ML15089A544
| ML15089A544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/2015 |
| From: | Bessette P Entergy Nuclear Operations, Morgan, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP |
| To: | NRC/OCM |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01, CLI-15-2, RAS 27430 | |
| Download: ML15089A544 (47) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and
) 50-286-LR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. )
)
(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) )
) March 30, 2015 ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC., INITIAL BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO COMMISSION QUESTIONS IN CLI-15-2 CONCERNING CONTENTION NYS-12C William B. Glew, Jr., Esq. Kathryn M. Sutton, Esq.
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. Paul M. Bessette, Esq.
440 Hamilton Avenue MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP White Plains, NY 10601 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Phone: (914) 272-3360 Washington, DC 20004 Fax: (914) 272-3205 Phone: (202) 739-3000 E-mail: wglew@entergy.com Fax: (202) 739-3001 E-mail: ksutton@morganlewis.com E-mail: pbessette@morganlewis.com Martin J. ONeill, Esq.
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002 Phone: (713) 890-5710 Fax: (713) 890-5001 E-mail: martin.oneill@morganlewis.com COUNSEL FOR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. CONTROLLING LEGAL PRINCIPLES.......................................................................... 6 A. The Adequacy of a SAMA Analysis Is Judged Under NEPAs Rule of Reason .................................................................................................................. 6 B. Implementation of Severe Accident Mitigation Measures, Including Those Ordered by the NRC in Response to Fukushima, Is Governed by the AEANot by NEPA ............................................................................................. 8 III. RESPONSES TO THE COMMISSIONS QUESTIONS ................................................. 9 A. Question 1: Address the underlying support and reasoning (if available) behind the NUREG/CR-3673 reports conclusion that a 90-day time period is an average period of time for completing decontamination for the most severe type of reactor accident. ........................................................... 9 B. Question No. 2: Identify from the record any peer review or similar vetting of the NUREG-1150 values for the decontamination cost inputs for nonfarm land and property (CDNFRM) and the decontamination time inputs (TIMDEC) used in the MACCS2 computer code ..................................... 15 C. Question No. 3: Providing references to the record, discuss the underlying reasons behind the Staff and Entergy experts opinion that the NUREG-1150 CDNFRM and TIMDEC values continue to reflect reasonable estimates for severe accident decontamination times and costs today, including for the heavier (DF of 15) decontamination effort .............................. 19
- 1. The NUREG-1150 TIMDEC and CDNFRM Values Still Represent the Best Available Inputs to a SAMA Analysis Performed Using the MACCS2 Code ...................................................... 20
- 2. The NUREG-1150 CDNFRM Values Remain Reasonable and Well-Suited for Use In a Time- and Spatially-Averaged SAMA Analysis.................................................................................................... 21
- 3. The NUREG-1150 TIMDEC Values Remain Reasonable and Well-Suited for Use In a Time- and Spatially-Averaged SAMA Analysis.................................................................................................... 23 D. Question No.4: Discuss the appropriateness of performing sensitivity analyses to account for uncertainties in the estimated decontamination times and non-farm decontamination costs, including what might be reasonable CDNFRM and TIMDEC inputs to use in sensitivity analyses for the Indian Point SAMA analysis .................................................................... 25
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page E. Question No. 5: Would it be appropriate to treat decontamination times and decontamination costs (and related decontamination factors) from an uncertainty analysis standpoint, using a range of valuese.g., smaller values for smaller release accident categories and larger values for the larger release categories? Why or why not? ........................................................ 28 F. Question No. 6: Discuss whether, and, if so, how, the SAMA analysis should account for the possibility of potential decontamination times longer than one year ............................................................................................. 31 G. Question No. 7: Discuss whether the Indian Point analysis contains conservatisms that bound or otherwise compensate for the uncertainty in the decontamination times and non-farm decontamination costs inputs used in the analysis .............................................................................................. 33 H. Question No. 8: Address to what extent the Staffs comparison of the decontamination cost values used in the IPEC SAMA analysis to decontamination cost values derived from Sandia National Laboratorys 1996 weapons accident study explains or otherwise substantiates the decontamination cost parameters used in the Indian Point analysis .................... 37 IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 39
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s)
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983) .......................................5 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) ...............................................................8 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 322 (1989) ..............................................8 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) .........................................................................................................................2 U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions Citizens Against Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ............................................2 Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Johnson, 165 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 1999) .........................8 Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ..........................................7 Mass v. NRC, 708 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................7, 8 Natl Parks & Conservation Assn v. U.S. Dept of Transp., 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000) .........21 Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974) ............................................................................7 Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) .....................................................................7 Administrative Decisions U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 &
2), CLI-02-17, 56 NRC 1 (2002) .....................................................................................................2 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-11, 71 NRC 287 (2010) ..................................................................................7, 31
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Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-1, 75 NRC 39 (2012) ................................................................................2, 31, 32 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-6, 75 NRC 352 (2012) ..........................................................................................7 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-10, 75 NRC 479 (2012) ....................................................................................7, 8 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-15, 75 NRC 704 (2012) ................................................................2, 4, 7, 8, 29, 31 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3),
CLI-11-14, 74 NRC 801 (2011).......................................................................................................8 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3),
CLI-15-2, 81 NRC __, slip op. (Feb. 18, 2015) ...............................................................................1 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3),
CLI-15-6, 81 NRC __, slip op. (Mar. 9, 2015) ......................................................................5, 9, 26 La. Energy Servs., L.P. (Natl Enrichment Facility), CLI-06-15, 63 NRC 687 (2006)...................6 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1),
CLI-12-5, 75 NRC 301 (2012).............................................................................................5, 29, 38 Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Indep. Spent Fuel Storage Installation),
CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403 (2005).......................................................................................................6 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), LBP-13-13, 78 NRC 246 (2013)..................................................................................................................... passim Federal Regulations 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-l.....................................................................2
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Federal Register Special Committee to Review the Severe Accident Risks Report, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,124 (June 21, 1989) .............................................................................................17 Notice of Availability of the Final License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR-ISG-2006-03:
Staff Guidance for Preparing Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analyses, 72 Fed. Reg.
45,466 (Aug. 14, 2007) ..............................................................................................................3, 26 Other Authorities Allonso and Gallego, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Countermeasures Using Accident Consequence Assessment Models, Rad. Prot. Dosimetry, 21 (No. 1/3) (1987) ..........................14 NEI 05-01, Rev. A, Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) Analysis Guidance Document (Nov. 2005)...........................................................................................3, 26, 27, 38, 34 NUREG-1150, Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (Dec. 1990) ............................................................................................................................ passim NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Vol. 1 (May 1996) ........................................................................................................2, 19 NUREG-1437, Supp. 38, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Final Report (Dec. 2010) ........................................................................................................................5, 6, 7, 19 NUREG-1935, State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report, Draft Report for Public Comment (Jan. 2012) ..................................................18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 29, 36 NUREG-1935, State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report (Nov. 2012) ................................................................................................18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 29, 36 NUREG/CR-2239, Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development (1982) ....................10 NUREG/CR-3673, Economic Risk of Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents (May 1984) ........................................................................................................9, 11, 12, 13, 22, 24
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NUREG/CR-4551,Vol. 2, Rev. 1, Part 7, Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks: Quantification of Major Input Parameters (Dec. 1990) .............................................................................4, 17, 20 NUREG/CR-4691 (SAND86-1562) Sandia National Laboratories, MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS Version 1.4), Volume I, Users Guide, (Draft Version)
(Revised July 15, 1987) .................................................................................................................14 NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, Review of NUREG-0654, Supp. 3, Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents (Dec. 2007) ...................................................................4 WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (1975).....................................................................10, 24
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and
) 50-286-LR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. )
)
(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) )
) March 30, 2015 ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC., INITIAL BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO COMMISSION QUESTIONS IN CLI-15-2 CONCERNING CONTENTION NYS-12C I. INTRODUCTION In accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) Order CLI-15-2, issued on February 18, 2015, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) hereby responds to the Commissions request for further briefing on eight questions related to New York State (New York or NYS) Contention NYS-12C (NYS-12C).1 NYS-12C concerns Entergys and the NRC Staffs compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 10 C.F.R. Part 51.2 Specifically, it challenges certain decontamination cost and time inputs to the severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) analysis submitted by Entergy as part of the license renewal application (LRA) for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 (IP2 and IP3), also referred to as the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC).
1 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), CLI-15-2, 81 NRC __, slip op.
(Feb. 18, 2015). The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) resolved NYS-12C in favor of Entergy and the NRC Staff in LBP-13-13. See generally Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), LBP-13-13, 78 NRC 246, 450-74 (2013).
2 Entergy recounted the procedural history of NYS-12C in its April and May 2014 answers opposing New Yorks two petitions for review concerning LBP-13-13, and incorporates the relevant discussion by reference here.
See Applicants Answer Opposing the State of New Yorks Petition for Review of the Boards Partial Initial Decision (LBP-13-13) at 3-16 (Apr. 28, 2014); Applicants Answer Opposing New York States Petition for Review of April 1, 2014 Board Order Denying Reconsideration of LBP-13-13 at 3-7 (May 23, 2014).
A license renewal SAMA analysis is a site-specific environmental mitigation analysis performed under NEPAnot a safety analysis performed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA).3 As a NEPA-driven requirement, a SAMA analysis must be judged under NEPAs rule of reason.4 The analysis evaluates the degree to which certain specific additional mitigation measures (e.g., new plant procedures or hardware) may reduce the already low risk5 by reducing the probability or the consequencesof the accident scenarios evaluated.6 The SAMA analysis is a quantitative cost-benefit analysis, assessing whether the cost of implementing a specific enhancement outweighs its benefit.7 At its core, the SAMA analysis is a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), because it examines the probability of various hypothesized accident scenarios, spanning a spectrum of potential initiating events, accident sequences, and severity of consequences.8 It is not based on best-case or worst-case accident scenarios.9 Instead, a SAMA analysis estimates mean accident consequence values (including both offsite population dose and economic costs), which are 3
Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI 15, 75 NRC 704, 706-07 (2012).
4 See Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI 17, 56 NRC 1, 12 (2002) (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 551 (1978); Citizens Against Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
5 The NRCs Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for license renewal contains a bounding, generic evaluation of severe accident impacts that is applicable to all plants. Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 709 (citing NUREG-1437, Vol. 1, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants - Main Report (Final Report) at 5-12 to 5-116 (May 1996)). Based on the GEIS evaluation, the NRC has determined that that the probability-weighted consequences of severe accidents are small for all plants. See 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-l (regarding severe accidents).
6 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 706.
7 Id. at 706-07.
8 Id. at 708.
9 Id. (citing Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-1, 75 NRC 39, 55 & n.73 (2012)).
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averaged over many hypothetical severe accident scenarios and over the examined 50-mile radius region surrounding the plant (with an additional uncertainty analysis performed).10 Probabilities and consequences are calculated with the use of established computer codes.
