RS-14-297, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the

ML14360A123
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	12/26/2014
From:	Gaston R Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
References
RS-14-297
Download: ML14360A123 (94)

Text

A111111W Exelon Generation RS-14-297

10 CFR 50.54(f)

December 26, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville. MD 20852 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

Subject:

Exelon Generation Company, LLC Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)

2. NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Re-evaluations, dated April 9, 2013 (ML13101A379)

3. Seismic Evaluation Guidance: "Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic", EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704 (ML13102A142)

4. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Re-evaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

5. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (RS-14-067), dated March 31, 2014 (ML14091A012)

6. Exelon Generation Company, LLC Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident 1.5 Year Response for CEUS Sites (RS-13-205), dated September 12, 2013 (ML13256A070)

Preparer:

Reviewer:

Approver.

Lead Responsible Engineer:

Branch Manager:

Senior Manager Design Engineering:

Corporate Acceptance:

Signature 12gle 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12.1AJj44$-,

6),As jL t1Ji4.QS Printed Name George G. Thomas Paul R. Wilson Paul R. Wilson Eyed All g

EY,"

Jeffrey S. Clark 9-lap 12 4S /gal' Shin' __1711414001

- MIL I 1,231 20 14 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 60.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC for the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, Illinois 60450-9765 Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 NRC Docket No. 50-237, 50-249 Correspondence No.: DRE-RS-14-297 Exelon Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 6611 Rockside Road, Suite 100 Independence, OH 44131-2344 Report Number: 14Q4237-RPT-004, Rev. 3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NTTF 2.1 Seismic Response for CEUS Sites December 26, 2014 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 50.54(f) letter to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.

In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of the final CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop that information. NEI proposed that descriptions of subsurface materials and properties and base case velocity profiles be submitted to the NRC by September 12, 2013, (Reference 6), with the remaining seismic hazard and screening information submitted by March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). NRC agreed with that proposed path forward in Reference 4.

Reference 1 requested that licensees provide interim evaluations and actions taken or planned to address the higher seismic hazard relative to the design basis, as appropriate, prior to completion of the risk evaluation. In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance in Reference 3, the enclosed Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 provides the information described in the "ESEP Report" Section 7, of Reference 3 in accordance with the schedule identified in Reference 2.

All equipment evaluated for the ESEP for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 was found to have adequate capacity for the required seismic demand as defined by the Augmented Approach (ESEP) guidance (Reference 3). Therefore, no equipment modifications are required.

This ESEP report transmittal completes regulatory Commitment No. 3 of Reference 5.

No new regulatory commitments result from this transmittal.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at (630) 657-3359.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 26th day of December 2014.

Respectfully submitted, Ronald W. Gaston Manager - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NTTF 2.1 Seismic Response for CEUS Sites December 26, 2014 Page 3 cc:

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Regional Administrator - NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden Station NRC Project Manager, NRR - Dresden Station Mr. Nicholas J. DiFrancesco, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety

Enclosure Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (89 pages)

Preparer:

Reviewer:

Approver Lead Responsible Engineer:

Branch Manager:

Senior Manager Design Engineering:

Corporate Acceptance:

Printed Name George G. Thomas Paul R. Wilson Paul R. Wilson Sionature GALL

1.414:4Pm-d TsetALL 1z.141;144; Date 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 0-4 Jae('

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.M4_1423120 itiat./C giatUfg Jeffrey S. Clark Eyed Ali EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(0 INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC for the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, Illinois 60450-9766 Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 NRC Docket No. 50-237, 50-249 Correspondence No.: DRE-RS-14-297

..mor Exelon Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 6611 Rockside Road, Suite 100 Independence, OH 44131-2344 Report Number: 14Q4237-RPT-004, Rev. 3

Document

Title:

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 2 & 3 Report Number: 14Q4239-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Project Name: Exelon ESEP for Dresden Job No.: 14Q4237

/NW Exelon This document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 17 and project requirements:

Rev. 0 (Initial Issue)

Prepared by: George G. Thomas

'- 3. ;1"1>-----

Date: 12/05/2014 Reviewed by: Dan Lavarnway Date: 12/05/2014 Approved by: Paul R. Wilson

6) awe-R- ttai-0-1 Date: 12/05/2014 Revision Record:

Revision No.

Prepared by/

Date Reviewed by/

Date Approved by/

Date Description of Revision 1

George G.

Thomas

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I*1:___

12/12/2014 Dan Lavarnway 12/12/2014 Paul R. Wilson 12/12/2014 Incorporated Client Comments 2

George G.

Thomas 12/18/2014

-1

,-%;- --,.:L _

Dan Lavarnway 12/18/2014 Paul R. Wilson 12/18/2014 ewi it

&o-Corrected Component Descriptions for five components per Client Comments 3

George G.

Thomas 12/22/2014 Paul R. Wilson 12/22/2014 paujI

ez.14.1.:11.44,,J Paul R. Wilson 12/22/2014 6)ws 02. ta:Low Incorporated Client Comments p_ A OC.

Stevenson & Associates DOCUMENT APPROVAL SHEET CONTRACT NO.

14Q4237 Page 2 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0

Purpose and Objective

6 2.0

Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies

7 3.0

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL

11 3.1

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL

11 3.1.1

ESEL Development

12 3.1.2

Power Operated Valves

13 3.1.3

Pull Boxes

14 3.1.4

Termination Cabinets

14 3.1.5

Critical Instrumentation Indicators

14 3.1.6

Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections

15 3.2

Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX implementation

15 4.0

Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)

16 4.1

Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee

16 4.2

Comparison to SSE

17 5.0

Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)

19 5.1

Description of RLGM selected

19 5.2

Method to Estimate ISRS

21 6.0

Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach

22 6.1

Summary of Methodologies Used

22 6.2

HCLPF Screening Process

23 6.3

Seismic Walkdown Approach

23 6.3.1

Walkdown approach

23 6.3.2

Application of Previous Walkdown Information

25 6.3.3

Significant Walkdown Findings

25 6.4

HCLPF Calculation Process

26 6.5

Functional Evaluation of Relays

28 6.6

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (including Key Failure Modes)

28 7.0

Inaccessible Items

30 Page 3 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 7.1

Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns

30 7.2

Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out

31 8.0

ESEP Conclusions and Results

32 8.1

Supporting Information

32 8.2

Identification of Planned Modifications

33 8.3

Modification Implementation Schedule

33 8.4

Summary of Regulatory Commitments

33 9.0

References

34 Attachment A - DNPS Unit 2 ESEL

38 Attachment B - DNPS Unit 3 ESEL

47 Attachment C - DNPS Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation

55 Attachment D - DNPS Unit 3 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation

73 Page 4 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 LIST OF TABLES Table 3-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEP

13 Table 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping)

16 Table 4-2: DNPS GMRS and SSE Between 1-10 Hz (5% Damping)

18 Table 5-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (5% Damping)

19 Table 5-2: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping)

20 Table 6-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio

27 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping)

17 Figure 4-2: DNPS GMRS to SSE Comparison (5% Damping)

18 Figure 5-1: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping)

21 Page 5 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 1.0

Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 & 3. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

Page 6 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 2.0

Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The DNPS Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) response strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control, Containment Function and Spent Fuel Pool Control are summarized below. This summary is derived from the Dresden Overall Integrated Plan (01P) including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 in Response to the March 12, 2012, NRC Order EA-12 049 [3]:

Phase 1 strategies Phase 1 strategies rely on installed plant systems. Phase 1 is expected to last approximately 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> from event initiation.

RPV PRESSURE CONTROL As described in the DNPS UFSAR, Section 5.4.6. [21], the Isolation Condenser (IC) provides Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure control and core cooling in the event that the reactor becomes isolated from the turbine and the main condenser. Steam flow from the reactor condenses in the tubes of the heat exchanger and returns by gravity to the reactor in a closed loop. The differential water head, created when the steam is condensed, serves as the driving force. Shell side water is boiled and vented to atmosphere outside the Reactor Building. Per the UFSAR (Reference 21, Section 5.4.6.3), the Isolation Condenser will operate approximately 20 minutes without initiation of shell-side makeup. In Phase 1 there are no shell side makeup sources that meet requirements for FLEX qualification. Therefore, the Isolation Condenser must be secured within 20 minutes of initiation to prevent operation with inadequate shell-side level.

Operation of the High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) System also removes heat from the RPV. This heat removal will be used to maintain RPV pressure after the Isolation Condenser is secured.

RPV INVENTORY CONTROL Phase 1 reactor water level control would be accomplished using the HPCI System with pump suction from the Torus. Operation of the HPCI Turbine will result in a heat input to the Torus. There is no current method to remove heat from the Torus when AC power is not available. With continuous HPCI operation, analysis indicates Torus temperature reaches 140°F approximately 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after event initiation. The DNPS UFSAR [21],

Section 6.3.2.3, identifies continued operation of HPCI above a Torus temperature of 140°F is not permitted for continued operability based on hydraulic/lube oil heat exchanger performance and pump net positive suction head.

Page 7 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Key Reactor Parameters are obtained via DC powered instrumentation. A DC load stripping strategy is employed to extend battery life for continued HPCI operation. No specific Containment control is required in Phase 1 as both temperature and pressure stay within design limits for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the event. Key Containment Parameters are obtained from DC powered instrumentation. No specific Spent Fuel Pool control is required in Phase 1 as the temperature remains less than 212°F for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the Unit operating and 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> during refueling operations. Spent Fuel Pool level is obtained from the new Spent Fuel Pool wide range instrumentation installed under order EA-12-051 [22].

Phase 2 strategies.

Phase 2 commences when shell-side makeup is available to the Isolation Condenser from a FLEX pump. DNPS will utilize pre-staged/portable equipment to provide shell-side makeup to the IC prior to the loss of HPCI as an RPV Pressure Control mechanism. Utilization of the IC as the RPV Pressure Control mechanism will significantly reduce RPV inventory loss/Torus heat addition.

The conceptual design uses FLEX pumps located in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) corner rooms or the Torus Basement near the Torus to take suction from the Torus and discharge into existing LPCI discharge piping. New connections will be installed on LPCI discharge piping that allow connection of temporary hoses to the IC makeup line. The IC makeup line will be used as a distribution header to supply water to the Isolation Condensers, Standby Liquid Control (SBLC)/RPV makeup and the Spent Fuel Pools for both Unit 2 and Unit 3. The use of the water in both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Torus, sequentially, will allow for approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of makeup capability. The FLEX pumps will be powered by a portable FLEX generator using temporary cables.

Upon determination of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE) and Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) event Operators will connect the suction of one primary FLEX pump to the FLEX connection of a LPCI pump. The FLEX pump discharge will be connected to a FLEX connection on the discharge side of the LPCI pumps in the corner room. Another hose will be utilized to connect a FLEX connection on the common LPCI discharge header to a FLEX connection on the common Isolation Condenser Makeup piping located on Elevation 517 feet.

The FLEX pump would be started to pressurize the IC Makeup piping. From the IC Makeup piping, water is available to both Isolation Condensers through installed piping and valves.

Temporary hoses will be connected to the IC Makeup header and routed to open hatches on top of each Unit's SBLC tank. The SBLC system will be used as a high pressure makeup source to the RPV. The makeup to the SBLC tank provides long term makeup to the system. Other hoses will be routed from the IC Makeup header to each Unit's Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System piping for makeup to the Spent Fuel Pools.

Page 8 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Once the first FLEX pump is operating, station personnel will begin aligning the other primary FLEX pump. When the initial Torus is drawn down to the minimum level, personnel will start the 2nd primary FLEX pump to begin utilizing water from the Other Unit'sTorus.

Approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of makeup is available utilizing the Torus inventory from both Units.

During the time FLEX pumps are using Torus inventory for FLEX makeup needs Station personnel will begin deployment of a hydraulic submersible pump into the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) for long term makeup. The hydraulic submersible pump and associated diesel driven hydraulic unit will be transported from a robust structure (a structure that meets ESEP design requirements for storage) inside the Protected Area to a location near the UHS.

Personnel will connect a discharge hose to the pump and lower the pump into the UHS using a small mobile crane also stored in the robust structure. Temporary hoses will be routed from the submersible pump to the Unit 2 Reactor Building along the Protected Area access road. The hose will be connected to a FLEX connection on the LPCI header for one of the LPCI subsystems. The LPCI crosstie line on that Unit will be closed to isolate the desired LPCI subsystem. When the submersible pump is started, valves on the associated LPCI subsystem will be opened to direct water into the Torus. The FLEX pump on that Unit will continue to operate with makeup to the Torus being supplied from the submersible pump. This arrangement allows water from the UHS to be strained through the ECCS Suction Strainers prior to utilization for FLEX makeup needs.

Power to FLEX Pumps One trailer mounted 800 kW portable generator will be staged in a robust structure outside the south side of the Reactor Building. This generator will be sized to supply all FLEX loads for both Units. Temporary cabling will be deployed from the generator robust structure to the reactor building to power the FLEX pumps. There will be multiple connection points available to ensure connections can be made to power the required loads. The connection panel in the FLEX generator enclosure will be compatible with RRC supplied equipment. Running the portable generator at its staged location in the robust structure will allow quicker availability of FLEX pumps to meet the 2.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> time critical action. The robust structure will accommodate the diesel generator requirements to run appropriately while inside the enclosure.

Power to 480 VAC Busses The 480 VAC safety related busses (2-7329 for Unit 2 and 3-7339 for Unit 3) will also be capable of being energized from the 800 kW FLEX generator using separate flexible cables. The flexible cables will be stored on reels/carts located near the 480 VAC safety related busses and other locations as required. Additional flexible cables may be stored on portable carts if needed. Connection to the busses will be made using modified Page 9 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 breakers that can be racked into empty cubicles on either safety related bus on a specific unit. The opposite division safety related bus can then be energized using the installed bus cross-connect mechanism. When the busses are energized, power will be available for the following actions: close AC valves to isolate the Recirculation System Loops to significantly reduce RPV leakage, the SBLC pumps will be available for high pressure RPV injection, the 125/250VDC battery chargers will be available for vital plant systems, and the Instrument Bus will be available to power vital plant instruments.

Key Reactor Parameters are initially obtained via DC powered instrumentation and additional instrumentation becomes available when AC power is available from the FLEX generator. A DC load stripping strategy is employed to extend battery life. No specific Containment control is required in Phase 2 as both temperature and pressure stay within design limits for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the event. Key Containment Parameters are initially obtained from DC powered instrumentation and additional instrumentation becomes available when AC power is available from the FLEX generator. Spent Fuel Pool level is obtained from the new Spent Fuel Pool wide range instrumentation installed under order EA-12-051 [22].

Phase 3 strategies.

Phase 1 and 2 strategies will provide sufficient capability and no additional Phase 3 strategies are required. However, Phase 3 support will be employed to provide backup equipment and consumable supplies. Phase 3 support for DNPS includes backup portable pumps, generators and consumable supplies.

Page 10 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 3.0

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].The ESEL for Unit 2 & 3 is presented in Attachment A and B, respectively.

3.1

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the DNPS Overall Integrated Plan (01P) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3]. The 01P provides the DNPS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of Core Cooling and Containment integrity consistent with the DNPS OIP including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support Core Cooling, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory control, Containment integrity, and required plant monitoring parameters. The DNPS FLEX plan only includes permanently installed FLEX equipment and therefore, this equipment is included on the ESEL.

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

1. The scope of components is limited to those required to accomplish the Core Cooling and Containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for Core Cooling/Containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the DNPS 01P including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the DNPS 01P including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e.,

either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

Page 11 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:

• Structures (e.g. Containment, Reactor Building, Turbine Building, etc.)

. Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

• Manual valves and rupture disks.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

. Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components (e.g. reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the DNPS 01P [3] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. The Reference 20 report validated the ESEL to the DNPS 01P through the February 2014 update [3.1, 3.2, 3.3]. It was confirmed by DNPS review [25] that the ESEL was also consistent with the August 2014 [3.4] FLEX update. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc., as necessary.

The flow paths credited for the DNPS ESEP are shown in Table 3-1.

Page 12 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Table 3-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEP Flow Path 7

FLEX Drawing P&IDs Unit 2 Unit 3 Steam from Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to Isolation Condenser and Condensate from Isolation Condenser back to RPV Not Applicable M-28 [24.1]

M-32 [24.19]

M-26, Sh. 2 [24.12]

M-359 [24.6]

M-363 [24.14]

M-357, Sh. 2 [24.20]

Isolation Condenser Shell Side Make-Up from FLEX Connectionl and Shell Side Steam Vent to Atmosphere

[3.3] &

[3.4]

M-28 [24.1]

M-4203 [24.15]

M-39 [24.13]

M-359 [24.6]

M-4203 [24.15]

M-369 [24.16]

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) from Torus to Reactor Pressure Vessel via HPCI Pump (for Core Heat Removal)

Not Applicable M-51 [24.21]

M-14 [24.22]

M-46, Sh. 1 [24.8]

M-46, Sh. 2 [24.9]

M-46, Sh. 3 [24.10]

M-374 [24.7]

M-347 [24.23]

M-46, Sh. 1 [24.8]

M-46, Sh. 2 [24.9]

M-46, Sh. 3 [24.10]

High Pressure Reactor Coolant Make-Up from Standby Liquid Control Tank to RPV Not Applicable M-33 [24.3]

M-26, Sh. 1 [24.11]

M-364 [24.24]

M-357, Sh. 1 [24.4]

Low Pressure Reactor Coolant Make-Up from FLEX Pump2 powered by a portable FLEX Diesel Generator to RPV, SFP, ISCO3

[3.3] &

[3.4]

M-29, Sh. 1 [24.2]

M-361, Sh. 1 [24.17]

Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Isolation from Recirculation System Not Applicable M-26, Sh. 2 [24.12]

M-357, Sh. 2 [24.20]

Fuel Oil from the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank.

Not Applicable M-41, Sh. 2 [24.18]

3.1.2 Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that "functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g. RCIC/AFW trips)."To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the DNPS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power operated valves:

' Flex Pump Provides make-up from either unit's Torus to either unit's Isolation Condenser shell side, Spent Fuel Pool, and Reactor Pressure Vessel [3.3], [3.4].

2 The FLEX Pump suction is upstream of the LCPI Pump and the discharge is downstream of the LPCI Pump on both sub-systems for each unit [3.3], [3.4].

3 Portable Diesel Driven Pumps Provide Make-up from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) to either Units Torus providing continuous supply to the FLEX Pumps [3.3], [3.4].

Page 13 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

. Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves), were included on the ESEL.

• Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Instruments identified to monitor parameters critical to control of elements of the FLEX Strategy

[3.1, 3.2, 3.3] are included in the ESEL. Only instruments critical to control and decision-making were included. Instruments that only indicate the success of the strategy (and not used for control or decision-making) were excluded from ESEP. For each of the included instruments, flow diagrams were reviewed as applicable to confirm the transmitter is within an established FLEX flow path. Elementary diagrams were reviewed to establish the signal path between the instrument transmitter and the credited indicator. The transmitter, indicator and any signal conditioning components, as well as power supplies used to power all the components necessary to the signal path were identified. For each of these items either the component itself or the instrumentation cabinet containing it was included in the ESEL. Instrument loops for the following parameters were included in the ESEL:

Page 14 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

• Reactor Coolant Pressure Indication

• Reactor Coolant Level Indication

• Drywell Pressure Indication

• Torus Level Indication

• Torus Temperature Indication

• Isolation Condenser Shell-Side Level Indication

• Low Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Indication

• Low Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Indication 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the DNPS 01P [3] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate")."

Item 6 in Section 3 goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in the FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.

3.2

Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX implementation All equipment used for FLEX implementation on the DNPS ESEL are the primary path.

Page 15 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-R5-14-297 4.0

Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1

Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee As discussed in the DNPS March Submittal [4], Dresden was designed and constructed before the concept of control point was defined, and the UFSAR [21] does not provide specific definition of the SSE control point. The SPID [14] guidance in Section 2.4.2 recommends for rock sites to define the control point at the top of the rock. Therefore, the control point was defined as elevation 515 feet MSL, which is the approximate top of the bedrock in the vicinity of the main power block. This elevation is used for comparison to the GMRS. The UFSAR [21],

states that the site SSE is anchored to a PGA of 0.2g.

The GMRS, taken from the DNPS March submittal report [4], is shown in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1.

Table 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g) 0.1 1.37E-02 0.125 1.72E-02 0.15 2.06E-02 0.2 2.75E-02 0.25 3.43E-02 0.3 4.12E-02 0.35 4.81E-02 0.4 5.49E-02 0.5 6.87E-02 0.6 7.82E-02 0.7 8.78E-02 0.8 9.71E-02 0.9 0.103 1

0.108 1.25 0.122 1.5 0.128 2

0.141 2.5 0.152 3

0.186 3.5 0.227 4

0.266 5

0.343 6

0.389 7

0.431 8

0.465 Page 16 of 89

./

1

dka Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g) 9 0.499 10 0.534 12.5 0.577 15 0.587 20 0.577 25 0.504 30 0.422 35 0.369 40 0.338 50 0.296 60 0.269 70 0.257 80 0.251 90 0.248 100 0.246

• GMRS 0.6 0.5 u--3 0.4 0.3

`C 0.2 0.1 0.1

1

10

100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping) 4.2

Comparison to SSE As identified in the DNPS March submittal report [4], the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1-10Hz range. A comparison of the GMRS to the SSE between 1-10Hz is shown in Table 4-2 and Figure 4-2.

