RNP-RA/14-0011, Revision to Response to Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident
| ML14069A151 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/2014 |
| From: | William Gideon Duke Energy Progress |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RNP-RA/14-0011 | |
| Download: ML14069A151 (64) | |
Text
SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION-WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 W R. Gideon H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Site Vice President
- ENERGY, Duke Energy Progress PROG RESS 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 0: 843 857 1701 F: 843 857 1319 Randy. Gideon(4duke-energy.com 10 CFR 50.54(0 Serial: RNP-RA/14-0011 FEB 2 7 2014 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261/RENEWED LICENSE NO. DPR-23
Subject:
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No.2 Revision to Response to Recommendation 2.3 "Seismic Walkdown" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident
References:
- 1.
NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, Dated March 12, 2012 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340
- 2.
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) Seismic Walkdown Guidance, For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, EPRI Report 1025286, dated 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12188A031
- 3.
Duke Energy Letter, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Response to Recommendation 2.3 "Seismic Walkdown" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated November 27, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML123410131 Ladies and Gentlemen:
On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued a letter requesting information per Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f) (Reference 1). The letter requested licensees to conduct seismic hazard walkdowns to verify current plant configuration with the current licensing basis (CLB).
Attachments 6 and 7 to Enclosure I of this letter contain SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION - WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 Upon removal of Attachments 6 and 7 from Enclosure 1, this letter in decontrolled.
4DAc
SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION-WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RNP-RAI14-0011 Page 2 of 3 Duke Energy conducted the requested walkdowns using the NRC endorsed, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidance (Reference 2). Duke Energy submitted the walkdown report for H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP) by letter dated November 27, 2012, (Reference 3).
The Enclosure to this letter provides Revision 1 to the Seismic Walkdown Report.
Duke Energy requests that Attachments 6 and 7 of the Enclosure to this letter, which contain secudty related information, be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390.
In Reference 3, Duke Energy stated in the Submittal Letter that the document contained a Regulatory Commitment to provide an updated report with the results of restricted access inspections for the entries in the Table below will be submitted by February 28, 2014.
Feature Committed Inspection Date Actual Inspection Date AFW MDPS TO SG-B SQUARE February 28, 2014 September 03, 2013 480 V EMERGENCY BUS El February 28, 2014 October 11, 2013 HAGAN RACK 30 February 28, 2014 September 03, 2013 HAGAN RACKS 1-13,26 February 28, 2014 September 03, 2013 INVERTER-A February 28, 2014 October 11,2013 Any other actions discussed in this document should be considered intended or planned actions. They are included for informational purposes but are not considered Regulatory Commitments.
If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Richard Hightower, Manager - Regulatory Affairs at (843) 857-1329.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on:
W. R. Gideon Site Vice President Attachments 6 and 7 to Enclosure I of this letter contain SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION - WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 Upon removal of Attachments 6 and 7 from Enclosure 1, this letter in decontrolled.
SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION-WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RNP-RA/14-0011 Page 3 of 3 WRG/shc
Enclosure:
Revision 1 to the Seismic Walkdown Report cc:
Mr. K. M. Ellis, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. S. P. Lingam, NRC Project Manager, NRR Mr. V. C. McCree, NRC Region II Administrator Attachments 6 and 7 to Enclosure I of this letter contain SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION - WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 Upon removal of Attachments 6 and 7 from Enclosure 1, this letter in decontrolled.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to RNP-RAI14-0011 18 Pages including this cover sheet ENCLOSURE I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261 RENEWED LICENSE NO. DPR-23
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 1.0 Introduction......................................................................................................................................
2 2.0 Seism ic Licensing Basis...........................................................................................................
3 3.0 Personnel Q ualifications..........................................................................................................
5 3.1 Equipm ent Selection Personnel.............................................................................................
5 3.2 Seism ic W alkdow n Engineers................................................................................................
6 3.3 Licensing Basis Review ers.....................................................................................................
7 3.4 IPEEE Review ers...............................................................................................................
7 3.5 Peer Review Team M em bers................................................................................................
7 4.0 Selection of SSCs............................................................................................................................
8 4.1 SW EL 1 Developm ent............................................................................................................
8 4.2 SW EL 2 Developm ent.........................................................................................................
11 5.0 Seism ic W alkdow ns and Area W alk-Bys..................................................................................
12 5.1 Seism ic W alkdow n M ethodology.........................................................................................
12 5.2 Area W alk-By M ethodology..................................................................................................
13 5.3 Results.......................................................................................................................................
14 5.4 M aintenance Assessm ent.....................................................................................................
15 5.5 Planned or New ly Installed Protection or M itigation Features...............................................
15 5.6 Inaccessible Item s....................................................................................................................
15 6.0 Licensing Basis Evaluations....................................................................................................
16 7.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution..............................................................................................
16 8.0 Peer Review...................................................................................................................................
16 :
Base List 1 :
SWEL 1 :
Base List 2 :
Rapid Drain Down List :
SWEL 2 :
Seismic Walkdown Checklists : Area Walk-By Checklists :
Peer Review Report Page 1
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 1.0 Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a Request for Information pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) (hereafter 50.54(f) letter) regarding "Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident" resulting from the Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. This submittal report, pursuant to the NRC's request for information, is offered to address the scope associated only with the 50.54(f) letter Enclosure 3, NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Seismic. Specifically, this report provides information for the H.B.
Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 (RNP) regarding the performance of seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions and to verify the current plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis. The information provided herein and the activities described in this report are consistent with the guidance provided by the Electric Power Research Institute's (EPRI) 2012 Technical Report 1025286 "Seismic Walkdown Guidance: for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic." The NRC, in its letter dated May 31, 2012, endorsed the EPRI guidance document.
Per EPRI 1025286, the 2.3 Seismic Walkdown inspections were to be non-intrusive visual inspections of primarily plant Seismic Category I SSCs per generic definition contain in EPRI guidance document.
During the inspections, observed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions were to be addressed through the corrective action program (CAP). Based on the EPRI guidance document, the list of SSCs for inspection were to be obtained through a systematic selection process to establish a broad, diverse and representative Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The SWEL for RNP was made up of a total of 138 SSCs in two separate lists: SWEL 1 included a variety of equipment types and locations throughout the plant and SWEL 2 included a shorter list of Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) SSCs.
This selection process for the SSCs combined with the inspection checklist attributes assessed the seismic capabilities of the plant. These attributes pertain to SSC anchorage, interaction and other considerations based on NRC and industry insights of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident.
Similar past seismic efforts include the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) and the Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 "Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" programs. Many of the same SSCs inspected for the A-46 Program were re-inspected for the current 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns. Most of the SWEL items originated from the A-46 Program Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL). These programs occurred in the 1990s. The A-46 program reviewed all of the seismic equipment in older nuclear plants and assessed their seismic capability related to experience based data and calculations. Where needed, equipment modifications were made to meet the required seismic capabilities. The IPEEE program used Seismic Margin programs to assess the plants' capabilities to perform when subjected to a larger Review Level Earthquake (RLE).
Modifications were also performed as a result if necessary. The A-46 outliers for RNP were subsumed by the IPEEE program.
The 2.3 Seismic Walkdown inspections were performed to visually check the condition of the SSCs and its anchorage to meet its seismic design basis. Also inspected are the surrounding equipment and area for interactions with other SSCs, fire hazards, water spray, and housekeeping issues that may interact with the SSCs. Conditions found were recorded on the developed checklists and evaluated. Any condition that was a potential adverse seismic condition (PASC) was further evaluated for its ability to meet its seismic design basis requirements and put into the plant CAP, if necessary. In addition to checking the SSCs with respect to their design basis, this report discusses the general adequacy of licensee monitoring and maintenance procedure by reviewing walkdown observations.
This submittal has been revised to include the results of the inspection of the five SSCs that were inaccessible during the initial walkdowns. These inspections were limited to internal inspections of electrical cabinets. The same methodology was applied during the follow-up walkdowns. The results of the walkdowns are presented within this report, and the seismic walkdown checklists for these items are included in Attachment 6. Additionally, a peer review was completed under the same methodology as Page 2
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 during the initial walkdowns, though different personnel were used. The results of the peer review are included in Attachment 8.
2.0 Seismic Licensing Basis The Seismic Licensing Basis for RNP is described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Compliance with the Seismic Licensing Basis assures that SSCs important to safety can perform their safety function both during and after a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE). SSCs important to safety are classified as Quality Class A, which consists of Class I and Class II SSCs. Class I SSCs are designed and built to withstand the maximum potential earthquake stresses for the particular region where a nuclear plant is sited. Those items vital to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor or whose failure either singularly or in combination with the failure of another structure or piece of equipment could result in radiation doses with consequences potentially exceeding guidelines of 10CFR100 or whose failure might cause or increase the severity of an accident are given the classification of Class I. Those items that are important to reactor operation, but are not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor or are systems involving orders of magnitude lower radioactive material inventories where a hypothetical accident could result in the release of such inventory and the resulting dose rate at the site boundary would not approach the guideline limit of 10CFR100 are given the classification of Class I1. Those items not related to reactor operation or safety were designated Class III.
All systems and components designated Class I were designed so that there would be no loss of function in the event of the maximum hypothetical ground acceleration acting in the horizontal and vertical directions simultaneously. The working stress for both Class I and Class II items is kept within code allowable values for the design earthquake. The following paragraphs describe the SSCs that comply with site characteristics, earthquake characteristics, the seismic design requirements for SSCs and the various codes and standards used for seismic designs at the RNP.
The plant is located in northwest Darlington County, South Carolina, approximately three miles west-northwest of Hartsville, SC, 25 miles northwest of Florence, SC, 35 miles north-northeast of Sumter, SC, and 56 miles east-northeast of Columbia, SC. The North Carolina border is 28 miles north of the site and the Atlantic Ocean is approximately 88 miles southeast. The plant is located atop more than 400 ft. of unconsolidated Coastal Plain sediments composed largely of sands with some clay and indurated layers overlie the crystalline basement. The surface of the basement rock slopes from the outcrop zone approximately 15 miles northwest of the site toward the Atlantic Coast. The basement surface is estimated at more than 3000 ft. below sea level. The upper soil (30 ft. depth) consists of surface alluvium over about 430 ft. of the Middendorf formation. The Middendorf is made up of sands, silty and sandy clay, sandstone, and siltstone. Compressional wave velocities are 17,500 fps in the basement rock, 7,200 fps in the Middendorf, and 1,500 fps in the top 30 ft. of alluvium. The alluvium and portions of the Middendorf formation occurring near the surface exhibit lenses of compressible material and for this reason piles have been selected for the support of all major structures. The pile foundations are supported by the stiff silty, clayey, and sandy soils encountered at about 50 ft. below existing grade and below the underlying dense sands.
The largest earthquake in this region occurred at Charleston in August, 1886. Charleston is approximately 120 miles south of the site. This shock had an intensity of about Modified Mercalli IX at the epicenter and it is estimated that this shock had a magnitude of 6 1/2 to 7 with epicentral acceleration of 0.25g to 0.30g.
However, damage was confined to a relatively small area and no permanent scars remain to give testimony to the shock. Aftershocks of the main earthquake had intensities ranging up to Modified Mercalli VII. It is unlikely that intensity at the RNP site exceeded VI for the largest Charleston shock.
Only one earthquake of intensity V or greater has ever been recorded within 50 miles of the RNP site.
This shock occurred on October 26, 1959, near McBee, Chesterfield County, South Carolina, with an intensity of Modified Mercalli VI. The epicenter was located about 15 miles from the RNP site. The estimated intensity at the RNP site was about V.
On the basis of historical data, it is expected that the RNP site area could experience a shock in the order of the 1959 McBee shock once during the life of the plant. This shock could be as far distant as in 1959, Page 3
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 or perhaps closer. On a conservative basis, magnitude 4.5 earthquake was selected with an epicentral distance of less than ten miles. This earthquake is the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and although the probable ground acceleration would be 0.07 to 0.09g, a value of 0.1g is used. The vertical component of the OBE is 2/3 of the horizontal acceleration.
To provide an adequate margin of safety, a maximum earthquake ground acceleration of 0.2g was selected for the hypothetical earthquake (Design Basis Earthquake - DBE). It is important to note that even if an earthquake comparable to the Charleston shock were to occur 35 miles from the site, the ground acceleration would not exceed 0.2g. The vertical component of the DBE is 2/3 of the horizontal acceleration.
Structures, equipment and safety related piping were designed in accordance with the following criteria:
Stress and deformation behavior of structures, piping, and equipment were maintained within the allowable limits when subjected to loads such as dead, live, pressure, and thermal, under normal operating conditions combined with the seismic effects resulting from the response to the OBE.
These allowable limits are defined in appropriate design standards such as:
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII, 1968 Edition with Summer 1968 addenda American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Code for Pressure Piping ANSI B31.1.0, Power Piping, 1967 ACI 318-63 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, 1963 edition and 1978 edition for current work The seismic analysis is described in section 3.7.2 of the UFSAR and includes the following design information:
- a. For the design earthquake ground acceleration of 0.1 g horizontally coincident with a vertical acceleration of 0.067 g, allowable stress limits were taken at 1.33 times allowable code stresses.
Primary steady state stresses are maintained within the allowable stress limits accepted as good practice and, where applicable, set forth in the appropriate design standards, e.g., ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, USAS B31.1 Code for Pressure Piping, and AISC Specifications for the Design and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings.
- b.
Primary steady state stresses when combined with the seismic stress resulting from the response to a ground acceleration of 0.133g acting in the vertical and 0.2g acting in the horizontal planes simultaneously, are limited so that the function of the component, system, or structure shall not be impaired as to prevent a safe and orderly shutdown of the plant.
Seismic Class I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment design is found in UFSAR Section 3.10. The maximum hypothetical ground motion horizontal acceleration for the plant is 0.2g. Plant instrumentation and electrical equipment was qualified as outlined in UFSAR Section 3.10 and in accordance with the following:
Electrical and control equipment which initiates reactor trips and/or actuates safeguards systems must be capable of performing its functions during and after an earthquake that has occurred at the plant site. To demonstrate the ability of this equipment to perform under earthquake conditions, selected types of this essential equipment representative of all protection and safeguards circuits and equipment were subjected to vibration tests which simulated the seismic conditions.
Other Class I equipment (flexible and rigid) were evaluated to assure functional adequacy when considering potential equipment resonance with the building during earthquake conditions. Details of Page 4
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. I these analyses are described in UFSAR Section 3.7.3. Tanks were originally qualified under TID 7024 Chapter VI. However, they were reanalyzed under resolution of USI A-40 via the USI A-46 program.
For Regulatory Guide 1.97 equipment use of IEEE 344-'71 and some enhancements from IEEE 344-75 is required.
Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants," was addressed in accordance with the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) developed Generic Implementation Procedure, Revision 2 as corrected on February 14, 1992 (GIP-2). Verification of the seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment included:
Training of Seismic Evaluation Personnel Identification of Safe Shutdown Equipment Screening Verification and Walkdown Outlier Identification and Resolution Evaluations were also performed for relay functionality review, tanks and heat exchangers review, and cable and conduit raceway review.
Revision 3 of the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP-03) as modified and supplemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Nos. 2 (SSER No. 2) and SSER No. 3, can be used as an alternative to existing methods for the seismic design and verification of modified, new, and replacement equipment. However, this alternative method is not used for NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 equipment. The commitment for Regulatory Guide 1.97 equipment is described above.
3.0 Personnel Qualifications The personnel involved in the Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Seismic walkdown activity at RNP came from a variety of backgrounds in the nuclear industry. The following personnel supported the walkdown activities with their qualifications as detailed below.
3.1 Equipment Selection Personnel 3.1.1 BillyAlumbaugh Billy Alumbaugh is a Registered Professional Engineer and has over 30 years engineering experience including 16 years nuclear experience with site experience working for a utility and as a consultant. Progressive experience in civil engineering ranges from individual contribution to supervisory and project management. Supervised multiple engineers at operating nuclear facility and was involved in several projects including: Control Room expansion, Equipment obsolescence, Dry Fuel Storage, and Containment redesign/design pressure uprate. Training received includes Auxiliary Operator, Waste Control Operator, Systems Training, 10CFR50.59 certification, and modification/change control. As a consultant, he served as the Civil/Structural Engineering Design Lead for the new plant Design Certification and Combined Operating License projects providing a technical review of civil based licensing responses to clients or the NRC and project management. More recently served as the Civil-Structural-Architect Discipline Manager for the detailed design phase of the US-APWR including all aspects of the design including the site specific and Design Control Document seismic evaluations. Billy Alumbaugh has an MS and a BS degree in Civil Engineering.