For the offsite consequence calculation, or Level 3 PRA, the NRC has endorsed use of the MACCS2 code to calculate estimated offsite consequenceswhich include both radiological doses and economic losses.11 The decontamination cost and time inputs at issue in NYS-12C are two of many inputs to the MACCS2 offsite economic consequence calculation. Others include, for example, inputs for population relocation costs and evacuation costs.12 Section III of this Brief sets forth Entergys responses to the specific questions posed by the Commission in CLI-15-2. For the reasons stated in its initial brief and summarized in the responses below, Entergy contends that the Board correctly found, as amply justified in LBP 13, that the decontamination time (TIMDEC) and non-farm area decontamination cost (CDNFRM) values applied in the SAMA analysis are reasonable and appropriate for the IPEC site and satisfy the requirements of NEPA and Part 51.13 The Board reached those conclusions by considering and weighing all parties testimony and evidenceand it did so consistent with NEPAs rule of reason and Commission case law applying that rule in the context of a SAMA analysis.14 10 Id.
11 Id. at 707 (citing NEI 05-01, Rev. A, Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) Analysis, Guidance Document (Nov. 2005) (NEI 05-01), as endorsed by Final License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR-ISG-2006-03: Staff Guidance for Preparing Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analyses, 72 Fed. Reg.
45,466 (Aug. 14, 2007)).
12 See Testimony of Entergy Witnesses Lori Potts, Kevin OKula, and Grant Teagarden on Consolidated Contention NYS-12C (Severe Accident Mitigation Alternative Analysis) at 41-42 (A52) & Tbl. 2 (Mar. 30, 2012) (Entergy Testimony) (ENT000450) (defining key economic and decontamination-related parameter inputs to the CHRONC module of MACCS2). The Board correctly focused its decision on the decontamination time and cost input values used in the IPEC SAMA analysis. See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 459.
13 See generally Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 467-74.
14 See generally id. at 457-74.
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With regard to the TIMDEC values, the Board observed that in MACCS2, TIMDEC represents an average time period during which people are temporarily interdicted [i.e., kept away from their residences] while decontamination activities are completed to reduce the dose by the specified dose reduction factor.15 It further noted that TIMDEC is not intended to be representative of any specific accident scenario, including a worst-case scenario.16 The Board accordingly found that Entergys NRC-approved TIMDEC values are reasonable given the well-established goal of a SAMA analysis, which is to estimate annual average impacts for the entire 50-mile radius study area, and the MACCS2 codes requirement for a single average decontamination time as an input value.17 With regard to the CDNFRM input values to MACCS2, the Board found that the values used by Entergy and approved by the NRC Staff are standard, best-estimate values for SAMA analyses and that those vetted via robust public and peer review processes before their inclusion in NUREG-1150.18 The Board further concluded that because the decontamination cost input parameter is a per capita number, the ultimate decontamination cost estimate (obtained by multiplying the per capita input values by Entergys Staff- and Board-approved 2035 population estimate for the Indian Point region) results in a reasonable site-specific decontamination cost estimate.19 15 Id. at 468 (citing Entergy Testimony at 77 (A102) (ENT000450)).
16 See id. at 468, 470 (citing Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 708).
17 See id. at 470-71 (citing Entergy Testimony at 18 (A1) (Ex. ENT000450)).
18 See id. at 471-72 (citing Entergy Testimony at 61 (ENT000450); Oct. 17, 2012 Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 1951; NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, Review of NUREG-0654, Supp. 3, Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents at 32 (Dec. 2007) (ENT000291); NUREG/CR-4551,Vol. 2, Rev. 1, Part 7, Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks: Quantification of Major Input Parameters at iii/iv (Dec. 1990)
(NUREG/CR-4551) (NYS000248)).
19 See id. at 467 (Based on this testimony, we find that these input values are per capita based and were multiplied by the IPEC region population distribution, so as to result in a site-specific SAMA analysis.) (citing Entergy Testimony at 48 (ENT000450); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1950 (Teagarden); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2139-40 (Teagarden); NRC Staff Testimony of Nathan E. Bixler, S. Tina Ghosh, Joseph A. Jones and Donald G. Harrison Concerning NYS Contentions NYS 12/16 at 41, 69 (Mar. 30, 2012) (NRC Staff Testimony) (NRC000041) 4
In making these findings, the Board expressly considered New Yorks opposing testimony, and even agreed with certain points made by New Yorks expert.20 However, as the Board aptly noted, [t]o be successful, New York thus must point to a deficiency that renders the SAMA analysis unreasonable under NEPA.21 The Board could find no such deficienciesand rightly sowhen it viewed all parties testimony and evidence through the lens of NEPAs rule of reason, as well as consistent and direct Commission precedent governing SAMA analyses.22 As the Board further noted, New Yorks position regarding the TIMDEC variable is based on an observation of the time required to decontaminate the areas surrounding Chernobyl and Fukushima,23 whereas a SAMA analysis is not designed to model a single radiological release event at a single moment in time.24 In the case of CDNFRM parameter, the Board found, based on its careful review of the record evidence, that [c]onsistent with NEPAs rule of reason, the Applicant and the NRC Staff acted based on the best available information and analysis in completing the SAMA evaluation.25 In short, the Boards decision in LBP-13-13 is clearly reasoned and fully supported by the adjudicatory record.26 After viewing the record as a whole and giving due weight to all parties (NRC000041); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2136 (Lemay)). In its ruling on contention NYS-16B, the Board concluded that that Entergys estimate of the 2035 projected population estimate and NRC Staffs approval thereof are reasonable and satisfy the requirements of NEPA. See generally Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 475-89.
20 See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 461-65, 468-74.
21 Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
22 See id. at 474 (But we are mindful that this is a NEPA-based contention, and that all NEPA requirements are governed by a rule of reason. We are further guided by the Commission's holdings that the proper question is not whether there are plausible alternative choices for use in the analysis, but whether the analysis that was done is reasonable under NEPA.) (quoting NextEra Energy Seabrook, L.L.C. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-12-5, 75 NRC 301, 323 (2012)).
23 Id. at 468-69 (citing New York Testimony at 52-55 (NYS000241)).
24 Id. at 471.
25 Id. at 472 (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 102 (1983)).
26 See Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), CLI-15-6, 81 NRC __, slip op. at 56 (Mar. 9, 2015) (citing the need for the Board to parse the evidence and clearly explain its reasoning).
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testimony on this contentionthe Board appropriately found that the NRC Staff has met its obligations under NEPA as they pertain to its independent review of Entergys SAMA analysis.
The Commissions questions in CLI-15-2 fundamentally raise factual and technical issuesnot legal or policy issues requiring de novo review of the Boards decision.27 It bears emphasis that the Commission generally will defer to the Board on its fact findings absent a showing that the Boards findings were clearly erroneous, meaning that, in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the findings were not even plausible.28 Here, the Boards fact findings are not only plausible, they are eminently reasonable, especially for purposes of a NEPA contention.
Accordingly, the Commission should affirm the Boards decision in LBP-13-13.
II. CONTROLLING LEGAL PRINCIPLES Before addressing the Commissions specific questions in CLI-15-2, Entergy summarizes a number of relevant controlling legal principlesas applied by the Board in LBP-13-13 and the Commission in long-standing, governing precedent.
A. The Adequacy of a SAMA Analysis Is Judged Under NEPAs Rule of Reason The Commission has held that the proper question is not whether there are plausible alternative choices for use in the [SAMA] analysis, but whether the analysis that was done is reasonable under NEPA.29 The fact that a computer modelMACCS2 in this casecould have been run with alternate inputs does not, ipso facto, suggest that the inputs used were unreasonable.30 Indeed, SAMA adjudications would prove endless if hearings were triggered 27 See id. at 12 (citing Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-17, 72 NRC 1, 11, 35 (2010)).
28 See id. (citing La. Energy Servs., L.P. (Natl Enrichment Facility), CLI-06-15, 63 NRC 687, 697 (2006); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Indep. Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403, 411 (2005)).
29 Seabrook, CLI-12-5, 75 NRC at 323 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 336-37 (Again, any number of alternative analyses may be reasonable under NEPA. The issue is not whether alternative approaches exist, alternative inputs may be substituted, or yet another factor could be considered.).
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merely by suggested alternative inputs and methodologies that conceivably could alter the cost-benefit conclusions but that may be no more accurate or meaningful.31 The Commission also has held that NEPA does not require that we wait until inchoate information matures into something that [possibly] might affect our review. It requires us to conduct our review with the best information available now. 32 Perhaps most importantly, NEPA does not require license renewal applicants or the Staff to use technologies and methodologies that are still emerging and under development, or to study phenomena for which there are not yet standard methods of measurement or analysis.33 Thus, as the Board noted in LBP-13-13, NEPA does not require agencies to resolve all uncertainties, including, in this case, uncertainties associated with the NUREG-1150 values used in the IPEC SAMA analysis.34 So long as the environmental impact statement identifies areas of uncertainty, the agency has fulfilled its mission under NEPA.35 At the end of the day, there always will be more data that could be gathered, and myriad alternate ways a NEPA analysis could have been done.36 The agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts and to move forward with decisionmaking.37 As in this case, the NRC 31 Id. at 323-24.
32 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 727 (quoting Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-6, 75 NRC 352, 376 (2012), petitions for review denied, Mass. v.
NRC, 708 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2013)).
33 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI 11, 71 NRC 287, 315-16 (2010), reconsideration denied, CLI-10-15, 71 NRC 479 (2010) (stating that a SAMA analysis is not intended to be a research document, reflecting the frontiers of scientific methodology, studies and data) (quoting Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 11-13 (1st Cir. 2008)).
34 Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 473 (citing Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 377 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)). See also Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 61 (5th Cir. 1974)
(holding that the mere fact that certain factors in a cost-benefit analysis are generally imprecise or unquantifiable does not render the result inadequate).
35 Marsh, 655 F.2d at 377.
36 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI 10, 75 NRC 479, 487 (2012).
37 Pilgrim, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC at 315 (citation omitted).
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Staff meets its NEPA obligations when, based upon the available technical information, the mitigation analysis outlines relevant factors, discloses uncertainties and opposing viewpoints, and indicates particular assumptions under which the Staff ultimately concludes that specific SAMAs are potentially cost-beneficial.38 B. Implementation of Severe Accident Mitigation Measures, Including Those Ordered by the NRC in Response to Fukushima, Is Governed by the AEANot by NEPA NEPA is a procedural statutealthough it requires a hard look at mitigation measures, it does not, in and of itself, provide the statutory basis for their implementation.39 The mitigation measures assessed in a SAMA analysis are supplemental to those the NRC already requires under its safety regulations and via its ongoing AEA-based regulatory oversight of reactor safety.40 Pursuant to its AEA authority, the Commission canand did so in response to the events at Fukushimaorder licensees to increase the capability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the risk of beyond-design-basis external events.41 The Commission also issued other orders, again pursuant to its AEA authority, requiring all reactor licensees to implement substantial safety enhancements to further strengthen the severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency 38 See Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI 17, 58 NRC 419, 431 (2003); Mass. v. NRC, 708 F. at 78 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Johnson, 165 F.3d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1999); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378-85 (1989)) (obtaining opinions from agency and outside experts, giving scientific scrutiny, and offering responses to legitimate concerns as evidence of a sufficiently hard look).
