ML14178A471
| ML14178A471 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1994 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14178A470 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-94-11, NUDOCS 9404200090 | |
| Download: ML14178A471 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1994011
Text
6.Vt REG&,
UNITED STATES
o 0NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
o
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
Z
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-261/94-11
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.:
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson
Inspection Conducted:
March 28-31, 1994
Inspector:, -a-
.
W. M. Sartor, Jr., Teamit4 e der
ae Signed
Accompanying Personnel: A. Gooden, RH
G. Salyers, RH
Approved by:
. 7-/
4
K. P. Barr,'-W f
Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the
licensee's deferred 1993 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. The
inspection was conducted to assess the adequacy of the licensee's emergency
response program, the implementation.of the emergency plan and procedures, and
the training program for emergency response. This was a partial participation
exercise for the onsite evaluation. On November 30, 1993, the licensee
provided information to the State and local response organizations for the
offsite portion of the biennial exercise which was evaluated by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. The
exercise was fully satisfactory with the exception of excessive time required
to complete the Alert -notification and to provide radiological data on the
General Emergency notification (exercise weakness identified in Paragraph 6).
9404200090 940408
ADOCK 05000261
G
Exercise strengths included the licensee's improved emergency response
facilities (Paragraph 9), the "STARSHIP" network of computers
(Paragraph 7), and the thorough critique process conducted by the exercise
evaluation staff (Paragraph 12).
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
M. Arnold, Senior Reactor Operator, Shift Technical Assistant
- R. Barnett, Exercise Emergency Response Manager
- C. Baucom, Shift Outage Manager
- G. Bowen, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness Training
- A. Carley, Manager, Site Communications
K. Darwin, Senior Reactor Operator, Work Control Center
- R. Dayton, Plant Controller
- M. Gann, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- A. Garrou, Project Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- T. Gildersleeve, Specialist, Brunswick Emergency Preparedness
- D. Gudger, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Programs
- C. Hinnant, Vice President, Robinson
- B. Houston, Manager, Brunswick Emergency Preparedness
- R. Howell, Senior Specialist, Nuclear Assessment Department
- P. Jenny, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- K. Jury, Manager, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
D. Knight,.Simulator Shift Supervisor
Kritch, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- A. Lucas, Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- T. McLeod, Office Supervisor
- R. Moore, Manager, Operations
- D. Nelson, Manager, Outage Management
- J. Padgett, Manager, Environmental and Radiological Control
- M. Pearson, Plant Manager, Robinson
R. Shane, Senior Reactor Operator, Simulator
- R. Steele, Manager, Maintenance Programs
- D. Taylor, Plant Controller
- D. Whitehead, Manager, Plant Support Services
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- B. Mozafari, Project Manager
- C. Ogle, Resident Inspector
W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
An index of abbreviations used in this report can be found in the last
paragraph.
2
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine
whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency
response capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the
licensee's Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and
Section IV. of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The scenario for this partial participation exercise was reviewed in
advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed with licensee
representatives prior to the exercise. The exercise scenario was well
organized and of sufficient detail for the licensee's emergency response
organization to demonstrate the exercise objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to
determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E
to 10 CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan) were implemented
with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignment of the
onsite emergency response organization.
The inspector determined that the initial onsite emergency organization
was adequately defined and the primary and alternate assignments for the
positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly
designated. During the exercise, the inspector observed that staff was
available to fill key functional positions within the initial onsite
emergency organization.
Following the Alert emergency declaration made by the Shift Supervisor
in the Simulator Control Room, the pagers were activated to direct the
immediate staffing of the Technical Support Center, Operational Support
Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility. Although the Shift
Supervisor entered the incorrect code for a drill activation,
corrections were quickly made and designated individuals responded to
their respective onsite emergency facility to assume the duties of
assigned emergency positions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting
and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether
arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel at the EOF were
adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the
planned response were identified as specified by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
,Paragraph
IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated
in Section II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).