3.1.2 Harold Bamberger Harold Bamberger has over 40 years of experience in both field and office functions required for designing, analyzing, and installing piping and pipe supports for metallic and non-metallic systems in major power, chemical, and pharmaceutical facilities. Mr. Bamberger has worked for Page 5
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 various nuclear power plants in design and review of piping, piping supports and other nuclear structure using ASME Section Il, ASME/ANSI B31.1 and B31.3, and applicable nuclear plant procedures. Mr. Bamberger is a Registered Professional Engineer and holds an AD in Mechanical Engineering Technology with additional classes in Mechanical Engineering and Technology.
3.2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers 3.2.1 Jose Olmeda Jose Olmeda has over 30 years of experience in the Analysis and Design of nuclear related facilities, components structures and systems. This includes the use of Industry Standards and codes as: ACI-318, ACI-349, AISC-ASD/LRFD, SEI/ASCE-7, ASCE-4-98, ASCE-43-05, ANSI/AISC N690, NFPA-17, and the Life Safety Code. He has a high degree of knowledge of the theory and applications of finite elements using structural analysis and design software such as GT-Strudl, STAAD.Pro2007 and other common design software in the structural engineering field. He is a longstanding member with the American Concrete Institute, American Institute of Steel Construction, and a Charter Member of the Structural Engineers Institute of the American Society of Civil Engineers. Mr. Olmeda maintains an Associated Membership in the ACI-1 18 Committee, Use of Computers for Concrete Applications.
3.2.2 Harold Bamberger-see above 3.2.3 Les Galazka Les Galazka has over 30 years of leadership/project management experience, including engineering. He has 26 years of nuclear experience including Structural, Mechanical, Piping and Pipe Support, Start-up, Nuclear Waste Process and Management, and System Engineering. He has six years of international experience on construction, equipment installation and testing, QC, engineering and management. He holds a Bachelors and a Masters in Mechanical/Structural Engineering.
3.2.4 Primo Novero Primo Novero has over 46 years of engineering experience, most of which in structural design, construction, and environmental. Mr. Novero has 34 years of nuclear structural design experience in various structures, systems and components involving different materials, and in diverse topical matters including seismic. Primo Novero has a BS in Civil Engineering and Environmental Engineering, and is a Registered Professional Engineer in the field of Civil, Structural and Environmental.
3.2.5 Bijan Mahnoori Bijan Mahnoori possesses 32 years of nuclear power plant design experience and has provided services to multiple nuclear facilities, including Crystal River Unit 3, Millstone Unit 1, Salem Units 1 and 2, Hope Creek, Nine Mile Point Unit 1, Turkey Point, Indian Point 3, and Seabrook Unit 1. Mr. Mahnoori has been trained by the Electric Power Research Institute Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (EPRI and SQUG) and is certified as a Seismic Capability Engineer. As a certified Project Management Professional (PMP) from Project Management Institute (PMI), he has performed project management activities for various projects.
3.2.6 Joshua Hegenderfer Joshua Hegenderfer is a Ph.D graduate with a strong research background to augment his role as a Civil/Structural Engineer. His responsibilities include performing engineering analysis and calculations for nuclear new-build, plant modifications, and Fukushima seismic reevaluation projects. He has been involved in numerous Fukushima projects with responsibilities including conceptual design, seismic reevaluation, and project task planning. He is currently leading Page 6
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 efforts in completing the NTTF 2.1 Seismic Expedited Evaluation Process (ESEP) as a member of the Seismic Review Team (SRT) and in performing necessary High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations.
3.2.7 David West David West has over 33 years of professional experience in the fields of mechanical engineering, seismic engineering, system engineering, safety analysis and engineering/project management. He is highly valued for quality of work, self initiative and communication skills. He has the proven ability to effectively manage and perform tasks involving mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls and civil/structural/architectural discipline responsibilities.
3.2.8 Matthew Haapala Matthew Haapala is a project engineer with three years experience in structural engineering.
His project experience includes engineering design, construction administration, and inspections. His technical specialties include dynamic finite element structural, analysis of buildings and NTTF 2.1 seismic fragility calculations and walkdowns. Matthew has a BAE and MAE in Architectural Engineering from the Pennsylvania State University and is a licensed Professional Engineer.
3.3 Licensing Basis Reviewers 3.3.1 Timothy Rouns Timothy Rouns has over thirty years of engineering experience, including over 20 years as a Civil/Structural Engineer and 8 years as a Fire Protection Engineer. He has detailed knowledge of AISC, ACI and NFPA codes and experience using ANSI and ASME piping codes in design.
He has a BS in Civil Engineering.
3.3.2 Winston Stewart Winston Stewart is a Design Engineer with over 10 years of related nuclear experience including: Modification Engineer, 10CFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Project Manager, and Procedure Technical Reviewer. He was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, and components; as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents. He served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B31.1,Section III and Section XI). He is a certified SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer, and has completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3. Winston holds a BE in Mechanical Engineering from The City College of New York.
3.4 IPEEE Reviewers 3.4.1 Harold Bamberger-see above 3.5 Peer Review Team Members 3.5.1 Jerry Panfil Jerome Panfil has over 30 years experience in the nuclear engineering profession as a civil/structural engineer on a variety of projects. He has extensive experience in the structural analysis, design, and installation of plant modifications in support of nuclear power station construction and operations. He has been a member of an IPEEE program team at a major nuclear plant. He holds a BS and MS in Architecture/Structural Engineering and is a licensed (i.e., Professional Engineer) Structural Engineer.
Page 7
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 3.5.2 Louis Wade Louis Wade has over 30 years' experience in Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC),
Project Management, and QA/QC consulting. Over 15 years in management positions associated with construction, maintenance, modifications, including work package control, and operation of DOE and NRC regulated facilities, Vitrification Facilities, Radioactive Waste Facilities, Gaseous Diffusion Facilities, and TRU Waste Characterization and Disposal. Mr.
Wade is an ASQ Certified Quality Auditor 10600, Lead Auditor per ANSI N45.2.23, and Lead Auditor per ASME-NQA 1.
3.5.3 Jake Finlayson Jake Finlayson is a Supervising Discipline Engineer with a broad understanding of project management and presents excellent leadership qualities. He has worked in depth on several Fukushima related projects doing technical work as well as dealing with project oriented tasks.
His project experience includes, but is not limited to, engineering design, engineering change modification packages, Fukushima technical oversight, as well as several project management related tasks. Jake holds a BS and MS in Civil Engineering from the University of Tennessee and is a licensed Professional Engineer.
3.5.4 Madeleine Grimmer Madeleine Grimmer has extensive experience in the field of nuclear energy. She has experience with the NRC NTTF Recommendations 2.1: Seismic in the analysis of High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) capacity calculations. She also has an in depth understanding of finite element analysis and its application to new design and existing plant modifications. She has a strong programming background and experience with a wide array of computer programs including ANSYS, Mathcad, SAP 2000, LabView, and Visual Basic.
Madeleine holds a BS in Civil and Environmental Engineering and a MSCE in Structural Engineering from the University of North Carolina, Charlotte.
4.0 Selection of SSCs 4.1 SWEL 1 Development The selection of SSCs included in SWEL 1 for RNP was based on the guidance provided in EPRI Guidelines, Section 3. Plant staff participated in the SSC selection process and concurred with the SSCs selected for SWEL 1. The inspection of items on this list addresses safe shutdown and containment integrity at the plant. This selection process was conducted by experienced personnel and plant operations staff members selecting SSCs based on the EPRI Guidance using screening selection criteria. These screens are listed as follows:
Screen #1: Seismic Category I Screen #2: Equipment or systems NOT regularly inspected Screen #3: Supports five safety functions o
Reactor reactivity control o
Reactor coolant pressure control o
Reactor coolant inventory control o
Containment function Screen #4: Sample considerations (systems, major new/replacement, equipment types, environments, IPEEE enhancements)
Page 8
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 The list of equipment resulting from Screen #3 is Base List 1. At RNP, the Base List 1 was created as suggested by the EPRI guidance document, through the use of a previous equipment list from implementation of the combined USI A-46 and IPEEE Seismic program. Per EPRI 1025286, the first screen narrows the list to SSCs classified as Seismic Category I items because only those have a defined seismic licensing basis against which to evaluate the as-installed configuration. For RNP, these items are not classified as Seismic Category I. They are typically classified as seismic Class I or seismic Class II. The second screen further narrows the list by selecting only those remaining items that do not have regular inspections to confirm their configuration is consistent with the licensing basis. The third screen ensures that those remaining items are associated with at least one of the five safety functions. The A-46 SSEL met the criteria for Screens #1, #2, and #3 (although the fifth safety function was not explicitly defined in the A-46/IPEEE SSEL, personnel performing the selection verified that the SSEL contained equipment supporting all safety functions including containment function), and thus using the A-46/IPEEE SSEL was appropriate.
Some items from the A-46/IPEEE SSEL were dropped during application of Screen 3 because they were not associated with any of the 5 safety functions.
Once Base List 1 was established, Screen #4 was applied to ensure the inspections encompassed a broad and varying array of equipment. Screen #4 included selection considerations compiled from the EPRI guidance document and from the 50.54(f) letter Enclosure 3. This resulted in the creation of SWEL 1. Considerations made for the creation of SWEL 1 are detailed in the sections below.
4.1.1 Equipment types/classes One of the sampling objectives was to select items from all equipment classes where possible.
A breakdown of the inspected items into the various equipment classes is provided in the following table.
Class SSEL No.
Equipment Included Total Selected 0
Other 20 4
1 Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors 8
2 2
Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels 2
1 3
Medium Voltage Metal-Clad Switchgear 0
0 4
Transformers 2
1 5
Horizontal Pumps 15 7
6 Vertical Pumps 7
2 7
Pneumatic-Operated Valves 37 16 8
Motor-Operated and Solenoid Operated Valves 69 18 9
Fans 10 3
10 Air Handlers 6
2 11 Chillers 0
0 12 Air Compressors 0
0 13 Motor Generators 0
0 14 Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches 10 2
15 Battery Racks 2
1 Page 9
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. I Class SSEL No.
Equipment Included Total Selected 16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 6
2 17 Engine Generators 2
1 18 Instrument Racks 108 40 19 Temperature Sensors 18 1
20 Instrument and Control Panels 60 11 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 31 12 Total 413 126 The above stated equipment classes were determined by the industry and provided in the EPRI guidance. Equipment classes were not included in the SWEL if they were not represented on Base List 1. Since the A-46/IPEEE SSEL was the starting point for Base List 1, additional verification was performed to ensure that no other safety-related equipment existed at the plant for Equipment Classes 3, 11, 12 and 13. None were identified. The equipment class for each SSC is included in Base List 1 of Attachment 1.
4.1.2 Five safety functions The appropriate proportion of SSCs serving each of the five safety functions on Base List 1 was maintained in the selection of SSCs for the SWEL 1 as follows:
Safety Function Total SSCs Selected SSCs Reactor reactivity control 137 40 Reactor coolant pressure control 166 43 Reactor coolant inventory control 130 42 Decay heat removal 271 89 Containment function 173 51 This table demonstrates full coverage of the five safety functions for the selected SSCs. Base List 1 in Attachment 1 includes the safety function category of each SSC.
4.1.3 Locations Although not required by the guidance, SSCs in a variety of plant locations were considered for inclusion on SWEL 1 including the Reactor Containment, Reactor Auxiliary Building, Control Building, Diesel Generator building, Service Water Intake Structure, Condensate Storage Tank, and the Diesel Fuel Storage. SWEL 1 in Attachment 2 includes the building location of each item.
Page 10
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 4.1.4 Environments SSCs from a variety of environments including dry and hot, wet and cold, mild and harsh, and inside and outside buildings were included for inspection in the SWEL 1. SWEL 1 in Attachment 2 includes the environment of each item.
4.1.5 Systems During the SWEL 1 selection process, consideration was given to equipment of varying systems including the Chemical Volume Control, Auxiliary Feedwater, Main Steam, and Residual Heat Removal Systems. Table B-1 of Appendix E of the EPRI guidance was consulted to ensure systems to support safety functions were included. Additionally, equipment in the Service Water System that support access to the Ultimate Heat Sink was included in SWEL 1. SWEL 1 in Attachment 2 includes the system of each SSC.
4.1.6 Risk The selection team was able to readily identify items that posed a higher risk ranking due to their knowledge and experience of nuclear plant operations and those SSCs that contribute to nuclear plant risk profiles. An element of the team's experience included knowledge of seismic PRA and other risk lists that comprise SSCs and conditions that combine probability and consequences of an event. Such items as emergency diesels, station batteries, core cooling systems, emergency cooling water systems, and 1E electrical switchgear are identified as critical equipment that have a higher risk profile. These items were included while maintaining a balance with the other requirements of SWEL equipment selection.
4.1.7 IPEEE vulnerabilities No IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities were reported for RNP.
4.1.8 Modified, replacement, and new equipment A review of plant modifications from 1995 (the initiation time of IPEEE) to 2011 was performed and key plant personnel were consulted to determine significant modifications to the plant.
Twenty-nine of 41 identified replacement items were inspected. No SSCs considered to be new equipment were identified.
4.1.9 Accessibility Before the walkdowns, some SSCs were determined to be inaccessible due to a variety of reasons, such as the item was in a high radiation area, blocked by sensitive instruments or was overhead and required scaffolding to access. When an item was removed from SWEL 1, a review of Base List 1 was completed to determine if similar equipment was accessible and a substitution was made. Items that did not have an acceptable substitute are to be inspected at a later date and are discussed in Section 5.6.
4.2 SWEL 2 Development Equipment Selection Personnel along with plant operations and systems personnel developed the RNP Base List 2, SWEL 2 and Rapid Drain-Down List based on the EPRI guidance document which presents screening criteria to identify specific equipment that is unique to the SFP SSCs. Screen #1 and #2 limit SFP SSCs to those which have a Seismic Category I licensing basis (or in the case of RNP, Quality Class A Class I SSCs) and are capable of being visually reviewed in the plant. This list is determined to be Base List 2 and is included as Attachment 3.
The Rapid Drain-Down List identifies items that have the possibility of providing a hydraulic pathway for a rapid drain-down of the SFP within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after an earthquake to a level approximately 10 ft.
above the spent fuel stored in the pool. It was determined that the return piping from the SFP Page 11
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 cooling heat exchanger has a 1 in. branch line near the fuel pool normal water level with a 0.5 in.
diameter hole to act as a vacuum breaker to prevent a siphoning effect on the pool. The other item was an SFP drain. This line is within 3 in. of the bottom of the pool. It is prevented from draining by two closed and locked valves, one inside the pool and one outside the pool, and a blind spectacle flange upstream of the outside valve. Only the spectacle flange was added to the SWEL 2 list since the return piping in question is seismic Class 1 and is covered under the ISI program. There are no other penetrations in the SFP within 10 ft. above the top of the fuel assemblies. The evaluation found no other drain down paths that would meet the Rapid Drain-down criteria and, therefore, the only item listed in Attachment 4 as meeting the rapid drain-down criteria was the blind spectacle flange. SWEL 2 is included as Attachment 5.
5.0 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The methodology used to complete the walkdowns and area walk-bys complies with the EPRI guidance.
The walkdowns and area walk-bys were performed by the SWEs listed in Section 3.2 in groups of at least two. The SWEs used engineering judgment, based on their experience and training, to identify PASCs.
After active discussion of all observations and judgments, all issues that were not resolved by consensus of the SWEs were further evaluated as described in Section 5.0 of the EPRI guidance document.
Walkdown results were documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklists and area walk-bys on Area Walk-By Checklists. These Checklists are provided as Attachments 6 and 7, respectively.
5.1 Seismic Walkdown Methodology The SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 lists were combined into one to develop the individual walkdown packages. Working with the site personnel, the walkdown packages were grouped based on elevation, location and the expected number of SSCs that could be walked down during the scheduled time and date. Two separate inspection teams were utilized in the original inspections. A third team was utilized in the follow-up inspections. The first team consisted of two contracted Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) trained in accordance with the EPRI guidance, an additional contracted engineer with a seismic background, and a plant employee. The second team consisted of two contracted Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) trained in accordance with the EPRI guidance and a plant employee. A pre-job brief was performed prior to each day's walkdown activities to ensure team members could perform the task safely and effectively. When SWEL items were inaccessible at the time of inspection and an appropriate substitute was not available, the item was documented to be inspected at a future date as detailed in Section 5.6 below.
Seismic walkdowns were performed on each SWEL 1 and 2 and were evaluated for adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic spatial interactions, or other adverse seismic conditions as detailed below.
5.1.1 Adverse Anchorage Conditions Lack of anchorage or inadequate anchorage has been the primary cause for malfunction and failure of equipment during an earthquake. During the walkdown inspection, the anchorage was inspected against specific design details for approximately 50% of the SWEL items that include anchorage.
