ML13323A893
| ML13323A893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1980 |
| From: | Faulkenberry B, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A892 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-80-31, NUDOCS 8101210608 | |
| Download: ML13323A893 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000206/1980031
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.
50-206/80-31
Docket No.
50-206
License No.
Safeguards Group
Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, California 91770
Facility Name:
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1
Inspection at:
San Onofre,
Inspection conducted:
September 29 - October 31,
1980
Inspectors:
J).ii2
I/'_<__-_/
L. Miller, Resident In.s.pecto!S
Date Signed
Date Signed
Date Signed
Approved By:
E
/C/-4 /V
B. H. Faulkenberry, Chief, Re cstor Projects Section 2,
Date.Signed
Reactor Operations ad Nucle6'rSupport Branch
Summnary:
Inspection on September 29-October 31, 1980 (Report No. 50-206/80-31)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, resident inspection of plant operations during
long term outage, monthly maintenance and surveillance observations,
follow-up on enforcement items, follow-up on licensee responses to
IE Bulletins, TMI Short Term Lessons Learned verification (Temporary
Instructions 2515/42, 43 and 44), and follow-up on a significant event
(loss of foreing material control inside reactor coolant system).
This
inspection involved 70 inspector-hours onsite by the resident inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
RV Form 219 (2)
810121-0-'-.."
0 ;
DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
- J. Haynes, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- D. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. Curran, Plant Manager
- R. Brunet, Superintendent, Unit 1
M. Wharton, Supervising Engineer, Unit 1
- D. Dunn, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. Tate, Supervisor of Plant Operations
- G. McDonald, Unit 1 Quality Assurance Supervisor
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees on the maintenance
and operations staffs during this inspection.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on October 31, 1980.
2. Inspection of Plant Operations During Long-Term Outage
The inspector observed control room operations for proper shift manning,
for adherence to procedures and limiting conditions for operation, and
for appropriate recorder and instrument indications. Thelinspector
reviewed logs and operating records regularly, and verified that the
radiation controlled.area access points were safe and clean.
The inspector noted that records of surveillance tests required during
the shutdown had been completed, and that the physical security plan
appeared to be properly implemented. Frequent discussions with control
room operators were held by the inspector to discuss their understanding
of the reasons for existing indications and plant conditions. The inspector
frequently toured throughout the facility. The licensee's fire protection
plan appeared to be properly implemented, and the cleanliness of the
facility was adequate.
The inspector reviewed the Temporary Modifications Log (lifted leads
and jumpers) and the active "Clearances."
Selected "Clearance" tags
were verified to be in place as indicated by the records.
The inspector walked down portions of the auxiliary feedwater and chemical
and volume control system to verify they were correctly lined up for
the existing plant status.
Five RWP's were reviewed for proper completion
and five radiation monitoring instruments were checked for operability,
and calibration.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3. Month j Surveillance Observations
The Inspector observed licensee personnel measure boron concentrations
perform Portable radiai on detector calibrations, perform area radiation
monitoring system checks$ and perform radiationsuvy.
Srelac
activity was'relatively low.
The activties obusrveys. Surveilance
in accordance with the appropriate procedures st
ngd
were performed
Operation were met where applicable. Logs and records were kept, and
wiere reviewed independently 1where required. The licensee's records
indicate that all surveillances require .
to be cd
ths
period were completed.
Compcetee riecohs
No items of noncompliance or deviations were dentifi
4.
Mot hllalntenance O bservations
a. Routine
Activities
The inspector observed portions of the following maintenance
- Steam driven auxiliary feedwater PUMP turbine repair.
- Auxiliary feedwater Dump re 'Pair.
The inspector determined that these activites did n
oi-t
n conitons
ei
u
d
eioat
The in co
i
for oeration that required administrative
approvals and layouts were obtained Priortoitain thwrk
thaTueet
ofprevceee-at
ntiaing
e oe
that apoed pocedures were being used by qualified Personnel,
prevlcent
Panrsanmteas used were certified, and that fire
rapventior o
ws
more appropriate for the activities.nto
b.
Steam
G
enerator
Re
se acoca1T
Durng hisinspection period, the licensee completed the water
and magnetite grit mixture decontamination of the "Bit and "A" steam
generators and commenced decontamination of the 1'1 steam generator.
