Letter Sequence RAI |
---|
|
|
MONTHYEARW3F1-2011-0061, Commitment to Provide 10 CFR 50.48(c) License Amendment Request and Request for Continued Enforcement Discretion2011-07-26026 July 2011 Commitment to Provide 10 CFR 50.48(c) License Amendment Request and Request for Continued Enforcement Discretion Project stage: Request W3F1-2011-0074, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)2011-11-17017 November 2011 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition) Project stage: Request ML1200304302012-01-0303 January 2012 Email PRA Peer Review Report Project stage: Other ML1200304372012-01-0303 January 2012 Fpra Pr Position Paper Final Project stage: Other ML1201205332012-01-12012 January 2012 Email, Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants Project stage: Acceptance Review W3F1-2012-0005, Supplemental Information in Support of the NRC Acceptance Review of Waterford 3 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 8052012-01-26026 January 2012 Supplemental Information in Support of the NRC Acceptance Review of Waterford 3 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Project stage: Supplement ML1203401282012-02-0303 February 2012 Acceptance Review Email, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Acceptance Review ML1203802572012-03-0909 March 2012 Request to Reinstate Enforcement Discretion License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Other ML1208704852012-04-0303 April 2012 Regulatory Audit Scheduled to Begin 5/7/2012 in Support of the License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Other ML12185A2122012-07-18018 July 2012 Request for Additional Information, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: RAI W3F1-2012-0064, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request2012-09-27027 September 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request Project stage: Response to RAI W3F1-2012-0083, 90-Day Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 8052012-10-16016 October 2012 90-Day Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 Project stage: Response to RAI ML13072A0632013-03-22022 March 2013 Request for Additional Information, Round 2, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: RAI ML13129A1502013-05-10010 May 2013 Request for Supplement of Review Schedule and Interim Milestones, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Other ML13157A0622013-06-26026 June 2013 Request for Additional Information, Round 3, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: RAI W3F1-2013-0048, Supplement to NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR)2013-12-18018 December 2013 Supplement to NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Project stage: Supplement ML14023A2792014-01-23023 January 2014 Notice of Meeting with Entergy Operations, Inc., to Discuss Waterford Unit 3 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Meeting ML14024A2912014-01-24024 January 2014 Notice of Meeting with Entergy Operations, Inc., to Discuss Its National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 License Amendment Request Supplement Changes for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Project stage: Meeting W3F1-2014-0025, Updated Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR)2014-06-11011 June 2014 Updated Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Project stage: Response to RAI ML14232A0262014-09-15015 September 2014 Continuation of Enforcement Discretion, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Other ML14350A2122014-12-22022 December 2014 Regulatory Audit Plan; January 12-14, 2015 Audit in Support of the Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Other ML15022A2392015-02-0606 February 2015 Request for Additional Information- National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 Project stage: RAI W3F1-2015-0015, Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request2015-03-12012 March 2015 Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request Project stage: Response to RAI W3F1-2015-0024, Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR)2015-04-10010 April 2015 Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Project stage: Response to RAI W3F1-2015-0025, Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)2015-05-14014 May 2015 Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3) Project stage: Response to RAI ML15182A3462015-07-13013 July 2015 Request for Additional Information - National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 Project stage: RAI ML15197A2292015-07-21021 July 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Project stage: RAI ML15239A7392015-08-31031 August 2015 Summary of Public Meeting with Entergy Operations, Inc. to Discuss Main Control Room Abandonment Regarding NFPA-805 License Amendment Request Project stage: Meeting W3F1-2015-0078, Revised Implementation Item Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR)2015-09-24024 September 2015 Revised Implementation Item Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Project stage: Request W3F1-2015-0081, Request for Additional Information (RAI) Clarification Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR)2015-10-13013 October 2015 Request for Additional Information (RAI) Clarification Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Project stage: Request W3F1-2015-0085, Transfer of License and Conforming Amendment2015-10-29029 October 2015 Transfer of License and Conforming Amendment Project stage: Other W3F1-2016-0003, Revised Licensing Actions and Implementation Items Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR)2016-01-18018 January 2016 Revised Licensing Actions and Implementation Items Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Project stage: Request 2014-01-23
