LIC-13-0135, Omaha Public Power District - Reply to NRC Request for Information Request for Exemption from Work Hour Requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7)
| ML13267A186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/2013 |
| From: | Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-13-0135, TAC MF2571 | |
| Download: ML13267A186 (26) | |
Text
-~
DjjjjD 0maIIa Public Power 0IsIIid 444 South 1cf' Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247 September 23,2013 UC-13-0135 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555
References:
- 1. Docket No. 50-285
- 2. Letter from OPPD (L. P. Cortopassi) to NRC (Document Control Desk), "Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7)," dated August 16, 2013 (ML13231A018) (UC-13-0121)
- 3. Letter from NRC (J. M. Sebrosky) to OPPD (L. P. Cortopassi), "Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action RE: Request for Exemption from Work Hour Requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7) (TAC No. MF2571)," dated August 26, 2013 (ML13233A248)
- 4. Letter from OPPD (L. P. Cortopassi) to NRC (Document Control Desk), "Reply to NRC Request for Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action RE: Request for Exemption from Work Hour Requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7) (TAC No. MF2571)," dated August 30,2013 (ML13246A182) (UC-13-0125
- 5. Email from NRC (J. Sebrosky) to OPPD (8. R. Hansher), "Request for Information Associated with the August 16, 2013, Work Hour Exemption Request (MF2571),"
dated September 18, 2013 (ML13261A212)
SUBJECT:
Reply to NRC Request for Information RE: Request for Exemption from Work Hour Requirements of 10 CFR 26.205{d)(7) (TAC No. MF2571)
On August 16, 2013, the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) submitted a request (Reference 2) for an exemption from requirements of paragraph 26.205( d)(7) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) for Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No.1. Reference 2 requested an exemption from specific requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7), to allow the use of the less restrictive work hour limitations described in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) and (d)(5) to support activities required for plant startup from the current extended outage, for a period not to exceed 45 days. In Reference 3, the NRC determined that additional information was needed before the staff could begin a detailed review of the Reference 2 exemption request and OPPD provided its response in Reference 4.
The purpose of this letter is to respond to the most recent NRC request for additional information (Reference 5). Accordingly, the NRC's questions and OPPD's responses thereto are attached.
OPPD requests approval of this exemption request by October 4, 2013.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.
Employment wfth EqualOpporlunny
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission lIC-13-0135 Page 2 If you should have any additional questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Bill Hansher at (402) 533-6894.
Sincerely, uis P. CortopassI Site Vice President and CNO Attachments: 1. Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Work Hour Exemption Request
- 2. Significant Work Activities During 1st Work Hour Exemption
- 3. Critical Path Schedule
LlC-13-0135 Page 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Work Hour Exemption Request By letter dated August 16, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13231A018) as supplemented by letter dated August 30, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13246A182), Omaha Public Power District (the licensee) submitted for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval a request for an exemption from requirements of paragraph 26.205(d)(7) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) for Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No.1. The proposed exemption would approve an exemption from specific requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7), to allow the use of the less restrictive work hour limitations described in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) and (d)(5) to support activities required for plant startup from the current extended outage, for a period not to exceed 45 days.
Based on a review of the submittal, the NRC staff has determined that the following additional information (RAI) is required in order to complete its review. The request for additional information was discussed with you on September 18, 2013. It was agreed that a response to these RAls would be provided by September 23, 2013. Should the NRC determine that these RAls are no longer necessary prior to the scheduled date, the request will be withdrawn. If circumstances result in the need to revise the requested response date, please contact me at (301) 415-1132 or via e-mail at joseph.sebrosky@nrc.gov. The NRC staff has determined that no security-related or proprietary information is contained herein.
NRC Question
- 1. OPPD focused the efforts on emergent issues during the period that was granted the first time. What is the relationship between the emergent issues addressed during the previous exemption period and the schedule for startup activities for exemption from Part 26, subpart I?
OPPD Response During the first exemption, Operations supported establishing and removing equipment clearance orders as part of outage maintenance on equipment and systems. Operations also supported system drains, and refills. This allowed post maintenance testing and surveillance activities to be accomplished. Items that fell outside of acceptance criteria required additional iterations to support maintenance and engineering resolution. Maintenance supported the outage schedule by executing corrective and preventive maintenance on plant equipment to improve or restore reliability. Modifications were installed to restore FCS compliance to current design requirements or to provide enhancements to support facility operations. Maintenance also supported troubleshooting activities.
During the first exemption, the major accomplishment for the plant was the alignment and restoration of the secondary systems. These systems had been in a layup condition to preserve the equipment from corrosion, which was found to be successful. Confirmation of the system status required special flush alignments to remove particulates and assure cleanliness.
Demineralization trailers were brought on site, installed with temporary hook-ups, and aligned to receive secondary water for cleanup. For the steam side of the systems, plant procedures and
LlC-13-0135 Page 2 strategies were developed to support partial disassembly at key points to allow flushing water to be added and removed, again to remove particulates from the extended outage. is a high-level list of work activities from the first work hour exemption, some of which have been completed. As shown on the list, many of these activities were associated with providing tornado missile protection for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) required to reach and maintain safe shutdown. The need to resolve tornado missile protection issues delayed loading fuel into the reactor (Le., a startup activity) when it became evident on July 20, 2013 that an exigent license amendment would have to be approved before OPPD could credit recently installed tornado missile barriers to allow core reload to proceed. For example, pull boxes PB-128T and PB-129T were among the SSCs vulnerable to tornado missiles. Pull boxes PB-128T and PB-129T are located outside on the southeast corner of the auxiliary building. These pull boxes contain electrical cables for the raw water (RW) pump motors, RW pump discharge strainers, associated RW valves, and RW pump room water level instrumentation in the intake structure.
Technical Specifications 2.8.1 (3) and 2.8.1 (4) require shutdown cooling to be operable when fuel is in the reactor and one or more reactor vessel head closure bolts are less than fully tensioned. The shutdown cooling system utilizes the low-pressure safety injection pumps to circulate the reactor coolant through the two shutdown cooling heat exchangers, returning it to the reactor coolant system (RCS) through the low-pressure safety injection header (USAR Section 9.3). The component cooling water (CCW) system, which cools components carrying radioactive or potentially radioactive fluids, supplies cooling water for the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. CCW also serves as a cooling medium for the containment air coolers, steam generator blowdown sampling coolers, and the control room economizer coils. The CCW system provides a monitored intermediate barrier between these fluids and the raw water system, which transfers the heat to the Missouri River (USAR Section 9.7).
Thus, the RW pumps must be functional and able to supply raw water to allow the transfer of heat from reactor coolant flowing through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers to the Missouri River via the CCW and RW systems. As explained in the reply to Question 4 below, an exigent amendment had to be obtained in late July 2013 before OPPD could credit the tornado missile protection installed around pull boxes PB-128T and PB-129T. The amendment permitted OPPD to have a basis for the presumption that the RW system was adequately protected from a tornado and thus capable of transferring heat from the re-fueled reactor to the Missouri River even in such an unlikely event as a tornado impacting the site.
The need to obtain the license amendment delayed the start of fuel loading until July 26, 2013 when the amendment was received. Following fuel loading, the reactor vessel internal components must be installed, the reactor vessel head replaced and tightened, all of which are startup activities. The delay in core re-Ioad had additional cascading effects as many subsequent startup activities associated with valve lineups, post-maintenance testing, placing equipment in service etc., depend upon the reactor being refueled before they can occur.