Page 17 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Table 4-2: DNPS GMRS and SSE Between 1-10 Hz (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g)

Horizontal SSE (g) 1 0.108 0.200 1.25 0.122 0.220 1.5 0.128 0.253 2

0.141 0.290 2.5 0.152 0.310 3

0.186 0.321 3.5 0.227 0.329 4

0.266 0.332 5

0.343 0.330 6

0.389 0.324 7

0.431 0.318 8

0.465 0.312 9

0.499 0.306 10 0.534 0.300 0.6 0.5 0.4 01 Frequency (Hz)

- GMRS

SSE Figure 4-2: DNPS GMRS to SSE Comparison (5% Damping) 10 Page 18 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 5.0

Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1

Description of RLGM selected The RLGM for DNPS was determined in accordance with Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] by linearly scaling the DNPS SSE by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio between the 1 and 10Hz range. This calculation is shown in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g)

Horizontal SSE (g)

GMRS/SSE 1

0.108 0.200 0.54 1.25 0.122 0.220 0.55 1.5 0.128 0.253 0.51 2

0.141 0.290 0.49 2.5 0.152 0.310 0.49 3

0.186 0.321 0.58 3.5 0.227 0.329 0.69 4

0.266 0.332 0.80 5

0.343 0.330 1.04 6

0.389 0.324 1.20 7

0.431 0.318 1.36 8

0.465 0.312 1.49 9

0.499 0.306 1.63 10 0.534 0.300 1.78 As shown above, the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio occurs at 10 Hz and equals 1.78.

The resulting 5% damped RLGM, based on scaling the horizontal SSE by the GMRS/SSE ratio of 1.78, is shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-2. Note that the RLGM PGA is 0.356g.

Page 19 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Table 5-2: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

RLGM (g) 1.14 0.356 1.25 0.392 1.43 0.438 1.67 0.481 2.00 0.516 2.50 0.552 3.33 0.584 4.00 0.591 4.44 0.591 5.00 0.587 6.67 0.570 10.0 0.534 11.1 0.520 12.5 0.506 14.3 0.491 16.7 0.473 20.0 0.456 25.0 0.438 28.6 0.427 33.3 0.417 40.0 0.402 50.0 0.388 66.7 0.374 100 0.356 Page 20 of 89

0.6 0.5

-zo 0.4

/

/

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.0 r2 0.3 0J Li)

'i' 0.2 0.1 0

1

. /

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10 Frequency (Hz)

/

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

• RLGM (g) 100 Figure 5-1: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping) 5.2

Method to Estimate ISRS The method used to derive the ESEP in-structure response spectra (ISRS) was to uniformly scale existing SSE-based ISRS from Structural Criteria Document TDBD-DQ-1 [17] by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio from Table 5-1 of 1.78. Existing ISRS were the same as those used for the USI A-46 program. Scaled ISRS are calculated for all buildings and elevations where ESEL items are located at DNPS. These scaled ISRS were used as the basis for screening and for the High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations 14Q4237-CAL-002, 14Q4239-CAL-003, and 14Q4239-CAL-004 [10].

Page 21 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 6.0

Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the highest peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a particular spectral shape, in this case the 5%

damped RLGM spectral shape. The calculated HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA (0.356g from Table 5-2). The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1.

Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041 [7].

2.

Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959 [8].

The deterministic approach using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041 [7] was used for DNPS to determine HCLPF capacities.

6.1

Summary of Methodologies Used DNPS performed a Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) in 1997. The SMA is documented in the DNPS IPEEE report [9] and consisted of screening walkdowns and HCLPF anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041 [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by trained engineers that successfully completed the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The majority of these engineers were also trained in using EPRI NP-6041 (the engineers attended the EPRI SMA Add-On course). The walkdown results were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) that are included in the Reference 11 report. Anchorage capacity calculations used the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041[7].

DNPS conservatively applied the methodology of EPRI NP-6041 [7] to all items on the ESEL for the ESEP. The performed screening used Table 2-4 from EPRI NP-6041 [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers who, as a minimum, have attended the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdowns were documented in SEWS from EPRI NP-6041 [7]. Anchorage capacity calculations use the CDFM criteria established within EPRI NP-6041 [7] with DNPS specific allowables and material strengths used as applicable. The input seismic demand used was the RLGM shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1.

Page 22 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 6.2

HCLPF Screening Process From Table 5-2, the spectral peak of the RLGM for DNPS equals 0.591g. Screening lanes 1 and 2 in Table 2-4 of NP-6041 [7] are bounded by peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g, respectively. Both lane limits exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration. ESEL components were screened to lane 1 of Table 2-4 in NP-6041 [7].

The DNPS Unit 2 and Unit 3 ESEL contain 114 items and 108 items respectively [20]. It is noted that the highest number designation is 228. There were 6 number designations not used:

28, 64, 152, 172, 196 and 202. Of the ESEL items, 27 and 27 are valves for Unit 2 and 3 respectively, both power-operated and air operated. Note that the difference in the number of ESEL components between the units is that the shared new FLEX equipment and the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank are all included on the Unit 2 ESEL. In accordance with Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041 [7], active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g (relative to the spectral peak) only requiring a review of valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping. Note that anchorage is not a failure mode. Valves on the ESEL may be screened out, subject to the caveat regarding large extended operators on small diameter piping. The non-valve components in the ESEL were evaluated to the remaining EPRI NP-6041 Table 2-4 [7]

screening caveats, as applicable.

6.3

Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.3.1 Walkdown approach Walkdowns for the DNPS were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041 [7] for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pg. 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041 [7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria:

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

Page 23 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI4

[Seismic Interaction] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection.

The DNPS walkdowns included, as a minimum, a 100% walk-by of all "existing" items on the DNPS ESEL except as noted in Section 7.0. Note that "new" items on the DNPS ESEL represent new permanently installed equipment that was not installed at the time of the walkdowns. These items are being installed to meet the RLGM input. Previous walkdown 4 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [14].".

Page 24 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 information that was relied upon as the basis for SRT judgment in excluding an item walkdown is documented in Section 6.3.2.

6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information The seismic walkdowns for DNPS included, as a minimum, a walk-by of all the components on the ESEL by the SRT with the following exceptions:

• ESEL Item # 24 2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR

• ESEL Item #175 2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV) 9 ESEL Item #176 2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

• ESEL Item #177 2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

• ESEL Item #178 2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

• ESEL Item #213 2/3-5201 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank A detailed discussion and resolution for the items listed above is provided in Section 7.0. All non-energized cabinets were opened when specialized tools were not needed to operate the cabinet doors. Photos were taken during the walkdowns. In general the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 walkdowns for DNPS [15] and [18] were not used but were available for reference. The existing calculations and SEWS from the USI A-46 evaluation of DNPS [16]

were utilized to aid the SRT in their screening decisions as indicated in Attachments C and D of this report. A walk by was performed to confirm that the equipment material condition and configuration is consistent with the walkdown conclusions and that no new significant interactions related to block walls or piping attached to tanks exist5. The results of the walkdowns, screenings and subsequent evaluations are included in the Reference 11 report.

6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with that guidance from NP-6041 [7], no significant outliers or anchorage concerns were identified during the DNPS ESEP walkdowns. The following finding was noted during the walkdowns:

• Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. These block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM. For any cases where the block wall represented the HCLPF 5 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15].

Page 25 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 failure mode for an ESEL item, it is noted in the tabulated HCLPF values described in Section 6.6 and shown in Attachments C & D.

6.4

HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041 [7]. Those evaluations included the following steps:

• Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions.

• Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041 [7] as described in Section 6.2.

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural (e.g. anchorage, load path etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in DNPS calculations 14Q4239-CAL-002, 14Q4239-CAL-003, and 14Q4239-CAL-004 [10].

Anchorage configurations for non-valve components were evaluated either by SRT judgment, large margins in existing design basis calculations, or CDFM based HCLPF calculations [10].

The results of these analysis methods are documented in Attachment C and D for DNPS Unit 2 and 3 respectively. For components beyond 40 feet above grade, Table 2-4 of NP-6041 [7] is not directly applicable.

EPRI 3002000704 [2] Section 5 references EPRI 1019200 [19] with respect to screening criteria beyond 40 feet above grade. This guide update allows multiplying the screening lane spectral acceleration value ranges by a factor of 1.5 in order to account for spectral acceleration (SAS) at the base of the component. This screening level at the base of a component is compared to the ISRS demand corresponding to the RLGM. For example, by factoring the acceleration ranges for screening lane 1 of NP-6041-SL Table 2-4, the capacity at the base of a component is bounded by 0.8g*1.5=1.2g. This is compared with the seismic demand presented by the ISRS.

ESEP equipment items which are beyond 40 feet above grade are located in the Reactor Building (RB) at elevation 570 feet and 589 feet. The 5% damped horizontal response spectra at these elevations are documented in 14Q4239-CAL-001 [10]. The maximum spectral peaks at these locations are 4.23g (E-W direction) and 6.83g (E-W direction) and well above the lane 2 bound applicable to floor response spectra of 1.5

• 1.2g = 1.8g. The maximum ZPA at these elevations were 1.19g and 1.42g respectively. This presented screening challenges that were addressed as discussed in the notes section of Attachment C and D.

Page 26 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 As described in Section 6.0, for HCLPF calculations the conservative, deterministic failure margin (CDFM) analysis criteria established in Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041 [7] are used for a detailed analysis of components. The relevant CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041 [7] are summarized in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio Load combination:

Normal + Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) 6 Ground response spectrum:

Conservatively specified (84% non-exceedance probability)

Damping:

Conservative estimate of median damping.

Structural model:

Best estimate (median) + uncertainty variation in frequency.

Material strength:

Code specified minimum strength or 95% exceedance of actual strength if test data is available.

Static capacity equations:

Code ultimate strength (ACI), maximum strength (AISC),

Service Level D (ASME) or functional limits. If test data is available to demonstrate excessive conservatism of code equations then use 84% exceedance of test data for capacity equations.

Inelastic energy absorption:

For non-brittle failure modes and linear analysis, use 80% of computed seismic stress in capacity evaluation to account for ductility benefits or perform nonlinear analysis and use 95%

exceedance ductility levels.

The HCLPF capacity is equal to the PGA at which the strength limit is reached. The HCLPF earthquake load is calculated as follows:

U = Normal + Ec Where:

U = Ultimate strength per Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041[7]

Ec = HCLPF earthquake load Normal = Normal operating loads (dead and live load expected to be present, etc.)

For this calculation, the HCLPF earthquake load is related to a fixed reference earthquake:

Ec = SFc*Eref 6 The ESEP evaluation uses the RLGM spectra as the SME.

Page 27 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Where:

• Eref = reference earthquake from the relevant in-structure response spectrum (ISRS)

• SFc = component-specific scale factor that satisfies U = Normal +Ec The HCLPF will be defined as the PGA produced by Ec. Because the DNPS RLGM PGA is 0.356g:

HCLPF = 0.356g*SFc 6.5

Functional Evaluation of Relays A HCLPF evaluation is performed for all relays and switches which may negatively "seal in" or "lock out" on the DNPS ESEL [20].

For relay evaluations, NP-6041-SL Appendix Q describes the following steps:

• Calculate in-cabinet response spectra (ICRS):

• Establish a clipping factor to be applied to the ICRS:

• Determine a relay's GERS Capacity:

• Establish adjustment factors to convert the relay's GERS capacity to a CDFM level:

• Compare clipped-peak and ZPA demands to the GERS capacity:

Of the 114 items on the DNPS Unit 2 ESEL, 9 are relays [20]. Of the 108 items on the DNPS Unit 3 ESEL, 9 are relays [20]. Specific seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for all 18 relays using either industry or DNPS specific documentation. In-cabinet capacity to demand evaluations were performed using the DNPS relay seismic capacities and the ESEP ISRS scaled with the NP-6041 in-cabinet amplification factors. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand. HCLPF capacities for these 18 total components are calculated in 14Q4239-CAL-004 [10] and are presented in Attachment C and D.

6.6

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values including the key failure modes are included in Attachment C and D. It is noted that several HCLPFs were calculated and shown not to control.

• For items screened out using NP 6041 [7] screening tables, the listed HCLPF is indicated to be greater than the RLGM PGA (>0.356g) and the failure mode is listed as "Screened". It is noted that components on the ESEL screen for as a minimum Screening Lane 1, that is the 0.8g screening lane. For equipment < 40 feet above grade, the screening HCLPF is limited by equipment capacity. This ground motion Page 28 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 HCLPF is estimated to be a minimum of (0.8g / 0.591g)* 0.356g = 0.482g, where, 0.8g is the minimum screening level, 0.591g is the peak of the ground RLGM and 0.356g is the PGA of the RLGM.

• For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the minimum capacity of 0.482g Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Anchorage". When the anchorage HCLPF turned out to be above this level, the listed HCLPF is set to >RLGM and the failure mode is "Equipment Capacity" along with a note providing the anchorage HCLPF and that it did not control capacity. When this was the case for equipment located less than 40 feet above grade, the HCLPF of 0.482g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity. When this was the case for equipment located above 40 feet above grade a HCLPF of 0.356g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity.

• For items where relay function controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the minimum capacity of 0.482g Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Equipment Function". When the relay function HCLPF turned out to be above this level, the listed HCLPF is set to >RLGM and the failure mode is "Equipment Capacity" along with a note providing the relay HCLPF and that it did not control capacity. When this was the case for equipment located less than 40 feet above grade, the HCLPF of 0.482g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity. When this was the case for equipment located above 40 feet above grade a HCLPF of 0.356g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity.

• For items where interaction controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the minimum capacity of 0.482g Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Interaction". It is noted there were no cases for Dresden ESEL items where this was the case. Therefore, the listed HCLPF is set to

>RLGM and the failure mode is "Equipment Capacity" along with a note providing the interaction HCLPF and that it did not control capacity. When this was the case for equipment located less than 40 feet above grade, the HCLPF of 0.482g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity. When this was the case for equipment located above 40 feet above grade a HCLPF of 0.356g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity.

Page 29 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 7.0

Inaccessible Items 7.1

Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns Six ESEL items were not accessible to the SRT during the ESEP walkdowns at DNPS. A description of circumstances and disposition for each of these items is provided below.

ESEL Item #24

2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR This valve is inside a locked Steam Tunnel that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-2301-8 in Unit 3. This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-2301-8 in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #175

2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-4A in Unit 3.

This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-4A in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #176

2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-5A in Unit 3.

This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-5A in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #177

2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-4B in Unit 3.

This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-4B in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #178

2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-5B in Unit 3.

Page 30 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-5B in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #218

2/3-5201

Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank:

This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible. Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041[7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern as judged by the SRT that are the preparer and checker of this report.

A review of the flexibility of attached piping for 2/3-5201 was performed based on available documentation. The conclusion of that review as judged by the SRT that are the preparer and checker of this report was that there was adequate flexibility of the attached lines and that the tank is screened.

7.2

Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out No additional walkdowns are required.

Page 31 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 8.0

ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1

Supporting Information DNPS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1].

It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704

[2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall DNPS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S.

plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [13] concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the Gl-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for DNPS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [12] therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [13] also apply to DNPS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely.

Page 32 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 This has been borne out of those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.

The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

• Safety factors applied in design calculations

• Damping values used in the dynamic analysis of SSCs

• Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations

• Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra

• Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications

• Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis

• Bounding requirements in codes and standards

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)

• Bounding testing requirements, and

• Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

8.2

Identification of Planned Modifications No modifications are required as a result of the DNPS ESEP.

8.3

Modification Implementation Schedule No modification implementation schedule is required because no modifications are required.

8.4

Summary of Regulatory Commitments No regulatory commitments are required.

Page 33 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 9.0

References 1

NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012 2

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704 3

Order Number EA-12-049 responses:

3.1

NRC Letter RS-13-020 from Dresden (ML13063A320), "Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 28, 2013 3.2

NRC Letter RS-13-119 from Dresden (ML13241A282), "First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 28, 2013 3.3

NRC Letter RS-14-010 from Dresden (ML14059A430), "Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 28, 2014.

3.4

NRC Letter RS-14-208 from Dresden, "Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 28, 2014 4

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3 (RS-14-067), dated March 31, 2014 (ML14091A012) 5

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991 6

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities -

10CFR 50.54(f), June 1991 Page 34 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 7

A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP 6041-SL 8

Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.

1994, TR-103959 9

"Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal Report", Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3, December 1997 10

DNPS ESEP Calculations:

10.1 14Q4237-CAL-002 Rev. 0, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Components of the ESEP that did not Screen".

10.2 14Q4239-CAL-003 Rev. 1, "ESEP HCLPFs for Relays" 10.3 14Q4239-CAL-004 Rev. 0, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Unit 2 & 3 Isolation Condenser Assemblies" 11

S&A Report No.: 14Q4237-RPT-005 Rev 1, "Dresden ESEP SEWS" 12

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States", March 12, 2014 13

NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014 14

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013. 1025287 15

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal, Correspondence No.12-167, dated November 15, 2012 16

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 & 3, "USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report", June 1996 17

TDBD-DQ-1 Rev 1, "Structural Design Criteria for Quad Cities and Dresden Stations",

April 13, 2000.

18

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal, Correspondence No.12-167, dated November 12, 2012 19

Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.

1994, 1019200 20

S&A Report No.: 14Q4237-RPT-003 Rev 1, "Validation of Expedited Seismic Equipment List" 21

Dresden Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 10, June 2013 22

Order EA-12-051 Page 35 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 23

14Q4237-CAL-001 Rev. 0, "Generation of In-Structure Response Spectra for use in ESEP Evaluations" 24

Dresden P&ID Drawings and Supplemental References 24.1 Dresden Drawing M-28, Rev. LP, Diagram of Isolation Condenser Piping 24.2 Dresden Drawing M-29 Sheet 1, Rev. Cl, Diagram of Low Pressure Coolant Injection Piping 24.3 Dresden Drawing M-33, Rev. HZ, Diagram of Standby Liquid Control Piping.

24.4 Dresden Drawing M-357 Sheet 1, Rev. BX, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculation Piping 24.5 Dresden Drawing M-357 Sheet 2, Rev BS, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping 24.6 Dresden Drawing M-359, Rev BN, Diagram of Isolation Condenser Piping 24.7 Dresden Drawing M-374, Rev CU, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping 24.8 Quad Cities' Drawing M-46 Sheet 1, Rev. CD, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection HPCI Piping Quad Cities8 Drawing M-46 Sheet 2, Rev. S, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection HPCI Piping Quad Cities8 Drawing M-46 Sheet 3, Rev. G, Diagram of HPCI Turbine Lubricating and Hydraulic Oil System and Pump Seal Cooler Piping Dresden Drawing M-26 Sheet 1, Rev. BR, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping Dresden Drawing M-26 Sheet 2, Rev. KK, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping Dresden Drawing M-39, Rev. DM, Diagram of Reactor Building Equipment Drains Dresden Drawing M-363, Rev. BF, Diagram of Shutdown Reactor Cooling Piping Dresden Drawing M-4203, Rev. E, Flow Diagram Isolation Condenser Make Up System Dresden Drawing M-369, Rev. WI, Diagram of Reactor Building Equipment Drains Dresden Drawing M-361 Sheet 1, Rev. VP, Diagram of Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Dresden Drawing M-41 Sheet 2, Rev. Al, Diagram of Turbine and Diesel Oil Piping 7 These Quad Cities drawings are to be used for validating the lube oil system at Dresden per TODI 14-036 [24.25].

Page 36 of 89 24.9 24.10 24.11 24.12 24.13 24.14 24.15 24.16 24.17 24.18

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 24.19 Dresden Drawing M-32, Rev. BC, Diagram of Shutdown Reactor Cooling Piping 24.20 Dresden Drawing M-357 Sheet 2, Rev BS, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping 24.21 Dresden Drawing M-51, Rev. CR, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping 24.22 Dresden Drawing M-14, Rev. LZ, Diagram of Reactor Feed Piping 24.23 Dresden Drawing M-347, Rev. CF, Diagram of Reactor Feed Piping 24.24 Dresden Drawing M-364, Rev AS, Diagram of Standby Liquid Control Piping 24.25 Dresden Station Transmittal of Design Information to Stevenson & Associates, DOC ID# 14-036 Rev. 000, "Use of QDC HPCI System Drawings for DRE",

September 8, 2014 25

Correspondence 14Q4237-LRC-115,

Subject:

Question: Do your ESELs Include FLEX Mods which meet the Augmented Approach Section 3.2 Criteria to be included on the ESEL?, From Eyad Ali to Jeffrey S. Clark, November 11, 2014 Page 37 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS44-297 Attachment A - DNPS Unit 2 ESEL Page 38 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State 1

2-1501-22A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Closed Open MOV will be manually opened with hand wheel to support RPV injection.