39 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), CLI-11-14, 74 NRC 801, 813 (2011) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 n.16 (1989)). See also Pilgrim, CLI-12-10, 75 NRC at 488 (stating that NEPA neither requires nor authorizes the NRC to order implementation of mitigation measures analyzed in an environmental analysis); Mass. v. NRC, 708 F.3d at 81 n.27 (To the extent [the petitioner] seeks to impose a substantive requirement that the NRC must require certain mitigation measures under NEPA, that is foreclosed by the fact that NEPA is not outcome driven.).
40 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 709 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 708. EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Effective Immediately) at 4 (Mar. 12, 2012).
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preparedness defense-in-depth layers.42 Thus, the Commission will act vigorously under the AEA when it believes doing so is appropriate.
Based on its analysis of plant risks, the Commission has concluded that the current operation and continued licensing of nuclear power reactors are safe.43 In this regard, its ongoing efforts to evaluate and further enhance NRC safety requirements do not imply that the NRC now considers severe accidents significantly more likely or potentially more damaging than suggested in the GEIS for license renewal.44 As noted above, the NRC has determined in the GEIS that the probability-weighted environmental consequences of severe accidents are small for all plants.45 III. RESPONSES TO THE COMMISSIONS QUESTIONS A. Question 1: Address the underlying support and reasoning (if available) behind the NUREG/CR-3673 reports conclusion that a 90-day time period is an average period of time for completing decontamination for the most severe type of reactor accident.
This question relates to the decontamination time (TIMDEC) input to the MACCS2 portion of the IPEC SAMA analysis. Specifically, the 60-day and 120-day TIMDEC values used in NUREG-1150 and the IPEC SAMA analysis were derived from the 90-day value discussed in NUREG/CR-3673, Economic Risks of Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents (Apr. 1984)
(ENT000466 / NRC000058).46 As the Board correctly noted, TIMDEC represents an average time period during which people are temporarily interdicted while decontamination activities are 42 Id. (citing EA-12-50, Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents (Effective Immediately) at 6 (Mar. 12, 2012)).
43 Id. at 728.
44 Id.
45 See n.5, supra. See also Indian Point, CLI-15-6, slip op. at 50 (stating that the severe accident impacts have been assessed generically through rulemaking and may not be revisited in individual licensing actions).
46 See Entergy Testimony at 80-87 (A105-107) (ENT000450) (discussing decontamination time values used in NUREG/CR-3673 and NUREG-1150 and their relationship). See also Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 469-70 (citing Entergy Testimony at 86 (A106) (ENT000450)).
9
completed to reduce the dose by the specified dose reduction factor (DRF).47 Following the expiration of the TIMDEC period, and upon satisfaction of the specified habitability criteria, MACCS2 assumes the resettlement of relocated persons.48 As discussed below, in MACCS2, the same average decontamination period (90 days in the case of NUREG/CR-3673) is used for each accident scenario modeled, from the most minimally contaminating event sequence to the worst; i.e., the value is not intended to be representative of any single, specific accident scenario.49 By way of background, the MACCS2 codes genesis can be traced to the development of CRAC, an early predecessor code to MACCS2.50 CRAC code was upgraded to the CRAC2 code, which was used in the severe accident and siting analysis documented in the 1982 Sandia Siting Study.51 The CRAC2 code was later replaced by the MACCS code (MACCS2s immediate precursor), which was used for consequence analysis calculations in the study now referred to as NUREG-1150, Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (Dec. 1990) (NYS00252A-C).52 47 Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 468 (citing Entergy Testimony at 77 (A102) (ENT000450)). The inputs applied in MACCS2 to evaluate decontamination are termed dose reduction factors (DRFs), and are represented by the code parameter DSRFCT, which is defined as the effectiveness of the various decontamination levels in reducing dose. Entergy Testimony at 66 (A86) (citing NUREG/CR-6613, Vol. 1 at 7-9 to 7-11 (ENT000243)).
48 See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 468 (citing Entergy Testimony at 77 (A102) (ENT000450)).
49 See id.
50 See Entergy Testimony at 20 (A32) (ENT000450).
51 See id. at 20-21 (A33) (ENT000450); NUREG/CR-2239, Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development (1982) (ENT000453). The 1982 Sandia Siting Study primarily focused on developing generic siting criteria for siting future reactors. It used five generic source terms (SST1 to SST5) for analyzing the consequences and socio-economic impacts of possible plant accidents at 91 existing or proposed reactor sites. Entergy Testimony at 21 (A34) (ENT000450) (citing NUREG/CR-2239 at 1-5, 2-1 (ENT000453)). These source terms were derived from the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and subsequent evaluations. Id. (citing WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (1975) (ENT000452)).
52 See Entergy Testimony at 21 (A34) (ENT000450). As the Board noted, NUREG-1150 is an NRC guidance document that presents an assessment of severe accident risks based on studies representing five commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. It summarizes the results of those studies and provides perspectives on how the results may be used by the NRC in carrying out its safety and regulatory responsibilities. NUREG-1150s stated objectives are to provide a current assessment of the severe accident risks of nuclear power plants of different designs, to summarize the perspectives gained in performing these risk analyses, and to provide a set of PRA 10
The bases of the economic models used to estimate offsite economic costs in MACCS (as applied in NUREG-1150) are described in NUREG/CR-3673, the subject of the Commissions question.53 NUREG/CR-3673 states that it developed and applied improved models to estimate the economic risks from unanticipated events which occur during U.S. LWR [light-water reactor]
operation.54 As part of this effort, the study estimated the offsite costs (including nonfarm area decontamination costs) of post-accident population protective measures and public health impacts for severe accidents resulting in releases of radioactive material to the environment.55 As relevant here, NUREG/CR-3673 states that, after the most severe type of reactor accident (i.e., an SST1 release, as previously modeled with CRAC2 as part of the 1982 Sandia Siting Study), a total of 11,000 man-years of effort is involved in the decontamination program to reduce population exposure from the accident.56 It further states that [b]ased on a mean time to completion of 90 days for the decontamination efforts, this program would require a work force of 46,000 men.57 The use of a 90-day decontamination time period therefore reflects NUREG/CR-3673s core assumptions that: (1) the most effective approach is to complete decontamination of those areas which can be restored to acceptable levels as quickly as possible; models and results that can support the ongoing prioritization of potential safety issues and related research. See Indian Point, LBP13-13, 78 NRC at 455-56 (citing NUREG-1150, Vol. 1 at iii, 1-2).
53 See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 469 (citing NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041). See also Entergy Testimony at 57 (A72) (ENT000450) (citing NUREG/CR-3673, § 4 (ENT000466); NUREG/CR-4691, MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) Model Description, Vol. 2 at 1-9, 4-1 (Feb. 1990)
(NYS000288) (citing NUREG/CR-3673 as the source of the economic models used in the MACCS code).
54 Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 472 (quoting NUREG/CR-3673 at EX-1 (ENT000466)).
55 See id. See also NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-15 to 4-17 (ENT000466).
56 NUREG/CR-3673 at 6-25 (ENT000466).
57 Id. (emphasis added). See also Indian Point, LBP-13-13. 78 NRC at 469 (citing NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041); Entergy Testimony at 83-85 (A105) (discussing use of 90-day decontamination period in NUREG/CR-3673).
11
and (2) [t]he time from start to completion of the decontamination process is specified to represent an average for those areas to be decontaminated.58 With regard to the first assumption, NUREG/CR-3673 explains that expedited decontamination is assumed because delays in decontamination increase the likelihood of migration and fixation of radionuclides in an area (thereby making decontamination more difficult and costly) and prolong the societal and economic disruption caused by the decontamination process.59 For a large area requiring decontamination, the reports authors assumed that many workers (e.g., military personnel, disaster relief agencies, and commercial personnel) would need to be deployed to complete the decontamination in a short time.60 As for the second assumption, the NRC Staffs experts explained that NUREG/CR-3673 reasonably identified an average effort required to restore habitability to an area following a severe accident.61 Although some accident scenarios might result in decontamination periods longer than 90 days, less severe accidents would require shorter decontamination periods and involve fewer resources.62 Thus, to provide a reliable and reasonable analysis, the decontamination time inputs to the economic models considered in NUREG/CR-3673 needed to represent the full spectrum of modeled severe accidents, including ones that require little decontamination.63 Importantly, the economic models discussed in NUREG/CR-3673 are based on the staged implementation of offsite population protective measures (i.e., relocation, decontamination, interdiction, condemnation) in post-accident situations.64 The NUREG/CR-3673 authors viewed 58 NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-19, 4-22 (emphasis added).
59 See Entergy Testimony at 87-88 (A109) (ENT000450) (quoting NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-19 (ENT000466)).
60 See NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-20, 6-25 (ENT000466).
61 See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 469 (citing NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041)).
62 See id. (citing NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041)).
63 See id. at 470 (citing NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041)).
64 See Entergy Testimony at 80-86 (A105-06) (ENT000450).
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this modeling approach as providing realistic estimates of the costs of post-accident protective measures.65 In other words, the post-accident decontamination program is not the only protective measure applied in the model or included in the offsite economic cost calculations.66 For example, some areas around the plant would not require any decontamination and evacuees could return to those areas a few days after the accident.67 Some areas would be able to be decontaminated to an acceptable level in the 90-day intensive decontamination period, after which time the relocated individuals could return.68 Other affected areas would not be conducive to rapid decontamination and would be interdicted or condemned.69 In the interdicted and condemned areas, the original population is assumed to be moved to an alternate location.70 In an interdicted area, it is possible that relocated persons could move back to the area as a result of radioactive decay, weathering, and additional decontamination efforts.71 A condemned area is never reclaimed, and the entire wealth of the condemned area is assumed to be lost.72 In the event of an actual severe accident, decontamination activities could extend over longer periods (e.g., greater than a year).73 Indeed, such activities may continue (and have continued in actual experience) following population resettlement.74 However, such activities would constitute work performed in the long-term recovery phase, during which selective 65 NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-6 (ENT000466).
66 See Entergy Testimony at 80-82 (A105) (ENT000450).
67 See id. at 37 (A51), 78 (A102) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 38 (A34) (NRC000041).
68 See Entergy Testimony at 78 (A102) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 39 (A34) (NRC000041).
69 See Entergy Testimony at 38-39 (A51) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 39 (A34) (NRC000041).
70 See NRC Staff Testimony at 38-39 (A34) (NRC000041).
71 See Entergy Testimony at 38-39 (A51) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 39 (A34) (NRC000041).
72 See Entergy Testimony at 39-40 (A51) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 39-40 (A34) (NRC000041).
73 See Entergy Testimony at 87 (A107) (ENT000450).
74 See id. at 80 (A103) (ENT000450).
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decontamination of specific locations may be performed.75 For the reasons explained above, the possibility that certain decontamination activities may persist for years is not in conflict with NUREG/CR-3673s use of a mean decontamination period of 90 days.76 Nor does it render the mean decontamination period of 90 days unreasonable under NEPA.