LlC-13-0135 Page 3 NRC Question
- 2. What is the status of the work described in the response to the clarifying question 1 found in the August 30, 2013, supplement (ADAMS Accession No. ML13246A182)?
Specifically, the work related to the unevaluated high energy line break in the steam supply to the aux feed water turbine inside room 19 & the high pressure safety injection issue which was not balanced in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.
OPPD Response The remaining modifications performing covered work to resolve the high energy line break (HELB) issue inside Rooms 13 and 19 of the auxiliary building are Engineering Change (EC) 61599 (Room 13) and EC 61935 (Room 19).
EC 61599 is replacing socket welds in greater than 1 inch diameter pipes with butt welds in select portions of piping in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) and steam generator blowdown (SGBD) system located in Room 13. The modification will ensure that welds on piping sections with a diameter greater than 1 inch installed between the systems' containment penetration and the outboard isolation valve are volumetrically inspectable. This change is required so that the welds for these pipe sections and valves can be volumetrically examined on a periodic schedule as required by the HELB guidelines and analysis. Covered work on EC 61599 is complete. As shown on the attached critical path schedule, leak testing of the CVCS and SGBD systems will follow. This task does not typically require support by covered workers.
EC 61935 is addressing the postulated failure of air-operated valves YCV-1045A or B to remain closed during a HELB at the inlet side of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) turbine stop valve (YCV-1045), and characterized as a single active failure. The specific failure that would cause YCV-1045A or B to open is the failure of solenoid valve YCV-1045A-20 or YCV-1045B-20 to remain energized. Both solenoids are powered by DC power supply DC-2. Engineering Analysis (EA)-
FC-11-037 shows that the opening of YCV-1045A or B in this scenario would result in Room 19 becoming harsh, which is unacceptable as the equipment in that room is not qualified for a harsh environment. EC 61935 is also addressing the single active failure of pressure switch PS-923 to annunciate and alarm the operators in case of a break. This is being addressed by installing a redundant pressure switch. Although covered work is in its initial stages on EC 61935, the current schedule (not shown on the critical path schedule) shows that the EC will be completed in early October 2013.
Flow balancing of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps was completed such that flow is evenly distributed to the four cold legs as assumed in the small break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) analysis; no covered work remains to resolve that issue.
NRC Question
- 3. It was stated in the response to clarifying questions 1 found in the August 30, 2013, supplement (ADAMS Accession No. ML13246A182) that the 45 day exemption request is for the completion of emergent issues as well as activities associated with restarting the plant. Please describe the relationship between the emergent issues
LlC-13-0135 Page 4 and the activities required for plant start up from this extended outage. In the introductory paragraphs of the August 16, 2013, and August 30, 2013, submittals, this 45 day exemption is explicitly requested for start up activities but in the response to the first question found in the August 30, 2013, supplement it is stated that the 45 days would be used for both resolving emergent issues and for start up activities.
Which is it? What is the plan/path forward that would ensure that all 45 days are necessary and that all the work that is planned can be completed within 45 days with the relaxed work hour requirements? '
OPPD Response The 45-day exemption is requested for start up activities. The inclusion of emergent issues was to further clarify and add specifics for all work associated with the refueling outage. The start up activities have realized scope growth to ensure the facility is brought into compliance with current design and licensing basis. The confirmation of design basis being met is integral to start up activities and have included design changes, modification instructions for the workforce, and assigning operability and acceptance testing. These are discussed as follows: is the critical path schedule as of September 23, 2013. The first two pages of the schedule show activities related to completing EC 61640. This EC is providing tornado missile protection for the main steam relief valve (MSRV) vents, atmospheric dump valve (ADV) vents, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (FW-10) vent, centrifugal exhaust fan (VA-41) vent and the auxiliary building pressure relief panels, which are all located on the auxiliary building roof at elevation 1057'-0". The missile barriers are required to protect safety-related SSCs located in Room 81 that do not have sufficient protection against tornado-generated missiles.
The schedule shows that the physical modifications and covered work needed to install EC 61640 will be completed by October 1, 2013. The remaining schedule consists primarily of those activities associated with a normal plant start-up, with breakers closed signifying the end of the outage on October 26, 2013. Although the attached schedule shows that this work can be completed in less than 30 days, OPPD is requesting 45-days as a contingency to allow resolution of any equipment issues that arise. OPPD believes that it is prudent to request the additional time as much of this equipment has been off-line for an extended period. Given that most emergent work will be essentially complete when the exemption is expected to be approved, the period that the exemption is in effect will be used primarily to complete activities associated with starting up the plant rather than to do emergent work.
The activities remaining in the plant start-up are becoming more familiar for the restoration of a plant in a typical outage. This workload is centered on system alignments, confirmation with second checks, and fill and vent procedures. The components and systems are then run to perform surveillances that are due on pre-established frequencies. These support declaration of operability required for mode ascensions. The modification work will also require testing, some in phases to demonstrate functionality and then full qualification as the plant is raised in temperature and pressure.
Maintenance work will continue to support plant operations. Equipment with leaks for example will need isolation, energy removed, and repairs made. This is not uncommon for a plant
LlC-13-013S PageS returning to power. However, after an extended outage, the station must be prepared for more than normal equipment challenges before placing the unit in service.
System walkdowns will require support to monitor for local abnormalities before they may become a challenge or threat to the operators in the control room. Multi-discipline teams are desired to perform efficient repairs to equipment and to maintain or restore margins.
With the mechanical plant systems in service, tested, and confirmed operable. The reactor can be taken critical. This approach requires the highest levels of attention and support. While the crews have maintained their training regimen, the use of just-in time training is necessary to assure the task is thoroughly reviewed, understood, and anomalies drilled on. The roles and responsibilities of individuals will necessitate entire crews be excused from outage activities and unit oversight while they go to the training center and simulator to have uninterrupted, focused briefings on critical activities. These briefings are scheduled and include taking the reactor critical, power ascension, low power physics testing, roll of main turbine with new digital control modification, and steam generator level control. The act of increasing feedwater flow to balance increased steam flow is a sensitive reactivity manipulation that has not occurred at Fort Calhoun since it was shutdown in 2011. Operators must demonstrate proficiency on dynamic parameter controls such as this.
NRC Question
- 4. The exemption request allowed covered workers to work hours necessary to install the physical modifications needed to protect the tornado missile vulnerabilities in an expeditious manner. Are these activities associated with the start-up check list?
Was there work done by individuals that were not considered to be covered as determined by a risk informed evaluation due to current plant configuration? Was it a consideration that this work would be completed in the 60 days such that start up activities could also be completed?
OPPD Response Tornado missile protection was not a startup checklist item. This issue arose because it was recognized that certain SSCs at Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) were vulnerable to the vertical velocity component of tornado missiles. At the same time, it was recognized that the design basis tornado described in the FCS, Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) was overly conservative when recent NRC guidance was considered. In the early 1970's when FCS obtained its operating license, data on tornado characteristics was limited due to the destruction of measurement instrumentation by the passing tornado. This lack of data resulted in overly conservative assumptions regarding the characteristics of the design basis tornado that could occur at FCS. Discussions between the NRC and OPPD culminated on July 20, 2013 when the NRC informed OPPD that a license amendment was necessary to change its current licensing basis (CLB) to require compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.76, Revision 1. An exigent license amendment request (LAR) was submitted on July 21, 2013 (Reference 1) and approved by the NRC in Amendment No. 272 (Reference 2) on July 26, 2013.
