ML13323A398
| ML13323A398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1980 |
| From: | Dodds R, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A394 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-361-80-06, 50-361-80-6, 50-362-80-04, 50-362-80-4, NUDOCS 8007020191 | |
| Download: ML13323A398 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000361/1980006
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
50-361/80-06
Report No.
50-362/80-04
Docket
No.
50-361, 50-362
License No. CPPR-97,
CPPR-98
Safeguards Group_
_
Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, California 91770
Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 2 and 3
Inspection at:
Construction Site, San Diego County, California
Inspection conducte :,, March 1-31,
1980
Inspectors:
___/_n
J. Pate, Resident Igipector
d ae Si ned
Date Signed
Date Signed
proved By:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Support Section
/bate/Signed
Reactor Construction & Engineering Support Branch
Summary: Inspection on March 1-31, 1980 (Report Nos. 50-361/80-06 and 50-362/80-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector
of construction activities including: piping storage and fitup; reactor
pressure vessel and internals protection, storage of high strength fasteners;
weld rod control; licensee corrective actions on previous inspection
findings; and general work in progress. The inspection involved 34
inspector-hours onsite by one NRC. inspector.
Results:
Of the five areas inspected, ore item. of noncompliance and one
deviation.was identified.
RV Form 219 (2)
se e so39
~
DETAILS
1. Individuals Contacted
a. Southern California Edison Company .(SCE)
+*D. E. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance
+*P. A. Croy, Site Project Quality Assurance Supervisor
R. R. Hart, Construction Manager
D. B. Schone, Lead Engineering Site Representative
=*W.
L. Rossfeld, Construction Lead QA Engineer
b. Bechtel Power Corporation(Bechtel)
=+*C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
=+*R. H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer
+*J. E. Geiger, Project Quality Assurance
+*W. D. Nichols, Assistant Project Field Engineer
=+*L. W. Hurst, Project Field Quality Assurance Supervisor
R. W. Welcher, Project Quality Assurance Engineer
+ J. E. Bashore, Division Quality Assurance Manager
In addition, construction craftsmen, engineers and foremen were
contacted during the inspection.
- Denotes attendees at management meeting on March 7, 1980
+Denotes attendees at management meeting on March 21; 1980
=Denotes attendees at management meeting on March 27, 1980
2. Construction Status
The licensee reported the site construction work is 78% complete as
of March 26, 1979.
The licensee's project management personnel
estimated that the construction of Units 2 and 3 was 90% and 61%
complete, respectively.
3. Storage of High Strenth Bolts
High strength bolts (A490, 1 1/2 inch diameter, 5 inches long) were
observed on March 5, 1980 in the iron workers' storage area at
Jap Mesa in a 5-gallon bucket that was half filled with water. The
bolts were coated with a film of red rust. There were approximately
100 other 5-gallon containers in the area also filled with nuts and
bolts. Most of these were covered with a large sheet of plastic.
Several buckets including the one noted above were not covered. It
appeared that the cover had been removed and not replaced, allowing
rain to fill the buckets. From the condition of the bolts it appeared
-2
that the bolts had been in the water for some time.
The use of a
plastic sheet to cover the buckets of bolts and nuts at the Jap Mesa
storaqe area was discussed at the weekly meeting on December 14,
1979.
The inspector noted the possible need for improving the storage conditions
at that time, but no action was taken.
The storage of high strength bolts in a manner that allows them to
become corroded is contrary to the requirement of ANSI Standard
N45.2.2-1972, Section 3.2.4(3) which states in part "Items subject
to detrimental corrosion, either internally or externally, shall be
suitably protected."
The SCE QA Plan, Chapter 13 and the Bechtel
QA Plan Procedure No. 13 both reference the requirement of ANSI
N45.2.2. The Bechtel construction procedure WPP/QCI 008 commits to the
requirements of ANSI N45.2.2-1972 as modified by Regulatory Guide
1.38.
This is an apparent deviation.
(50-361/80-06/01)
4. Weld Rod Control
Four E7018 (Low Hydrogen) welding electrodes were found in the
Unit 3 High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump room (RM-015)
on 3/13/80. No one was working in the room at the time and the shift
was not over. The inspector returned to the HPSI pump room the
next morning (3/14/80) and the rod had not been returned to the rod
room or discarded by bending.