As Entergys experts explained, early MACCS code documentation indicates that this staged approach to modeling the decontamination and rehabitation of areas affected by a postulated severe accident has been part of the MACCS code since its inception in the 1980s.77 It continues to be an integral part of the MACCS2 code, as does the assumption that decontamination activities will be performed in an expedited manner.78 Entergys experts concluded that the 60-day and 120-day TIMDEC values used in NUREG-1150 and the IPEC SAMA analysis represent +/-30-day sensitivity cases when compared to the 90-day base case from NUREG/CR-3673 and early (circa 1987) MACCS code documentation.79 Based upon their review of documents, they further concluded that NUREG/CR-3673 and NUREG-1150 support the conclusion that the two decontamination levels (i.e., dose reduction factors of 3 and 15) and times (i.e., TIMDEC values equal to 60 and 120 days) defined in the IPEC SAMA analysis are appropriate to model early efforts within days to 75 See id. at 87 (A107) (ENT000450).
76 See id. at 78 (A102), 80 (A103) (ENT000450).
77 See id. at 85-86 (A106) (ENT000450) (citing NUREG/CR-4691 (SAND86-1562) Sandia National Laboratories, MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS Version 1.4), Volume I, Users Guide, (Draft Version)
(Revised July 15, 1987) (NUREG/CR-4691) (ENT000467); Allonso and Gallego, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Countermeasures Using Accident Consequence Assessment Models, Rad. Prot. Dosimetry, 21 (No.
1/3) pp. 151-158 (1987) (ENT000468)).
78 See id. at 15 (A26), 88 (A109) (ENT000450).
79 See id. at 85 (A105) (ENT000450). Specifically, when NUREG-1150 was issued in 1990, the two retained dose reduction factor cases were 3 and 15, with the DRF=15 time adjusted to 120 days. See id. at 86 (A106) (citing NUREG-1150, Vol. 3, Appendix D at D-30).
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weeks after plume deposition, and before weathering and human activities (both planned and inadvertent) significantly affect the distribution of the contamination.80 In summary, the 90-day decontamination time period used in NUREG/CR-3673 can be traced back to the early development of MACCS. The 90-day period reflects the NUREG/CR-3673 authors staged approach to decontamination and re-habitation of interdicted areas following a postulated severe accident, and represents an average value that takes into account all of the modeled severe accident scenarios, including ones requiring little decontamination. The use of the 90-day base case in NUREG/CR-3673 led to the application of the 60-day and 120-day periods (for DRFs = 3 and 15, respectively) in NUREG-1150, the SAMA analyses for IPEC and other plants, and, as discussed below, current NRC state-of-the-art consequence analyses. As also discussed below, to the knowledge of Entergys experts, the NUREG-1150 values have not been replaced or superseded by any newer, published NRC studies. Thus, the Board appropriately concluded that it is reasonable under NEPA for Entergy to have adopted 60-day and 120-day average decontamination time values from NUREG-1150 for DRFs of 3 and 15, respectively.81 B. Question No. 2: Identify from the record any peer review or similar vetting of the NUREG-1150 values for the decontamination cost inputs for nonfarm land and property (CDNFRM) and the decontamination time inputs (TIMDEC) used in the MACCS2 computer code.
As discussed during the hearing, NUREG-1150 was made available for public comment and subjected to multiple peer reviews that, in the opinion of Entergys expert, Dr. Kevin OKula, involved an unprecedented level of technical scrutiny.82 NUREG-1150 was, and remains, a seminal NRC PRA study that presents population dose results for a 50-mile radial region around 80 See id. 86-87 (A107); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2186:20-2187:7 (Teagarden).
81 Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 470-71.
82 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2370:2-2372:9 (OKula). See also Entergy Testimony at 21-22 (A35), 55 (A72)
(ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 46 (A39) (NRC000041).
15
each of five representative nuclear power plants.83 It used the MACCS code and applied the same economic inputs for each of the five study sites, except for the variables related to farm and nonfarm wealth, which are based on region-specific inputs.84 As noted above, the CDNFRM and TIMDEC values used in the IPEC SAMA analysis are based on the NUREG-1150 values.
NUREG-1150 was the subject of extensive peer reviews and public vetting, having first been issued in draft form in February 1987 for public comment. In response, 55 sets of comments totaling approximately 800 pages were submitted to the NRC.85 In addition, three organized peer review committees, two sponsored by the NRC and one by the American Nuclear Society (ANS), submitted comments to the NRC.86 The NRC issued a second draft version of NUREG-1150 in 1989.87 That version considered the comments received, and also reflected improvements in methods identified during the conduct of the draft risk analyses, in the design and operation of the studied plants, and in the information base of severe accident phenomenology.88 Given the substantial number of comments on the first NUREG-1150 draft and resulting changes to the report, the second draft version also was subjected to multiple peer reviews.89 First, a special international review committee, established by the NRC in consultation with the General Services Administration (GSA) under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act,90 studied the report for approximately one 83 Entergy Testimony at 22 (A35) (ENT000450) (citing NUREG-1150, Vol. 1 at 2-3, 2-20 (NYS00252A)).
84 Id. at 52 (A71).
85 See NUREG-1150, Vol. 1 at 1-2 (NYS00252A).
86 See id. Appendix D to NUREG-1150 provides a summary of the principal comments (and their authors) on the first draft of NUREG-1150 and the Staff's responses thereto.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) is a federal law enacted in 1972 that governs the operation of federal advisory committees and emphasizes public involvement through open meetings, chartering, public involvement, and reporting. The GSA oversees the FACA process. The purpose of the NUREG-1150 16
year and published its findings in August 1990.91 The ANS-sponsored review of the report proceeded in parallel, and the results of that review were published in June 1990.92 Also, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed the analyses and provided comments.93 Four sets of public comments also were received by the NRC.94 According to the final NUREG-1150, [w]hile all committees suggested that some changes be made to the report, the comments received were, in general, positive, with all review committees recommending that the report be published in final form as soon as possible and without extensive reanalysis or changes.95 In addition, NRC and industry technical staff vetted key economic inputs before their inclusion in NUREG-1150, as reflected in NUREG/CR-4551a seven-volume report that was issued in December 1990 and prepared to support the development of NUREG-1150.96 NUREG/CR-4551 states that before the offsite accident consequence calculations for NUREG-1150 were performed, most MACCS input parameters were reviewed, and for each parameter reviewed, a best-estimate value was recommended.97 Parameters reviewed included economic input parameters.98 special committee was to provide the NRC with a technical peer review of the adequacy of the methods, insights, analyses and conclusions set forth in the April 1989 draft of NUREG-1150, including answers to particular questions posed by the Commission. Special Committee to Review the Severe Accident Risks Report, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,124 (June 21, 1989).
91 See NUREG-1150, Vol. 1 at 1-2 (NYS00252A) (citing NUREG-1420, Special Committee Review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Severe Accident Risks Report (NUREG-1150) (Aug. 1990)).
92 See id. (citing LeSage et al., Report of the Special Committee on NUREG-1150, The NRCs Study of Severe Accident Risks, American Nuclear Society (June 1990)).
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 NUREG/CR-4551, Vol. 2, Rev. 1, Part 7, Evaluation of Severe Accident Risks: Quantification of Major Input Parameters (December 1990) (NYS000248) specifically discusses major MACCS input parameters used in the NUREG-1150 study. See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 456, 470, 472; Entergy Testimony at 22-23 (A36), 60 (A76) (ENT000450).
97 See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 470, 472 (citing and quoting NUREG/CR-4551, Vol. 2, Rev. 1, Part 7 at iii/iv (NYS000248)).
98 See id.
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Entergys experts also cited the NRCs use of the NUREG-1150 values in the recently-completed State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA) project as further evidence of their continued applicability and suitability for use in SAMA analyses.99 The NRC initiated the SOARCA project in 2006 to develop revised best estimates of the offsite radiological health consequences of severe reactor accidents by including significant plant improvements and updates not reflected in earlier NRC assessments.100 Although the SOARCA study is not a SAMA analysis, it is a state-of-the-art assessment of the accident progression, radiological releases, and offsite consequences associated with a severe accident.101 The Staffs expertsthree of whom were involved in the SOARCA projectalso testified that Entergys CDNFRM values, as derived from NUREG-1150, have a long history of use for exactly this kind of analysis (i.e., SAMA analysis) and continue to be used by the NRC in current state-of-the-art consequence assessments (like the SOARCA project).102 Thus, the Staffs experts viewed their use as inputs to the IPEC SAMA analysis as reasonable and consistent with current practice.103 Notably, the SOARCA report reflects an overall positive view of the NUREG-1150 study.104 To date, the NRC has not 99 See Entergy Testimony at 62 (A78) (ENT000450) (citing NUREG-1935, State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report, Draft Report for Public Comment, at 61, 63 (Jan. 2012) (Draft NUREG-1935)
(ENT000455)); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1951:17-21 (Teagarden). The final version of NUREG-1935 was published in November 2012, after completion of the hearing on NYS-12C. The final report does not reflect any significant substantive changes from the draft report. See NUREG-1935, State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report (Nov. 2012), available at ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12332A057 and ML12332A058.
100 See Entergy Testimony at 26 (A41) (ENT000450).
101 See Draft NUREG-1935 at 63 (ENT000455) (stating that the MACCS2 decontamination parameters do affect decisions on whether contaminated areas can be restored to habitability and therefore affect predicted doses and risk of health effects, and that[v]alues from NUREG-1150 provide the basis for decontamination parameters, which consist of two levels of decontamination, just as in NUREG-1150).
102 See NRC Staff Testimony at 89-90 (A81) (NRC000241); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2158:13-2161:25 (Harrison); id. at 2251:13-24 (Jones).
103 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2251:13-2252:10 (Jones).
104 See Draft NUREG-1935 at 6-7 (The improved PRA methodology used in the NUREG-1150 study greatly enhanced the understanding of risk at NPPs and is considered a significantly updated and improved revision to the Reactor Safety Study.); id. at 33 (The insights from the NUREG-1150 study have been used in several areas of reactor regulation, including the development of alternative radiological source terms for evaluating design-basis accidents at nuclear reactors.).
18
issued any guidance or other documents to licensees that call into question the continued use of the NUREG-1150 values, particularly within the context of a NEPA evaluation.105 In summary, Entergys MACCS2 decontamination cost and time inputs are: (1) based on peer-reviewed NUREG-1150 values that have been extremely well-vetted by the nuclear industry, the national laboratories, and the NRC;106 (2) used in all NRC-approved SAMA analyses;107 and (3) applied in the NRCs recent SOARCA project.108 Therefore, those values are reasonable and remain appropriate for use in a NEPA-based SAMA analysis.109 C. Question No. 3: Providing references to the record, discuss the underlying reasons behind the Staff and Entergy experts opinion that the NUREG-1150 CDNFRM and TIMDEC values continue to reflect reasonable estimates for severe accident decontamination times and costs today, including for the heavier (DF of 15) decontamination effort.
As the Board noted in LBP-13-13, Entergy and the NRC Staff witnesses testified that they considered the appropriateness of the NUREG-1150 numbers to the IPEC SAMA analysis,110 including the TIMDEC and CDNFRM values, and concluded that they constitute reasonable values for IPECeven today.111 As discussed during the hearing, Entergy initially conveyed this position in a February 2008 RAI Response,112 wherein it described the key MACCS2 input parameters that contribute to the offsite economic cost risk and justified the applicability of 105 It also warrants mention that NRC Staff witness Donald Harrison testified that the analyses performed as part of developing NUREG-1150 provided substantial support undergirding the basis of the 1996 10 C.F.R. Part 51 rulemaking and the license renewal GEIS. See Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2158:13-2161:25 (Harrison).
