteria of SF91 NF-R041, Table 2-4usnd that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLFF.

Interaction,- Block Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLISM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLP~s exceed the reported HCLFF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

• 000* Component adjacentto block wall. Aue building block wails were evaluated in the IPEEE as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-1.

However block wall may have lower HCLFF than component, therefore HCLFF reported here as >RLGM.

Page 41 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Appendix B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 42 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL. and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdomn nr ESEL. ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Wl-y SEWS 5

Screening Notes lHCLPP*

Key Failure Mode**

5 1

2 3

4 S

6 7

8 8

10 11 2FW-VA-OSO32 2FW-VA-0O33A 2FW-VA-OOO1A 2ND-VA-0056 2ND-VA-SO06 2ND-VA-O064 2NI-VA-0Ou9 2NI-VA-0151 2N1-VA-0161 ORN-VA-0007A 2NV-VA-O095B Refueling Water Retire Pump Suction Isolation Refueling Water Recirc Pump Suction Isolation Refueling Water Recirc Pomp Suction Isolation ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs ND Relief - Hotlegs NO Relief - 'B' Coldlegs NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg Ni Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg Ni Relief-Coidleg SNSWP Supply to Units l and 2 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cost AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 750 750 750 733 716 733 716 750 733 716 733 Rm 626 J J/6i Rm 824 Rm 626 J J/Gi HH/60 FF/60 66/60 Rm 830 66/60 Rm 788 H H/60 Rm 601 AA/63 Rm 802A EE/G0 Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Walk-By Walk-By Walk-Gy Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Wulkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By Walk-By p 782 Included in ]PEtE, p 782 p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782 p 782 Included in IPEtE, p 782 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendio C Table 2-4 Referenun 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, Appoendix C Table 2-4 p 77G Included in IPEER, p 778 p785 included in IPtEEE, p 788

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened perlPEER Screened perlPEER Screened perlPEtEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-60141 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EFRI NP-6541 Screened perlIPEGE Screened per PEtEE 12 2CA22CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Caxity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,

>RM ScendprPIN-04 Isolation-OValAe RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown AppendixeendCpeTable P-204 Isolation Valve

~~117' 2CR Apni al Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Caxity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rex. 1,

>LM SceedprERN-04 13 2NC-VA-0273ACRX72-CSdCosd OeanClsd Wldw>LM SrendprPRN-64 Isolation Value RX 72B° SieCoed Oe0ndCoeRWidw Appendix C Table 2-4 NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cauity Coe pnadCoe akB 8

nlddi PEp73>LMSree e

PE 4 2N-AO3ASolenoids and Pneumatic Controls RX 806 Clsd pnan5lse°ak-y p 8 ncue5iRERp2 1.5 2N1-VA-0430A 2NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply RX 762 2A CLA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 785 Included in IPEEt, p 785

>RLGM Screexed per PEEt from 2A CIA (MOV) 45° SiR 16 2FW-TK-O000a Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard

>760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Reference 10, Included in IPtEE (p 772). Enaluated by Structural

>RLOM Screened per IPEER Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461).

43 N-AOSA 2ACABokVle MV X

73 Pp 46Rs Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEER, p 784

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 18 2N1-VA-B065B 26 CIA Block Value (MDV)

RX 733 Pipe Chase Oe 14 Coe akB 8

nlddi PEp74>LMSree e

PE 138e 47Rs Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in FREEE, p 7 8 4

>RLGM Screened per ]PEER 18 2N1-VA-0076A 2C CIA Block Value (MOV)

RX 733 Pipe Chas 20 2NI-VA-0088B 20 CIA Block Value (MOV)

RX 73 Pipe Chase 317° 49R Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in [PEER, p 784

>RLOM Screened per IPEER 21-2EHM-TP-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 730 CC/61 off Functional Walk-By p74 New equipment - updated IPEGE SEWS exaluation.

>RLOM Screened per IPEEG 22 2EHM-PN-HMPPA HZ2Igniter Power Panel AUX 750 CC/Ga Standby Punctional Walkdown ReeeclBounded by exaluation of 2EHM-TB-a589.

>RL0M Screened per tPRI NP-6041-Appendix C 2EHM-HR-TB03 A

ri 2giesRfrne1,Nti xeinedtbs.Tse oSUT 23 thru TB7a (Odd A'TanH giesRX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown Rfrne.,No nxpinedabs.TstdoSUTS

>RLGM Undetermined numbers only)

(35 igoiters per Train)

Appendix C TRS.

23 2HM-X-MBP Vltge edBypssSwtchAU 75 C/6 Deenrgied Fuctina WakdwnReference 1.0, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,

>81GM Screened per EPRI NP-8041 23 a 2EHMSX-H8PA oltae Re Bypss witc AUX 750 C/Ga De-eergied Fnctonal Wankown ppenixbCTabl22-Page 43 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPP Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or SWCSreigNtsNLPC-KyPjseMdf ESEL ID ED B D escription B ldg EL Loca tion N orm al State D esired State W alk-B ySE SSc e n g N o sH L F

• K e Fal r M d e 23 b 2EHM-VR-HMRA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 CC/Ri ce-energized Functional Walkdown Rfrne1,SensotbednEPIN-4-Sev1,0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 24 2EHM-TB-1SB9 Local Terminal Boa AUX 750 cc/el n/u Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens oat bused on RPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.60 Functional Appendio C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 2CA-HX-5003 TDCAP Bearing Oil cooler AUX 716 AA/RO Idle Functional Walk-By p 542

>RLGOM Screened per IPEEt 27 2CA-PU-0S03 TurieD rive PAu mp)ryFed e AUX 716 AA/R0 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242

