ML13302B475
| ML13302B475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1979 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Arenal A SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912190156 | |
| Download: ML13302B475 (4) | |
Text
o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD SUITE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA
.* i WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 November 30, 1979 Docket Nos.
50-361---..
50-36LoCA Jn~L Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Attention:
Mr. A. Arenal, Vice President Advanced Engineering Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 79-27 is forwarded to you for information.
Although no written response is required at this time, these concerns will be addressed as part of the licensing process for your plant. If you desire additional information regarding this.matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, R. H. Engelken Director
Enclosures:
1.-
- 2.
Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/enclosures:
J. H. Drake, SCE 7912190
& 462-
UNITED STATES SSINS No.: 6820 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Accession No.:
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 7910250499 WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 November 30, 1979 IE Rulletin No. 79-27 LOSS OF NON-CLASS-1-F INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM BUIS DURING OPERATION Description of Circumstances:
On November 10, 1979, an event occurred at the Oconee Power Station, Unit 3, that resulted in loss of power to a non-class-1-F 120 Vac single phase power panel that supplied power to the Integrated Control System (ICS) and the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) System. This loss of power resulted in control system malfunctions and significant loss of information to the control room operator.
Specifically, at 3:16 p.m., with Unit 3 at 100 percent power, the main condensate pumps tripped, apparently as a result of a technician performing maintenance on the hotwell level control system. This led to reduced feedwater flow to the steam generators, which resulted in a reactor trip due to high coolant system pressure and simultaneous turbine trip at 3:16:57 p.m. At 3:17:15 p.m., the non-class-1-E inverter power supply feeding all power to the integrated control system (which provides proper coordination of the reactor, steam generator feedwater control, and turbine) and to one NNI channel tripped and failed to automatically transfer its loads from the DC power source to the regulated AC power source. The inverter tripped-due to blown fuses. Loss of power to the NNI rendered control room indicators and recorders for the reactor coolant system (except for one wide-range RCS pressure recorder) and most of the secondary plant systems inoperable, causing loss of indication for systems used for decay heat removal and water addition to the reactor vessel and steam generators. Upon loss of power, all valves controlled by the ICS assumed their respective failure positions. The loss of power existed for approximately three minutes, until an operator could reach the equipment room and manually switch the inverter to the regulated AC source.
The above event was discussed in IE Information Notice No. 79-29, issued November 16, 1979.
NUREG 0600 "Investigation into the March 28, 1979 TMI Accident" also discusses TMI LER 78-021-03L whereby the RCS depressurized and Safety Injection occured on loss of a vital bus due to inverter failure.
Actions to Be Taken by Licensees For all power reactor facilities with an operating license and for those nearing completion of construction (North Anna 2, Diablo Canyon, McGuire, Salem 2, Sequoyah, and Zimmer):
IE Bulletin No..79-27 m ember 30, 1979 W
Wge 2 of 2
- 1. Review the class-1-E and non-class 1-E buses supplying power to safety and non-safety related instrumentation and control systems which could affect
,the ability to achieve a cold shutdown condition using existing procedures or procedures developed under item 2 below. For each bus:
a) identify and review the alarm and/or indication provided in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of power to the bus.
b) identify the instrument and control system loads connected to the bus and evaluate the effects of loss of power to these loads including the ability to achieve a cold shutdown condition.
c) describe any proposed design modifications resulting from these reviews and evaluations, and your proposed schedule for implementing those modifications.
- 2. Prepare emergency procedures or review existing ones that will be used by control room operators, including procedures required to achieve a cold shutdown condition, upon loss of power to each class 1-E and non-class 1-E bus supplying power to safety and non-safety related instrument and control systems. The emergency procedures should include:
a) the diagnostics/alarms/indicators/symptom resulting from the review and evaluation conducted per item 1 above.
b) the use of alternate indication and/or control circuits which may be powered from other non-class 1-E or class 1-E instrumentation and control buses.
c) methods for restoring power to the bus.
Describe any proposed design modification or administrative controls to be implemented resulting from these procedures, and your proposed schedule for implementing the changes.
- 3. Re-review IE Circular No. 79-02, Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies, dated January 11, 1979, to include both class 1-E and non-class 1-E safety related power supply inverters. Based on a review of operating experience and your re-review of IE Circular No. 79-02, describe any proposed design modifications or administrative controls to be implemented as a result of the re-review.
- 4. Within 90 days of the date of this Bulletin, complete the review and evaluation required by this Bulletin and provide a written response describing your reviews and actions taken in response to each item.
Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact the IE Regional Office.
Approved by GAO B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
IE Bulletin No. 79-27 Enclosure Novebmer 30, 1979 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
79-26 Boron Loss From BWR 11/20/79 All BWR power reactor Control Blades facilities with an OL 79-25 Failures of Westinghouse 11/2/79 All power reactor BFD Relays In Safety-Related facilities with an Systems OL or CP 79-17 Pipe Cracks In Stagnant 10/29/79 All PWR's with an (Rev. 1)
Borated Water System At OL and for information PWR Plants to other power reactors 79-24 Frozen Lines 9/27/79 All power reactor facilities which have either OLs or CPs and are in the late stage of construction 79-23 Potential Failure of 9/12/79 All Power Reactor Emergency Diesel Facilities with an Generator Field Operating License or Exciter Transformer a construction permit 79-14 Seismic Analyses For 9/7/79 All Power Reactor (Supplement 2)
As-Built Safety-Related Facilities with an Piping Systems OL or a CP 79-22 Possible Leakage of Tubes 9/5/79 To Each Licensee of Tritium Gas in Time-who Receives Tubes pieces for Luminosity of Tritium Gas Used in Timepieces for Luminosity 79-13 Cracking in Feedwater 8/30/79 All Designated (Rev. 1)
System Piping Applicants for OLs 79-02 Pipe Support Base Plate 8/20/79 All power Reactor (Rev. 1)
Designs Using Concrete Facilities with an (Supplement 1)
Expansion Anchor Bolts OL or a CP 79-14 Seismic Analyses For 8/15/79 All Power Reactor (Supplement) As-Built Safety-Related Facilities with Pipinq Systems an OL or a CP