ML13183A058

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Tennessee Valley Authority - Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown
ML13183A058
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/28/2013
From: James Shea
Tennessee Valley Authority
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML13183A058 (66)
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Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 June 28, 2013 10 CFR 50.54(f)

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 NRC Docket No. 50-260

Subject:

Tennessee Valley Authority - Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Results of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012
2. TVA Letter to NRC, "Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) - Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Seismic Walkdown Results for Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated November 27, 2012 On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Reference 1 to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains specific Requested Actions, Requested Information, and Required Responses associated with Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3: Seismic.

In Reference 2, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) provided the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) seismic walkdown reports in accordance with the NRC Request for Information (Reference 1). The BFN seismic walkdown reports documented the plant walkdowns performed to identify and address plant-specific vulnerabilities and verify the adequacies of Printed on recycled paper

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 28, 2013 monitoring and maintenance procedures. In Section 5.1 of Enclosure 2 to Reference 2, TVA identified 4 pieces of BFN, Unit 2, equipment that could not be walked down due to being inaccessible during reactor power operations. TVA committed in Reference 2 to complete seismic walkdowns for these 4 pieces of equipment in the BFN, Unit 2, spring of 2013 refueling outage. TVA has completed these remaining seismic walkdowns.

The purpose of this letter is to provide the results of the completed BFN, Unit 2, walkdown inspections performed for the 4 pieces of equipment identified in Reference 2. Specifically, the Enclosure of this letter provides the updated Seismic Walkdown Report for BFN, Unit 2.

Pages 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 110, 111, 113, 370to 379, 550to 559 and 907 of the Enclosure to this letter have been revised to include the results for these walkdowns and these pages supersede those pages submitted in Enclosure 2 to Reference 2. The remaining pages of the Enclosure to this letter (pages 2-1, 113-1, 714-1, and 847-1 to 847-16) are new and added to the report to document these additional walkdowns. There were no degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions that required either immediate or follow-up actions identified as a result of these additional seismic walkdowns at BFN, Unit 2.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Kevin Casey at (423) 751-8523.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 28th day of June 2013.

Respe Ily, J V~6ea ice\- resident, Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure:

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report cc (Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRR Director - NRC Headquarters NRR Project Manager - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

ENCLOSURE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2: SEISMIC RESPONSE REPORT

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC RESPONSE REPORT 16-April-2013 WorleyParsons 633 Chestnut St. Suite 400 Chattanooga TN, 37450 Tel: 423-757-8020 Fax: 423-757-5869 www.worleyparsons.com WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd ABN 61 001 279 812

© Copyright 2012 WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd

NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 REV DESCRIPTION ORIG REVIEW WORLEY- DATE CLIENT DATE PARSONS APPROVAL APPROVAL I BFN Unit 2 Selsm(I ~/I&NIY 7 Z" A 0 4/7-3 / ZC(

Walkdown Report Page 2 of 907

REVISION LOG

Title:

Browns ferry Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation2.3: Seismic Response Report Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No. Approved 0 Initial Issue 16-Nov-2012 1 Revision to add additional walkdowns for inaccessible equipment that was identified 16-Apr-2013 in Rev. 0 of this report. Walkdowns performed during BFN Unit 2 refueling outage.

Also, revision to Appendix G: Peer Review Report.

Added page numbers: 2-1, 113-1, 714-1, and 847-1 through 847-16 Revised page numbers: 3-4, 10-11, 14-15, 110-111, 113, 370-379, 550-559, and 907 TVA 10534 [8-19951 Page 2-1 of 907

i*I NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 Table of Contents

1) Executive Sum m ary ....................................................................................................... 4
2) Seism ic Licensing Basis .................................................................................................... 5 2.1 General Plant Description ............................................................................................. 5 2.2 G round Response Spectra ........................................................................................... 5 2.3 Structures ......................................................................................................................... 8 2.4 Equipm ent ........................................................................................................................ 8 2.5 Seism ic Spatial System Interactions ............................................................................. 9
3) Personnel Q ualifications ................................................................................................. 10 3.1 Equipm ent Selection Personnel .................................................................................. 10 3.2 Seism ic W alkdown Engineers ..................................................................................... 10 3.3 Licensing Basis Reviewers ........................................................................................ 10 3.4 IPEEE Reviewers ...................................................................................................... 11 3.5 Peer Review Team ...................................................................................................... 11
4) Selection of Structures, System s, and Com ponents (SSCs) ............................................. 12 4.1 SW EL Selection ............................................................................................................... 12 4.2 SW EL Analysis ................................................................................................................ 13
5) Seism ic W alkdowns and Area W alk-Bys ........................................................................... 14 5.1 Seism ic W alkdown Checklists .................................................................................... 14 5.2 SW C Sum m ary & AW C Sum m ary ............................................................................. 15
6) Licensing Basis Evaluations .............................................................................................. 16 6.1 Licensing Basis Calculations ...................................................................................... 16 6.2 Potentially Seism ically Adverse Conditions .................................................................. 16
7) IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report ........................................................................... 18 7.1 IPEEE Description ...................................................................................................... 18 7.2 IPEEE Findings and Vulnerabilities ............................................................................. 18
8) Peer Review ......................................................................................................................... 19
9) References ........................................................................................................................... 20
10) Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 21 Appendix A: Resum es ......................................................................................................... 22 Appendix B: Base List 1 ........................................................................................................ 57 Appendix C: Base List 2 ...................................................................................................... 83 Appendix D: SW ELs and Areas .............................................................................................. 109 Appendix E: SW Cs ............................................................................................................. 113-1 Appendix F: AW Cs .............................................................................................................. 714-1 R1 Appendix G : Peer Review Report ............................................................................................ 900 Page 3 of 907

hi* NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

1) Executive Summary As a result of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, the United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required all U.S. nuclear power plants to perform seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions and to verify the current plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis. The NRC Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) issued a report (Reference 1) that made a series of recommendations. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) Letter (Reference 2) that requests information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. This report provides guidance for conducting a seismic walkdown as required in the 50.54(f) Letter, , Recommendation 2.3: Seismic.

In support of conducting the NTTF-2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) issued a report entitled Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 3) to provide instruction for uniform seismic walkdowns of all U.S. nuclear power plants. This document also includes guidance for reporting the findings of the required walkdowns.

At Unit 2 of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), a total of 120 items, general Seismic Category 1, were selected from the original Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) to fulfill the requirements of the NTTF-2.3 Seismic Walkdowns. The selected equipment was located in various environments and included many different types of equipment from multiple safety systems. A total of 50 areas were included for area walk-bys. The equipment walkdowns and area walk-bys were performed by seven walkdown engineers organized in teams consisting of two walkdown engineers and operations personnel, between July 9, 2012 and March 25, 2013.

Of the 120 equipment items in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), 120 were completed during the walkdown phase. Three potential adverse seismic conditions were found and addressed through the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Corrective R1 Action Program (CAP).

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Til NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

2) Seismic Licensing Basis The seismic licensing basis for the BFN is derived from Reference 4 - BFN FSAR.

2.1 General Plant Description The BFN site is located on the north shore of Wheeler Lake at river mile 294 in Limestone County in north Alabama. The site is approximately 10 miles southwest of Athens, Alabama, and 10 miles northwest of the center of Decatur, Alabama. The plant consists of three General Electric (GE) boiling water reactors with Mark I containments, each with an electrical output of about 1,100 megawatts. Commercial operation of each unit began on the following dates: Unit 1 on August 1, 1974, Unit 2 on March 1, 1975, and Unit 3 on March 1, 1977.