>RLGM Screened per IPEER 27 a 2SA-TR-O0003 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 Ak/GO Idle Functional Walk-By RulE-ftE-booW wih2>F-03,wihbsa RLGM Screened per PEEt Rule-of-the-boo wink 2cA-pu-0003, which bus an

>LM Sree e

PE 27 b 25A-VA-0004 TDCAP Steam control Valve AUX 716 AA/60I Idle Functional Walk-By FPEEE SEWS RMScendprFE Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-PU-0003, which bus an 27 c 2SA-GV-0003 TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Wulk-By FPEEE SEWS

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 27 d 2Sk-OX-S003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By RIn-ftE-booEW wih2A>-03,wihbsa RLOM Screened per FREEE 28 2cA-PN-AFTp TDCAp control Panel AUX 716 AA/el n/u Available Walk-By p 187

>RLOM Screened per FREEE 29 25A-VA-O048ABC TDCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 Pp/SR Idle Open Walk-By p 796 Included in IPERE, p 7R6

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE (AOV)

(DH3) lo S-V08 ArSpl oeoi upVle Iner Doghouse PP F/S9 Energized ce-energized Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 2a 2A-V00 AiSppySlniDupVle (DHS) 77Appendloxc Table 2-4 Reerncn1,Scees uDbsegohERoN-641seev 1

>RLGM Screened per EFR1 NP-6041 29 b 2SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve InerDoHous 767 FF/S9 Energized De-energized Waikdown Reee~Appendlo10c TableS en2-4°u ae nER P64-L e.1 Rm 601 30 2SA-VA-0003 TDCAF Trip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 PF/eR Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEER, p 786

>RLISM Screened per IPEER 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 54 2-V-32 2A VI Essential Hdr Supply from VO U

3 Rm 726 closed closed Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLOM Interaction - Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psiE)

F/9Appendio C

Table 2-4 2B Vi Essential Hdr Supply from VG RefeencM10ISceensoutbusdno

-F1BNP604-SLWRe.l1 35 2Vl-VA-0034 AUoRLOM/8 loeInteraction efrece10

-rensou Black PR N-64WallRv.1 Inlet Relief (115 psig()U 3

PS lse lsd Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4 36 2VI-VA-0112 2AV u ~gIsrmn i

ak AX 73R 2

lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-BO41-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 Relief (115 psig)

AUF33F/SRApndxCTal 37 2IV-14 2A VI Auo Bldg Instrument Air Tank AX 73Rm 725 Closed closed Walkdow Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 pslg)

F/9Appendio C

Table 2-4 38 2VI-A S

28 VI Ase Bldg Instrument Air Tank AU 3

F5 lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 Relief (115 psig)

AU 3

PS lsdcoe abon Appendio c Table 2-4 39 2lV-16 2B VI Ace Bldg Instrument Air Tank AU 3

F5 lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on SF91 NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLOM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 2-V-16 Relief (115 psUi73P/Sglse loe aidw Appendix C Table 2-4 40 2-V-09 2SM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 790D/67 closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1, oRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041 2V-A25 120 psig)

(DH4()

9 Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 44 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and H-CLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walbdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State wl-y SEWS*

Screening Notes H-CI.PFP Key Failure Mode**

25M-7A8 VI Accumulator Relief Dater Doghouse Referesce 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 41 2V1-VA-2018 g10pig D4 790 DD/68 Closed Closed Walkdown Apeni C'Tb

'24RLGM Screened per EFRI NF-6041 4 2V-A2 2

SM3B8IAcmuao eif Ine ohueReference 10, Screens out bused on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM scendprERN-64 42 2lV-09

{25M30 iAcuuao RelifgInerDoHous 790 DD/60 Closed Closed Wolkdows Appendsx C Table 2-4>RM SrendprERN-64 45 ~

2SM-SAB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 79 05 lsdCoe ld Reference 10, Screens ost based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RO cendprER F64 43 2lV-09 (120 psig)

(DH3}

70D/9 ls)Cosd Wldw Appendin C Table 2-4>RM ScenderERNP64 44 2CA-VA-0084AB OAFo oto o2 1

n AUX 718 Rm80Open peThttd/

Walk-By p 781 Included in PEEE, p781.

>RL0M Screened per FREEE Associated Pneumatic Controls B8/62 Closed 44 a 2CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-bus with 2MC1O

>SLGM Screened per PEtEE 44 b 2CA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 718Rm80 Functional Functional Walk-By Role-of-the-boa with 2CA-84AB

>RL0M Screened per PEtEE 88/62 Sm 801 44 d 2CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hon with 2CA-64A8

>RLGM Screened per PEtEE 44 e 2CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve 44 f 2CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve TDCA Flow Control to 28 50 and 45 2C-VA-052A8Associated Pneumatic Controls 45 a 2CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader 45 b 2CA-SS-0520 Selector twitch 45 c 2CA-MT-0520 Misc Transmitter 45 d 2CA-VF-0520 Valve Fositioner 45 e 2CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve 4S f 2CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve TDCA Flow Control to 2C SO and 48 2CA-VA-0048AB Associated Pneumatic Controls 48 a 2CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader 46 b 2CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch 48 c 2CA-MT-0480 Misc Transmitter 48 d 2CA-VP-0480 Valve Fositioner 46 e 2CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve 481f 2CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve TDCA Flow Control to 2D010 and 47 2C-VA-058A8Associated Pneumatic Controls AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 718 716 718 787 718 718 716 716 716 716 787 716 718 716 716 nn/oL Sm 601 Sm 601 Sm 601 BB/81 Control Sm 825 Sm 601 B8/81 Sm 601 8BB/61 Sm 601 88/61 Sm 801 Sm 801 Sm 601 CC/Bo Control Sm 925 Sm 801 CC/BO Sm 801 CC/Bo Sm 601 CC/Ba Sm 601 Energized Energized Open Functional Functional Functional Functional Energized Energized Open Functional Functional Functional Functional Energized Reference 10, Energized Walkdown Apni Reference 10, Energized Walkdown Apnl Open/Throttled/

