ML13330A063
| ML13330A063 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1980 |
| From: | Baskin K Southern California Edison Co |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-12, TASK-3-12, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8006200464 | |
| Download: ML13330A063 (54) | |
Text
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 K. P. BASKIN TELEPHONE MANAGER, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (213) 572-1401 AND LICENSING June.18, 1980 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Projects Branch No. 5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Mr. D. L. Ziemann's letters of March 6 and March 28, 1980 requested information regarding the environmental qualification of safety related electrical equipment at San Onofre Unit 1. This information is provided as an enclosure to this letter. In addition, emergency operation instructions and information regarding the containment pressure and temperature analysis for San Onofre Unit 1 were provided by our letters dated March 14 and May 1, 1980.
It should be noted that SCE's review of this matter is continuing.
As information is identified which was not available for inclusion in this submittal, appropriate revisions to the enclosed information will be provided to the NRC Staff.
If you have any questions on this information, please let me know.
Subsocribed on-this /f.
day-- of 1980..
By K. P. Baskin Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing FMIALSP Subscribed and sworn to before me on this AGNES CRABTREE NOTARY PUUC - CALIFORNIA d
PRINCIPALOFRCM
/
_day of 1980.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY My Commission Exp. Aug27. 1982 Notary ublic in and for the County of Los A eles, State of California 700Q20 1 A4/6 Enclosure
Enclosure ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 In connection with the NRC's continuing review of the environmental qualifi cation of electrical equipment at San Onofre Unit 1, additional information was requested by Mr. D. L. Ziemannes letters of February 15, 1980, March 6, 1980 and March 28, 1980.
In-particular, the February 15, 1980 letter included additional guidance in Enclosure 1, " Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors," and, "Guidelines for Identification of That Safety Equipment of SEP Operating Reactors for Which Environmental Qualification is to be Addressed."
The qualification of electrical equipment at San Onofre Unit 1 with respect to these guidelines is discussed in.the following paragraphs. The format for this information is consistent with guidance provided by the NRC Staff at a meeting on February 21, 1980.
This information augments the information on this subject which has previously been submitted by letters dated February 24, 1978 and February 13, 1979.
Safety Related Electrical Equipment In accordance with Enclosure 2 to Mr. D. L. Ziemann's February 15, 1980 letter, the Final Safety Analysis Report, the Emergency Operating Procedure for a Loss of Coolant (S-3-5.5, Rev. 18) and other relevant correspondence were reviewed.
to identify the safety related electrical equipment which is utilized to mitigate the consequences of a loss of primary or secondary coolant (LOCA, MSLB or FWLB) at San Onofre Unit 1.. A comprehensive list of equipment from these sources is provided by system in Table 1.
The list of equipment in Table 1 has been further reviewed to determine whether each specific component is required to mitigate the consequences of a loss of primary or secondary coolant. The systems or components which have been determined to be not required to mitigate the consequences of a loss of primary or secondary coolant are listed in Table 2. In each case,. the basis for excluding the particular system or-component i's provided.. Qualification of equipment listed in Table 2 is not further addressed.
Environment Following Loss of Coolant For the purposes of defining the environment following a postulated loss of primary or secondary coolant, the plant has been divided into various areas as identified in Figure 1. The limiting environment associated with each of these areas following a loss of coolant is identified in Table 3. The basis for the indicated environment is also identified.
Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment Areas of the plant where there is no difference between the environment during normal operation and the environment following a loss of primary or secondary coolant are defined as nonhostile environments.. Equipment which is located in
-2 a nonhostile environment, as defined in Table 3, is concluded to be qualified by experience based on the fact that this equipment is functional during normal operation of the plant. The equipment which is located in a nonhostile environment is listed by system in Table 4. Qualification of equipment in Table 4 is not further addressed.
Equipment which is required to function to mitigate the consequences of a loss of primary or secondary coolant and which is located in a hostile environment is listed by system in Table 5. In addition, the hostile environment, the qualification of each component and the basis for that qualification is listed in Table 5. It shall be noted that although the NRC Guidelines contemplate that equipment inside containment will be qualified by type testing, where such testing is not available for original.plant equipment, qualification has been based on analysis and/or similarity.
Equipment for which qualification is not available to fully satisfy the hostile environment conditions identified in Table 5 is listed in Table 6. For each component listed in Table 6,-additional information and/or proposed remedies are provided. For example, the existence of redundant systems, or the time period in which the equipment is required to operate-can provide sufficient basis for not requiring additional qualification of a particular component.
Evaluation of the environmental qualification of all components listed in Table 6 is continuing.
The NRC guidelines suggest that equipment required to mitigate the consequences of a loss of primary or secondary coolant should be reviewed with respect to the potential for degradation due to thermal and radiation aging. Although such a review is not included in the environmental qualification evaluations in this submittal, the following actions will be initiated to ensure that equipment is not susceptible to significant degradation due to thermal and radiation aging:
(1) Maintenance procedure(s) will be prepared to ensure that aging characteristics of component materials are considered in selection of replacement parts, and (2) a program will be initiated to periodically review maintenance and surveillance records to identify the need for replacement or modification of equipment or components.which are exhibiting age related
.degradation..
Based on the information presented in the preceding paragraphs and the attached tables, there is sufficient basis to conclude that San Onofre Unit 1 can be brought to a safe shutdown condition following a postulated loss of primary of secondary coolant without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
AREA-19AREA-18 AREA-17 AREA-6 AE 1
x z
/ \\ AREA-I AREA-2' AE-AREA-8A-8 AREA-6AREAFI12U KE SONGS 1 AREAS A JDE Rp~loft
TABLE 1:
Systems and components associated with Operating Instruction S-3-5.5, Rev. 18, Loss of Coolant:
- 1.
Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers Instrumentation and equipment required to trip the reactor on:
- a. Steam flow/feedwater flow mismatch FT-460, FT-461 and FT-462 FT-456, FT-457 and FT-458 FM-456B-X, FM-457B-X and FM-458B-X
- b. Pressurizer high/low pressure PT-430, PT-431 and PT-432 YE-430B, YE-431B, YE-432B PC-430A/F, PC-431A/D, PC-432A/B PI-430, PI-431, PI-432
- c. Safety Injection Sequencer
- d. Pressurizer high level LT-430, LT-431 and LT-432 YE-430A, YE-431A, YE-432A LC-430A, LC-431A, LC-432A LI-430, LI-431, LI-432
- e. Reactor overpower K-1501 to K-1508
- 2.
Safety Injection System (SIS)
Safety Injection Pumps G-50A and G-50B PT-910A (east) and PT-910B (west)
Feedwater Pumps G-3A and G-3B HV-853A and HV-853B HV-854A and HV-854B HV-852A and HV-852B HV-851A and HV-851B CV-875A and CV-875B CV-36 and CV-37 FT-912/FI-912, FT-913/FI-913, FT-914/FI-914 MOV-850A, MOV-850B and MOV-850C Refueling water tank level LT-950, LI-950 LS-69
- 3.
Containment Isolation System (CIS)
CV-102 and 103 (Sphere Sump Discharge)
CV-104 and 105 (RCS Drain Tank Discharge)
CV-106 and 107 (RCS Drain Tank Vent)
CV-146 and 147 (Sphere Air Sample)
SV-1212-8 and 1212-9 (Sphere Air Sample)
CV-117, 118 and 119 (Steam Generator Steam Sample)
CV-120, 121 and 122 (Steam Generator Blowdown Sample)
CV-123 (Service Air)
CV-949, 957 and 962 (RCS Sampling)
CV-537 and 115 (Service Water)
CV-533 and 534 (Pressurizer Relief Tank)
I
-2 CV-536 and 535 (RCS Drain Tank)
CV-525 and 526 (RCS Letdown)
CV-527 and 528 (RCP Sealwater)
CV-287 (RCS Letdown)
CV-202, 203 and 204 (RCS Letdown)
CV-532 (Pressurizer Relief Tank)
CV-515 and 516 (Air-Units Cooling Water)
PT-1120 A, B, C and PT-1121 A, B, and C CS-1, 2 and 3 Limit Switches SV-702 B, D (Cold Leg Vent)
SV-702 A, C (Cold Leg Vent)
POV-9, 10 (Sphere Purge)
CV-40, 116 (Sphere Vent)
CV-10, (Sphere Vent)
- 4.
Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)
- 5.
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
Note:
Portions of the system are also listed as components of the Recircu lation System FCV-1115A, FCV-1115B, FCV-1115C CV-410 and CV-411 LT-1100/LI-1100A (Volume Control Tank)
LT-1108/LR-1108
- 6.
Containment Spray System (CSS)
Note:
Portions of this system are also listed as components of the Safety Injection System Refueling water pumps G-27A and G-27B CV-517 and CV-518 PT-18, PI-165 (refueling water pump discharge pressure)
FT-504, FQ-504, FY-504, FIS-522 (spray flow)
PT-501, PT-502 and PT-503 PIS-511, 512 and 513 CV-82 and CV-114 MOV-880 MOV-883 Chemical addition pumps, G-200A and G-200B SV-600 and SV-601 FT-506 and FT-507 (hydrazine flow)
FIS-500 and FIS-501 LT-500A and LT-500B (hydrazine tank level)
LIS-500A and LIS-500B
-3
- 7.
Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ADV)
CV-76, CV-77, CV-78 and CV-79
- 8.
Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)
CCW pumps G-15A, G-15B and G-15C MOV-720A, B TE/TC/TR-606 FT/FI-606 CV-737A and CV-737B (Recirculation heat exchanger)
- 9.
Salt Water Cooling System (SWCS)
Salt Water Cooling pumps G-13A and G-13B POV-5 and POV-6, SV-24 and SV-25 MOV-9 SV-81, SV-82
- 10.
Monitoring Instrumentation TA-401B-X, TA-411B-X and TA-421B-X (RCS low T ave.)
CBX-1-1, CBX-1-2, CBX-2-1, CBX-2-2, SDX-1-1 and SDX-2-1 K1521, K1522, K1523 and K1524 Steam pressure PT-2/R8-2 Core exit thermocouples PT-4/R8-1 RCS subcooling recorder Pressure Transmitter for RCS subcooling recorder Reactor Coolant Temperature Detectors YR-456, YR-457, YR-458 (steam generator low level)
Humidistat
- 11.
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump G-10 FT/FC/FI-2002A, B, C (auxiliary feedwater flow)
LT/LI-450X, 451X, 452X Condensate Storage Tank Level
- 12.
Electrical Distribution System (EDS) 4 kV buses 1C and 2C 480 V buses 1, 2 and 3 Motor Control Centers 1, 1A, 1B, 2, 2A, 2B, 3 Vital Buses 1, 2, 3, 4 and Utility Bus DC Buses 1, 2 Battery Chargers A, B, C, D Undervoltage Relays CV6, CV7 MOV-850C UPS Diesel Generators and supporting systems Penetrations
-'4 Cable Cable Splices
- 13.
Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS)
Fan A-33 Motors for A-31 normal filter and emergency filter dampers
- 14.
Radiation Monitoring System (RMS)
R-1215 (air ejector)
R-1214 (stack)
R-1216 (steam generator blowdown)
R-1232 (containment area radiation monitor)
R-1234 (auxiliary building area radiation monitor)
RLR-1200, 1201
- 15.
Instrument Air System Instrument and Service Air Compressors K-1A, K-1B and K-1C Emergency Air Compressor PCV-40 SV-105, SV-106 and SV-107 CV-41 PS-56, PS-57 and PS-58 SV-147 PS-119 PT-11, PT-12, PI-163 and PI-164 (Instrument and service air pressure)
- 16.
Reactor Coolant System CV-530 and CV-531 CV-545 and CV-546 Valve Position Indication Pressurizer Heaters
- 17.
Main Condenser System
- 18.
Recirculation System Note: Portions of this system are also listed as components of the Containment Spray System Recirculation pumps G-45A and G-45B MOV-866A and MOV-866B FT-500, FQ-500, FY-500, FIS-520 FT-501, FQ-501, FY-501, FIS-521 LC-951, LI-951 LS-73
I
(
-5 FCV-1115D, FCV-1115E and FCV-1115F MOV-356, MOV-357 and.MOV-358 MOV-1100B, MOV-1100D and MOV-1100C Charging pumps G-8A and G-8B Charging pump discharge pressure indicator PT-1119A and B MOV-18 and MOV-19 FT-1114A/FI-1114A, FT-1114B/FI-1114B and FT-1114C/FI-1114C
- 19.
HotLeg Recirculation FCV-1112 FIT-1112, FI-1112, FC-1112 CV-304 CV-305 PCV-430C and PCV-430H
TABLE 2:
Equipment Not Essential to Mitigate a Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant Safety Injection System PT-910A (east) and PT-910B (west)
These pressure transmitters monitor the safety injection pump discharge pressure and can be used by the operator to determine if the pumps are running. However, there are no trips or automatic actions associated with these transmitters. Operation of the safety injection pumps can be determined from other monitored parameters, such as safety injection line flowrate (FI-912, FI-913 and FI-914) and RWST level (LI-950).
Recirculation System PT-1119A (north) and PT-1119B (south)
These pressure transmitters monitor the charging pump discharge pressure and can be used by the operator to determine if the pumps are running.
There are no trips or automatic actions -associated with these transmitters.
Operation of the charging pumps can be determined from other monitored parameters, such as charging pump safety injection flowrate (FI-1114 A, FI-1114 B-and FI-1114 C).
Residual Heat Removal System The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is used to attain a cold shutdown condition. However, in the event that all or part of this system is unavailable following a steam or feedwater line break inside containment alternate shutdown methods are available. One such method involves removal of heat through the steam generators-and is described in the Loss of Coolant Operating Instruction. Another method involves use of the recirculation pumps to provide cooling and is described in Item 5 of the enclosure to SCE's letter to the NRC dated November 27, 1974.
In the event of a steam or feedwater line break outside containment, the RHR system would not be affected by a hostile environment and would be available to permit operations to attain cold shutdown.
Chemical and Volume Control System LT-1100/LI-1100A This indicator provides volume control.tank level indication as one of the listed accident symptoms. However, other instrumentation is available to identify the accident as listed in Section 1.0 of the Operating Instruction. Therefore, this indication is not required. (Following a loss of coolant accident charging pump suction is from the RWST and not the volume control tank.)
LT-1108/LR-1108 This instrumentation monitors the level in the boric acid tank, which can be.used following a steam or feedwater line break for boration of the RCS to cold shutdown conditions. However, boration can be accomplished for these accidents utilizing RWST water. Therefore, level instrumentation associated with the boric acid tank is not required.
-2 FCV-1115A, B, C These valves are the reactor coolant pump seal injection flow control valves. Following an accident these valves are kept open to maintain seal injection in accordance with the Operating Instruction. However, in the event of a LOCA, these valves are closed and the parallel recirculation flow control valves (FCV-1115 D, E and F) are opened to establish recirculation flow to the core. The operator is instructed to establish 110 gpm to each cold leg. In the event that one or all of FCV-1115A, B and C were to fail in the open position, this would not affect the ability to establish a flow of 110 gpm since these valves are small compared to the recirculation flow control valves.
Containment Spray System PT-18, PI-165 This pressure transmitter and indicator provide indication of refueling water pump discharge pressure and can be used by the operator to determine if the pumps are running. There are no trips or automatic actions associated with these instruments. Operation of these pumps can be determined from other monitored parameters such as containment spray flowrate (FIS-522).