Covered workers installed the barriers necessary to protect tornado missile vulnerabilities, as the vulnerable SSCs were required to be operable or functional to enable the plant to reach and
LlC-13-0135 Page 6 maintain safe shutdown. During the first exemption, this entailed protecting the SSCs needed to reload the core and maintain shutdown cooling. At FCS, individuals that perform covered work are not "uncovered" when performing work that would not be considered "covered" by a risk informed evaluation. This practice is conservative and decreases the chance of exceeding work hour limits caused by a covered worker not coding his or her time properly.
When the first exemption (Reference 3) was granted on June 11, 2013, OPPD believed that the emergent work (i.e., tornado missile protection etc.) had been sufficiently identified such that it could be completed along with activities associated with starting the plant up. However, additional tornado missile vulnerabilities were discovered and it was not until OPPD was 39 days into the 60-day exemption period that it was recognized that a license amendment was necessary to resolve the tornado missile issue.
In response to OPPD's exigent license amendment request dated July 21, 2013 (Reference 1),
the NRC approved Amendment No. 272 (Reference 2) on July 26, 2013. Amendment No. 272 allowed OPPD to utilize the guidance of RG 1.76, Revision 1 (Reference 4) and Bechtel Power Corporation, Topical Report, Topical Report BC-TOP-9A, (Reference 5) to install suitable tornado missile protection. Nonetheless, core reload and the subsequent startup activities that follow that evolution could not proceed until this issue was resolved.
NRC Question
- 5. Currently, does the licensee have any equipment reliability concerns that would affect the proposed schedule in such a way that the 45 days requested would not be sufficient? If so please describe.
OPPD Response The current schedule reflects the work needed to resolve known equipment reliability concerns.
System engineers have been conducting system health reviews on safety significant and maintenance rule systems and preparing system health reports for some time. OPPD is confident that these reviews have identified equipment reliability concerns to the extent that their resolution is reflected in the current schedule. However, as the NRC notes in Reference 6, systems that have been shut down for prolonged periods are subject to different environments than those experienced during power operations. Thus, it is quite possible that some issues may not manifest themselves until later in the outage as systems are heated up and placed into service. Nevertheless, OPPD is confident that the 45 days requested is sufficient time to resolve any such issues.
NRC Question
- 6. As provided in supplemental information to the exemption request dated August 30, 2013, the licensee provided the average hours worked by various groups of personnel subsequent to the ending of the initial exemption period. Please confirm the planned schedules for personnel going forward until the proposed start date of the second exemption period.
LlC-13-0135 Page 7 OPPD Response From August 11, 2013 through September 21, 2013, those work groups subject to the work hour controls specified in 10 CFR 26.205 (Le., those that fall into 10 CFR 26.4(a) categories) have averaged the following number of hours per week:
Department Work Hour Averages Chemistry 40 Radiation Protection 40 Maintenance 46 Operations 40 Security 44 These averages are well under those permitted by 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7), which permits individuals to work a weekly average of 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />. Maintenance is the only department working more hours on average than reported in OPPD's supplemental response (Reference 7).
Chemistry, Radiation Protection, and Operations are working fewer hours and the hours worked by Security have remained the same. This schedule is conducive to minimizing fatigue as the period between when the first exemption expired on August 9, 2013, until the NRC dispositions this exemption request is expected to approximate a 6-week cycle. OPPD does not expect to deviate significantly from the schedule listed above under the assumption that the NRC promptly dispositions this exemption request.
References
- 1. Letter from OPPD (L. P. Cortopassi) to NRC (Document Control Desk), "Exigent License Amendment Request 13-02 Revise Current Licensing Basis to Adopt a Revised Design Basis / Methodology for Addressing Design-Basis Tornado / Tornado Missile Impact," dated July 21, 2013 (ML13203A136) (LlC-13-0061)
- 2. Letter from NRC (J. M. Sebrosky) to OPPD (L. P. Cortopassi), "Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No.1-Issuance of Exigent Amendment RE: Revise Current Licensing Basis for Addressing Design-Basis TornadolTornado Missile Impact (TAC No. MF2469)," dated July 26, 2013 (ML13203A070) (NRC-13-0095)
- 3. Letter from NRC (L. E. Wilkins) to OPPD (L. P. Cortopassi), "Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No.
1 - Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Section 205 {TAC No. ME9770),"
dated June 11, 2013 (NRC-13-0077)
- 4. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.76, Revision 1, "Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants," March 2007
- 5. Bechtel Power Corporation, Topical Report BC-TOP-9A, "Design of Structures for Missile Impact," Revision 2, September 1974
- 6. Memorandum from NRC (Tony Vegel) to NRC (Eric Leeds), "Issuance of Revised U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Manual Chapter 0350 Panel Fort Calhoun Station Restart Checklist Basis Document," dated March 7, 2013 (ML13066A877) (NRC-13-0025)
- 7. Letter from OPPD (L. P. Cortopassi) to NRC (Document Control Desk), "Reply to NRC Request for Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action RE: Request for Exemption from Work Hour Requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7)
(TAC No. MF2571)," dated August 30,2013 (ML13246A182) (LlC-13-0125)
LlC-13-0135 Significant Work Activities During 1st Work Hour Exemption Jun. 11 to Aug. 9, 2013 Activity 10 EC59744 Replace States Blocks with Marathon Blocks in Containment (SRI)
EC59874 HPSI PUMP RUNOUT MODIFICATION (MOD) (Active)
EC 59878 Replace Compressorfor VA-96 (SRI) (H/Appr)
EC60067 Replace Breakers (Register)
EC60136 (TMS) PROTECTION FOR 3 AUX BUILDING ISSUES (MCC) (Register)
EC60137 (TMS) PROTECTION FOR DG VENT AND FILL LINES (MCC) (Register)
EC60138 (TMS) PROTECTION FOR RW INTAKE STRUCTURE (MCC) (Register)
EC60174 PT-118 REPLACEMENT (H/Appr)
EC60183 TORNADO MISSILE TEMP MOD 2 RW PULL BOXES) PB-128T & 129T EC60844 FIX PIPE SUPPORT FOR STEAM LINE TO VA-17 (MCC) (Active)
EC60845 MODIFY SUPPORTS FOR RWS-14 AND SIS-42A PER CR 2013-02335 (MCC)
(H/Appr)
EC60846 REMOVE U-BOLTS AS REQUIRED BY CR 2013-03383 (MCC) (H/Appr)
EC60945 REPLACE ELASTOMERS IN VALVE OPERATORS PCV-6680A-1/2-0, PCV-6680B-1/2 o (OCR) (Assigned)
EC60975 TORNADO MISSILE SHIELD ( INTAKE STRUCTURE) (TEMP) (Active)
EC60X10 Exhaust I Intake VA-41 EC61000 REPLACE BREAKER IN MCC-4A2-A2R (H/Appr)
EC61001 REPLACE BREAKER IN MCC-3C2-E3L (EC) (Register)
EC61147 Tornado Missile - Raw Water Pipe Room 81 I Room 69 EC61199 Tornado Missile - Bottom Sluice Gate Operator EC61233 Tornado Missile Mod- Intake Structure EC61234 Tornado Missile - Switchgear Room Doors I Pipe in Water Plant EC61236 INSTALL 90 DEGREE ELBOWS ON SOLENOID VALVE EXHAUST PORTS (MCC)
(Assigned)
EC61532 FW-10 Exhaust on 1057' Aux Bldg Roof EC61547 REMOVE CAP ON SENSING LINE SHOWN ON DWG FILE 85 (DCR) (Assigned)
EC61588 Tornado Missiles 4kv Bus Penetrations EC61639 Control Room, Room 81 Doors & BAST (Register)
EC61640 AB Roof (Blow-ofts, FW-10 Stack, MSRVs, VA-41 & 41, Scabbing) (Register)
EC61641 AB East Wall Duct Openings (FD-64 & 65)
EC62002 EXHAUST I INTAKE VA-42 SHIELDS Page 1
LlC-13-0135 2011 RFO Critical Path Schedule
480935-09-74 , EC61640 Prefabricate Uprtght ( lof 2)
VA-41 480935-09-75 EC61640 Prefabricate Upright (2 of 2)
VA-41 EC61640 Layout 1 Drill Holes (1 of 2)
VA-41
'_'A <<'_'~'~~~_~_"'_~~~' _',_m~,A"'O_
EC61640 Layout 1 Drill Holes (2 of 2)
VA-41 EC61640 Install Upright (1 of 2) VA-41 2.0 09-25-13 05:00 480935-09-79 AE EC61640 Install Upright (2 of 2) VA-41 2.0 I 09-25-13 07:00 480935-09-80 AE EC61640 Layout 1 Install Truss (1 of 2) I VA-41 480935-09-81 AE EC61640 Layout 1 Install Truss (2 of 2) CST ' KCM. JW. I VA-41 KW-IW 480935-09-82 :AE EC61640 Layout/Install End Wall VA-41 CST 16.0 09-27-13 09:00
_~_ w ""'"O~'~_m~
_:-:-w. . <-:-_w+_~ _____ >"
480935-09-83 AE EC61640 Set Wl2s to Support Roof Steel 8.0 I 09-28-13 VA-41 01:00 480935-09-84 AE EC61640 Prep for Wall Steel VA-41 480935-09-85 ;AE EC61640 Set Wall Steel VA-41 480935-09-86 AE EC61640 Set Roof Steel VA-41 480935-09-87 AE 480935-09-66 'AE CST KCM.JW.