[Table View] |
|
---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000382/20230102024-01-31031 January 2024 Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000382/2023010 IR 05000382/20230032024-01-23023 January 2024 Acknowledgment of Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2023003 ML24012A1962024-01-12012 January 2024 Response to 2nd Round Request for Additional Information Concerning Relief Request Number EN-RR-22-001 Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and ML23340A2292023-12-28028 December 2023 Withdrawal of an Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 to Remove Exemption from Testing Certain Relays at Power to Support Elimination of Potential Single Point Vulnerability (EPID L-2022-LLA-0169)-LTR ML23349A1672023-12-21021 December 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure ML23348A3572023-12-14014 December 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Use Online Monitoring Methodology Slides and Affidavit for Pre-Submittal Meeting ML23352A0292023-12-13013 December 2023 Entergy - 2024 Nuclear Energy Liability Evidence of Financial Protection ML23340A1592023-12-13013 December 2023 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Entergy Fleet Project Manager Assignment ML23333A1362023-11-29029 November 2023 Supplement to Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23325A1442023-11-21021 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23312A1832023-11-14014 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2023003 and Notice of Violation ML23311A2082023-11-0909 November 2023 Reassignment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch IV IR 05000382/20234012023-10-0404 October 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000382/2023401 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000382/20230052023-08-21021 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 - (Report 05000382/2023005) IR 05000382/20233012023-08-15015 August 2023 NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000382/2023301 IR 05000382/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2023002 IR 05000382/20234022023-08-0707 August 2023 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000382/2023402 (Full Report) IR 05000382/20230402023-07-12012 July 2023 Revised 95001 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000382/2023040, Exercise of Enforcement Discretion, and Follow-Up Assessment Letter ML23191A4562023-07-10010 July 2023 Notification of Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection (050003822023010) and Request for Information ML23158A1042023-06-0808 June 2023 Information Request for the Cybersecurity Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000382/2023401 ML23145A2272023-06-0202 June 2023 95001 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000382/2023040, and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML23130A2732023-05-10010 May 2023 and Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station - Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23117A2172023-05-0101 May 2023 Safety Evaluation for Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment IR 05000382/20230012023-04-24024 April 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2023001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Report 07200075/2023001, and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML23111A2132023-04-21021 April 2023 Responses to RAI Concerning Relief Request Number EN-RR-22-001 Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/ Replacement Activities ML23110A1122023-04-20020 April 2023 Annual Report for Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual Changes Under 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3), 10 CFR 71.106, and 10 CFR 72.140(d). Notification of Application of Approved Appendix B to 10 CFR 72 Subpart G ML23108A2542023-04-18018 April 2023 WCGS Information Request, Security IR 2023401 IR 05000382/20234032023-04-17017 April 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000382/2023403 ML23093A2122023-04-0303 April 2023 Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 2022 ML23089A0602023-03-30030 March 2023 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Fleet Project Manager Assignment ML23088A3922023-03-29029 March 2023 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance (10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)) ML23080A2882023-03-21021 March 2023 Decommissioning Funding Status Report Per 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1) Entergy Operations, Inc ML23059A2592023-03-0707 March 2023 Correction to Issuance to Amendment No. 270 Adoption of TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b ML23065A2002023-03-0303 March 2023 EN 56252 Update - Flow Serve - Final Notification of Potential Part 21 on Peerless 56 Frame DC Motors ML23060A1092023-03-0101 March 2023 Proof of Financial Protection (10 CFR 140.15) IR 05000382/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, (Report 05000382/2022006) ML22322A1092023-02-17017 February 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 270 Adoption of TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b IR 05000382/20230902023-02-0101 February 2023 Final Significance Determination of a White Finding, NOV, and Follow-Up Assessment