106 See Entergy Testimony at 55-58 (A72), 59-62 (A76-78).
107 See id. at 14 (A26); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1951:13-16 (Teagarden).
108 See Entergy Testimony at 14 (A26), 85-86 (A106); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1951:17-21 (Teagarden).
109 See generally Entergy Testimony at 48-58 (A64-73), 72-88 (A93-109).
110 Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 473.
111 See, e.g., Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2067:14-2069:3 (Potts); id. at 2080:15-19 (Potts) ([T]he key input data from NUREG-1150 [were] judged by us to be applicable to the Indian Point SAMA analysis.).
112 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2079:21-25 (Potts); NL-08-028, Letter from Fred Dacimo, Vice President, Entergy, to NRC, Reply to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Renewal Application - Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis at 37-38 (Feb. 5, 2008) (February 2008 RAI Response) (ENT000460) 19
Entergys selected input values to the IPEC site and region.113 As reflected in the RAI response and further discussed at the hearing, the NUREG-1150 values (as adjusted to 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) ratio method), are reasonable for numerous reasons that the Board discussed in LBP-13-13.114 In summary, the values continue to reflect reasonable estimates because they are based on the highest quality and most accurate scientific information currently available (i.e., NUREG-1150 and other NRC-approved documents supporting its development).
In addition, they are well-suited for use in a probabilistic SAMA analysis because the latter necessarily considers a multitude of clean-up scenariosranging from those requiring light to heavy decontamination over a sizable geographic region.115
- 1. The NUREG-1150 TIMDEC and CDNFRM Values Still Represent the Best Available Inputs to a SAMA Analysis Performed Using the MACCS2 Code As explained in response to Question 2, the NUREG-1150 economic and decontamination-related values are still viewed as the most reasonable values currently available for use by licensees in SAMA analyses based on NRC and industry-reviewed studies. Entergys and Staffs experts fully corroborated this point, testifying that standard MACCS2 modeling for NRC severe accident assessments uses NUREG-1150 input values due to their well-established pedigree within the PRA community.116 NUREG-1150 was subjected to multiple peer reviews that involved an 113 See id. at 2079:19-2080:19 (Potts) (citing February 2008 RAI Response, Attach. 1 at 37-38 (ENT000460)).
114 See February 2008 RAI Response, Attach. 1 at 38 (ENT000460); Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 467-73
([G]iven that NUREG-1150 was made available for public comment and was subjected to peer review, and based upon the foregoing discussion of the situation and the witnesses testimony, we find that the use of the NUREG-1150 CDNFRM values was not unreasonable.).
115 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2139:11-21 (Teagarden). See also Entergy Testimony at 18 (A31) (ENT000450); NRC Testimony at 89-90 (A81) (NRC000041).
116 See Entergy Testimony at 72 (A95) (ENT000450); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1951:21-1952:1 (Teagarden) (So Entergy used values that are per person values, have been well vetted in the PRA community, have been used consistently through time, used in the latest study [SOARCA] and then those values are applied to the population distribution.); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2059:4-5 (Teagarden) (We believe those are the best inputs. We know of no technically superior inputs to use.); NRC Staff Testimony at 69 (A61) (NRC00041) (The detailed methodology described in NUREG/CR-4551 and applied at the per-person level provides a reasonable and tested approach for use in the SAMA analysis.); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2158:13-2161:25 (Harrison); id. at 2251:13-24 20
unprecedented level of technical scrutiny,117 and NRC and industry technical staff vetted key economic inputs before their inclusion in NUREG-1150, as reflected in NUREG/CR-4551.118 Entergy and NRC Staff experts further testified that there is no NRC- and industry-accepted alternative to the NUREG-1150 values, and that to their knowledge, all license renewal applicants have used these NUREG-1150 values (as escalated) in their SAMA analyses.119 According to Entergy expert Grant Teagarden, who has supported numerous SAMA analyses, these values represent the best values that are available for a SAMA analysis, and [w]e know of no technically superior values to use for the MACCS code input for these [parameters].120 As discussed above, the NRCs use of the NUREG-1150 values in the SOARCA project is further evidence of their continued applicability and suitability for use in SAMA analyses.121
- 2. The NUREG-1150 CDNFRM Values Remain Reasonable and Well-Suited for Use In a Time- and Spatially-Averaged SAMA Analysis The NUREG-1150 CDNFRM values (as escalated for time) also continue to provide reasonable estimates for severe accident decontamination costs, including for the heavier (DRF of
- 15) decontamination effort. First, as explained by Entergys and Staffs experts, NUREG/CR-3673 indicates that the nonfarm decontamination cost estimates and decontamination factors applied in NUREG-1150 reflect consideration of different decontamination methods, land uses, and accident source term release magnitudes, with the goal of developing an average value.122 As (Jones) (stating that the exercise of reviewing the alternative input parameters has given [the Staff] a great degree of confidence that the original [NUREG-1150] values are reasonable).
117 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2370:2-2372:9 (OKula). See also Entergy Testimony at 21-22 (A35), 55 (A72)
(ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 46 (A39) (NRC000041).
118 Entergy Testimony at 60 (A76) (ENT000450). See also Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 470, 472.
119 Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1951:13-16 (Teagarden); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2158-60 (Harrison).
120 Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2040:2-5 (Teagarden). See also id. at 2043:24-2044:4 (Ms. Potts).
121 Entergy Testimony at 62 (A78) (ENT000450) (citing Draft NUREG-1935 at 63 (ENT000455)); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1951:17-21 (Teagarden).
122 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2169:24-2170:9 (Teagarden); see also id. at 2142:2-9 (Teagarden); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2044:22-2045:10 (Harrison) (citing NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-17 (ENT000466)).
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such, the NUREG-1150 CDNFRM values reflect both lighter and heavier decontamination scenarios. In fact, the experts emphasized that NUREG/CR-3673 specifically states that it considered the large areas which may require decontamination after the worst accidents in defining the variety of decontamination techniques which could be employed, and that [t]he decontamination cost estimates incorporate information on a multitude of possible methods to be used in the decontamination of non-farm areas.123 In addition, Staff experts explained that NUREG/CR-3673 explicitly notes that the large uncertainties inherent in estimates of reactor accident radionuclide release processes (e.g., source terms), atmospheric transport and deposition, decontamination effectiveness, and decontamination costs limit the usefulness of more detailed analyses.124 Thus, NUREG/CR-3673 itself as well as the Staffs related testimony indicate that detailed or localized decontamination cost estimates (e.g., that reflect heavier decontamination efforts within a particular area)even assuming they could be developed and applied within the MACCS2 code frameworkare not necessarily better suited for use in SAMA analysis than the average single TIMDEC values recommended in NUREG-1150.125 Furthermore, Entergy and Staff experts testified that the NUREG-1150 decontamination cost values remain reasonable for the IPEC region today because they are based upon levels of contamination (DRF = 3 for lighter and DRF = 15 for heavier) and population rather than upon the region in which the contamination occurs.126 On this point, the experts explained that MACCS2 applies the nonfarm economic inputs, including the nonfarm decontamination cost (CDNFRM) 123 NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-15, 4-17 (ENT000466) (emphasis added); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2246:13-20 (Teagarden);
124 See NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-17 (ENT000466); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2044:22-2045:10 (Harrison).
125 See NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-17 (ENT000466) (Detailed analyses of decontamination costs based on land usage mapping and estimation of decontamination costs for specific area types is not justified for risk models because areas requiring decontamination are large enough that average values provide reasonable cost estimates.).
126 See NRC Staff Testimony at 41 (A35) (NRC00041); Entergy Testimony at 55-58 (A72) (ENT000450); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1949:23-1950:8 (Teagarden).
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value, on a per person basis.127 Specifically, in MACCS2, the populations within the IPEC SAMA analysis region were multiplied by these per person decontamination cost values, as appropriate, making the resulting decontamination cost estimate site-specific.128 This approach, in the experts view, reasonably accounts for areas with high population densities and low population densities (e.g., due to the high proportions of parkland and other rural property), as well as areas requiring lighter and heavier decontamination, within the 50-mile IPEC SAMA analysis region.129 In summary, both Entergy and NRC Staff experts testified that the NUREG-1150 nonfarm decontamination cost values used in the IPEC SAMA analysis were designed to be average values that reflect both lighter and heavier decontamination efforts, and can be reasonably applied on a per-person basis to make the resulting cost estimates site-specific.130 Accordingly, the Board appropriately concluded, based on its review of the entire record, that the Staffs acceptance of CDNFRM input values derived from NUREG-1150 for use in the IPEC SAMA analysis was reasonable under NEPA.131
- 3. The NUREG-1150 TIMDEC Values Remain Reasonable and Well-Suited for Use In a Time- and Spatially-Averaged SAMA Analysis Entergys and the Staffs experts also explained why, for purposes of a SAMA analysis, the TIMDEC values first applied in NUREG-1150 continue to reflect reasonable estimates for 127 See NRC Staff Testimony at 41 (A35) (NRC00041) (By using a per-person basis, this approach takes into account the site-specific high population density of New York City and the correspondingly high density of buildings.); Entergy Testimony at 55-58 (A72) (ENT000450).
128 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1949:23-1950:8 (Teagarden); Entergy Testimony at 55-58 (A72) (ENT000450).
129 See Entergy Testimony at 58 (A72) (ENT000450). For the IPEC SAMA analysis, Entergy developed a year 2035 population estimate based on census data and population projections that are specific to the IPEC SAMA analysis region. Entergy Testimony at 48 (A65) (ENT000450); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2139:18-2140:15 (Teagarden). Therefore, the large population centers (including the New York City metropolitan area) within the SAMA analysis region were multiplied by the CDNFRM values. NRC Staff Testimony at 69 (A61)
(NRC00041); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1950:4-8 (Teagarden).
130 See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 467 (Based on this [Entergy and NRC Staff] testimony, we find that these input values are per capita based and were multiplied by the IPEC region population distribution, so as to result in a site-specific SAMA analysis.).
131 See id. at 471-74.
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severe accident decontamination times today, including for heavier decontamination efforts.132 As discussed in response to Question 1 above, the MACCS2 economic consequence model is based on a staged implementation of offsite population protective measures in post-accident situations, and focuses on achieving a decontamination level that is both cost-effective and feasible.133 This sequence was initially outlined in the WASH-1400 model, later extended by NUREG/CR-3673, and applied in both the NUREG-1150 and SOARCA studies through the use of the MACCS and MACCS2 computer codes, respectively.134 According to Entergys experts, the modeling of staged protective measures implementation provides reasonable estimates of the costs of post-accident population-protective measures, because the projection of likely doses over multiple time periods accounts for the durations of protective measures that may be necessary for short- and long-lived radionuclide releases.135 It also reflects the fact that full information would not be immediately available in post-accident situations, and that radiological conditions in the environment may change rapidly with time.136 Entergys experts testified that the two decontamination levels and times defined in the IPEC SAMA analysis (DRF = 3 accomplished over a 60-day period and DRF = 15 accomplished over a 120-day period) are appropriate to model early efforts within days to weeks after plume deposition, and before weathering and human activities significantly affect the distribution of the contamination.137 132 See Entergy Testimony at 80-86 (A105-06) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 89-90 (A81) (NRC000041).