For all SWEL items with anchorage, a general visual inspection of anchorage was performed to determine if the SSC had indications of the following:
Bent, broken, missing, or loose hardware Corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation Visible cracks within 10D of an anchor Gaps that may exist at the visible parts of the equipment foundation Other potential adverse concerns Page 12
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 In cases where the anchorage was inaccessible and a substitution was not possible, an alternate method was used to assess potential degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions which included:
An review of previous walkdown packages to validate prior inspection attributes for adequacy A determination whether the local environment could cause the degradation of anchorage or its installation, (e.g., adverse environment conditions):
o Evidence of moisture or relatively high humidity, o
Evidence of corrosion on other nearby components and o
Anchorage, and/or indication of vibration that could loosen the fasteners.
A check whether the equipment and its anchorage have been subjected to maintenance or modified since it was last walked down The SWEs used engineering judgment to assess whether the anchorage is potentially vulnerable to seismic failure or malfunction. The basis for any judgment used in the assessment was documented in the seismic walkdown checklists.
5.1.2 Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions Seismic spatial interaction is the physical interaction between the SWEL item and a nearby SSC caused by relative motion between the two during an earthquake. The walkdown included an inspection of the adjacent and surrounding areas to each SWEL item for adverse seismic interaction conditions that could affect the capability of the item to perform its intended safety-related functions. The three types of seismic spatial interaction effects considered were:
proximity to an item, failure of an SSC and falling on an item, and flexibility of attached lines impacting an item.
5.1.3 Other Adverse Seismic Conditions In addition to adverse anchorage and spatial interaction conditions, other potentially adverse seismic conditions that could challenge the adequacy of SWEL items were also identified when present, such as:
Degraded conditions Loose or missing fasteners that secure internal or external components to equipment Large, heavy components mounted on a cabinet that are not typically included by the original manufacturer Cabinet doors or panels that are not latched or fastened 5.2 Area Walk-By Methodology The focus of the area walk-bys was to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item (either within the room or for large rooms within approximately 35 ft. from the item). The key examination factors that were considered included:
anchorage conditions, significantly degraded equipment in the area, a visual assessment of cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting, housekeeping items that could cause adverse seismic interaction, and seismically induced fire and flooding/spray interactions as described below.
5.2.1 Seismically Induced Fire Interactions During the seismic walkdown, the engineers visually assessed hazardous/flammable material (e.g., compressed flammable gas bottles, fuel tanks, other combustible material, etc.) and high Page 13
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 voltage equipment located in the vicinity of the SWEL item to ensure adequate support and the absence of seismic interaction. The SWEs assessed the likelihood of seismically induced fire during the walkdowns. This was primarily accomplished by assessing seismic event impacts to flammable or combustible materials and high energy electrical equipment. Results of the findings are included in AWC.
5.2.2 Seismically Induced Flooding/Spray Interactions Two examples of potential flooding sources are rupture of piping and vessels. Flooding is most likely to originate from threaded fire protection piping, sprinkler head impact, flexible headers and stiff branch pipes, non-ductile mechanical couplings, seismic anchor motion and failed supports.
As the SWEs performed the walkdowns, they visually assessed the potential sources of water (e.g. fire suppression piping, tanks, etc.) located in the vicinity of the subject SSC. The SWEs verified that the water sources had adequate support so that they are not likely to be a source of flooding or spray that could adversely affect the nearby SSCs. The items that were identified as potential flooding/spray conditions were documented on the AWC along with any assessment of the effects.
5.3 Results When conditions were identified during the inspection that were not readily determined as acceptable, they were documented along with an evaluation of the condition using available design information and based on the SWEs' experience. SSCs may have been determined to be a PASC at the time of the inspection and noted as such on the checklist, or the condition may have been documented and further discussion completed before determining if it was a PASC. Non-PASC conditions found during the inspections are those evaluated and determined to not affect the ability of the item to perform its intended safety function during or after design basis ground motion as noted in the Current Licensing Basis. For those items not readily evaluated to meet the Current Licensing Basis, the item was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution. Of the 138 SWEL items inspections and 56 area walk-bys, 9 PASCs were identified. For all PASCs identified, a licensing basis review was completed as detailed in Section 6.0 below.
The following table summarizes the condition and status of each (initially identified) potentially adverse seismic condition.
Feature Condition Status of Resolution North Service Water Spalled grout in mounting pedestals and The condition was found Header Strainer anchor bolts had lack of proper thread to be bounded by the engagement seismic licensing basis Reactor Coolant Pump "A' An HVAC duct on threaded rod hangers The condition was found Seal Leak-off high range does not appear to be seismically to be bounded by the flow transmitters supported and is directly above flow seismic licensing basis transmitters Refueling Water Storage The grating over the Safety Injection pipe The condition was found Tank level transmitter is not adequately anchored to be bounded by the seismic licensing basis Reactor Protection Filing cabinet and rack of instruments The condition was found Instrumentation Rack Area secured with thin cables. Potential to be bounded by the deficiencies are size of cable, slack in seismic licensing basis cable, and use of only one attachment point.
Page 14
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 Feature Condition Status of Resolution Emergency Diesel The overflow pipe from the diesel engine A portion of piping was Generator Jacket Water to the bottom of the tank may not be found not to be bounded Expansion Tank sufficiently restrained in the north-south by the seismic licensing direction basis upon further review; the condition is scheduled to be corrected by Work Request # 11612009 Instrument Racks PT-125, Two HVAC ducts near the instrument The condition was found 154, PI-1 54B, & LT-494 rack do not appear to be properly to be bounded by the restrained seismic licensing basis Emergency Diesel Service Water anchor bolt nut does not The condition was found Generator A Air Receiver have full thread engagement to be bounded by the Tank seismic licensing basis Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Pump baseplate configuration not in The condition was found Pump "A" conformance with drawing to be bounded by the seismic licensing basis SFP Spent Fuel Pit Hi/Lo Support for LA-651 was found with two The condition was found Level Alarm anchor bolts in lieu of four as shown in to be bounded by the drawing seismic licensing basis In the inspections completed following the original submittal, no additional PASCs were identified.
However, the status of the Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Expansion Tank piping was further evaluated as discussed in Section 6.0.
5.4 Maintenance Assessment The maintenance assessment, as required as part of the 10CFR50.54(f) response, was completed by analyzing the number of housekeeping and maintenance issues identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys and the determined causes during CAP evaluation. During the walkdowns, relatively few housekeeping problems and other minor issues were noted such as areas of general corrosion, slightly chipped grout, and minor spalling. Most mobile equipment, tables, and tools were either secured properly or located in safe locations away from plant equipment. Few issues were noted with cleaning equipment. These indicators suggest that monitoring and maintenance processes and procedures are adequate.
5.5 Planned or Newly Installed Protection or Mitigation Features There were no planned or newly installed protection or mitigation features.
5.6 Inaccessible Items At the time of the original submittal, there were five items as shown in the table below that were not completely inspected since internal inspection posed a personnel and/or plant safety concern at the time of inspection. All inspections have since been completed, and the results are included in Section 5.3. There are no remaining inaccessible items that require inspection.
Page 15
ENCLOSURE1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. I Feature Inspection Completion Date AFW MDPS TO SG-B SQUARE 09/03/2013 480 V EMERGENCY BUS El 10/11/2013 HAGAN RACK 30 09/03/2013 HAGAN RACKS 1-13,26 09/03/2013 INVERTER-A 10/11/2013 6.0 Licensing Basis Evaluations Originally, all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions that were identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were found to meet the plant seismic licensing basis through evaluation in the plant CAP system. During subsequent reviews, a portion of the Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Expansion Tank piping was found to not meet its licensing basis but was determined to be operable. Disposition of this condition was evaluated under the plant's CAP and the corrective action is scheduled for completion in the first quarter of 2014.
No potentially adverse seismic conditions were identified in the inspections completed following the original submittal, and thus no licensing basis evaluations were required for these additional items.
7.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution The IPEEE program identified no seismic vulnerabilities for RNP.
8.0 Peer Review The Peer Review Report is included in Attachment 8.
Page 16
ENCLOSURE 1 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 Attachments : : : : : : : :
Base List 1 SWEL 1 Base List 2 Rapid Drain Down List SWEL 2 Seismic Walkdown Checklists Area Walk-By Checklists Peer Review Report Page 17
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to. Enclosure 1 to RNP-RAI14-0011 26 pages including this cover sheet : Base List 1
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
j j oo~
FLOO 35 Mt3 2
3 (j~~~~~
TOA Z3 6
3 7
7 0
rt
___R-D VETIATIN DMPE 0
G-1030(4)R1 TB 251 MEZANNE HV()
0 0
0 L-19 A
w w
L 0
0 z) it SAET IxIE VALV CONTAINMENT RC-551A
____*SV1 5379197(1)R31 RC 275 SRs__1 0
0I RC-551 SAFTYLELIFTVLV U)FLOOR SEETD 35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ROOM SYSTEM REE)
TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 CR-17 VENTILATION DAMPER 0
G-190304(4)(R4)
0 0
0 1
L-1 9 AIR 0
G-190304(4)(R4)
0 0
0 1
RC-551A RELIEF VALVE 0
5379-1971(1)(R31)
RC 275 CONTAINMENT SRVs 0
1 0
0 0
RC-551B RELIEF VALVE F
S 0
79-1971(1)(R31)
RC 275 CONTAINMENT SRVs 0
1 0
0 0
SVI-IB SAFETY VALVEOSGB0G109()R5 TB 22 OEAIG G0 1
0 0
0 RC-551C SE RELIEF VALVES 0
G79-1971(1)(R31)
RC 275 CONTAINMENT SRVs 0
1 0
0 0
~-t
-SV3 I
S6-2A SW STRAINER A 0
G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
1 0
S6-1 B SW STRAINER B 0
G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
1 0
SI-857A RELIEF VALVE 0
5379-1082(1)(R31)
1 0
0 0
SV1-1A RELIEF VALVE FOR SG A 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-1B RELIEF VALVE FOR SGJB 0
G-190196()(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-2C RELIEF VALVE FOR SG C 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-2A RELIEF VALVE FOR SG A 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-2B RELIEF VALVE FOR SG B 0 G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-2C RELIEF VALVE FOR SG C 0 G-1 90196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-3A RELIEF VALVE FOR SG A 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-3C RELIEF VALVE FOR SG C 0 G-190196(l)(R35)
1 0
0 0
0 (D
-U 0
0
-'I r.j (Il SVl-3C RELIEF VALVE FOR SG C 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
0 EV 00 zO Z w 0-~iI
)C.
ZZ ELETOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 SV1-4A RELIEF VALVE FOR SG A 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SVl-4B RELIEF VALVE FOR SG B 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
SV1-4C RELIEF VALVE FOR SG C 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
DC-MCC-A 125 VDC MCC-A 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
DC-MCC-B 125 VDC MCC-B 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
MCC-10 MOO CONTERO 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
_______MOTORCENTEROL_____
MCC-16 MTRCONTERO 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
MTORCENTEROL______
MCC-18 MTRCONTERO 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
___MOTOR CENTERO MCC-5,EA MTRCONTERO 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
MOTOR CONTROL MCC-6,6A CENTER 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
IMOTOR CONTROL__
MCC-9 j
CENTER 1
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
EE 480 V EMERGENCY BUS ER-BE1 E2 2
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
EQIMENTUSE 480 VDEESRIPTINCBU DWG-96(R0 NO ABL 24DEGE ROOM SYSTEM 1
E2E CVT CONSTANT VOLTAGE 4
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
SV1CV75 REIFVLEFRS
-916l(3)T3 22 OEAIG S
TRAN-4 CONSTANT VOLTAGE 4
G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
AFWCC-12 AUVEDWAE MC-
-966R0 4
ATTER DMDP 1
1 AFWAUXMOTOR F
WTERO G-190197(4)(R29)
0 0
0 1
AUX FEEDWATER AFW MDP MCC18MOTOR CONTRO 1
G-19014(R2)
R ROOM 2460 0
0 0
1 AFW5,5 MOTOR CONTROL___
1_____
______6R20 226 AUBDA_11 1
0 2
CD TU 0) 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
0 Uj cc 0 (J O=)=
1.
v.O
.Z 00 00 w0w-00 Oz
-J 0
uJ r-uJ X
0j Cu3
-J 0
0 I-z Ez I0ZZum DESCRIPTION U)
DWG NO BLDG FLOOR ELEV ROOM SYSTEM SELECTED 35131 I 36 72 36 TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 BAT BAT AUX FEED WATER STEAM BORIC ACID TANK TRANSFER 5
5 G-190196(1)(R35) 5379-685(3)(R24) 5379-685(3)(R24)
TB RAB RAB 226 226 226 AFW SDP CCW PUMP AFW CVCS 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 BORIC ACID TANK TRANSFER 5
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 CCW CCW PUMP A 5
5379-376(1)(R26)
1 1
1 1
CCW CCW PUMP B 5
5379-376(1)(R26)
1 1
1 1
CCW CCW PUMP C 5
5379-376(1"'R26)
-1 1
1 1
1 0
3
(,Dl CHARGING PUMP B AND C-COOLER CHARGING PUMP C AND COOLER
_ CP-C
~FUEL OIL TRANSFER FOTP-APUMPA 5
5 5
5379-685(2)(R38) 5379-685(2)(R38)
G-190204D(2)(R12)
RAB RAB YARD 226 226 N/A CHARGING CHARGING DIESEL OIL CVCS CVCS AC SI 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
0 0
1
+
4
~
1 1
1 t-4
~-l
~-
SIP-A SI PUMPA 5
5379-1082(2)(R32)
1
+/-
-1
+/-
1-1 1
1 1
1 1
SIP-B SI PUMP B 5
5379-1082(2)(R32)
1 WST-GAS-COMP-A WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR A 5
5379-376(4)(R26)
0 0
0 0
0 0
WST-GAS-COMP-B WASTE GAS COMPRESSOR B 5
5379-376(4)(R26)
G-190204D(2)(R12)
RAB YARD 246 N/A WASTE GAS DIESEL OIL CCW AC 0
0 0
-u (0
0O 01 FOTP-B FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP B 6
1 1
1 1
1 RHRP-A RHR PUMP A UNIT RHRP-B RHR PUMP B UNIT 6
SWPA SW PUMP A 6
5379-1484(R25) 5379-1484(R25)
G-190199(2)(R44)
NW OF NW OF SW 203 203 216 RHR PUMP PIT RHR PUMP PIT SWP PIT RHR 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 RHR 0
0 SW 0
0 0
1 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
FLOOR SE D
35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO IBLDG ROOM SYSTEM EVTOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 SWPB SW PUMP B 6
G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
1 SWPC SW PUMP C 6
G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
1 0
SWPD SW PUMP 0 6
G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
1 0
AO DAMPER FROM CR-D2A OUTSIDE AIR 7
G-190304(4)(R1)
0 0
0 1
CVC-303A RCP A SEAL DlSCH AOV 7
5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 0
0 1
CVC-303B RCP B SEAL DlSCH AOV 7
5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENTj CVCS 0
0 0
0 1
CVC-303C I RCP-C SEAL DlSCH AOV 7
5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 0
0 1
CVC-310A LOOP 1 HOT LEG 7
5379-685(1 )(R35)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 0
0 1
INJECTION AOV ILOOP 2COLD LEG ICC CVC-310B INJECTION 7
5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 226 ~CONTAINMENTj CVCS__
0 0
0 0
1 FCV-1424 FL CUT VALVE MDP-A 7
G-190197(4)(R2g)
RAB 226 AFWMD AFW0 0
0 0
1 PISTO OP VALV fDP AF MDPý ROO 0 0 j
0 0
1 FCV-1425 PITO OPVLEMP 7
G-190197(4)(R29)
0 0
0 1
SW-A ROOMWCONTROL FCV-1608A S
AFLO 7
G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
0 0
SW-B60B FLOW COTO 7
G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
0 FLOW CV LV 35 31 36 7E 3
FV-1625A SW CR G-190199(1)(R42)
0 0
0 0
FCV1625B FLOW CONTROL VALVE G-190199()(R4)
0 0
1 0
FCORB PUMP G-190199(1)(R42)
0 0
0 0
0 3
(0 0
C
-4' Ch FCV-1625C FLOW CONTROL VALVE SCR C G-190199(l)(R42)
0 1 0 1 0 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS
,,J This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
z
-z Z w~
FLOOR SE D
3(
31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ROOM SYSTEM-ELEVTOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 FCV-6416 FL CONTROL VALVE 7
G-190197(4)(R29)
0 0
0 0
HC-2 CHARGING ISOLATION 7
5379-685(1)(R35)
RAB 226 CHARGING CVCS0 0
0 1
0 HCV-121 LINE AOV SD N AN2 PCV-1091 PCVATM N2 AC NL HBR2-8606(2)(R7)
SHED YARD YARD SG 0
0 0
1 0
PCV-1093A STA UPRNEDSCH 7
HBR2-8606(2)(R7)
0 0
1 0
PCV-1093B STEAM DUMP N2 DISCH 7
HBR2-8606(2)(R7)
0 0
1 0
__PRES PCV-1093C STA UPRE DS C 7
HBR2-8606(2)(R7)
0 0
1 0
PCV-455C PORV-1 7
5379-1971(2)(Rll1)
RC 275 PZR CUBICAL PORVs 0
1 0
0 0
PCV-456 PORV-2 7
5379-1971(2)(Rll1)
RC i275 PZR CUBICAL PORVs 0
1 0
0 0
F-W
)
P 1
PRV-1806 INRESU ET REUAO 7
G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
1 0
IPRESSURE REGULATOR F
PRV-1807 I NLET 7
G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
1 0
PRV-1 808 PRESSURE REGULATOR 7
G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
1 0
SELECTE RV(-1 SG PORV FOR SG A 7
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
1 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
1 0
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
1 0
0 3
CD
-Uw Co 0
Cl' 0
Cl' SI-856A SI-856B AOV RWST/SI RETURN AOV RWST/SI RETURN 7
5379-1082(2)(R32)
RAB 7
5379-1082(2)(R32)
RAB 226 226 SI PUMP ROOM SI PUMP ROOM SI SI 1
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
1 0
0 1
-+
I
-I-
!TEMP CONTROL VALVE TCV-1 660 1
(AOV) DG-A 7
G-190199(6)(R31)
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
0 -0 z 5z X u)~~
~
SEECE 3
313 I72U 0LOO 4 0000
~1
-J LELEV O0O MW00 x
Z 0 0- T1 1.