WakB p78 Closed Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Reference 10, Energized Walkdown Apni Energized Walkdown Rernc10 Appendix C Dpen/Throttled/

Walk-By p 781 Closed Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Reference 10, Energized Walkdomn Apni Reference 10, Energized Waikdown Apni Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 781 Closed Included in IPEER, p 781 Sale-of-the-hon with 2MC1O Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-52A8 Rule-of-the-has with 2CA-52A8 Rule-of-the-hon with 2CA-52AB

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEtE Screened per PEtEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEtE Screened per FPEEE Screened per EFRI NF-6041 AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX Included in PEES, p 781 Rule-of-the-hon with 2MC10 Role-of-the-hon with 2CA-48AB Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-48AB Sole-of-the-hon with 2CA-48AB

>RLGM

>RLiM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM

>RLOM Screened per EPRI NF-B041 Screened per FPEES Screened per FPEES Screened per FPEES Screened per FPEES Screened per PEEt Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 AUX 716 Sm 601 Energized Sm 601 AUX 716 88/83 Open

>RLOM Included in PEES, p 781

>RLOM Screened per FEES Page 45 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or SW cenn oe CP e

alr oe ESELID EoDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State waSlk-eigyoe HLF*

e aiueMoe*

47 a 2CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 625 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hon with 2MCSO

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 47 b 2CA-SS-5360 Selector Switch AUX 716 6w61Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hoe with 2CA-36AB

>RLGM Screened per [FEtEE BB/63 47 d 2CA-VF-0360 VastTrFnsmitioer AUX 716 RmBaFunctional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-3eAB

>RLGM Screened per PEEt 66/63 e7 2CA-SVP-0360 SolvenPosidtVaner AUX 71.6 Rm60unergizedl Eunergizedl Walkdown Appendi-n Ct 2A3AB>LG creedpr PE 47 f 2CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reeece1,RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Appendix C 46 25VCV-OSV-31BA lniB av U

76R 0

nried Eegzd W

dw

>RLGM Screened per PEPR tE-4 48 2VC-09B26 S0 Main Steam FORV and Outer Doghouse 89FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 264

>LMSree e

PE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH4)

Closed LMScendprPt 50 25V-CV-00S7ABC 2BS6anSemPR ad OtrD os 09 FF/66 Closed OeThotd/

Walk-By p 264

>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Associated Pneumatic Controls (OH4)

Closed 20 53 Main Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse BO PS lsd Open/Throctled/

akB 6

51 2SV-CV-0501AB60 F5 lse akB 9

>RLGM Screened per PEEt 51Associated Pneumatic Controls (OH3)

Closed 52 2EPL-FN-EVOA Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution R

MScendprFt 5 2ELP-VA Panel AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212>RGSrendplPE 52 a 2EPL-PN-EVDD Vital Battery 126 VDC Distribution>6M ScendprPE Panel AUX 733 CC/57 Functional Punctional Walk-By p 212

>LMSree e

PE 63 OEPL-BA-EVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C54Functional Functional Walkdown RefreLeM0,ppInteractionndnt

- Blockstng rfertoUWall 5

54 0EPL-BC-EVCS Vt Bteyhagradhrer AX 73RmTO 70upnctional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens oct based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Ren. 1, 0.45 Functional Connection Boo ECBS BB/54 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 2EPE-MX-EMXA4 650 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 56 2EPE-MX-EMXA2 650 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32

>RLGM Screened per IPOEE 57 2EPE-MX-EMXB4 650 VAC Essential Power AUX Rm3716Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RL0M Screened per IPEtEE 66/63 2ETP-CA-0010 SB Pzr FORV Relay/Indication AUX 767 HH/SB Standby Functional Walk-By p 216

>RLGM Screened per FREEE (2ATC 10)

Main Control Board Cabinet for 56 2EOA-PN-MCS Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rrn 625 Standby Functional Walk-By p686

>RL0M Screened per FPEEE Temperature Indication Main Control Board Cabinet with 60 2EOA-PN-MC7 AX 77 onrlR92 Stny Futinl W k-y p8>RLGM Screened per PEtE H2 Igniter Control SwitchAU76 Coto6w65 Sady Fninl WlkB p6 Main Control Board Cabinet for CA 61 2EOA-PN-MC10 AUX 767 Control 6m 625 Standby Functional Walk-By p 66

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE

/ NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 62 2EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 525 Standby Functional Walk-By p686

>RLGM Screened per FPEEE Indication Page 46 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL. and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Wldw T

SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPP**

Key Failure Mode**

Walk-By Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 63 2tOA-PN-MC2 System (PORV Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p Se