In addition the licensee began to in v dul y h e t e s rf c
cindivduaol
honer
them
surfacB"
c o r r s i
o l a e
r f o m a
c h "
B
" s t e a
m g e n e r
a t
o r t u
b e w h i
c h w a s p l a n
n e d
to be sleeved
By the end of this period approximately 1500of th
2500 tubes to be sleeved In the
IB stateea
0 a en
he
The 'Inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken in-response
to the dilution event of September 21, 1980. These actions were
to revise the 10 CFR 50.59 analysistofrhrdsus
hemars
to e t
ken to
emo e g it rom the reactor coo ant sy stem , to
1nstall a newer type of Inflatable seal which'was designed to-reduce
the likelihood of seal rupture, and to revise the decontami nat ion
procedure to require more frequent monitoring of the system for
rapid inventory losses which might indicate seal .failure.
The
inspector confirmed these actions.
(Item 50-206/80..28-01 Closed).
-3
On October 20, 1980, the inspector reviewed the records of the
decanting of the decontamination waste storage tank performed on
October 19.
This decanting was performed using a temporary hose.
from the decontamination waste storage tank through a filter to
the containment sump, and thence immediately to the west holdup
tank. Licensee samples of the water for radioactivity indicated
the presence of alpha radioactivity.
A licensee representative
stated that these samples would be analyzed offsite using alpha
spectometry to quantify the radioactivity in the samples.
(01
50-206/80-31-02).
On October 22, 1980, licensee personnel informed the inspector
that the decontamination spray arm had fallen off while it was
being used to decontaminate the "A"
steam generator hot leg channel
head, for an unknown period of up to 38 minutes.
While the explanation
and analysis of this event was still being developed by the licensee,
the arm again fell off on October 24; this time for up to sixty
minutes. The arm is in three segments, each connected by a sliding
dovetail joint, with each joint locked by a hand-tightened bolt.
The licensee concluded that due to insufficient care by one operator,
two of these segments had been misassembled on October 22. After
the separation at one joint on that date, the arm had been inspected
- for
proper assembly, but the inspection had failed to detect the
improper assembly at a second joint, according to a contractor
representative. The contractor conducted immediate.retraining
of all operators who were required to assemble this equipment.
A licensee representative stated that an inspection of the "A"
hot lei channel head would be performed prior to steam generator
closure and appropriate corrective action developed.
The inspector
interviewed the licensee and contractor supervisory personnel,
inspected the equipment to evaluate the licensee's explanation,
and stated that the actions taken appeared adequate to prevent
recurrence. The inspector also stated that the licensee should
report the results of the steam generator inspection once it was
performed.
(01 50-206/80-31-03).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5. Followup on Sionificant Event (Loss of Foreign Material Control Inside
On October 10, 1980, the licensee informed the inspector that several
pieces of debris were unaccounted for in the "A" hot leg of the reactor
coolant system. In addition, on October 14, 1980, the Plant Manager
provided the inspector with a list of 12 additional items which had
been recovered from that leg after the initial report on October 10.
Also, he informed the inspector that a metal cover plate for the "A"
steam generator cold leg loop seal had been inadvertently dropped into
the "A" cold leg and could not be immediately recovered.
Prompt discussions between licensee representatives and the NRC were
conducted. These discussions resulted in the Immediate Action Letter
dated October 15, 1980. This letter confirmed that the licensee would
halt all steam generator work until it had revised its written procedures
to incorporate stricter tool control, foreign material exclusion and
steam generator channel head debris inspection requirements. The inspector
subsequently verified that these procedural requirements had beer incorporated
by the licensee.
In addition, the letter confirmed that prior to the resumption of power
operations, the licensee would submit to the Regional Office of Inspection
and Enforcement a written report on the deleterious effects, if any, of
any unrecovered foreign material in the reactor coolant system. This
report, of necessity, must evaluate what amount of foreign material might
not be recovered due to size, location and other considerations (01
50-206/80-31-01).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6. Followup on Items of Noncompliance
A.
(Closed) Deficiency (79-12-01)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and verfied by review
of the revised procedure, S-A-112, "Station Quality Assurance Program",
that the list of safety-related equipment had been corrected. This
item is C1ose.
B. (Closed) Infraction (79-12-02)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure, S01-II-1.9, "Control,
Calibration, and Maintenance of Measuring and Test Equipment" and
verified that the procedure now included a reference to the four
Roylyn pressure gauges which had cited as not being calibrated
on time.