0 173 01 (AOV DG-Bz 0 L w
w 0z TCV-1902
__TEMCONTVALV 7
_G19099(0)(31 TB 226
_AWSD SW_
0_1_0 0
0u V')
FLOOR I
EETD35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION 4
DWG NO BLDG ROOM SYSTEM TCV-1 661
_TEMP CONTROL VALVE 7
G-190199(6)(R31)
RAB EL6EV G
TOTAL 137w 16 13 21 17
_ MP-A (AOVR TCV-1902A TEMP CONT VALVE 7
G-190199(10)(R31)
1 0
0 0
TCV-1903B MDP-B TEMP CNT VALVE AFW MDP SW 0
1 0
1 0
(AOV) 7 9
(
3 A
ROOM TCV-659B AOV TEMPERATURE 7
5379-376(1)(R26)
1 0
1 0
TCV-659C AOV TEMPERATURE 7
5379-376(1)(R26)
1 0
1 0
CONTROL 1
AFW-V2-14A MOV COMMON 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
1 0
1 1
AFW-V2-14B MOV COMMON 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
1 0
1 1
MOV-COMMON 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
TB 242-6 AFW-V2-14C
-R2ý)
4-SEC ONT PR AFW 0
1 0
1 1
MOV OMMN HEDERAFW MDP AFW-V2-16A MOV COMMON HEADER 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
1 0
1 1
MDP IROOM AFW-V2-16B MOV MDP-A 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
1 0
1 1
ROOM AFW MDP AFW-V2-16C MOV MDP-B 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
1 0
1 1
RAFW MDP AFW-V2-20A MOV COMMON HEADER 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
RAB 226 A
OP AFW 0
1 0
1 0
ROOM MOV COMMON HEADER AFW MDP AFW-V2-20B MOP 8
G-190197(4)(R29)
1 0
1 0
MDP ROOM CC-716A MOV FORIN 8
5379-376(3)(R20)
1 0
1 0
ICC-716B 1EMOV FOR CCW/RCP 8
5379-376(3R20)
1 CC-71T 8
5379-376(2)(R26)
1 0
1 0
0) 0r 3CD U2 M0 CC-735 MOV CCW/THERMAL BARRIER 8
5379-376(2)(R26)
1 0
1 0
ROBINSON - Base List 1 SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
0 0
OOZ O
Zu 0 0l~ 1 0 zZ CO FLOOR SEETD35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ROOM SYSTEM-o~~~
~
TTL 171610 27117 CC-749A_
DISCHARGE TO 8
5379-376(2)(R26)
1 0
1 0
5379-376(2)(R26)
1 0
1 0
BORIC ACID ISOLATION 857-8()R8 A
2 C
UP CC 1
0 0
0 0
MOV SELECTEDE CV-0 VALVE 137_____ 166_
130_271_173 CVC-381 MOV RERL WAE 8
5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 0
0 1
EV-1702B SOEO ID VA X
ULVETO 8 G37-376(25)(R26)
TAB 2265 OPER~lN SGROM 0
0 0
1 0
CVC-350__
BOI ACID ISOLATION__
8____
53965()R8___26_C UP VS1 SOLENOID VALVE TO EV-1702 RVI-1 8
G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
1 0
E-78 SOLENOID VALVE TO 0
EV178RVI-2 8
G-190200(5)(R13)
1 0
EV-1711 SOLENOID VALVE TO 8
G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
1 0
RVI-3 EV-1963B-1 SOLENOID VALVE 8
G-190204D(2)(R12)
0 0
1 0
EV-1963B-2 SOLENOID VALVE 8
G-190204D(2)(R12)
0 0
1 0
5379-376(3)(R20)
1 0
1 0
IA-488O RVI-18 G-190200(5)(R13)
TB1 265 OPERATING SG 0
0 0
1 0
IA-490 SOLENOID INLET VALVE 8
G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
1 0
TO RVI-3 SSOLENOID VALVE TO IA-492 S
I8E G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
1 0
RVI-2 IA-633 SOLENOID INLETVALVE G-190200(5)(R13)
0 0
TO RVI-1 0
3D
-4 0
C,'
SOLENOID INLET VALVE TO RVI-3 IA-635 SOLENOID VALVE TO
_RVI-2 LCV1 15C VCT ISOLATION MOV 8
8 8
G-190200(5)(R13)
G-190200(5)(R13) 5379685(2)D5 TB TB RAB 265 265 226 OPERATING OPERATING CHARGING SG SG 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
0 CVCS 0
0 0
0 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS
-J This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
ý 0
z( z 0000 z
ZOL LU 0(J 0
ZZ ORFLOOR S35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION__Y 1 GDWG NO BLDG ELV ROOM SYSTEM TOA 13 16 1027 13 Ud SELCTE oTOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 MS-V1-8A (MOV) 2A MS SUPPLY 8
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
MS-V1-8B (MOV) TR B MS SUPPLY 8
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
(SDP)
MS-V1 -8C (MOV) mR C MS SUPPLY 8
G-190196(1)(R35)
1 0
0 0
_ (SDP)
PCV-3 PRESS CONTROL VALVE 8
G-190200(9)(R9)
RC 275 CONTAINMENT PORVs 0
1 0
0 0
ACC A PCV-4 PRESS CONTROL VALVE 8
G-190200(9)(R9)
RC 275 CONTAINMENT PORVs 0
1 0
0 0
SMOVCTOPORV456 B
I RC-535 M
8 5379-1971(2)(Rll)
RC 275 PZR CUBICAL PORVs 0
1 0
1 0
(BLOCK RC-536 MOVBOC 8
5379-1971(2)(RlR)
RC 275 PZR CUBICAL PORVs 0
1 0
1 0
(BLOCK853917()1)
RHR-744A RHRJSU COLD LEG 8
5379-1484(R25)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT RHR 0
0 0
1 0
JUNCTION MOV RHR/SI COLD LEG RHR-744B RHR/TI COL 8
5379-1484(R25)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT RHR 0
0 0
1 0
______I JUNCTION MOV_
alia-75 RHR LOOP 2HOT'LEG RHR-750 ISOLATION 8
5379-1484(R25)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT RHR 0
0 0
1 0
RHR-751 RHR SUCTION LINE MOV 8
5379-1484(R25)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT RHR 0
0 0
1 0
RHR PUMP INLET - PUMP NW RHR-752A A
8 5379-1484(R25)
0 0
1 0
RHR PUMP INLET-PUMP NW RHR-752B B
P 8
5379-1484(R25)
0 0
1 0
8 5379-1484(R25)
0 0
1 0
___________PUMP A__
8 5379-1484(R25)
0 0
1 0
~~PUMP B T__
RHRICONTAINMENT NW SI-860A j
{ 8 5379-1082(5)(R28)
0 0
1 0
RHR/CONTAINMENT NW SI-860B SUMP 8
5379-1082(5)(R28)
0 0
1 0
0 3
-u Co 00 0
-9' I~J Cl'
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
0=
z :5 z fu 0~ o 0 0
-w
__0 0___
0 z
RSELECTED 35 31 36 72 3
u)0:
FLOR3 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ELV ROOM SYSTEM 0
TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 RHR/SI CONT SUMP NW Sl-861A ISLMV f8 5379-1484(R25)
0 0
1 0
SRHRSI CONTSUMP NW SI-861B ISOL MOV 8
5379-1484(R25)
0 0
1 0
S1-862A RWST/RHR ISOL MOV 8
5379-1484(R25)
NW
0 0
1 0
EI RWST/RHR ISOLATION NW NO B
RHROOM SYSTEM SI-862B R
MOV 8
5379-1484(R25)
0 0
1 0
I O OF SI-863A MOV SI/RHR BOUNDARY 8
5379-1082(2)(R32)
0 0
1 0
SI-863B MOV SI/RHR BOUNDARY 8
5379-1082(2)(R32)
0 0
1 0
SI-864A MOV RWST DSCH LINE l 8 5379-1082(2)(R32)
0 1
1 0
5379-1082(2)(R32)
0 1
1 0
SI-867A MOV SI/BITINLETVALVE 8
5379-1082(1)(R31)
0 0
0 1
SI-867B MOV SI/BIT INLET VALVE 8
5379-1082(1)(R31)
0 0
0 1
Sl-870A MOV BIT OUTLET V
8 5379-1082(1)(R31)
RAB 226 BIT ROOM Sl 1
0 0
0 1
VALVES S MOV BIT OUTLET SI-870A i
VB LET 8
5379-1082(1)(R31)
0 0
0 1
Sl-878A MOV SI DSCH PATH FOR 5379-1082(2)(R32)
0 0
0 1
S PUMPS 5 _
2
=r
-U (0
0 0
0
-4' N) cn PORV 456 SOLENOID SV-1 i
_VALVES SV-2 SOLENOID VALVES TO PORV 455C PORV 456 SOLENOID SV-34 S 3_
VALVES SV-4 SOLENOID VALVES TO 8
8 8
G-190200(9)(R9)
G-190200(9)(R9)
G-190200(9)(R9)
G-190200(9)(R9)
RC RC RC RC 275 CONTAINMENT 275 CONTAINMENT 275 CONTAINMENT 275 CONTAINMENT PORVs 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 1 8 PORVs 0
0 0
0 1
rIuiv 45L,
ROBINSON - Base List I 1 SAFETY FUNCTIONS DESCRIPTION (0
--I C,
DWG NO FLOOR ELEV SELECTED 35 1 31 1 36 1 72 1 36 ROOM SYSTEM TOTAL 11371 166 130 271 173 4-h 4
V6-12A SUPPLY SW DSCH HDR X-CONNECTION SW DSCH HDR X-I2 CONNECTION ISOL VALVE TO NORTH V6-12D SUPPLY MOV BUTTERFLY TB V6-16A ISOL V6-16B SW/TB ISOL MOVS 8
8 G-190199(2)(R44)
G-190199(2)(R44)
G-190199(2)(R44)
216 SWP PIT 216 SWP PIT 216 SWP PIT 216 1 SWP PIT SW 0
0 0
1 1
1 1
SW 0
0 0
Sw 0
0 1 1
0 8
8 8
G-190199(2)(R44)
G-190199(10)(R31)
G-190199(10)(R31)
0 0
0 1
1 1
1 0
1 RAB RAB V6-16C SW/TB ISOL MOVS EXHAUST FAN FOR EDG-HVE-17B EXHAUST FAN EDG-A HVE-18HVAC 8
9 9
G-190199(10)(R31)
G-190304(2)(R26)
G-190304(2)(R26)
RAB RAB RAB 226 CCW PUMP 226 CCW PUMP 226 CCW PUMP 226 EDG ROOM B 226 EDG ROOM A SW SW HVAC HVAC 0
0 1
1 1
0 32 0
1 1
0 0
1 1
0 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 I
0 HVH-6A SI/CS PUMP RM HVAC HVH-6B SI/CS PUMP RM HVAC HVH-7A AFW PUMP RM HVAC 9
G-190304(2)(R26)
RAB 226 SI PUMP ROOM 226 SI PUMP ROOM HVAC t
I I
~
+-+
p-9 9
G-190304(2)(R26)
0 0
1 0
G-190304(2)(R26)
RAB AFW MDP 226 ROOM AFW MDP 226 RROOM HVAC 0
0 0
1 0
G-190304(2)(R26)
0 0
2.
c) 1 1
0 0
G-190304(2)(R26)
OF 203 RHR PUMP PIT OFi HVAC HVAC ol0l0 HVH-8B HVS-5 RHR PUMP RM HVAC SUPPLY FAN 9
9 9
G-1"90304(2)(R26)
G-190304(2)(R26)
G-190304(2)(R26)
NW NW 203 OF RHR PUMP PIT EDG ROOM B 0
0 1
0 1
1 1
0 1
HVS-6 SUPPLY FAN RAB 226 EDG ROOM B HVAC ill 1 1 i11
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
F31.3 0
UI-g)
Ix(
EQIMN D
DSRPIO W
O BD LVTOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 ED0 A 0I 0D A
IIxYRS 0
U EDAI DAIDYRW 10 G-190199(6)(R31)
1 1
1 1
DRYER SIDE 4~~~~~~1 1.-___
R I=___
EDG B AIR EDG B AIR DRYER SW 10 G-190199(6)(R31)
1 1
1 1
DRYER SIDE HVH-CR HADNCNTRL RMuAITR&
10 G-190304(4)(R1)
0 0
0 1
________P HADN UNST
_(
HVS-CR AIR CLEANING UNIT 10 G-190304(4)(R1)
0 0
0 1
H&V EQUIPMENT ROOM WCCU-1A COOLER 10 G-190199(9)(R36)
0 0
1 0
H&VEQUIPMENTROOM 10 G-190199(9)(R36)
0 0
1 0
WCCU-1 COOLE INSTR-BUS-1 IA14 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
118V__ _
1NTUEN U
INSTR-BUS-2 2DG INSTRUEN S
14 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
STBU AIR 118V INSTRUMENT BUS1 INSTR-BUS-3 1
14 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
INSTR-BUS-1 NTRUM S
14 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
118V N
INTUMNIT &U INSTR-BUS-A 1V INSTRMENT B
14 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
INS-US-7A 7AEUP 10 G-190626(R20)
RAB 242-5 S
GSW AC 0
0 1
0 INSTR-BUS-7B 118V INSTRUMENT BUS 14 G-190626(R20)
1 1 i 1
1
~~7B_
S118V INSTRUMENT BUS INSTR-BUS-4 118V INSTRUMENT BUS 14 G-190626(R20)
1 1
_4 0
CD (D
i0 C,'
INSTR-BUS-9A 118V INSTRUMENT BUS 9 _
118V INSTRUMENT BUS INSTR-BUS-9B9B 14 14 G-190626(R20)
G-190626(R20)
RAB RAB 242-6 242-6 SAFEGUARDS SAFEGUARDS AC 1
1 1
+
+
+-1 t-AC 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 4
1 t
4
+/-
+
I-BATTERY-A STATION BATTERY "A" 115 G-190626(R20)
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEEIA-46 program.