>RLGM Screened per IPtEEE Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet for ICCM a 2EOA-FN-MC1 AU 6

oto m95 Sadb ucinl Wl-y p8 RLGM Screened per IPEtEE ICCM Remote DisplayAU 76 CotoSm95 Sady Fninl Wlky p6 ICCMb 2EA-CA9211 Train A Remote Display Processor behind 2MC2 ICCMc 2EA-CA9221 Train S Remote Display Processor ICCMc 25A-CA5221 behind 2MC2 ICCM d 2tIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display ICCM e 2EIA-P-9220 Train S Remote Dinsplay ICCM f 2EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-SS Cabinet ICCM g 2tIA-CA-922t Train S ICCM-SS Cabinet SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Block Valves 64 21E-CASG1S Closure Permissive) 6B 21E-CA9020 SSPS CabinetS

(CLA Block Valves Closure Permissive) 66 2EQB-FN-DGLSA Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters) 120 VAC Inst and Control 67 2EPG-PN-EKVA Panelboard 66 2EPG-Bl-EVIA Vital leverter Steam Generator NS Level 69 2CF-LT-60t nicto Lo 70 2P-LT554t Indication Loop 2 Steam Generator NS Level 71 2CP-LT-557t Indication LoopS2 Steam Generator NR Level 72 2P-LTSG~t Indication Loop 4 Steam Generator 61 WievRang 73 2SM-PT-50O Sea50eatr#

id ag Pressure Indication Loop 73 a 2CA-FN-AFFA 2A CA Pump Control Panel Steam Generator #2 Wide Range 74 25M-FT-311G Pressure Indication Loop 75 2M-PT5140 Steam Generator 63 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 75 a 2CA-PN-AFPS 26 CA Pump Control Panel Steam Generator #4 Wide Range 76 2SM-PT-5170 Pressure Indication Loop Steam Generator #51 NC WS T-Hot 77 2C-SDSSS0 Indication Loop N/A Reactor Vessel Level Indication 77 a (no EDB #)

System {RVUS) Cabinet AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX AUX 767 767 767 767 750 750 767 767 750 733 No 739 742 740 744 750 716 733 733 716 750 740 767 Control Rm 929 Control Sm 925 Control Sm 925 Control Sm 929 cc/ss cc/S s Control Sm 929 CC/S S Control Sm 625 CC/SBS Smn SOS BB/61 Sm 731 DD/54 Rm 701 cc/ss Accam 2A Sm 36' 46R Accum 26 Sm 145° SSR Accum 2C Sm 219' S6R Attain 2D Sm 326' S7S Sm 604 DD/67 Sm 601 BB/61 Sm 713 DO/59 Sm 713 DD/59 Sm 601 cc/62 Sm 6t4 00/67 24' SOR BS/63 Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference it, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Standy Funtionl Wa~down Appendis C Table 2-4>RG Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference it, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM Standy Funtionl Waldown Appendix C Table 2-4>RG Rule-of-the-box with 2MC1, which has an IPEEt Standby Functional Walk-By utWS

>RLGM Rule-of-the-box with 2MC1, which has an IPEtEE Standby Functional Walk-By SEWS

>RLGM Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference 3D, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6G41-SL, Rev. 1, 02 Appendix C Table 2-4 Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference 3D, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 02 Appendix C Table 2-4 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11

>RLGM Standby Functional Walk-By p 11

>RLGM Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6G41-SL, Rev. 1, Standby Functional Waikdown Apeni C'abe 0.29 Nmnl10VC Functional Walk-By p 209

>SLGM Output Nmnl10VC Functional Walk-By p 65 vRLGM Output indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Appendix C Table 2-4 indicaion Idicaton Wabdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM Indication Indication Walkdown Rfrne1,SresotbsdnSF1P-4-Lev1,

>RLGM Appendix C Table 2-4 Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, xLG Appendix C Table 2-4 Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sex. 1,

>R M

Indication indication Walkdown Reeec>0 cen u

ae nS5 P94-L e.1 RLOM Appendis C Table 2-4 Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM Appendix C Table 2-4 Standy Functional Walk-Sy p 180

>RLGM Indiction Indiatio Waldown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-5041-SL, Rev. 1, SO Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM Indication Indication Walkdown ApenixCLabeM-Functinal Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 03 stadbyAppendix C

Table 2-4 Screened per EPSI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEE5 Screened per IPEER Functional Functional Screened per FREEE Screened per IPEtS Functional Screened per IPREEE Screened per FREEE Screened per EPRI NP-6t41 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6t41 Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Screened per PEEt Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Screened per IPSEEE Screened per SFPR1 NP-6041 Screened per SFR1 NP-6041 Functional Page 47 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or SESSreigNtsHLP KeFaleMoe 5

ESEL ID EDn Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired StateSESSrennNosHLP*

KyFaleMde*

Walk-By Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 78 2CR-BO Indicatios Loop RX740 164° 3CR Indicatios Indication Walkdown ApedxCTal RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B041 79 2C080 Steam Generator #3 NC WR T-Hot RefLGM Screenednsoutbapero EEPRNP60NP-854e1 1

79 2CR-90 Indication Loop RXf 740 203° 3CR Indication Indication Walkdown Refreseni SO Screen out basedMon EPRIeNP-pe41-PRIRev.41 Steam Generator #4 NC WRT-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 80 2NC-RD-920 RX70 3o 0

niaio niain Wldw RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E041 80Indication Loop RN70 38 C niain Idcto akon Appendin C Table 2-4 1 2SP-00 Cndctaiomnt LooPresr AUX 750 00/60 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RG cendprER P64 Indcaton oopAppendin C

Table 2-4 INdCato LooPrsuie AUXssur/87 Iniaio nicto3Widw Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 82 2NC-PT-5120 IndCatWR Loprsuie PressureDRm713dcton idcton Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4

>RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Process Control Cabinet 1 Control Rm 825 (32I-A91 7300 cabinet)

AUX 767 AA/54 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16

>LMSree e PE 84 2F0-TK-0558 2A Diesel Generator Fuel OilYrd

<6NA Inatvilbe nac/albe WlkB p56 84 2DT-06 Storage Tank Yr

<70NAnttAvial Inatvaabe W k-y p56>RLGM Screened per IPEER 28 Diesel Generator Puel Oil 85 2FD-TK-0O57 Strg akYard

<780 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By 556

>LMSree e

PE 800 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer 88 2EPE-MX-EMXA3 Pan 2A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 Rm85Closed Closed Walkdown Reeec'0 cen u

ae nER P64-L Re.

RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B041 2VXIA (04A) 88/86 Appendix C Table 2-4 800 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer 87 2EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 28 Suction Isolation Valve AUX 733 Rm 718 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 2VX2B (0iC) 88/65 Appendiu C Table 2-4 800 VAC Essential VE/VX (04C, 080 Rm 805 88 2OPE-MX-EMXC

&O030)

AUX 750 ta/S9 Closed Closed Walk-By p32

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE 800 VAC Essential for VE/VX (OBE &

Rm 716 88 2EPE-MX-EMXDO 5D AUX 733 B60Closed Closed Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE H2 Skimmer Fan 2A Suction Reference 10,0.0untoa 80 2VX-VA-G001A Isolation Valve RX 828 264' 45R Closed Open Walkdown Appendix C0.0Fntoa 81 2VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen skimmer Fan No 2A RX 818 272° 38R Off On Walkdown Rfrne0,0.38 Anchorage Appendix C H2 Skimmer Pan 28 Suction Refncencena0 9 2V--OOB Isolation valve RX 827 283' 489 Closed Open Walkdown Refeencex 10 0.41 Fntoa 83 2VN-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Pan No 28 RX 8186 288' 389 off On Walkdown Rfrne1,0.38 Anchorage Appendix C 2VX-DA-8125 Containment Air Return Fan 2A tale-of-the-bun with 2VX-AH-GOOB, which has an 84 RX775 27°5RCoevOe ak RL0M Screened per IPEEE (2RAF-D-2)

Damper RN20 0

lse pn Wl-yPEEE SEWS 90 2VX-AH-0051 Containment Air Return Fan 2A RX 770 270' SOR Off On Walk-By p

4 3 4

>RLGM Screened per PEtEE RB 2VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 2A AUX 767 u /OS Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-3L, Rev. 1, 0.35 Anchorage Appendis C Table 2-4 87 2VE-XF-O0005 Annulus Ventilation Fan 28 AUX 787 JJ/6S Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.30 Anchorage Appendix C Table 2-4 A82CP-0 l A Closed Cooling Water System AUX 750 GG/SO On On Walk-By p 255

>LMSree e

PE Pump 99 2CP-02 A2 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 700 PP/SO On On Walk-By p 2550MS0endpe PE Pump 100 2KC-TK-0009 Component Cooling Water System AUN 787 J /57 Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Walk-By p 528

>LMSree e

PE Serge Tank>RG ScendprPE KC Auoiliary Bldg Supply Non-101 2KC-VA-0055A Essential Isolation AUX 750 LI/S9 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEER, p 783

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE XC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-1_02 2KC-VA-0230A Essential Isolation AUX 730 LLI58 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in {PEEt, p 783 vRLOM Screened per IPEER Page 48 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description 103 2KCVA-OO KG KAuxiliary Bldg Return Non-103 2C-VA-001A Essential Isolation 104 2C-VA-OOBA KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-104 2G-VA-OOSA Essential Isolation Bldg AUX AUX EL 750 750 Location GG/5e GG/56 OPERATING STATE Normal State Desired State WaEWdom*orScreening Notes Walk-By Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEtE, p 783 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p SOB HCLPF**

>RLOM

>RLOM Key Failure Mode 0*

Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPEEE 15 2

-H-OS Train A Component Cooling Water AX 70JJ7 Inatn-eve ta/n-eie Wadon Reference 10, HICLPF based us IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by

>LMSree e PE 10HXCH-00 AU 5

J5 natI-evc nati-evc aku Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates>RM ScendprPE 106 2NC-VA-5032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 8BOB esrie Cvt Closed Closed Walk-By p 763 Included in IPEEE, p 783

>RLOM Screenhd per IPEEE 110° 32R 107 2NC-VA-OOSBB NC System Pressurizer PORV 103 2NC-VA-SO01i Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 109 2NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 110 2NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 111 2ND-PU-SOO01 Train A ND Pump 112 2ND-PU-5002 Train B ND Pump 113 2ND-HXt-OOS3 Train A ND HiX 114 2ND-HX-O004 Train B ND HX 115 2ND-HX-OO0S Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX 116 2ND-VA-SOO2AC RHR Pomp Hotleg Suction Isolation 117 2ND-VA-O001B RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation Train A RHR Isolation to the 113 2N1-VA-0173A Cilg Train B RH8 Isolation to the ie9 2NI-VA-0178B Cilg 120 2NI-vA-0118A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldiegs 121 2N1-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs 122 2N1-VA-O1SOB Train B NI Isolation to the Coldiegs 123 2NI-VA-01528 Train B NI Isolation to the Hotiegs 124 2N1-VA-0182A NI Isolation to the Codldegs 125 2NI-PU-OOO9 Train A NI Pump 126 2NI-PU-O0lO Train B NI Pump 127 2N5-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump 128 2NS-PU-0002 Train B NO Pump RX RX RXt RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX Pressurizer Cavity 806 lOS5°32R Pressurizer Cavity 784 109° 34R 82 Pressurizer Cavity 109° 34R 02 Pressurizer Cavity 30 i09= 34R Sm 506 695 Sm 507 695 PPS Sm 785 LL/6O Sm 786 Sm 508 695 746 184'°48R 743 184° 27R 733 00/60 Sm373 HH/60 Sm 646 716 Sm 646 740 0/6 Sm 646 716 0/6 Rm 830 70 HH/60 Sm 738 Sm 835 716