2.2 Ground Response Spectra The BFN licensing-basis Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) ground motion acceleration response spectra are defined in Sections 2.5.4 and 12.2 of the BFN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The site design ground spectrum is that of a Housner shaped spectrum with horizontal peak ground acceleration (PGA) corresponding to the OBE is 0.10g and the DBE is 0.20g, defined at the top of the sound rock. Vertical ground motion is two-thirds of the horizontal ground motion as specified in the FSAR. Figure 1 shows the OBE and Figure 2 shows the DBE input spectra with various damping.

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NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SITE DESIGN SPECTRUM OPERATIONAL BASIS EARThQUAKE AMENDMENT 16 HORIZOUTAL FIGURE 2.5-8 Figure 1 - Site Design Spectrum Operating Basis Earthquake Page 6 of 907

NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SITE DESLGN SPECTRUM DESIGN1 BASIS EaXTQqUA'/

HORIZOWTAL AMENDMENT 16 FIGURE 2.5-9 Figure 2 - Site Design Spectrum Design Basis Earthquake Page 7 of 907

hNTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 2.3 Structures The design of all structures and facilities (Class I & II) conformed to the applicable general codes or specifications such as Uniform Building Code (UBC); American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC); "Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings"; American Concrete Institute (ACI) "Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete" (ACI 318-71), "Requirements for Reinforced Concrete" (ACI 318-71), "Requirements for Reinforced Concrete Chimneys" (ACI 907); and American Welding Society (AWS) "Structural Welding Code - Steel" (AWS-D.1.1), among others.

Seismic requirements for Class I structures, features, and systems are contained in TVA General Design Criteria BFN-50-C-7102. The design of Class I structures was based on the following criteria:

  • OBE considered a horizontal ground acceleration of 0.10g.
  • DBE considered a horizontal ground acceleration of 0.20g
  • Vertical ground accelerations associated with the OBE and DBE were defined as 2/3 of the corresponding horizontal response spectra.

Class I structures, equipment and safety-related piping were designed such that stress and deformation behavior of structures, piping, and equipment were maintained within the allowable limits when subjected to loads such as dead, live, pressure, and thermal, under normal operating conditions combined with the seismic effects resulting from the response to the OBE. These allowable limits are defined in appropriate design standards such as the American Society of Mechanical Engieers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Code for Pressure Piping ANSI B31.1.0, Power Piping; ACI 318 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete; the AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings. In addition, the stresses that resulted from normal loads and design basis loss-of-coolant accident loads combined with the response to the DBE were limited so that no loss of function occurred and the capability of making a safe and orderly plant shutdown was maintained.

2.4 Equipment GE designed, fabricated, and supplied the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS),

turbine-generators, as well as the nuclear fuel for the plant. GE also provided technical supervision for the installation and startup services of this equipment. In general, the modules were designed to withstand and perform their functions during an OBE and a DBE. This qualification was ascertained by either analytical techniques, vibration testing techniques, or a combination of the two. A seismic specification covering the following procedure was made a part of the purchase order.

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pm, NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 All the Class I instrumentation and electrical equipment were designed and tested or analyzed to ensure their capability to perform their required functions during and after the DBE. This includes equipment made by GE as well as that purchased by GE.

Suppliers of Class I equipment were required to verify the adequacy of their equipment by submitting test, analytical, or operating experience data. Typically, equipment supplied as part of the original design is in compliance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-344-71 requirements.

In addition, BFN was identified as one of the operating plants to be reviewed for the NRC Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 requirements. As such, plant-specific verification of the seismic adequacy of selected safe shutdown equipment items (SSEL

- Safe Shutdown Equipment List) has been performed as part of the Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 resolution (Reference 5).

Furthermore, the use of A-46 criteria and methods in accordance with the implementation guidelines provided in References 7 and 8 has been included as an alternate approach for the seismic qualification of new equipment and replacements for existing equipment (Appendix C, Reference 9).

2.5 Seismic Spatial System Interactions The BFN has a seismic categorization similar to Regulatory Guide 1.29, using the terminology of Class I and Class I1.The term Il/I is used to describe physical conditions where Class II components are located above or in proximity to Class I components.

Seismic induced spray refers to the possible breach of a fluid pressure boundary due to its own seismic response or its seismic interaction with other plant features. Seismic induced spray is a hazard when there are target Class I components, vulnerable to fluid spray, in the vicinity of the source.

A comprehensive "11/1" seismic interaction verification program was implemented as part of the BFN-1 Restart Project. Seismic spatial interactions (failure, falling, and impact) were evaluated for all SSEL items during the USI A-46 resolution program. Impact-related seismic interactions are further addressed by the TVA BFN Potential Clearance Discrepancy (PCD) evaluation program for piping clearance discrepancies of 3" and under. Seismic-induced spray evaluations were addressed by detailed walkdowns and bounding evaluations in accordance with TVA Design Criteria BFN-50-C-7306.

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iuE NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

3) Personnel Qualifications The personnel qualification for all individuals involved in the execution of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic can be found in this section. Full resumes for the listed individuals can be found in Appendix A of this document.

3.1 Equipment Selection Personnel The personnel involved in equipment selection and review are:

" Steve Gray, Retired Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) from BFN with extensive experience providing engineering support through all phases of the operating site.

  • Nicholas Pressler, Senior Structural Engineer with 7 years of experience, including 2 years of experience in the nuclear industry.
  • Jason Black - Associate Structural engineer with 1.5 years of engineering experience, including 1.5 years in the nuclear power industry.

3.2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers The personnel involved in performing the seismic walkdowns are:

  • Nicholas Pressler

" Patrick McCarraher, Senior Supervising Structural Engineer with over 38 years of engineering experience, including 15 years in the nuclear power industry.

  • Jeffry Lawrence, Mechanical Engineer II, Engineer in Training (E.I.T.) with five years of engineering experience, including two in the nuclear power industry.
  • Avinash Chunduri, Structural Engineer II with 6 years of engineering experience, including 1.5 years' experience in nuclear power industry.
  • George Bongart, Associate Civil Engineer with 9 months engineering experience.

" Jason Black

" James Edgar, Professional engineer in the state of Tennessee with 11 years of engineering experience including 2 years in the nuclear power industry.

" Josh Best - - Project Mechanical Engineer with 5 years engineering experience, R1 including 4 years in the nuclear power industry.

3.3 Licensing Basis Reviewer The personnel involved in performing the licensing basis reviews:

  • Steve Samaras, Site engineer at BFN with extensive experience providing engineering support for the operating site.

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NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 3.4 IPEEE Reviewers The personnel involved in reviewing IPEEE vulnerabilities are:

  • Josh Best

" Jason Black I R1 3.5 Peer Review Team The personnel involved in the peer review process are:

  • John Dizon, Over 30 years of experience in the field of civil and structural engineering, earthquake engineering, risk assessment and project management.

" Steve Eder, Over 30 years of experience in the field of civil and structural engineering, project management, seismic engineering, risk management John Dizon is the Peer Review Team Leader.

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miu NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

4) Selection of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)

The selection of SSCs for the Recommendation 2.3 Seismic walkdowns followed the guideline provided in Reference 3 - The EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance. The SWELs and list of corresponding Area Walk-Bys for BFN Unit 2 can be found in Appendix D of this document.