2 2-1501-20B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST INB MOV Closed Open MOV will be manually opened with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

3 2-1501-38B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Closed Open MOV will be manually opened with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

4 2-1501-32B U2 LPCI LOOP I AND II X-TIE MOV Open Closed MOV will be manually closed with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

5 2-1501-21A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ OTBD ISOL VLV Open Throttle 11 2-2301-3 U2 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Closed Open 12 2-2301-64 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Open Closed AOV fails closed on loss of instrument air 13 2-2301-65 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV (AOV)

Open Closed ACV fails closed on loss of instrument air 14 2-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Closed Open 15 2-2301-CV1 (2) (3) (4)

(5) (6)

HPCI Turbine Control Valve Closed Open There are 6 control valves mounted on a single assembly on the HPCI Turbine 16 2-2301 HPCI Turbine Available Operating 17 2-2301-6 U2 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Open Closed 18 2-2301-35 U2 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Closed Open 19 2-2301-36 U2 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Closed Open 20 2-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Available Operating 21 2-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP HPCI Speed Reducer Available Operating 22 2-2302 HPCI Main Pump Available Operating 23 2-2301-14 U2 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Closed Open Page 39 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item if Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 24 2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Closed Open 25 2-2301-48 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Closed Open 26 2-2301-49 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Open Closed 27 2-2303-AOP HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Off On 28 Not Used 29 2-2303-TG HPCI Turning Gear Off On 30 2-2320-GSLO Gland Seal Leak off Drain Pump Off On 31 2-2320-GSEF HPCI Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust Fan Off On 32 2-2303-MSC Motor Speed Changer Low Speed Stop High Speed Stop 33 2-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit High Speed Stop Varies to control HPCI flow 34 2-2386 HPCI Turbine Signal Converter Available Operating 35 2-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Available Operating Controlled by flow transmitter 2-2358 on instrument rack 2-2202-29 36 2-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Available Operating Passive Component 37 2-2320-GSC Gland Seal Leak off Condenser Available Operating Passive Component Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI isolation (Steam Line Break & Rx Pressure Trips).

38 2-2202-28 INSTRUMENT RACK ISO COND AND HPCI FLOW INDICATION Available Operating 39 2-2202-29 Instrument Rack Available Operating Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI operation/isolation (HPCI Flow Control).

40 2-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-39. If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

41 2-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-33. If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

Page 40 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State 42 2-2330-1258 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-39. If the relay energizes HPCI may

. isolate.

43 2-2330-126 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-39.1f the relay energizes HPCI may isolate.

44 2-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Turbine Trip relay in panel 902-39.

If the relay energizes HPCI may trip 45 2-0902-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Available Available Contains relays related to HPCI operation 46 47 2-0902-3 PANEL REACTOR +

CONTAINMENT COOLING Available Available Main Control Room panel that contains control switches for system initiation and component starts.

2-0902-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY ESS 2 Available Available Contains Isolation Relay 2330-125A 85 2-1302 Isolation Condenser assembly Available Operating Passive Component 86 2-1301-3 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET ISOL VLV (MOV,DC)

Closed Open 87 2-1301-10 U2 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV (MOV, Emerg., AC)

Closed Open Motor Operated Valve allows FLEX Pump to makeup water to ISCO shell side.

88 2-1301-17 U21SOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV (AOV)

Open Closed Air Operated Valve Fails Closed on Loss of Air 89 2-1301-20 U2 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV (AOV)

Open Closed Air Operated Valve Fails Closed On Loss of Air 90 2-4399-74 U2 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV (MOV, DC)

Closed Open Motor Operated Valve that will need to be opened for primary makeup path for ISCO.

91 2-0595-115A RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 902-40. If the relay chatters the Isolation Condenser may isolate Page 41 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State Relay in panel 902-41. If the relay 2 -0595-92 RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized chatters the Isolation Condenser 115B may isolate Relay in panel 902-40. If the relay 2-0595-RELAY ISO CONDIN BOARD 93 Energized Energized de-energizes the Iso. Condenser 116A VALVE CONTROL may isolate RELAY ISO COND Relay in panel 902-41. If the relay 2-0595-94 OUTBOARD VALVE Energized Energized de-energizes, the !so. Condenser 116B CONTROL may isolate PANEL PCIS RELAYS 95 2-0902-40 Available Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

INBOARD PCIS 1 PANEL PCIS RELAYS 96 2-0902-41 Available Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

OUTBOARD PCIS 2 109 2-83125-2 125 VDC Battery Available Operating 110 2-83125-2 125 VDC Charger 2 Energized Energized 111 2-83125-2 125 VDC Battery Bus 2 Energized Energized 2-83125-125 VDC Turbine Building 112 Energized Energized 2A-1 Bus 2A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building 113 2-83125-2B Energized Energized Bus 2B 2-83125-125 VDC Turbine Building 114 Energized Energized 2B-1 Bus 2B-1 Unit 2 125 VDC Reactor 115 2-83125-2 Energized Energized Building Distribution Panel 124 2-83250-2 250 VDC Battery Available Operating 125 2-83250-2 Unit 2 250 VDC Charger 2 Energized Energized 126 2-83250-2 Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2 Energized Energized 127 2-83250-2A Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2A Energized Energized 128 2-83250-2B Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2B Energized Energized ESS Bus PANEL 120/240 134 2-0902-49 Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL ESS Uninterruptible Power 135 2-0902-63 Energized Energized Supply and Static Switch 136 2-0902-50 Instrument Bus Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

Reactor Water Level indicator in 137 2-0640-29A 2A RPV NR LVL Energized Energized Main Control Room.

Page 42 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State 138 2-0646A U2 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Energized Energized Level Transmitter for 2-0640-29A 139 2-2202-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 2-0646-A is located on.

Available Available 140 2-0263-156 U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

141 2-0263-152A U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Pressure Transmitter for 2-0263-156 142 2-2202-78 Instrument Rack that PT 2-0263-152A is located on.

Available Available Instrument Cabinet 143 2-8540-2/4 U2 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS & M-U FLOW Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

144 2-1625 U2 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Energized Energized Pressure Transmitter for 2-8540-2/4 145 2-1602-3 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Energized Torus Level indicator in Main Control Room.

146 2-1626 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Energized Level Transmitter for 2-1602-3 147 2-1640-200 U2 TORUS TEMP MON Energized Energized Recorder will be used to monitor Torus Temperature. Power supplied via terminal block in cabinet 2-2202-70A. (No active components for this function in 2-2202-70A) 148 2-0902-36 Main Control Room Panel PANEL IRM/SRM Available Available Panel contains the Torus Temperature Recorder.

149 2-1340-2 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Energized Energized Isolation Condenser Shell-side Level indicator 150 2-1341 U2 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Energized Energized Transmitter for Isolation Condenser Shell-side Level 151 2-0902-5 Main Control Room Panel Available Available Contains RPV level and pressure indicators 152 Not Used 153 2-1549-A U2 LPCI LOOP I MAIN SUPPLY HDR Energized Energized Flow Transmitter for LPCI line Flow which will measure the primary FLEX pump flow.(Flow Recorder2-1540-7 on 902-3, ROB)

Page 43 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 154 2-2202-19A INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Available Available Rack that FT 2-1549-A is mounted on.

175 2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

176 2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

177 2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

178 2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

179 2-0902-4 Main Control Room Panel PANEL SHUTDOWN HO COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Available Available Panel contains control switches for the Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

180 2-7329 Bus 29 Energized Energized Main Bus for distribution from FLEX Generator 181 182 2-7828-7 2-7829-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 29-7 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

Energized Energized MCC that powers the "B" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

191 2-1103 2-1103 UNIT 2 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Available Available Passive Component 192 2-1102-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP De-energized Energized 193 2-1107-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Available Available Passive Component 194 2-1106-A 2A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV De-energized Energized 195 2-7828-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-1 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" SBLC pump and Squib Valve.

196 Not Used Page 44 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 203 TBD Primary FLEX Makeup Pump" Standby Operating Pump: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Pre-Staged in RB basement.

Common to both units 204 TBD Primary FLEX 800kW Diesel Generator"'

Standby Operating Diesel Generator: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Staged in New Seismically Robust Structure. Common to both units 205 TBD Primary FLEX Diesel Generator Power Distribution Cabinet."

Standby Operating Distribution Cabinet: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Staged in New Seismically Robust Structure. Common to both units Disconnect Switch: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Staged in New Seismically Robust Structure. Common to both units 206 TBD Disconnect Switch with Receptacle at D/G for Swgr Neutral Connection."

Standby Operating 207 2-0902-32 Panel 902-32 Energized Energized Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 208 2-0902-18 Panel 902-18 Energized Energized Added for Reactor Level Instrumentation 209 2-0902-19 Panel 902-19 Energized Energized Available Added for Drywell Pressure Instrument Power Source 210 2-1503A Containment Cooling Hx Available Added for pressure boundary 211 2-1503B Containment Cooling Hx Available Available Added for pressure boundary 212 2-2202-70B Panel 2202-70B Available Available Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 213 2-2202-73A Panel 2202-73A Energized Energized Added for Reactor Pressure Instrumentation 214 2-2202-73B Panel 2202-73B Energized Energized Added for Torus Level Instrumentation 215 2-7829-2 Motor Control Center 29-2 Energized Energized Added MCC to provide power to 125V DC Battery Charger 216 2-7828-2 Motor Control Center 28-2 Energized Energized Added MCC to provide power to Instrument Bus on 2-0902-50 217 2-7828-3 Motor Control Center 28-3 Energized Energized Added MCC to provide power to 250V DC Battery Charger gi Addressed in FLEX Implementation Modification and Procured to meet the ESEP Requirements.

• • • These are portable equipment that are no longer required to be on the ESEL. These equipment items are addressed in the FLEX implementation modification.

Page 45 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

218 L_

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID 2/3-5201 Description Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Normal State Available Desired State Available Added for Fuel Oil Source Page 46 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Attachment B - DNPS Unit 3 ESEL Page 47 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

6 Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID 3-1501-22B Description Normal State Desired State U3 LPCI LOOP ll COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Closed

' MOV will be manually opened Open with hand wheel to support RPV injection.

7 3-1501-20A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST INBD MOV Closed MOV will be manually opened Open with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

8 3-1501-38A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Closed MOV will be manually opened Open with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

9 3-1501-32A U3 LPCI LOOP I AND II X-TIE MOV Open 1 MOV will be manually closed with Closed

hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

10 3-1501-21B U3 LPCI LOOP ll COOLANT INJ OTBD ISOL MOV Open Throttle 48 3-2301-3 U3 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Closed Open 49 3-2301-64 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 50 3-2301-65 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 51 3-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Closed Open 52 3-2301-CV1 (2)

(3) (4) (5) (6)

HPCI Turbine Control Valve Closed There are 6 control valves Open mounted on a single assembly on the HPCI Turbine 53 3-2301 HPCI Turbine Available Operating 54 3-2301-6 U3 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Open Closed 55 3-2301-35 U3 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Closed Open 56 3-2301-36 U3 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Closed Open 57 3-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Available Operating 58 3-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP HPCI Speed Reducer Available Operating 59 3-2302 HPCI Main Pump Available Operating 60 3-2301-14 U3 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Closed Open 61 3-2301-8 U3 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Closed Open 62 3-2301-48 U3 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Closed Open Page 48 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

63 Equipment Opera-WIZ:Ste Not

it;

ID 3-2301-49 Description Normal State Desired Sta Closed U3 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Open 64 Not Used 65 3-2303-AOP Auxiliary Oil Pump Off On 66 67 3-2303-TG Turning Gear Off On 3-2320-GSLO HPCI GLAND SEAL LEAK OFF DRAIN PUMP Off On 68 3-2320-GSEF Gland Seal Exhauster Fan Off On 69 3-2303-MSC Motor Speed Changer Low Speed Stop High Speed Stop 70 3-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit High Speed Stop Varies to control HPCI flow 71 3-2386 HPCI TURB SIGNAL CONVERTER Available Operating 72 3-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Available Controlled by flow transmitter 3-Operating

2358 on instrument rack 3-2203-29 73 3-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Available Operating

Passive Component 74 3-2320-GSC HPCI TURBINE GLAND SEAL CONDENSER Available Operating

Passive Component 75 3-2203-28 Instrument Rack Available Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI Operating

isolation (Steam Line Break & Rx Pressure Trips).

-4 76 3-2203-29 Instrument Rack Available Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI Operating operation/isolation (HPCI Flow Control).

77 3-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 903-39. If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

78 3-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay on panel 903-33.

If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

79 3-2330-125B RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay on panel 903-39.

If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

Page 49 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL,

Item #

80 Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID 3-2330-126 Description RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE Normal State Desired State De-energized Isolation relay on panel 903-39.

De-If the relay chatters FIPCI may energized isolate.

81 3-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized Turbine Trip relay on panel 903-De-

39. If the relay chatters HPCI may energized trip.

82 3-0903-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Available

' Contains relays related to HPCI Available operation 83 3-0903-3 PANEL REACTOR +

CONTAINMENT COOLING Available Main Control Room panel that contains control switches for Available system initiation and component 1 starts.

84 3-0903-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY ESS 2 Isolation Condenser assembly Available Available Contains Isolation Relay 2330-125A Passive Component 97 3-1302 Available Operating 98 3-1301-3 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET ISOL VLV Closed Open 99 3-1301-10 U3 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV Closed Allows FLEX Pump to makeup Open water to ISCO shell side.

100 3-1301-17 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 101 3-1301-20 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 102 3-4399-74 U3 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV Closed Open Motor Operated Valve that will need to be opened for primary makeup path for ISCO.

103 3-0595-115A RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-40. If the relay chatters the Isolation Condenser may isolate 104 3-0595-115B RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-41. If the relay chatters the Isolation Condenser may isolate 105 3-0595-116A RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-40. If the relay de-energizes the Iso. Condenser will isolate.

106 3-0595-1168 RELAY ISO COND OUTBOARD VALVE CONTROL Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-41. If the relay de-energizes the 'so.

Condenser will isolate.

Page 50 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

107 Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments AMINER 41 ID 3-0903-40 Description PANEL PCIS RELAYS INBOARD PCIS 1 Normal Available Desired SIONght_

Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

108 3-0903-41 PANEL PCIS RELAYS OUTBOARD PCIS 2 Available Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

116 3-83125-3 125 VDC Battery Available Operating 117 3-83125-3 125 VDC Charger 3 Energized Energized 118 3-83125-3 125 VDC Battery Bus 3 Energized Energized 119 3-83125-3A 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A Energized Energized 120 3-83125-3A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A-1 Energized Energized 121 3-83125-3B 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B Energized 1

Energized 122 3-83125-3B-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B-1 Energized Energized 123 3-83125-3 Unit 3 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel Energized Energized 129 3-83250-3 250 VDC Battery Available Operating 130 3-83250-3 Unit 3 250 VDC Charger Energized Energized 131 3-83250-3 Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3 Energized Energized 132 3-83250-3A Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3A Energized Energized 133 3-83250-3B Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 38 Energized Energized 155 3-0903-49 ESS Bus PANEL 120/240 VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

156 3-0903-63 ESS Uninterruptible Power Supply and Static Switch Energized Energized 157 3-0903-50 Instrument Bus Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

158 3-0640-29A 3A RPV NR LVL Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

159 3-0646A U3 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Energized Energized Level Transmitter for 3-0640-29A 160 3-0263-156 U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

161 3-0263-152A U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Pressure Transmitter for 3-0263-156 162 3-2203-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 3-263-152A &

3-0646-A is located on.

Available Available 163 3-8540-2/4 U3 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS

& M-U FLOW Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

Page 51 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-115-14-297 Item #

ESEL,

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 164 3-1625 U3 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Energized Pressure Transmitter for 3-8540-Energized 2/4 165 3-1602-3 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Torus Level indicator in Main Energized Control Room.

166 3-1626 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Energized

Level Transmitter for 3-1602-3 167 3-1640-200 U3 TORUS TEMP MON Energized Recorder will be used to monitor Torus Temperature. Power supplied via terminal block in Energized cabinet 3-2203-70A. (No active i components for this function in 3-2203-70A) 168 3-0903-36 Main Control Room Panel PANEL IRM/SRM Available Panel contains the Torus Available Temperature Recorder.

169 3-1340-2 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Energized Isolation Condenser Shell-side Energized Level indicator.

170 3-1341 U3 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Energized Transmitter for Isolation Energized Condenser Shell-side Level Contains RPV level and pressure Available

indicators 171 3-0903-5 Main Control Room Panel Available 172 Not Used 173 3-1549-B U3 LPCI LOOP II MAIN SUPPLY HDR Energized Flow Transmitter for LPCI line which will measure the primary Energized FLEX pump flow. (Flow Recorder3-1540-7 on 903-3, ROB) 174 3-2203-19B INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Available Rack that FT 3-1549-B is mounted Available on.

183 3-0202-4A 3A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Open Motor Operated Valve is to be Closed

closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

184 3-0202-5A 3A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

185 3-0202-4B 3B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

186 3-0202-5B 3B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

Page 52 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 187 3-0903-4 Main Control Room Panel PANEL SHUTDOWN HO COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Available Panel contains control switches Available

for the Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

188 3-7339 Bus 39 Energized Main bus for distribution from Energized FLEX Generator 189 3-7838-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-7 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

MCC that powers the "B" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

190 3-7839-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 39-7 Energized Energized 197 3-1103 3-1103 UNIT 3 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Available Available

Passive Component 198 3-1102-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP De-energized Energized 199 3-1107-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Available Available

Passive Component 200 3-1106-A 3A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV De-energized Energized 201 3-7838-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-1 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" SBLC pump and Squib Valve.

202 Not Used 219 3-0903-18 Panel 903-18 Energized Energized Added for reactor level instrumentation 220 3-0903-19 Panel 903-19 Energized Added for Drywell Pressure Energized Instrument Power Source 221 3-0903-32 Panel 903-32 Energized Energized

Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 222 3-1503A Containment Cooling Hx Available Available

Added for pressure boundary 223 3-1503B Containment Cooling Hx Available Available

Added for pressure boundary 224 3-2203-70B Panel 2203-70B Available Available

Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 225 3-2203-73A Panel 2203-73A Energized Added for Reactor Pressure Energized Instrumentation 226 3-2203-73B Panel 2203-73B Energized Added for Torus Level Energized Instrumentation 227 3-7839-2 Motor Control Center 39-2 Energized Added MCC to provide power to Energized 125V DC battery charger Page 53 of 89

ID Description Equipment

ESEL, Item #

Notes/Comments Operating State Normal

Desired State

State 228 3-7838-2 Energized Energized Motor Control Center 38-2 Added MCC to provide power to 250V DC battery charger and 120V AC instrument bus on 3-0903-50 Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Page 54 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Attachment C - DNPS Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation Page 55 of 89

Report 14Q,4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 1

2-1501-22A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

2 2-1501-20B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST INB MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

3 2-1501-38B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

4 2-1501-32B U2 LPCI LOOP I AND ll X-TIE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

5 2-1501-21A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ OTBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

11 2-2301-3 U2 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

12 2-2301-64 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

13 2-2301-65 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

14 2-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

15 2-2301-CV1 HPCI Turbine Control Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

16 2-2301 HPCI Turbine Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

17 2-2301-6 U2 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

18 2-2301-35 U2 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

19 2-2301-36 U2 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

20 2-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 56 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 21 2-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP; HPCI Speed Reducer Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Gear Unit included with main HPCI Pump 2-2302. Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

Gear Unit screened with Pump 2-2302.

22 2-2302 HPCI Main Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

23 2-2301-14 U2 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

24 2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

25 2-2301-48 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

26 2-2301-49 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

27 2-2303-AOP HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. The small vertical pump measures approximately 13" in diameter and 27" tall. Pump is anchored to skid using five approximately 5/8" bolts steel to steel bolts. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

29 2-2303-TG HPCI Turning Gear Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

R.O.B. with 2-2301 turbine, see parent.

30 2-2320-GSLO Gland Seal Leakoff Drain Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Very small pump, anchored to the floor using four anchor bolts. Anchorage screened for RLGM.

31 2-2320-GSEF HPCI Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust Fan Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Fan casing measures approximately 18" in diameter and approximately 20" in length. Bolted to a plate that is welded on top of 2-2320-GSC using four 3/8" bolts. Unit likely weighs no more than 150 lbs. Anchorage is screened for RLGM.

Page 57 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 32 2-2303-MSC Motor Speed Charger Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Speed Charger included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Speed Charger is adequately supported for the RLGM.

33 2-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Gear Unit included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

34 2-2386 HPCI Turb Signal Converter Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small panel measures 42" tall, 30" wide, and 12" deep. Panel is anchored to wall using four 3/8" anchor bolts, one in each corner.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

35 2-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

36 2-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Lube oil cooler is 10' long and 1' in diameter.

Equipment has three straps around it, two that are welded to the side of the skid and one that is on a plate embedded into the concrete longitudinally supported by a lug.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

37 2-2320-GSC Gland Seal Leakoff Condenser Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small condenser, located under grating, is mounted on two short piers (2.375" high) that are 3' apart. It is anchored through the piers into the concrete floor by two 3/4" anchors per pier. The anchor bolts, grout-in-place type, are embedded into the concrete slab a distance of 18" and the anchor's core hole is filled with bonding compound. Anchorage screened for RLGM.

38 2-2202-28 INSTRUMENT RACK ISO COND AND HPCI FLOW INDICATION Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 58 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 39 2-2202-29 Instrument Rack Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

40 2-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK; Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HGA11JG52G Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.63g in Calculation 1404237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

41 2-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-33. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A9H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

42 2-2330-1256 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

43 2-2330-126 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

44 2-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Turbine Trip relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

Page 59 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 45 2-0902-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

46 2-0902-3 PANEL REACTOR

+

CONTAINMENT COOLING Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

47 2-0902-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY ESS 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

85 2-1302 Isolation Condenser assembly Anchorage 0.369g Screened based on specific HCLPF analysis for this large Horizontal tank. The HCLPF value is governed by the capacity of the anchor bolts attaching the saddle to the pedestal, and has a value of 0.369g as indicated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-004.