/5 Sm 633 716 0/5 Sm 303 68G0/57 Sm 304 695

/7 Closed Closed Closed Closed Off Off Intact Intact Intoact Closed Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Cloned Open/Closed Open/Cloned Open/Closed Open/Closed Off Off Off Off Closed Closed Closed Closed Intact Intact Intact Intact Intact Open Open Open Open Open Open/Closed Open Open/Closed Open/Closed Intact Intact Intact Intact Walk-By p 783 Included in ]PEtE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEBE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in ]PEEE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 7

S 3

>RLOM Walk-By p 273

>RLOM Walk-By p 273

>RLOM Walk-By p 458

>RLOM Walk-By p 458

>RLOM Rule-of-the-box witE 2ND-PU-tO0l, mhich has an Walk-By IPEtE SEWS

>RLOM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783

>RLGM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEt, p 7

8 4

>RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in ]PEtE, p 7 8 4

>RLOM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784

>RLOM Walk-By p 245

>RLOM Walk-By p 248

>RLOM Walk-By p 277

>RLOM Walk-By p 277

>RLOM Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEtEE Screened per PEtEE Screened perlPEEt Screened perlPEEE Screened perlIPEBE Screened perlPEEE Screened per PEtE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEES Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPEES Screened perlPEtE Screened perlIPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perlPEtS Screened per PEtEE Screened perlPEES Screened per PEtEE Screened perlP6EE Screened perlPEEt Screened perlPEEE Page 49 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HICLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID BOB Description Bldg EL 129 2NS-HX-1003 Train A NI Heat Exchanger AUX 750 130 2N5-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 131 25M-VA-ISS7AB Train A MliV Outer Doghouse 792 (DM4) 132 2SM-VA-S0OSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DM3) 1.33 2SM-VA-S003ABC Train C MIV Inter Doghouse 792 (DM3) 134 25M-VA-OOOIAB Train D Mliv Dater Doghouse 792

)DH4) 135 2VV-20 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 783 2VV-35 Valve (DH4) 136 2V-VAO021 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78 13 2VV-01 Valve (DH4) 137 2V-VAO022 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78 Valve (DM4) 73

138 2V-AO03 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 733 13 2VV-23 Valve (DM4) 139 2SV-VA-OO24 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 733 Valve (DM4) 140 2SVVA-~l4 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 Valve (DM3)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 11 2VV-13 Valve (DH3) 142 25V-VA-OO1B Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 Valve (DM3) 143 25V-VA-5017 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 7388 Valve (DH3) 144 2VV-lg Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 2VV-03 Valve (DM3)

Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 145 25V-VA-SSS8 Vave(D3 Train C Melt Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 16 2VV-53 Valve (DM3)

OPERATING STATE Location Normal State Desired State Walkd-Byo SEWSr Screening Notes HCLPFP*

Key Failure Mode***

Em 738>LM srendprF6 L/OIntact intact Walk-By p

4 5 1

>LM Sree e

PE Rm 736 DD/69 DO/I9 DD/B7 EE/68 EB/EB EE/SB EE/SR EE/SB E/ES5 EE/60 Intact Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Intact Walk-By p 4511 Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p 355 Closed Walk-By p 100 Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p

2 9 7

Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 237 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 237 Closed Walk-By p 237 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297

>RLOM

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>R133M

>RLGMW

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLOM Screened perlFEtEE Screened per FEES Screened per PEEE Screened perlPFEBE Screened perlFEEt Screened per IPEEE Screened perlFEEE Screened per IFEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlFEtEE Screened perlFEtEE Screened perFEtEE Screened perlFEEE Screened per FEEE Screened perFEtEE Screened perlPSEEE Screened per IPEEE 147 2VV-lO Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 E/6O Closed Closed Walk-By p 237

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE 2VV-SS Valve (DM3) 7B Page 50 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HICLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBy SEWS*

Screening Notes NCLPF**

Key Failure Mode**

148 2SV-VA-O11l Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78E/OCoeClsd Wk-y p27>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE Valve (DH31) 78E/SClsd Coe WakB p29 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghoase 78S/SCoe lsd Wl-y p9 149 2SV-VA-0012 79E6OCoeCosd Wk-y p27>RLGM Screened per ]PEtE Valve (DH3I) 10 2VV-02Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78E/ES6 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297

>LMSree e

PE 10 2VV-52 Valve (DH4)

RMScendprPE 151 2V-VAOB03Train DMain Steam SafewyRelief Outer Doghouse 78E/8Coe lsd Wl-y p27>LM Sree e

PE 151 2SV-VA-O045 ri08 anSemSft ele ue ohue 78E/8 lsdCoe akB 9

>RL0M Screened per IPtEE Valve (DH4) 78E/nClsd Coe Waky p29 1532 S-AO5 Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788E/ES Closed Closed Walk-By p 297

>LMSree e

PE Valve (DH4) 54 2VV-06Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297

>LMSree e

PE 14 2VV-05 Valve (DH4) 78S/BClsdloe Waky p29 Rule-of-the-hon with 2RN-PU-0053, which has an