0 0
ot z
u)~7 SEECE 3
31 36-a23 z
wU 0
FLOO R 1--
OW00300 x
Z (0~
FLO ROO SYTE w Z-a_
EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ROOM SYSTEM OC3ELEV EETOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 BATTERY-B STATION BATTERY "B" 15 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
BAT ROO BAT-CHGR-A BATTERY CHARGER "A" 16 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
__________ROOM
-BATTERY BAT-CHGR-B BATTERY CHARGER "B" 16 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
BATTERY BAT-CHRG-A1 BATTER CHARGER "Al" 16 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
BA-IROO BAT-CHRG-B1 BATTER CHARGER "B1" 16 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
INVERTER-A_ _
__NVE__TER-A_16_G-190626(R20)_
_AB_246_
E2ROOM INVERTER-A INVERTER-A 16 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
INVERTER-B INVERTER-B 16 G-190626(R20)
1 1
1 1
EDG-A EMERGENCY DIESEL 17 G-190204A(1)(R18)
1 1
1 1
EMERGENERATOR DI EDG-B EMERGENCY DIESEL 17 G-190204A(1)(R18)
1 1
1 1
GENERATOR PRESSURE SWITCH FOR SIESMIC A1-E1/2 FPS A
18 TGB 242-6 NEAR HALON FIE 0
0 0
0 1
FP/A FIRE PRESSURE SWITCH FOR SIESMIC A1-NCV FPS A
18 RAB 226 SOUTH PIPE FIE 0
0 0
0 1
FP/A FIRE
~PRESSURE SWITCH FOR SIESMIC A2-CSR FPS B
18 TGB 242-6 NEAR HALON FIE 1
1 1
1 1
FP/B FIRE PRESSURE SWITCH FOR SIESMIC A2-SCV 18 RAB 226 SOUTH PIPE 10 0
0 0
1 FP/A FIRE B1-E1/2 FP/B 18 TGB 242-6 NEAR HALON FIRE 1
1 1
1 1
FP/B__
_FIRE_
0 CD
-U
'a 0
-4' I~J C,'
B1-NCV B2-CSR B2-SCV PRESSURE SWITCH FOR FP/B PRESSURE SWITCH FOR FP/B PRESSURE SWITCH FOR FP/B 18 18 RAB TGB 226 242-6 SOUTH PIPE NEAR HALON SIESMIC FIRE 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
1 1
SIESMIC FIRE 1
18 RAB 226 SOUTH PIPE SIESMIC FIRE 0
0 0
0 1
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
.1 0 -0
-J z
z
_O u~~~~u)~~
FLO SEETDZ5 3
3 2
3 0000
-~Zo 1-- 3 P-3 1-27 1--
0 U0C> Z I0 FFLOOR S
D 35 31 36 72 36 EUPETID DESCRIPTION 5
DWG NO BLDG ELV ROOM SYSTEM 0
TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 DPS-1608A DIFF PRESS SWITCH SW 18 G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
1 0
iDIFF PRESS SWITCH SW-DPS-1608B B
18 G-190199(2)(R44)
0 0
1 0
ERFIS-MUX-3 ERFIS MULTIPLEXER 3 18 5379-3503(R13)
1 0
0 1
FDPS-A1 FIRE DAMPER POWER 18 RAB 226 OUTSIDE CCW SIESMIC 0
0 0
0 1
SUPPLY FIRE FIC-626 FLOW INDICATOR 18 5379-376(2)(R26)
0 0
1 0
CONROL -
FLOW INDICATOR NW FIC-637 CONTROLLERD 18 5379-376(4)(R26)
0 0
1 0
FIC-638 FLOW INDICATOR N
CONTROLLER 18 53936()R6 OFN FI-3 FLOW CNTROLLER 18 5379-376(4)(R26)
0 0
1 0
FIC-657 FLOW INDICATING 18 5379-376(4)(R26)
0 0
1 0
CONTROL-CSP FIC-658 CONTROLLER-18 5379-376(4)(R26)
0 0
1 0
FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-110 FOR BAT TO CHARGING 18 5379-685(2)(R38)
0 0
0 0
CHARGING FLOW FT-122 CHARGING 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
1 1
1 1
TRANSMITTER AWD FT-1424 FL TRANS MDP-A 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
0 0
1 0
FT-1425 FL TRANS MDPB 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
0 0
1 0
_2 G_
_R
_B ROOM FT-1425A__
AFW MDPS TO SG-A 18 G-1 90197(4)(R29)
0 1
0 FT145AFLOW TRANS j
_________ROOM I___ 0 i
0 32I CD
-U C,)
0
-4' a'
AFW MDPS TO SG-B I2 FLOW TRANS AFW MDPS TO SG-C FLOW TRANS AFW SDP TO SG-A FLOW TRANS 18 18 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
G-190197(4)(R29)
G-190197(4)(R29)
RAB RAB TB AFW MDP 226 226 226 ROOM AFW MDP ROOM AFW SDP AFW 0
AFW AFW 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
0 0
0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
EQUOIP N ID DZ w
TOTA 1
a7 w6 1z30L 27 17 OAFWDZ TO
. 0 AFW S D zz FT-154B0 ix RAN__
W_
FLO TRN....
FLOOREALLESELECTED 35 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG FLO ROOM SYSTEM 3
1 3
2 3
I ELEV
_______IoTOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 FT-1426B AFW SDP TO SG-BA 18 G-590197(4)(R29)
0 0
1 0
_FLOW TRANS
_I I
{I FT-i1426C AFW SDP TO SG-C 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
0 0
1 0
FT-15A/ FT-RCP-C SEAL LEAK-OFF FT-154B H R AN LOWKTRANS18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 1
0 0
FT-154B HI RANGE FLOW TRANS RCP-C SEAL LEAK-OFF FT-155B jLO RANGE FLOW TRANS 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 1
0 0
FT-154ABFT RCP-B SEAL LEAK-OFF 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 1
0 0
LOB H RANGE FLOW TRANS FT-156A/
F-RCP-A SEAL LEAK-OFF 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 1
0 0
-15B HI RANGE FLOW TRANS FT-156B LO SAG LEAK-ONS 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 1
0 0
LORNFLOW TRANSMITTER FT-13 56A/
SALE18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 251-6 CCWTUMP CVCS 0
0 0
FT-156B HŽI!
RANGE FLOW TANS FT-i568 RCP-A SEAL LEAK-OFF FT-_1_5_6__LLO RANGE FLOW TRANS 18 5379-685(i)(R35)
RC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 1+
00 0
FT-613 IFLOW TRANSMITTER 18 5379-376(i)(R26)
0 0
1 0
I CCW___
FT-6416 COMMON FL TRANS 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
0 0
1 1
FT-943 SI FLOW TRANSMITTER 18 5379-1082(1)(R31)
0 0
0 1
AFW MDPS TO SG-A FY-1425A A
SQUARE 18 A-190197(1425A)
0 0
1 0
FY-1425B AFW MOPS TO SG-B 18 A-190301(1425B)
0 0
1 0
FY -1425C____
SQ UARE FY-1425C AFW MDPS TO SG-C 18 A-190197(i425C) IRAB 226 OUTSIDE AFW AFW 0
0 0
1 0
1 SQUARE I__
I__
I_
I___
_I_
0
=)
CD M3 46 in FY-1 426A FY-1426B AFW SDP TO SG-A SQUARE ROOT AFW SDP TO SG-B SQUARE ROOT 18 B-190301(1426A)
A-190301(1426B)
TB TB 18 226 226 226 AFW SDP AFW SDP AFW SDP AFW AFW 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
0 FY-1426C AFW SDP TO SG-C SQUARE ROOT 18 A-190301(1426C)
0 0
1 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
0 0
CoIFLO SELECTED 35 31~
36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG IROOM SYSTEM
-JJ ELEV ELEVTOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 I-T50 INSTRUMENT RACK FOR 18 RAB T 246 RCA ACCESS PORVs 0
0 0
0 1
IR-PT-95 CW PT-95, IR-PT-951 INSTRUMENT RACK FOR 18 RAB 246 RCA ACCESS PORVs 0
0 0
0 1
LI6 4
LOCAL LEVEL 18 5 793 07R 3)
R B_6
___W
___RG TNK
_CW 0__
1_
__1 DOST LEVEL INDICATOR LIS-1 966 SWTH1
-924()R2 AD N/A DIESEL OIL AC 1
1 1
1 1
CSTLEELSIGNAL LM-1454A ISLTR 18 A-i190301(1453)
0 0
0 1
18 A-190197(1453)
POWER SUPPLY 18 5379-3512R16)
H 226 RWST SY0 0
1 0
LEVEL TRNSMITTE LT-106 E
RAT R
18 5379-685(3)(R24)
0 0
1 1
B T-A LT-108 E AT-B 18 5379-685(3)(R24)
0 0
1 1
LT-115 VOLUME CONTROLE 18 5379-685(2)(R38)
0 0
1 0
_______LEVELTANKILEVEL LT-1454A CST LEVEL TRANS 18 G-190197(1)(R49)
0 0
1 0
LT-1454B CST LEVEL TRANS 18 G-190197(1)(R49)
0 0
1 0
CCW SURGE TANK 1
5379-371)(R26)
NRA 2267 CWST CCW LT-614 LEVEL TRANSM R
18, 5379-06(3)(R24)
CCW 1
0 0
1 0
LT-948 RWST LEVEL TRANS 18 5379-1082(2)(R32)
0 1
0 0
BAT-H 0) 2r 3D
-U C0 CI' 0
-'I (7'
LT-969 PC-611 RWST LEVEL TRANS 18 5379-1082(2)(R32) 5379-376(1)(R26)
NORT H
RAB 226 226 RWST CCW PUMP SI 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
-~
4-4
~-
PRESSURE CONTROL -
COMMON 18 CCW 0
f 4
1-
+
i i
+ -
i PI-125B REMOTE RCP-C TB DIFF1 1 8 PI-25 579347(R 3 RB 26,OUH ABE CC.0 1
08 5379-3478(RI3)
0 1
0 0
r~rtzll
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
.i 0
0 0
0 Z
w 0 ~
(J0Z w
_j ix X
zia 0FLOOR S
T 35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ELV ROOM SYSTEM PI18 RS.O TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 REMOTE8RCPRBEBS0FF 18 5379-3478(R13)
RAB 226 SOUTH CABLE CVCS0 0
1 0
0 LL RREMOTE RCP-A T.B.
18 56 72 3
PI-128B RMT.C 18 5379-3478(RS3)
0 1
0 0
PERPCSEAL PI-154B R
DCH 18 5379-3475(R15)
RC 2261CONTABLE CVCS 0
0 1
0 0
DF.PRESS.
SREMOTE RCP-A SEAL PI-1 56B RMECP 18 5379-3475(R15)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
0 1
0 0
REMT OSCH PIC-1393 PlC FOR SDP TURBINE 18 G-190196(1)(R35)
0 1
0 0
(GOVERNS)
PIC-157 SEAL INJECT FILTER 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
0 1
0 0
PRES IND PIC-477 CONTROLLER 18 G-190196(1)(R35)
0 0
1 0
PIC-487 PRESS INDIC CONTLR 18 G-190196(1)(R35)
0 0
1 0
PREFOR SG B
_ONTR PIC-497 FOR SG C 18 G-190196(1)(R35)
0 0
1 0
PS-4500FOR SGITCH 18__
__26O0 PS-4500A DG-A PRESSURE 18 G-190204A(2)(R10)
01 0
S~_WITCH PS-4500B SWTH18 G-190204A(3)(R10)
0 0
1 0
a.* m"r! S-'-/I-Ir-Ir(*-*
0 CD PS-4509A UUILrI PrMr-0UM SWITCH 18 0)
G-190204A(2)(R10)
G-190204A(3)(R10)
1 1
1 1
PS-4509B OUTLET PRESSURE SWITCH 18 RAB 226 226 EDG ROOM B AC 1
1 1
1 1
PS-68A PS-68B PRESSURE SWITCH FOR FP/A PRESSURE SWITCH FOR FP/B 18 18 RABI RAB 226 OUTSIDE OF OUTSIDE OF OUTSIDE OF SIESMIC FIRE 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 PS-69A SIESMIC FIRE SIESMIC FIRE 0
4-+
~
4.-
PRESSURE SWITCH FOR 18 FP/A R~AB 1]226 r
0 0
0 0
1
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
.1 uP)
FLO 35 f5 3
072
,mao~o TOA 371610 w7 173 0
Z5 0
a ~ w z
00 05 o
X ZO 0-(Z 4 w
I-Uz w 0 wIx
>uJ 0 M T0)
FLOOR SEETD35 131 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION 41 DWG NO BLDG ELV ROOM SYSTEM
_l j E E T O T A L 1 3 7 1 1 6 6 11 3 0 1 2 7 1 11 7 3 PS-69B PSH/L-602A PRESSURE SWITCH FOR FP/B PRESSURE SWITCH (HIL) 18 18 RAB RAB 226 226 OUTSIDE OF SOUTH CABLE SIESMIC FIRE RHR 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
A-190301(602A) 0 0
0 PSL-1474A-1 PSL-1474A-2 PSL-1474B-1 PSL-1474B-2 PSL-1476-1 PSL-1476-2 PT-117 MDP-A TRIPS MDP-A 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
RAB MDP-A TRIPS MDP-A PR SW TRIP MDP-B LOW PRESS 18 18 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
RAB 226 226 226 226 AFW MDP ROOM AFW G-190197(4)(R29)
G-190197(4)(R29)
RAB RAB AFW MDP ROOM AFW MDP ROOM AFW MDP ROOM AFW AFW AFW SDP LINE TRIPS SDP LINE TRIPS 18 18 G-190197(4)(R29)
TB G-190197(4)(R29)
TB 5379-685(2)(R38)
RAB 226 226 246 AFW SDP AFW SDP VOLUME AFW AFW VCT PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 18 CVCS t
+
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 I
0 0
1 1
0 0
1 1
1 0
0 1
1 1
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
0 1
0 CD PT-121 PT-125 CHARGING PRESSURE 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RAB 226 CHARGING CVCS CVCS PRESSURE TRANS RCP-18 C
5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 228 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TRANS RCP-T PT-12 B
185379-685(1)(R35)
RC 228 CONTAINMENT CVCS
-4 0
PT-131 PT-1421A PT-1421B PT-1 54 PT-1 55 PRESSURE TRANS RCP-A MDP COMMON HEADER PRESS TR 18 18 18 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC COMMON PR TRANS RCP-C SEAL DISCH PRESS TRANS G-190197(4)(R29)
G-190197(4)(R29) 5379-685(1)(R35)
RAB TB RC 228 CONTAINMENT AFW MDP 226 ROOM 226 AFW SDP 226 CONTAINMENT 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS AFW AFW CVCS RCP B SEAL DISCH PRESS TRANS 8{5379-685(1)(R35)
R CVCS i1ul 0 0 j
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
- 1. 01 0
i5z 0w E
U)
I->.
(F=
0z 6 X,
, a Z0 U)
SELECTED
')
FLOOR 35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ROOM SYSTEM
- J ELEV R
TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 PT-1 56 1 RESS TRANS 18 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 1
1 0
0 1
PT-1616
'NORTH SW SUPPLY HDR 18 G-190199(9)(R36)
0 1
0 PT-1684 PRESS 18 G-190199(19)(R31)
0 0
1 0
PT-1684 I
PRESS 18 G-1_90199(10)(R31)
0 0
1 0
PT-484 SG A MAIN STEAM LINE 18 G-190196(1)(R35)
0 0
1 0
PT-474__
PRESS PT-48 jSG BMINSTEMIN PT44PRESS 18 G-190196(1)(R35)
0 0
1 0
PT-494 SG C MAIN STEAM LINE 18 G-190196(1)(R35)
0 0
1 0
PT-602A T
PRESSURE 18 5379-1484(R25)
1 0
0 1
T TRANSMITTER FOR PT-934 I PRESS TRANS BIT 18 5379-1082(1)(R31)
1 0
0 1
PT-943 SI/BIT PRESS TRANS 18 5379-1082(1)(R31)
1 0
0 1__
TEMPERATURE i
TIC-107 INDICATOR 18 5379-685(3)(R24)
0 0
0 0
TEMPERATURE TIC-109 TEMPEATUR 18 5379-685(3)(R24)
0 0
0 0
~INDICATOR TEMP IND CNTLLR -
TIC-625 18 5379-376(2)(R26)
0 1
1 1
THERMAL.....
RPS/CR'D
-t TM-410 LOW LEVEL AMPLIFIER 18 5379-3527(R23)
RAB 226 NORTH CABLE R/NR 0
1 0
1 0
RP/NIS TM-413 LOW LEVEL AMPLIFIER 18 5379-3502(R20)
RAB 226 SOUTH CABLE RPS/CRD 0
1 0
1 0
RPS/CRD TM-413B SIGNAL ISOLATOR 18 5379-3502(R20)
RAB 226 SOUTH CABLE
/
0 1
0 1
0
/NIS 0
CD TE-116 VOLUME CONTROL TANK TEMP 19 5379-685(2)(R38)
0 0
1 1
-4
+
+
+-~
~-4
~-
TE-123 HX DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE 19 1 5379-685(l)(R35) I RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 1
I 0
1 1
TE-123 19 5379-685(1)(R35)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS I
1 0
1 1
ROBINSON - Base List I AFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
.J 8o8 FLOORSELECTED 35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION
I 0
zw E
Z z Zw 0cFLOOR RO OM SYS EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO SELECTEDE35R31M36Y72E3 ELEVTOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 w
4!