Letter; NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2023090 ML23032A5062023-02-0101 February 2023 Technical Specification Index and Bases Update to the NRC for the Period November 11, 2021 Through July 25, 2022 ML23030A6642023-01-27027 January 2023 Flowserve, Part 21 Second Interim Notification Report Re Peerless 56 Frame DC Motors IR 05000382/20220042023-01-26026 January 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2022004 and Independent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200075/2022001 ML23024A0822023-01-20020 January 2023 Stephens Insurance, Entergy - 2023 Nuclear Energy Liability Evidence of Financial Protection ML23018A2202023-01-18018 January 2023 Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment IR 05000382/20220912023-01-12012 January 2023 Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000382/2022091 and Preliminary White Finding and Apparent Violation IR 05000382/20220032023-01-0505 January 2023 Revised Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2022003 ML22342B1402022-12-0202 December 2022 56252-EN 56252 - Flowserve - Limitorque - Interim Report Potential Part 21 on Peerless 56 Frame DC Motors ML22300A2082022-11-30030 November 2022 Issuance of Amendment No. 269 Adoption of 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors ML22332A5292022-11-29029 November 2022 Notification of NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination 05000382/2023301 IR 05000382/20220132022-11-28028 November 2022 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000382/2022013 IR 05000382/20220022022-11-0101 November 2022 Revised Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2022002 2024-01-31
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML23348A1222023-12-14014 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Grand Gulf, River Bend, and Waterford, Unit 3 - 2nd Round of Official RAIs for RR EN-RR-22-001, Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk Informed Categorization for Class 2 and 3 Systems ML23191A4562023-07-10010 July 2023 Notification of Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection (050003822023010) and Request for Information ML23097A0412023-04-0606 April 2023 June 2023 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML23076A0552023-03-13013 March 2023 EP Program Inspection RFI Hjs 10132022 ML23052A0882023-02-17017 February 2023 Inspection Request for Information ML22290A0442022-10-13013 October 2022 December 2022 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML22206A0172022-07-22022 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information: Waterford 3 - License Amendment Requests to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 and TSTF-505 ML22209A1082022-07-15015 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAIs to License Amendment Request for Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 and Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-505, Revision 2 ML22103A1712022-04-13013 April 2022 LAR to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-505_NRC Request for Additional Information ML22012A1592022-01-0505 January 2022 WF3 2022 EP Exercise Inspection RFI Sdh 010522 ML21280A0812021-10-0505 October 2021 Email 10-5-21 - Request for Information_ Waterford EP Inspection (71114.04 & 71151) - Nov-Dec 2021 ML21285A0242021-10-0505 October 2021 Digital Instrumentation and Control Modification Inspection Request for Information ML22112A1512021-08-0606 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - for Review: Draft RAIs to LAR to Relocate Chemical Detection Systems Technical Specifications (TS) to Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) ML21216A4562021-08-0404 August 2021 WF3 2021 EP Exercise Inspection Request for Information (RFI) ML21218A0402021-07-26026 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAIs to Entergy Operations, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 LAR to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 ML21196A5302021-07-19019 July 2021 Wat 2021010 RFI Letter 21N_05 Gap ML21195A0692021-07-13013 July 2021 Staton, Unit 3 - Notification of Digital Instrumentation and Control Modification Inspection and Request for Information ML21125A6522021-05-0606 May 2021 Wat 2021003 Brq RFI- Md, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Notification of Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2021003) and Request for Information ML21112A2542021-04-29029 April 2021 Request for Additional Information Digital Upgrade to the Core Protection and Control Element Assembly Calculator System (EPID L 2020 Lla 0164) - Redacted Version ML20288A2082020-10-0808 October 2020 8Oct2020 Email - Request for Information (RFI) to Support and Prepare for the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program Inspection at the Waterford 3 Station Scheduled to Occur the Week of December 7, 2020 ML20289A3502020-10-0505 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - NRC Request for Additional Information - WF3 EAL Scheme Change - L-2020-LLA-0122 ML20125A3212020-05-0404 May 2020 WAT2020410 Inspection Document Request ML20086M3852020-04-0101 April 2020 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3/4 8.1, A.C. Sources Operating W3F1-2020-0014, Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding Application for Technical Specification Change to Control Room Air Conditioning System2020-03-20020 March 2020 Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding Application for Technical Specification Change to Control Room Air Conditioning System