4.1 SWEL Selection The development of SWEL 1 began with the integrated SSEL that was developed for the resolution of USI A-46 program and the implementation of IPEEE program for BFN Units 2 and 3 (References 5 and 6, respectively). This list was divided by unit, location, system, and equipment class. After separating the data into these categories, equipment was selected to represent the multiple equipment classes. Many of the suggested equipment classes that were listed in the EPRI guidance were not included in the original SSEL. In order to include all of the recommended classes of equipment, the scope of the selection was expanded to cover all Seismic Category 1 Safety Related equipment.

After a wide variety of environments and equipment classes were satisfied, each entry in the list was assigned to one of the five safety functions that support safe shutdown of the plant. Safety Function "0 - Support Function" was added in addition to the EPRI guidance to include equipment that does not perform one particular safety function but does support all five primary safety functions. These six safety functions are:

0. Support Functions
1. Reactor reactivity control
2. Reactor coolant pressure control
3. Reactor coolant inventory control
4. Decay heat removal
5. Containment function The SSEL developed during the USI A-46 program included one path to satisfy the five safety functions listed above. The seismic IPEEE required both a preferred path and an alternate path, so the USI A-46 SSEL was expanded accordingly. In some cases there are multiple systems involved in these safety functions. In these cases Systems, Structures and Components (SSC) from the redundant systems that were not part of USI A-46 were added to the SWEL 1. For instance, the Standby Liquid Cooling (SLC) system was not inspected during the USI A-46 program, and was added to the SWEL for that reason.

This categorized list is presented in Appendix B as Base List 1. After separating the data into the previously mentioned categories, a sample was selected from Base List 1 to represent all Special Considerations that were required by the EPRI Walkdown Page 12 of 907

iuN NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 Guidance. Once safety functions were assigned, the equipment was reviewed and compared to plant documentation to locate any new or modified equipment. To account for high risk equipment in the walkdown process, the SWEL was compared to the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) Rankings and any shared equipment was noted.

Some of the equipment classes that were listed in the EPRI walkdown guidance were not covered in the original SSEL, and therefore are not present in Base List 1.

However, in order to include all of the classes of equipment, the scope of the selection was expanded for these seismic walkdowns to include other Seismic Category 1 Safety Related equipment for the classes that were not previously covered.

The SWEL 1 represents the full list of equipment that was selected from Base List 1 and from the Category 1 equipment list. The SWEL 1 can be found in Appendix D.

Base List 2, presented in Appendix C, is a list of all spent fuel pool systems and equipment. SWEL 2 consists solely of equipment related to the Spent Fuel Pool at the site, including any equipment or system failure that could cause rapid drain-down of the pool and accidental exposures of fuel assemblies. The Spent Fuel Pool system was reviewed with the system engineers and it was determined that there is no path for rapid drain-down to occur. The full list of seismic category 1 SSC's was reviewed and it was determined that there were 5 pieces of equipment related to the spent fuel pool that were seismic category 1 and fit into one of the equipment categories. These pieces of equipment make up SWEL 2.

4.2 SWEL Analysis The combined SWEL for BFN Unit 2 consists of 120 items of equipment. The SWEL for BFN Unit 2 adequately addresses all criteria that were required for the selection of SSCs in the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance. These criteria include a distribution of environments, systems, safety functions, and classes of equipment.

The following equipment addresses the new and improved equipment criteria for BFN Unit 2:

H UNID Description BFN-2-PM P-076-0110 CNTMT ATM MON SYS ANLZR 2A SMPLRTN PMP Tablel. New/Improved Equipment Page 13 of 907

hNTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

5) Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys Guidance for performing the walkdowns and walk-bys required for Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 2.3 can be found in Reference 3 - The ElectricalPower Research Institute's Seismic Walkdown Guidance.

The walkdowns and walk-bys were conducted in accordance with these guidelines and each was given a final status. Ifno issues were noted or housekeeping and minor maintenance issues were noted during a walkdown or walk-by, a YES status was given to the selected piece of equipment or area. Ifa potentially adverse seismic condition was noted, a NO status was given and the equipment was entered into the CAP to begin a functional evaluation. Ifequipment was inaccessible, or ifa portion of an item of equipment was unobservable, an UNKNOWN status was given.

5.1 Seismic Walkdown Checklists One hundred and twenty (120) out of one hundred and twenty (120) Seismic Walkdown I R1 Checklists (SWCs) were completed at BFN Unit 2. The SWCs completed at BFN Unit 2 can be found in Appendix E of this document. The types of potentially adverse seismic conditions that were addressed during these walkdowns include:

0 Bent, broken, missing, or loose hardware S Corrosion that is more than moderate S Visible cracks in surrounding concrete S Impact of soft targets S Collapsing equipment 0 Line flexibility Fifty (50) Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs) were completed at BFN Unit 2. These I R1 AWCs can be found in Appendix F of this document. The types of potentially adverse seismic conditions that were addressed during these walk-bys include:

  • Anchorage of equipment
  • Degraded conditions of anchorage
  • Cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducts
  • Spatial interactions between equipment
  • Flooding/spray hazards
  • Fire hazards
  • Housekeeping and temporary equipment Page 14 of 907

~iI NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 Anchorage configuration for 50 items of equipment in BFN Unit 2 was verified by R drawings, calculations, and/or the A-46 Screening Evaluation Worksheets (SEWs). . R1 For cabinets and panels that were selected for walkdown, NRC guidance was followed to determine which could and could not be opened for internal inspection. Undue safety hazards, operational hazards, or cabinets that required extensive disassembly were documented and only observable anchorage was included in those walkdowns.

5.2 SWC & AWC Summary The results documented by the SWCs and AWCs for BFN Unit 2 are summarized below:

  • 117 SWCs resulted in a YES status RI
  • 3 SWCs resulted in a NO status I o Potentially Adverse Condition 1 0 BFN-0-STN-067-0926 o Potentially Adverse Condition 2 0 BFN-2-PNLA-009-0015 o Potentially Adverse Condition 3 M BFN-2-PNLA-009-0005
  • 50 AWCs resulted in a YES status R1 Page 15 of 907

hil NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

6) Licensing Basis Evaluations 6.1 Licensing Basis Calculations When a potentially adverse seismic condition was identified at BFN, the condition was entered into the corrective action program. No licensing basis evaluations were performed by the walkdown team per TVA expectations to communicate any potential operability concerns as soon as they were identified. Due to the nature of this process, no calculations were performed by the walkdown team for licensing basis evaluations before the CAP entry was submitted. All licensing basis determinations were performed by BFN engineering on each CAP entry.

Multiple CAP entries were generated during the seismic walkdown process at BFN Unit

2. There were a total of three CAP entries that were considered potential seismically adverse conditions. No degraded or non-conforming conditions were found during the course of this walkdown process.

6.2 Potentially Seismically Adverse Conditions The potentially seismically adverse seismic conditions summarized above are described in more detail below.

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miu NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 6.2.1 Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition 1 During a walkdown of BFN-0-STN-067-0926 it was observed that the concrete pad the strainer was sitting on was cracked. This has been entered into the CAP Program and a work order has been written to address the issue.