FT-506, FT-507, LT-500A, LT-500B FIS-500, FIS-501, LIS-500A, LIS-500B These instruments provide indication of hydrazine flow and hydrazine tank level.
However, this is a completely automatic and redundant system and failure of both trains is not considered credible. These instruments are not required for proper operation of the system. Therefore, these instruments are not required.
Main Condenser System If the main condenser is available following an accident, it can be used for dumping steam. However, this system would be unavailable in the event of a loss of offsite power., The atmospheric dump valves or steam generator safety valves can be used to dump steam as required.
Monitoring Instrumentation CBX-1-1, CBX-1-2, CBX-2-1, CBX-2-2, SDX-1-1, SDX-2-1, K1521, K1522, K1523, K1524 This instrumentation is used to verify reactor trip. However, redundant means exist for automatically initiating a reactor trip and failure of such redundant means, including manual trip, is not considered credible.
Therefore, these instruments are not required.
PT-4/R8-1 This instrumentation records feedwater pump discharge pressure and can be used to determine a feedwater line break.
However, other instrumentation is available to adequately diagnose a feedwater line break including steam generator level and feedwater flow.
-3 Core Exit Thermocouples These instruments are used to verify adequate core cooling. However, other instrumentation is available to determine this, including hot leg temperature.
Humidistat This instrument is used to monitor containment humidity and provides an alarm on high humidity which is one of the listed symptoms for a loss of coolant. However, other instrumentation is available to identify the accident as listed in Section 1.0 of the Operating Instruction.
Therefore, this indication is not required.
YR-456, YR-457, YR-458 These instruments provide an alarm on low steam generator level which is one of the listed symptoms for a steam line break. However, other instrumentation is available to identify the accident as listed in Section 1.0 of the Operating Instruction. Therefore, this indication is not required. In addition, indication of steam generator level is provided by LI-450X, 451X and 452X.
TA-401B-X, 411B-X, 421B-X These instruments provide an indication of RCS average temperature which is identified as one of the symptoms of a loss of coolant. This information is not required during the course of the accident since the RCTD's provide information regarding the status of the RCS. In addition, other instrumen tation is available to identify the accident as listed in Section 1.0 of the Operating Instruction.
Radiation Monitoring System R-1214 This instrument monitors radiation in the stack and is one of the listed symptoms for a steam generator tube rupture.
However, other instrumentation is available to identify the accident as listed in Section 1.0 of the Operating Instruction.
R-1234 This instrument monitors the radiation levels in the reactor auxiliary building. The Operating Instruction instructs the operator to monitor this for detection of recirculation loop leakage. However, the instruction also indicates that recirculation flow must be maintained and so this information cannot be used to change the status of the recirculation system. Therefore, this monitor is not required.
Electrical Distribution System L&F Machine Penetrations These penetrations are used for the power circuitry associated with the reactor coolant pumps. Following a LOCA or MSLB inside containment, the reactor coolant pumps are not required.
-4 Containment Isolation System Limit Switches The limit switches on the containment isolation valves are only associated with providing valve position indication in the control room. These switches are not associated with valve movement and as such their failure will not affect closure of the isolation valves.
Reactor Protection System K-1501 to K-1508 These instruments provide a reactor trip on overpower which is one of the listed symptoms for a main steam line break. Sufficiently redundant means exist for automatically initiating a trip such that this trip is not essential.
In addition, other instrumentation is available to identify the accident as listed in Section 1.0 of the Operating Instruction. Therefore, these instruments are not required.
Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Heaters The pressurizer heaters would normally be used to provide primary system pressure control during long term cooling following a small break LOCA, MSLB or MFLB. However, in the event that the pressurizer heaters are not available, alternate methods of system pressure control are available as discussed in NUREG-0611.
These methods include: (1) controlling the system temperature by controlling the rate of energy removal from the primary system by the steam generator, (2) controlling the liquid level in the pressurizer to account for the cooling off of the liquid, steam, and metal, (3) water-solid operation of the pressurizer, or (4) operation of the safety injection system.' Therefore, the pressurizer heaters are not required.
.g Table 3:
Post-Accident Environmental Conditions Area 1, Containment The environment specified in containment is based on the guidelines in to Mr. Ziemann's February 15, 1980 letter. Specifically, the environment is based on a LOCA. Temperature and pressure are based on the Containment Post Accident Pressure Reanalysis submitted to the NRC by letter dated January 19, 1977. Chemical sprays are used as identified in Amendment 52 to the Final Safety Analysis Report forwarded by letter dated December,3, 1975.
Radiation is based on the value specified in Enclosure 1 to Mr. Ziemann's February 15 letter. The post-accident flooding level is based on an elevation of 3' 11" as indicated in Appendix B of NUS-1854, Separation and LOCA Environment Assessment of San Onofre Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems, dated December, 1977.
Based on the above references the following environment is specified for the containment:
Temperature:
291oF Pressure:
64'.1 psia Relative.Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
Yes Radiation:
2 X 107 rads Submergence:
Yes to elevation 3' 11" It is noted that the radiation level of 2 X 107 rads identified above is based on the NRC guidelines for gamma radiation. Beta radiation has not been evaluated in this submittal since it is considered less significant than gamma radiation due to its low penetrating power. In addition, recent analyses done in connection with TMI followup activities have calculated a value for San Onofre Unit 1 of 2 X 108 rads integrated over one year. It is our understanding that the basis for these numbers is the same, i.e., TID 14844.
Pending further discussions with the NRC staff to resolve differences in these numbers, the NRC guideline number will continue to be utilized for environmental qualification.
The NRC guidelines also specify that for PWR's with automatic containment spray, the LOCA environment can be used for qualification of equipment to an MSLB environment.
San Onofre Unit 1.has automatic containment spray.
However, the environment associated with an MSLB at San Onofre Unit 1 is currently being reevaluated in accordance with automation of the auxiliary feedwater system. Preliminary results of these analyses have been communicated to the NRC in recent meetings and correspondence. Following completion of these analyses, the appropriate environment for qualification of equipment inside containment required to mitigate the consequences of an MSLB will be reevaluated.
Area 1, Piping Penetration Building The Piping Penetration Building is located west of-the containment. The temperature in this building is expected to increase slightly under the post accident conditions and, as such, a value of 110OF was specified in NUS-1854 dated December, 1977. Pressure will remain at atmospheric.
Radiation in this area will.be due to operating the recirculation system since some components of this system are located in this area. The radiation level is based on the guidelines in Enclosure 1 to Mr. Ziemann's February 15 letter.
-2 Based on the above, the following environment is specified for the Piping Penetration Building:
Temperature:
110 0F Pressure:
- 14. 7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No Area 1, Outside In the areas outside, the environmental conditions will remain at ambient with the exception of radiation which results from operating the recirculation system.
The radiation level is based on the NRC guidelines. The following environment is specified:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No Area 2, Mezzanine Under Turbine Deck Area 2 is located directly south of the containment and contains the feedwater and steam piping. The limiting temperature in this area is based on a high energy line break which results in a saturated steam environment at atmospheric pressure. This is based on the Report on Effects of a Piping System Break Outside the Containment dated December, 1973.
The radiation level in this area is based on the TMI calculations of the integrated dose for 1 year due to a LOCA (see the discussion for Area 1, Containment). The specified environment is:
Temperature:
212oF Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No, Radiation:
3 X 107 rads Submergence:
No Area 3, Fuel Storage Building This building will remain at ambient conditions following an accident. With respect to radiation, calculations performed for TMI followup, have estimated a value of 5 X 102 rads integrated over one year at the outside wall of the Sphere Enclosure Building. Therefore, the dose in Area 3 will be significantly less than this and is considered insignificant. The specified environment is:
-3 Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Areas 4, 5 and 6, Under Turbine Deck The limiting temperature in this area is based on a high energy line break (see the discussion for Area 2).