133 See Entergy Testimony at 80-87 (A105-06).
134 See Entergy Testimony at 80 (A105) (ENT00450).
135 See id. at 81 (A105) (ENT000450) (citing NUREG/CR-3673 at 4-6 (ENT000466)).
136 See id.
137 See Entergy Testimony at 86-87 (A107) (ENT000450); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2186:20-2187:7 (Teagarden) (The Indian Point analysis used the values used in NUREG-1150 and the justification would be that they were used in the seminal document of NUREG-1150 and also in recognition of how MACCS2 looks at TIMDEC in comparison with other mitigating strategies such as extended interdiction, which is another means of achieving a dose reduction that can be implemented within MACCS .).
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Entergys and NRC Staffs experts further explainedand the Board agreedthat in order to provide a reliable and reasonable analysis, the MACCS2 decontamination time must represent all of the modeled severe accidents, including ones that require little to no decontamination; i.e., it must it be a single average value that is representative of all possible severe accident scenarios.138 The experts viewed this as a reasonable approach, especially in the context of a probabilistic, time-and spatially-averaged SAMA analysis that considers a multitude of clean-up scenarios.139 D. Question No.4: Discuss the appropriateness of performing sensitivity analyses to account for uncertainties in the estimated decontamination times and non-farm decontamination costs, including what might be reasonable CDNFRM and TIMDEC inputs to use in sensitivity analyses for the Indian Point SAMA analysis.
Entergy respectfully submits that simple sensitivity analyses are not appropriate to account for uncertainties in the estimated decontamination times (i.e., TIMDEC) and non-farm decontamination costs (i.e., CDNFRM). As a technical matter, Entergy does not believe that the specific CDNFRM and TIMDEC input values used in the IPEC SAMA analysis are conducive to independent sensitivity analyses given the manner in which they were developed or in view of the specific function of those values in MACCS2. As an NRC Staff expert testified, the TIMDEC and CDNFRM parameters are closely interrelated, and MACCS2 analysts therefore must consider that nexus in selecting input values.140 Entergys expert agreed, stating that the decontamination factor, cost, and time form a suite of variables that reflect how MACCS2 models decontamination,141 such that the code user should not alter one of these variables without 138 See NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2153:24-2155:3 (OKula); Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 470-71 (Accordingly, given the legitimate goal of a SAMA analysis and the input requirement of the MACCS2 code for a single average decontamination time as an input value which is representative of all possible severe accident scenarios, we find that Entergys use and the NRCs approval of these TIMDEC values is reasonable .).
139 See Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2139:11-12 (Teagarden); NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041).
140 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2200:15-2201:5, 2209:6-20 (Bixler).
141 See id. at 2227:8-16 (Teagarden) (CDNFRM and TIMDEC are related to one another.); see also id. at 2247:10-14 (Teagarden) (So [] the cost is linked to the time, which is linked to the dose reduction factor achieved.).
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evaluating the impact of the change on the other, related variables.142 Entergy is not aware of any published NRC or industry guidance that recommends, or explains how to appropriately perform, sensitivity analyses that involve modifying TIMDEC and CDNFRM input values that, to date, have been uniformly based on the NUREG-1150 suite of values.
As a legal matter, Entergy followed NRC-endorsed guidance, which, as the Commission noted in CLI-15-6, should be accorded special weight absent unusual circumstances.143 In particular, the NRC Staff has endorsed NEI 05-01 and long recommended that license renewal applicants follow NEI 05-01 guidelines when preparing their SAMA analyses.144 With respect to sensitivity analyses, NEI 05-01 recommends that applicants perform sensitivity analyses that reflect: plant modifications that may have been planned or occurred since the PRA model freeze date; use of an uncertainty factor derived from the ratio of the 95th percentile to the mean point estimate for internal events core damage frequency (CDF); significant findings from the PRA peer review; changes to evacuation speed assumed in the Level 3 PRA model; changes to the real discount rate used in the Level 3 PRA model; and changes in the SAMA analysis period.145 142 Id. at 2248:2-9 (Teagarden); see also id. at 2269:15-22 (Teagarden). As a practical matter, even if Entergy or the NRC Staff were to undertake sensitivity analyses that involved modifying the current NUREG-1150-based values, the MACCS2 code itself imposes limits on the range of values that could be used. The MACCS2 source code limits the TIMDEC input value to a maximum one year, and the CDNFRM input value to a maximum of
$100,000/person. See Entergy Testimony at 73 (A98), 91 (A115). But for the reasons stated in response to Question 4, Entergy does not believe that such sensitivity cases are necessary or appropriate.
143 See Indian Point, CLI-15-6, slip op. at 19, 21.
144 Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1926:10 (Teagarden); Entergy Testimony at 18 (A30) (citing Notice of Availability of the Final License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR-ISG-2006-03: Staff Guidance for Preparing Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analyses, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,466, 45,467 (Aug. 14, 2007) (NEI 05-01, Revision A, describes existing NRC regulations, and facilitates complete preparation of SAMA analysis submittals.)). In reviewing a license renewal applicants SAMA analysis, the NRC Staff uses the guidance contained in NUREG-1555, Standard Review Plan for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants - Supplement 1: Operating License Renewal, Sec. 5.1.1 (Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives) (Oct. 1999) (ENT00019B).
145 See NEI 05-01 at 30-32 (NYS000287).
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Entergy followed the guidance in NEI 05-01 in preparing the IPEC SAMA analysis.146 For example, Entergy performed an uncertainty analysis of the internal-event CDF for IP2 and IP3, in which it assessed the impact on the SAMA screening if the estimated benefits for each SAMA were further increased by the resulting uncertainty factors.147 Entergy included any additional SAMAs identified as cost-beneficial in the uncertainty analysis within the set of potentially cost-beneficial SAMAs, even if they were not cost-beneficial in the baseline analysis.148 Based on NEI 05-01 guidance and in response to related Staff RAIs, Entergy performed additional sensitivity analyses.149 Those sensitivity analyses, all of which are discussed in the NRC Staff s FSEIS, considered the use of a 3 percent (instead of 7 percent) discount rate, use of a longer plant life, tourism and business losses, and an increased probability of a thermally-induced steam generator tube rupture.150 Notably, Entergy and the NRC Staff conservatively adopted the case incorporating lost tourism and business as the base case analysis.151 As a result of these additional analyses, Entergy identified four additional IP2 SAMAs and one additional IP3 SAMA as potentially cost-beneficial.152 146 See Entergy Testimony at 47 (A62) (ENT000450); NEI 05-01 at 30-32 (NYS000287).
147 See Entergy Testimony at 47 (A62) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 22 (A14), 93-94 (A84)
(NRC00041).
148 See Entergy Testimony at 47-48 (A62) (ENT000450) (citing NL-09-165, Letter from Fred Dacimo, Entergy, to NRC, License Renewal Application - SAMA Reanalysis Using Alternate Meteorological Tower Data, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units Nos. 2 and 3, Attach. 1 at 10-28, 30-31 (Tbls. 4, 5, 6 & 7) (Dec. 11, 2009)
(ENT000009).
149 See NUREG-1437, Supp. 38, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Final Report, Vol. 3, App. G at G-18, G-21, G-40, G-45 to G-47, G-49 (Dec. 2010) (NYS00133I) (FSEIS).
150 See id.
151 See Entergy Testimony at 124-25 (A153) (ENT000450). Entergy expert Grant Teagarden testified that this calculation is not customarily done by NRC license renewal applicants and represents a conservatism in Entergys SAMA analysis. See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2078:21-2079:8 (Teagarden); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2308:22-4 (Teagarden).
152 See FSEIS, Vol. 3, App. G at G-49 (NYS00133I).
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As stated in the FSEIS, the Staff reviewed Entergys analysis methods and concluded that the SAMA evaluations performed by Entergy are reasonable and sufficient for the license renewal submittal.153 Thus, Entergys sensitivity analyses were fully consistent with current applicable guidance, standard industry practices, and NRC Staff expectations.154 Finally, it bears emphasis that the net effect of these sensitivity analyses (insofar as the results were incorporated into the IPEC SAMA analysis base case or otherwise used to increase the number of SAMAs identified as potentially cost-beneficial) is increased conservatism in the IPEC SAMA analysis.155 As discussed in response to Question 7, infra, the conservatisms in the IPEC SAMA analysis are substantial and, in the opinion of Staff expert Dr. Tina Ghosh, accommodate uncertainties in decontamination cost and time input values to MACCS2.156 Thus, in addition to the substantial record evidence summarized above, those conservatisms further suggest that additional simple sensitivity analyses of the type posited in Question 4 are not appropriate under NEPAs rule of reason.
E. Question No. 5: Would it be appropriate to treat decontamination times and decontamination costs (and related decontamination factors) from an uncertainty analysis standpoint, using a range of valuese.g., smaller values for smaller release accident categories and larger values for the larger release categories? Why or why not?
Based on the record of the proceeding, such an approach would not be appropriate given the nature and purpose of a SAMA analysis, and the decontamination model on which MACCS2 relies. In fact, adjusting the NUREG-1150-based TIMDEC and CDNFRM input values based on the size of the release category is fundamentally inconsistent with the goals of a best-estimate SAMA analysis performed using MACCS2 and controlling Commission case law defining the 153 See id. at G-49.
154 Entergy Testimony at 17-19 (A29-30), 46 (A61) (ENT000450) (explaining that Entergy followed the NRC-approved, prescriptive guidance in NEI 05-01 to perform the IPEC SAMA analysis).
155 See NRC Staff Testimony at 93-94 (A84) (NRC000041); Entergy Testimony at 47 (A62), 124-25 (A153)
(ENT000450).
156 See Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2235:5-10 (Ghosh).
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purpose and contours of a SAMA analysis.157 Furthermore, any alternative decontamination time and cost values must have an established technical basis.158 Entergy and Staff experts testified that they are unaware of any such values, and thoroughly explained why New Yorks proposed alternative values lack a technical foundation and are unreasonable under NEPA.159 By way of explanation, the MACCS2 portion of the SAMA analysis considers a broad spectrum or range of release categories, including those that involve minimal or no failure of the containment (and thus lower accident source terms).160 It is not concerned solely with the most severe release category, like the Early High release category cited by New Yorks expert.161 Thus, the decontamination-related inputs to MACCS2 need to be representative of accidents with Fukushima-like source terms, but also accidents with much smaller source terms; i.e., they must represent all of the modeled accidents.162 The well-vetted and time-tested CDNFRM and TIMDEC values used by Entergy in the IPEC SAMA analysis serve precisely that purpose.
Entergys experts testified that the decontamination factor, cost, and time values used in NUREG-1150, the IPEC SAMA analysis, and the SOARCA study were developed as a suite of 157 See NRC Staff Testimony at 91 (A83) (NRC000041) (noting that decontamination times need to be reflective of the full range of severe accidents and their decontamination requirements); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1907:3-7 (Teagarden) (A SAMA analysis is designed to be what we say [is] a best estimate analysis, a representative average basis.).