ML20049A4102020-02-20020 February 2020 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.d, Control Room Air Filtration System ML19262H0362019-09-0404 September 2019 Ti 2515/194 Request for Information and Email ML19274D4932019-07-24024 July 2019 Request for Information IR 05000382 2019-003 Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection ML19203A0062019-07-19019 July 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Waterford 3 - Final Request for Additional Information (Rais) Re Relief Request WF3-RR-19-2: Alternate Repair of Degraded Drain Line of Chemical and Volume Control System ML19151A6102019-06-0404 June 2019 Non-Proprietary Second Round RAI Regarding License Amendment Request for Use of the Tranflow Code for Determining Pressure Drops Across the Steam Generator Secondary Side Internal Components ML19172A0852019-05-24024 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Waterford 3 - Final Request for Additional Information (Rais) Re Relief Request W3-ISI-032: Volumetric Examination Requirements ML19035A0412019-02-0101 February 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Waterford 3 - Final Request for Information Regarding Relief Request WF3-RR-19-001 for Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Weld Overlay ML19018A0102019-01-28028 January 2019 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Revision of Technical Specification 3/4.7.4,Ultimate Heat Sink ML18320A0902018-11-26026 November 2018 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Use of the Transflow Code for Determining Pressure Drops Across the Steam Generator Secondary Side Internal Components ML18318A4352018-11-14014 November 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Waterford 3 - Final Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Alternative to ASME Code Case N-770-2 ML18299A0862018-11-0707 November 2018 Draft Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Regarding the Revision of UFSAR Section 3.9 ML18262A0412018-09-25025 September 2018 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Section 15.4.3.1 of the Waterford 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to Account for Fuel Misload ML18145A2652018-06-0101 June 2018 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Request for Licensing Action Use of Tranflow Code for Determining Pressure Drops Across Steam Generator Secondary Side Components ML18085A6942018-03-26026 March 2018 Ref: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, License Renewal Application - RAI Set 18 ML18058A0572018-02-23023 February 2018 Enclosurequest for Additional Information (Letter to J. Giddens Request for Additional Information Regarding Entergy Operations, Inc.'S Decommissioning Funding Plan Update) ML18039A9722018-02-0808 February 2018 Notification of Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inspection (05000382/2018002) and Request for Information ML17233A2402017-08-14014 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI for Waterford Unit 3 Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-501 Relocate Stored Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Volume Values to Licensee Control ML17170A3012017-06-16016 June 2017 Notification of Inspection (NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2017003) and Request for Information ML17101A4432017-04-17017 April 2017 Requests for Additional Information for the Review of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, License Renewal Application - Set 17 ML17086A5852017-03-28028 March 2017 Request for Additional Information for the Environmental Review of Waterford 3 ML17072A0102017-03-14014 March 2017 Requests for Additional Information for the Review of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, License Renewal Application Set - 15 ML17272A3352017-03-0101 March 2017 Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, License Renewal Application - Set 14 ML17040A5382017-02-14014 February 2017 Requests for Additional Information for the Review of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, License Renewal Application - Set 13 ML17018A3592017-01-26026 January 2017 Requests For Additional Information For The Review Of The Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, License Renewal Application Set 12 (CAC MF7492.) ML16354A1052016-12-27027 December 2016 RAI License Amendment Request to Revise TS 3/4.3.2 to Relocate Surveillance Frequency Requirements for Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Subgroup Relays to the Surveillance Frequency Control Program ML16356A5942016-12-19019 December 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - MF8325 Draft RAIs Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Table Notation for Table 4.3-2, ESFAS Surveillance Requirements 2023-07-10
[Table view] |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 26, 2013 Vice President, Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3- REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION- NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD NFPA 805 (TAG NO. ME7602)
Dear Sir or Madam:
By letter dated November 17, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113220230), Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy, the licensee),
submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to transition its fire protection licensing basis at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, from paragraph 50.48(b) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) to 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 (NFPA 805).