The radiation level which may result 'from a LOCA, is considered insignificant (see the discussion for Area 3).
The specified environment is:
Temperature:
212 0F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 7, Turbine Deck Extension This area is at the south end of the turbine building and will remain at ambient conditions following any postulated accident. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 8, Auxiliary Building The auxiliary building and auxiliary building roof, located west of containment, contain various items of recirculation equipment. The post-accident environment is ambient with the exception of radiation which results from operating the recirculation system. The radiation level is based on the NRC guidelines. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No Area 9, Intake Structure This area is outside and removed from radiation areas. Environmental conditions will remain at ambient. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 10, Control Administration Building This area contains the control room and various electrical distribution equipment. The control room environment will remain at ambient conditions following an accident provided the control room fan is operable.
Other areas do not require air conditioning to be operable. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 12, Condensate Storage Tank This area is outside and will remain at ambient conditions. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No Area 14, Refueling Water Storage Tank This area is outside and will remain at ambient conditions with the exception of radiation which results from operating the recirculation system. The radiation level is based on the NRC guidelines.
The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
4 X 106 rads Submergence:
No
-5 Areas 16 and 17, Diesel Generator Building The diesel generator building is located at the northeast corner of the plant and is equipped with redundant air conditioning systems. This building will remain at ambient conditions. The specified environment is:
Temperature:
970F Pressure:
14.7 psia Relative Humidity:
100%
Chemical Sprays:
No Radiation:
No Submergence:
No
TABLE 4:
EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN NON-HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS Equipment Location Area Safety Injection System Safety Injection Pumps G-50A and G-50B 14 FI-912, 913, 914, 10 LT-950 14 LI-950 10 LS-69 14 Recirculation System FQ-500, 501 10 FY-500, 501 10 FIS-520, 521 10 LI-951 10 FI-1114A, B and C 10 Containment Spray System FQ-504 10 FY-504 10 FIS-522 10 PIS-511, 512, 153 10 Chemical Addition Pumps G-200A and G-200B 8
SV-600 and 601 8
Containment Isolation System CV-949, 957, 992 10 CS 1, 2, 3 10 Hot Leg Recirculation FI-1112 10 FC-1112 10 Component Cooling Water System TC-606 10 TR-606 10 FI-606 10
-2 Saltwater Cooling System Saltwater Cooling Pumps G-13A and G-13B 9
POV-5 and 6, SV-24 and 25 9
MOV-9 9
SV-81 and 82 9
Auxiliary Feedwater System FI-2002A, B and C 10 FC-2002A, B and C 10 LI-450X, 451X, 452X 10 Condensate Storage Tank Level 12, 10 Control Room Air Conditioning A-33 10 Motors for A-31 normal filter and emergency 10 filter dampers Electrical Distribution System 4 kV Buses IC and 2C 10 480 V Buses 1, 2 and 3 10, 3 Motor Control Centers 1, 1A, 1B, 2, 2B, 3 10, 3, 7 Vital Buses 1, 2, 3, 4 and Utility Bus 10 DC Buses 1, 2 10, 17 Battery Chargers A, B, C and D 10, 17 Diesel Generators and Supporting Systems 16, 17 Undervoltage Relays CV6, CV7 10 MOV-850C Uninterruptible Power Supply 7
Monitoring Instrumentation RCS Subcooling Recorder 10 R8-2 10 Reactor Protection System FM-456B-X, 4578-X, 458B-X 10 YE-430A, 431A, 432A 10 LC-1430A, 431A, 432A 10 LI-430, 431A, 432A 10 YE-430B, 431B, 432B 10 PC-'430A/F, 431A/D, 432A/B 10 R8-2aet Ieci Suc 10 Ract Protection Semuner1
-3 Instrument Air PI-163, 164.
10 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation RLR-1200, RLR-1201 10 R-1215 3
R-1216 10
Table 5:
Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Page 1 of 1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.(6)
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE FT460, 461 and 462 Foxboro E13DM Area 1 T -
2910 F 3000 F Test 10 Steam Flow Containment P -
64.1 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
Yes Yes Test 10 R - 2E7 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S'- No FT456, 457 and 458 Foxboro. 613DM Area 2 T -
212oF 294 0F Similar (2) 3 Feedwater Flow P -
14.7 75 Similar (2) 3 H -
100%
100%
Similar (2) 3 C -
No R -
3E7 S -
No PT430, 431 and 432 Foxboro E11GM Area 1 T -
291 0F 3000 F Test 10 Pressurizer Pressure Containment P -
64.1 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
Yes Yes Test 10 R - 2E7 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S -
No LT430, 431 and 432 Foxboro E13DH Area 1 T -
291oF 300oF Test 10 Pressurizer Level Containment P -
64.1 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
Yes Yes Test 10 R - 2E7 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S -
No
Page 1 of 2 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE G-3A and B Byron Jackson 10 x 10 x 27 Area 5 T -
212oF 212 0F Analysis 1
Feedwater Pumps 2 staqe DVMX Area 6 P -
14.7 NVS*
Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C - No R. -
No S -
No HVB53A and B Teledyne Republic Manufacturing Area 5 T - 212oF 140oF Spec 5
HV851A and B 02112-002-5210 Area 6 P -
14.7 NVS Spec 5
HV854A and B 02112-003-5210 H -
100%
100%
Spec 5
HV852A and B C -01 Npco C -
No R - No S -
No CV875A and B Area 5 T - 212 0F 6500 F (1)
Sim; Anal (2) 2, 3, 1 Feedwater Pump Solenoid ASCO WPHT 8314 Area 6 P -
14.7 65 Sim; Anal 2, 3, 1 Recirculation H - 100%
100%
Sim; Anal 2, 3, 1 C -
No R -
No S -
No CV36 and 37 Area 5 T - 212 0 F 650 0F (1)
Analysis 2, 3, 1 (SV17 and 18)
Solenoid ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 Area 6 P -
14.7 65 Analysis 2, 3, 1 Feedwater to
Fo ede aer to H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3, 1 Condenser C - No R -
No S - No FT912, 913 and 914 Foxboro 630-2AS Area 2 T -
212oF NVS Analysis 3
SI Flow P -
14.7 NVS Analysis 3
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 3
C -
No R -
3E7 9.9E5 Analysis 3
S -
No
- NVS No Value Specified
Page 2 of' 2 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE MOV 850A, B and C Crane Valves Area 1 T - 291 0F 329 0F Analysis 2, 1 SI Valves Limitorque SMA-1-40 Containment P - 64.1 105 Analysis 2, 1 H -
100%
Steam Analysis 2, 1 C - Yes Yes Analysis 2, 1 R -
2E7 2E8 Analysis 2, 1 S
No
Page 1 of 3.
RECIRCULATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE G-45A and B Chempump GPS-60L-46H-3T Area 1 T -
291oF 3000F (3)
Analysis 2
Recirculation Pumps Containment P -
64.1 165 (3)
Analysis 2
H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2
C -
Yes Yes Analysis 2
R -
2E7 5.35E7 Analysis 2
S -
Yes Yes Analysis 2
MOV 866A and B Darling Valves Area 1 T - 291 0F 329 0F Analysis 2, 3, 1 Limitorque SMBOOO-5 Containment P -
64.1 105 Analysis 2, 3, 1 H -
100%
Steam Analysis 2, 3, 1 C --Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3, 1 R -
2E7 2E8 Analysis 2, 3, 1 S -
No FT500 and 501 Foxboro E13DM Area 1 T -
291F 3000 Test 10 Recirculation Flow Containment P -
64.1 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
Yes Yes Test 10 R -
2E7 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S -
No LC951 Gems Corp Area 1 T -
291 0F Sump Level LS 800 Containment P -
64.4 H -
100%
C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -
Yes MOV/LCV 1100B and D Darling Valves Area 8 T -
110 0F 3290F Analysis 2, 3, 1 MOVaCV i C
Limitorque SMB-uc-t P -
14.7 105 Analysis 2, 3, 1 C harging Pump Suction H -
100%
Steam Analysis 2, 3, 1 C -
No R - 4E6 2E8 Analysis 2, 3, 1 S -
No
Page 2 of 3 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT.
MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE G-A and B Pacific Pumps 2" Type Z 12 Stage Area 8 T -
i1O0 F 212 0 F Analysis i
P - 14.7 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis i
C -
No R -
4E6 107 Analysis 2, 1 S -
No LS-73
-Magnetrol-A 153F-MPK-TDM Area 1 T -
2910 F Sump Hi-Hi Alarm Containment P -
64.1 H -
100%
C -
Yes R -2E7 S -Yes MOa 18 ahd 19 Velan Valves Area 1 T -
110 0 F 329 0F Similar (2) 2, 3 Charging Pump Discharge Limitorque SMB-00 P -
14.7 105 Similar 2, 3 H -
100%
Steam Similar 2, 3 C -No R - 4E6 2E8 Similar 2, 3 S -
No FCV 1115 D, E and F.
Honeywell Positioner Area 1 T -
110oF Recirculation Flow Cotrol IS HE-1 P -
14.7 H -
100%
C - No S - No FT 1114A 9, and C Foxboro 13HA Area 1 T -
110OF AMB Recirculation Injection P -
14.7 AM Exp Flow P - 14.7 ATM Exp H -
100%
AMB Exp C -
No R -
4E7 3E6 Spec 12 S -
No
Page 3 of 3__
RECIRCULATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE MOV 356, 357 and 358 Edwards Valves Area 1 T -
2910F 329 0F Analysis 2, 3 Recirculation Injection Limitorque SMB-00-25 Containment P -
64.1 105 Analysis 2, 3 H -
100%
Steam Analysis 2, 3 C -
Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3 R - 2E7 2E8 Analysis 2, 3 S -
No
Page 1 of 2, CONTAINMENT SPRAY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE G-27A and B Worthington 4HN-172 Area 14 T - 970F 2480 F Analysis 2, 3, 1 Refueling Water Pumps P -
14.7 NVS Analysis 2, 3, 1 H -
100%
NVS Analysis 2, 3, 1 C -
No R - 4E6 1E7 (4)
Analysis 2, 3, 1 S -
No MOV 883 Darling Valve Area 14 T - 970 F 3290 F Similar (2) 2, 3 RWST Isolation Limitorque SMB-00 P -
14.7 105 Similar 2, 3 H -
100%
Steam Similar 2, 3 C -
No R - 4E6 2E8 Similar 2, 3 S -
No MOV 880 Darling Valve Area 1 T -
110oF 329 0F Similar (2) 2, 3 Spray/Recirculation Limitorque SMB-00 P -
14.7 105 Similar 2, 3 Crosstie H -
100%
Steam Similar 2, 3 C -
No R -
4E6 2E8 Similar 2,
3 S -
No CV517 and 518 EBV Systems D-6-300-7 Area 1 T - 970F-110 0F c of c 15 Spray Flow Control P -
14.7 ATM c of c 15 H -
100%
100%
c of C 15 C-No R - 4E6 2E7 c of c 15 S -
No FT 504 Foxboro E13DM Area 1 T - 970F 300OF Test 10 Spray Flow P -
14.7 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
No R -
4E6 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S -
No
Page 2 of 2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV82 and 114 Area 1 T -
2910 F 650 0 F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV128 and 118 Solenoid ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 Containment P - 64.1 64 Analysis 2, 3 Spray Isolation H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C -
Yes Yes Analysis 2,
3 R -
2E7 NV (5) -
Ai-a-lysiK 2,- 3 S-No
- PT501, 502 and 503 Foxboro E11GM Area 1 T - 97 0F 3000 F Test 10 Containment P -
14.7 75 Test 10 Pressure H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
No R -
3E7 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S -
No
Page 1 of 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV102, 104 and 106 Area 1 T -
291oF 6500F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV108, 110 and 112 ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 Containment P -
64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Sump Discharge H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 RCS Dr Tk Discharge C
Y Yes -
-Analysis--
--,-3---
RCS Dr Tk Vent R -
2E7 NVS (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -No CV103, 105 and 107 ASCO 8300 B61 Area 1 T - 110 0 F 650 0 F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV19, 111 and 113 P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Sphere Sump Discharge H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 RCS Dr Tk Discharge C -
No RCS Dr Tk Vent R - 4E6 NVS (5)
Similar 2, 3 S -
No CV146 and 147 Area 1 T -
291oF 650 0 F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV1212-6 and 1212-7 ASCO WPLB 8300 859 Containment P -
64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Air Sample H - 100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C -
Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3 R -
2E7 NVS (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -
No SV1212-8 and 1212-9 ASCO HT X 8210 27 Area 1 T -
110 0F Sphere Air Sample P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No CV117, 118 and 119 ASCO WPLB 8300 B61VR Area 2 T -
212oF 650oF (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 5V119, 120 and 121 P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Steam Gen. Steam Sample H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -
No R -
3E7 NVS (5)
Similar 2, 3 S -
No
Page 2 of 5, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV120, 121 and 122 ASCO WP 8300 861R Area 2 T -
212oF 650 0F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV122, 123 and 124 P - 14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Steam Gen. Blowdown Sample H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -
No R-
- 3E7-
-NVS (5)
Siliflar 33 S -No CV123 ASCO WP 8300 B61R Area 1 T -
97 0F.
650 0 F (1)
Similar (2) 2, 3 SV125 P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 Service Air H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -
No R -
3E7 NVS (5)
Similar 2, 3 S -
No CV537 Contromatic C-9922-DC Area 1 T -
291 0 F 272 0F Spec 28 Service Water Solenoid ASLO WP 8317 35 Containment P -
64.1 61.1 Spec 28 H -
100%
100%
Spec 28 C -
Yes Yes Spec 28 R -
2E7 lE8 Spec 28 S -
No CV115 ASCO WPLB 8300 B61RU Area 1 T -
97 0F 650 0 F (1)
Similar (2) 2,-3 Service Water P -
14.7 65 Similar 2, 3 H -
100%
100%
Similar 2, 3 C -No R -
3E7 NVS (5)
Similar 2, 3 S -
No SV702B and D Morotta Valve Co.
Area 1 T -
2910F Cold Leg Vent Model MV 583H-4A Containment P -
64.1 H -
100%
C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -
No
Page 3 of 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE SV702A and C Morotta Valve Co.