FDAP-A1 FDAP-A2 FDAP-B1 FDAP-B2 FDPS-B1 ICCM-861 FIRE DETECTOR ACTUATION FIRE DETECTOR ACTUATION FIRE DETECTOR ACTUATION FIRE DETECTOR ACTUATION 20 20 20 20 RAB RAB RAB RAB FIRE DAMPER POWER SUPPLY 20 RAB INADEQUATE CORE COOLING ICCM-8611 IR-11B IR-2B IR-3B LI-477A INADEQUATE CORE COOLING INSTRUMENT RACK: PT-1 131,156, PI-156B & LT-FlINSTRUMENT RACK: PT-128.155. PI-155B & LI-20 20 20 20 RAB RAB RC RC RC TB 226 OUTSIDE CCW SIESMIC
- FIRE 246 tE/E2 ROOM SIESMIC 2FIRE SIESMIC 226 OUTSIDE CCW FIRE SIESMIC 246 EI/E2 ROOM FIRE SIESMIC 226 OUTSIDE CCW 4 RFIRE 249-6 ROD DRIVE CAB 249-6 ROD DRIVE CAB 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 226 lCONTAINMENT CVCS 242.5 SECONDARY AFW 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 0
0 0
0 CD INSTRUMENT RACK: PT-20 125.154. PI-154B & LT-SG-A LEVEL INDICATOR 20 5379-3578(RO) 0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
0
+
+
+
LI-477B SG-A LEVEL INDI AFWP 20 RM PNL 5379-3578(RO)
1-i
+
+
Co ED 0
a' LI-487A LI-487B LI-497A LI-497B SG-B LEVEL INDICATOR 20 5379-3516(R17)
TB 242.5 SECONDARY AFW MDP 226 R
ROOM AFW AFW SG-B LEVEL INDIC AFWP ROOM SG-C LEVEL INDI MEZZANINE SG-C LEVEL INDICATOR AFW 20 20 20 5379-3516(R17) 5379-3517(R20) 5379-3517(R20)
RAB TB RAB 242.5 226 254 SECONDARY AFW MDP ROOM CONTROL ROOM AFW AFW RPS/CRD
/NIS NUC-INST-PROTECT CA NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 20 RAB 1
0 0
0 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
.J 88 I-
- w OOj O j u
E
___cc w____ w_
w LU Oz cn FLOOR 35 31 36 72 36 EUPETID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ELV ROOM SYSTEM TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 POST ACCIDENTCOTL PAM I MNTRPEL 20 RAB 254 CNRL CAB 0
0 0
0 0
MONITOR PAL R
ROOM R
PAMIACIDNT 20 RAB 254 CNRL CAB 0I 0
0 0
0 PAMII_________________
MONITOR PANEL ROOM PXMTR-1 PRESS CAB: LT-459, PT-2 3906(0 C
26 CNANETCC PXMTR-1 L4 20 5379-0169(R0)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
a 0 0
PRESS CAB: LT-460, PT-PXMTR-235 20 5379-0169(R0)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 0
1 0
0 0
PXMTR-3 PRESS CAB: LT-462, PT-20 5379-0169(R0)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT 1 CVCS 0
1 0
0 0
PTOTR-4 444,445 500 20 163 C
N RACK-29 HAGAN RACK 29 20 HBR2-11267 RAB 254 HAGAN ROOM CAB 0
0 1
0 0
RACK-30 HAGAN RACK 30 20 HBR2-11268 RAB 254 HAGAN ROOM CAB 0
0 1
0 0
MOISC.REA RACKL 50-OM RACK-50 MSAF EGUAYRC50 20 RAB 242-6 1SAFEGUARDS CAB 1
0 0
0 0
_RELAYS
_-GUA_
20 5379-03237 RAB 242-6 SAFEGUARDS CAB 1
0 0
0 0
RACK-53-57 RPS RACK 53-57 20 5379-03134 RAB 226 SAFEGUARDS CAB 10 0
0 0
0 P RESS LAB:
LT 1
RACK-58-62 RP RACK 62 20 5379-03134 RAB 242-6 HAFGANRO CAB 1
0 0
0 0
RC50 MS.RELALYS RAK5 i0 4-SAFEGUARDS CAB 1
0 0
0 0
RACK-63,64 SAFEGUARDS RACK 6 20 RAB 242-6 SAFEGUARDS CAB 1
0 0
0 0
&64LY 20__
5379_03134 242-SAEURS CA-0
=C3 CD
-U (0
0 0
Cl' REACTOR-BRK-CABINET FOR REACTOR 20 CAB RAB 226 RPS/CRD SOUTH CABLE I S
/NIS 1
0 0
0 0
t I
t-+
1-~
+-
RMS-CONSOLE RPI-RACK-1 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM ROD POSITION TRANSLATING 20 RAB 254 20 B-190628(78)(R12)j RAB 242-6 CONTROL ROOM CABLE SPREAD CABLE SPREAD CAB 0
0 0
0 0
RPS/CRD
/NIS 1
0 0
0 0
RPI-RACK-2 ROD POSITION TRANSLATING 20 B-190628(79)(R12)
RAB] 242-6 RPS/CRD
/NIS I
0 0
0 0
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS
-J This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
00
-J 00 zOw
'Z-(
00
-j 1- 0 00 0-500 tOýz 0
w w
0a I--z ZZ OI0 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION 1I SELECTED 35 31 36 72 36 TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 RPI-RACK-3 RPI-RACK-4 ROD POSITION TRANSLATING ROD POSITION TRANSLATING 20 20 B-190628(80)(R10)
B-190628(81)(R9)
RAB RAB 242-6 CABLE SPREAD 242-6 CABLE SPREAD RPS/CRD
/NIS RPS/CRD
/NIS 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 RTGB RTGB RVLIS RVLIS INSTRUMENTATION TM-410B SIGNAL ISOLATOR SIGNAL PROCESSOR TM-577
]
CABINET CH TM-578 SIGNAL PROCESSOR T7 CABINET CH WEST
]HAGAN RACKS 14-25,27,28 ART-A AIR RECEIVER A TANK ART-B AIR RECEIVER B TANK BAT-A BORIC ACID TANK A BAT-B BORIC ACID TANK B CCW CCW HX A CCW CCW HX B 20 RAB 20 20 20 5379-3527(R23) 5379-3502(R20)
S RO 249-6 ROD 226 NORTH 254 CET 254 CETI 254 HAGA 226 EDG R TROL
DROVE CAB 1
1 1
1 1
-CABLE RPS/CRD 0
1 1
1 1
/NIS RPS/CRD PANEL 1
0 0
1 0
/NIS RPS/CRD PANEL RPS 1
0 0
1 0
/NIS ROOM C1_
NJROOM CAB 1
1 1i I
0 2r 3D 1
1 1
1 20 20 5379-3502(R20) 5379-02045-77 RAB RAB I
+
21 G-190204A(1)(R18)
1 1
1 1
21 G-190204A(1)(R18)I RAB
+
226 EDGROOMB a
AC 1
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
21 5379-685(3)(R24)
21 5379-685(3)(R24)
0 0
0 0
21
-U a)
(0 CD 0
(I' 21 5379-376(1 )(R26) 5379-376(1 )(R26) 5379-376(1)(R26)
G-190197(1)(R49)
RAB RAB 226 226 CCW PUMP CCW PUMP CCW 1
0 0
0 0
CCW 1
0 0
0 0
CCW CST CVC 4-COMPONENT COOLING WATER CONDESATE STORAGE TANK 21 RAB TB 267 226 CCW SRG TNK SOUTH WEST CCW 0
0 0
1 0
21 AFW 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
REGENERATIVE HX 21 1 5379-685(l)(R35)
RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS 1
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
-j 0
I- 0 0~
Ez U
I
-ww-a zu z <
U ZZ U
FLOOR SELECTED 35 31 36 72 36 EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO BLDG ROOM SYSTEM IELEV D
TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 DAY FUEL OIL DAY TANK A 21 G-190204D(2)(R12)
1 1
1 1
DAY FUEL OIL DAY TANK B r21 G-190204D(2)(R12)
1 1
1 1
DOST DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK 21 G-190204D(2)(R12) YARD EXCS-LTDWN-HX EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCH-EXPANSION TNK-A EXPANSION TNK-B N2-ACC-A N2-ACC-B NON-REG-HX-CCW JACKET WATER EXPANSION JACKET WATER EXPANSION N2 ACCUMULATOR A N2 ACCUMULATOR B NON-REGEN. HX CCW SHELL SIDE 21 21 21 5379-376(3)(R20)
G-190204A(1)(R18)
G-190204A(1)(R18)
RC RAB RAB N/A DIESEL OIL 228 CONTAINMENT 226 EDG ROOM A 226 EDG ROOM B AC 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
(D 1
1 1
1 1
1 21 21 21 G-190200(9)(R9)
G-190200(9)(R9) 5379-376(2)(R26)
RC RC RAB 275 275 226 PZR CUBICLE PZR CUBICLE NON-REGEN HX ROOM PORVs PORVs CCW CCW 1
1 0
0 0
0 1
1 i
i i
+
+
+-~
+
~-
+
I PRZ PRESSURIZER STEAM SAMPLE HX 21 5379-376(1 )(R26)
RAB 226 7
+-~
+
+
PZR PRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE HX 21 5379-376(1 )(R26)
Cl' RHR RWST RX SG RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A
RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RWST TANK WNENT 21 21 5379-1484(R25) 5379-1484(R25)
RAB RAB 226 226 226 SAMPLE ROOM SAMPLE ROOM RHR HX ROOM RHR HX ROOM CCW RHR 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
1 1
I 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 0
RHR 0
0 0
1 0
1
-I
+-t
+-t 21 NORT 5379-1082(2)(R32)
0 0
1 0
REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLE HX SG BLOWDOWN SAMPLE HX A 21 21 5379-376(1 )(R26) 5379-376(1 )(R26)
RAB RAB 226 226 SAMPLE ROOM SAMPLE ROOM CCW CCW 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 SG SG BLOWDOWN SAMPLE HX B 21 5379-376(1 )(R26)
0 1
ROBINSON - Base List I SAFETY FUNCTIONS This list represents the equipment coming out of EPRI screen #3 and is also the SSEL list from the IPEEE/A-46 program.
00 00 OU LuJ
-j
~0 0-00 0z wC1 I-z Ez 0(ID LI-U 60
(/0
--I U
DWG NO BLDG FLOOR ELEV SELECTED 35 31 36 72 36 ROOM SYSTEM TOTAL 137 166 130 271 173 21 5379-376(1)(R26) I RAB 226 SAMPLE ROOM CCW 0
0 1
1 1
21 r5379-76(4)(R26)
0 0
0 0
21 SW HX VCT SEAL WATER HX VOLUME CONTROL TANK 21 21 HBR2-8606(2)(R7) 5379-685(2)(R38) 5379-685(3)(R24)
TB RAB RAB 242.5 226 246 MEZZANINE SEAL WATER HX ROOM VOLUME SG CVCS CVCS 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
0 0
0 0
-=F 3(D 413
-U (0
0 (I'
0
~4~
0i
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Enclosure 1 to RNP-RA/14-0011 5 pages including this cover sheet : SWEL 1
ROBINSON - SWEL I SAFE The function of this worksheet is to select Items to be included on the Seismic Wakdown Equirnent List (SWEL) using the procedures d
outlined in the EPRI "Seismic Walkdown Guidance" document.
0=-no 1= Yes If the equipment or system ws an outlier during the IPEEEI A-46, an 'Ais present in the MOD column. If the equipment or system has 00c undergone modifications, an 'M' is present in the MOD column. New equipment is represented with an 'N' in the MOD column.
SSEL SWEL SELECTED 40 43 ITEM ITEM EQUIPMENT to DESCRIPTION DWG NO ELEV ROOM SYS NNO O
TOTAL 137 16
,, I CR-o7 VENTILATON DAMPER 0 T*0**R~
TB 251 MEZ2 N V*
0 0 S1.DAPMERFOROUTSIDE
-903D4lu
)R 2
2 L-19 D
AIR 0
0
~~~AIR 10J4dR 6
3
$6-lA SWSTRAINERA 0ig199R4 SW{
0 7
4
$6-lB SWSTRAINER8 0
0 1901 99(2)(R44 24 5
MCC-1 MOTOR CONTROL I
G-246 AUX BLDG AC 1
1 CENTER 26 1
R062R20 25 6
MCC-18 MOTOR CONTROL 1
'40VCENTER 1906261201 29 7
1 EMER-BUS-E 1 480 V EMERGENCY BUST-Y 2
-- G-iE.
4 El 2
190626(R20) 31 01 A-CONSTANT VOLTAGE 7 4 1902(R0 RAE 242-6 E1IIE2 ROOM AC1 1
- 1~VT7.51 1906?(26I0 AUX FEEDWATER G-AFW MDP 33 New AFW ARA 226 AFWM 0
0 MOTO 5-19019A4j(R29 ROOM
-O~
AUX FEED WATER G-STEAM 5190196()(R351 TB I 226 AFWSDP AFW 0
T
- 5379-38 New CCW CCW PUMP A 5
1 36I~lR2§)
i r ~ ~~5379-I 40 New CCW COW PUMP C 5
1 4
~3176 flLR2U6J
~ ~CHARG1N-G
-PUMP B ANDi 5379-41 10 CP-B 5CHRIGPUPBN RAB 226 CHARGING CVCS 0
0 COOLER 6852X(R3.1 4
FUEL OIL TRANSFER 5
G-YARD N/A DIESEL OIL AC I
1 43 11 FOTP-A PUMAYARD N/A~It
~~~PUMP A
19 24(2*
WST-GAS-WASTE-GAS 5379-46 112 5
RAE 246 WASTE GAS CCW 0
0 COMP-A COMPRESSOR A 376L411R26) 2 A
W 48 FUEL OIL TRANSFER G6 G-Y N/A DIESEL.OIL AC 13 POP-B PMP B 190204DI2)10 51 14 SWVPA SWPUMPA B
6 9
0 5
- 15.
2 A O D A M P E R F R O M 1 3 G -
55 15 CR-DTA 7
0 SB New CR-D2B 7O T I
0 62 New FCV-1424 FLCUTVALVEMDP-A 711 RAE 226 AFWMDP 190197T4 ROOM 6
F
!PISTON OP VALVE MDP-G-
ROOMA6 0 j0 63 New F CV-1425 7,
RA 226 AFWMD F
0 B
901497 4R29...
ROOM 69 New FCV-6416 FL CONTROL VALVE 7
0 A
STEAM DUMP N2 ADCC INLT 1
BR2 N
71.
1 PCV-10.
9 7..P -9 7
YARD YARD SG 0
0 STA DUMP N2 DSCH HBR2-72 New POV-1093A 7
0 73 STEA DUMP N2 OISCH -~HER2-T
- 4.
EZNN 1
19 PCV-10938 FRE TB
- 42.
MEZZANINE SG
-PRIES7 74 New -PCV-1093C 7EMDM 2DSH H~-
T 242.5 MEZZANINE SG3 FRIEE 9606t2)LR7)
.TI PRESSURE 7
3G-77 New PRV-1806
'7TB 265 OPERATING SG13 0
0 7
REGULATOR INLET 190200t51(R13 T
2 78 20 PRV-1807 RESURE 1
j 0
0 SREGULATOR NLET TB 265 OPERATING
_.....0 0
0 42 88 51 130 271 173 0
0 1
0 0
1 0
1 0
~0 1
0 0
I D 1 I 7---
__- o: o7 1
1 1
1 1
10 0 1 10
'011 0
0 1
0 010 0
1 0
01 0
0 1
0
-0 1
o]
I-29 115 131 125 120 126 1 85 3 41 125 131 134 122 1U34 94 40 1
0 1
0j 1
0 1I0 10 1-10 1 I 0 1010 0
ii 0
1 001 10 iii 010 M
1 0 I1 21 01 0
A 1
F0 1
101 01 a1 0
A 1
0 1
0 1
0 0I 1 1 AM i
0 1
0 1
0 10 1.