86 2-1301-3 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET !SOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Valve on large bore line with very rugged yoke. Screens based on similar valves evaluated.

87 2-1301-10 U2 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

30" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

88 2-1301-17 U2 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Noted that the yoke is independently supported, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure. Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides.

Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

Page 60 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 89 2-1301-20 U2 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Noted that the yoke is independently supported, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure. Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides.

Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

90 2-4399-74 U2 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

28" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Noted that it is a small Limitorque SMB000 operator) with a maximum weight =

160 lbs. (including hand wheel) < 200 lbs.

limitation. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

91 2-0595-115A RELAY ISO COND Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-40. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

92 2-0595-115B RELAY ISO COND Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-41. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

Page 61 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 93 2-0595-116A RELAY ISO COND Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-40. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 140.4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

94 2-0595-116B RELAY ISO COND OUTBOARD VALVE CONTROL Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-41. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

95 2-0902-40 PANEL PCIS RELAYS INBOARD PCIS 1 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the HCLPF performed for 3-0903-41 which is a similar panel with similar anchorage. The HCLPF in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 was shown to be > RLGM without considering the top anchorage.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 3.34g and therefore did not control capacity.

96 2-0902-41 PANEL PCIS RELAYS OUTBOARD PCIS 2

Anchorage 0.392g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the HCLPF performed for 3-0903-41 which is a similar panel with similar anchorage. The HCLPF in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 was shown to be 0.392g for anchorage without considering the top anchorage.

109 2-83125 Batt 125 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 1.11g and therefore did not control capacity..

Page 62 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 110 2-83125 Charg 125 VDC Charger 2 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF for anchorage calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.657g and did not control capacity.

111 2-83125 Bus 125 VDC Battery Bus 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

112 2-83125-2A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 2A-1 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

113 2-83125-2B 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus-2B Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

114 2-83125-2B-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus-2B-1 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

115 2-83125 Dist Unit 2 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz.

The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g <

1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15% overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

Page 63 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 124 2-83250 Batt 250 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 2.68g and therefore did not control capacity..

125 2-83250 Charg Unit 2 250 VDC Charger Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Charger is anchored using four sets of two anchor bolts spaced more than 5" apart, with the exception of the front right set, which are only spaced 4" apart. The current anchorage configuration is deemed by the SRT to be adequate given the high margin for similar equipment item, which has less rigorous anchorage and identical dimensions.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 1.11g and therefore did not control capacity..

126 2-83250 MCC Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 1.11g and therefore did not control capacity..

Page 64 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 127 2-83250-2A Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2A Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz.

The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g <

1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15% overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

128 2-83250-2B Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 28 Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz.

The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g <

1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15% overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

134 2-0902-49 ESS Bus; PANEL 120/240 VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 3.38g and therefore did not control capacity..

Page 65 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 135 2-0902-63 ESS Uninterruptible Power Supply and Static Switch Screened

>RLGM There are two separate components shared by this equipment ID number, a wall-mounted panel and a floor mounted assembly consisting of 3 cabinets. The wall-mounted cabinet has dimensions of 46.5" tall, 13.5" deep, and 28.5" wide.

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Wall mounted portion of 2-0902-63 anchorage screens for RLGM based on low seismic input at EL. 517 (ground spectra) and high margin for other similarly anchored cabinets. Floor mounted cabinet screens due to the robust anchorage and low seismic input.

136 2-0902-50 Instrument Bus Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 140.4237-CAL-002 to be 3.38g and therefore did not control capacity..

137 2-0640-29A 2A RPV NR LVL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

138 2-0646-A U2 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-2202-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-2202-5, see parent.

139 2-2202-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 2-0646-A is located on Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 66 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 140 2-0263-156 U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

141 2-0263-152A U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-2202-78.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-2202-78, see parent.

142 2-2202-78 Instrument Rack that PT 2-0263-152A is located on Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small instrument rack consisting of 4" nominal pipe.

The rack is anchored to the floor with four 5/8" bolts and transmitter 2-0263-152A is bolted to the rack using four 3/8" bolts. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

143 2-8540-2/4 U2 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS &

M-U FLOW Equipment Capacity 0.482g Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

144 2-1625 U2 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter mounted to the wall using four 1/2" expansion anchors. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

145 2-1602-3 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

146 2-1626 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter mounted to a 6" channel using four 1/4" bolts. The channel is then welded to the platform. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 67 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 147 2-1640-200 U2 TORUS TEMP MON Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 2-0902-36.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-36, see parent.

148 2-0902-36 Main Control Room Panel; PANEL IRM/SRM Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

149 2-1340-2 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

150 2-1341 U2 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Equipment Capacity 0.356g Transmitter mounted directly to a wall of rack. Affixed to wall with a 3" channel bolted to the column with two 1/4" bolts cantilevered out from wall 9" and up 7". The equipment is then U-bolted to the 1.5" nominal pipe that extends the 7" up from the 3" channel (pipe welded all around) using two U-bolts.

Transmitter meets GERS caveats that has a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 10g. Taking a high estimate for demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand. HCLPF calculated in 1404237-CAL-002 for the anchorage and was calculated to be 1.116g and did not control the capacity.

151 2-0902-5 Main Control Room Panel Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

153 2-1549-A U2 LPCI LOOP I MAIN SUPPLY HDR Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on rack 2-2202-19A.

Instruments on this rack were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Rack 2-2202-19A, see parent.

Page 68 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 154 2-2202-19A INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

175 2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

176 2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

177 2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

178 2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

179 2-0902-4 Main Control Room Panel; PANEL SHUTDOWN HOW COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

180 2-7329 Bus 29 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.89g and did not control capacity.

181 2-7828-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 140.4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

182 2-7829-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 29-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

191 2-1103 2-1103 UNIT 2 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Screened

>RLGM Tank screened for RLGM based on review of design basis analysis 002316 (CQD) and scaling of the acceptance criteria for the analysis for the applicable failure modes.

Page 69 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 192 2-1102-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small pump anchored using 6 anchor bolts. Very well anchored. Pump will respond rigidly with about a 2g horizontal input based on the RLGM input. Capacity Vs. Demand and Anchorage screens by inspection and engineering judgment, pump is seismically rugged.

193 2-1107-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small accumulator light weight that is U-bolted to the support.

Measured 16" in height and 8" in diameter.

Very well supported, screens by inspection.

194 2-1106-A 2A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small Valve is located on an approximately 2" nominal pipe.

The valve measures 6" in diameter and 15" long.

Capacity Vs. Demand screens by inspection and engineering judgment, valve is seismically rugged.

195 2-7828-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-1 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

207 2-0902-32 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY AUTO BLOWDOWN ESS 1 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

208 2-0902-18 Panel 902-18 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on comparison to existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for similar panels.

209 2-0902-19 PANEL PROCESS INSTRUMENTAT ION Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on comparison to existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for similar panels.

Page 70 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 210 2-1503A 2A CONTAINMENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

211 2-1503B 2B CONTAINMENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

212 2-2202-70B DIV 2 ATWS PANEL 2202-70B Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

213 2-2202-73A PANEL - DIV I ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

214 2-2202-73B PANEL - DIV II ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

215 2-7829-2 Motor Control Center 29-2 Screened

>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane from EPRI NP-6041. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

216 2-7828-2 Motor Control Center 28-2 Screened

>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane from EPRI NP-6041. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation supplemented by the Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 evaluation of the embedded angle.

Page 71 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 217 2-7828-3 Motor Control Center 28-3 Screened

>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane from EPRI NP-6041. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation supplemented by the Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 evaluation of the embedded angle.

218 2/3-5201 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank:

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

Page 72 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Attachment D - DNPS Unit 3 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation Page 73 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 6

3-1501-22B U3 LPCI LOOP II COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

7 3-1501-20A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST INBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

8 3-1501-38A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

9 3-1501-32A U3 LPCI LOOP I AND ll X-TIE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

10 3-1501-21B U3 LPCI LOOP II COOLANT INJ OTBD ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

48 3-2301-3 U3 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

49 3-2301-64 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

50 3-2301-65 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

51 3-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

52 3-2301-CV1 HPCI Turbine Control Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

53 3-2301 HPCI Turbine Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

54 3-2301-6 U3 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

55 3-2301-35 U3 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

56 3-2301-36 U3 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Page 74 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 57 3-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

58 3-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP; HPCI Speed Reducer Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Gear Unit included with main HPCI Pump 2-2302. Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

Gear Unit screened with Pump 3-2302.

59 3-2302 HPCI Main Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

60 3-2301-14 U3 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

61 3-2301-8 U3 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 restrictions for a 0.8g screening lane.

62 3-2301-48 U3HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

63 3-2301-49 U3 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

65 3-2303-AOP Auxiliary Oil Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. The small vertical pump measures approximately 13" in diameter and 27" tall. Pump is anchored to skid using five approximately 5/8" bolts steel to steel bolts. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

66 3-2303-TG Turning Gear Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

R.O.B. with 2-2301 turbine, see parent.

67 3-2320-GSLO HPCI GLAND SEAL LEAK OFF DRAIN PUMP Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Very small pump, anchored to the floor using four anchor bolts. Anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 75 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 68 3-2320-GSEF Gland Seal Exhauster Fan Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Fan casing measures approximately 18" in diameter and approximately 20" in length.

Bolted to a plate that is welded on top of 2-2320-GSC using four 3/8" bolts. Unit likely weighs no more than 150 lbs. Anchorage is screened for RLGM.

69 3-2303-MSC Motor Speed Changer Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Speed Charger included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Speed Charger is adequately supported for the RLGM.

70 3-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Gear Unit included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

71 3-2386 HPCI TURB SIGNAL CONVERTER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small panel measures 42" tall, 30" wide, and 12" deep. Panel is anchored to wall using four 3/8" anchor bolts, one in each corner.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

72 3-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

73 3-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Lube oil cooler is 10' long and 1' in diameter.

Equipment has three straps around it, two that are welded to the side of the skid and one that is on a plate embedded into the concrete longitudinally supported by a lug.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 76 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 74 3-2320-GSC HPCI TURBINE GLAND SEAL CONDENSER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small condenser, located under grating, is mounted on two short piers (2.375" high) that are 3' apart. It is anchored through the piers into the concrete floor by two 3/4" anchors per pier. The anchor bolts, grout-in-place type, are embedded into the concrete slab a distance of 18" and the anchor's core hole is filled with bonding compound.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

75 3-2203-28 Instrument Rack Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

76 3-2203-29 Instrument Rack Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing similar USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

77 3-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK; Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HGA111G52G Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.63g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

78 3-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 3-0903-33. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A9H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

79 3-2330-125B RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

Page 77 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 80 3-2330-126 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

81 3-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Turbine Trip relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

82 3-0903-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

83 3-0903-3 PANEL REACTOR

+ CONTAINMENT COOLING Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

84 3-0903-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

97 3-1302 Isolation Condenser assembly Anchorage 0.369g Screened based on specific HCLPF analysis for this large Horizontal tank. The HCLPF value is governed by the capacity of the anchor bolts attaching the saddle to the pedestal, and has a value of 0.369g as indicated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-004.

98 3-1301-3 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Valve on large bore line with very rugged yoke. Screens based on similar valves evaluated.

Page 78 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 99 3-1301-10 U3 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

30" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

100 3-1301-17 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Valve has a 42" offset, yoke is only supported on one side, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure.

Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

101 3-1301-20 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Valve has a 42" offset, yoke is only supported on one side, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure.

Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

102 3-4399-74 U3 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

28" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Noted that it is a small Limitorque SMB000 operator) with a maximum weight

= 160 lbs. (including hand wheel) < 200 lbs.

limitation. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

Page 79 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 103 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-40. Relay in this 115A panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Equipment 0.482g Capacity GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

104 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-41. Relay in this 115B panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Equipment 0.482g Capacity GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

105 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-40. Relay in this 116A panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Equipment 0.482g Capacity GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

106 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-41. Relay in this 116B OUTBOARD panel were adequately supported for the VALVE CONTROL RLGM.

Equipment Capacity 0.482g GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

107 3-0903-40 PANEL PCIS Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

RELAYS INBOARD Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the PCIS 1 HCLPF performed for 3-0903-41 which is a Anchorage 0.392g similar panel with similar anchorage. The HCLPF in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 for the similar panel was shown to be 0.392g without considering the top anchorage.

Page 80 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 108 3-0903-41 PANEL PCIS RELAYS OUTBOARD PCIS 2

Anchorage 0.392g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. The anchorage HCLPF in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 was shown to be 0.392g without considering the top anchorage.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 3.38g and did not control the capacity.

116 3-83125 Batt 125 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.800g and did not control the capacity.

117 3-83125 Charg 125 VDC Charger 3

Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF for anchorage calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.657g and did not control capacity.

118 3-83125 Bus 125 VDC Battery Bus 3 Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

119 3-83125-3A 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A Equipment Capacity 0 482 g 14Q4237-CAL-002 Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

120 3-83125-3A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A-1 Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

121 3-83125-3B 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B Equipment Capacity 0 482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

122 3-83125-3B-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B-1 Equipment Capacity 0. 482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

Page 81 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 123 3-83125 Dist Unit 3 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations.

Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz. The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g < 1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15%

overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

129 3-83250 Batt 250 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0 482 g

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.871g and did not control capacity.

130 3-83250 Charg Unit 3 VDC Charger Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Charger is anchored using four sets of two anchor bolts spaced more than 5" apart, with the exception of the front right set, which are only spaced 4" apart. The current anchorage configuration is deemed by the SRI to be adequate given the high margin for similar equipment item, which has less rigorous anchorage and identical dimensions.

131 3-83250 MCC Unit 3 VDC MCC 3

Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.765g and did not control capacity.

Page 82 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 132 3-83250-3A Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3A Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations.

Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz. The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g < 1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15%

overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

133 3-83250-3B Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3B Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations.

Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz. The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g < 1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15%

overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

155 3-0903-49 ESS Bus; PANEL 120/240 VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL i

Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Page 83 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 156 3-0903-63 ESS Uninterruptible Power Supply and Static Switch Screened

>RLGM There are two separate components shared by this equipment ID number, a wall-mounted panel and a floor mounted assembly consisting of 3 cabinets. The wall-mounted cabinet has dimensions of 46.5" tall, 13.5" deep, and 28.5" wide.

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Wall mounted portion of 2-0902-63 anchorage screens for RLGM based on low seismic input at EL. 517 (ground spectra) and high margin for other similarly anchored cabinets. Floor mounted cabinet screens due to the robust anchorage and low seismic input.

157 3-0903-50 Instrument Bus Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Noted that there is insufficient spacing to wall behind equipment. However, cabinet does not contain relays required for ESEP and therefore, interaction is judged acceptable.

158 3-0640-29A 3A RPV NR LVL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-5, see parent.

159 3-0646 U3 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-2203-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-2203-5, see parent.

Page 84 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 160 3-0263-156 U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

161 3-0263-152A U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-2203-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-2203-5, see parent.

162 3-2203-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 3-263-152A & 3-0646-A are located on Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

163 3-8540-2/4 U3 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS & M-U FLOW Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

164 3-1625 U3 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter mounted to the wall using four 3/8" expansion anchors. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

165 3-1602-3 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

166 3-1626 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter welded on both sides to the 2" leg of a 6" channel. The channel is then welded to a beam of the platform. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 85 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 167 3-1640-200 U3 TORUS TEMP MON Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 3-0903-36.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-36, see parent.

168 3-0903-36 Main Control Room Pane!;

PANEL IRM/SRM Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

169 3-1340-2 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

170 3-1341 U3 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Equipment Capacity 0.356g Transmitter mounted directly to a wall of rack. Affixed to wall with a 3" channel bolted to the column with two 1/4" bolts cantilevered out from wall 9" and up 7". The equipment is then U-bolted to the 1.5" nominal pipe that extends the 7" up from the 3" channel (pipe welded all around) using two U-bolts.

Transmitter meets GERS caveats that has a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 10g. Taking a high estimate for demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand. HCLPF calculated in 14Q4237-CAL-002 for the anchorage and was calculated to be 1.116g and did not control the capacity.

171 3-0903-5 Main Control Room Panel Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

173 3-1549-B U3 LPCI LOOP II MAIN SUPPLY HDR Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on rack 3-2203-19B.

Instruments on this rack were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Rack 3-2203-19B, see parent.

Page 86 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 174 3-2203-19B INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable similar existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

183 3-0202-4A 3A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

184 3-0202-5A 3A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

185 3-0202-4B 3B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

186 3-0202-5B 3B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

187 3-0903-4 Main Control Room Panel; PANEL SHUTDOWN HO COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

188 3-7339 Bus 39 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable similar USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

189 3-7838-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

190 3-7839-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 39-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

197 3-1103 3-1103 UNIT 3 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Screened

>RLGM Tank screened for RLGM based on review of design basis analysis 002316 (COD) and scaling of the acceptance criteria for the analysis for the applicable failure modes.

Page 87 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 198 3-1102-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small pump anchored using 6 anchor bolts. Very well anchored. Pump will respond rigidly with about a 2g horizontal input based on the RLGM input. Capacity Vs. Demand and Anchorage screens by inspection and engineering judgment, pump is seismically rugged.

199 3-1107-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small accumulator light weight that is U-bolted to the support.

Measured 16" in height and 8" in diameter.

Very well supported, screens by inspection.

200 3-1106-A 3A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small Valve is located on an approximately 2" nominal pipe. The valve measures 6" in diameter and 15" long.

Capacity Vs. Demand screens by inspection and engineering judgment, valve is seismically rugged.

201 3-7838-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-1 Equipment Capacity 0 482 g

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

219 3-0903-18 Panel 903-18 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

220 3-0903-19 PANEL PROCESS INSTRUMENTATI ON Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on comparison to existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for similar panels.

221 3-0903-32 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY AUTO BLOWDOWN ESS 1

Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

222 3-1503A 3A LPCl/CONTAINM ENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

Page 88 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 223 3-1503B 3B LPCl/CONTAINM ENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

224 3-2203-70B PANEL LOCAL ATWS TRIP UNIT LOGIC PL2203-70B Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

225 3-2203-73A PANEL - DIV I ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

226 3-2203-73B PANEL - DIV ll ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

227 3-7839-2 Motor Control Center 39-2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

228 3-7838-2 Motor Control Center 38-2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 89 of 89

A111111W Exelon Generation RS-14-297

10 CFR 50.54(f)

December 26, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville. MD 20852 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

Subject:

Exelon Generation Company, LLC Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)

2. NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Re-evaluations, dated April 9, 2013 (ML13101A379)

3. Seismic Evaluation Guidance: "Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic", EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704 (ML13102A142)

4. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Re-evaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

5. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (RS-14-067), dated March 31, 2014 (ML14091A012)

6. Exelon Generation Company, LLC Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident 1.5 Year Response for CEUS Sites (RS-13-205), dated September 12, 2013 (ML13256A070)

Preparer:

Reviewer:

Approver.

Lead Responsible Engineer:

Branch Manager:

Senior Manager Design Engineering:

Corporate Acceptance:

Signature 12gle 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12.1AJj44$-,

6),As jL t1Ji4.QS Printed Name George G. Thomas Paul R. Wilson Paul R. Wilson Eyed All g

EY,"

Jeffrey S. Clark 9-lap 12 4S /gal' Shin' __1711414001

- MIL I 1,231 20 14 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 60.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC for the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, Illinois 60450-9765 Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 NRC Docket No. 50-237, 50-249 Correspondence No.: DRE-RS-14-297 Exelon Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 6611 Rockside Road, Suite 100 Independence, OH 44131-2344 Report Number: 14Q4237-RPT-004, Rev. 3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NTTF 2.1 Seismic Response for CEUS Sites December 26, 2014 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 50.54(f) letter to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.

In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of the final CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop that information. NEI proposed that descriptions of subsurface materials and properties and base case velocity profiles be submitted to the NRC by September 12, 2013, (Reference 6), with the remaining seismic hazard and screening information submitted by March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). NRC agreed with that proposed path forward in Reference 4.

Reference 1 requested that licensees provide interim evaluations and actions taken or planned to address the higher seismic hazard relative to the design basis, as appropriate, prior to completion of the risk evaluation. In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance in Reference 3, the enclosed Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 provides the information described in the "ESEP Report" Section 7, of Reference 3 in accordance with the schedule identified in Reference 2.

All equipment evaluated for the ESEP for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 was found to have adequate capacity for the required seismic demand as defined by the Augmented Approach (ESEP) guidance (Reference 3). Therefore, no equipment modifications are required.

This ESEP report transmittal completes regulatory Commitment No. 3 of Reference 5.

No new regulatory commitments result from this transmittal.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at (630) 657-3359.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 26th day of December 2014.

Respectfully submitted, Ronald W. Gaston Manager - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NTTF 2.1 Seismic Response for CEUS Sites December 26, 2014 Page 3 cc:

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Regional Administrator - NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden Station NRC Project Manager, NRR - Dresden Station Mr. Nicholas J. DiFrancesco, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety

Enclosure Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (89 pages)

Preparer:

Reviewer:

Approver Lead Responsible Engineer:

Branch Manager:

Senior Manager Design Engineering:

Corporate Acceptance:

Printed Name George G. Thomas Paul R. Wilson Paul R. Wilson Sionature GALL

1.414:4Pm-d TsetALL 1z.141;144; Date 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 0-4 Jae('

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.M4_1423120 itiat./C giatUfg Jeffrey S. Clark Eyed Ali EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(0 INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC for the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, Illinois 60450-9766 Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 NRC Docket No. 50-237, 50-249 Correspondence No.: DRE-RS-14-297

..mor Exelon Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 6611 Rockside Road, Suite 100 Independence, OH 44131-2344 Report Number: 14Q4237-RPT-004, Rev. 3

Document

Title:

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 2 & 3 Report Number: 14Q4239-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Project Name: Exelon ESEP for Dresden Job No.: 14Q4237

/NW Exelon This document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 17 and project requirements:

Rev. 0 (Initial Issue)

Prepared by: George G. Thomas

'- 3. ;1"1>-----

Date: 12/05/2014 Reviewed by: Dan Lavarnway Date: 12/05/2014 Approved by: Paul R. Wilson

6) awe-R- ttai-0-1 Date: 12/05/2014 Revision Record:

Revision No.