KW-IW 480935-09-67 AE EC61640'CO~~;North Wall with'i;Bail"'~CST lKCM. JW.
Bearing Bird Screening KW-IW 480935-09-68 AE EC61640 Cover East Wall with 1" Ball CST .* !'KCM. JW.
Bearing Bird Screening !KW-IW Page 1 of 15
OI*EE*1*CL*A
- VALVE LINE UP PER OI*EE*1*CL*A OPS OPS OI*EE*1*CL*A (4160V)
OI*EE*2*CL*B
- VALVE LINE UP PER OI*EE*2*CL*B OPS
- r****** ...... *
. (MCC)
OI*EE*2*CL*C
,'~y-- - ,,~-,~~,
00489988-o3*H HCV*2983
- HANG LLRT*M*22*06 CLEARANCE . TAG TAG 480935*09*70 AE EC61640 Cover West Wall with 1" Ball Bearing Bird Screening CST KCM,JW, KW*IW I
OI*EE*4*CL*A 1
- VALVE LINE UP PER OI*EE*4*CL*A ' OPS OPS OI*EE-4*CL*A l 50% Complete (120VAC) 00368166-01 SEDG0001 * (R) VERIFICATION OF DIESEL SE*ST*DG-0001 i 10*01*13 . ':1' GENERATOR LOADS : 12:00 00489988*11 . HCV*2983
- HCV*2983: INSTALL BLOCK PER TM IC*ST*AE*3122 : 10-01*13 : SOC Purification Secured .
EC62065 : 17:00 '
-*********-~*---****-*****--I 00360607*01-01 OPESF0001 (ESF*01) (DG*1) DIESEL AUTO START OP*ST*ESF*0001 5.0 10*01*13
- INITIATING CIRCUIT CHECK 12
- 00 00360927-02 'CN REMOVE CNTMT SPECTRALINK STATIONS
- 1 OI*CO*5*CL*D
- VALVE LINE UP PER OI*C0-5*CL*D (Electrical Penetration Caps)
OI*CO*5*CL*D 00360607-01*02 OPESFOOOl (FC>7D) (ESF-01) (DG*2) DIESEL AUTO START INITIATING CIRCUIT CHECK OPS OP*ST*ESF*0001 :.
00489988-04 HCV*2983
SO*0-44*Cl*A{exSDC) ,
480935-09*73 AE EC61640 Prepare OPSAC :1 OI*EE*5*CL*A 1
- VALVE LINE UP PER OI*EE*5*CL*A (120VAC)
- 1 MEV_TMP TORNADO MISSILE PROTECTION MEV Bank to keep breakers closed on 10/25/13@ 1200 Page 2 of 15
Ol-CA-l-CL-D
- VALVE LINE UP PER OI-CA-1-CL-D (IA) OPS OPS Ol-CA-l-CL-D 4.0 10-01-13 10-02-13 25% Complete :1 23:00 03:00 01-EE-3-Cl-A
Ol-RW-l-CL-A
- VALVE LINE UP PER Ol-RW-l-CL-A OPS OPS Ol-RW-l-CL-A 80% Complete 1 (Raw Water) 01-CO-5-CL-A VALVE LINE UP PER 01-CO-5-CL-A OPS OPS 01-CO-5-CL-A 'I (Mechanical Penetrations)
OP-l_VENT__SI SUCT
- VENT BOTH 24" MAIN SAFETY OPS SFM, RP, Ol-SI-l ATT 17 I INJECTION PUMP SUCTION LINES OPS 00360595-01 OPCONTOO02 (R) CLOSED CONTAINMENT OPS RP,OPS OP-ST-CONT-0002 2.0 10-02-13 'I PENETRATION ISOL. VER 01:00 00389219-01 AI-28D
- VERIFY ERF PROGRAM TASKS "RL T" ENG SE TDB-111.8 2.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 1 AND" RCSL" ARE UPDATED 1 01 :00 03:00 00489988-03-R HCV-2983
- REMOVE LLRT-M-22-06 CLEARANCE TAG TAG 2.0. 10-02-13 10-02-13 SOC Purification Remains :1 03:00 unavailable.