3
An inspector noted that the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures
identified other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
response. The limited participation of this exercise did not include
these organizations; however, arrangements for requesting offsite
assistance resources were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E
to 10 CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately
implemented.
The licensee's EAL-1 and EAL-2 flowchart was used to identify and
classify each emergency condition and to escalate to more severe
classifications as the simulated accident progressed. The licensee's
classifications and emergency declarations were appropriate throughout
the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established
for notification by the licensee of State and local response
organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and
followup messages to response organizations had been established; and a
means to provide early notification to the population within the plume
exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and the specific criteria in
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure (PEP-171, Emergency
Communicator and Staff) for providing emergency information to Federal,
State,. and local response organizations, and for alerting and mobilizing
the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. The inspector
noted that implementing procedures for notifications had been
established and were adequate to provide guidance to personnel
responsible for initial notification to the State and local authorities.
The notifications to the offsite authorities were generally well
formulated and properly approved; however, two observations were made
that reflected issues with -timeliness that require improvement.
I
The initial notification was for the Alert emergency
classification made in the Simulator at 0903 hours0.0105 days <br />0.251 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.435915e-4 months <br />. The simulated
event was a fire affecting safety related equipment and resulted
04
in the Auxiliary Operator trained as the emergency communicator
being dispatched to the scene of the fire. Although the Shift
Supervisor designated someone else to be the emergency
communicator, the actual notification to the offsite authorities
did not occur until approximately twenty minutes after the
emergency classification. This notification process was also
assisted by the communicators in the EOF, although the formal
discussion of turnover responsibilities did not occur until
approximately ten minutes later.
The second issue was the failure to provide the radiological data
for the General Emergency declaration in a timely manner.
Specifically, the General Emergency was declared at 1121 hours0.013 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.265405e-4 months <br /> and
the emergency notification was initiated approximately 13 minutes
later with the required Recommended Protective Actions; however,
the message was incomplete without the radiological data for
items 11-14 being included. The notification form stated that the
information in items 11-14 may not be available on initial
notifications. However, in this case the radiological data was
not transmitted until approximately 50 minutes later with a
routine follow-up notification.
The inspector identified and summarized the above negative observations
as an exercise weakness as follows:
Inspector Followup Item 50-261/94-11-01:
Exercise Weakness for failure
to provide timely information to the State and local response
organizations following an emergency classification.
One Exercise Weakness, but no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that communications among the licensee's
emergency response facilities and emergency response facilities and
emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response
organization and offsite authorities were good. This exercise saw the
licensee's use of its network of computers known as "STARSHIP" (Site
Transient Analysis and Review Systems Having Interactive Processing) to
enhance its communication and accident assessment capabilities.
The "STARSHIP" network of computers provided an accident assessment,
notification/communication, and record-keeping capability that was quite
effective. This menu-driven system provided select ERO personnel with
access to displays such as:
Real-time plant data, SPDS, Miscellaneous,
and Emergency Preparedness. From the Miscellaneous Display, for
example, the Emergency Notification Form, EP Logs, and Event Log List
5
were some of the items that could be accessed. The Emergency
Notification Form was presented as a window that allowed the user to
enter appropriate data onto the form and then fax it to various
locations (onsite and offsite).
Observations indicated that the
"STARSHIP" network will enhance the communications process as the
capabilities are further utilized via additional training and
familiarity with the system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public
as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the
exercise. The licensee's Joint Information Center was located at its
Southern Division Operations office on US Highway 52 in Florence,
South Carolina. Because this facility was activated and evaluated by
FEMA during the November 30, 1993, exercise, it was not activated during
this onsite exercise. However, a total of four news releases were
prepared by public information personnel and approved by the Emergency
Response Manager during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Facility and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency
facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided
and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the
emergency response facilities to include the Simulator Control Room
(SCR), TSC, OSC, and the EOF. In all cases, the facility and its
dedicated equipment facilitated the emergency response.
The TSC and EOF, which had been redesigned and upgraded prior to the
1992 exercise, continued to contribute to improved emergency management.