>LM Sree e

PB 155 2RN-HX-OOO5 2A RN Pump Motor Coaler AUX 716 PP/S6 In-Service In-Service Walk-By p 249 IRLGMEScreeed(per2PE)

RN Pump Discharge Cross Train 156 2RN-VA-5540A AUX 716 00/59 Normally Open Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtS, p 786

>RLOM Screened per IPESS Supply Isolation MDV 157 2RN-VA-OOS6A KC HIX Cooling Water Supply AUX 760 NH/S6 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPtEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Isolation 25S 2RN-VA-SS89A KC HX Cooling Water Outlet AUX 750 HH/B8 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included In IPSEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation 15 R-AO1Al A1C Pomp Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 00/SS Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included In IPSEE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE Water Outlet Isolation 16 R-AB2AA2 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 00/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEtE Water Outlet Isolation Sm 714 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 799

>RLOM Screened per IPSEEE 161 2RN-VA-O070A EDO 1(D HX Supply MDV Isolation AUX 736 DO/En 162 2RN-VA-0073A EDG KD0 HX Outlet MDV Isolation AUX 736 Rm0764 Open Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEt, p786

>RLOM Screened per IPSEEE 163 2RN-VA-0134A Tri SH upl'slto AUX 750 RMM/Si Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 798 RL0M Screened per IPEtE Sm 634 Standby/

Itc WakB p22 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NV-PU-O515, which has an

>RLOM Screened per IPEtEE 164 2RN-HX-0017 Train A NV Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/57 In-Service Itt WakB p25 IPEtE SEWS (p 252)

Sm 694 Standby/

Intact Walk-By p 252 Rueo-h-o ih2VP-OS hc a

n

>RIGM Screened per ]PEtEE 165 2RN-HX-0019 Train A NV Pump Bearing oil Cooler AUX 716 HH/B7 In-Service IPEEt SEWS (p 252) 16 2-H-2 Train A NV Pump Gearbos Dii AUX 716 Sm 634 Standby/

Intact Walk-By p 252 Role-of-the-boo with 2NV-PU-0S15, which has an

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 16 2NH-21 Coaler HH/57 In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 252)

Sm SO5efrnc50 167 2VA-AH-0024 Train A NS Pump AHU AUX 695 G57Standby Intact Walkdown Rfrnepndx0CSame make/model as ESEL 168

>RLOM Screened per IPEEE Sm 506 Stnb Inat Wl-y 41 169 2VA-AH-0025 Train A ND Pump AHU AUX 695 GG/59 tnb nat akB 1

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm 635 Sady Itc WakB p25 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NI-PU-0009, which has an

>LM Sree e

PE 169 2RN-HX-0023 Train A NI Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/58Sady ItcSak9 p25 IEESW p25

>LMSree e

PE Rrn 635 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NI-PU-0009, which has an

>LM Sree e

PE 170 2RN-HX-0025 Train A NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler AUX 716 HS9Standby Intact Walk-By p

2 4 5

>RPEMEScreeed(per2P5t Page 51 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDE Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBo SEWS*

Screening Notes HCLPF**

Key Failure Mode**

171 2RN-VA-O279B Unit 2 Aus Bldg Ventilation Return AUX 750 Rm 830 Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEER, p 786

>RLGM Screened per IPEEt Isolation KM/es 172 ORN-VA-0147AC 1A/2A RN Disch to RC S-Over Isol AUX 716 Rmp60n Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included ie IPEEE, p 776

>RLGM Screened per FREEE 173 5RN-VA-0148A SA/2A RN Essential Return Header AUX 716 FF/39 Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEtEE, p776

>RLGM Screened per IPEEE to SNSWP 2A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Rm 647 174 2RN-VA-5286A Isolation AUX 733 FP/es Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786

>RLOM Screened per IPEtE lA RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return 175 1RN-VA-0286A IoainAUX 733 EE/5n Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776

>RLGM Screened per IPEER Unit 1 Non-ESS Return Isolation to Rm 6026ERO cendprPt 176 1RN-VA-5564A AUX 733F/S Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in FREEE, p 776

>LMSree e

PE SNSWPFF5 177 2EPE-MX-EMXB 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 73Rmn 724 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32

>RLGM Screened per IPEEt GG/B6 178 2CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Aus 716 Closed Open Walkdown Screens out based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6E41 Isolation from circulating water Table 2-4 Screens out based on EF61 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RM ScendprERNP64 178 a 2CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Value Ass 716 Energized On-energized Wulkdown Table 2-4>RM ScenderERNP64 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RG ScendprERN-64 178 b 2CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve Aus 716 Closed Closed Walkdown Tableceeedpr 2-4-64 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 178 c 2CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 716 Intact Intact Walkdown Table 2-4

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604Z Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 178 d 2CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 716

.Intact Intact Walkdown Table 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RG ScendprERNP64 178 e 2CA-PS-5385 Pressure Switch Ass 716 Functional Functional Walkdown Tableceeedpr P2-4-64 178f CAPS-39 PessreSwtchAu 76 Fncioal untinal WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 178 CA-S-581 resure with An 76 Fnctonal Funtioal alkownTable 2-4 178 g 2CA-TB-1901 aundto BR' huesRlysA Ass 716 Functional Functional Walkdown HCLPF for relays, SEWs for remainder of cabinet 0.68 Functional Letdown Inboard Containment Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 5,

>RG SrenderPIN-64 17 N-AO3A Isolation ER 732 Open Closed Walkdown Table 2-4 Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, LM Sree prER P64 178 a 2NV-SV-535E Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScendprEINP04 Page 52 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBo SEWS.