A review team, consisting of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and contractors from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA) participated in a regulatory audit at Waterford in Killona, Louisiana, from May 7- 11, 2012. By letter dated July 18, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12185A212), the NRC staff issued requests for additional information (RAis). By letters dated September 27 and October 16, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12272A099 and ML12290A215, respectively), the licensee provided its responses to the RAis. By letter dated March 22, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13072A063), the NRC issued a second set of RAts.
By letter dated May 16, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13137A128), the licensee provided its response to this second set of RAis. The NRC staff is continuing its review of the RAI responses received in the licensee's letter dated May 16, 2013, and those RAis and responses are unrelated to the RAI request enclosed to his letter, since they are related to different review areas.
The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided by the licensee and determined that additional information is needed to complete the review. Please note that review efforts on this task (TAC No. ME7602) are continuing and additional RAis may be forthcoming.
On May 22, 2013, during a telephone call between the Entergy staff and the NRC staff, it was agreed that:
1 At the earliest following the call, the NRC staff would, send a draft version of the enclosed RAis via email to the licensee followed by a formal issuance of the RAis, as draft, on the public docket.
- 2. The NRC staff will not start the review until the licensee provides a letter detailing the schedule.
- 3. The focused Fire PRA Peer Review will now be reviewed by NRC staff.
- 4. The NRC staff believes that the enclosed RAis discuss the gaps and shortcomings with the licensee's submittals, as identified by the NRC staff. While the NRC staff does not expect a specific response to the enclosed RAis, the staff expects the discussed concerns be addressed in the final LAR submittals planned submittal. Also, this RAI does not preclude future RAis.
- 5. The NRC staffs LAR submittal schedules and interim milestone request, documented in the NRC staff's letter dated May 10, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13129A150), is hereby withdrawn. The licensee is requested to provide a new schedule for the submittal of the supplement within 2 weeks from the date of this letter.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1480 or via e-mail at kaly.kalyanam@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, N. Kalyanam, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-382
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ADOPT NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805 PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTOR GENERATING PLANTS WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-382 By letter dated November 17, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113220230), Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy, the licensee),
submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to transition its fire protection licensing basis at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, from paragraph 50.48(b) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) to 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 (NFPA 805).
A review team, consisting of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and contractors from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA) participated in a regulatory audit at Waterford in Killona, Louisiana, from May 7 - 11, 2012. By letter dated July 18, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12185A212), the NRC staff issued requests for additional information (RAis). By letters dated September 27 and October 16, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12272A099 and ML12290A215, respectively), the licensee provided its responses to the RAis. By letter dated March 22, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13072A063), the NRC issued a second round of RAis. By letter May 16, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13137A128), the licensee provided its response to those RAis. The NRC staff is continuing its review of the RAI responses received in the licensee's letter dated May 16, 2013, and those RAis and responses are unrelated to this request since they related to different review areas.
The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided by the licensee and determined that additional information is needed to complete the review.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) RAI 01.01 During the audit, it was explained that, when addressing fire spread along cables or to cables in nearby trays from an ignition source or other already ignited cables, the zone of influence (ZOI) associated with the heat release rate (HRR) from only the ignition source was assumed to envelope any fire spread beyond the characteristic 35-degree vertical "cone" described in Appendix R of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 10119891 NUREGICR-6850, "EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities," Volume 1: Summary and Overview," September 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052580075), and Volume 2: Detailed Methodology," September 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052580118). By letter dated Enclosure
October 16, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI1 and stated that additional plausible secondary ignition targets were identified in only two physical access units (PAUs).