C. (Closed) Infraction (80-09-01)
Time constraints during which required actions must be taken had
been incorporated into all emergency operating instructions. The
inspector reviewed-a portion of these instructions and stated the
licensee's actions appeared adequate. This item is closed.
D. (Closed) Infraction (80-09-02)
The inspector verified that the licensee s emergency operating
instructions had been reviewed and revised. This completes the
required corrective action for this item.
E.
(Closed) Infraction (80-12-01)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and discussed it
with licensee personnel. The inspector verified that the required
data had been subsequently recorded. The inspector stated that
licensee's discussion of the mandatory nature of procedures with
the instrument technicians appeared adequate. This item is closed.
F. (Closed) Deficiency (80-12-02)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action and measures
to prevent recurrence, and stated that the discussion of the importance
of following procedures with the instrument technicians appeared
to be sufficient. This item is closed.
G. (Closed) Deficiency (80-16-01)
The inspector verified that the licensee had revised its procedures
S01-3-1.3, "Determination of Just Critical Rod Position and Reactor
Shutdown Margin" and the associated calculation form.
The inspector
stated that .the revised form and procedure appeared adequate to
ensure accurate calculation of shutdown margin in the future.
This item is closed.
H. (Oen) PAT Notices of Violation (80-19-02)
(1) The inspector reviewed the licensee amended schedule and progress
report for the revision of all procedures to incorporate requirements
of ANSI N18.7-1976.
The inspector stated that the stretchout
of the schedule was acceptable provided that other commitments
made by the licensee in regard to maintenance personnel retraining
and establishment of a preventive maintenance program were not
also delayed by the proposed postponement of the development
of new maintenance procedures until August 1, 1981. A licensee
representative stated that no modifications of those commitments
was intended.
(2) The inspector reviewed the revised S01-I-1.14 - "General Maintenance
Procedure" and verified that it established requirements for
maintenance schedules and periodic replacement of safety-related
parts with a service life.
(3) The inspector stated that the licensee's commitment to establish
a maintenance retraining program (due November 30, 1980) and
to develop a procedure for fire hose inspections remained
open on this item and would be inspected later.
-6
I. (Closed) Infraction (80-21-01)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and verified that
the licensee had established manned control points to prevent future
unauthorized entry with improper clothing or monitoring devices.
This item is closed.
J. (Closed) Deficiency (80-21-02)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and verified that
protective clothing requirements for steam generator platform work
appeared to be uniformly applied. This item is closed.
K. (Closed) Infraction (80-21-03)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and corrective action
and stated that they appeared adequate. This item is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7. Followup On Licensee Responses to IE Bulletins (IEB's)
A. IEB 78-12, 12A (Closed)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's statement in their July 13,
1979 letter (Head to Engelken). According to a licensee representative,
this letter stated that weld material records for the reactor pressure
vessel had not been maintained, but that the vessel had been built
to code. This item is closed.
B.
TEB 79-14 (Open)
The inspector reviewed the current status of the licensee's final
report on this Bulletin with a licensee representative. The representative
stated that the report was not yet available.
C. IEB 79-17 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's report: "A Review of Stress
Corrosion .Cracking at San Onofre Unit 1" (Bechtel -
14000-027 dated
February, 1980).
This report reviewed the history of austenitic
stainless steel corrosion at San Onofre.Unit 1 and made three
recommendations:
1. Replace all TP 304 pipe and fittings with TP304L.
2. Provide a protective coating for systems directly or indirectly
exposed to the seacoast environment..
3. Replace the stainless steel braided electrical tracing with
Chemelex 20 PVT-Trace, a fluoropolymer-covered electrical tracing.
-7
Licensee personnel stated that the third recommendation had been
accomplished, and that the first two recommendations would be seriously
considered for long-range corrective action. The inspector stated
that this Bulletin would be closed, but that the contractor's report
would be forwarded for further review by NRC, and the licensee's
progress in accomplishing these recommendations would be monitored.
(01 50-206/80-31-04).
D..
IEB 79-18 (Open)
The inspector determined that the licensee had not yet completed
the installation and checkout of the modified announcing system.