Screening Notes H-CLPF**

Key Failure Mode t

Screens out based or tPRI NP-E045-SL, Rev. 1,

>RM ScendprPRN-E4 179 b 2NV-SV-5351 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RM ScendprPIN-64 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

>LM ScendprtlNFE4 180 2NV-VA-t121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 RHE HtX Room Closed Closed Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScendprPRN-64 180 a 2NV-ML-1250 Mancal Loader AUX 767 control Rm 923 Functional Functional Walkdown Rule-of-the-boy with 2MC10

>RLGM Screened per IPEtEE 18 N-AO5A Letdown Inboard Containment X72Clsd Coe WadwnScreens out bused on EPRI NP-E041-SL, Rev. 5,

>RG ScenderEINP64 isolation E75clsd Coe WakwnTable 2-4 Screens out based on EPRI NF-E041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened p)er EPRI NF-E541 191 a 2NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve EX 752 De-energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4 2NVSV451 olnod alv E

72 c-negied c-negied WakdwsScreens out based on EPRI NF-E541-SL, Rev. 5, SRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E041 581 b N-V47 oeodVleR 5

eeegzd D-nrie akonTable 2-4 18 N-AOBA Letdown Inboard containment R75Cosd Cse WadwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1,

>RM ScenderPRN-64 Isolation E75clsd coe WakwnTable 2-4 Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, EO ceee e

PR PE4 182 a 2NV-SV-4585 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG SrenderEINP64 Screens oat based on EFEI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, RO ceee e

FR PE4 182 b 2NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Dc-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScenderERNP64 183 2N-V-OOSB Exes Ledon soatin X

25 loedClsed WakdwnScreens out based on EFEI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5,

>tLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E541 183 NV-A-025E toces Ltdon iolaton S

78 cosedCloed albownTable 2-4 Screens oat based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, RO ceee e

FR PE4 183 a 2NV-SV-5250 Solenoid Valve EX 725 Dc-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG SrenderERNP64 Instrument Air Blackout Screens oct based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 5, 184 2V1-TK-O0SSUX70 vnatInat Wlkon>LGM Screened per EPEI NP-E545 Accumulator AU 5

natItc akonTable 2-4, Anchorage qualified for 2xSSE 185 2V-12g lakot ccuulto Rlie AX 50 loedClsed WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, vRLGM Screened per EPRI NF-E541 185 V1-328 ElakoctAccmultorRelif AS 70 cosedCloed alkownTable 2-4 Screens oct based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 5G ceee e

PR PE4 186 2VI-1335 Elackoct Header Relief AUS 730 closed closed Walkdown Table 2-4d)r PR N-64 18 V-t8 Ul Vi B/D HDE FLEX AIR SUPPLY Au 5

lsdOe akonScreens out based on FFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6045 18 V-99 CNTRL Table 2-4, Design qualified for 2xS5E 188 2ETA 4 KV Essential Swgr Aax 750 Energized Energized Walkby Included in PEEt, p 795

>RLGM Screened per PEEt

• Page number refers to IPEtE scanned document page.

""HCLFPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLFF esceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (S.26g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened oat from further evaluation.

• • Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per PEEt - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per FFR1 NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6045, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

interaction - Elock Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evalcuated in the IPEtE and therefore the block wall meets the ELOM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage -Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - indicates that functional failure is the gocerning failure mode for the component.

• • • Component adjacent to block wall. Aax building block walls were evaluated in the PEEt as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-2.

However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.

Page 53 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 1 Appendix C MNS FLEX Flow Paths List of Figures Figure C-i. Auxiliary Feedwater System.............................................................. 55 Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System........................................ 56 Figure C-3. Main Steam Header........................................................................ 57 Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System..................................... 58 Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System.......... 59 Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header..............................................................................

60 Page 54 of 60

Expdied eimicEvlutio PocesepoMcUXIrNuLeARY StEDATion YTE Rev. 1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM N*N-S*FETY AUXILIARY ~EE{]WATER 8URIEQ

'CDESE*

CI~Cd.LATI*O TUR~BINE DRIVEN STE*.', OENER*ATO*

CTEA', CENERATD'*

5TEA¢-l OE,*EfbTC*

Figure C-i. Auxiliary Feedwater System Page 55 of 60

ExpeitedSeimic valatio PrcessReprt, c

6uReularE Statio RevPL1 Rev. 1 BORATE~ WATER SUPPLY REFUELING WA I ER S'~$IEW

~~%Lfl~

IfR

,~c:ut ~.M.

Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System Page 56 of 60

MATN STEAM HEAOER Rev. 1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 MAIN STEAM HEALER CS AE S STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER (9:

RE-HEATERS (2ND STAGE; FDWPT Figure C-3. Main Steam Header Page 57 of 60

ExpdiedSeimi Ealutin rocssReort M~uREANCleaR StatioNT AE Rev. 1 REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-JP SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

~SC KOl LE~

C~L~ LL~S M~ 1421 L~

Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System Page 58 of 60

Expditd Sismc Ealutin Poces Rpor, M~uREAC NCOLeArT StatioERe.

Rev. i REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP (LOW PRESSURE~

RESIOJAL HEAT ~E~~vAL SY~TEM HOT LEG CL,,, 3)

(cONY.

Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System Page 59 of 60

S/G SECONDARY FLEX MAKE-UP PUMP CONNECTIONS FEEDWATER SYSTEM TEMPERINO HEADER Rev. I Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1 S/C SECOND ARY FLEX MAKE -UP PUMP C~NNE CTIUNS FEEDWATER SYSTEM TEMPER INC H AD H I

L JTI Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header.

Page 60 of 60