05000382/LER-2013-007, Regarding Technical Specification 3.9.7 Violation, Load Over Irradiated Fuel During Dry Fuel Storage Activities
| ML13353A136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2013 |
| From: | Jarrell J Entergy Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| W3F1-2013-0069 LER 2013-007-00 | |
| Download: ML13353A136 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3822013007R00 - NRC Website | |
text
ýEntergy Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093 Tel 504-739-6685 Fax 504-739-6698 jjarrel@entergy.com John P. Jarrell III Manager - Regulatory Assurance Waterford 3 10 CFR 50.73 W3F1 -2013-0069 December 17, 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-007-00 Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)
Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38
Dear Sir or Madam:
Entergy is hereby submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-007-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3). This report provides details associated with a violation of Technical Specifications during dry fuel loading activities within the Spent Fuel Handling Building.
Based on plant evaluation, it was determined that this condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
This report contains no new commitments. Please contact John P. Jarrell, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (504) 739-6685 if you have questions regarding this information.
Sincen
- Rly, i7
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report 2013-007-00 eVI
W3F1 -2013-0069 Page 2 cc:
Mr. Marc L. Dapas, Regional Administrator U.S. NRC, Region IV RidsRgn4MailCenter@nrc.gov U.S. NRC Project Manager for Waterford 3 Kaly.Kalyanam@nrc.gov U.S. NRC Senior Resident Inspector for Waterford 3 Marlone. Davis@nrc.gov Chris.Speer@nrc.gov
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 1013112013 (10-2010)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station 05000 382 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification 3.9.7 Violation, Load Over Irradiated Fuel During Dry Fuel Storage Activities
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED D
SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR CLTYN DO NUB MONTHi MOT DAY YEAR YA UBR N FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 18 2013 2013
- - 007 00 12 17 20131
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
[1 20.2201(b)
[1 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
Mode 1 E] 20.2201(d)
[: 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[3 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) l-20.2203(a)(1)
E] 20.2203(a)(4)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
LI 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL Ej 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
LI 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(x)
E] 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[1 50.36(c)(2)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
LI 73.71(a)(4) 10 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
LI 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
LI 73.71(a)(5) 100%
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
E:I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
EL 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[] OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in
__ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
INITIAL CONDITIONS Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3), was operating steady-state in Mode 1, at or near 100% power at the time of discovering the condition, with Dry Fuel Storage (DFS) activities in progress.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On October 18, 2013, personnel at Waterford 3 identified that, contrary to Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.7, during dry fuel loading activities in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB), with the transfer cask loaded with fuel, a load of over 2000 pounds was placed over the transfer cask with a crane that is not single failure proof. This condition occurred with the irradiated fuel covered with a stainless steel lid, 9.5 inches thick, welded in place covering the fuel.
Since the Dry Fuel Storage Procedure, Stack-UP and Transfer of Loaded MPC (DFS-003-006) did not require the use of the FHB main hook at that time, use of the auxiliary hook was allowed by the procedure to install the 2500 pound transfer cask lid. As a result, the use of a crane that is not single failure proof was used, contrary to TS 3.9.7, during this DFS campaign as well as previous DFS campaigns.
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE As a operation or condition prohibited by TS 3.9.7, this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
BACKGROUND - SYSTEM DESIGN Waterford 3 is a Combustion Engineering design pressurized water reactor [AC]. The irradiated fuel, after adequately spent and decayed, is transferred from the Spent Fuel Pool using the Holtec HI-STORM 100 Cask Storage System into HI-STORM DFS casks and stored for a time on the DFS concrete pad at the facility site. In this process the fuel is loaded into a Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) while inside the HI-TRAC transfer cask and underwater in the SFP Cask Loading area. After loading, the HI-TRAC transfer cask is moved from the SFP and the 9.5 inch thick stainless steel lid is installed onto the MPC and welded, covering and containing the irradiated fuel. After the MPC is verified to be sealed and prepared for transporting to the HI-STORM cask for storage, the HI-TRAC transfer cask top lid, weighing approximately 2500 pounds, is lowered into place. It was during this placement of the HI-TRAC transfer cask lid that the single-failure proof crane should have been used.
CAUSAL FACTORS Based on discussions with personnel associated with the DFS activity, there appeared to have been an erroneous assumption that the 9.5 inch thick MPC lid in place, covering the fuel, would constitute the load as not being over the fuel, similar to the design and license base of the Reactor head being in place covering the irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel. The MPC lid being in place is not credited for allowing these heavy loads over irradiated fuel in the design or license bases.
EXTENT OF CONDITION The use of a crane that is not single failure proof, occurred contrary to TS 3.9.7, during the DFS campaign associated with this event, as well as previous DFS campaigns.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Ref. CR-WF3-2013-5106 CA-01)
" Dry Fuel Storage Procedure, Stack-UP and Transfer of Loaded MPC (DFS-003-006), was changed to require using the single-failure proof handling system of the FHB crane main hook instead of allowing the use of FHB auxiliary hook that is not considered single-failure proof.
A review of the DFS procedures was performed to ensure that all lifts over fuel, including the fuel considered covered, which weigh over 2,000 pounds uses the main hook of the FHB crane.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety significance with this event was minimal because of the high capacities of the rigging and hoist used to move the HI-TRAC upper lid cover, which weighs approximately 2,500 pounds, and the MPC 9.5 inch thick lid welded in place covering the fuel.
The auxiliary hook used to place the HI-TRAC lid has a rated capacity of 30,000 pounds. This was load tested during initial installation up to approximately 1.25 times the rating, or 37,500 pounds. The weakest links in the multi-function rigging system that is used for the HI-TRAC upper lid are the safety hoist rings, which have a capacity of 8,000 pounds each. Since four of these are used, the rated capacity of the multi-function rigging system for the HI-TRAC upper lid is 32,000 pounds.
The multi-function rigging system is required to have all components be proof load tested at twice the rated vertical load. For the setup used to move the HITRAC upper lid cover, this would be 64,000 pounds.
The weight of the HI-TRAC upper lid cover was less than 10% of the rated capacities of the equipment used to move the lid, without crediting the tested load capacity of the systems. In addition, the fuel was inside the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) with a 9.5 inch thick lid welded in place which would have provided protection from this dropped load, if it had occurred.
SIMILAR EVENTS
A search was performed using the NRC's ADAMS search engine for other similar reported events at Waterford 3 and in the industry. Though and event at H. B. ROBINSON was reported in 1997 (LER #:
97-05-02) identifying the failure to utilize a single-failure proof crane, no similar events were identified where this occurred when incorrectly assumed credit was taken for irradiated fuel being covered by a canister lid, such as while in a fuel transfer cask.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Energy industry identification system (EIIS) codes and component function identifiers are identified in the text with brackets [ ].