The SCE QA management personnel was
immediately advised and this was discussed with SCE management personnel
at the Friday weekly meeting 3/21/80. The inspector was advised that
SCE and Bechtel had done several surveillances during the week and had
found no additional incidence of weld electrodes not being properly
controlled.
SCE concluded that the electrodes found by the inspector
were an isolated case.
On March 24, 1980, after completion of the work shift nineteen (19)
E7018 welding electrodes were found uncontrolled at elevation 30 feet,
next to stairway in containment for Unit No. 3, and on March 26, 1980,
unbent E7018 welding electrodes were retrieved from the rod stub
barrel outside of welding rod room No. 3.
Bechtel Work Plan Procedure/Quality Control Instructions (WPP/QCI)
No. 200, Control of Welding Filler Material, Rev. 11.0, Paragraph 6.1.6
states that "At the completion of the welder's work shift, the
portable rod warmer, container pouch, all unused filler material and
the welder copy of the WR-6, WR-7 or WR-99 forms shall be returned to
the Rod Room attendant;" Paragraph 8.1.1 states that, "Electrodes
returned to the rod room and not intended for re-issue shall be bent
180' and placed in a suitable trash barrel by the rod room attendant."
This is an apparent item of noncompliance (50-361/80-06/02).
-3
5. Reactor Vessel and Internal Installation and Storage
Site activities for storage of the Units 2 and 3 reactor pressure
vessels and internals were observed. Both vessels are installed and
installation of Unit 2 internals is essentially complete. Installation
of Unit 3 internals is nearly complete.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety-Related Piping
The piping related activities listed below were observed to ascertain
compliance with applicable construction specifications and procedures.
Activity
System
Identification No.
Weld Fitup
Safety Injection
S2-1204-ML-032
Rev. 13
Storage
Component Cooling Water
S3-CC-084-2
Storage
Component Cooling Water
S3-CC-078-2
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7. Plant Tour
The inspector toured both Units 2 and 3 several times each week
during the inspection report period. Particular attention was directed
to observing work in progress, availability of supervision and
quality control inspectors at the work areas, housekeeping and
preservation of equipment.
During the tour, the following additional items were observed:
A. One of the four anchor bolts used on pipe hanger S2-RC-157-H-OOA
(supports a 3/4 inch sample line from the reactor coolant system)
was of a different type than the other three bolts. Additional
followup revealed that three of the anchor bolts were per the
drawing and the fourth was a stud which was not properly marked.
The stud was removed and a shell type concrete anchor was found
properly installed. The construction specification allows
substitution of a shell anchor for an expansion anchor. The
inspector also observed that the shell anchor was installed at a
slight angle. The construction specification CS-C8 did not
have an acceptance criteria for concrete anchors installed at an
angle. The licensee was requested to provide acceptance criteria
or explain why acceptance criteria was not needed. (50-361/80-06/03)
-4
B. The flange on the reactor coolant pump loop 1B bleedoff line,
S2-1201-ML-043, to the flow indicator 2FI-0160 was observed to
be highly magnetic although the attached piping was non-magnetic.
It appears from the specification that the pipe and the flange
should be stainless steel.
SCE management personnel were asked
to determine whether or not the flange was nonconforming.
(50-361/80-06/04).
C. The inspector observed the setup for grinding the upper core
support key ways (slots) per Field Action Request (FAR)
No. 1370-183. The slots had to be reground as a result of the
shrinkage that resulted from welding the flow channel extensions
on to the fuel alignment plate.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8. Management Interview
The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in
Paragraph 1) on March 7, 21 and 27, 1980. The scope of the inspections
and the inspector's findings were discussed. The licensee representatives
made the following commitments.
A. The high strength bolts stored at Jap Mesa would be placed
under a permanent cover. See Paragraph 3.
B. A new weld rod control program will be implemented for
better accountability for weld rod that has been issued.
See Paragraph 4.
C. The material specification for the reactor coolant pump
bleedoff line will be reviewed for acceptability of magnetic
material.
See Paragraph 7.B.