Prepared by/

Date Reviewed by/

Date Approved by/

Date Description of Revision 1

George G.

Thomas

.'""-t

Y '

I*1:___

12/12/2014 Dan Lavarnway 12/12/2014 Paul R. Wilson 12/12/2014 Incorporated Client Comments 2

George G.

Thomas 12/18/2014

-1

,-%;- --,.:L _

Dan Lavarnway 12/18/2014 Paul R. Wilson 12/18/2014 ewi it

&o-Corrected Component Descriptions for five components per Client Comments 3

George G.

Thomas 12/22/2014 Paul R. Wilson 12/22/2014 paujI

ez.14.1.:11.44,,J Paul R. Wilson 12/22/2014 6)ws 02. ta:Low Incorporated Client Comments p_ A OC.

Stevenson & Associates DOCUMENT APPROVAL SHEET CONTRACT NO.

14Q4237 Page 2 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0

Purpose and Objective

6 2.0

Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies

7 3.0

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL

11 3.1

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL

11 3.1.1

ESEL Development

12 3.1.2

Power Operated Valves

13 3.1.3

Pull Boxes

14 3.1.4

Termination Cabinets

14 3.1.5

Critical Instrumentation Indicators

14 3.1.6

Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections

15 3.2

Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX implementation

15 4.0

Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)

16 4.1

Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee

16 4.2

Comparison to SSE

17 5.0

Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)

19 5.1

Description of RLGM selected

19 5.2

Method to Estimate ISRS

21 6.0

Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach

22 6.1

Summary of Methodologies Used

22 6.2

HCLPF Screening Process

23 6.3

Seismic Walkdown Approach

23 6.3.1

Walkdown approach

23 6.3.2

Application of Previous Walkdown Information

25 6.3.3

Significant Walkdown Findings

25 6.4

HCLPF Calculation Process

26 6.5

Functional Evaluation of Relays

28 6.6

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (including Key Failure Modes)

28 7.0

Inaccessible Items

30 Page 3 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 7.1

Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns

30 7.2

Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out

31 8.0

ESEP Conclusions and Results

32 8.1

Supporting Information

32 8.2

Identification of Planned Modifications

33 8.3

Modification Implementation Schedule

33 8.4

Summary of Regulatory Commitments

33 9.0

References

34 Attachment A - DNPS Unit 2 ESEL

38 Attachment B - DNPS Unit 3 ESEL

47 Attachment C - DNPS Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation

55 Attachment D - DNPS Unit 3 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation

73 Page 4 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 LIST OF TABLES Table 3-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEP

13 Table 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping)

16 Table 4-2: DNPS GMRS and SSE Between 1-10 Hz (5% Damping)

18 Table 5-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (5% Damping)

19 Table 5-2: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping)

20 Table 6-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio

27 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping)

17 Figure 4-2: DNPS GMRS to SSE Comparison (5% Damping)

18 Figure 5-1: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping)

21 Page 5 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 1.0

Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 & 3. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable the NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

Page 6 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 2.0

Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The DNPS Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) response strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control, Containment Function and Spent Fuel Pool Control are summarized below. This summary is derived from the Dresden Overall Integrated Plan (01P) including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 in Response to the March 12, 2012, NRC Order EA-12 049 [3]:

Phase 1 strategies Phase 1 strategies rely on installed plant systems. Phase 1 is expected to last approximately 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> from event initiation.

RPV PRESSURE CONTROL As described in the DNPS UFSAR, Section 5.4.6. [21], the Isolation Condenser (IC) provides Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure control and core cooling in the event that the reactor becomes isolated from the turbine and the main condenser. Steam flow from the reactor condenses in the tubes of the heat exchanger and returns by gravity to the reactor in a closed loop. The differential water head, created when the steam is condensed, serves as the driving force. Shell side water is boiled and vented to atmosphere outside the Reactor Building. Per the UFSAR (Reference 21, Section 5.4.6.3), the Isolation Condenser will operate approximately 20 minutes without initiation of shell-side makeup. In Phase 1 there are no shell side makeup sources that meet requirements for FLEX qualification. Therefore, the Isolation Condenser must be secured within 20 minutes of initiation to prevent operation with inadequate shell-side level.

Operation of the High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) System also removes heat from the RPV. This heat removal will be used to maintain RPV pressure after the Isolation Condenser is secured.

RPV INVENTORY CONTROL Phase 1 reactor water level control would be accomplished using the HPCI System with pump suction from the Torus. Operation of the HPCI Turbine will result in a heat input to the Torus. There is no current method to remove heat from the Torus when AC power is not available. With continuous HPCI operation, analysis indicates Torus temperature reaches 140°F approximately 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after event initiation. The DNPS UFSAR [21],

Section 6.3.2.3, identifies continued operation of HPCI above a Torus temperature of 140°F is not permitted for continued operability based on hydraulic/lube oil heat exchanger performance and pump net positive suction head.

Page 7 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Key Reactor Parameters are obtained via DC powered instrumentation. A DC load stripping strategy is employed to extend battery life for continued HPCI operation. No specific Containment control is required in Phase 1 as both temperature and pressure stay within design limits for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the event. Key Containment Parameters are obtained from DC powered instrumentation. No specific Spent Fuel Pool control is required in Phase 1 as the temperature remains less than 212°F for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the Unit operating and 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> during refueling operations. Spent Fuel Pool level is obtained from the new Spent Fuel Pool wide range instrumentation installed under order EA-12-051 [22].

Phase 2 strategies.

Phase 2 commences when shell-side makeup is available to the Isolation Condenser from a FLEX pump. DNPS will utilize pre-staged/portable equipment to provide shell-side makeup to the IC prior to the loss of HPCI as an RPV Pressure Control mechanism. Utilization of the IC as the RPV Pressure Control mechanism will significantly reduce RPV inventory loss/Torus heat addition.

The conceptual design uses FLEX pumps located in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) corner rooms or the Torus Basement near the Torus to take suction from the Torus and discharge into existing LPCI discharge piping. New connections will be installed on LPCI discharge piping that allow connection of temporary hoses to the IC makeup line. The IC makeup line will be used as a distribution header to supply water to the Isolation Condensers, Standby Liquid Control (SBLC)/RPV makeup and the Spent Fuel Pools for both Unit 2 and Unit 3. The use of the water in both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Torus, sequentially, will allow for approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of makeup capability. The FLEX pumps will be powered by a portable FLEX generator using temporary cables.

Upon determination of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE) and Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) event Operators will connect the suction of one primary FLEX pump to the FLEX connection of a LPCI pump. The FLEX pump discharge will be connected to a FLEX connection on the discharge side of the LPCI pumps in the corner room. Another hose will be utilized to connect a FLEX connection on the common LPCI discharge header to a FLEX connection on the common Isolation Condenser Makeup piping located on Elevation 517 feet.

The FLEX pump would be started to pressurize the IC Makeup piping. From the IC Makeup piping, water is available to both Isolation Condensers through installed piping and valves.

Temporary hoses will be connected to the IC Makeup header and routed to open hatches on top of each Unit's SBLC tank. The SBLC system will be used as a high pressure makeup source to the RPV. The makeup to the SBLC tank provides long term makeup to the system. Other hoses will be routed from the IC Makeup header to each Unit's Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System piping for makeup to the Spent Fuel Pools.

Page 8 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Once the first FLEX pump is operating, station personnel will begin aligning the other primary FLEX pump. When the initial Torus is drawn down to the minimum level, personnel will start the 2nd primary FLEX pump to begin utilizing water from the Other Unit'sTorus.

Approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of makeup is available utilizing the Torus inventory from both Units.

During the time FLEX pumps are using Torus inventory for FLEX makeup needs Station personnel will begin deployment of a hydraulic submersible pump into the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) for long term makeup. The hydraulic submersible pump and associated diesel driven hydraulic unit will be transported from a robust structure (a structure that meets ESEP design requirements for storage) inside the Protected Area to a location near the UHS.

Personnel will connect a discharge hose to the pump and lower the pump into the UHS using a small mobile crane also stored in the robust structure. Temporary hoses will be routed from the submersible pump to the Unit 2 Reactor Building along the Protected Area access road. The hose will be connected to a FLEX connection on the LPCI header for one of the LPCI subsystems. The LPCI crosstie line on that Unit will be closed to isolate the desired LPCI subsystem. When the submersible pump is started, valves on the associated LPCI subsystem will be opened to direct water into the Torus. The FLEX pump on that Unit will continue to operate with makeup to the Torus being supplied from the submersible pump. This arrangement allows water from the UHS to be strained through the ECCS Suction Strainers prior to utilization for FLEX makeup needs.

Power to FLEX Pumps One trailer mounted 800 kW portable generator will be staged in a robust structure outside the south side of the Reactor Building. This generator will be sized to supply all FLEX loads for both Units. Temporary cabling will be deployed from the generator robust structure to the reactor building to power the FLEX pumps. There will be multiple connection points available to ensure connections can be made to power the required loads. The connection panel in the FLEX generator enclosure will be compatible with RRC supplied equipment. Running the portable generator at its staged location in the robust structure will allow quicker availability of FLEX pumps to meet the 2.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> time critical action. The robust structure will accommodate the diesel generator requirements to run appropriately while inside the enclosure.

Power to 480 VAC Busses The 480 VAC safety related busses (2-7329 for Unit 2 and 3-7339 for Unit 3) will also be capable of being energized from the 800 kW FLEX generator using separate flexible cables. The flexible cables will be stored on reels/carts located near the 480 VAC safety related busses and other locations as required. Additional flexible cables may be stored on portable carts if needed. Connection to the busses will be made using modified Page 9 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 breakers that can be racked into empty cubicles on either safety related bus on a specific unit. The opposite division safety related bus can then be energized using the installed bus cross-connect mechanism. When the busses are energized, power will be available for the following actions: close AC valves to isolate the Recirculation System Loops to significantly reduce RPV leakage, the SBLC pumps will be available for high pressure RPV injection, the 125/250VDC battery chargers will be available for vital plant systems, and the Instrument Bus will be available to power vital plant instruments.

Key Reactor Parameters are initially obtained via DC powered instrumentation and additional instrumentation becomes available when AC power is available from the FLEX generator. A DC load stripping strategy is employed to extend battery life. No specific Containment control is required in Phase 2 as both temperature and pressure stay within design limits for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the event. Key Containment Parameters are initially obtained from DC powered instrumentation and additional instrumentation becomes available when AC power is available from the FLEX generator. Spent Fuel Pool level is obtained from the new Spent Fuel Pool wide range instrumentation installed under order EA-12-051 [22].

Phase 3 strategies.

Phase 1 and 2 strategies will provide sufficient capability and no additional Phase 3 strategies are required. However, Phase 3 support will be employed to provide backup equipment and consumable supplies. Phase 3 support for DNPS includes backup portable pumps, generators and consumable supplies.

Page 10 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 3.0

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].The ESEL for Unit 2 & 3 is presented in Attachment A and B, respectively.

3.1

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the DNPS Overall Integrated Plan (01P) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3]. The 01P provides the DNPS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of Core Cooling and Containment integrity consistent with the DNPS OIP including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support Core Cooling, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory control, Containment integrity, and required plant monitoring parameters. The DNPS FLEX plan only includes permanently installed FLEX equipment and therefore, this equipment is included on the ESEL.

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

1. The scope of components is limited to those required to accomplish the Core Cooling and Containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for Core Cooling/Containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the DNPS 01P including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the DNPS 01P including all 6 month FLEX updates through August 2014 [3] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e.,

either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

Page 11 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:

• Structures (e.g. Containment, Reactor Building, Turbine Building, etc.)

. Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

• Manual valves and rupture disks.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

. Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components (e.g. reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the DNPS 01P [3] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. The Reference 20 report validated the ESEL to the DNPS 01P through the February 2014 update [3.1, 3.2, 3.3]. It was confirmed by DNPS review [25] that the ESEL was also consistent with the August 2014 [3.4] FLEX update. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc., as necessary.

The flow paths credited for the DNPS ESEP are shown in Table 3-1.

Page 12 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Table 3-1: Flow Paths Credited for ESEP Flow Path 7

FLEX Drawing P&IDs Unit 2 Unit 3 Steam from Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to Isolation Condenser and Condensate from Isolation Condenser back to RPV Not Applicable M-28 [24.1]

M-32 [24.19]

M-26, Sh. 2 [24.12]

M-359 [24.6]

M-363 [24.14]

M-357, Sh. 2 [24.20]

Isolation Condenser Shell Side Make-Up from FLEX Connectionl and Shell Side Steam Vent to Atmosphere

[3.3] &

[3.4]

M-28 [24.1]

M-4203 [24.15]

M-39 [24.13]

M-359 [24.6]

M-4203 [24.15]

M-369 [24.16]

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) from Torus to Reactor Pressure Vessel via HPCI Pump (for Core Heat Removal)

Not Applicable M-51 [24.21]

M-14 [24.22]

M-46, Sh. 1 [24.8]

M-46, Sh. 2 [24.9]

M-46, Sh. 3 [24.10]

M-374 [24.7]

M-347 [24.23]

M-46, Sh. 1 [24.8]

M-46, Sh. 2 [24.9]

M-46, Sh. 3 [24.10]

High Pressure Reactor Coolant Make-Up from Standby Liquid Control Tank to RPV Not Applicable M-33 [24.3]

M-26, Sh. 1 [24.11]

M-364 [24.24]

M-357, Sh. 1 [24.4]

Low Pressure Reactor Coolant Make-Up from FLEX Pump2 powered by a portable FLEX Diesel Generator to RPV, SFP, ISCO3

[3.3] &

[3.4]

M-29, Sh. 1 [24.2]

M-361, Sh. 1 [24.17]

Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Isolation from Recirculation System Not Applicable M-26, Sh. 2 [24.12]

M-357, Sh. 2 [24.20]

Fuel Oil from the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank.

Not Applicable M-41, Sh. 2 [24.18]

3.1.2 Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that "functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g. RCIC/AFW trips)."To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the DNPS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power operated valves:

' Flex Pump Provides make-up from either unit's Torus to either unit's Isolation Condenser shell side, Spent Fuel Pool, and Reactor Pressure Vessel [3.3], [3.4].

2 The FLEX Pump suction is upstream of the LCPI Pump and the discharge is downstream of the LPCI Pump on both sub-systems for each unit [3.3], [3.4].

3 Portable Diesel Driven Pumps Provide Make-up from the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) to either Units Torus providing continuous supply to the FLEX Pumps [3.3], [3.4].

Page 13 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

. Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves), were included on the ESEL.

• Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Instruments identified to monitor parameters critical to control of elements of the FLEX Strategy

[3.1, 3.2, 3.3] are included in the ESEL. Only instruments critical to control and decision-making were included. Instruments that only indicate the success of the strategy (and not used for control or decision-making) were excluded from ESEP. For each of the included instruments, flow diagrams were reviewed as applicable to confirm the transmitter is within an established FLEX flow path. Elementary diagrams were reviewed to establish the signal path between the instrument transmitter and the credited indicator. The transmitter, indicator and any signal conditioning components, as well as power supplies used to power all the components necessary to the signal path were identified. For each of these items either the component itself or the instrumentation cabinet containing it was included in the ESEL. Instrument loops for the following parameters were included in the ESEL:

Page 14 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

• Reactor Coolant Pressure Indication

• Reactor Coolant Level Indication

• Drywell Pressure Indication

• Torus Level Indication

• Torus Temperature Indication

• Isolation Condenser Shell-Side Level Indication

• Low Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Indication

• Low Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Indication 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the DNPS 01P [3] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate")."

Item 6 in Section 3 goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in the FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.

3.2

Justification for use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX implementation All equipment used for FLEX implementation on the DNPS ESEL are the primary path.

Page 15 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-R5-14-297 4.0

Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1

Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee As discussed in the DNPS March Submittal [4], Dresden was designed and constructed before the concept of control point was defined, and the UFSAR [21] does not provide specific definition of the SSE control point. The SPID [14] guidance in Section 2.4.2 recommends for rock sites to define the control point at the top of the rock. Therefore, the control point was defined as elevation 515 feet MSL, which is the approximate top of the bedrock in the vicinity of the main power block. This elevation is used for comparison to the GMRS. The UFSAR [21],

states that the site SSE is anchored to a PGA of 0.2g.

The GMRS, taken from the DNPS March submittal report [4], is shown in Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1.

Table 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g) 0.1 1.37E-02 0.125 1.72E-02 0.15 2.06E-02 0.2 2.75E-02 0.25 3.43E-02 0.3 4.12E-02 0.35 4.81E-02 0.4 5.49E-02 0.5 6.87E-02 0.6 7.82E-02 0.7 8.78E-02 0.8 9.71E-02 0.9 0.103 1

0.108 1.25 0.122 1.5 0.128 2

0.141 2.5 0.152 3

0.186 3.5 0.227 4

0.266 5

0.343 6

0.389 7

0.431 8

0.465 Page 16 of 89

./

1

dka Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g) 9 0.499 10 0.534 12.5 0.577 15 0.587 20 0.577 25 0.504 30 0.422 35 0.369 40 0.338 50 0.296 60 0.269 70 0.257 80 0.251 90 0.248 100 0.246

• GMRS 0.6 0.5 u--3 0.4 0.3

`C 0.2 0.1 0.1

1

10

100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-1: DNPS GMRS (5% Damping) 4.2

Comparison to SSE As identified in the DNPS March submittal report [4], the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1-10Hz range. A comparison of the GMRS to the SSE between 1-10Hz is shown in Table 4-2 and Figure 4-2.

Page 17 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Table 4-2: DNPS GMRS and SSE Between 1-10 Hz (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g)

Horizontal SSE (g) 1 0.108 0.200 1.25 0.122 0.220 1.5 0.128 0.253 2

0.141 0.290 2.5 0.152 0.310 3

0.186 0.321 3.5 0.227 0.329 4

0.266 0.332 5

0.343 0.330 6

0.389 0.324 7

0.431 0.318 8

0.465 0.312 9

0.499 0.306 10 0.534 0.300 0.6 0.5 0.4 01 Frequency (Hz)

- GMRS

SSE Figure 4-2: DNPS GMRS to SSE Comparison (5% Damping) 10 Page 18 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 5.0

Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1

Description of RLGM selected The RLGM for DNPS was determined in accordance with Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] by linearly scaling the DNPS SSE by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio between the 1 and 10Hz range. This calculation is shown in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

GMRS (unscaled, g)

Horizontal SSE (g)

GMRS/SSE 1

0.108 0.200 0.54 1.25 0.122 0.220 0.55 1.5 0.128 0.253 0.51 2

0.141 0.290 0.49 2.5 0.152 0.310 0.49 3

0.186 0.321 0.58 3.5 0.227 0.329 0.69 4

0.266 0.332 0.80 5

0.343 0.330 1.04 6

0.389 0.324 1.20 7

0.431 0.318 1.36 8

0.465 0.312 1.49 9

0.499 0.306 1.63 10 0.534 0.300 1.78 As shown above, the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio occurs at 10 Hz and equals 1.78.

The resulting 5% damped RLGM, based on scaling the horizontal SSE by the GMRS/SSE ratio of 1.78, is shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-2. Note that the RLGM PGA is 0.356g.

Page 19 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Table 5-2: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz)

RLGM (g) 1.14 0.356 1.25 0.392 1.43 0.438 1.67 0.481 2.00 0.516 2.50 0.552 3.33 0.584 4.00 0.591 4.44 0.591 5.00 0.587 6.67 0.570 10.0 0.534 11.1 0.520 12.5 0.506 14.3 0.491 16.7 0.473 20.0 0.456 25.0 0.438 28.6 0.427 33.3 0.417 40.0 0.402 50.0 0.388 66.7 0.374 100 0.356 Page 20 of 89

0.6 0.5

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Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

• RLGM (g) 100 Figure 5-1: DNPS RLGM (5% Damping) 5.2

Method to Estimate ISRS The method used to derive the ESEP in-structure response spectra (ISRS) was to uniformly scale existing SSE-based ISRS from Structural Criteria Document TDBD-DQ-1 [17] by the maximum GMRS/SSE ratio from Table 5-1 of 1.78. Existing ISRS were the same as those used for the USI A-46 program. Scaled ISRS are calculated for all buildings and elevations where ESEL items are located at DNPS. These scaled ISRS were used as the basis for screening and for the High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations 14Q4237-CAL-002, 14Q4239-CAL-003, and 14Q4239-CAL-004 [10].

Page 21 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 6.0

Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the highest peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a particular spectral shape, in this case the 5%

damped RLGM spectral shape. The calculated HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA (0.356g from Table 5-2). The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1.

Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041 [7].

2.

Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959 [8].

The deterministic approach using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041 [7] was used for DNPS to determine HCLPF capacities.