Additionally, the OSC has been relocated to the new Operations and
Maintenance Building within the protected area. The dedicated space and
equipment for the OSC along with its relocation within the protected
area greatly enhanced the repair team effort.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6
10.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that methods, systems, and equipment
for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of
a radiological emergency conditions were in use as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and the
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment reviewed by the inspector included an
engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological
hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting rom the simulated
accident. The licensee was effective in the identification and
mitigation of the release path and the dose assessment team in the EOF
was able to provide dose projections and source term estimates for the
accident sequence.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions
during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed
and in place, and protective action for emergency workers, including
evacuation of nonessential personnel were implemented promptly as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and the specific criteria in
The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for
formulating protective action recommendations -(PARs) for the offsite
populace within the 10-mile EPZ. The PARs were quickly formulated and
promptly provided to the State and local authorities with the General
Emergency notification message.
The inspector also observed that protective actions were instituted for
onsite emergency responders which included periodic radiation surveys in
the ERFs, evacuation of nonessential personnel, and continued
accountability of emergency response personnel.
It was also observed in
the TSC that the Radiological Control Director and Emergency Repair
Director demonstrated a good interface in protecting the Damage Control
Team members from exceeding the emergency worker exposure limits.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine whether the deficiencies identified as a result of the
exercise, and the weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response
organization were formally presented to licensee management for
corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.N.
7
The licensee conducted player critiques in the ERFs immediately
following the exercise. On March 30, 1994, the licensee also conducted
evaluator/controller critiques prior to the formal presentation to
facility management on the following day. The licensee's critique to
their management on March 31 was comprehensive and addressed
observations as strengths, deficiencies, or comments. The detailed
draft report that was provided to management was representative of an
aggressive emergency preparedness program with a commitment for
improvement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-261/91-26-03:
Failure to provide
complete information regarding the simulated casualty to State and local
governments. This issue was closed based on observations during this
exercise which included: The SEC in the SCR and the ERM in the EOF
reviewed the emergency notifications to ensure complete and up-to-date
information was being provided. The emergency communicator in the EOF
also verbalized awareness of this requirement as notifications were
formulated for approval.
14.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 31, 1994, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
below. Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
Status
Description and Reference
50-261/94-11-01
Open
Exercise Weakness for
delayed Initial Notification
(Paragraph 6).
15.
Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report
Emergency Action Level
Emergency Planning Zone
Emergency Response Facility
ERM
Emergency Response Manager
Emergency Response Organization
EW
Exercise Weakness
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Support Center
Protective Action Recommendation
PEP
Plant Emergency Procedure
8
Site Area Emergency
Simulator Control Room
SEC
Site Emergency Coordinator
Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and
Timeline
0
ROBINSON 1993 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES PERFORMED ON MARCH 30, 1994
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the
Control Room to
detect accident
conditions, assess and project radiological consequences, and formulate
near term mitigating actions.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in providing
accident
assessment
and mitigation,
and
communication/notification
activities.
2A.
Demonstrate
the
adequacy
of
the
Emergency
Operation
Facility
in
providing dose assessment and communication/notification activities.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to identify and properly classify the emergency
in accordance with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
4.
Demonstrate
the adequacy of
alerting, notifying, and mobilizing
Emergency Response Organization Personnel.
5.
Demonstrate the timeliness of initial
and follow-up notifications to
responsible state and local government agencies.
6.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the information provided to responsible
state and local government agencies.
7.
Demonstrate the capability to make timely and accurate notification to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(Actual participation of the NRC
Operations may be simulated.)
8.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with plant emergency teams and
company environmental monitoring teams.
9.
Demonstrate
the ability to
communicate
between
emergency
response
facilities.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological assessment process
while maintaining personnel radiation exposure as low as reasonably
achievable (ALARA).
11.
Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities
and assessment.
12.
Demonstrate
the
ability to provide
adequate
radiation protection
services such as dosimetry and personnel monitoring.
CON-94-0222
RNPD-94-03-RO
2.0-2
13.