Area 1 T -
97OF Cold Leg Vent Model MV 583H-4A P -
14.7 H -
100%
C - No R - 3E7 S -
No POV 9 and 10 Area 1 T -97 0F AMB Exp SV29 and 30 ASCO 8345 P -
14.7 ATM Exp Sphere Purge H -
100%
AMB Exp C -No R -
3E7 NVS (5)
Similar (2) 2, 3 S -No CV40 and 116 Area 1 T -
291 0F 650 0 F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV19 and 127 ASCO WPLB 8300 859 Containment P -
64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Vent H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C -
Yes Yes Analysis 2, 3 R -
2E7 NVS (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -No CV10 Area 1 T -
970F 650 0 F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 SV28 ASCO WPLB 8300 859 P -
14.7 65 Analysis 2, 3 Sphere Vent H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C -
No R -
3E7 NVS (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -
No CV533 and 536 Contromatic C-9922-DC Area 1 T -
2910 F 272 0F Spec 28 Press Relief Tank Solenoid ASCO WPHT 8370 93 Containment P -
64.1 61.1 Spec 28 RCS Drain Tank H -
100%
100%
Spec 28 C -
Yes Yes Spec 28 R -
2E7 1E8 Spec 28 S -
No
Page 4 of 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV534 and 535 Contromatic C-9922-DC Area 1 T -
110 0F 120 0 F Spec 28 Press Relief Tank Solenoid ASCO WPHT 8370 93 P -
14.7 NVS Spec 28 RCS Drain Tank H -
100%
100%
Spec 28 C -
No 4E6---
2-.5E-7-- ----
Spec---
28 -----
S -
No CV525 and 527 EBV D-2-300-6 Area 1 T -
291 0 F 272 0F c of c 15 RCS Letdown EBV D-3-150-14 Containment P - 64.1 61.1 c of c 15 RCP Sealwater H -
100%
100%
c of c 15 C -
Yes Yes c of c 15 R - 2E7 3E7 c of c 15 5 -
No CV526 and 528 EBV D-2-300-6 Area 1 T -
110 0 F 110 0 F c of c 15 RCS Letdown EBV D-3-150-14 P - 14.7 ATM c of c 15 RCP Sealwater H - 100%
100%
c of c 15 C -
No R - 4E6 2E7 c of c 15 S -
No CV287 BS&B 70-18-9 DRTX Area 1 T -
291 0F RCS Letdown Solenoid ASCO Containment P -
64.1 H -
100%
C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -
Yes
- CV202, 203 and 204 ASCO WPLB 8300 B59 Area 1 T -
2910 F 650 0 F (1)
Analysis 2, 3 RCS Letdown Containment P - 64.1 65 Analysis 2, 3 H -
100%
100%
Analysis 2, 3 C -
Yes Yes Analysis 2,
3 R -
2E7 NVS (5)
Analysis 2, 3 S -No
Page 5 of 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV532 Contromatic C-9922-DC Area 1 T -
110 0F 1200 F Spec 28 Press Relief Tank ASCO WPHTX 8370 93 P -
14.7 NVS Spec 28 H -
100%
100%.
Spec 28 C -
No R - 4E6 2E7 Spec 28 S-No CV515 and 516 EBV D-6-150-18 Area 1 T - 970F 970F c of C 15 Air Units P-14.7 ATM c of c 15 Cooling Water H -
100%
100%
c of c 15 C -
No R - 4E6 2E7 c of c 15 S -No PT 1120A, B and C Foxboro E11GM Area 1 T - 970F 3000 F Test 10 PT 1121A, B and C P -
14.7 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -No R -
3E7 2.2E8 Test 11, 26 S -
No
Page 1 of HOT LEG RECIRCULATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE FCV 1112 Area 1 T -
110 0 F 1200 F Analysis 1
HLR Flow Control ASCO WPHT 8314 6 P -
14.7 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No FIT 1112 Brooks 5523A Area 1 T -
110 0F HLR Flow P -
14.7 H -
100 C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No CV304 Area 1 T -
291oF NVS Analysis 1
Loop A ASCO WPHT 8314 6 Containment P -
64.1 NVS Analysis 1
Charging Line H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
Yes NVS Analysis 1
R -
2E7 S -
No CV305 Area 1 T -
2910 F NVS Analysis 1
Pressurizer Spray Line ASCO WPHT 8314 6 Containment P -
64.1 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
Yes NVS Analysis 1
R -
2E7 (4)
S -
No PCV 430C and H BS&B 70-18-9 DRTX Area 1 T - 291 0 F NVS Analysis 1
Loop A and B Foxboro 69 TA-1 Containment P -
64.1 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
Yes NVS Analysis 1
R -
2E7 S -
No
Page 1 of 1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV410 and 411 ASCO LB 8316 12 Ar ea 8 T - 970F VCT Inlet P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No
Page 1 of 1 STEAM DUMP EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV76, 77, 78 and 79 Solenoid Area 1 T - 970F SV85, 86, 87 and 88 Valvair 5682-2 P -
14.7 ATM Steam Dump H -
100%
C -
No R -
3E7 S -
No S
Pae 1 of 1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE G15A, B and C Pacific 6 x 14 Type DS Area 8 T - 970F 212oF Analysis 1
Component Cooling Pumps P -
14.7 NVS Analysis 1
H -
100%
NVS Analysis 1
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No MOV 720A and B Crane Valves Area 8 T - 970 F 3290F Similar (2) 2, 3 Component Cooling Limitorque SMB-00-5 P - 14.7 105 Similar 2, 3 Ht Ex Outlet H -
100%
Steam Similar 2, 3 C -
No R - 4E6 2EB Similar 2, 3 S-No CV737 A and B EBV Systems D-4-150-18 Area 8 T - 970F 1100F c of c 15 Recirculation Ht Ex P -
14.7 ATM c of c 15 H -10%
100%
c of c 15 C -
No R - 4E6 2E7 c of C 15 S-No TE-606 Foxboro DB-13V-264 Area 8 T -
97 0F Cooling Water P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No FT606 Foxboro 13A Area 8 T-970 F AMB Exp P -
14.7 ATM Exp H -
100%
AMB Exp C -No R -
4E6 1.9E4 Similar (2) 3 S -
No
Page 1 of 1, AUXILIARY FREDWATER SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE G-10 Pacific Pump JTC-2" Area 6 T -
212 0F Auxiliary Feed Pump P - 14.7 H -
100%
C -No R -
No S -
No FT2002A, B and C Controlatron 240N-3CS40 Area 2 T -
212 0 F Auxiliary Feed Flow P -
14.7 H - 100%
C -
No R -
3E7 S -
No LT 450X, 451X and 452X Foxboro NE13DM Area 1 T - 2910 F 300oF Test 10 Containment P -
64.1 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
Yes Yes Test 10 R -
2E7 2.2EB Test 11, 26 S -
No 0I
Page 1 of 2 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE Cable GE Vulkene Various T -
291 0F 392oF Test 3, 4 P -
64.1 80 Test 3
H -
100%
100%
Test 3
C -
Yes Yes Vendor Data 6
R -
2E7 1E8 Test 3
S -
Yes Yes Vendor Data 6
Cable GE Various T -
2910 F 348 0 F Test 7
P -
64.1 135 Test 7
H -
100 Steam Test 7
C -
Yes Yes Test 7
R -
2E7 2.2E8 Test 7
S -
Yes Yes Test 24 Cable Raychem Various T - 970F 358 0 F Test 8
P -
14.7 149 Test 8
H -
100%
Steam Test 8
C -
No R -
3E7 2E8 Test 8
S -
No 0
0 Cable Rockbestos Various T -
2910F 346 F Test 9
P -
64.1 128 Test 9
H -
100%
Steam Test 9
C -
Yes Yes Test 9
R -
2E7 2EB Test 9
S -
No Penetrations Viking Area 1 T -
291oF 272 0F Spec 17, 18, 19 P -
64.1 68 Test 20 H -
100%
High Spec 17, 18, 19 C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -
No
Page 2 of 2 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE Penetrations Conax Area 1 T - 291 0F 340 0F Test 30, 31 P -
64.1 125 Test 30, 31 H -
100%
100%
Test 30, 31 C -
Yes Yes Test 30, 31 R -
2E7 2.2E8 Test-30, 31 S -
No Penetrations Amphenol Area 1 T - 291oF 3000F Test; Anal 21, 27 P - 64.1 70 Test 21 H -
100%
100%
Test 21 C -
Yes Yes Test 21 R -
2E7 1E8 Test 22 S -- No Cable Splices Raychem Various T -
2910F 3580F Test 23 P -
64.1 134 Test 23 H -
100%
100%
Test 23 C -
Yes Yes Test 23 R -
2E7 2E8 Test 23 S -
No Motor Control Center Westinghouse Class11-350 Area 8 T - 970F 2A P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
4E6 S -
No
Page 1 ofj REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV530 and 531 ASCO 8316 Area 1 T -
291oF Pressurizer Block Containment P - 64.1 Valves H -
100%
C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -
No CV545 and 546 ASCO 8316 Area 1 T -
2910F Pressurizer PORV Containment P -
64.1 H -
100%
C -
Yes R - 2E7 S - No Limit Switches NAMCO EA180 Area 1 T -
2910F 340OF Test 32 Pressurizer PORV and Containment P - 64.1 85 Test 32 Relief Valves H -
100%
100%
Test 32 C -
Yes Yes Test 32 R -
2E7 2E8 Test 32 S -
No
Page 1 of 1 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE RCTD's Weed Instrument Area 1 T - 2910F 291oF c of c 13 TE400, 401, 402 A, B, C Model 2004 Containment P - 64.1 64.1 c of c 13 TE410, 411, 412 A, B, C H -
100%
100%
c of c 13 TE420, 421, 422 A, B, C C -
Yes Yes c of c 13 R -
2E7 3.5E6 c of c 13 S -
No PT2 Honeywell 737 NISI Area 2 T - 212oF Amb Experience Steam Pressure P -
14.7 Atm Experience H -
100%
Amb Experience C -
No R -
3E7 2E6 Similar (2) 3 S -
No Subcooling Recorder Foxboro E11GM Area 1 T -
291oF 300'F Test
- 10.