6.1

Summary of Methodologies Used DNPS performed a Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) in 1997. The SMA is documented in the DNPS IPEEE report [9] and consisted of screening walkdowns and HCLPF anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041 [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by trained engineers that successfully completed the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The majority of these engineers were also trained in using EPRI NP-6041 (the engineers attended the EPRI SMA Add-On course). The walkdown results were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) that are included in the Reference 11 report. Anchorage capacity calculations used the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041[7].

DNPS conservatively applied the methodology of EPRI NP-6041 [7] to all items on the ESEL for the ESEP. The performed screening used Table 2-4 from EPRI NP-6041 [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers who, as a minimum, have attended the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course. The walkdowns were documented in SEWS from EPRI NP-6041 [7]. Anchorage capacity calculations use the CDFM criteria established within EPRI NP-6041 [7] with DNPS specific allowables and material strengths used as applicable. The input seismic demand used was the RLGM shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1.

Page 22 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 6.2

HCLPF Screening Process From Table 5-2, the spectral peak of the RLGM for DNPS equals 0.591g. Screening lanes 1 and 2 in Table 2-4 of NP-6041 [7] are bounded by peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g, respectively. Both lane limits exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration. ESEL components were screened to lane 1 of Table 2-4 in NP-6041 [7].

The DNPS Unit 2 and Unit 3 ESEL contain 114 items and 108 items respectively [20]. It is noted that the highest number designation is 228. There were 6 number designations not used:

28, 64, 152, 172, 196 and 202. Of the ESEL items, 27 and 27 are valves for Unit 2 and 3 respectively, both power-operated and air operated. Note that the difference in the number of ESEL components between the units is that the shared new FLEX equipment and the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank are all included on the Unit 2 ESEL. In accordance with Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041 [7], active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g (relative to the spectral peak) only requiring a review of valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping. Note that anchorage is not a failure mode. Valves on the ESEL may be screened out, subject to the caveat regarding large extended operators on small diameter piping. The non-valve components in the ESEL were evaluated to the remaining EPRI NP-6041 Table 2-4 [7]

screening caveats, as applicable.

6.3

Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.3.1 Walkdown approach Walkdowns for the DNPS were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041 [7] for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pg. 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041 [7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria:

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

Page 23 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI4

[Seismic Interaction] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection.

The DNPS walkdowns included, as a minimum, a 100% walk-by of all "existing" items on the DNPS ESEL except as noted in Section 7.0. Note that "new" items on the DNPS ESEL represent new permanently installed equipment that was not installed at the time of the walkdowns. These items are being installed to meet the RLGM input. Previous walkdown 4 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [14].".

Page 24 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 information that was relied upon as the basis for SRT judgment in excluding an item walkdown is documented in Section 6.3.2.

6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information The seismic walkdowns for DNPS included, as a minimum, a walk-by of all the components on the ESEL by the SRT with the following exceptions:

• ESEL Item # 24 2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR

• ESEL Item #175 2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV) 9 ESEL Item #176 2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

• ESEL Item #177 2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

• ESEL Item #178 2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

• ESEL Item #213 2/3-5201 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank A detailed discussion and resolution for the items listed above is provided in Section 7.0. All non-energized cabinets were opened when specialized tools were not needed to operate the cabinet doors. Photos were taken during the walkdowns. In general the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 walkdowns for DNPS [15] and [18] were not used but were available for reference. The existing calculations and SEWS from the USI A-46 evaluation of DNPS [16]

were utilized to aid the SRT in their screening decisions as indicated in Attachments C and D of this report. A walk by was performed to confirm that the equipment material condition and configuration is consistent with the walkdown conclusions and that no new significant interactions related to block walls or piping attached to tanks exist5. The results of the walkdowns, screenings and subsequent evaluations are included in the Reference 11 report.

6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with that guidance from NP-6041 [7], no significant outliers or anchorage concerns were identified during the DNPS ESEP walkdowns. The following finding was noted during the walkdowns:

• Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. These block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLGM. For any cases where the block wall represented the HCLPF 5 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15].

Page 25 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 failure mode for an ESEL item, it is noted in the tabulated HCLPF values described in Section 6.6 and shown in Attachments C & D.

6.4

HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041 [7]. Those evaluations included the following steps:

• Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions.

• Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041 [7] as described in Section 6.2.

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural (e.g. anchorage, load path etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in DNPS calculations 14Q4239-CAL-002, 14Q4239-CAL-003, and 14Q4239-CAL-004 [10].

Anchorage configurations for non-valve components were evaluated either by SRT judgment, large margins in existing design basis calculations, or CDFM based HCLPF calculations [10].

The results of these analysis methods are documented in Attachment C and D for DNPS Unit 2 and 3 respectively. For components beyond 40 feet above grade, Table 2-4 of NP-6041 [7] is not directly applicable.

EPRI 3002000704 [2] Section 5 references EPRI 1019200 [19] with respect to screening criteria beyond 40 feet above grade. This guide update allows multiplying the screening lane spectral acceleration value ranges by a factor of 1.5 in order to account for spectral acceleration (SAS) at the base of the component. This screening level at the base of a component is compared to the ISRS demand corresponding to the RLGM. For example, by factoring the acceleration ranges for screening lane 1 of NP-6041-SL Table 2-4, the capacity at the base of a component is bounded by 0.8g*1.5=1.2g. This is compared with the seismic demand presented by the ISRS.

ESEP equipment items which are beyond 40 feet above grade are located in the Reactor Building (RB) at elevation 570 feet and 589 feet. The 5% damped horizontal response spectra at these elevations are documented in 14Q4239-CAL-001 [10]. The maximum spectral peaks at these locations are 4.23g (E-W direction) and 6.83g (E-W direction) and well above the lane 2 bound applicable to floor response spectra of 1.5

• 1.2g = 1.8g. The maximum ZPA at these elevations were 1.19g and 1.42g respectively. This presented screening challenges that were addressed as discussed in the notes section of Attachment C and D.

Page 26 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 As described in Section 6.0, for HCLPF calculations the conservative, deterministic failure margin (CDFM) analysis criteria established in Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041 [7] are used for a detailed analysis of components. The relevant CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041 [7] are summarized in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1: DNPS Maximum GMRS/SSE Ratio Load combination:

Normal + Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) 6 Ground response spectrum:

Conservatively specified (84% non-exceedance probability)

Damping:

Conservative estimate of median damping.

Structural model:

Best estimate (median) + uncertainty variation in frequency.

Material strength:

Code specified minimum strength or 95% exceedance of actual strength if test data is available.

Static capacity equations:

Code ultimate strength (ACI), maximum strength (AISC),

Service Level D (ASME) or functional limits. If test data is available to demonstrate excessive conservatism of code equations then use 84% exceedance of test data for capacity equations.

Inelastic energy absorption:

For non-brittle failure modes and linear analysis, use 80% of computed seismic stress in capacity evaluation to account for ductility benefits or perform nonlinear analysis and use 95%

exceedance ductility levels.

The HCLPF capacity is equal to the PGA at which the strength limit is reached. The HCLPF earthquake load is calculated as follows:

U = Normal + Ec Where:

U = Ultimate strength per Section 6 of EPRI NP-6041[7]

Ec = HCLPF earthquake load Normal = Normal operating loads (dead and live load expected to be present, etc.)

For this calculation, the HCLPF earthquake load is related to a fixed reference earthquake:

Ec = SFc*Eref 6 The ESEP evaluation uses the RLGM spectra as the SME.

Page 27 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Where:

• Eref = reference earthquake from the relevant in-structure response spectrum (ISRS)

• SFc = component-specific scale factor that satisfies U = Normal +Ec The HCLPF will be defined as the PGA produced by Ec. Because the DNPS RLGM PGA is 0.356g:

HCLPF = 0.356g*SFc 6.5

Functional Evaluation of Relays A HCLPF evaluation is performed for all relays and switches which may negatively "seal in" or "lock out" on the DNPS ESEL [20].

For relay evaluations, NP-6041-SL Appendix Q describes the following steps:

• Calculate in-cabinet response spectra (ICRS):

• Establish a clipping factor to be applied to the ICRS:

• Determine a relay's GERS Capacity:

• Establish adjustment factors to convert the relay's GERS capacity to a CDFM level:

• Compare clipped-peak and ZPA demands to the GERS capacity:

Of the 114 items on the DNPS Unit 2 ESEL, 9 are relays [20]. Of the 108 items on the DNPS Unit 3 ESEL, 9 are relays [20]. Specific seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for all 18 relays using either industry or DNPS specific documentation. In-cabinet capacity to demand evaluations were performed using the DNPS relay seismic capacities and the ESEP ISRS scaled with the NP-6041 in-cabinet amplification factors. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand. HCLPF capacities for these 18 total components are calculated in 14Q4239-CAL-004 [10] and are presented in Attachment C and D.

6.6

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values including the key failure modes are included in Attachment C and D. It is noted that several HCLPFs were calculated and shown not to control.

• For items screened out using NP 6041 [7] screening tables, the listed HCLPF is indicated to be greater than the RLGM PGA (>0.356g) and the failure mode is listed as "Screened". It is noted that components on the ESEL screen for as a minimum Screening Lane 1, that is the 0.8g screening lane. For equipment < 40 feet above grade, the screening HCLPF is limited by equipment capacity. This ground motion Page 28 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 HCLPF is estimated to be a minimum of (0.8g / 0.591g)* 0.356g = 0.482g, where, 0.8g is the minimum screening level, 0.591g is the peak of the ground RLGM and 0.356g is the PGA of the RLGM.

• For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the minimum capacity of 0.482g Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Anchorage". When the anchorage HCLPF turned out to be above this level, the listed HCLPF is set to >RLGM and the failure mode is "Equipment Capacity" along with a note providing the anchorage HCLPF and that it did not control capacity. When this was the case for equipment located less than 40 feet above grade, the HCLPF of 0.482g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity. When this was the case for equipment located above 40 feet above grade a HCLPF of 0.356g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity.

• For items where relay function controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the minimum capacity of 0.482g Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Equipment Function". When the relay function HCLPF turned out to be above this level, the listed HCLPF is set to >RLGM and the failure mode is "Equipment Capacity" along with a note providing the relay HCLPF and that it did not control capacity. When this was the case for equipment located less than 40 feet above grade, the HCLPF of 0.482g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity. When this was the case for equipment located above 40 feet above grade a HCLPF of 0.356g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity.

• For items where interaction controls the HCLPF value, and the HCLPF is less than the minimum capacity of 0.482g Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is set to "Interaction". It is noted there were no cases for Dresden ESEL items where this was the case. Therefore, the listed HCLPF is set to

>RLGM and the failure mode is "Equipment Capacity" along with a note providing the interaction HCLPF and that it did not control capacity. When this was the case for equipment located less than 40 feet above grade, the HCLPF of 0.482g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity. When this was the case for equipment located above 40 feet above grade a HCLPF of 0.356g was given as the governing HCLPF for Equipment Capacity.

Page 29 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 7.0

Inaccessible Items 7.1

Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns Six ESEL items were not accessible to the SRT during the ESEP walkdowns at DNPS. A description of circumstances and disposition for each of these items is provided below.

ESEL Item #24

2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR This valve is inside a locked Steam Tunnel that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-2301-8 in Unit 3. This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-2301-8 in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #175

2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-4A in Unit 3.

This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-4A in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #176

2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-5A in Unit 3.

This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-5A in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #177

2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-4B in Unit 3.

This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-4B in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #178

2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

This valve is inside containment shield wall that is inaccessible when the unit is on line which has been the case throughout the ESEP effort. This valve was screened for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane in EPRI NP-6041 guidance based on the identical valve 3-0202-5B in Unit 3.

Page 30 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 This valve screened by comparison as judged acceptable by the Seismic Review Team (SRT) that performed the walkdown on valve 3-0202-5B in Unit 3.

ESEL Item #218

2/3-5201

Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank:

This tank is buried and, by definition, not accessible. Per the screening criteria of Table 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041[7], the anchorage configurations of buried tanks are inherently seismically rugged and of no concern as judged by the SRT that are the preparer and checker of this report.

A review of the flexibility of attached piping for 2/3-5201 was performed based on available documentation. The conclusion of that review as judged by the SRT that are the preparer and checker of this report was that there was adequate flexibility of the attached lines and that the tank is screened.

7.2

Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out No additional walkdowns are required.

Page 31 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 8.0

ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1

Supporting Information DNPS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1].

It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704

[2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall DNPS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S.

plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [13] concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the Gl-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for DNPS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [12] therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [13] also apply to DNPS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely.

Page 32 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 This has been borne out of those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.

The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

• Safety factors applied in design calculations

• Damping values used in the dynamic analysis of SSCs

• Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations

• Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra

• Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications

• Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis

• Bounding requirements in codes and standards

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)

• Bounding testing requirements, and

• Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

8.2

Identification of Planned Modifications No modifications are required as a result of the DNPS ESEP.

8.3

Modification Implementation Schedule No modification implementation schedule is required because no modifications are required.

8.4

Summary of Regulatory Commitments No regulatory commitments are required.

Page 33 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 9.0

References 1

NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012 2

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704 3

Order Number EA-12-049 responses:

3.1

NRC Letter RS-13-020 from Dresden (ML13063A320), "Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 28, 2013 3.2

NRC Letter RS-13-119 from Dresden (ML13241A282), "First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 28, 2013 3.3

NRC Letter RS-14-010 from Dresden (ML14059A430), "Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", February 28, 2014.

3.4

NRC Letter RS-14-208 from Dresden, "Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)", August 28, 2014 4

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3 (RS-14-067), dated March 31, 2014 (ML14091A012) 5

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991 6

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities -

10CFR 50.54(f), June 1991 Page 34 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 7

A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP 6041-SL 8

Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.

1994, TR-103959 9

"Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal Report", Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3, December 1997 10

DNPS ESEP Calculations:

10.1 14Q4237-CAL-002 Rev. 0, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Components of the ESEP that did not Screen".

10.2 14Q4239-CAL-003 Rev. 1, "ESEP HCLPFs for Relays" 10.3 14Q4239-CAL-004 Rev. 0, "High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Calculations for Unit 2 & 3 Isolation Condenser Assemblies" 11

S&A Report No.: 14Q4237-RPT-005 Rev 1, "Dresden ESEP SEWS" 12

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States", March 12, 2014 13

NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014 14

Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013. 1025287 15

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal, Correspondence No.12-167, dated November 15, 2012 16

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 & 3, "USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report", June 1996 17

TDBD-DQ-1 Rev 1, "Structural Design Criteria for Quad Cities and Dresden Stations",

April 13, 2000.

18

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal, Correspondence No.12-167, dated November 12, 2012 19

Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.

1994, 1019200 20

S&A Report No.: 14Q4237-RPT-003 Rev 1, "Validation of Expedited Seismic Equipment List" 21

Dresden Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 10, June 2013 22

Order EA-12-051 Page 35 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 23

14Q4237-CAL-001 Rev. 0, "Generation of In-Structure Response Spectra for use in ESEP Evaluations" 24

Dresden P&ID Drawings and Supplemental References 24.1 Dresden Drawing M-28, Rev. LP, Diagram of Isolation Condenser Piping 24.2 Dresden Drawing M-29 Sheet 1, Rev. Cl, Diagram of Low Pressure Coolant Injection Piping 24.3 Dresden Drawing M-33, Rev. HZ, Diagram of Standby Liquid Control Piping.

24.4 Dresden Drawing M-357 Sheet 1, Rev. BX, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculation Piping 24.5 Dresden Drawing M-357 Sheet 2, Rev BS, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping 24.6 Dresden Drawing M-359, Rev BN, Diagram of Isolation Condenser Piping 24.7 Dresden Drawing M-374, Rev CU, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping 24.8 Quad Cities' Drawing M-46 Sheet 1, Rev. CD, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection HPCI Piping Quad Cities8 Drawing M-46 Sheet 2, Rev. S, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection HPCI Piping Quad Cities8 Drawing M-46 Sheet 3, Rev. G, Diagram of HPCI Turbine Lubricating and Hydraulic Oil System and Pump Seal Cooler Piping Dresden Drawing M-26 Sheet 1, Rev. BR, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping Dresden Drawing M-26 Sheet 2, Rev. KK, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping Dresden Drawing M-39, Rev. DM, Diagram of Reactor Building Equipment Drains Dresden Drawing M-363, Rev. BF, Diagram of Shutdown Reactor Cooling Piping Dresden Drawing M-4203, Rev. E, Flow Diagram Isolation Condenser Make Up System Dresden Drawing M-369, Rev. WI, Diagram of Reactor Building Equipment Drains Dresden Drawing M-361 Sheet 1, Rev. VP, Diagram of Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Dresden Drawing M-41 Sheet 2, Rev. Al, Diagram of Turbine and Diesel Oil Piping 7 These Quad Cities drawings are to be used for validating the lube oil system at Dresden per TODI 14-036 [24.25].

Page 36 of 89 24.9 24.10 24.11 24.12 24.13 24.14 24.15 24.16 24.17 24.18

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 24.19 Dresden Drawing M-32, Rev. BC, Diagram of Shutdown Reactor Cooling Piping 24.20 Dresden Drawing M-357 Sheet 2, Rev BS, Diagram of Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating Piping 24.21 Dresden Drawing M-51, Rev. CR, Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping 24.22 Dresden Drawing M-14, Rev. LZ, Diagram of Reactor Feed Piping 24.23 Dresden Drawing M-347, Rev. CF, Diagram of Reactor Feed Piping 24.24 Dresden Drawing M-364, Rev AS, Diagram of Standby Liquid Control Piping 24.25 Dresden Station Transmittal of Design Information to Stevenson & Associates, DOC ID# 14-036 Rev. 000, "Use of QDC HPCI System Drawings for DRE",

September 8, 2014 25

Correspondence 14Q4237-LRC-115,

Subject:

Question: Do your ESELs Include FLEX Mods which meet the Augmented Approach Section 3.2 Criteria to be included on the ESEL?, From Eyad Ali to Jeffrey S. Clark, November 11, 2014 Page 37 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS44-297 Attachment A - DNPS Unit 2 ESEL Page 38 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State 1

2-1501-22A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Closed Open MOV will be manually opened with hand wheel to support RPV injection.

2 2-1501-20B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST INB MOV Closed Open MOV will be manually opened with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

3 2-1501-38B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Closed Open MOV will be manually opened with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

4 2-1501-32B U2 LPCI LOOP I AND II X-TIE MOV Open Closed MOV will be manually closed with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

5 2-1501-21A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ OTBD ISOL VLV Open Throttle 11 2-2301-3 U2 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Closed Open 12 2-2301-64 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Open Closed AOV fails closed on loss of instrument air 13 2-2301-65 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV (AOV)

Open Closed ACV fails closed on loss of instrument air 14 2-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Closed Open 15 2-2301-CV1 (2) (3) (4)

(5) (6)

HPCI Turbine Control Valve Closed Open There are 6 control valves mounted on a single assembly on the HPCI Turbine 16 2-2301 HPCI Turbine Available Operating 17 2-2301-6 U2 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Open Closed 18 2-2301-35 U2 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Closed Open 19 2-2301-36 U2 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Closed Open 20 2-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Available Operating 21 2-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP HPCI Speed Reducer Available Operating 22 2-2302 HPCI Main Pump Available Operating 23 2-2301-14 U2 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Closed Open Page 39 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item if Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 24 2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Closed Open 25 2-2301-48 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Closed Open 26 2-2301-49 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Open Closed 27 2-2303-AOP HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Off On 28 Not Used 29 2-2303-TG HPCI Turning Gear Off On 30 2-2320-GSLO Gland Seal Leak off Drain Pump Off On 31 2-2320-GSEF HPCI Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust Fan Off On 32 2-2303-MSC Motor Speed Changer Low Speed Stop High Speed Stop 33 2-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit High Speed Stop Varies to control HPCI flow 34 2-2386 HPCI Turbine Signal Converter Available Operating 35 2-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Available Operating Controlled by flow transmitter 2-2358 on instrument rack 2-2202-29 36 2-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Available Operating Passive Component 37 2-2320-GSC Gland Seal Leak off Condenser Available Operating Passive Component Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI isolation (Steam Line Break & Rx Pressure Trips).

38 2-2202-28 INSTRUMENT RACK ISO COND AND HPCI FLOW INDICATION Available Operating 39 2-2202-29 Instrument Rack Available Operating Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI operation/isolation (HPCI Flow Control).

40 2-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-39. If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

41 2-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-33. If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

Page 40 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State 42 2-2330-1258 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-39. If the relay energizes HPCI may

. isolate.

43 2-2330-126 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 902-39.1f the relay energizes HPCI may isolate.

44 2-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Turbine Trip relay in panel 902-39.

If the relay energizes HPCI may trip 45 2-0902-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Available Available Contains relays related to HPCI operation 46 47 2-0902-3 PANEL REACTOR +

CONTAINMENT COOLING Available Available Main Control Room panel that contains control switches for system initiation and component starts.

2-0902-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY ESS 2 Available Available Contains Isolation Relay 2330-125A 85 2-1302 Isolation Condenser assembly Available Operating Passive Component 86 2-1301-3 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET ISOL VLV (MOV,DC)

Closed Open 87 2-1301-10 U2 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV (MOV, Emerg., AC)

Closed Open Motor Operated Valve allows FLEX Pump to makeup water to ISCO shell side.