Demonstrate
the
ability to
adequately
control
the
spread
of
contamination and the radiological exposure of on-site and off-site
emergency workers.
14.
Demonstrate
the ability to formulate
appropriate protective action
recommendations to off-site government authorities.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization
within the time limits specified within the Emergency Plan and its
implementing procedures (normal working hours).
17.
Demonstrate that the Technical
Support Center,
Operational
Support
Center, and Emergency Operations Facility can be activated in accordance
with the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures.
.32.
Demonstrate the activation, operation, and reporting of field monitoring
teams.
33.
Demonstrate the assessment of radiological consequences of the accident
and of any release of radioactive material to the environment.
36.
Demonstrate
the ability to reassess plant conditions
and evaluate
recovery considerations as defined by the plant emergency plan.
38.
Demonstrate that previously identified NRC Open Items resulting from the
previous year's exercise can be closed.
Numbered objectives represent their order in the data base and are not intended
to be sequential.
CON-94-0222
RNPD-94-03-RO
2.0-3
Robinson 1993 Deferred Annual Exercise
Note: This Exercise will be run with the simulator in
interactive mode,
all
times given are approximate
At 0830 EST on March 30,
1994 Robinson Unit 2
is
at 100% power,
late
in
core
life, and the RCS activity is normal.
At 0846 , a small fire in the Charging
Pump room occurs at the "A" Charging Pump and cabling area.
Fire alarms will be
received in the Simulator Control Room and a Fire Brigade response initiated.
At 0855 the dedicated shutdown power supply (a power supply in addition to the
Emergency Busses) will be de-energized as a result
of the fire,
removing the use
of loads supplied from the DS bus ("A" Charging Pump, "A" CCW Pump, etc.).
An Alert should be declared around 0900 based on a fire with the potential to
affect safety related equipment. The fire may be successfully extinguished by
the plant Fire Brigade after
15 minutes of in-room fire
fighting effort.
No
offsite assistance will be required to extinguish the fire.
At 0915 a 100 gpm primary to secondary leak is
ramped
in
to the
"A" Steam
Generator.
The leak causes alarms in
the blowdown radiation monitor for the
associated Steam Generator and the Condenser Air Ejector discharge monitor.
Plant shutdown may begin around 0930. At 0926, the fan belts break on the HVS-1
supply fan interrupting supply air
to the Auxiliary Building.
The loss of supply
air
disrupts *the flow balance within the Auxiliary Building,
but negative
pressure is maintained.
During the plant shutdown,
a spurious Turbine Trip occurs with no associated
Reactor trip (ATWS). A manual trip from the control board will be required to
reduce reactor power.
This represents a second Alert.
The Steam Dump System
(designed to relive steam flow from the Steam Generators to the Condenser after
a Turbine Trip) fails to operate.
All Steam line Power Operated Relief Valves
(PORVs) open to prevent overpressurization. When the plant stabilizes the "A"
Steam Line PORV will remain stuck open.
A Site Area Emergency should be declared around 1017 based upon a 100 gpm leak
in the Reactor Coolant System and the stuck open PORV which provides a direct
uncontrolled path to the atmosphere.
However the release is minor as no fuel
failure has occurred at this time.
At 1116,
a Loose Parts Monitoring System
(LPMS)
alarm occurs which indicates
loose parts transported in the Reactor Coolant System. The loose parts result
in mechanical damage to a number of fuel assemblies in the core.
Approximately
9% of the fission
product activity
normally trapped in the space between the fuel
and the cladding
(gap activity)
is
released into the RCS.
related radiation monitors begin to alarm.
Since there is also a leak of coolant
into the "A" Steam Generator, this activity is released out the open PORV.
A General Emergency should be declared at around 1130 based upon the fuel damage
in addition to the direct pathway via the Steam Generator leak and open PORV for
release into the environment.
From 1130 until
approximately 1300, the release continues while the Control Room
cools down and depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System to mitigate the release.