- a. Please explain how "plausible secondary ignition sources" are defined. For example, please describe whether the ZOI approach summarized above was applied or was some modified approach used.
- b. If the ZOI approach was applied, please explain how, even after considering the flame spread rate of 0.3 mm/sec recommended for thermoset cables (XLPE) in Appendix R of NUREG/CR-6850 (0.9 mm/sec for thermoplastic [PVC], if applicable), the assumed ZOI continues to bound any expansion beyond the cone until the fire is suppressed.
- c. The RAJ response stated that ~suppression was not included in the baseline analysis." If this is the case, please describe whether the fire is assumed to spread until all possible targets within the ZOI, including subsequent fire propagation, are damaged.
- d. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI 21 and stated, "For the IEEE-383 qualified thermoset cables at Waterford, the fire spread is considered to be limited to those raceways within the cable damage ZOI; spread of a fire beyond the ZOI due to a secondary (i.e., target) fire was not evaluated." Please describe whether this means that fire was allowed to spread throughout a cable tray where at least part of it was within the ZOI or if no spread along that tray beyond the ZOI was assumed. If the former, describe whether vertical propagation to upper trays as a result of horizontal propagation along a given tray was assumed. If the latter, provide a basis for what would appear to be a non-conservative assumption, given that, even for qualified, thermoset cables, fire spread rates of 0.3 mm/sec are cited in NUREG/CR-6850 and retained as a result of cable fire tests in the FLASH-CAT [Flame .§pread over Horizontal Cable Irays] model recommended by NUREG/CR-7010, "Cable Heat
.B.elease, !gnition, and .Qpread in Iray Installations during Eire (CHRISTIFIRE),
Phase 1: Horizonlal Trays," July 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12213A056).
- e. One possible basis suggested by your staff during the May 2012 audit was that the assumed ZOI extended far enough beyond the nominal 35-degree cone and that, based on timing and suppression considerations, the probability of fire spreading beyond the extended ZOI was shown to be negligible. If so, please explain. Regardless, provide explanation and, as appropriate, a confirmatory calculation incorporating fire phenomenological considerations.
PRA RAI 04.01 By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI4 and stated that the Fire Risk Evaluation (FRE) considered the risk profile of each area based on the ignition frequency (IF), conditional core damage probability (CCDP) and high-risk scenarios in each area, and determined if additional defense-in-depth (DID) was warranted. The response also stated that, if deficiencies were discovered that did not allow the DID goal to be met, a change
would be considered. Please describe the methodology that was applied to address the three elements identified in National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," 2001 Edition, (NFPA 805) Section 1.2 and the associated DID goals. The description should clarify how ignition frequency and CCDP are considered together with other aspects of the fire scenario, such as propagation, detection, and suppression.
PRA RAI 10.01 When subjecting unprotected cables to direct fire damage for delta-risk evaluations of variances from deterministic requirements (VFDRs) (non-compliant case), please describe whether any of the deviations from NUREG/CR*6850 were used as the basis for evaluating the risk in the non-compliant case. If so, please indicate whether a sensitivity analysis was performed removing such credit and recalculating the delta-risk, and if so, provide the sensitivity analysis results (e.g., use of a reduction factor for fire damage outside an electrical cabinet, or extensions of resolved analysis methods where the justification has been questioned, such as limiting transient combustible HRR to lower than the NUREG/CR-6850 default profile for trash fires).
PRA RAI16.01 Regarding the low likelihood of damage to sensitive electronics in "non*adjacent cabinets," your letter dated October 16. 2012 (Page 7 of 48), states that "Any potential damage that could propagate to a non-adjacent panel would also be mitigated by room cooling (if functional) and any active fire suppression (which is more likely given the time required to reach damage in non*adjacent equipment)." However, by letter dated October 16, 2012, in response to PRA RAI 1, you stated that "Suppression was not included in the baseline analysis." Appendix S of NUREG/CR-6850 suggests delaying damage to sensitive electronics in "adjacent cabinets" with double walls and an air gap by 10 minutes. The RAI response credits the additional air gap between non*adjacent, well-sealed cabinets as a "significant" contributor to delayed damage.