6.2.2 Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition 2 During the walkdown of BFN-2-PNLA-009-0015 it was observed that the light cage was missing from the interior light. During a seismic event there would be a possibility that the light bulb could dislodge and potentially impact soft targets inside the panel. This has been entered into the CAP Program and a work order has been written to address the issue.

6.2.3 Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition 3 During the walkdown of BFN-2-PNLA-009-0005 it was observed that the light cage was missing from the interior light. During a seismic event there would be a possibility that the light bulb could dislodge and potentially impact soft targets inside the panel. This has been entered into the CAP Program and a work order has been written to address the issue.

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hil NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

7) IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report 7.1 IPEEE Description In Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, the NRC requested that the utilities for all active nuclear power plants in the United States perform an evaluation of their nuclear power generating facilities to identify any vulnerabilities associated with the occurrence of several plant-specific external events, and to access the impact of these vulnerabilities on the potential for plant core damage or radioactive material release. This program, designated the Individual Plant Examination of External Events, is a corollary program to the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) which focuses on the vulnerabilities associated with the occurrence of external events. The BFN was designated as a 0.3g focused scope plant for the seismic IPEEE.

7.2 IPEEE Findings and Vulnerabilities The IPEEE Report for the BFN addressed multiple vulnerabilities that were identified during the original IPEEE walkdown process for Units 2 and 3 systems including common systems for all three units. A full list of these vulnerabilities can be found in Reference 6 - Seismic IPEEE Report for Browns Ferry NuclearPlant. A list of the equipment identified during IPEEE is listed below along with actions taken.

UNID DESCRIPTION RESOLUTION Transformer to be replaced as part of the BFN-0-OXF-219- HCLPF capacity below long-term asbestos material removal TDA 0.3g program at BFN.

Transformer to be replaced as part of the BFN-O-OXF-219- HCLPF capacity below long-term asbestos material removal TDB 0.3g program at BFN.

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pm' NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

8) Peer Review A peer review was performed in accordance with References 2 and 3. The peer review process involved considerable interaction with the review teams, and was performed throughout all phases of the effort including the following:

" Selection of the SSCs included on the SWEL

  • In-plant walkdown observations and completed checklists for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

" Identified potentially adverse seismic conditions, utilization of the CAP process, and associated licensing basis review considerations

" Submittal report In summary, the peer review results are confirmatory and fully supportive of the evaluations and findings as described in this report. The completed peer review report is included as Appendix G to this report.

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NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2

9) References Refere nce Document Title Document Number Preparer No.

Recommendations for Enhancing N/A United States Nuclear Reactor Safety in the 2 1st Century Regulatory Commission Letter: Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54 (f) United States Nuclear 2 Regarding Recommendations 2.1, N/A Regulatory Commission 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Electric Power Research Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Institute Seismic 4 BFN FSAR, Revision 4 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant USI A-46 50147-R-001 Tennessee Valley Authority Seismic Evaluation Report 517R01 Tne eValyAtoi 6 Seismic IPEEE Report Browns Ferry 50147-R-002 Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Plant 517R02 TneeValyAtoi Generic Implementation Procedure 7 (GIP) for Seismic Verification of N/A Seismic Qualification Nuclear Plant Equipment - Revision Utilities Group 3A, December 2001 Implementation Guidelines for Seismic Qualification of New and 8 Replacement Equipment/Parts N/A Seismic Qualification (NARE) Using the Generic Utilities Group Implementation Procedure (GIP) -

Revision 5 October 2002 9 BFN FSAR BFN-24.4 Tennessee Valley Authority Page 20 of 907

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_1..0 1 SN0-A4U.03110022 U &UlEL617 MOR AJU 10 0 O 6171 MECI4001MI'AM 10311 2.3A,5.1 NO I NO 031 2063 BFN0O-ANU-030,089 Ul & UZ8. 53 ANUS18 0 1 CS 15931 MECHEQUIP Am 3 &P LINE 0311 2.3.4ý5 NO I - NO I 00 w468 NO 1090 24811.2A.,9 2020 3 FN.42-3AA9.211-000C 4EVSNI2thOWN BOARD C 0 CS 617 2A 4kV 5O90DAM C YES 199 2019 3 0M,40-bOAA-211-0=3 4XVHVr3UOVMOWN0A40 I 1I a $9I 3 25 4kV505D Fi.M0 21 4 1.2.3,4,5 YES 19 23 NO. 021 2009 1 BFN-0-B088-22940MOA 480VOISOAUXBOI2 48DVAUX111 219 1,V,4.5 YES 7 4 YES iUs 2000 IL 39-0.9089-219- 3 AsvDsL8111 30 4SO 4903801585 219 1.2.3,4.5 2068 _4 BFN-0-SD00.280-00OZ 250-V DCBATTERYBOARD 2 0 SATT20 M 2 28 NO 2072 14 ,2SVOCOSLSYS BATOOARO.C Dr. 3.5 DGC 2so T.

LLN,J12 NO 2071 14 125 VOCOSLSYSBAI BOARDD 254 1.,2.3.4.5 NO YES I o0 2080 16 DGC I2ZVDCOSLSYSGTRYCHGRtA 0GI 254 1,.3,.4.5 Hal2 16 DGC 125 VDCDSLSYSBTIY CHGR I65 254 -'.23.4.5 BFN.04CHG8.2544000008 2M8 16 to 0GD.125 VOC000 5TS 890{

RCGR A 0 56S DG HALLWAY 254 1.,'.3,4,5 2;fl 002D.125 HVCDSL.SYSiTRYOiGR B -0 7i5 154 1.2.3.4.S 165 YES

=106 11 8FN-D-CH"-31-nWO CONTROLSAYWATER CHILLER 8 0 595 73-2 2=]4.

205-3 8PN.-V-AN030-0068 OI.SE.LGEN RMC;EXHtFAN A 0 9

DIES.ELGE.N M C EXHFANA O6 DGC )30 1.4s YES 0 583 0c6C )30 3.4.3 NO YeS DIESELGENRM 0 E4XH FANA 0 OGD 230 3,4.5 YES 019 DIESELGEN RM D EMHFAN DG D NO 019 0 130 3,4,5 YES No 2051 I 10 I W-0.FCO-0304060 INLETDAMPER FOR FAN *A"IN OG ROOM "C' 0 Dr, 1565 R-C-2301 3.4.5 NO NO 007 Bfld.0-FCOO020-0069A OUTLETDAMPERFOR FAN W IN 00 ROOM -C" O~c 020 YEO DESEL5G.NERATOR C OGC 7 065 BFGN-O-PMP-092-OOCU 1IESMGENERATOR 0 0 00 165 NO 20321 RHRSW PUMP C2 0 I tNA*E S45 C )7Zr 4.5 NO. YES RNRSWPUMP 80 NO YES 017 8ON-0-PNLA-0248-(XXX S5DVSDB.

2108 DISTRIBUTIONPANEL58-C YES0 NO 7 8FN-0.PNLA-248-00DOC

-207o 14 2SOVDISTRIBU.TIONPANI ELSB 0 CB 617 BSOY10 YE5  ?