158 See Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2227:7-2228:4 (Teagarden).
159 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2040:2-5 (Teagarden); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2158:13-2161:25 (Harrison); id. at 2251:13-24 (Jones); Entergys Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Consolidated Contention NYS-12C (Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis) at 87-103 (¶¶ 172-201), 110-113 (¶¶ 217-221) (Mar. 22, 2013) (summarizing Entergy and NRC Staff expert testimony demonstrating that New Yorks proposed TIMDEC and CDNFRM values lack technical justification). In any case, as the Board noted, the Commission specifically has held that the proper question is not whether there are plausible alternative choices for use in the analysis, but whether the analysis that was done is reasonable under NEPA. Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 474 (quoting Seabrook, CLI-12-5, 75 NRC at 323). Accordingly, the question is not whether more or different analysis can be done. Id. (quoting Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 714).
160 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2153:24-2155:3 (OKula) (So the basis of the SAMA analysis is to reflect on a spectrum of potential source terms, model each one randomly in terms of the meteorological conditions. . . .).
161 See New York Rebuttal Testimony at 22:17-21 (NYS000420); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2112:19-2114:14, 2186:4-12 (Lemay).
162 See NRC Staff Testimony at 90 (A81) (NRC000041); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2153:24-2155:3 (OKula).
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parameters and designed to be consistent with the MACCS2 habitability decision-making model.163 The experts further explained that the NUREG-1150 CDNFRM values were designed to be average values that reflect both lighter and heavier decontamination efforts and which can be applied on a per-person basis.164 As the Board noted in its ruling, these experts also testified that NUREG-1150 TIMDEC values were intended to represent an average time period during which people are temporarily interdicted while decontamination activities are completed to reduce the dose by the specified dose reduction factor.165 As such, the CDNFRM and TIMDEC values used by Entergy already reflect consideration of a range of severe accident release categories.166 The use of mean or average values is entirely consistent with the objectives of a SAMA analysis, which seeks to make reasonable cost-benefit evaluations under NEPA. Entergys experts emphasized that because a SAMA analysis is concerned with mean annual consequences, it is not designed to model a single radiological release event under specific meteorological conditions at a single moment in time.167 Instead, it models, in an integrated fashion, numerous accident release conditions that could, based on probabilistic analysis, occur at any time under varying weather conditions during a one-year period.168 As such, the size of the release is not the sole factor in determining how long post-accident decontamination would take, or how much it would cost. The modeled weather conditions and the population distribution also will affect how many individuals 163 See, e.g., Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2247:10-14 (Teagarden).
164 NRC Staff Testimony at 41 (A35) (NRC00041); Entergy Testimony at 55-58 (A72) (ENT000450); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1949:23-1950:8 (Teagarden).
165 See Indian Point, LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 468-70 (citing Entergy Testimony at 77 (A102) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 89-90 (A81)). As the Board noted, New Yorks expert agreed that the TIMDEC value is intended to be an average value. Id. at 470 (citing Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2181:8-9 (Lemay)).
166 As the Staff experts explained, the IPEC SAMA analysis itself used eight source term groups that represent a broad range of postulated accident conditions. See NRC Staff Testimony at 24 (A18) (NRC00041).
167 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 457 (citing Entergy Testimony at 18 (A31) (ENT000450)).
168 See id. (citing Entergy Testimony at 18 (A31) (ENT000450)).
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need to be relocated and how much land needs to be decontaminated.169 As Entergys experts noted, the goal of the SAMA analysis is to estimate mean cumulative impacts from postulated severe accidents (i.e., dose and economic costs) to all individuals and land within a 50-mile radius of the plant.170 The Commission specifically has endorsed the methodologies used by Entergy in the IPEC SAMA analysis, particularly the use of frequency-weighting and averaging methods.171 Accordingly, given that NUREG-1150 CDNFRM and TIMDEC values are average values that reflect consideration of a range of severe accident release categories, and were developed to be consistent with the MACCS2 decontamination/habitability model, sensitivity analyses of the type described in this question are not appropriate under NEPAs rule of reason.
F. Question No. 6: Discuss whether, and, if so, how, the SAMA analysis should account for the possibility of potential decontamination times longer than one year.
It is not necessary to account for decontamination time values longer than one year for purposes of the IPEC SAMA analysis or the resolution of NYS-12C. Decontamination times exceeding one year are outside the MACCS2 codes accepted range; i.e., MACCS2 allows a maximum TIMDEC value of one year.172 As Entergy and NRC Staff experts explained,173 applying TIMDEC values greater than one year would require modifications to the source code of MACCS2the standard, NRC-endorsed tool for SAMA analyses.174 But, as the Commission has 169 See Entergy Testimony at 32-33 (A46-47) (noting that in the MACCS2 portion of the IPEC SAMA analysis, 155 randomly-selected weather sequences, postulated to occur in each of the 16 principal compass sector directions and for the associated population distributions, were analyzed for each source term).
170 Indian Point, LBP-13-13, slip op. at 467-68 (citing Entergy Testimony at 18 (ENT000450)).
171 See Pilgrim, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC at 316 (stating that a SAMA analysis is an averaging of potential consequences insofar as mean consequence values are multiplied by the estimated frequency of occurrence of specific accident scenarios to determine population dose risk and offsite economic cost risk for each type of accident sequence studied).
172 See Entergy Testimony at 73-75 (A97-99) (ENT000450).
173 See Entergy Testimony at 73-75 (A97-99) (ENT000450); Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2201:6-20 (Bixler).
174 See Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 707 (The NRC has endorsed use of the MACCS2 Accident Consequence Analysis (MACCS2) code to calculate estimated offsite consequences); see also Pilgrim, CLI-12-1, 75 NRC at 41 (The NRC uses MACCS2 to evaluate the potential offsite consequences of severe nuclear reactor accidents, and NRC-endorsed guidance on SAMA analysis endorses use of the MACCS2 code.) (citation omitted).
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observed, such action goes far beyond NEPA requirements, because NEPA does not require the NRC to engage in an extensive revision of the MACCS2 code.175 Insofar as the Commission may wish to explore potential modifications to the MACCS2 decontamination model, including the maximum TIMDEC values accepted by the code, Entergy respectfully submits that it should do so as a generic matter (i.e., outside of this plant-specific adjudication). Entergy is not aware of any NRC guidance or regulatory precedent suggesting that applicant modifications to the code may be necessary, much less acceptable to the NRC.176 Further, a generic-based approach would be more conducive to participation by all interested stakeholders and ensuring that MACCS2 code standardization, configuration controls, and quality assurance are appropriately maintained.177 Furthermore, the record of this proceeding indicates that modification of the MACCS2 code is not a trivial or routine undertaking. Entergys experts testified that altering the MACCS2 source code without independent verification of proper code functionality is counter to standard industry configuration control and software quality assurance practices.178 Additionally, such modifications to the code, they explained, may be inconsistent with the codes internal decision-making logic.179 Specifically, forcing a decontamination period beyond a year in the MACCS2 analysis via the TIMDEC variable (as New Yorks expert did) distorts the codes dose reduction resettlement optimization strategy.180 That is, an artificially long TIMDEC period precludes 175 Pilgrim, CLI-12-1, 75 NRC at 60 (rejecting an intervenors demand that the MACCS2 code be modified to include an alternative atmospheric transport and dispersion plume model as far beyond NEPA requirements).
176 See Entergy Testimony at 74-75 (A99) (ENT000450) (The NRC has provided no indication that it expects or encourages licensees to modify the code for purposes of a SAMA analysis.).
177 See id. at 74 (A99) (An expectation to change the source code as needed is not reasonable or appropriate.
Individual users must use the computer code as provided by the distributor (in this case the NRC and Sandia National Laboratories) to ensure quality assurance is maintained.).
178 See id. at 74-75 (A99-100).
179 See id. at 77-80 (A102-03) (ENT000450).
180 See id. at 78 (A102) (ENT000450).
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proper modeling of the resettlement of interdicted persons following the cessation of decontamination activities.181 The NRC Staffs expert similarly testified that using TIMDEC values exceeding the one-year maximum allowed by MACCS2 defeats the logic in the code.182 He reiterated that one year was set as the upper bound, because the framework of the code was based on one year, not more than a year.183 Within the MACCS2 framework, applying TIMDEC values as large as 15 or 30 years causes property values to decrease to zero or almost zero.184 This, in turn, precludes MACCS2 from modeling the successful decontamination and resettlement of those properties (particularly for a DRF of 15) and instead results in condemnation of the properties.185 This is further proof of the fact that the code user should not arbitrarily alter the individual variables without evaluating the impact of the change on other, related variables, especially in the context of the MACCS2 decontamination model.186 For the foregoing reasons, Entergy respectfully submits that it not necessary or appropriate to consider decontamination time values greater than one year with respect to the IPEC SAMA analysis, and that doing so would contravene NEPAs rule of reason.
G. Question No. 7: Discuss whether the Indian Point analysis contains conservatisms that bound or otherwise compensate for the uncertainty in the decontamination times and non-farm decontamination costs inputs used in the analysis.
Dr. Ghosh of the NRC Staff directly addressed this question at the hearing. She testified that, in her expert opinion, the existing margin in the IPEC SAMA analysis accommodates or 181 See id. If, for example, a value of 10 years is used for TIMDEC, then MACCS2 will not model the return of any affected individuals to their residences until 10 years have passed. However, many individuals within the 50-mile radius SAMA analysis region would be able to return to their homes relatively quickly. See id.
182 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2201:17-20 (Bixler).
183 Id. at 2273:6-8 (Bixler).
184 Id. at 2201:6-20 (Bixler); see also id. at 2273:9-13 (Bixler).
185 Id. at 2201:15-18 (Bixler) 186 See id. at 2248:2-9 (Teagarden); see also id. at 2269:15-22 (Teagarden).
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bounds uncertainties related to decontamination cost estimates.187 Specifically, she explained that the theoretical benefit of actually implementing all of the twenty-two IP2 and IP3 SAMAs identified by Entergy as potentially cost-beneficial would exceed the maximum attainable benefit (i.e., eliminate the baseline risks of plant operation) for IP2 and IP3, and, in the case of IP2, eliminate the baseline risks twice over.188 As she further explained, this reflects the fact that SAMA analysis is done on a per SAMA candidate basis, and that many of the SAMA candidates act on the same accident sequences.189 Therefore, as the lower-cost alternatives for mitigating the dominant accident sequences (e.g., steam generator tube rupture) are implemented, the baseline risk, as recalculated, is reduced.190 This reduces the likelihood that other SAMA candidates acting on the same accident sequences will remain, or become, potentially cost-beneficial.191 This existing margin in the IPEC SAMA analysis clearly is attributable to the numerous conservatisms embedded in the analysis. They include, for example, Entergys use of the projected population in year 2035, which is the last year of the IP3 period of extended operation and two years after the end of the IP2 period of extended operation;192 a no-evacuation 187 Id. at 2235:5-10 (Ghosh) (Youre right that my fundamental point is that the ISR New York State analysis introduces some uncertainty and into particular elements of the benefit calculation. And I believe that the existing margin in the analysis can accommodate this uncertainty already.) (emphasis added).
188 Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2163:10-2166:8 (Ghosh).
189 Id. at 2164:24-2165:1 (There are multiple SAMAs that are already identified to mitigate the same types of accidents.); id. at 2223:11-21 (Ghosh).