Please describe whether the conclusion still holds if no suppression is credited and whether these "well-sealed" cabinets satisfy the criteria in NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1 "Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods Enhancements," September 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103090242). Also, see Frequently Asked Question (FAQ)-08-0042, Fire Propagation from Electrical Cabinets, located in ADAMS Accession No. ML092110537.
PRA RAI 25.01 One of the bases for assuming a time of 15 minutes for the manual non-suppression probability is "listed time to damage for secondary cable targets of 19 minutes" from NUREG/CR-6850.
Specifically, please clarify the source of this reference within the document (i.e., cite the corresponding table, figure, and/or section). The other basis for the 15-minute assumption is the sensitivity study for sensitive electronics. Please explain how this estimate was calculated.
PRA RAI 29.01
- a. For actual plant conditions, which do not meet the assumed generic PAU ceiling heights of 7 or 12 feet (ft), or the assumed cabinet height of 7 ft. please describe how the generic methodology is applied to ensure the results bound the actual
conditions, including the apparent assumption of 12ft for all transient fire scenarios based on assuming their location at floor level. Describe how the potential for transient fires located above the floor level is accommodated by the generic approach. Also, given that the use of the ignition frequency correction factor for electrical cabinet fire damage beyond the source has not be accepted, please describe the alternative (e.g., sensitivity analysis) that is provided to address conditions where this was applied but may not be properly characterized by the generic approach.
- b. Reference is made in your letter dated September 27, 2012, to two groupings for HRRs, 69 kilowatt (kW) and 702 kW. It is unclear where these groupings arise, although it is possible they are meant to characterize Cases 1 and 2 from Table E-1 of NUREG/CR-6850 for the minimum (75th percentile) and maximum (98*
percentile) listed HRRs for those two groups (69 kW at the 75th percentile for Case 1 and 702 kW at the 98* percentile for Case 2). Table E-1 of NUREG/CR-6850 also cites an "intermediate" HRR of 211 kW as the 98th percentile for Case 1 and the 751h percentile for Case 2. Please describe whether this HRR was also examined. Also cited are scenarios at 1000 kWand 1750 kW, respectively, presumably for Cases 1 and 2. Please provide a discussion of the selection of these higher HRRs, which include secondary ignitions.
- c. With regard to the 69 kW HRR grouping discussed in (b), there is a statement in your letter dated September 27, 2012, that the 69 kW HRR may have initially limited the selection for hot gas layer screening for transient scenarios. This seems to suggest that Case 7 in Table E-1 of NUREG/CR-6850, where 69 kW represents the 98th percentile HRR, rather than Case 1, where it represents the 751h percentile, may have been the corresponding Case for "Group 1." Please provide clarification.
PRA RAI 43.01 By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RA143 and in RAI response 43.a stated that the items in S-1 are not in the PRA model and that the items in S-2 are in the PRA modeL However, LAR AttachmentS, Table S-1, identifies that items 81-3, 81-4, and 81-5 are in are included in the PRA modeL Please explain the discrepancy between the RAJ response and LAR AttachmentS, Table S-1.
PRA RAI 44.01
- a. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI44b, which did not address the equivalency of the counting method of using plant computer data versus reviewing surveillance test procedures, and therefore does not provide justification as to why the approach is acceptable in place of reviewing surveillance test data. Please evaluate the two different counting methods and clarify why the results are expected to be equivalent or provide an evaluation of the fire probability risk assessment (FPRA) results that illustrates the effect of any potential correction to the random failure data in the PRA.