88 2-1301-17 U21SOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV (AOV)

Open Closed Air Operated Valve Fails Closed on Loss of Air 89 2-1301-20 U2 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV (AOV)

Open Closed Air Operated Valve Fails Closed On Loss of Air 90 2-4399-74 U2 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV (MOV, DC)

Closed Open Motor Operated Valve that will need to be opened for primary makeup path for ISCO.

91 2-0595-115A RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 902-40. If the relay chatters the Isolation Condenser may isolate Page 41 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State Relay in panel 902-41. If the relay 2 -0595-92 RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized chatters the Isolation Condenser 115B may isolate Relay in panel 902-40. If the relay 2-0595-RELAY ISO CONDIN BOARD 93 Energized Energized de-energizes the Iso. Condenser 116A VALVE CONTROL may isolate RELAY ISO COND Relay in panel 902-41. If the relay 2-0595-94 OUTBOARD VALVE Energized Energized de-energizes, the !so. Condenser 116B CONTROL may isolate PANEL PCIS RELAYS 95 2-0902-40 Available Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

INBOARD PCIS 1 PANEL PCIS RELAYS 96 2-0902-41 Available Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

OUTBOARD PCIS 2 109 2-83125-2 125 VDC Battery Available Operating 110 2-83125-2 125 VDC Charger 2 Energized Energized 111 2-83125-2 125 VDC Battery Bus 2 Energized Energized 2-83125-125 VDC Turbine Building 112 Energized Energized 2A-1 Bus 2A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building 113 2-83125-2B Energized Energized Bus 2B 2-83125-125 VDC Turbine Building 114 Energized Energized 2B-1 Bus 2B-1 Unit 2 125 VDC Reactor 115 2-83125-2 Energized Energized Building Distribution Panel 124 2-83250-2 250 VDC Battery Available Operating 125 2-83250-2 Unit 2 250 VDC Charger 2 Energized Energized 126 2-83250-2 Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2 Energized Energized 127 2-83250-2A Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2A Energized Energized 128 2-83250-2B Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2B Energized Energized ESS Bus PANEL 120/240 134 2-0902-49 Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL ESS Uninterruptible Power 135 2-0902-63 Energized Energized Supply and Static Switch 136 2-0902-50 Instrument Bus Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

Reactor Water Level indicator in 137 2-0640-29A 2A RPV NR LVL Energized Energized Main Control Room.

Page 42 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ESEL,

ID Description Normal State Desired State 138 2-0646A U2 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Energized Energized Level Transmitter for 2-0640-29A 139 2-2202-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 2-0646-A is located on.

Available Available 140 2-0263-156 U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

141 2-0263-152A U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Pressure Transmitter for 2-0263-156 142 2-2202-78 Instrument Rack that PT 2-0263-152A is located on.

Available Available Instrument Cabinet 143 2-8540-2/4 U2 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS & M-U FLOW Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

144 2-1625 U2 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Energized Energized Pressure Transmitter for 2-8540-2/4 145 2-1602-3 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Energized Torus Level indicator in Main Control Room.

146 2-1626 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Energized Level Transmitter for 2-1602-3 147 2-1640-200 U2 TORUS TEMP MON Energized Energized Recorder will be used to monitor Torus Temperature. Power supplied via terminal block in cabinet 2-2202-70A. (No active components for this function in 2-2202-70A) 148 2-0902-36 Main Control Room Panel PANEL IRM/SRM Available Available Panel contains the Torus Temperature Recorder.

149 2-1340-2 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Energized Energized Isolation Condenser Shell-side Level indicator 150 2-1341 U2 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Energized Energized Transmitter for Isolation Condenser Shell-side Level 151 2-0902-5 Main Control Room Panel Available Available Contains RPV level and pressure indicators 152 Not Used 153 2-1549-A U2 LPCI LOOP I MAIN SUPPLY HDR Energized Energized Flow Transmitter for LPCI line Flow which will measure the primary FLEX pump flow.(Flow Recorder2-1540-7 on 902-3, ROB)

Page 43 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 154 2-2202-19A INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Available Available Rack that FT 2-1549-A is mounted on.

175 2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

176 2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

177 2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

178 2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

179 2-0902-4 Main Control Room Panel PANEL SHUTDOWN HO COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Available Available Panel contains control switches for the Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

180 2-7329 Bus 29 Energized Energized Main Bus for distribution from FLEX Generator 181 182 2-7828-7 2-7829-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 29-7 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

Energized Energized MCC that powers the "B" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

191 2-1103 2-1103 UNIT 2 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Available Available Passive Component 192 2-1102-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP De-energized Energized 193 2-1107-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Available Available Passive Component 194 2-1106-A 2A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV De-energized Energized 195 2-7828-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-1 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" SBLC pump and Squib Valve.

196 Not Used Page 44 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 203 TBD Primary FLEX Makeup Pump" Standby Operating Pump: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Pre-Staged in RB basement.

Common to both units 204 TBD Primary FLEX 800kW Diesel Generator"'

Standby Operating Diesel Generator: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Staged in New Seismically Robust Structure. Common to both units 205 TBD Primary FLEX Diesel Generator Power Distribution Cabinet."

Standby Operating Distribution Cabinet: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Staged in New Seismically Robust Structure. Common to both units Disconnect Switch: This item is in the FLEX mod design phase. Will be Staged in New Seismically Robust Structure. Common to both units 206 TBD Disconnect Switch with Receptacle at D/G for Swgr Neutral Connection."

Standby Operating 207 2-0902-32 Panel 902-32 Energized Energized Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 208 2-0902-18 Panel 902-18 Energized Energized Added for Reactor Level Instrumentation 209 2-0902-19 Panel 902-19 Energized Energized Available Added for Drywell Pressure Instrument Power Source 210 2-1503A Containment Cooling Hx Available Added for pressure boundary 211 2-1503B Containment Cooling Hx Available Available Added for pressure boundary 212 2-2202-70B Panel 2202-70B Available Available Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 213 2-2202-73A Panel 2202-73A Energized Energized Added for Reactor Pressure Instrumentation 214 2-2202-73B Panel 2202-73B Energized Energized Added for Torus Level Instrumentation 215 2-7829-2 Motor Control Center 29-2 Energized Energized Added MCC to provide power to 125V DC Battery Charger 216 2-7828-2 Motor Control Center 28-2 Energized Energized Added MCC to provide power to Instrument Bus on 2-0902-50 217 2-7828-3 Motor Control Center 28-3 Energized Energized Added MCC to provide power to 250V DC Battery Charger gi Addressed in FLEX Implementation Modification and Procured to meet the ESEP Requirements.

• • • These are portable equipment that are no longer required to be on the ESEL. These equipment items are addressed in the FLEX implementation modification.

Page 45 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

218 L_

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID 2/3-5201 Description Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Normal State Available Desired State Available Added for Fuel Oil Source Page 46 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Attachment B - DNPS Unit 3 ESEL Page 47 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

6 Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID 3-1501-22B Description Normal State Desired State U3 LPCI LOOP ll COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Closed

' MOV will be manually opened Open with hand wheel to support RPV injection.

7 3-1501-20A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST INBD MOV Closed MOV will be manually opened Open with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

8 3-1501-38A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Closed MOV will be manually opened Open with hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

9 3-1501-32A U3 LPCI LOOP I AND II X-TIE MOV Open 1 MOV will be manually closed with Closed

hand wheel to support Torus makeup from UHS.

10 3-1501-21B U3 LPCI LOOP ll COOLANT INJ OTBD ISOL MOV Open Throttle 48 3-2301-3 U3 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Closed Open 49 3-2301-64 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 50 3-2301-65 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 51 3-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Closed Open 52 3-2301-CV1 (2)

(3) (4) (5) (6)

HPCI Turbine Control Valve Closed There are 6 control valves Open mounted on a single assembly on the HPCI Turbine 53 3-2301 HPCI Turbine Available Operating 54 3-2301-6 U3 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Open Closed 55 3-2301-35 U3 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Closed Open 56 3-2301-36 U3 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Closed Open 57 3-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Available Operating 58 3-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP HPCI Speed Reducer Available Operating 59 3-2302 HPCI Main Pump Available Operating 60 3-2301-14 U3 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Closed Open 61 3-2301-8 U3 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Closed Open 62 3-2301-48 U3 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Closed Open Page 48 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

63 Equipment Opera-WIZ:Ste Not

it;

ID 3-2301-49 Description Normal State Desired Sta Closed U3 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Open 64 Not Used 65 3-2303-AOP Auxiliary Oil Pump Off On 66 67 3-2303-TG Turning Gear Off On 3-2320-GSLO HPCI GLAND SEAL LEAK OFF DRAIN PUMP Off On 68 3-2320-GSEF Gland Seal Exhauster Fan Off On 69 3-2303-MSC Motor Speed Changer Low Speed Stop High Speed Stop 70 3-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit High Speed Stop Varies to control HPCI flow 71 3-2386 HPCI TURB SIGNAL CONVERTER Available Operating 72 3-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Available Controlled by flow transmitter 3-Operating

2358 on instrument rack 3-2203-29 73 3-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Available Operating

Passive Component 74 3-2320-GSC HPCI TURBINE GLAND SEAL CONDENSER Available Operating

Passive Component 75 3-2203-28 Instrument Rack Available Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI Operating

isolation (Steam Line Break & Rx Pressure Trips).

-4 76 3-2203-29 Instrument Rack Available Contains instrumentation transmitters associated with HPCI Operating operation/isolation (HPCI Flow Control).

77 3-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK De-energized De-energized Isolation relay in panel 903-39. If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

78 3-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay on panel 903-33.

If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

79 3-2330-125B RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized De-energized Isolation relay on panel 903-39.

If the relay chatters HPCI may isolate.

Page 49 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL,

Item #

80 Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID 3-2330-126 Description RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE Normal State Desired State De-energized Isolation relay on panel 903-39.

De-If the relay chatters FIPCI may energized isolate.

81 3-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE De-energized Turbine Trip relay on panel 903-De-

39. If the relay chatters HPCI may energized trip.

82 3-0903-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Available

' Contains relays related to HPCI Available operation 83 3-0903-3 PANEL REACTOR +

CONTAINMENT COOLING Available Main Control Room panel that contains control switches for Available system initiation and component 1 starts.

84 3-0903-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY ESS 2 Isolation Condenser assembly Available Available Contains Isolation Relay 2330-125A Passive Component 97 3-1302 Available Operating 98 3-1301-3 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET ISOL VLV Closed Open 99 3-1301-10 U3 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV Closed Allows FLEX Pump to makeup Open water to ISCO shell side.

100 3-1301-17 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 101 3-1301-20 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV Open Air Operated Valve fails closed on Closed loss of instrument air 102 3-4399-74 U3 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV Closed Open Motor Operated Valve that will need to be opened for primary makeup path for ISCO.

103 3-0595-115A RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-40. If the relay chatters the Isolation Condenser may isolate 104 3-0595-115B RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-41. If the relay chatters the Isolation Condenser may isolate 105 3-0595-116A RELAY ISO COND Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-40. If the relay de-energizes the Iso. Condenser will isolate.

106 3-0595-1168 RELAY ISO COND OUTBOARD VALVE CONTROL Energized Energized Relay in panel 903-41. If the relay de-energizes the 'so.

Condenser will isolate.

Page 50 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

107 Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments AMINER 41 ID 3-0903-40 Description PANEL PCIS RELAYS INBOARD PCIS 1 Normal Available Desired SIONght_

Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

108 3-0903-41 PANEL PCIS RELAYS OUTBOARD PCIS 2 Available Available Contains the ISCO Valve Relays.

116 3-83125-3 125 VDC Battery Available Operating 117 3-83125-3 125 VDC Charger 3 Energized Energized 118 3-83125-3 125 VDC Battery Bus 3 Energized Energized 119 3-83125-3A 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A Energized Energized 120 3-83125-3A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A-1 Energized Energized 121 3-83125-3B 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B Energized 1

Energized 122 3-83125-3B-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B-1 Energized Energized 123 3-83125-3 Unit 3 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel Energized Energized 129 3-83250-3 250 VDC Battery Available Operating 130 3-83250-3 Unit 3 250 VDC Charger Energized Energized 131 3-83250-3 Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3 Energized Energized 132 3-83250-3A Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3A Energized Energized 133 3-83250-3B Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 38 Energized Energized 155 3-0903-49 ESS Bus PANEL 120/240 VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

156 3-0903-63 ESS Uninterruptible Power Supply and Static Switch Energized Energized 157 3-0903-50 Instrument Bus Energized Energized Provides power to instruments.

158 3-0640-29A 3A RPV NR LVL Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

159 3-0646A U3 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Energized Energized Level Transmitter for 3-0640-29A 160 3-0263-156 U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

161 3-0263-152A U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Energized Energized Pressure Transmitter for 3-0263-156 162 3-2203-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 3-263-152A &

3-0646-A is located on.

Available Available 163 3-8540-2/4 U3 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS

& M-U FLOW Energized Energized Reactor Water Level indicator in Main Control Room.

Page 51 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-115-14-297 Item #

ESEL,

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 164 3-1625 U3 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Energized Pressure Transmitter for 3-8540-Energized 2/4 165 3-1602-3 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Torus Level indicator in Main Energized Control Room.

166 3-1626 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Energized Energized

Level Transmitter for 3-1602-3 167 3-1640-200 U3 TORUS TEMP MON Energized Recorder will be used to monitor Torus Temperature. Power supplied via terminal block in Energized cabinet 3-2203-70A. (No active i components for this function in 3-2203-70A) 168 3-0903-36 Main Control Room Panel PANEL IRM/SRM Available Panel contains the Torus Available Temperature Recorder.

169 3-1340-2 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Energized Isolation Condenser Shell-side Energized Level indicator.

170 3-1341 U3 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Energized Transmitter for Isolation Energized Condenser Shell-side Level Contains RPV level and pressure Available

indicators 171 3-0903-5 Main Control Room Panel Available 172 Not Used 173 3-1549-B U3 LPCI LOOP II MAIN SUPPLY HDR Energized Flow Transmitter for LPCI line which will measure the primary Energized FLEX pump flow. (Flow Recorder3-1540-7 on 903-3, ROB) 174 3-2203-19B INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Available Rack that FT 3-1549-B is mounted Available on.

183 3-0202-4A 3A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Open Motor Operated Valve is to be Closed

closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

184 3-0202-5A 3A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

185 3-0202-4B 3B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

186 3-0202-5B 3B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Open Closed Motor Operated Valve is to be closed when power is available from FLEX Generator.

Page 52 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297

ESEL, Item #

Equipment Operating State Notes/Comments ID Description Normal State Desired State 187 3-0903-4 Main Control Room Panel PANEL SHUTDOWN HO COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Available Panel contains control switches Available

for the Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

188 3-7339 Bus 39 Energized Main bus for distribution from Energized FLEX Generator 189 3-7838-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-7 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

MCC that powers the "B" Recirculation Loop Isolation Valves.

190 3-7839-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 39-7 Energized Energized 197 3-1103 3-1103 UNIT 3 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Available Available

Passive Component 198 3-1102-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP De-energized Energized 199 3-1107-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Available Available

Passive Component 200 3-1106-A 3A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV De-energized Energized 201 3-7838-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-1 Energized Energized MCC that powers the "A" SBLC pump and Squib Valve.

202 Not Used 219 3-0903-18 Panel 903-18 Energized Energized Added for reactor level instrumentation 220 3-0903-19 Panel 903-19 Energized Added for Drywell Pressure Energized Instrument Power Source 221 3-0903-32 Panel 903-32 Energized Energized

Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 222 3-1503A Containment Cooling Hx Available Available

Added for pressure boundary 223 3-1503B Containment Cooling Hx Available Available

Added for pressure boundary 224 3-2203-70B Panel 2203-70B Available Available

Added for HPCI Trip Circuit 225 3-2203-73A Panel 2203-73A Energized Added for Reactor Pressure Energized Instrumentation 226 3-2203-73B Panel 2203-73B Energized Added for Torus Level Energized Instrumentation 227 3-7839-2 Motor Control Center 39-2 Energized Added MCC to provide power to Energized 125V DC battery charger Page 53 of 89

ID Description Equipment

ESEL, Item #

Notes/Comments Operating State Normal

Desired State

State 228 3-7838-2 Energized Energized Motor Control Center 38-2 Added MCC to provide power to 250V DC battery charger and 120V AC instrument bus on 3-0903-50 Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Page 54 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Attachment C - DNPS Unit 2 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation Page 55 of 89

Report 14Q,4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 1

2-1501-22A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

2 2-1501-20B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST INB MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

3 2-1501-38B U2 LPCI LOOP II FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

4 2-1501-32B U2 LPCI LOOP I AND ll X-TIE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

5 2-1501-21A U2 LPCI LOOP I COOLANT INJ OTBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

11 2-2301-3 U2 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

12 2-2301-64 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

13 2-2301-65 U2 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

14 2-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

15 2-2301-CV1 HPCI Turbine Control Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

16 2-2301 HPCI Turbine Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

17 2-2301-6 U2 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

18 2-2301-35 U2 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

19 2-2301-36 U2 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

20 2-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 56 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 21 2-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP; HPCI Speed Reducer Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Gear Unit included with main HPCI Pump 2-2302. Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

Gear Unit screened with Pump 2-2302.

22 2-2302 HPCI Main Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

23 2-2301-14 U2 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

24 2-2301-8 U2 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

25 2-2301-48 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

26 2-2301-49 U2 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

27 2-2303-AOP HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. The small vertical pump measures approximately 13" in diameter and 27" tall. Pump is anchored to skid using five approximately 5/8" bolts steel to steel bolts. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

29 2-2303-TG HPCI Turning Gear Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

R.O.B. with 2-2301 turbine, see parent.

30 2-2320-GSLO Gland Seal Leakoff Drain Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Very small pump, anchored to the floor using four anchor bolts. Anchorage screened for RLGM.

31 2-2320-GSEF HPCI Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust Fan Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Fan casing measures approximately 18" in diameter and approximately 20" in length. Bolted to a plate that is welded on top of 2-2320-GSC using four 3/8" bolts. Unit likely weighs no more than 150 lbs. Anchorage is screened for RLGM.

Page 57 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 32 2-2303-MSC Motor Speed Charger Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Speed Charger included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Speed Charger is adequately supported for the RLGM.

33 2-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Gear Unit included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

34 2-2386 HPCI Turb Signal Converter Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small panel measures 42" tall, 30" wide, and 12" deep. Panel is anchored to wall using four 3/8" anchor bolts, one in each corner.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

35 2-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

36 2-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Lube oil cooler is 10' long and 1' in diameter.

Equipment has three straps around it, two that are welded to the side of the skid and one that is on a plate embedded into the concrete longitudinally supported by a lug.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

37 2-2320-GSC Gland Seal Leakoff Condenser Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small condenser, located under grating, is mounted on two short piers (2.375" high) that are 3' apart. It is anchored through the piers into the concrete floor by two 3/4" anchors per pier. The anchor bolts, grout-in-place type, are embedded into the concrete slab a distance of 18" and the anchor's core hole is filled with bonding compound. Anchorage screened for RLGM.

38 2-2202-28 INSTRUMENT RACK ISO COND AND HPCI FLOW INDICATION Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 58 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 39 2-2202-29 Instrument Rack Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

40 2-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK; Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HGA11JG52G Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.63g in Calculation 1404237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

41 2-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-33. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A9H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

42 2-2330-1256 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

43 2-2330-126 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

44 2-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Turbine Trip relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

Page 59 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 45 2-0902-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

46 2-0902-3 PANEL REACTOR

+

CONTAINMENT COOLING Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

47 2-0902-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY ESS 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

85 2-1302 Isolation Condenser assembly Anchorage 0.369g Screened based on specific HCLPF analysis for this large Horizontal tank. The HCLPF value is governed by the capacity of the anchor bolts attaching the saddle to the pedestal, and has a value of 0.369g as indicated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-004.

86 2-1301-3 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET !SOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Valve on large bore line with very rugged yoke. Screens based on similar valves evaluated.

87 2-1301-10 U2 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

30" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

88 2-1301-17 U2 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Noted that the yoke is independently supported, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure. Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides.

Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

Page 60 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 89 2-1301-20 U2 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Noted that the yoke is independently supported, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure. Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides.

Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

90 2-4399-74 U2 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

28" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Noted that it is a small Limitorque SMB000 operator) with a maximum weight =

160 lbs. (including hand wheel) < 200 lbs.

limitation. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

91 2-0595-115A RELAY ISO COND Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-40. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

92 2-0595-115B RELAY ISO COND Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-41. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

Page 61 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 93 2-0595-116A RELAY ISO COND Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-40. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 140.4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

94 2-0595-116B RELAY ISO COND OUTBOARD VALVE CONTROL Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 2-0902-41. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control the capacity.

95 2-0902-40 PANEL PCIS RELAYS INBOARD PCIS 1 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the HCLPF performed for 3-0903-41 which is a similar panel with similar anchorage. The HCLPF in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 was shown to be > RLGM without considering the top anchorage.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 3.34g and therefore did not control capacity.

96 2-0902-41 PANEL PCIS RELAYS OUTBOARD PCIS 2

Anchorage 0.392g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the HCLPF performed for 3-0903-41 which is a similar panel with similar anchorage. The HCLPF in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 was shown to be 0.392g for anchorage without considering the top anchorage.

109 2-83125 Batt 125 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 1.11g and therefore did not control capacity..

Page 62 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 110 2-83125 Charg 125 VDC Charger 2 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF for anchorage calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.657g and did not control capacity.