Ol-BW+CL-A
- VALVE LINE UP PER Ol-BW-l-CL-A OPS OPS Ol-BW+CL-A 2.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 1 (Bearing Water) ,01:00 03:00 01-CO-5-CL-C
- VALVE LINE UP PER 01-CO-5-CL-C OPS 'IC, RP 01-CO-5-CL-C 2.0,10-02-13 10-02-13 1 (Mechanical Penetration Caps Inside CNTMT) 01-SS-1-CL-A
- VALVE LINE UP PER OI-SS-l-CL-A OPS OPS OI-SS-l-CL-A 1.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 I (Secondary Sampling) 02:00 03:00 OP*12*04R FH-l REMOVE CLEARANCE OP-12-04 (OP-12 TAG Prerequisite 47)
TAG OP-12 1.0 10-02-13 02:00 10-02-13 03:00 CW-14D or CW-14E open. ,
MODE,,4F MODE 4/5 EXIT MODE 4 OPS 0.0 10-02-13 03:00
- +
NRC CAL_l CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER REQUIREMENTS MET PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 210 DEG OM 0.0 10-02-13 OP-l ..,210F OP-l PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 210"F REQUIREMENTS MET OPS OP-l STEP 5 0.0 10-02-13 OP-2A_250F RCS H/U RCS TO 250F OPS OPS OP-2A 4.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 I 01-SI-1*CL-A
(HPSI) 04:00 10:00 Page 3 of 15
2011 RFO Critical Path OP-2A_300F RCS H/U RCS TO 300 F OPS SSA,OPS OP-2A OP-1_300F OP-1 PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 300F REQUIREMENTS MET OPS OP-1 STEP 6 0.0 OP-2A_.1300 RCS PRESSURIZE RCS FROM 300 TO 1300 OPS OPS OP-2A 4.0 1 PSIA OP-2A_440F RCS H/U RCS TO 440 F OPS OPS OP-2A 5.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 10:00 15:00 OP-2A_1700 RCS RAISE RCS PRESSURE TO 1700 PSIA OPS OPS OP-2A 4.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 ,I 14:00 OP-1 .. 1700 OP-1 PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 515°F OR 1700 PSIA REQUIREMENTS MET OPS OP-1 STEP 8 0.0 : . 10-02-13 OP-2A_2100 RCS RAISE RCS PRESSURE TO 2150 PSIA OPS OPS OP-2A 1.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 1 18:00 00360542-01 OPRC3007 (R) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPS RP, DECON, OP-ST-RC-3007 4.0 10-02-13 10-02-13 INTEGRITY TEST . QC, SE, OPS 19:00 23:00 00360542-01-02 OPRC3007 (R) INSPECT INSIDE RV SKIRTI FULLY QC PS, QC, RP, OP-ST-RC-3007 2.0 10-02-13 10-03-13 AE-10, When >300°F, energize < 2 1 BOLT ICI COVERS SE 23:00 01:00 hrs/24 hrs.
00360542-01-03 OPRC3007 (R) VISUAL INSPECTION TO LOCATE QC PS, QC, RP, OP-ST-RC-3007 2.0 10-02-13 10-03-13 ANY PRESSURE LEAKAGE OF RCS SE,IC 23:00 01:00 453729-06-38 RC-375 EC56872 Cycle Valve RC-375 to Verify OPS SE, OPS, RP, PED-GEI-79 2.0 10-02-13 10-03-13 SECURES LETDOWN. 1 Valve Operates Freely Without Packing ML, Gladson, 23:00 01:00 Leakage KLM, TKF, T)l\l~
00258402-01-PT CH-305 PERFORM PMT FOR CH-30S QC RP, QC PE-PM-VX-0411 0.0 . 10-03-13 10-03-13 Need CH-9B inservice, CH-9B to be INSPECTION 01:00 01:00 used for startup 00304769-04 RC-141 ET-PT: RC-141 PER OP-ST-RC-3007 SFM OPS OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 .1 (360542-01 ) 01:00 01:00 00320332-03 HCV-1388B ET-PT: HCV-1388B: LEAKAGE QC RP,QC 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 1 INSPECTION (360S42-01) . 01:00 01:00 00320332-11 HCV-1388B ET-PT: HCV-1388B: QC LEAKAGE QC QC 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 1 INSPECTION 01:00 . 01:00 00320391-04 SL-690 ET-PT: SL-690: QC LEAK CHECK QC RP, QC, CH OP*ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 1 AFFECTED JOINTS (360542-01) .01:00 01:00 00325854-06 HCV-2S06A ET-PT: HCV-2506A: LEAK TEST QC QC,RP 0.0: 10-03-13 10-03-13 :1 WfSAMPLING IN SERVICE (360542-01) 01:00 Page 4 of 15
_ ~ ~N 00325930-02 SI-284 ET-PT: SI-284: LEAK CHECK 'QC :QC (360542-01 )
00340742-02 CH-PT-235-B ET-PT: CH-PT-235-B: LEAK CHECK (360542-01 )
____ " ____ M _ ~ _________ ** __ '- _ ~ _
00341201-02 CH-195 ET-PT: CH-195: LEAK CHECK (360542-01 )
00341695-02 RC-268 ET-PT: RC-268: LEAK CHECK QC QC (360542-01) 00359897-03 RC-123 ET-PT: RC-123: LEAK CHECK (360542-01 )
- 01:00 10-03-13 01:00
- -1 :I 00360818-03 RC-167 ET-PT: RC-167: LEAK TEST FOR BLANK QC QC OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 :I FLANGE PER OP-ST-RC-3007 01:00 (360542-01 )
00360868-04 RC-10-22 ET-PT: RC-10-22 AND RC-10-29: LEAK QC QC OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 :I CHECK PER OP-ST-RC-3007 01:00 (360542-01 )
00363059-06 , -~f---PCV-2969
,,~'" .,~~ ,<"~~~~,_~~~_,~~o ET-PT: PCV-2969: LEAK CHECK
~,~_~_~~~_~~.+ ___
~~
OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01 )
00363060-02 RC-374 :'ET-PT: RC:374~LEAK-CHECK QC IQC I~~~~-13 10-03-13 1
(360542-01 )
0.0 :I I
00363060-03 RC-374 ET-OT: RC-374: PERFORM ! OPS lops OP-ST-RC-3007 :I OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01) 00364947-02 RC-123 ET-PT: RC-123: LEAK CHECK WELDS ' QC QC 10-03-13 (360542-01) 01:00
- I 00367503-02 00369094-02 00369094-05 DPT-110W RC-10-41 RC-10-38 ET-PT: DPT-110W: LEAK CHECK PER OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01)
ET-PT: RC-10-41: LEAK CHECK HOUSING DURING OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01 )
~ ~ ~ ----0<"_-'
ET-PT: RC-10-38: LEAK CHECK HOUSING DURING OP-ST-RC-3007 QC QC QC RP,QC QC QC OP-ST-RC-3007
- OP-ST-RC-3007 OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13
- 10-03-13
- 01:00
. 10-03-13 11'\ .... 1'\1'\
j :I
- I
- I (360542-01 )
l 00369094-08 RC-10-30 ET-PT: RC-10-30: LEAK CHECK QC :QC OP-ST-RC-3007 r' 0,0 I 10-03-13 :I HOUSING DURING OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01 )
00369094-11 RC-10-28 ET-PT: RC-10-28: LEAK CHECK QC QC OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 i 10-03-13 10-03-13 HOUSING DURING OP-ST-RC-3007
- I (360542-01 )
00369094-14 RC-10-26 ET-PT: RC-10-26: LEAK CHECK QC QC OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 -~--'-~-I :I HOUSING DURING OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01) 5 of 15
ET*PT: RC-10*21: LEAK CHECK HOUSING DURING Op*ST*RC*3007 (360542*01 )