At 1210, the chain drive on the Turbine turning gear breaks, causing the turbine
to stop rolling. Damage Control teams may want to repair the chain to prevent
damage to the turbine.
(93EXTIMLN.EX)
Deferred 1993 RNPD Exercise Time line
Note: This' Exercise will be run with the simulator in
interactive mode,
all
times given are approximate
TO
0830
Initial
conditions: Reactor is at 100% power steady state,
boron concentration is 22 ppm, late in core life, normal RCS
activity. "A" Charging and "A" CCW pumps are running.
T+16"
0846
Fire alarm in Charging Pump Room (one train), Fire Tech. will
be dispatched to investigate.
T+18"
0848
Second train fire alarm actuated in Charging Pump Room, Fire
alarm will be sounded and fire brigade will respond.
T+21"
0851
Approximate time for status report from Charging Pump Room.
Status will be room has heavy smoke near the overhead
and
flames appear to be coming from the "A" Charging Pump fire.
Sparks have been thrown from "A" pump onto
"B"
pump and the
Charging Pump Control Panel causing some burn marks on both.
T+25"
0855
DS Bus Undervoltage alarm is received on the DS/FP Annunciator
panel A.
"A" CCW Pump and "A" Charging Pump will be lost as
a result of the loss of the DS bus.
"D" Service Water Pump
alternate power supply from the DS bus is lost also.
T+26"
0856
480 Volt Bus Ground Alarm (APP-009-E7)
is received to give the
Control
Room
indications. of
other
potential
problems.
Approximate time for Fire Brigade at the scene.
T+30"
0900 Approximate
time for declaring
ALERT
based
on
fire
with
potential to effect safety related equipment.
T+38"
0908
Approximate time fire is reported out. Actual time for "fire
out" will be
after
15 minutes of
in
room
fire
fighting.
Initial
attempts with portable equipment will be unsuccessful.
T+45"
0915 Charging Pump High Speed alarm (APP-003-F4) is received on the
RTGB.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture is beginning (100 gpm leak
ramped in over 10 minutes) in "A" Steam Generator.
T+46"
0916
A
second Charging
Pump will be started and
a leak
rate
determination (OST-051) may be started.
T+50"
0920
R-19A (Steam Generator Blowdown) monitor alarms.
T+52"
0922
R-15 (Condenser Air Ejector Discharge) monitor alarms.
T+56"
0926
Fan belts break on
EVS-1
interrupting supply
air
to the
Auxiliary Building.
3.0-2
1993 Deferred Exercise Time line (Continued)
T+59"
0929
Start
shutdown of the Reactor at 2% a minute,
RCS boration
begins.
T+72"
0942 Approximate
time
to
recover
DS
bus
(actual time to be
determined by player response) ,
this
will recover
"A" CCW
Pump.
T+75"
0945
Shutdown rate increased to 3% a minute.
T+97"
1007
A spurious Turbine
trip
and an
failure
of the reactor to
automatically trip (ATWS). Manual Trip from the RTGB will be
successful.
T+98"
1008
Due to a failure of the Steam Dump System to operate all
three
Steam Generator PORVs lift to reduce pressure.
T+102"
1012
"A" S/G PORV will remain open after
temperature is returned to
normal.
T+103"
1013
The Main Steam Isolation Valve for "A" S/G to be shut after
RCS temperature is reduced below 547F.
T+107"
1017. Approximate time to declare SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on two
(RCS and Containment) Fission Product Barriers breached.
T+152"
1102
"A" S/G PORV fails full open.
T+166"
1116
LPMS alarm is received in the Control Room.
T+168"
1118
R-9 (Letdown line) monitor alarms and continues to increase.
T+,171"
1121 R-9 exceeds 5 Rem (if Letdown is in service).
T+175"
1125
Approximate time for GENERAL EMERGENCY declaration.
T+176-END
1126
Cooldown and depressurization to stop release.
T+220"
1210 Chain drive on Turbine Turning Gear breaks,
causing turning
gear to stop.
T+270"
1300
Approximate end of drill.
0
3.0-3