111 2-83125 Bus 125 VDC Battery Bus 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

112 2-83125-2A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 2A-1 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

113 2-83125-2B 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus-2B Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

114 2-83125-2B-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus-2B-1 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

115 2-83125 Dist Unit 2 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz.

The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g <

1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15% overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

Page 63 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 124 2-83250 Batt 250 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 2.68g and therefore did not control capacity..

125 2-83250 Charg Unit 2 250 VDC Charger Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Charger is anchored using four sets of two anchor bolts spaced more than 5" apart, with the exception of the front right set, which are only spaced 4" apart. The current anchorage configuration is deemed by the SRT to be adequate given the high margin for similar equipment item, which has less rigorous anchorage and identical dimensions.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 1.11g and therefore did not control capacity..

126 2-83250 MCC Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 1.11g and therefore did not control capacity..

Page 64 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 127 2-83250-2A Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 2A Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz.

The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g <

1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15% overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

128 2-83250-2B Unit 2 250 VDC MCC 28 Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz.

The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g <

1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15% overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

134 2-0902-49 ESS Bus; PANEL 120/240 VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 3.38g and therefore did not control capacity..

Page 65 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 135 2-0902-63 ESS Uninterruptible Power Supply and Static Switch Screened

>RLGM There are two separate components shared by this equipment ID number, a wall-mounted panel and a floor mounted assembly consisting of 3 cabinets. The wall-mounted cabinet has dimensions of 46.5" tall, 13.5" deep, and 28.5" wide.

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Wall mounted portion of 2-0902-63 anchorage screens for RLGM based on low seismic input at EL. 517 (ground spectra) and high margin for other similarly anchored cabinets. Floor mounted cabinet screens due to the robust anchorage and low seismic input.

136 2-0902-50 Instrument Bus Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 140.4237-CAL-002 to be 3.38g and therefore did not control capacity..

137 2-0640-29A 2A RPV NR LVL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

138 2-0646-A U2 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-2202-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-2202-5, see parent.

139 2-2202-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 2-0646-A is located on Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 66 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 140 2-0263-156 U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

141 2-0263-152A U2 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-2202-78.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-2202-78, see parent.

142 2-2202-78 Instrument Rack that PT 2-0263-152A is located on Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small instrument rack consisting of 4" nominal pipe.

The rack is anchored to the floor with four 5/8" bolts and transmitter 2-0263-152A is bolted to the rack using four 3/8" bolts. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

143 2-8540-2/4 U2 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS &

M-U FLOW Equipment Capacity 0.482g Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

144 2-1625 U2 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter mounted to the wall using four 1/2" expansion anchors. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

145 2-1602-3 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

146 2-1626 U2 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter mounted to a 6" channel using four 1/4" bolts. The channel is then welded to the platform. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 67 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 147 2-1640-200 U2 TORUS TEMP MON Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 2-0902-36.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-36, see parent.

148 2-0902-36 Main Control Room Panel; PANEL IRM/SRM Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

149 2-1340-2 U2 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 2-0902-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-0902-3, see parent.

150 2-1341 U2 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Equipment Capacity 0.356g Transmitter mounted directly to a wall of rack. Affixed to wall with a 3" channel bolted to the column with two 1/4" bolts cantilevered out from wall 9" and up 7". The equipment is then U-bolted to the 1.5" nominal pipe that extends the 7" up from the 3" channel (pipe welded all around) using two U-bolts.

Transmitter meets GERS caveats that has a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 10g. Taking a high estimate for demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand. HCLPF calculated in 1404237-CAL-002 for the anchorage and was calculated to be 1.116g and did not control the capacity.

151 2-0902-5 Main Control Room Panel Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

153 2-1549-A U2 LPCI LOOP I MAIN SUPPLY HDR Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on rack 2-2202-19A.

Instruments on this rack were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Rack 2-2202-19A, see parent.

Page 68 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 154 2-2202-19A INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

175 2-0202-4A 2A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

176 2-0202-5A 2A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

177 2-0202-4B 2B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

178 2-0202-5B 2B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV (MOV)

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

179 2-0902-4 Main Control Room Panel; PANEL SHUTDOWN HOW COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

180 2-7329 Bus 29 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.89g and did not control capacity.

181 2-7828-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 140.4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

182 2-7829-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 29-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

191 2-1103 2-1103 UNIT 2 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Screened

>RLGM Tank screened for RLGM based on review of design basis analysis 002316 (CQD) and scaling of the acceptance criteria for the analysis for the applicable failure modes.

Page 69 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 192 2-1102-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small pump anchored using 6 anchor bolts. Very well anchored. Pump will respond rigidly with about a 2g horizontal input based on the RLGM input. Capacity Vs. Demand and Anchorage screens by inspection and engineering judgment, pump is seismically rugged.

193 2-1107-A 2A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small accumulator light weight that is U-bolted to the support.

Measured 16" in height and 8" in diameter.

Very well supported, screens by inspection.

194 2-1106-A 2A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small Valve is located on an approximately 2" nominal pipe.

The valve measures 6" in diameter and 15" long.

Capacity Vs. Demand screens by inspection and engineering judgment, valve is seismically rugged.

195 2-7828-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 28-1 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

207 2-0902-32 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY AUTO BLOWDOWN ESS 1 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

208 2-0902-18 Panel 902-18 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on comparison to existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for similar panels.

209 2-0902-19 PANEL PROCESS INSTRUMENTAT ION Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on comparison to existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for similar panels.

Page 70 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 210 2-1503A 2A CONTAINMENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

211 2-1503B 2B CONTAINMENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

212 2-2202-70B DIV 2 ATWS PANEL 2202-70B Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

213 2-2202-73A PANEL - DIV I ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

214 2-2202-73B PANEL - DIV II ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

215 2-7829-2 Motor Control Center 29-2 Screened

>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane from EPRI NP-6041. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

216 2-7828-2 Motor Control Center 28-2 Screened

>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane from EPRI NP-6041. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation supplemented by the Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 evaluation of the embedded angle.

Page 71 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 217 2-7828-3 Motor Control Center 28-3 Screened

>RLGM Equipment screens (other than anchorage) for the 0.8g to 1.2g screening lane from EPRI NP-6041. Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation supplemented by the Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 evaluation of the embedded angle.

218 2/3-5201 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank:

Screened

>RLGM Inaccessible. See Section 7.1 for Screening.

Page 72 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 Attachment D - DNPS Unit 3 ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Mode Tabulation Page 73 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 6

3-1501-22B U3 LPCI LOOP II COOLANT INJ INBD ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

7 3-1501-20A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST INBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

8 3-1501-38A U3 LPCI LOOP I FULL FLOW BYP TEST OTBD MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

9 3-1501-32A U3 LPCI LOOP I AND ll X-TIE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

10 3-1501-21B U3 LPCI LOOP II COOLANT INJ OTBD ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

48 3-2301-3 U3 HPCI TURB STM SUPPLY MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

49 3-2301-64 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN AOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

50 3-2301-65 U3 HPCI TURB SV ABOVE SEAT DRN VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

51 3-2303-STPV HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

52 3-2301-CV1 HPCI Turbine Control Valve Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

53 3-2301 HPCI Turbine Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

54 3-2301-6 U3 HPCI SUCT VLV FROM CST Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

55 3-2301-35 U3 HPCI TORUS SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

56 3-2301-36 U3 HPCI SUCT ISOL MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Page 74 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 57 3-2302-1 HPCI Booster Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

58 3-2302-2 GEAR UNIT HPCI PUMP; HPCI Speed Reducer Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Gear Unit included with main HPCI Pump 2-2302. Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

Gear Unit screened with Pump 3-2302.

59 3-2302 HPCI Main Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

60 3-2301-14 U3 HPCI MN PMP RECIRC TO TORUS MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

61 3-2301-8 U3 HPCI MN PMP DISCH MOV TO FEED HDR Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 restrictions for a 0.8g screening lane.

62 3-2301-48 U3HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO BOOST PMP SUCT MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

63 3-2301-49 U3 HPCI CLG WTR RETURN TO COND STORAGE MOV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

65 3-2303-AOP Auxiliary Oil Pump Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. The small vertical pump measures approximately 13" in diameter and 27" tall. Pump is anchored to skid using five approximately 5/8" bolts steel to steel bolts. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

66 3-2303-TG Turning Gear Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

R.O.B. with 2-2301 turbine, see parent.

67 3-2320-GSLO HPCI GLAND SEAL LEAK OFF DRAIN PUMP Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Very small pump, anchored to the floor using four anchor bolts. Anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 75 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 68 3-2320-GSEF Gland Seal Exhauster Fan Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Fan casing measures approximately 18" in diameter and approximately 20" in length.

Bolted to a plate that is welded on top of 2-2320-GSC using four 3/8" bolts. Unit likely weighs no more than 150 lbs. Anchorage is screened for RLGM.

69 3-2303-MSC Motor Speed Changer Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Speed Charger included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Speed Charger is adequately supported for the RLGM.

70 3-2303-MGU Motor Gear Unit Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Motor Gear Unit included with lubricating and hydraulic oil system. Motor Gear Unit is adequately supported for the RLGM.

71 3-2386 HPCI TURB SIGNAL CONVERTER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small panel measures 42" tall, 30" wide, and 12" deep. Panel is anchored to wall using four 3/8" anchor bolts, one in each corner.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

72 3-2340-1 HPCI Flow Controller Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

73 3-2303-SOC Lube Oil Cooler Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Lube oil cooler is 10' long and 1' in diameter.

Equipment has three straps around it, two that are welded to the side of the skid and one that is on a plate embedded into the concrete longitudinally supported by a lug.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 76 of 89

Report 140.4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 74 3-2320-GSC HPCI TURBINE GLAND SEAL CONDENSER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small condenser, located under grating, is mounted on two short piers (2.375" high) that are 3' apart. It is anchored through the piers into the concrete floor by two 3/4" anchors per pier. The anchor bolts, grout-in-place type, are embedded into the concrete slab a distance of 18" and the anchor's core hole is filled with bonding compound.

Anchorage screened for RLGM.

75 3-2203-28 Instrument Rack Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

76 3-2203-29 Instrument Rack Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing similar USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

77 3-2330-124 RELAY HPCI 90 PSI INTERLOCK; Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HGA111G52G Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.63g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

78 3-2330-125A RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 3-0903-33. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A9H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

79 3-2330-125B RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

Page 77 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 80 3-2330-126 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Isolation relay Functional Capacity 0.37g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.37g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003.

81 3-2330-104 RELAY CONTROL GEN-PURPOSE ;

Turbine Trip relay Equipment Capacity 0.482g Relay contained in 3-0903-39. Relay in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 0.53g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and did not control capacity.

82 3-0903-39 PANEL HPCI RELAYS ESS 2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

83 3-0903-3 PANEL REACTOR

+ CONTAINMENT COOLING Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

84 3-0903-33 PANEL LPCl/CORE Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

97 3-1302 Isolation Condenser assembly Anchorage 0.369g Screened based on specific HCLPF analysis for this large Horizontal tank. The HCLPF value is governed by the capacity of the anchor bolts attaching the saddle to the pedestal, and has a value of 0.369g as indicated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-004.

98 3-1301-3 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER RX INLET ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Valve on large bore line with very rugged yoke. Screens based on similar valves evaluated.

Page 78 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 99 3-1301-10 U3 ISOL CDSR CNTAM DEMIN WTR FILL SV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

30" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

100 3-1301-17 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE INBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Valve has a 42" offset, yoke is only supported on one side, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure.

Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

101 3-1301-20 U3 ISOL CDSR VENT TO MN STM LINE OTBD ISOL VLV Screened

>RLGM Valve has a 42" offset, yoke is only supported on one side, this is acceptable because they are from the same structure.

Valve has a 42" offset but is well supported on all sides. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 7g. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

102 3-4399-74 U3 ISOL CDSR CLEAN DEMIN WTR FILL VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small MOV on small Limitorque operator. Attached to a 4" line.

28" offset. Line well supported adjacent to valve. Noted that it is a small Limitorque SMB000 operator) with a maximum weight

= 160 lbs. (including hand wheel) < 200 lbs.

limitation. Valve meets GERS caveats that have a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 22g for the valve operator. Taking a high estimate for in piping demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand.

Page 79 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 103 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-40. Relay in this 115A panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Equipment 0.482g Capacity GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

104 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-41. Relay in this 115B panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Equipment 0.482g Capacity GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

105 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-40. Relay in this 116A panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Equipment 0.482g Capacity GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

106 3-0595-RELAY ISO COND Relay contained in 3-0903-41. Relay in this 116B OUTBOARD panel were adequately supported for the VALVE CONTROL RLGM.

Equipment Capacity 0.482g GE 12HFA151A2H Relay. Relay HCLPF capacity determined to be 1.07g in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-003 and does not control capacity.

107 3-0903-40 PANEL PCIS Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

RELAYS INBOARD Anchorage screened for RLGM based on the PCIS 1 HCLPF performed for 3-0903-41 which is a Anchorage 0.392g similar panel with similar anchorage. The HCLPF in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 for the similar panel was shown to be 0.392g without considering the top anchorage.

Page 80 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 108 3-0903-41 PANEL PCIS RELAYS OUTBOARD PCIS 2

Anchorage 0.392g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. The anchorage HCLPF in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 was shown to be 0.392g without considering the top anchorage.

Interaction HCLPF from Block Wall calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 3.38g and did not control the capacity.

116 3-83125 Batt 125 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.800g and did not control the capacity.

117 3-83125 Charg 125 VDC Charger 3

Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF for anchorage calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.657g and did not control capacity.

118 3-83125 Bus 125 VDC Battery Bus 3 Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

119 3-83125-3A 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A Equipment Capacity 0 482 g 14Q4237-CAL-002 Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

120 3-83125-3A-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3A-1 Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

121 3-83125-3B 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B Equipment Capacity 0 482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

122 3-83125-3B-1 125 VDC Turbine Building Bus 3B-1 Equipment Capacity 0. 482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.665g and did not control capacity.

Page 81 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 123 3-83125 Dist Unit 3 125 VDC Reactor Building Distribution Panel Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations.

Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz. The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g < 1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15%

overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

129 3-83250 Batt 250 VDC Battery Equipment Capacity 0 482 g

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.871g and did not control capacity.

130 3-83250 Charg Unit 3 VDC Charger Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Charger is anchored using four sets of two anchor bolts spaced more than 5" apart, with the exception of the front right set, which are only spaced 4" apart. The current anchorage configuration is deemed by the SRI to be adequate given the high margin for similar equipment item, which has less rigorous anchorage and identical dimensions.

131 3-83250 MCC Unit 3 VDC MCC 3

Equipment Capacity 0.482 g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.765g and did not control capacity.

Page 82 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 132 3-83250-3A Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3A Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations.

Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz. The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g < 1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15%

overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

133 3-83250-3B Unit 3 250 VDC MCC 3B Equipment Capacity 0.356g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2.

This panel was braced at the top as a result of USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations.

Frequency of the braced assembly a minimum of 15 Hz. The peak seismic demand spectral acceleration at 15 Hz. and above is 1.702g < 1.8g, therefore screens. It is noted that this screening lane is appropriate since all caveats have been satisfied.

Anchorage screens by inspection since without the braces and a seismic input of 1.752g the anchorage was only about 15%

overstressed. Therefore, with the addition of the top braces the anchorage also screens.

155 3-0903-49 ESS Bus; PANEL 120/240 VAC ESS SERV DIST PNL i

Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Page 83 of 89

Report 1404237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 156 3-0903-63 ESS Uninterruptible Power Supply and Static Switch Screened

>RLGM There are two separate components shared by this equipment ID number, a wall-mounted panel and a floor mounted assembly consisting of 3 cabinets. The wall-mounted cabinet has dimensions of 46.5" tall, 13.5" deep, and 28.5" wide.

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Wall mounted portion of 2-0902-63 anchorage screens for RLGM based on low seismic input at EL. 517 (ground spectra) and high margin for other similarly anchored cabinets. Floor mounted cabinet screens due to the robust anchorage and low seismic input.

157 3-0903-50 Instrument Bus Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on size and weight of cabinet and anchorage similarity to other assemblies that screened based on existing calculations.

Noted that there is insufficient spacing to wall behind equipment. However, cabinet does not contain relays required for ESEP and therefore, interaction is judged acceptable.

158 3-0640-29A 3A RPV NR LVL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-5, see parent.

159 3-0646 U3 REACTOR NARROW RANGE LVL FW CONTROL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-2203-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 2-2203-5, see parent.

Page 84 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 160 3-0263-156 U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

161 3-0263-152A U3 REACTOR WIDE RANGE PRESSURE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-2203-5.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-2203-5, see parent.

162 3-2203-5 Instrument Rack that transmitter 3-263-152A & 3-0646-A are located on Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

163 3-8540-2/4 U3 PRI CNMT MR DW PRESS & M-U FLOW Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

164 3-1625 U3 DRYWELL MEDIUM RANGE PRESS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter mounted to the wall using four 3/8" expansion anchors. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

165 3-1602-3 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

166 3-1626 U3 TORUS NARROW RANGE LEVEL Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats. Small transmitter welded on both sides to the 2" leg of a 6" channel. The channel is then welded to a beam of the platform. Very rugged installation, anchorage screened for RLGM.

Page 85 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 167 3-1640-200 U3 TORUS TEMP MON Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on Panel 3-0903-36.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-36, see parent.

168 3-0903-36 Main Control Room Pane!;

PANEL IRM/SRM Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

169 3-1340-2 U3 ISOLATION CONDENSER SHELL SIDE Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained in 3-0903-3.

Instruments in this panel were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Panel 3-0903-3, see parent.

170 3-1341 U3 ISOLATION CDSR SHELL SIDE Equipment Capacity 0.356g Transmitter mounted directly to a wall of rack. Affixed to wall with a 3" channel bolted to the column with two 1/4" bolts cantilevered out from wall 9" and up 7". The equipment is then U-bolted to the 1.5" nominal pipe that extends the 7" up from the 3" channel (pipe welded all around) using two U-bolts.

Transmitter meets GERS caveats that has a peak spectral acceleration capacity of 10g. Taking a high estimate for demand acceleration, the capacity exceeds the demand. HCLPF calculated in 14Q4237-CAL-002 for the anchorage and was calculated to be 1.116g and did not control the capacity.

171 3-0903-5 Main Control Room Panel Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

173 3-1549-B U3 LPCI LOOP II MAIN SUPPLY HDR Screened

>RLGM Instrument contained on rack 3-2203-19B.

Instruments on this rack were adequately supported for the RLGM.

Instrument ROB with Rack 3-2203-19B, see parent.

Page 86 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 174 3-2203-19B INSTRUMENT RACK (LPCI)

Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable similar existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

183 3-0202-4A 3A RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

184 3-0202-5A 3A RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

185 3-0202-4B 3B RECIRC PMP SUCT VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

186 3-0202-5B 3B RECIRC PMP DISCH VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

187 3-0903-4 Main Control Room Panel; PANEL SHUTDOWN HO COOLING CLEANUP +

RECIRC Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

188 3-7339 Bus 39 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable similar USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

189 3-7838-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

190 3-7839-7 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 39-7 Equipment Capacity 0.482g Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 1404237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

197 3-1103 3-1103 UNIT 3 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK Screened

>RLGM Tank screened for RLGM based on review of design basis analysis 002316 (COD) and scaling of the acceptance criteria for the analysis for the applicable failure modes.

Page 87 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 198 3-1102-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small pump anchored using 6 anchor bolts. Very well anchored. Pump will respond rigidly with about a 2g horizontal input based on the RLGM input. Capacity Vs. Demand and Anchorage screens by inspection and engineering judgment, pump is seismically rugged.

199 3-1107-A 3A STANDBY LIQUID ACCUMULATOR Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Small accumulator light weight that is U-bolted to the support.

Measured 16" in height and 8" in diameter.

Very well supported, screens by inspection.

200 3-1106-A 3A SBLC DISCH HDR SQUIB VLV Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats for Screening Lane 2. Relatively small Valve is located on an approximately 2" nominal pipe. The valve measures 6" in diameter and 15" long.

Capacity Vs. Demand screens by inspection and engineering judgment, valve is seismically rugged.

201 3-7838-1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 38-1 Equipment Capacity 0 482 g

Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage HCLPF calculated in Calculation 14Q4237-CAL-002 to be 0.649g and did not control capacity.

219 3-0903-18 Panel 903-18 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

220 3-0903-19 PANEL PROCESS INSTRUMENTATI ON Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on comparison to existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation for similar panels.

221 3-0903-32 PANEL LPCl/CORE SPRAY AUTO BLOWDOWN ESS 1

Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

222 3-1503A 3A LPCl/CONTAINM ENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

Page 88 of 89

Report 14Q4237-RPT-004 Rev. 3 Correspondence No. DRE-RS-14-297 ESEL Item #

Equipment ID DESCRIPTION Failure Mode HCLPF (compared to RLGM)

Notes 223 3-1503B 3B LPCl/CONTAINM ENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Equipment support was modified as a result of the USI A-46 and IPEEE evaluations. Due to the high safety factors in the braces to the wall and the redundancy of the support the anchorage screens.

224 3-2203-70B PANEL LOCAL ATWS TRIP UNIT LOGIC PL2203-70B Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

225 3-2203-73A PANEL - DIV I ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

226 3-2203-73B PANEL - DIV ll ATS Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

227 3-7839-2 Motor Control Center 39-2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

228 3-7838-2 Motor Control Center 38-2 Screened

>RLGM Meets NP-6041 Table 2-4 caveats.

Anchorage screened for RLGM based on scaling of applicable existing USI A-46 anchorage evaluation.

Page 89 of 89