Pressure Transmitter Containment P -
64.1 75 Test 10 H -
100%
100%
Test 10 C -
Yes Yes Test 10 R -
2E7 2.2EB Test 11, 26 S -
No 0II
Page 1 of 2 INSTRUMENT AIR EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE CV41 U.S. Gauge PIC 07M Area 6 T -
212 0F Service Air Isolation 12CB-315 P - 14.7 PCI H -
100%
C -
No R -
No S -
No PS56, 57 and 58 United Electric Area 6 T -
212 0F Compressed Air Header P -
14.7 H - 100%
C -
No R - No S -
No SV147 Area 6 T -
212oF Emergency Compressor P -
14.7 Start H -
100%
C -
No R -
No S -
No PS119 Square "D" GH62 9013 Area 6 T -
212 0F Emergency Compressor P -
14.7 Start H - 100%
C -
No R - No S -
No K-1A, B and C Chicago Pneumatic 12 x 11 Area 6 T -
2120F Compressors TDO-B2 P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
No S -
No
Pane 2 of 2 INSTRUMENT AIR EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
QUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE Emergency Compressor Worthington 25 BN-24 Area 6 T -
212 0F P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
No S - No PCV40 Fisher 1805-3 Area 6 T -
212 0F Instrument Air P -
14.7 Isolation H -
100%
C -
No R -
No S -
No SV105, 106 and 107 Area 6 T - 212 0F Instrument Air Dryer P -
14.7 H -
100%
C -
No R -
No S -
No PT11 and 12 Honeywell Y737NI-SI Area 6 T -
212 0F Instrument and Service P -
14.7 Air H -
100%
C -
No R -
No S -
No
Page 1 of*1 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER LOCATION ENV.
DUAL.
METHOD REFERENCE R-1232 Tr acer Lab Ar ea 1 T -
2910O Containment WJ-12 Containment P -
64.1 H -
100%
C -
Yes R -
2E7 S -
No 0
REFERENCES
- 1.
NUS 1854
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment dated February 24, 1978
- 5.
Specification 82-9010, 6/6/75
- 6.
General Electric Wire and Cable Product Data, Vulkene Industrial Control Cable, September 15, 1961
- 7.
FIRL Test Report F-C3713-2A, May, 1975
- 8.
FIRL Test Report F-C4033-1, January, 1975
- 9.
The Rockbestos Company, Qualification of Firewall III Class IE Electric Cables, February 1, 1977
- 10.
Foxboro Test Report Nos. T3-1013 and T3-1013 (Supplementary)
- 11.
Foxboro Test Report No. T3-1068
- 12.
SCE Purchase Order H2205004, 8/28/75
- 13.
Weed Instrument Co. Inc. Certificate of Compliance
- 14.
International Instruments, Certificate of Compliance dated 11/16/77
- 15.
EBV Systems Division, Certificate of Compliance
- 16.
Foxboro Company, Statement of Conformance dated 11/14/77
- 17.
Specification BSO-3042, 7/20/64
- 18.
Specification BSO-3043, 5/6/64
- 19.
Specification BSO-3280
- 20.
SONGS 1 FSAR, Volume IV, Section 4.3.6.4
-2
- 21.
Amphenol Technical Report 123-1247
- 22.
Amphenol Technical Report 123-1260
- 23.
FIRL Test Report F-C4033-3, January, 1975
- 24.
Specification SO 23-304-11
- 25.
Specification SEP 404, July, 1976
- 26.
Foxboro Test Report No. T3-1097
- 27.
Amphenol letter from Paul T. Smith to SCE Att: D. Nanda dated August 31, 1977
- 28.
Specification SEP-402, December, 1975
- 29.
Specification SO1 IS-01, September 27, 1979
- 30.
IPS 525.1 Design Qualification Report for Low Voltage Power and Control Electric Penetration Assemblies, Conax Corporation
- 31.
IPS 525.2 Design Qualification Report for Low Voltage Instrumentation Electric Penetration Assemblies, Conax Corporation
- 32.
Qualification of NAMCO Controls Limit Switch Model EA 180 dated September 5, 1978
NOTES (1)
The temperature qualification parameter specified represents that value at which constituent parts constructed of ferrous material will degrade and does not include that value for the valves brass body and organic constituent parts. It is not expected that the brass body will degrade within the required operation time of the valve, if at all. Failure of organic material will not impair the deenergizing of the solenoid valve, allowing its associated control valve to assume its fail-safe position (see Reference 2 Page 6A-102).
(2)
The use of "Similarity" indicates that the identified equipment is similar to that already qualified by analysis in References 2 and 3.
(3)
The pump qualification temperature and pressure values represent the limiting value specified in Reference 2 which corresponds to the pump casing.
(4)
The qualification value is for the pump motor as described in References 2 and 3. Specification for the pump mechanical seals specifies a recirculation radiation value of 106 rads.
(5)
Failure of constituent parts due to radiation damage is inconsequential to proper operation of the component (See Reference 2 Page 6A-102).
(6)
Environments specified are from Table 3.
Table 6:
Equipment Located in Hostile Environments For Which Qualification Is Not Available Reactor Protection System FT-456, 457, 458 These transmitters provide an input to the reactor trip on steam flow-feedwater flow mismatch. In the event of a steam or feedwater line break this trip will occur almost immediately. Therefore, these transmitters will have performed their function prior to being exposed to any high temperature if the break is in Area 2. Furthermore, additional instrumentation which would not be affected by a break in this location is available to provide a reactor trip such as pressurizer pressure or level. For a break in any other area these transmitters would not be affected. These transmitters are not required following a LOCA and, therefore, the radiation is not applicable.
Safety Injection System HV-853A, B, 851A, B, 854A, B, 852A, B These valves are used to transfer the feedwater pumps from feedwater service to emergency core cooling service. In the event of a feedwater or steam line break in the vicinity of the valves, the environment could be saturated steam at 2120F. The valves are covered and would not be expected to be exposed to this temperature. Moreover, since the two trains are at opposite sides of the turbine building, any given break could only affect one train. The safety analyses for the plant are based on one train of emergency core cooling.
Therefore, in the unlikely event that these valves failed to operate in the break environment, the core would be adequately cooled.
FT-912, 913 and 914 These transmitters provide surveillance of safety injection flow, however, they are not required for proper operation of the safety injection system. In the event of steam or feedwater line break in Area 2, these transmitters could be exposed to 212 0F saturated steam. In the event of a LOCA, safety injec tion is terminated within the first half hour, before these transmitters would be exposed to a high radiation environment. If the transmitters fail, the operator can still establish that safety injection flow has stopped, as would be the case for a steam or feedwater line break, by monitoring RWST level which he is required to do by the procedure.
