ML13270A287

Email, Request for Additional Information Round 4 (Apla), Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)

ML13270A287
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	09/27/2013
From:	Lynnea Wilkins Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Edwards M Omaha Public Power District
Wilkins L
References
TAC ME7244
Download: ML13270A287 (1)

Text

From: Wilkins, Lynnea Sent: Friday, September 27, 2013 12:34 PM To: EDWARDS, MICHAEL L Cc: VAN SANT, BERNARD J; Burkhardt, Janet; Sebrosky, Joseph

Subject:

Fort Calhoun Station Fourth Round RAIs for NFPA 805 LAR (ME7244)

Mike, By letter dated September 28, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML112760660), as supplemented by letters dated December 19 and 22, 2011, and March 20, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML113540334, ML11363A077, and ML12083A147, respectively), Omaha Public Power District, (the Licensee), submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to transition their fire protection licensing basis at the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1, from Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Section 50.48(b), to 10CFR50.48(c), National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 (NFPA 805). A review team, consisting of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and contractors from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA) participated in a regulatory audit of Fort Calhoun in Blair, NE from March 5 -9, 2012. By letter dated April 26, 2012, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12198A406) the NRC issued requests for additional information (RAls). By letters dated July 24, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12208A131), August 24,2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12240A151), and September 27,2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12276A046) the licensee provided responses to the RAls. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided by the licensee in response to the first set of RAIs and determined that additional information was needed for the staff to complete its evaluation. Consequently, the staff issued a second round of RAIs on February 22, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13053A226) and a third round of RAIs on June 27, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13178A035). The licensee responded to these RAIs in letters dated April 23, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13116A015), May 21, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13144A814), July 29, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13211A055),

and September 12, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13192A198).

The U.S. NRC staff has reviewed the information provided in your application and determined that additional information is required in order to complete its review. These RAIs can be found below. The NRC considers these RAIs to be the fourth round of RAIs. Based on discussions with you on September 25 and September 27, it was agreed that a response to the RAIs found below will be provided by October 25, 2013. Should the NRC determine that the RAIs found below are no longer necessary prior to the dates found above, the request will be withdrawn. If circumstances result in the need to revise the requested response date, please contact me or Joe Sebrosky.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ADOPT NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805 PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTOR GENERATING PLANTS FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT 1 (TAC NO. ME7244)

SSA RAI 17.02

The proposed design for REC-117, circuit modification to prevent spurious closure of normally open bus tie breaker resulting from hot shorts provided in response to SSA RAI 17.01 uses a new set of switch contacts that provide isolation of the close circuit in breakers BT-1B4A, BT-1B3B and BT-1B4C. The NRC staffs understanding of the proposed design indicates that the switch that provides this isolation function will be located on the main control board in the main control room. The NRC staff has several questions related to the proposed circuit design:

1. The protection provided by the proposed design is only functional as long as the switch remains intact. Please provide justification that the control switch open contacts will maintain this configuration given fire damage to the switch (the open contacts are only as good as the switch integrity under fire conditions; state if the open contact configuration be assured given a loss of switch integrity) expected as postulated in the performance-based Fire Risk Evaluations in accordance with NFPA 805.

2. Please state if the circuit design is a stand alone design or if the licensee plans to implement this design in concert with recovery actions to prevent breaker closure (local actions to remove fuses, rack out the circuit breaker, etc.).