8 BSIV047N 067-0326 91ECW PUMP D0SCHARGESTRAINE 0 rI.TAKE 565 1004.5 YES S3 017 C IEEW PUMP DISCARGE STRAINER o INTAK, 565 No 018 2205 21,l BPN.-D1NK.084.062 BON-0-N508-06435, NITROGW STRG rNK8 0 YARD S63 No VSLGEN 0 RIGHT U43K STARTINGAIRTANK o 00 -165 IO8 YES 005 3 34, o10l 01 BPNv~.0-VR.34.0640D CADMN2TANK W AVA8RIZrR 0. YARD 365 384 NO 015 BEN0VV-lEA219.10 0 YARO 565 034 CAOM2I1 TANK" VAPORIZER 810 016 AKV/480V X111%1TO0B o Do 5a3 SOLH1AST CORKiER 032 No I - YES 126 480V SH10M5N BOARDZA 2A 4MDV.SDBD RM C 31 72.2.2.,5 YES .2 13 No 1017 2 486V SHUTDOWNB8OARD8 23 4Y 50080 RM O 129 460V AM(7V 80 ZA" NO 480V RMOVSO 20 2 Co r.37 2A4 kV 1090 RM C BO?-2-B:188.268-000264 75953 29 4kVS000 It.%D YES .10 332 NO SROVRMOV 8D2C* FICA8.1/313 No 480V REACMOV RD 2D 2 Re 593 ACA- 1/A11

' 'A 2015 1 480V PEAC2RMOVISO 2E 622 RCA-UN" 2016. 1 2AAWSDBIRIO.C 81 1L2,3.4.5 YES 11.

28 0LVSORD,RM P NO 021 NO 035 20o5 16 250VBATTERY CHARGER 2A 2 R CS i 8ATT 80 RM 2 091 205?4

.09 10 0

BFN-2-C..-067-048 8FN-2-O.RE-070 EECW/IRIPUMP2AROOMCOOLER

EOW/OlIR PUMP Z ROOM COOLER 2 " 41, SW6CORNER SW CORNER

)671I 3,4.5 1067I 3.4,5 No: NOj 090 093 205. 1 ONZ.C.R08707 J 08W/CS PU.MP2AROOMCOOLER 324 60.529 NWCORNER 10674 3.4.5 I NO0 YES 037 039 2114 7 13i Page 110 of 907

Browns Ferry Unit 2 5WEL Equip. Class (0 U- - Safety RISK LERF New or Anch.

.21) NDesptior Unit Bldg. Eiev. Room Sys. Function RANKINGS Rank Replaced Verified 2049 B BFN-2-FCV-023-0034 RHRHTX2ACOOLWATEROUTLET 2 RB 565 U/R9 023 4,5 NO NO 041 2046 8 BFN-2-FCV-023-0040 RHRHTX2C COOLWATEROUTLET 2 RB 565 U/R9 023 4,5 NO NO 041 2001 0 BFN-2-FCV-0B3-OO8A 2A SLCSQUIBVLV(GE-1l-14A) 2 RB 639 SLCAREA 063 1 NO - NO 004 2002 0 BFN-2-FCV-063-O0OBB 2BSLCSQUIBVLV( GE-11-148) 2 RB 639 SLCAREA 063 1 NO NO 004 2038 7 BFN-2-ECV-064-0020 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER VACRLFVLV 2 RB 565 SECORNER 064 5 NO NO 009 2039 7 BFN-2-FCV-064-0021 SUPP CHAMBERVACRLF VLV 2 RB 565 R/2T 064 5 No NO 009 2040 7 8FN-2-FCV-O64-0032 SUPPCHAMBEREXHAUSTINBDISOLVLV 2 RB 565 R12/Q 054 5 NO NO 010 2041 7 RFN-2-FCV-064-0033 SUPP CHAMBER EXHAUSTOUTBOISOLVLV 2 RB 5B5 RP/P 064 5 NO NO 010 2044 7 BFN-2-FCV-067-0050 EECWSYSTEMNORTHHEADER BACKUP TO RBCCW 2 RB 593 PIR13 067 3,4,5 NO NO 039 2045 8 RFN-2-FCV-074-O001 RHRPMP A SUPP POOLSUCTIONVALVE 2 RB 519 SW CORNER 074 3,4 NO NO 012 2051 8 BFN-2-FCV-075-0022 SYS1 TESTBYPASSVLVOPERATOR 2 RB 519 NW CORNER 075 3 NO NO 037 2050 8 BFN-2-FCV-075-0037 CS/PUMP 28 & 2D MINI-FLOW VALVE 2 RB 541 NECORNER 075 3 NO NO 038 2108 8 BFN-2-FCV-078-0062 SYSTEMISOLATION MOTOROPERATED VLV 2 RB 639 RCA 078 SWEL2 NO NO 104 2042 7 BFN-2-FCV-08S-39A/0219 CRDSCRAMINLET VALVE. 2 RB 565 P-S/R9&13 085 1 NO NO 011 2043 7 BFN-2-FCV-085-39A/0227 CRDSCRAMINLET VALVE 2 RB 565 P-S/R9&13 085 1 NO NO 011 2047 8 BFN-2-FSV-08S-0037A CRD\SCRAM DUMP VALVE 2 RB 565 N/R12 085 1 NO NO 040 2048 8 BFN-2-FSV-,85-DI37B CRD\SCRAM DUMP VALVE 2 RB 565 N/R12 095 1 NO NO 040 2064 13 BFN-2-GEN-26R-0002DA LPO MI 2DA GENERATOR 2 RB 639 U/R14 269 3 NO YES 005 2065 13 BFN-2-GEN-268-O00ZDN LPCIMG2DN GENERATOR 2 RB 621 U/R13 268 3 NO YES 003 2066 13 BFN-2-GEN-268-0002EA LPCIMG2EAGENERATOR 2 RB 621 U/R14 266 3 NO YES 003 2067 13 BFN-2-GEN-268-OOO2EN LPCIMG 2ENGENERATOR 2 RB 639 U/R14 268 3 NO YES 005 2079 16 BFN-2-INV-256-0001 DIVI ECCSATUINVERTER 2 RB 593 28 4kV SDBDRMD 256 1,2,3,4,5 NO YES 021 2086 38 BFN-2-LPNL-9ZS-0001 PANEL25-0001 2 RB 519 NWCORNER 925 3 NO NO 037 2088 18 BFN-2-LPNL-925-OOOSA LOCAL PANEL25-SA 2 RB 593 S/R10 925 1,2 NO YES 036 2089 19 BFN-2-LPNL-925-O005 LOCAL PANEL25-59 2 RB 593 S/RiO 925 1,2 NO YES 036 2090 18 BFN-2-LPNL-925-O0OSD LOCALPANEL25-51 2 RB 593 S/RIO 925 1,2 NO YES 036 2091 19 BFN-2-LPNL-925-=06A LOCAL PANEL25-6A 2 RB 593 P/R12 925 1,2 NO YES 039 2092 18 BFN-2-LPNL-92S-4]006D LOCALPANEL25-60 2 RB 593 P/R12 929 1,2 NO YES 039 2087 19 BFN-2-LPNL-925-0060 PANEL 25-60 FORCSPMP 2 RB 519 NECORNER 925 3 NO NO 014 2093 18 BFN-2-LPNL-925-0223 LOCALPANEL2-25-223 2 RB 593 Q/112 925 1,2 NO YES 039 2109 20 BFN-2-LS-078-0001D SKIMMER SURGETANKLEVEL LOWLOWISOL 2 RB 639 RCA 079 SWEL 2 NO NO 099 2110 20 BFN-2-LS-078-0OOIE SKIMMER SURGETANKLEVEL LOWLOWISOL 2 RB 639 RCA 078 SWEL2 NO NO 099 2111 20 BFN-2-LS-078-OOO1F SKIMMER SURGETANKLEVEL LOW LOW ISOL 2 RB 639 RCA 076 SWEL2 NO NO 099 2112 20 BFN-2-LS-079-0001G SKIMMER SURGETANK LOWLEVELSWITCH 2 RB 639 RCA 078 SWEL2 NO NO 099 2115 7 BFN-2-PCV-001-O019 MS/MAIN STEAMSAFETYRELIEF VALVE 2 RB 585 DRYWELL 001 2 NO - N NO 2116 7 BFN-2-PCV-001-OD34 MS/MAIN STEAMSAFETYRELIEF VALVE 2 RB SBS DRYWELL 001 2 NO NO____ 11ev4-2029 5 BFN-Z-PMP-063-0006A 2ASLCPUMP (GE-11-2A) 2 RB 639 SLCAREA 063 1 NO YES 004 2030 5 BFN-2-PMP-063-=0689 2ZSLCPUMP (GE-11-2B) 2 RB 639 SLCAREA 063 1 NO YES 004 2031 S BFN-2-PMP-073-0029 HPCIBOOSTERPUMP 2 RB 519 HPCIROOM 073 3 NO NO 013 2028 5 BFN-2-PMP-073-OD47 HPCITURBINE AUXIUARYOIL PUMP 2 RB S19 HPCIROOM 073 3 NO NO 013 2033 6 BFN-2-PMP-074-0005 RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL PUMP 2A 2 RB 519 SW CORNER 074 3,4 NO YES 012 2034 6 BFN-2-PMP-074-O016 RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL PUMP 2C 2 RB 519 SW CORNER 074 3,4 NO YES 012 2036 6 BFN-2-PMP-075-003 CORESPRAYPUMP 2B 2 RB 519 NECORNER 075 3 NO YES 014 2037 6 BFN-2-PMP-075-OD42 CORESPRAYPUMP 20 2 RB 519 HECORNER 075 3 NO YES 014 2027 5 BFN-2-PMP-076-0110 CNTMTATMMON SYSANLZR2ASMPLRTNPMP 2 RB 565 SCRAMVALVE AREA 076 5 NO YES NO 035 2096 20 BFN-2-PNLA-009-D003A REACTOR SHUTDOWN &CONTAINMENT COOLING 2 CR 617 U2 MCR 009 2,3 NO YES 120 2099 20 BFN-2-PNLA-009-000S REACTOR CONTROL PANEL 2 CR 617 U2 MCR 009 1 NO YES 120 2100 20 BFN-2-PNLA-09-0006 FEEDWATER DTM &CONDSPNL 2 CD 637 U2MCR 009 1 NO YES 120 2044 20 BFN-2-PNLA-0:9-0009 CONTROL PNLA9-9 2 CB 617 U2 MCR 009 1,2.3,4,5 YES 193 - YES 120 2095 20 BFN-2-PNLA-009-001S PNL9-15 AUXINSTRRM 2 CR 593 U2 AIR )091 1 NO YES 089 2096 PNLA-009-D017 PNL 9-17 AUX INSTR RM UT-2 2 CB 593 U2AIR 009 1 NO I- I I I YES 089 2097 20 PNLA-.O0-0D32 CS&HPCI (CHAI PNLA9-32 2 C1 1 593 UZAIR )091 3 1 NO YES 089 2073 20 .. I-NO 069 BFN-2-PNLA-O09-0081 PANEL 9-R1 AUX INSTR ROOM 2 U2 AIR )09 1 2.3.4.5 1 NO 3211 19 B FN-2-TE-084-O I 616 TORUS WATER TEMP ELEMENT 2 TORUS 064 5 NO NO 126 2118 19 BFN-2-TE-064-M161C TORUS WATER TEMP ELEMENT 2 RB 1519 TORUS 064 5 NO NO 126 Page 111 of 907