AM 1
- 0. 1 0
-1 0 1 0 M
1 jo 1
10 1
[o10 A
1 0
1 lo 1
0 1 0 M
0 1
1 1
1 0
0 11 I
D I1 0
0 N 0 1
1 1
1 0 0 1
11+ 1 41 0 1 1 0 1 1 0l 1
0 1 10 1 ý 1
0 01 0
1 1
1 01 F1i10 1 0 1F 1 1 0 0 10 0
1-F 1 1i 1
010 1 0
1 1
1 I
0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 01 1 0 01
-~ 1 01 St 3
ID
SSEL SINEL
(
ITEM ITEM EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION D
DWG NO FLR ROOM SYS NO NELEV 1
PRESSURE 7
G-79 2
PRV-1808 REGULATOR INLET 13TB 265 OPERATING SG 80 New RVI-1 SG PORV FOR SG A 7
-~~G
-9161(35 82 New RV1-3 SG PORV FOR SG C I7 3-TB 265 OPERATING SG
~
90196(l)(R35 T
TEMP CONTROL VALVE G-RA 226 EDG ROOM B IW 86 Nw V161 AO DGB 7
190199 6XR31 RA-2 DROB S
(
87 New TCV-1902A TEMP CONT VALVE 7
G-TB 226 AFW SDP SW AOVI190199(0 R3 94 New AFW-G2-14C MOV-COMMoN 8
TB 242-6 SEC-CNTPPR AFW Now 190197(4)(R291 AFW D
97 New AFW-V2-16C MOVMDP-B 8
G RA 226 M
99 New iAFW-V2-20B GD OMNHAE RAE 226 "KFW MOP MOP 1190197(4)9R29 ROOM AFW 105 28 CVC-350 BORIC ACID ISOLATION 8
63579-I RAE 226 CCW PUMP CVCS VALVE 681)R38) 107 29 EV-1702 SOENOID VALVETO 8
13-TB 268 OPERATING SG RVt-1 92)R3 S108 New 7
SOLENOIDMVALVETO 8
10 2
TB 265 OPERATING
-S 18 Nw E-788 TB 265 OPERATING S
1 Nw V7 SOLENOID VALVE TO G-109 New EV-1711 RVI-3 1902005R13TB 265 OPERATING SG 113 New IA-488 SOLENOID INLETVALVE 8
(2-TB 265 OPERATING SG 4 113 Now IA-488 TR 8 '190 5R3T 6
PRTG S
TO RVl-1 92I
~
L1_
1SOLENOID INLET VALVE T
G-11 e
IA-49RVI 8I 5
TB 265 OPERATING SG 115 32 IA-492 SOLENOID VALVE TO 8
T SO 116 Ne I-63 TRV1 102 (R13*
TS 265 OPERATING SG
.1...
....1'3+
I SOLENOID INLET VALVE G
118 w
IA-N 633 8
TB 265 OPERATING SG TO RVI-1 1190205f{5(R 13 117 23 IA-634 SOiLENOIDLVALVE 8
0-TB 265 OPERATING SG TO RVI-3 t902Iot5oAl3_
118 New IA-635 4SLN6 M
o G
8V-920~lI TB I265 OPERATING SG 120 New MS-VI-8A (MOV)2AMSSUPPLY 8
G-TB 226-AFWSOP A
124e M-l8 L501 919016(1XR3P5 T 2
F D
F 123 N
PRESS CONTROL G8 -
{
N.ew
.PCV-3 VALVE ACC8A 1902-R9)
RC 275
'!CONTAINMENT P/.
124 NPw PCV4 8
RC 275 CONTAINMENT PORVs 124 New...*.
VALVE ACCe B
_0_2 R9 C
158 40 V6-18A MOV BUTTERFLY TB 226 CCW PUMP SW ISOL 190199"10 R3 4
162 41 J
HVE-18 EXHAUST FAN EDG-A 9
RAE 226 6(DG ROOM A HVAC HVAC 19030 INR26 167 42 HVH-6A RHR PUMP RM HVAC 9
__190304(2)(R261 OF 169 New HVS-5 SUPPLY FAN 9
190 1
EDGAAIR EDGAAIR DRYERSW 1
G-R r
71 43 10 o
RAE 228 EDGROOM A SW DRYER
_SIDE I90199161LR3 173 44 HVH-CR UNIT &
10 G-41 RAE 242-6 H&V HVAC 178 45 INSTR-BUS-2 118V INSTRUMENT BUS 14 0-RAE 242-6 SAFEGUARDS AC 2
t 190626(R_20,...
I 183 8
INTR-BS-7 118V INSTRUMENT BUS 1G 426A
.183 46
.NSTR-BUS-B 7B 14 RAE 242-6 SAFEGUARDS 78 lWS26i~R20J
-AATcR 187 47 BATTERY-A STATION BATTERY "A" 15 G-RA 246 BATTERY DC
=
j19062920 R
ROOM 190 48 BAT-CHGR-B BATTERY CHARGER "B" 16 8
6 RAS 248 BATTERY DC G--RA-24190626R20 ROOM AC 193 49 INVERTER-A INVERTER-A 186 11G626 R
2
.R 195 50 EDG-A EMERGENCY DIESEL 7A-17 RAE 22 OROOM A AC 9
GENERATOR 190204Aj1 R1R PRESSURE SWITCH 1S ESMIC 200 51 A2-SCV FOR FPIA 18 RAE 226 SOUTH PIPE
', ~ ~
~
~
O
__........ L _...........L _
E -d TOTAL 137 18" 130 271 173 SELECTED 1] 0 3 1 "42 91I S-4 I
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
0 0
1
_0 00 0
0 1
1 io 0
t 0
0 0
0 o
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 Is 1
1 0
1 0
0 1 0 0
0 o-0 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 o i o
- I o
0 i 0 1
o 0
1 0
0 0
1 1
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0i
. 1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
0 01 0
0 0
J1 1
0 0
0 29 115 13 125 2
126 1 185 13 1 41 125 1 13 4 134 3
94 401 1
0 1
0 1
0 0 iI 1
0 01t 1
1 1
1 0
10 1-0 1
0 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 I~
1 0 011 i
io1_
1 0 1
0 1
00 1
1 0 1i 0
1 0
1 0
1 o1 0[ 011o 1
-_1 01 0 110 1 0 I
0~ 1 0
1 0
1 0ý o
I 0
1 ~0 0
1 1 0 10 o
1 10101 0
11t 1 0 1
0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1--o~
~ 1T 11 0 1
0 0
1 1
0 I
1 0 1
0 1
01 01 1
0 1
0o 1 jo' 01 M I 10 1
0 1
0 1
0 10 1 0K (D
A.M M
M 1
0
-1 0
1 !0 1
0 1
0!
0i 1
o1 0 1
1 0
1 0 1I 0
1 oI o
I 10 1 10 1of 0y 1 0 1
0 1
0 1
ft1 0
1 0
1 01 M
1 0
1 0ý1 1"0 1
0 1 1 I 1
0 1
0 0
SSEL SWE F
LR ITEM ITEML EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION DWG NO ROOM SYS TNO NO~Ii m
ELEV 40 1,43 42 189 61 I
~
8 -~-
4 13, 1 16 1 130 1 271 I 13 203 52-PRESSURE SWITCH i
SIESMIC I 203 52 82-CSR PSR SPIT 18 TGB 242-6 NEAR HALON FiRE FOR FP/IB 1 -
-- ý 206 63 DPS-1608A DSFFPRSSSWTCH SW 216 SwE PIT Sw SW-A 980199(2)(R44, NW l-lý
-l--.
t 210 54 FIC-637 OINDICATOR 18 5379-203 RHR PUMP PIT CCW CONTROLLER -
37614)(R96).,OF 203 212 Ne FC-57 FLOW INlDICTING 18 539 A.. 22.S.
PMPROM.O 212 N
FIC-657 CONTROL-CSP 376(41(RZ6) RS 26iIUPOM C
FLOW INDICATING 5379-R C
213 New FIC-658 iN 18 37N(4)R26)
+ New FC.+58 CONTROLLER 1
3764 R26 FLOWTRANSMITTER 5378-214 55 FT-110 F..BA.......G..
18 RAB 226 CCWPUMP CVCS C A R I G
F O I N
37-
+...
215 New FT-122 CHARGING FLOW 18 RAB 226 CHARGING CVCS TRANSMITTER 666}j(NL35j TTI T....G-
!AFW MOP 216 New FT-1424 FLTRANSMDP-A 18 1 RAB 226 WMD AFW 217 56 FT-1425 FLTRANS MDB 18 G-NAB 226 AFWMDP AFW 1 90 1 9 7 149R 2 9 R ROOM 222 New FT-1426B AFSDPTSB 1
TB 226 AFSP AFW--
FLOW TRANS 1
9174(2 B
26 AWD F
FT-i 54Ai
- RCP-C SEAL LEAK-OFF 5379-224 New ING FL TNS 18 R
NC 251-6 CONTAINMENT CVCS FT-S4I
,5
__,ý'HIRANGE FLCW TRANS.-
685(l(351.*.
2FT-155A/ FT-RCP-B SEAL LEAK-OFF 8 NC CONTAINMENT VO 226 New is R 251.
cCOTANMNT CV
__ 5~
ýHI RANGE FLOW TRANS 1 850 )(R35) 228 N
FT-156A N.CP-A SEAL LEAK-OFF 1-C I
z~ ew18 RC 251." CONTAINME:NT L.VL;S
-FT-156B HI RANGE FLOW TANS i685(1)(R35 FLOWTRANSMITTEN 18 539 RA 2-CPM C
230 57 FT-613 CCW 37§01
-6 A
231 New FT-6416 COMMON FL TRANS 18 TB 226 AFWSDP AFW 180197141R29 4
232 New FT-943 SI FLOW TRANSMITTER! 18 RAB 226 SI PUMP ROOM SI WAMOPS TO SG-B
-T--
A-234 58 FY-1425B
__SOUAE 190301I11425B1 IR P 50
~NSTRUMENT RACK 1
239 59 IR-PT-950 ISR T
RAB 246 RCAACCESS PORVs FOR PT-950 DOST LEVEL' G-
[ : -
242 60 LIS-1966 DOSTLEVE 18
- 0 YARD N/A DIESEL-OIL AC
- - ~INDICATOR SWITCH 18Ol~2"4D}2R j,
__DISLOL A
245 61 LQ-948 POWER SUPPLY 18 5379-NORT 226 RWST SI 24 NLEVELTRANSMITT 35121R16_
LH 24 New LT-106BATA 18 RAB 226 CCWPUMP CVCS G,-
249 62 LT-1454A CST LEVEL TRANS 18 10 TB 226 SOUTH WEST AFW 7
C SURGE TANK I
1579-L.
251 New LT-614 W
ETN 18 1
RAB 267 CCWSRGTNK!,
CCW LEVEL
ýi 37(1351 2~
252 63 LT-948 RWST LEVEL TRANS 1
527-T NORT 226 RWST I
SI 254 N o PR ESS U R E C O N TR O L -
18 3710 1 1326)
H 1
25-4 New
+
P-611 COMMON R NAB 226 CCWPUMP CCW l
]
l F
(
0 0
0 0
1 o
1 1
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
S o
1 0
o o
1 0
o 01-ItO 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 00 0
0 0
1 o
i o
0 0
1 0
0 1
0 0o 0
1 0
......I-- I..... p_ _
o 1 o I
i 0
10 01 o
o I o o o
o o1 o
t - ++-
0 1
0 0
{
0 1
0 0
1 0
10 to i
0Lo*
1 1
I 1
0 1
0 0
0 0o 1
10.
0 I.
1 0
0 10 1
0 0
0 0
110 0
0 0
1 0
jo lifO 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 -
0..
1
-- o o -i o
0 vO+I : 0-29 [16 3 ~3125J120j 12 IS1 41 125313 l 22{ 14 1314 ~140 1
10 1
0 1
0 0
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1 1o 0 o 1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 01 o,
1 I L 1
0 1
0 1
0 1 ci 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 M 1 0
1 1
0~ 1 01 M 1 0 1
0 1
1 0
- M 1
0 i110 11 011 0
M 1 1
0 1
0 0 10 M 1 0l 1
0 1
010 o
I o o i
I 1
1 0
1 0 1
ol 1
0 o+
1 1
0 1
010 SI o+- I i° I o° ° 0 o
o
[_ IO 10 1 11 00
- 1_I, 1 1 1
1 00 M 1 0
0 1 1 a0 10 1
0 1 -
1,,
1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1
01 1 01 0~o 41 1
141 00 1a 1
- 1.
0° 1 0°1 0 M
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 1 0__
1_11 0
10101 0 PI V3 256 1
REMOTE RCP B TB 5379-256 64 PI-128B D1F R
8 7R3RAS 226 SOUTH CABLE CVCS
..4..
P..
DIFF. PRESS,---
378 R13 26 66 PC8 PRESS INDIC CONTLR 1
G-
+
1 S264 66PREI-N87CFO NTLN 81901 1
TB I 251 MEZZANINE SG P10-487 FOR SO B 1016TR3 DG-A PRESSURE 18 t
266 New PS-4500A SW1TCH 18 190204A2R1 NAB 226 EDG ROOMA AC r
OUTLETPORESSUE 0
268 67 PS-4509A 18 RAB 226 EDG ROOM A AC S-
.SWITCH 1.0204At21(
1 2
^72 68^^ [
PS-9A
- PRESSURE SWITCH SESMIC 2
68FOR FP/A 18 NAB 226 OUTSIDE OF RE 276 69 PSL-1474A-2 MDP-ATRIPSMDP-A 18 4
RABS 226 MD i
AFW 190197(4)(R29+
ROOM AF 281 70 PT-17 VC PRESSURE 5379-TASITR 18 N AB 246 VOLUME OVOS TRANSMITTER 6852 R 8
+
5 MD'COMMIONHEADEIR C---1L38 I AFV M 286 71 PT-1421A MOP CMOHEADER 18 N-RAB I226 b AFW PRESS TN~
18097C4)(R28 ROOM_____
NORTH-SWSUPPLY 1
G-AFW MOP SWT N9 1
ABS 226 ROM______
261 "72 FT-166 HNDRPRESS 18 19L991(9)NR36 2
293 i
New PT7 PAEALN181TB I 25147 MEZZANINE SO I
PRIES 9161INS L______
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SSEL SWEL i
7
.TE
,TM EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION G NO ROOM SYS NO NO 1v01I 1 40 1
43 1 42 1 89 1 61 1 29 1 115 113 1 125 1 20 1 126 1 1 1 85 "1
I IV 1 166 1 130 1 271 1 173 1 41 1 125 1131 IU 122 1 134 1 3 194 401 295 73 PT-494 SG C MAIN STEAM LINE 181 G-TB 251 MEZZANINE SG 7
1 TEMPERATURE 5379-RW INICTO 19TC-0 RAB 26 CCWPUMP iCVCS INDICATOR 6853)R4 N
T TEMPERATURE 5379-26 300 Now TIC-109 18 5379,-
RB 26 CWPM CC 302 75 TM-410 LOW LEVEL AMPLIFIER 189 57(-
RAB 226 NORTH CABLE RPS/CRDI 527(R23)
A 22 NORTH...........
CA LE HIS_
32 7 TEMPERATURE 19 5379-322 79 TE-607 TEMPERATURE 19 RAB 226 CCW PUMP CCW
...23.
A ELE M E N T C C W 376(1)(f26)
R I CA.
.E C C W A-5 PANEL A-65V: PSL-1616 A-
& PSL-1684 0 190301(1616
__B SPREAD CAB 329 81 EAST HAGAN RACKS 1-13F26 20 5379-02045-77 RAS 254 HAGAN ROOM CAB I
331 N..
EDO-A-CON-D GA-CONTROL.
20 WAL RB 22 E
OMA A
SWCBDA SWITCHBOARD A 20 WL RA 26 EDROMA C
346 85 ICCM-861 INADEQUATE CORE COOLING 20 RAB 249-6 ROD DRIVE CAB 349 New R-2 INSTRUMENT RAC 20 RC I 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS IR2 2 55,Pl-l Mk& LT-
~~~INSTrRUMENT RACK PT-350 New IR-3B INSTRUMENT RACK
& LT 20 RC 226 CONTAINMENT CVCS
- 1125154,PI-154 & LT----
352 SO-A LEVEL INDI AFWP 2
7 AFW MOP 352 86 LU 47B RPL 20 5379-3578(RO)
RAB I 22 OM AW 96 LI47E RM PNL F
ROOM
- 7 87 NUC-INST-NUCLEAR 20 RAE 254 CONTROL RPSiCR)i PROTEýCT &
INSTRUMENTATIO ROM
-N-365 89 RACK-30 HAGAN RACK 30 20 HBR2-11268 RAB 254 HAGAN ROOM CAB 377
~CONTROL CA 377 92 RTGB RTGB 20 RAE 254 ROOM CABRI 391 93 TM-578 SIGNAL PROCESSOR 20 539 RAE 25 CET PANEL CABINET CH 35R2OL NIS 383 New ART-A AIR RECEIVER A TANK 21 RAE B
226 EDG ROOM A AC 190204A(l)(RI 384 94 ART-B AIR RECEIVER B TANK 21.RA 226 EDG ROOM B AC
,~~~~~190204Afljl(R1 A
26 EOROMB A
386 95 BAT-B BORIC ACID TANK B 21 RAB 1 226 CCW PUMP CVCS 387 New CCW CCW HX A 21 5379-
9 COMPONENT COOLING 3796 R
26 CWU 39 96 CWWATER 21 3
RAB 267 CCWSRG TNK CCW WATER3T6(1j(R29 392 New DAY FUEL OIL DAY TANK A 21 RAB 226 EDG ROOMA AC G-393 97 DAY FUEL OIL DAY TANK B 21 190204D(2)(R1 RAB 226 EDO ROOM B AC 2)
EXPANSION JACKET WATER
-1 T
396 New 2
ETPAN 21 1
RAE 226 ED ROOM A AC TNKA EXPANSION.