00369094*20 RC*10*10 ET*PT: RC*10*10: LEAK CHECK ,QC QC OP*ST*RC*3007 0.0110.03.13 HOUSING DURING Op*ST*RC*3007 101:00 (360542*01 )
00369094*23 RC*10-8 ET*PT: RC*10*8: LEAK CHECK QC QC Op*ST*RC*3007 0.0 10*03*13 HOUSING DURING OP*ST*RC-3007 01:00 (360542*01 )
00369094*26 RC*10*6 ET*PT: RC*10*6: LEAK CHECK QC 'QC Op*ST*RC*3007 HOUSING DURING Op*ST*RC*3007 (360542*01 )
00369094*29 RC*10*5 ET*PT: RC*l0*5: LEAK CHECK QC RP,QC Op*ST*RC*3007 HOUSING DURING Op*ST*RC*3007 (360542*01) 00370430-06
_. **-*1- ---:- --- --------- ---- ~-
RC ET-PT: RC*142: LEAK CHECK, QC QC OP-ST-RC-3007 PERFORM OP*ST-RC-3007 (360542-01) 00370517-03 RC*125 ET-PT: RC-125: LEAK CHECK PER :QC QC PE-PM*VX-0410N 00370522-02 SI-281 ET*PT: SI-281: LEAK CHECK ' QC QC (360542-01 )
00372813-02 FE*3115 ET*PT: FE*3115: QC LEAK CHECK 'QC QC 00374727*03 CH-193 ET*PT: CH-193: INSPECT FOR QC QC LEAKAGE (360542-01) 00374730*02 PCV-210 ET*PT: PCV*210: LEAKAGE QC RP,QC INSPECTION (360542-01) 00374731-02 WD-1276 ET-PT: WD-1276: LEAKAGE QC , RP,QC INSPECTION (360542*01) 00374733-02 PCV-2949 ET-PT: PCV*2949: LEAKAGE QC ,QC INSPECTION (360542-01) 00374734-02 PCV*2929 ET*PT: PCV-2929: LEAKAGE QC QC INSPECTION (360542*01) 00374743-04 HCV*311 ET-PT: HCV-311: LEAKAGE QC RP,QC INSPECTION (360542-01) 00374744-04 HCV*314 ET-PT: HCV-314: LEAKAGE QC QC, MCC-3Al INSPECTION (360542-01) 00;374745-04 HCV-320 ET-PT: HCV*320: LEAKAGE QC RP,QC INSPECTION (360542*01) 00374746-04 HCV*321 ET-PT: HCV-321: LEAKAGE QC RP,QC 0.0 10*03-13 INSPECTION (360542-01) 01:00 Page 6 of 15
2011 00374749-04 HCV*2914 ET*PT: HCV*2914: LEAKAGE QC QC INSPECTION (360542*01) 00374750-04 HCV*2934 ET*PT: HCV*2934: LEAKAGE INSPECTION (360542*01)
QC 'QC I* *:1 00374751-04 'HCV*2954 ET*PT: HCV-2954: LEAKAGE QC QC 0.0. 10*03*13 10-03*13 :1 INSPECTION (360542-01) 00374825-02 RC*244 ET*PT: RC*244: LEAK CHECK QC QC 0.0 10*03*13 10*03-13 (360542*01 ) 01:00 01:00 00374827 *02 RC*243 ET*PT: RC*243: LEAK CHECK (360542*01 )
- 01:00 10-03*13 01:00 I 1 00374828-02 RC*112 ET*PT: RC*112: LEAK CHECK QC RP,QC Op*ST*RC*3007 0.0 10*03*13 10*03*13 :1 (360542*01 ) 01:00 01:00 00374830-02 LCV*101*2 ET*PT: LCV*101*2: LEAK CHECK QC RP,QC 0.0: 10*03-13 1 (360542-01 ) 01:00 00374830*05 LCV*101-2 ET*PT: LCV-101*2: PERFORM QC RP,QC QC*ST-CH*3005 0.0 10*03*13 10*03-13 I QC*ST*CH*3005 (360542*01) 01:00 01:00 00374834*02 CH-223 ET*PT: CH-223: LEAK CHECK QC QC 0.0 10*03*13 10*03*13 I 01:00 01:00 00375135*02 DPT-124W PT*ET: DPT*124W: PERFORM OP*ST*RC*3007 (360542*01)
00375135-03 DPT*124W PT*ET: DPT*124W: LEAK CHECK QC ; RP,QC OP*ST*RC*3007 1 (360542*01 )
00375141-02 CH*208 ET*PT: CH*208: LEAK CHECK QC (360542*01 )
00389050*02 PIC*242 (E) ET*PT: P*242: PERFORM LEAK IC :1 CHECK & VERIFY PROPER INDICATION 00389051*02 PIC*243 (E) ET*PT: P-243: PERFORM LEAK IC IC 0.0 10*03*13 10*03*13 1 CHECK & VERIFY PROPER INDICATION *01:00 01:00 00389053*02 PIC*244 (E) ET*PT: P*244: PERFORM LEAK IC IC 0.0 10*03*13 10*03*13 1 CHECK & VERIFY PROPER INDICATION 01:00 01:00 00389275*04 RC ET*PT: CEDMS: LEAK CHECK PER QC QC Op*ST*RC*3007 0.0 10*03*13 10-03*13 :1 OP*ST*RC-3007 (360542*01) 00390143*02 RC*6 ET*PT: RC*6: LEAK CHECK PER QC .QC OP-ST*RC-300? 0.0: 10*03-13 10*03*13 :I OP-ST*RC*3007 (360542*01)
Page 7 of 15
00390146-03 YE-116A ET-PT: YE-116A: LEAK CHECK PER PE-RR-HJTC-1253 (360542-01) 00390147-03 YE-116B ET-PT: YE-116B: LEAK CHECK PER ' OP-ST-RC-3007 PE-RR-HJTC-1253 (360542-01) 00390190-02 YE-116B ET-PT: YE-116B: LEAK CHECK OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01)
- -- ~ ---- -- ~ ~ -
00390190-03 YE-116B ET-PT: YE-116B LEAK CHECK PER OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01) 00390216-03 RC-4 ET-PT: RC-4: LEAK CHECK PER , OP-ST-RC-3007 OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01)
< 0'>_ ~_< ____ "~,~ _ _ _ _ _
00390218-02 . YE-116A ET: YE-116A: LEAK CHECK (360542-01) OP-ST-RC-3007 00390218-03 . YE-116A ET-PT: YE-116A: LEAK CHECK PER OP-ST-RC-3007 OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542-01) 00392037-04 HCV-317 ET-PT: HCV-317: LEAK OFF LEAKAGE INSPECTION (360542-01) j .. - - - - + - ~ - - - ~ * - - ~ -
00392037-05 HCV-317 ET-PT: HCV-317: DRAIN HEADER QC LEAKAGE INSPECTION 00392037-08 HCV-317 ET-PT: HCV-317: LEAKAGE QC . RP,QC INSPECTION (360542-01) 00392041-04 HCV-2974 ET-PT: HCV-2974: LEAK OFF LEAKAGE; QC 'QC INSPECTION (360542-01) 00392041-05 HCV-2974 ET-PT: HCV-2974: DRAIN HEADER QC ; RP,QC 0.0 LEAKAGE INSPECTION 00392041-08 , HCV-2974 ET-PT: HCV-2974: LEAKAGE INSPECTION (360542-01) 00402145-02 RC-203 ET-PT: RC-203: LEAK CHECK PACKING 'QC (360542-01) 00404893-02 TCV-202 ET-PT: TCV-202: LEAKAGE QC QC OP-ST-RC-3007 INSPECTION (360542-01) 00409981-02 RC (E) ET - PT; D/DPT-114Y LEAK CHECK QC .QC . OP-ST-RC-3007 PER OP-ST-RC-3007 (360542) 00409982-02 RC-204 (E) ET-PT: RC-204:QC LEAK CHECK QC QC PACKING 5
00411405-02 RC*AlDPT*114X (E) ET*PT: RC*ADPT*114X*L: LEAK CHECK (360542-01) 00411415*02 RC*124 (E) ET*PT: RC*124: LEAK CHECK QC 00412268*02 RC*3D (E) ET*PT: RC*3D: LEAK CHECK WELDS QC QC OP*ST*RC*3007 PER OP*ST*RC*3007 (360542-01) 00412291-07 PCV*103-1 (E) ET* PT: PCV*103*1: INSPECT FOR LEAKAGE SYSTEM IN SERVIC 00412329*04 1 SI*278 (E) ET*PT: SI*278: LEAK CHECK v ** __ _" "
00413017-02 ~-******TRC:i10 p~ ~ ~~,~_~, ~,~"" ~ _~ ~,,_~_~~~~~~,
(E) ET*PT: RC*210: LEAK CHECK QC 00413028*04 . SI*279 (E) ET*PT: SI*279: LEAK CHECK AFFECTED JOINTS 00414105*02 RC*302 (E) ET*PT: RC*302: LEAK CHECK 3/4 PIPE BETWEEN RC*302 & FT*3175 00419355*02 SL*168 ET*PT: SL*168: EXTERNAL LEAK SFM SFM CHECK 00423424*04 CH*22B ET*PT: CH*22B: LEAK CHECK AT NOP QC QC
\ , , _ ~ v ~ ~ ~ v ~ v ~ __ ~ w v ~ . " " _ ~ v . __
00423619*05 LT*106 ET*PT: LT*106: LEAK CHECK ALL AFFECTED FITIINGS
.m~.w<< __ ** v,>~"'. "" __ ~"m 00434049-02 RC*138 ET*PT: RC*138: LEAK CHECK FITIINGS 0.0 00439440-01*PT ' D/PT*102 ET* D/PT*102: leak check IC*ST*RC*0028 0.0
~.. . ...