Browns Ferry Unit 2 Area Walk-Bys No. AWC No. Unit Building Elevation Location Walkdown Date 002 O-CB-EL593-002 0 CB 593 Mech Equip Room 7/17/2012 069 O-CB-EL595-069 0 CB 595 Roof Chiller A & B Area 8/3/2012 001 O-CB-EL617-001 0 CB 617 Mech Equip Room 7/17/2012 120 O-CB-EL617-120 1/2 CB 617 Unit 1 & 2 Main Control Room 8/14/2012 006 O-DG-EL565-006 0 DG 565 Electrical Tunnel 7/19/2012 007 O-DG-EL565-007 0 DG 565 Diesel Generator Room C 7/19/2012 008 O-DG-EL565-008 0 DG 565 Diesel Generator Room D 7/19/2012 019 O-DG-EL583-019 0 DG 583 Fan Room D 7/25/2012 020 O-DG-EL583-020 0 DG 583 Fan Room C 7/25/2012 115 O-DG-EL583-115 0 DG 583 Diesel Aux Board Room 8/13/2012 015 0-YD-EL565-015 0 YD 565 Vaporizer Tank A Area 7/25/2012 016 0-YD-EL565-016 0 YD 565 Vaporizer Tank B Area 7/25/2012 017 0-YD-EL565-017 0 Intake 565 RHRSW Pump Room B 7/25/2012 018 0-YD-EL565-018 0 Intake 565 RHRSW Pump Room C 7/25/2012 066 2-CB-EL593-066 2 CB 593 Battery Board Room 2 8/3/2012 089 2-CB-EL593-089 2 CB 593 Aux Instrument Room 7/19/2012 090 2-CB-EL593-090 2 CB 593 Battery Room 7/19/2012 091 2-CB-EL593-091 2 CB 593 Battery Board Room 7/19/2012 067 2-CB-EL617-067 2 CB 617 250V Shutdown Board Room C 8/3/2012 012 2-RB-EL519-012 2 RB 519 RHR Pump Area 7/20/2012 013 2-RB-EL519-013 2 RB 519 HPCI Room 7/20/2012 014 2-RB-EL519-014 2 RB 519 NE Quad 7/20/2012 037 2-RB-EL519-037 2 RB 519 NW Quad 7/30/2012 126 2-RB-EL519-126 2 RB 519 Unit 2 Under Torus 10/18/2012 038 2-RB-EL541-038 2 RB 541 NE Quad 7/30/2012 096 2-RB-EL541-096 2 RB 541 SW Quad 8/9/2012 009 2-RB-EL565-009 2 RB 565 SE Quad 7/20/2012 010 2-RB-EL565-010 2 RB 565 NW Quad 7/20/2012 011 2-RB-EL565-011 2 RB 565 Scram Valve Area East Side 7/20/2012 035 2-RB-EL565-035 2 RB 565 Scram Valve Area West Side 7/30/2012 040 2-RB-EL565-040 2 RB 565 Scram Dump Valves N/R12 7/30/2012 041 2-RB-EL565-041 2 RB 565 Elevator/Stairs Door Area 7/30/2012 109 2-RB-EL565-109 2 RB 565 R14-R12, R-U 8/10/2012 130 2-RB-EL565-130 2 RB 565 UNIT 2 DRYWELL 3/25/2013 131 2-RB-EL565-131 2 RB 565 UNIT 2 STEAM VAULT 3/25/2013 132 2-RB-EL585-132 2 RB 585 UNIT 2 DRYWELL 3/25/2013 133 2-RB-ELS85-133 2 RB 585 UNIT 2 DRYWELL 3/25/2013 R1 021 2-RB-EL593-021 2 RB 593 Electrical Board Room 2B 7/19/2012 036 2-RB-EL593-036 2 RB 593 Column Lines R9 to R11, U to S 7/30/2012 039 2-RB-EL593-039 2 RB 593 RBCCW Heat Exchanger Area 7/30/2012 108 2-RB-EL593-108 2 RB 593 R11-R13, S-U 8/10/2012 119 2-RB-EL593-119 2 RB 593 480V Shutdown Board Room 2B 8/13/2012 003 2-RB-EL621-003 2 RB 621 LPCI Generator Area 7/18/2012 022 2-RB-EL621-022 2 RB 621 Electrical Board Room 2A 7/19/2012 110 2-RB-EL621-110 2 RB 621 S-U, R8-R1O 8/10/2012 118 2-RB-EL621-118 2 RB 621 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A 8/13/2012 004 2-RB-EL639-004 2 RB 639 SLC Area 7/18/2012 005 2-RB-EL639-005 2 RB 639 LPCI Generator Area 7/18/2012 099 2-RB-EL639-099 2 RB 639 SLC Area (By Stairs) 8/9/2012 104 2-RB-EL639-104 2 RB 639 S-U, R8-R11 8/9/2012 Page 113 of 907

INTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 Appendix E: SWCs The following signatures are provided for the engineers responsible for the Seismic Walkdown Checklists that were performed during the Unit 2 outage March 25, 2013. The equipment walked down during the outage include:

BFN-2-FCV-001-0026 BFN-2-FCV-001-0038 BFN-2-PCV-001-0019 BFN-2-PCV-001-0034 Name Signature Date Josh Best gt "'- -// -. **

Jason Black* f* IA,. A *-*O, Page 113-1 of 907

Sheet 1 of 5 Status: Y 0NElULI Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0026 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSIV "B" Inboard Isolation Valve Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Room, Area 130, Drywell Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments. Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is Y[:N M the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose Y EIN lI U EI N/A 2 hardware?

3Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B, Classes of Equipment.

Page 370 of 907 R1

Sheet 2 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) 3 Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0026 Equipment Class 7 Equipment Description MSIV "B" Inboard Isolation Valve Anchorage (Continued)

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild Y FIN El U El N/A E surface oxidation?
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near Y FIN [I U I-1 N/A E the anchors?
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant Y FIN LI U F1 N/A M documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Page 371 of 907 R1

Sheet 3 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0026 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSIV "B" Inboard Isolation Valve

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the Y ON EjU E anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or YE NE: U[Z] N/A[L]

structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and YE NEJ U[-] N/A[D lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Page 372 of 907 R1

Sheet 4 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0026 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSIV "B" Inboard Isolation Valve Interaction Effects (Continued)

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YE N U[:I N/A[:]
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment YEN[l UEl free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that YE NEI UFI could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Page 373 of 907 R1

Sheet 5 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0026 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSIV "B" Inboard Isolation Valve Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 374 of 907 R1

Sheet 1 of 5 Status: Y ENE]ULI Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0038 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSIV "C" Outboard Isolation Valve Location: Bldg. U2-RB Floor El. 565 Room, Area 131, Steam Vault Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments. Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable Anchoraqe

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is Y E NE the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose Y [L] N [] U [] N/A Z hardware?

3Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B, Classes of Equipment.

Page 375 of 907 R1

Sheet 2 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) 3 Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0038 Equipment Class 7 Equipment Description MSIV "C" Outboard Isolation Valve Anchorage (Continued)

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild Y [-N [] U El N/A Z surface oxidation?
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near Y ON EI U 0 N/A 2 the anchors?
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant Y EN El U F1 N/A 0 documentation? (Note: This question only applies ifthe item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Page 376 of 907 R1

Sheet 3 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0038 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSIV "C" Outboard Isolation Valve

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the YON [:1U [-

anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or YON[l ULI N/A[l structures?
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and YO NEJ U[-- N/A-lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Page 377 of 907 R1

Sheet 4 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) 3 Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0038 Equipment Class 7 Equipment Description MSIV "C" Outboard Isolation Valve Interaction Effects (Continued)

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YI N u[:l N/A[-]
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment YEN[:] U--

free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that YO NLuEIjU could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Page 378 of 907 R1

Sheet 5 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-FCV-001-0038 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSIV "C" Outboard Isolation Valve Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 379 of 907 R1

Sheet 1 of 5 Status: Y ZNE] UF Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0019 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Room, Area 132, Drywell Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments. Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is Y [IN 0 the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose Y [:NEl U ElN/A hardware?

3Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B, Classes of Equipment.

Page 550 of 907 R1

Sheet 2 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0019 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV Anchorage (Continued)

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild YIZIN ElUEl N/AZ surface oxidation?
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near YEFNEII uf[I N/AE the anchors?
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant YEIN F1 U E N/A 0 documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Page 551 of 907 R1

Sheet 3 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0019 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the Y ON [:U Ej anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or YON[: ULI N/AE--

structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and YZ NEI U-] N/A[--

lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

R1 Page 552 of 907

Sheet 4 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0019 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV Interaction Effects (Continued)

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO N UE-- N/A[:]
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment YEN[:] U[:

free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that YO NEI UFl could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Page 553 of 907 R1

Sheet 5 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0019 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 554 of 907 R1

Sheet 1 of 5 Status: Y ENEDU D Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0034 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Room, Area 133, Drywell Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments. Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is Y IZIN N the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose Y OIN 0i U [] N/A E hardware?

3Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B, Classes of Equipment.

Page 555 of 907 R1

Sheet 2 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0034 Equipment Class 3 Z Equipment Description MSRV Anchorage (Continued)

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild Y EI-N El U El N/A Z surface oxidation?
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near Y rIN El U [: N/A Z the anchors?
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant Y -N [--I U E-1N/A Z documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Page 556 of 907 R1

Sheet 3 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0034 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the Y ON [:1 U [:]

anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or YON[]I ULI N/AD structures?
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and YM NEI UE- N/A[:]

lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Page 557 of 907 R1

Sheet 4 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0034 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV Interaction Effects (Continued)

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YN N ULI N/A[D]
10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment YM N[I: U[-D free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that YN NEII u-Il could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Page 558 of 907 R1

Sheet 5 of 5 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. BFN-2-PCV-001-0034 Equipment Class 3 7 Equipment Description MSRV Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Evaluated by: Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 559 of 907 R1

NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Response Report Browns Ferry Unit 2 Appendix F: AWCs The following signatures are provided for the engineers responsible for the Area Walk-By Checklists that were performed during the Unit 2 outage March 25, 2013. The walk-bys performed during the outage include:

2-RB-EL565-130 2-RB-EL565-131 2-RB-EL585-132 2-RB-EL585-133 Name Signature Date Jason Black Josh Best = _

2/.5_ __

RI Page 714-1 of 907

Sheet 1 of 4 Status: YZ0 NE] U 0 2-RB-EL565-130 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Drywell Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.

The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable

1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free Y[EN El UEl N/A [

of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?

2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free Y ZN [_1 U [:1 N/A ED of significant degraded conditions?

4If the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of about 35 feet from the SWEL item.