190 Id. at 2165:21-2166:2 (Ghosh) (The point Im trying to make is that if you look at the existing list of candidates that are there and if you actually started to implement some of them, the incremental benefit of implementing additional SAMAs just goes down. And we cant completely eliminate the plant risk twice over.).
191 Id. at 2224:22-2225:2 (Ghosh) ([W]e dont believe were going to come up with any more SAMAs that would be potentially cost beneficial and that they would be cheaper alternatives to mitigating the same types of accidents that were already looking at mitigating with the list that we have.); see also id. at 2235:19-2236:8 (Ghosh) ([I]ts hard to imagine that they would really become cost beneficial since there is already alternatives on the table to mitigate those same types of accident sequences.).
192 See Entergy Testimony at 48 (A65) (ENT000450); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1963:5-9 (Teagarden) ([T]he industry guidance document, NEI 05-01, specifies that economic impacts should be baselined to the year of the analysis which is [2005]. Population is projected to a further date, 2035.).
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assumption, which overestimates doses incurred in the early phase of potential accidents;193 and the results of a sensitivity case for lost tourism and business in the base case analysis (as discussed in response to Question 4 above).194 NRC Staff experts elaborated on several other important, but more technically-nuanced, conservatisms in the IPEC SAMA analysis. For example, Dr. Ghosh explained that the IPEC SAMA analysis used two multipliers on the internal benefit quantification in order to account for (1) external events, and (2) analysis uncertainties.195 The analysis uncertainties multiplier was based on the ratio of the 95th percentile CDF to the mean or point estimate CDF.196 Any SAMAs that became cost-beneficial after the use of these two multipliers were included as cost-beneficial.197 Dr. Ghosh testified that even though the analysis uncertainties multiplier is typically estimated as the ratio of the 95th percentile CDF to the mean or point estimate CDF, this multiplier is meant to account for analysis uncertainties generally, not just uncertainties in the level 1 PRA.198 Entergys use of mean consequence values also added conservatism to the IPEC SAMA analysis.199 One of the Staffs experts, Dr. Bixler, testified that he reviewed the distribution of Entergys MACCS2 offsite consequence and determined that the mean value (as used by 193 Entergy Testimony at 35 (A49) (ENT000450) (citing FSEIS, Vol. 3, App. G at G-21 (NYS00133I)).
194 Id. at 124-25 (A153).
195 See NRC Staff Testimony at 22 (A14), 93-94 (A84) (NRC000041). Entergy used a total multiplier of 8 for IP2 and IP3 in the SAMA analysis. As noted in the FSEIS, this was a slight overestimate of the product of the external events multiplier by the analysis uncertainties multiplier, which was (3.8 x 2.1) for IP2 and (5.5 x 1.4) for IP3. Furthermore, these multipliers are applied to the total benefit, which includes all the averted cost terms.
See id. at 94 (A84).
196 See id. at 22 (A14).
197 See id.
198 See id. at 93-94 (A84).
199 See Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2290:21-2291:23, 2293:6-21 (Ghosh).
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Entergy) was well above the median of the distribution.200 More specifically, the mean results were generally between the 66th and 72nd percentiles.201 This means that the SAMA analysis results are skewed in the direction of greater offsite dose and economic consequences.202 Dr. Bixler also testified that the most current analyses (from the SOARCA project) show that a realistic treatment of aerosol sizes associated with a reactor radiological release corresponds to a deposition velocity of about 0.3 centimeters per second (cm/s) as opposed to the 1 cm/s deposition velocity assumed by Entergy.203 According to Dr. Bixler, Entergys use of a larger deposition velocity resulted in about three times more deposition than MACCS2 would have predicted had Entergy used a more realistic deposition velocity.204 This, in turn, led Entergy to overestimate decontamination costs.205 In addition, Entergys use of two decontamination factors (DRF = 3 and 15) instead of the three permitted by MACCS2 also introduces conservatism.206 Staff experts testified that by using only two DRFs, Entergys analysis provides a level of conservatism, because for any area where a DRF of 3 is not sufficient, the model jumps to a much higher DRF of 15, which costs much more to implement than a DRF of 3.207 For instance, where the model actually calculates the need for a DRF of 3.1, the full cost of $13,824 per person is applied for implementing a DRF of 15.208 In 200 NRC Staff Testimony at 29 (A23) (NRC000041). The median is defined as the value for which the outcome is lower half of the time and for which it is greater half of the time, whereas the mean is simply the arithmetic average of all the outcomes. Id.
201 Id. A seventieth percentile result is one for which seventy percent of the outcomes are lower and thirty percent of the outcomes are higher. Id.
202 See Oct. 18, 2012 Tr. at 2293:6-21 (Ghosh).
203 See NRC Staff Testimony at 50 (A43) (NRC000041).
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 41 (A36); see also Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1988:20-1989:8 (Teagarden).
207 See NRC Staff Testimony at 41 (A36) (NRC000041).
208 See id.
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reality, an area requiring a DRF of 3.1 would not need to be decontaminated to a DRF of 15.209 An intermediate decontamination factor would cost less to implement (some value between $5,184 and $13,824 per person).210 Therefore, applying a DRF of 15 to these areas where less costly approaches would likely be used adds conservatism to the estimated decontamination costs.211 Finally, it warrants mention that the IPEC SAMA analysis was prepared before the Commission ordered Entergy and other NRC licensees to implement procedural and plant modifications in response to the March 2011 Fukushima accident. As discussed in Entergys May 6, 2013 submittal to the NRC (in which Entergy provided the results of its more detailed, engineering project cost estimates for implementation of potentially cost-beneficial SAMAs),
Entergys ongoing implementation of the Commissions numerous, ongoing Fukushima action items are intended and expected to substantially mitigate the risks of certain beyond-design-basis accidents.212 The fact that the IPEC SAMA analysis does not take into account these substantial safety and mitigation-related enhancements is itself a significant conservatism in the analysis.
H. Question No. 8: Address to what extent the Staffs comparison of the decontamination cost values used in the IPEC SAMA analysis to decontamination cost values derived from Sandia National Laboratorys 1996 weapons accident study explains or otherwise substantiates the decontamination cost parameters used in the Indian Point analysis.
The 1996 Site Restoration Report has no direct relevance to the IPEC SAMA analysis given its focus on plutonium cleanup.213 In fact, it has no direct relevance to any nuclear power plant SAMA analysis, as the Commission explicitly recognized in the Seabrook license renewal proceeding. In that case, the Commission noted that the Site Restoration Report is focused on 209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See id. at 41-42 (A36).
212 See NL-13-075, Letter from F. Dacimo, Entergy, to NRC Document Control Desk, License Renewal Application Completed Engineering Project Cost Estimates for SAMAs Previously Identified as Potentially Cost-Beneficial (May 6, 2013) (ENT000608).
213 See Entergy Testimony at 68-72 (A90-92); NRC Staff Testimony at 13 (A6a), 15 (A6c) (NRC000041).
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plutonium dispersal events and contains no suggestion that the MACCS2 code assumes inapplicable radionuclide particle sizes.214 Further to this holding, Entergy and Staff witnesses fully explained why the Site Restoration Report is inapplicable to the IPEC SAMA analysis.215 In the FSEIS, the NRC Staff stated that it does not consider the methodology for clean-up of a nuclear weapons accident relevant to clean-up following a nuclear power plant (NPP) accident.216 Nonetheless, the Staff explained that for purposes of responding to claims made in NYS-12C and related comments on the draft SEIS, it asked Sandia National Laboratories compare the decontamination cost factors derived from the Site Restoration Report to those used in the IPEC SAMA analysis.217 Section G.2.3 of the FSEIS summarizes the results of that comparison.218 In brief, Sandias approach included identifying basic considerations of each type of accident (e.g., contaminants, half life of contaminants, and health and safety considerations),
identifying the decontamination methods required, and comparing the Site Restoration Report cost values (as applied to the urban area of New York City) to those used in the IPEC SAMA analysis.219 Among other things, Sandia noted that decontamination activities for moderate plutonium contamination are most directly comparable to the decontamination activities for heavy cesium contamination (i.e., the major form of radioactive contamination resulting from a nuclear 214 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station Unit 1), CLI-12-5, 75 NRC at 332 (overruling the admission of contention that relied on the Site Restoration Report as a supporting reference).
215 See Entergy Testimony at 68-72 (A90-A92), 130 (A160) (ENT000450); NRC Staff Testimony at 13 (A6a), 15 (A6c) (NRC000041). Significantly, New Yorks own expert even conceded that the Site Restoration Report is not ideal because it relates to plutonium dispersal events, not to reactor severe accidents. Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2012:11-13 (Lemay). He further admitted that the reports focus on plutonium decontamination costs is a weakness of that method. Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 2108:5-8 (Lemay).
216 FSEIS, Vol. 3, App. G at G-23 (NYS00133I).
217 See id.
218 See id. at G-22 to G-24.
219 See id. at G-23. Sandias analysis is documented in Technical Assistance in Support of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 License Renewal, Initial Assessment - Technical Review, Predecisional Draft (Jan. 8, 2010)
(NYS000218).
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power reactor severe accident).220 The Site Restoration Report (Table 6-2) provides an estimated cost of $178.4 million per square kilometer for clean-up of moderate plutonium contamination in urban areas, or $14,900 per person when expressed on a per capita basis for New York City.221 By comparison, a cost of $13,824 per person was used in Entergys MACCS2 analysis for decontamination of heavy cesium contamination.222 Sandia thus found that the decontamination cost from the Site Restoration Report ($14,900 per person) is not significantly different than the value used by Entergy in the IPEC SAMA analysis ($13,824 per person).223 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above and in Entergys initial briefs in response to New Yorks petitions for review, the Commission should fully affirm the Boards decision on NYS-12C in LBP-13-13 based on the current adjudicatory record. No further proceedings are required.
Respectfully submitted, Signed (electronically) by Paul M. Bessette William B. Glew, Jr., Esq. Kathryn M. Sutton, Esq.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Paul M. Bessette, Esq.
440 Hamilton Avenue Martin J. ONeill, Esq.
White Plains, NY 10601 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP Phone: (914) 272-3360 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
E-mail: wglew@entergy.com Washington, D.C. 20004 Phone: (202) 739-5738 E-mail: ksutton@morganlewis.com E-mail: pbessette@morganlewis.com Counsel for Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Dated in Washington, D.C.
this 30th day of March 2015 220 See FSEIS, Vol. 3, App. G at G-24 (NYS00133I).
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See id. As stated in the FSEIS, even if the Site Restoration Report values were escalated to coincide with IPEC SAMA analysis dollar amounts, the difference still would still be within a factor of about 2, which is not significant given the uncertainties inherent in such cost predictions. See id.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and
) 50-286-LR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. )
)
(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) )
) March 30, 2015 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this date a copy of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Initial Brief in Response to Commission Questions in CLI-15-2 Concerning Contention NYS-12C was submitted through the NRCs E-filing system.
Signed (electronically) by Martin J. ONeill Martin J. ONeill, Esq.
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, TX 77002 Phone: (713) 890-5000 Fax: (713) 890-5001 E-mail: martin.oneill@morganlewis.com Counsel for Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
DB1/ 82725025.1