Recirculation System LC-951, LS-73 These instruments provide indication of containment sump level. Qualification information is not available on these instruments. However, in accordance with the operating procedure these instruments are not relied on by themselves for a specific operator action. The operator is instructed to also monitor RWST level on LI-950 and LS-69. These latter instruments are not located in hostile environments and, as such, would be operable. Therefore, in the event LC-951 or LS-73 fails, adequate information is available to the operator. In addition, in connection with implementation of TMI related requirements new containment sump level indication will be installed.
g7,
-2 FCV-1115D, E, F These valves provide flow control to the injection lines for long term recirculation. Nineteen hours following initiation of safety injection the Hot Leg Recirculation System is actuated. At that time the flow control valves will be modulated for a reduced flow to the core. It will be necessary to have these valves qualified for 19 hour2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> operation. Qualification of this component has been suspended pending consideration in connection with the Systematic Evaluation Program as discussed in SCE's letter dated August 10, 1978.
The NRC Staff's response to this letter was provided by letter dated October 16, 1978.
Containment Isolation System CV-287 This containment isolation valve may be submerged following a LOCA. However, there are other containment isolation valves downstream of this valve which are also closed following a LOCA and which will ensure containment isolation.
Therefore, plant modifications associated with this valve have been suspended pending consideration in connection with the Systematic Evaluation Program as discussed in SCE's letter to the NRC dated August 10, 1978. The NRC Staff's response to this letter was provided by letter dated October 16, 1978.
CV-537, 533, 536, 525, 527 These valves provide containment isolation of the pressurizer relief tank,.RCS drain tank, service water, RCS letdown and RCP sealwater. The containment pressure and temperature values specified for these valves are the original specification values. These values are less than 10% lower than the conserva tively calculated values for the containment environment and as such the valves would be expected to close. Moreover, the lines containing these isolation valves also have isolation valves located outside containment which have been qualified for the environment outside containment. Failure of the valves inside containment would not prevent isolation of the line by the valve outside containment.
SV-1212-8, 1212-9 Evaluation of the environmental qualification of these solenoid valves is continuing.
SV-702A, B, C, D These valves are used to periodically vent the safety injection lines during normal operation to reduce the potential for water hammer in these lines.
Except when the lines are being vented, these valves are closed. Following an accident these valves remain closed and are not required to change position.
Therefore, these lines will remain isolated.
-3 Hot Leg Recirculation System FCV-1112, CV-304, CV-305, PCV-430C, PCV-430H, FIT-1112 These components are part of the Hot Leg Recirculation System which is provided to protect against the possibility of boron precipitation in the reactor for the case of a cold leg LOCA. This system is not required for an MSLB, FWLB or LOCA other than in a cold leg. Qualification of components within this system has been suspended pending consideration in connection with the Systematic Evaluation Program as discussed in SCE's letter to the NRC dated August 10, 1978.
The NRC Staff's response to this letter was provided by letter dated October 16, 1978. Pending completion of this qualification, an alternate hot leg recirculation path is available as discussed in the LOCA Operating Instruction.
Steam Dump System CV-76, 77, 78 and 79 These valves are the atmospheric steam dump valves and are used to dump steam in the event the main condenser is not available. The valves are shielded by the Sphere Enclosure Building and by steel enclosures designed to protect them from high energy pipe breaks and, as such, would not be expected to be exposed to the high radiation calculated for this area of the plant. However, in the event they did fail after prolonged exposure, the main steam safety valves would be available. The atmospheric dump valves would not be affected by a steam or feedwater line break at any location.
Component Cooling Water System G-15A, B and C The component cooling water system provides cooling to the recirculation heat exchanger. During the recirculation phase of emergency core cooling, the component cooling water pumps will be exposed to radiation from the recircula tion loop. However, shielding from components in the area, such as the surge tank, should reduce the dose considerably from the 4 X 106 rads which has been assumed for the recirculation loop. Moreover, three pumps are available, whereas only one pump has to be operable at any given time.
TE-606, FT-606 These instruments are used only to monitor the component cooling water system. They are not required for any automatic action or for the component cooling water system to function.
Auxiliary Feedwater System G-10 This pump could experience a 212oF saturated steam environment in the event of a steam line break in the vicinity of the pump. Although specific qualification for this environment is not available, it is not expected that this environment would affect operability of the pump. However, in the event this pump did fail, the other steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump would be available.
FT-2002A, B, C These flow transmitters were recently installed to meet TMI related requirements and were purchased to control grade requirements. These transmitters are scheduled to be replaced with qualified transmitters by January 1, 1981.
Electrical Distribution System Viking Penetrations Evaluation of the environmental qualification of these penetrations is continuing.
Motor Control Center 2A MCC-2A is located within the Reactor Auxiliary Building. The post-accident environment within this building includes a radiation dose of 4 X 106 rads associated with recirculation equipment. The safety related equipment receiv ing power through this motor control center is actuated upon initiation of safety injection and containment spray signals and do not require further actuation. During the recirculation phase this motor control center is not required for powering any safety related equipment.
Reactor Coolant System CV-530, 531-, 545 and 546 Evaluation of the environmental qualification of these components is continuing.
Monitoring Instrumentation RCTD's These instruments are used to monitor the RCS for adequate core cooling following an accident. In the event of an MSLB the NRC Guidelines identify the appropriate radiation dose as 2 X 106 rads.
The temperature detectors are qualified for at least 3.5 X 106 rads and therefore are acceptable following an MSLB. Following a LOCA the dose is specified as 2 X 107 rads.
This dose is due to a large break LOCA with a TID 14844 source term. However, for a large break LOCA safety injection and recirculation are maintained and there is no real need for the RCTD's. These instruments are more important
-for a small break LOCA to ensure adequate core cooling and appropriate safety injection operation. For the small break case, the dose will not be as high and the RCTD's would be expected to remain operable.
PT-2 This component provides indication of steam line pressure and is utilized by the operator to identify a loss of secondary coolant and to monitor steam pressure following a small break LOCA.
In the event of a secondary line break, this instrument will not be exposed to a hostile environment unless the break is in Area 2. If the break is in Area 2 and the instrument fails due to high temperature, the operator can use other information such as containment
-5 radiation to determine if the event is a loss of secondary coolant. This instrument is qualified for a dose of 2 x 106 rads which is less than the most severe radiation environment postulated for Area 2. However, these higher levels are for a large break LOCA, whereas this instrument is required only for a small break where the dose will be lower and the instrument would be expected to remain operable.
Radiation Monitoring System R-1232 This component is utilized by the operator to determine radiation level inside containment. In the event of a LOCA, this component may not be operable to determine radiation levels. In connection with implementation of TMI related requirements new containment radiation monitors will be installed.
Instrument Air System The instrument air system equipment is located in the southwest corner of the turbine building, Area 6. A steam or feedwater line break in Area 6 would be more towards the north end of this area and would be separated from the instrument air equipment, both by distance and by the massive steel structure which houses the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Therefore, it is unlikely that the instrument air system would see the temperature of 212oF which has been identified for Area 6. It is, therefore, expected that the instrument air equipment would remain operable in the event of a steam or feedwater line break in this area. However, in the event that the electric driven instrument air equipment is not operable there is a diesel driven air compressor which can be connected to the instrument air header.
Chemical and Volume Control System CV-410, 411 These valves are on the sealwater return line to the volume control tank. In the event of a loss of coolant they are required to close to prevent loss of suction to the charging pumps and therefore, they receive a close signal from the Safety Injection Sequencer. The valves are located in the charging pump room of the reactor auxiliary building. Prior to initiation of recirculation this room is at ambient conditions and, therefore, the valves are qualified to close based on experience. The valves are not required to change position again and fail closed on loss of air, therefore, the prolonged effects of radiation are inconsequential.