00444873*04 . HCV*239 ET*PT: HCV*239: IN-SERVICE LEAK
. CHECK (BODY)
,,--~,~,- ~~... ~ .
00444874*04 , HCV*240*0 ET*PT: HCV*240: INSERVICE LEAK QC CHECK (BODY)
' ~ ,V-' ~"~",, ,_.~",,~~,~,~, ._~~.v~vv~. AVV~.~ "~,,~~w_~~~,~,, * ,,_
00444877*04 'HCV*238-0 ET*PT: HCV*238: IN*SERVICE LEAK 'QC iQC,ML, CHECK (BODY) ! Gladson, KLM,
! TKF, TWS
~ L."
00452418-06 RC*142 ET*PT: RC*142: LEAK CHECK, PERFORM OP*ST*RC*3007
'ac ; OPS,QC, SE Op*ST*RC*3007 5
00456554-02 RC-126 ET-PT RC-126: LEAK CHECK SFM QC, SFM 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 :I 01:00 01:00 00457200-03 CH-208 ET-PT CH-208 LEAK CHECK SFM QC, RP, SFM 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 :I AFFECTED FITTINGS 01:00 01:00 00458047 -03 MS-320 ET-PT: MS-320: LEAK CHECK QC QC, RP 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 AFFECTED CONNECTIONS 01:00 01:00 00458048-03 MS-323 ET-PT: MS-323: LEAK CHECK QC QC 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 I AFFECTED CONNECTIONS 01:00 01:00 00460316-03 C/PT-102 ET-PT: C/PT-102; LEAK CHECK DURING IC IC OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 :I HOT HYDRO 01:00 01:00 00462051-02 HCV-238 ET-PT; HCV-238: LEAK CHECK QC QC, RP, 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 I RHRAG, ML,
~~~ds~;"KLM,
- 00462052-02 HCV-239 ET-PT; HCV-239: LEAK CHECK QC QC,ML, 0.0: 10-03-13 10-03-13 I Gladson, KLM, TKF, TWS 00462636-03 CH-520 ET: PT: CH-520: QC LEAK CHECK. QC QC, RHRAG 0.0.10-03-13 10-03-13 01:00 01:00 00462910-05 TCV-202 ET-PT; TCV-202: LEAK CHECK BODY TO BONNET AND PACKING QC QC, RP.
RHRAG. ML, IC-RR-VX-0409 0.0.10-03-13 01:00 10-03-13 01:00 1 :
Gladson, KLM, Tltl; T\MQ.
00481618-03 PCV-210 ET-PT-PCV-210: QC LEAK CHECK QC QC 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 :I 01:00 01:00 00481619-04 TCV-211-2 ET-PT: TCV-211-2: QC LEAK CHECK QC QC 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 :I 00482838-07 -PMT2 PT-118 ET-PT: PT-118: PERFORM OPS OPS OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0: 10-03-13 10-03-13 I OP-ST-RC-3007 01:00 01:00 00488248-02 ACH-415 ET-PT: ACH-415: LEAK CHECK OF QC QC 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 I AFFECT TUBING AT NOP/NOT. 01:00 01:00 00489720-02 RC-159 ET-PT; RC-159: LEAK CHECK QC QC 0.0 10-03-13 . 10-03-13 I 01:00 01:00 00489722-02 RC-121 ET-PT; RC-121: LEAK CHECK QC QC 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 I 01:00 01:00 00494976-03 RC-10-29 ET-PT: RC-10-29: PERFORM QC OPS,QC, SE OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 I OP-ST-RC-3007. (360542-01) 01:00 01:00 00495018-02 RC-10-01 ET-PT: RC-10-01: PERFORM QC QC,OPS OP-ST-RC-3007 0.0 10-03-13 10-03-13 I OP-ST-RC-3007. (360542-01) 01:00 01:00 Page 10 of 15
492042-06-130 CHSP-88 EC61599 Perform VT-2 Leak Test on CVCS Letdown Line per QCP-400 492042-06-131 CHSP-88 EC61599 Perform VT-2 Leak Test on CVCS Charging Line per QCP-400 492042-06-132 CHSP-88 EC61599 Perform VT-2 Leak Test on CST ML,QC 0.0 SGBD Line per QCP-400 HOTHYDRO-MNM HOT HYDRO PMT FINISH MILESTONE OM OP-2A_480F RCS H/U RCS TO 480°F OPS i OPS OP-2A
~
OP-2A_IX CH-8A1B ADD LITHIUM & PLACE LlTHIATED IX OPS CH,OPS CH-AD-0004 2.0110-03-13 (CH-8A) IN SERVICE ,01:00 I
1 00396620-01 ICMSOOOl (W12) FUNCTIONAL TEST OF STEAM IC ,IC,OPS IC-ST-MS-OOOl 8.0! 10-03=13 RFO Start-up Test GENERATOR LOW PRESSURE SIGNAL ACTUATION (550# (477°F RCS) < SG <
&;:'M# {"U:U::;.°J; J:2.r~n.