Page 847-1 of 907 R1

Sheet 2 of 4 2-RB-EL565-1 30 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Drywell

3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the YO*N [:1 U [] N/A [--I cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

Y N-I U El N/AZ1

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

Y ON [1 UEI N/A [:

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?

Page 847-2 of 907 R1

Sheet 3 of 4 2-RB-EL565-130 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Drywell

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y [NL[I1UEl N/A E seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?
7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y NN ElU [1N/A E seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Temporary outage scaffolding was located above and below the MSIV.

This scaffolding must be removed prior to Unit 2 outage completion. The scaffolds have been inspected and seismically braced in accordance with plant procedures. No potentially adverse seismic interactions are associated with the MSIV.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions YEN[:1 UEl1 that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?

Page 847-3 of 907 R1

Sheet 4 of 4 2-RB-EL565-130 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Drywell Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Equipment associated with this AWC:

BFN-2-FCV-001-0026 Evaluated by:Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 847-4 of 907 R1

Sheet 1 of 4 Status: Y Z NEI UEl 2-RB-EL565-131 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Steam Vault Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.

The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable

1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free Y ONF1 U [1N/A [3 of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free Y ON F1 U F1 N/A [E]

of significant degraded conditions?

"Ifthe room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of about 35 feet from the SWEL item.

Page 847-5 of 907 R1

Sheet 2 of 4 2-RB-EL565-131 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Steam Vault

3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the Y ON El U El N/A Er cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?
4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y0ON El U [_1 N/A1 seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y NN [] U El N/A[

seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?

R1 Page 847-6 of 907

Sheet 3 of 4 2-RB-EL565-131 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Steam Vault

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y ENEl UEl N/A [:

seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y EN E U EII N/A El seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Temporary outage scaffolding was located above the MSIV. This scaffolding must be removed prior to Unit 2 outage completion. The scaffolds have been inspected and seismically braced in accordance with plant procedures. No potentially adverse seismic interactions are associated with the MSIV.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions Y [KN E- U [-

that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?

Page 847-7 of 907 R1

Sheet 4 of 4 2-RB-EL565-131 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 565 Area 4 Steam Vault Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Equipment associated with this Area Walk-by Checklist:

BFN-2-FCV-001 -0038 Evaluated by:Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 847-8 of 907 R1

Sheet 1 of 4 Status: Y Z N ] U[ZJ 2-RB-EL585-132 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.

The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings, Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable

1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free Y ON El U F1 N/A[]

of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?

2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free Y ON El U -- N/A []

of significant degraded conditions?

4 1f the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of about 35 feet from the SWEL item.

Page 847-9 of 907 R1

Sheet 2 of 4 2-RB-EL585-132 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell

3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the YZN ElU ElN/A E cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?
4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y EN EUEl N/A E seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse YZN ElU E1N/A El seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?

Page 847-10 of 907 R1

Sheet 3 of 4 2-RB-EL585-132 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse YON EI U El N/A [Z seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?
7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y ON [I U [-] N/A I1 seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Temporary outage scaffolding was located above and below the MSRV.

This scaffolding must be removed prior to Unit 2 outage completion. The scaffolds have been inspected and seismically braced in accordance with plant procedures. No potentially adverse seismic interactions are associated with the MSRV.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions Y ZN [I U [1 that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?

Page 847-11 of 907 R1

Sheet 4 of 4 2-RB-EL585-1 32 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Equipment associated with this Area Walk-By Checklist:

BFN-2-PCV-001-0019 Evaluated by:Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 847-12 of 907 R1

Sheet 1 of 4 Status: Y Z N E] U f 2-RB-EL585-133 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items.

The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Note: Y = Yes, N = No, U = Unknown, N/A = Not Applicable

1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free YEN [] U E N/A[-Z of potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)?
2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free YE*N [-]U L N/A E1 of significant degraded conditions?

4If the room in which the SWEL item is located is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), the area selected should be described. This selected area should be based on judgment, e.g., on the order of about 35 feet from the SWEL item.

R1 Page 847-13 of 907

Sheet 2 of 4 2-RB-EL585-133 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell

3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the YON El U EII N/AZE cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?
4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y ON ElU [1 N/A E seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?
5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y ONEl UEl N/A [:

seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?

Page 847-14 of 907 R1

Sheet 3 of 4 2-RB-EL585-133 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell

6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y ON El U El N/A El seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?
7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse Y ON E- U El N/A El seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

Temporary outage scaffolding was located above and below the MSRV.

This scaffolding must be removed prior to Unit 2 outage completion. The scaffolds have been inspected and seismically braced in accordance with plant procedures. No potentially adverse seismic interactions are associated with the MSRV.

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions Y ON 0 U F that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?

Page 847-15 of 907 R1

Sheet 4 of 4 2-RB-EL585-133 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location: Bldg. U2 RB Floor El. 585 Area 4 Drywell Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Equipment associated with this Area Walk-By Checklist:

BFN-2-PCV-001 -0034 Evaluated by:Josh Best Date:3/25/2013 Jason Black 3/25/2013 Page 847-16 of 907 R1

NTTF 2.3/BFN-02, R1 April 3, 2013 Page 7 of 7 full concurrence with all of the potential adverse seismic conditions summarized in Section 6.2 of the BFN2 Seismic Response Report.

Comments regarding the individual potential adverse seismic conditions for BFN1 include the following:

" Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition 1 addresses cracking of the concrete base pad for strainer 0-STN-067-0926. Based on the configuration including attached piping as well as other anchors and pedestal, it was judged that there was sufficient margin for the strainer to withstand a design basis earthquake. The walkdown team noted this as a potential adverse seismic condition and entered it into the CAP. A work order was initiated to repair the crack so that no further damage will occur to the concrete.

" Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition 2 addresses a missing safety cage for an interior light for 2-PNLA-009-0015. The walkdown team determined that the florescent light bulb could dislodge during a seismic event and impact soft targets inside the panel. This does not appear to be credible due to the interfering cabling and other components inside of the panel. The walkdown team conservatively noted this as a potential adverse seismic condition and entered it into the CAP. A work order was initiated to reinstall the missing cage.

  • Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition 3 addresses a missing safety cage for an interior light for 2-PNLA-009-0005. The walkdown team determined that the florescent light bulb could dislodge during a seismic event and impact soft targets inside the panel. This does not appear to be credible due to the interfering cabling and other components inside of the panel. The walkdown team conservatively noted this as a potential adverse seismic condition and entered it into the CAP. A work order was initiated to reinstall the missing cage.

SUBMITTAL REPORT The peer review team has reviewed the BFN2 submittal report in detail, including the additional IR1 walkdown evaluations performed during the March refueling outage, and we are in full concurrence with the documented observations and findings. The report is in compliance with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286, and meets the requirements and objectives of the NRC 50.54 (f) letter.

In our opinion, the potential adverse seismic conditions identified by the program are in general only minor issues, and this is a reflection of the adequate seismic design criteria as well as sufficiently rigorous seismic-related construction and maintenance procedures that TVA has in place at BFN2. The walkdown demonstrates that the current plant configuration is in compliance with the current seismic licensing basis. Furthermore, the walkdown demonstrates that that TVA has maintained or improved the seismic IPEEE HCLPF capacity of the plant.

Sincerely, John 0. Dizon, P.E. Stephen J. Eder, P.E.

Lead Peer Reviewer Peer Reviewer Page 907 of 907 FACILITY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC.

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