E. IEB 79-23 (0oen)
A licensee representative stated that the test report on the diesel
generator was not yet available for inspection. The inspector
stated that the report would be reviewed when it became available.
F..
IEB 79-25 (Oen)
A licensee representative stated that the test results on overtravel
measurements were not available due to the temporary absence of
personnel familiar with their location. The inspector stated that
the results would be reviewed upon the return of the knowledgeable
parson.
G.
IEB 79-27 (Closed)
The inspector confirmed with a licensee representative that an
emergency procedure for loss of electrical power to the 125 vdc
buses would be prepared sufficiently prior to the unit's return
to power for the Resident Inspector to review and comment on.
(01 50-206/80-31-05). This item is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8. Inspection of TMI Task Action Plan Category "A" Requirements
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had completed several TMI
"Lessons Learned" actions, or had initiated action to complete them,
as noted below by the reference to the NRC Action Plan (NUREG 660) item
number:
a.
Task Action Plan (TAP) 1.A.1.1
The inspector verified through discussions with licensee personnel
and review of Operating Instruction S-0-6, "Duties and Responsibilities
and Authority of the Shift Technical Advisor" that the licensee had
stationed interim Shift Technical Advisors as required.
-8
b.
TAP 1.A.1.2
The inspector reviewed Operating Instruction S-0-4, "Watch Engineer's
Authority, Responsibilities and Duties," and a memo from Vice President
for Nuclear Engineering and Operations, R. Dietch, dated January 2,
1980 to verify that the Watch Engineer's duties had been described
as required by this item.
c. TAP 1.C.3
The inspector reviewed Operating Instruction S-0-100, "Station
Operations" and verified that the definition of authority required
had been made by the licensee. He further verified that the Watch
Engineer training program emphasized the safety responsibility
of the Watch Engineer.
d. TAP 1.C.4
The inspector reviewed S-0-100, "Station Operations" and S-A-103,
"Control Room Access," and determined that these procedures made
adequate provisions for controlling control room access.
e. TAP II.D.3
The inspector verified that positive indications of valve position
for the pressurizer power operated relief valves had been installed.
The inspector also reviewed the preoperational test results for this
system. The inspector stated that the licensee's actions adequately
addressed this item.
f. TAP II.E.1.2
The inspector interviewed a licensee representative responsible
for this item who stated that the licensee had agreed with NRR
to implement all seven required criteria in its automatic feedwater
system by January 1, 1981. This system is to be "safety grade."
The representative further stated that this commitment was contingent
upon regional power availability and the availability of required
materials. The inspector determined by observation that the licensee's
present auxiliary feedwater system has been modified by the installation
of a remote manual (from the control room) discharge valve for the
electric-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The inspector further
noted that a letter from NRR dated December 21, 1979 required that
the licensee not automate the auxiliary feedwater system until
NRR had reviewed and approved the licensee's steam line break and
feedwater break analyses. The licensee representative stated that
these analyses would be submitted to NRR by December 1, 1980. On
the basis of these facts the inspector stated that the licensee's.
actions were acceptable.
-9
g.
TAP II.
E. 3.1
The inspector reviewed the licensee's pressurizer heater power
supply installation.
He observed that the heaters are powered
from 480 Vac buses 1 and 2 which can be powered redundantly from
either onsite or offsite power. The inspector also verified that
Procedure S-3-5.5, "Loss of Coolant", specifically required the
operator to reenergize the necessary groups of pressurizer heaters
to establish and maintain natural circulation. The inspector stated
that the time required to connect pressurizer heaters to their
emergency power source appeared consistent with prompt initiation
and maintenance of natural circulation. The inspector observed
that the interfaces of the pressurizer heaters to the Vital Buses
were through Westinghouse Mode DB-25 ACB's which tripped on overcurrent
or low level in the pressurizer.
The inspector stated that this
appeared to be isolation similar to that used for safety-related
components powered from the vital buses, and that the licensee's
actions appeared acceptable.
h. TAP II.E.4.2
The inspector reviewed the licensee's completed preoperational
test 2.1.4-1, "Diverse Containment Isolation System Test"; observed
the installed equipment in the control room; reviewed the licensee's
list of essential and non-essential systems; verified that all
non-essential systems were isolated by the containment isolation
signal when tested; that resetting of the isolation signal did not
result in automatic reopening of containment isolation valves when
tested; that reopening of containment isolation valves required
deliberate operator action when tested; and that.containment isolation
was initiated by either a safety injection initiation signal or
by high pressure in the containment.