025?4Afl){R~l
'l7"I 9
EXPANSION JA TW*ER 21..
0... -l.....
RABT 226 EDO ROOM B AC TNK-B EXPANSION 100A1R 403 99 RHR RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 21 5379-RAE 226 R HX ROOM RHR S
AM D
1494BR25 -
1 408 New SG
-q6Pý 21 1)R2 RAE 226 SAMPLE ROOM CCW SAPL HX B
__;7§L)~j 411 100 STM STEAM DUMP 2 21 HBR2-TB 242.5 MEZZANINE SG
.6062ý... -------
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
1-0 1
0 0
1 0 1
0 1
o0 1
0o 1
0 1 0 1 0-- 1 0K 1
0 1 '0 1
0
---...4 - --..... -...
1 0
1 0
1 1
0 1
~-----'---~
F-V 1 0 1
i0 I
o0 1 01 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0,
1 0o 1 0 0o M
1 o0 1
0 1
0 4
i 1
0 1
o0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 I o ! I o-
! i 1 o ! 1 1
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
A f1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 1
o o
IMil 0
1 0
1 o
I i
1 1
1 A.M 1
0 0
1 1
0 110o 0
i 1
t 1
1 I
I 1
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 1I 1-1 0 i 1
0 1
0 1
0 0 1 00
-i'L o l I'l..1-ý 1....1 OO 1
i0 0
0 01 04i A
o I oi 010 1--] -1 1
+L-1f o
j
-I o
1
......... i-o......
1 1
1 1
0 i 1 0
1 0
1 0o O1 1
I 0
lo 1
1 1
0oi 1 o 0
1r --
1 0
0 1
0 M
1 0
1 0
1 0
10 0
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 1 0
0 O
1 01 1
0 1
0 1
0 PI>
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Enclosure 1 to RNP-RAI14-0011 3 pages including this cover sheet : Base List 2 ROBINSON SWEL 2 BASE LIST U)
SELECTED U)
EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION BLDG SYSTEM 0
TOTAL PB(STOP)/SFPSP SPENT FUEL PIT SKIMMER PUMP PUSH BUTTON STOP SW A
SF 7105 PB(STRT)/SFPSP SPENT FUEL PIT SKIMMER PUMP PUSH BUTTON START SW A
SF 7105 PB(-STOP/PMP-B SFP COOLING PUMP B PUSH BUTTON STOP SWITCH 1 A
SF 7105 A
SF 7105 PB1-STRT/PMP-B SFP COOLING PUMP B PUSH BUTTON START SWITCH 1 A
SF 7105 A
SF 7105 SS1/SFPC-PMP-A SFP COOLING PUMP A START STOP SWITCH 1 SS2/SFPC-PMP-A SFP COOLING PUMP A START STOP SWITCH 2 A
SF 7105 A
SF 7105 SS2/SFPC-PMP-B SFP COOLING PUMP B START STOP SWITCH 2 A
SF 7105 SFPC-HTX SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT EXCHANGER A
SF 7105 SFPC-742 EMERGENCY COOLING CONNECTION A
SF 7105 SFPC-793 SFPC PUMP LO LEVEL SUCTION A
SF 7105 SFPC-796 SFPC PUMP "B" HI LEVEL SUCTION A
SF 7105 SFPC-797 SFPC PUMP LO LEVEL SUCTION A
SF 7105 SFPC-798A PURIFICATION LOOP INLET A
SF 7105 SFPC-798B PURIFICATION LOOP OUTLET A
SF 7105 SFPC-799A PI-652 ISOLATION A
SF 7105 SFPC-799D SFPC PUMP DISCHARGE VENT A
SF 7105 A
SF 7105 SFPC-802B RWP PUMP DISCHARGE TO MIXED BED DEMIN ASF_7105 SFPC-802C RC FILTER RETURN TO RCS VIA HIGH HEAD SI A
SF 7105 SFPC-805A RWP PUMP SUCTION FROM RWST A
SF 7105 SFPC-819 SFP HX INLET A
SF 7105 A
SF 7105 SFPC-820 SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET SFPC-B21A SFP HX TUBE SIDE VENT A
SF 7105 SFPC-821B SFP HX TUBE SIDE DRAIN A
SF 7105 SFPC-821C SFPC PUMP "B" CASING DRAIN A
SF 7110 SFPC-824J SFPC PUMP "B" CASING VENT A
SF 7110 SFPC-836A SFPC PUMP "A" HI LEVEL SUCTION A
SF 7110 1 of 2 ROBINSON SWEL 2 BASE LIST u*
SELECTED (0
EQUIPMENT ID DESCRIPTION BLDG SYSTEM UTOTAL A
SF 7110 SFPC-836B SFPC PUMP "A" DISCHARGE A
SF_7110 A
SF 7110 SFPC-837 SFPC PUMP "B" DISCHARGE A
SF 7110 SFPC-838A SFPC PUMP "A" CASING DRAIN A
SF 7110 SFPC-838B SFPC PUMP "A" CASING VENT A
SF 7110 LA-651 SFP SPENT FUEL PIT HI/LO LEVEL ALARM A
SF 7110 RO-2049 SPECTACLE FLANGE FOR LINE NO. 8-AC-151R-58 A
_SF_7110 A
SF 7110 RO-2050 SPECTACLE FLANGE FOR LINE NO. 4-AC-15IR-59A SF71 AC-204 SFP PUMP B DISCHARGE A
SF 7110 AC-204A SFP PUMP A DISCHARGE A
SF 7110 AC-58 SFP PUMP B SUCTION A
SF 7110 AC-S8A SFP PUMP A SUCTION A
SF 7110 AC-59 SFP PUMP SUCTION A
SF 7110 A
SF 7110 AC-60 SFP PUMPS DISCHARGE TO SFP HEAT EXCHANGER A
SF_7110 AC-60A SFP PUMP A DISCHARGE TO SFP HEAT EXCHANGERA SF71 A
SF 7110 AC-61 SFP HEAT EXCHANGER TO SPENT FUEL PIT A
SF 7110 AC-63 SFP FILTER TO SPENT FUEL PIT SFPC-PMP-A SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING PUMP "A" A
SF 7110 SFPC-PMP-B SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING PUMP "B" A
SF 7110 A
SF 7110 TE-651A SPENT FUEL PIT TEMP MONITORING THERMOCOUPLE TE-651B SPENT FUEL PIT TEMP MONITORING THERMOCOUPLE A
SF71 A
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SF 7110 TIC-651B SPENT FUEL PIT HI/LO TEMP IND SWITCH TW-653 THERMOWELL FOR SFP HEAT EXCHANGER RETURN LINE TEMP INDICATOR AI SF 7110 1.-i 2 of 2
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Enclosure 1 to RNP-RAI14-0011 2 pages including this cover sheet : Rapid Drain Down List H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report Feature SPECTACLE FLANGE
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Enclosure 1 to RNP-RA/14-0011 2 pages including this cover sheet : SWEL 2
R O BN SO N -S W E L 2 E N I O N E T
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Enclosure 1 to RNP-RAI14-0011 5 pages including this cover sheet : Peer Review Report
H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 : Peer Review Report Peer Review activities were performed on the Seismic Walkdown Program in addition to the Programmatic Controls/Oversight that were established for the project. A brief description of the Programmatic Controls/Oversight and Peer Review findings is provided below:
Procirammatic Controls/Oversight Programmatic Controls/Oversight were developed for the 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns and implanted at H.B.
Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP). A specification based on the EPRI guidance was established to control SWEL development and walkdown requirements. A specification was developed since EPRI 1025286 was written as guidance, whereas, the specification provided definitive criteria and control to avoid interpretation and promote consistency. The specification was inclusive of the EPRI guidance. A Quality Assurance (QA) person was present at the site during the inspection to assure form and specification compliance. Technical oversight was performed by the Project Manager (PM). The PM was onsite during the SWEL development and intermittently during the walkdowns and report generation phases of the project. An in-process review of work was performed during those intervals. Inspections at the four sites were being performed concurrently and lessons learned were relayed to the inspection teams at the other sites to determine if commonality was present within the fleet: These in-process reviews were performed through all phases of the project with the intent of meeting the intent of the EPRI guidance.
Peer Review Separate from the programmatic controls implemented at the sites, Peer Review activities were performed on the seismic walkdown program that spanned from the development of the specification and Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) through the physical walkdowns and ultimately to the report preparation and review. The Peer Review team concluded that the inspection program was performed in accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June, 2012. The Peer Review found the effort at RNP was performed in a competent manner and a very broad spectrum of components located throughout the power block were included in the program. The results were documented in a Duke (legacy Progress Energy) engineering change package.
Aspects of the program that were reviewed by the Peer Review justifying this statement are provided as follows:
Inspection Team The Peer Review found Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE) performing the inspections were very experienced with a background in design engineering including seismic design at nuclear facilities dating back to design of the first generation nuclear power plants. SWEs had prior seismic walkdown experience at operating nuclear power plants, Department of Energy facilities, and other pertinent applications.
Training consistent with the EPRI training was provided to all SWEs before any inspections were performed. The resumes of the SWEs were reviewed and it was determined that the SWEs were found to have qualifications that were consistent with the requirements of the regulatory guidance.
Selection of SWEL Items The Peer Review concluded the process used to select SWEL items included both selected and diverse aspects. The list of equipment was obtained from the A-46 Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) and the appropriate screening filters identified in the EPRI guidance were applied. The number of items included in the SWEL represented an appropriate number of items in each equipment class when compared to the total number of items on the SSEL. The items that were individually selected typically were items that would have the most severe consequence in the event that the target item were to fail during the seismic event and resulted in components associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators, vital power, and heat removal systems, etc. being well represented. Other conditions given additional consideration included environmental and distribution into diverse structures; while items that are included in other programmatic inspections, (e.g. AOV, MOV, Appendix R, ASME Section Xl Subsection Page 1
H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. 1 : Peer Review Report IWE/IWL) were minimized. The process used to determine the SWEL items was determined to be in accordance with the EPRI guidance and adequately represents a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the five safety functions.
The Peer Review confirmed site Operations experience was included in the review of the components to assure a representative distribution of equipment was included in the SWEL. Operations also performed preliminary walkdowns to determine if the components could be safely accessed. A selection/substitution criterion was established before the items were assessed and if items were judged inaccessible, then the substitution criterion was used. The Peer Review interviewed the personnel making the equipment selections and operations personnel to confirm an acceptable approach was used in selecting the equipment for sampling.
A sample of modifications performed at the site since the last IPEEE/A-46 inspection, previous A-46 outliers, and upgrades were reflected in the SWEL.
The SWEL contained 126 components in SWEL-1 and an additional 12 items in SWEL-2 totaling 138 total selected items for the combined SWEL. The number of items on SWEL-1 exceeds the recommended range of 90-120 items in the EPRI guidance and is considered conservative.
The process used to select the SWEL items, inclusion of Operations Personnel into the selection of the items, A-46 outliers and modifications were represented in the SWEL and the number and distribution of items was in accordance with the EPRI guidance and confirmed by the Peer Review utilizing the Peer Review Checklist for the SWEL.
Pre-inspection Preparation Peer Review was performed on the pre-inspection prepared walkdown packages which consisted of general configuration and structural drawings, anchorage detailing, and seismic demand on the anchorage and it was confirmed that these packages were available in the field during the inspection. The inspection packages were reviewed for thoroughness to the criteria and samples were selected to determine appropriateness of the information. At random intervals during the walkdown phase of the project, the SWEs were questioned to determine if they had been adequately prepared and specifically, they were questioned to determine if they knew the vertical and horizontal strong motion demand in the areas that they would be working. Additional instructions were provided during these intermediate assessments to affect subsequent inspections. The SWEs demonstrated that they had adequately prepared for the inspections prior to entering the field.
Conduct of Inspections The Peer Review concluded the SWEs conducted field inspections with the walkdown packages "in-hand." The Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) and Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC) were physically used in the field and place keeping practices were employed. The SWEL items were inspected; the forms were filled out in the field, and were reviewed by the SWEs before they left the area. As a result of conversations with the SWEs and Peer Review observations during the inspections, it was concluded that pertinent and thorough conversations occurred between the SWEs in the field to generally reach a consensus on a real time basis in the field. The inspections were performed in accordance with the EPRI guidance and within the confines of the controlling specification.
Review of Walkdown and Area Walk-By Checklist The peer reviewers discussed the inspections with the SWEs prior to field implementation and sampled field reports during the inspections to determine adequacy of the inspection. The SWEs were asked to describe the encountered field conditions and the forms were reviewed to determine if the information was representative. The checklist was used predominately with hand written notes being used judiciously to reflect conditions. Intermediate guidance during the inspection process was provided and documentation was improved during the inspection phase of the project. Oversight provided during the Page 2
H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. I : Peer Review Report walkdowns resulted in some of the first components being re-inspected to improve the field notes documentation.
The final documents (i.e., package including checklist, photographs, drawings, notes) were compared to the field notes with Peer Review reviewing over 30% of the forms. As a result of the Peer Review, there were some instances that required the SWE to obtain and/or delineate additional information in the walkdown packages. Once incorporated, the information presented on the forms was considered consistent with specification requirements and were judged representative of the field conditions.
Decisions for Entering Potential Adverse Seismic Conditions (PASCs) into CAP Process The Peer Review concluded the identification of potential SSCs placed into the CAP process was in accordance with the controlling walkdown specification. The specification decision process delineated if items were to be initiated in CAP immediately or if they were to be evaluated in accordance with the NTTF 2.3 Seismic program. Site documentation, (e.g., original A-46/IPEEE inspection results, existing CAP Non-Conforming Record (NCRs), calculations, evaluations, etc.), was reviewed if the SWEs could not make an immediate acceptance determination. If the item was originally evaluated and marked as Unknown for PASC determination on the walkdown checklist and additional research did not yield a qualification of the existing condition, a NCR was initiated and the item was identified as a PASC. If additional information was located and the SWEs agreed on the status, the field notes were updated to reflect the acceptable condition. This was represented on the final walkdown and/or walk-by checklists, and no NCR would have been generated. The field notes were reviewed and evidence of documenting additional information was observed.
The Peer Review concluded that the process for evaluating identified issues in the field to determine if they were PASCs was in accordance with the EPRI guidance. The PASCs that were generated were reviewed and determined to meet the threshold for a NCR which was issued and documented in CAP.
Review of Licensing Basis A Peer Review of the developed licensing basis evaluations, including the decisions for entering potentially adverse seismic conditions into RNP's CAP, was performed and found to be acceptable.
Review of Submittal Report The Peer Review reviewed the submittal report and it was found to be consistent with the information provided in the inspection reports and the supporting documentation and met the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
Summary The Peer Review concluded the program was controlled and performed in accordance with the guidance outlined in EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. The number of items in the SWEL met and exceeded the minimum requirements and was distributed appropriately among the various criteria. The types of issues encountered were appropriate for the seismic demand for the site.
Several significant modifications have been made at the site and these improvements were included in the component sampling.
Several housekeeping items were identified resulting in a number of work requests and CAP items. The site addressed most of the items during the inspections. A general impression of the SWEs was maintenance was being performed at the site and as a rule the site was conducting site work in accordance with the Station's Housekeeping procedures.
In conclusion, the Peer Review found the personnel involved in the inspections had sufficient knowledge of the site before the inspections and inspected the SWEL items in accordance with provided guidance.
The conditions encountered and the degree of severity of the conditions indicates that RNP is conducting Page 3
H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, Rev. I : Peer Review Report its maintenance and modification programs with consideration of seismic requirements. The performed inspections and assessments were conducted in accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI
- 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. The results were assessed to be reasonable and consistent and the number of PASCs is consistent with seismic demand for the region and age of the unit.
An additional peer review of the walkdowns performed to evaluate the five inaccessible items, which were limited to internal inspections of electrical cabinets, was completed by the Peer Review Team. The SWEs' qualifications were reviewed and found to meet the requirements of the guidance outlined in EPRI
- 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. All other aspects reviewed were based on their relevancy to the inaccessible items' walkdown scope. The conclusions provided in the peer review remain validated for the additional inaccessible items walkdowns performed.
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