OP-2A_51OF RCS H/U RCS TO 510°F OPS lOPS . OP-2A OP-l_515F ,OP-l PRIOR TO ENTERING MODE 3 (515F)
I REQUIREMENTS MET OPS OP-1 STEP 9 OP-2A_515F IRCS H/U RCS TO >515 F OP-2A Mode_3_HoIdl Hold at Mode 3 72.0 110-03-13 1 16:00 1
'10-06-13 16:00
- MODE_3F MODE 3 MODE 3 o.oT' I
I EME_WIND EMERGENT EQUIPMENT WINDOW OM 336.0 tl0-06-13 10-20-13 116:00 16:00
.---.. .J Mode_4S2 Mode 4 OM 0.0110-06-13
- 16:00 00462044-01 RC FC-1212 CR 2012-15566 - CR002Y IC IC 4.0 Rick Schmidt; CAUSING NUMEROUS ALARMS OP-2A_PHTRl RC-4 ENERGIZE PZR HEATERS (DRAW OPS OPS OP-2AATT 1 1.0 10-20-13 10-20-13 BUBBLE) 16:00 : 17:00 OP-2A_19 (225°F)1 IRC-4 RAISE PR'ESSURE TO 1!iPSIA (225F) OPS : OPS OP-2AATT 1 Page 11 of 15
2011 RFO Critical Path OP-l_P225Fl OP-1 PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 225F PZR TEMPERATURE OPS OP-1 STEP 4 0.0 10-20-13 OP-2A_221 RC-4 RAISE PRESSURE TO 220 PSIA (390F) OPS . OPS OP-2AATT 1 OP-2A_210Fl RCS RAISE RCS TO 210F OPS SSA,OPS OP-2AATT 1 OP-l .. 210Fl OP-1 PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 210F OPS OP-1 STEP 5 REQUIREMENTS MET MODE.3F2 MODE 4/5 EXIT MODE 4 OPS 0.0 10-21-13 05:00
- OP-2A .. 250F1 RCS H/U RCS TO 250F OPS OPS OP*2A 10.0 10*21-13 10*21-13 05:00 15:00 OP-2A_300F 1 RCS H/U RCS TO 300 F OPS SSA,OPS OP*2A 3.0 10*21-13 10-21-13 15:00 18:00 OP-l_300F1 OP-1 PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 300F REQUIREMENTS MET OPS OP-1 STEP 6 0.0 10-21-13 18:00 I
- OP-2A._440F 1 RCS H/U RCS TO 440 F OPS OPS OP*2A OP-2A _480F 1 RCS H/U RCS TO 480'F OP-2A OP-2A_510F1 RCS H/U RCS TO 510'F OP-2A
, 03:00 05:00 OP-1_.515F1 OP-1 PRIOR TO ENTERING MODE 3 (515F)
REQUIREMENTS MET OPS OP-1 STEP 9 0.0* 10-22-13 I
- 06:00 06:00 MODE_3F3 MODE 3 MODE 3 HOLD FOR PMTS OPS 10-24-13 II 06:00 00470278-01 FW-479
- VARIOUS: VALVE STEM INSPECTION SFM SFM 10-24-13 AND LUBRICATION IN FW SYSTEM 04:00 00470278-02 FW-479
OP-2A_DILU RCS DILUTE TO CRITICAL BORON +100PPM OPS OPS OI-CH-4 A TT 4 OP-2A_RXSU RX REACTOR STARTUP (G-92 BRIEF) OPS OPS OP-2AATT2 00370732-01-Brief RC-1 LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING (G-92 OPS Dept 364. RE-CPT-RX-0001 BRIEF) OPS MODE.2F MODE 2 MODE2 OPS 0,0 10-24-13 10-24-13 22:00 22:00 00360536-01 AD - ADMINISTRATIVELY VERIFY EEQ PME ENG 10,0 10-25-13 10-25-13 COMPLIANCE PRIOR TO START UP , 07:00 17:00 00489191-01 R FW-4A
- REMOVE FW-4A1B/C-Ol CLEARANCE TAG TAG.MM 4,0 10-25-13 10-25-13 TO ROTATE THE FEEDWATER PUMP 13:00 17:00 SHAFTS ON FW-4A1B/C BY HAND 00389231-02 ERF ERFCS. ENABLE ERF FUNCTIONS FOR ITS IT.STA.OPS 2,0 10-25-13 10-25-13 PLANT START-UP 14:00 16:00 OP-2A__ TG1 TURBINE ON TURNING GEAR OM 4,0' 10-25-13 10-25-13 15:00 19:00 00389231-04 ERF ERFCS; VERIFY ALL ENABLED ITS IT 1,0 10-25-13 FUNCTIONS 16:00 OP-l_POWER OP-l PRIOR TO POWER OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS MET OPS OP-1 STEP 11 0,0 10-25-13 17;00 I
- OP-2A_2 RX RAISE RX POWER TO 2% OPS OPS OP-2AATT4 2,0 10-25-13 17:00 OP-2A_MFW FW-4B START FIRST MAIN FEED PUMP FW-4B OPS OPS 2,0 10-25-13 17:00 MODE_1F MODE 1 MODE 1 OPS 0,0 10-25-13 19:00
- OP*2A_TGWU ST-2 WARM-UP TURBINE GENERATOR OPS OPS OI*ST-2 10,0 10-25-13 10-26-13 SHELL 19:00 05:00 OP*2A. TGWU2 ST-2 PERFORM CHEST WARMUP PER OPS OPS OI-ST-2 ATT 1 2,0 10-26-13 10-26-13 OI-ST-2 05:00 07:00 OP-2A.TGWUl ST-2 TURBINE STARTUP PER OI-ST-2 OPS OPS OI-ST-2 ATT 1 3,0 10-26-13 10-26-13 07:00 10:00 00361154-01 ST-1 ST-1: POST OUTAGE OVERSPEED MM IC. OPS. MM. OI-ST*l0 4,0 10-26-13 10*26-13 TRIP TEST ,ENG 10:00 14:00 Page 13 of 15
EC-43213 Perform Unloaded Generator Bump Test (Voltage Regulator Stability Test) lAW EM*CP*01*1500
____1 ....,......
OI*ST*2_3B ST*2 GENERATOR BUMP TEST OPS : EM. SE, OPS i OI-ST-2 ATT 3 1.0 00467607-04 EE*17
, ,~~~~-~,-~,-~,
OP*2A_TG . ST*2 SYNCRONIZE AND CLOSE BRKS OP*2A_BRK DS-Tl BREAKERS CLOSED MILESTONE ; OPS 0.0 ,10*26*13 I OP-4_30 RX RAISE PWR TO 30% OPS OPS OP-4 HOLD_30 RC*2A 30% CHEMISTRY POWER ASCENSION 'OPS CRITERIA CH,OPS ,OP-4 36.0110-26-13 110-28*13 OP-4_66 RX RAISE RX POWER TO 66% (3% Ihr) OPS OPS OP*4 i
~""~~.~~--~ -, -~~, ~~~
RECPTRX02*01*02 I RC.1 CORE THERMAL POWER CALCULATION OP-4_85 --tRx RAISE RX POWER TO 85%
05:00 11:00 OPRPSOO05C OPRPSOO05 (OEM) RPS POWER ADJUSTMENT OPS ; OPS,IC ; OP-ST-RPS-0005 2.0 11:00 OP*4_98 RX INCREASE POWER TO 98% OPS ,OPS,IC OP-4 7.0 10-29-13 13:00 378679-04-27 MS-475, MS-477 , EC-49401 Notify OC to Support Leak CST iFE 4.0 MS-479, MS-481 Check of 479 AND 481 Valve Replacement(4 Hour Hold Time) 378679-04-28 MS-475 ' EC-49401 Leak Check MS-475 CST !OC,FE 378679-04*29 --"T'MS':477 EC-49401 Leak Check
.... ~.----,......--..~-.........,~... I*** ., .. ,."." ....
378679-04*30 MS-479 - 'eC.49401-C';ak Ct;;ckMS-479 378679*04*31 MS-481 EC-49401 Leak Check MS*481 OC,FE Page 14 of 15
OP-4_100 RX RAISE RX POWER TO 100% OPS OPS,IC OP-4 4.0 10-30-13 10-30-13 11:00 15:00 MTGL 1_.22 RC-1 Unit at 100% Power 0.0 10-30-13 15:00
+:
OP-2A._BRK3 OUTA.GE COMPLETION (MILESTONE) OM 0.0 10-30-13 17:00'
- Page 15 of 15