The inspector stated that
the licensee's actions were acceptable.
i.
TAP II.F.2
The inspector observed that a "control grade" primary coolant saturation
meter was installed in the control room which automatically selected
the hottest hot leg loop temperature for control room display.
The inspector noted that the licensee had decided that additional
instrumentation to supplement this meter was unwarranted in their
March 25, 1980 letter to NRR. The inspector stated that the meter
installation in addition to the procedures confirmed in Inspection
Report (50-206/80-12) appeared to adequately address this item.
In addition the inspector stated that Open Items 50-206/80-12-04
and 80-12-05 were closed.
- 10
j. TAP II.G.1
The inspector observed that the licensee had installed a backup
nitrogen pneumatic operation system for the pressurizer power operated
relief valves (PORV's) and PORV block valves. The inspector also
observed that the nitrogen system had been identified as essential,
and the containment isolation system had been appropriately modified.
The inspector noted that this item implied that these valves were
electrically operated, while at San Onofre 1 they are pneumatically
operated, and the pneumatic source of power, the instrument air
system, is not safety related or qualified. The inspector stated
that notwithstanding this anomaly, the licensee's actions appeared
acceptable.
k.
TAP III.A.1.2
The inspector observed that neither the Technical Support Center
(TSC) nor the Operational Support Center (OSC) definitions had
been incorporated into the licensee's Emergency Plan, but noted
that according to a licensee representative the plan would be updated
to reflect these centers as well as other changes by January 1,
1981.
Licensee personnel stated that the facility presently does
not have isometric drawings for some piping systems less than 2"
in diameter, nor photographs of these systems, so that the TSC
set of drawings is incomplete. Furthermore, the inspector noted
that some inaccuracy in the existing facility drawings of safety
related systems had been.recently identified by the inspector (See
Inspection Report 80-16 pp 5-6).
Notwithstanding this, the inspector
stated that it was apparent that the licensee had in fact established
an interim TSC and OSC, and therefore the completion of this item
Was substantially confirmed.
1. TAP III.D.1.1
The inspector reviewed the leak reduction program established by
the license in S-I-1.71, "Maintenance of Auxiliary Radioactive
Systems Outside.Containment", S-111-2.40, "Post Accident Operation
of Radioactive Waste Systems", S-3-3.26, "Leakage Test of Radioactive
Systems Outside Containment", and Technical Specification 4.2,
"Safety Injection and Containment Spray System Periodic Testing.
The inspector observed that the licensee's test program was in
two parts: measurements of leakage from the recirculation loop
outside containment, as required by the Technical Specifications;
and measurements of other leakage from other systems that might
contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient.
The licensee has submitted the overall leak rate results to NRR
in a letter dated January 17, 1980. A licensee representative
stated that the implied acceptance criteria for all leakage was
625 "effective" cc/hr, where the Technical Specification weighted
leak rate known as "effective leak rate" is used.
The inspector
-1 1
noted that S-3-3.26 did not specify the plant valve lineup in which
the leakage was measured, and to that extent a different valve
lineup might produce different leak rate data. The licensee was
not able to retrieve the raw test data at the time of the inspection.
The inspector stated that it would be reviewed once the licensee
retrieved it. (01 50-206/80-31-07).
The inspector additionally reviewed the licensee's preventive maintenance
program to reduce leakage to as-low-as-practical, S-I-1.71. The
inspector observed that this procedure only required that when
components were repaired that the use of lower leakage rate materials
or components should be "considered". The inspector stated that this
vague direction to workers was acceptable absent any regulatory
guidance. However, the inspector will monitor the licensee's
implementation of this program to ensure that it is effective.
(01 50-206/80-31-06).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview
An exit interview (Paragraph 1) was held on October 31, 1980 to summarize
the scope and findings of.this inspection. The inspector also reminded
the licensee of the importance of vigilant fire prevention inside the
containment during this outage, due to the large amounts of combustible
(albeit fire-resistant) polyethylene sheeting being used there. The
inspector noted that the sheeting (Visqueen) releases large quantities
of noxious black smoke when it burns.
A licensee representative stated
that the use of large quantities of this material inside containment
would be reviewed.
(01 50-206/80-31-07).