- b. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI44d and stated that, after reducing the time available to pelform the action to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the impact on the human error probability (HEP) for fire is not impacted by the assumption change per the HRA Screening Figure 5.2.1-1 in PRA-W3-05-003.
The NRC staff noted that if the time available is at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> but less than 2, the HEP should be doubled (or set to 0.01 if undeveloped), at least for screening purposes. Please provide an explanation of why there is no impact.
- c. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RA144e and stated that the assumed HEP value for EHFMANTNR (the PRA human error event code for Failure to transfer loads to the Startup Transformers (SUTs) when auto transfer fails--no DC power) has no impact on the FPRA results since the event does not appear in a single cutset. Please describe whether this refers to the internal events PRA (lEPRA) or FPRA cutsets. If the former, indicate whether it was excluded (e.g., truncated) prior to increasing its HEP by a factor of six. If it was excluded before increasing its value, describe whether it still could have appeared in the FPRA cutsets.
- d. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI44f and recognized that the cooling tower models have not been updated since the power uprate. Since the wet cooling towers (WCT) and dry cooling towers (OCT) provide important, credited functions in the FPRA, the success criteria should be modeled for the as-designed, as-operated plant. To meet this supporting requirement (SR), please update the success criteria in the FPRA.
- e. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI44, describing the modeling of the battery, but did not provide sufficient information for the NRC staff to complete its review. Please provide the information requested in PRA RAI44h (see the NRC staff's letter dated July 18, 2012).
- f. For Fact and Observation (F&O) SY-A 12b-01, please describe whether the potential for a loss of significant inventory over a period of time was also considered for inclusion of diversion flowpaths in the FPRA.
PRA RAI 53.01 By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to part c of PRA RAI 53 and stated that if the solenoid operated valve (SOV) fails closed following a loss of power and the only PRA function is for the SOV to close, then power dependency would not be modeled for the valve.
However, a hot short may have the potential to maintain a SOV energized until it is cleared.
Please provide a discussion regarding how hot shorts for SOVs were considered for inclusion in the FPRA, and explain why they may not have been included, as appears to be the case, given that no power dependency was logically tied to the SOVs. Provide this discussion for SOVs in the FPRA, as well as for SOVs within the boundary of an AOV in the FPRA. If hot short modeling for SOVs were included by means other than model logic, please explain how this was done and how it can be used for FREs, which may require the assessment of power dependency to SOVs.
PRA RAI 58.01
- a. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI58 and stated that, "the non-compliant case includes basic events that no credit can be given to when compliant with NFPA 805. These basic events are items such as modifications to the plant or operator action that reduce the risk of fire leading to an undesirable state." Please clarify this statement, provide examples, and relate it, as applicable, to the modifications and operator actions in the LAR or otherwise in the FPRA.
- b. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to various PRA RAis and used the value of "TRUE," which is confusing. The response to RAI PRA 10 states that "In the delta risk evaluations, all components/cables with associated VFDRs are assumed protected (set to TRUE) in the compliant case and not protected, subject to direct fire damage or random failure in the non-compliant case (whether a current fire wrap exists or not)." While the response to RAI PRA 39 states "In the FPRA quantification (using FRANC) fire impacts are modeled by setting FPRA basic events associated with fire-failed components and cables to True in the FPRA fault tree and then quantifying the model." In one case, TRUE represents the protected components/cables and in the other case TRUE represents the basic components associated with fire-failed components and cables. Please describe how the value of TRUE can represent a decrease in risk (response to RAI PRA 10) and also an increase in risk (response to RAI PRA 39). Describe why a value of FALSE is not used for basic events which are assumed to be successful (e.g., assumed successful for the compliant case). Provide examples in your explanation.
- c. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI47, and provided an example that stated that setting the basic event for Sl-4058 to a value of TRUE removes the cutset which contains Sl-4058 and Sl-4018. The NRC notes that setting a basic event to a value of TRUE would be expected to retain the basic event's cutset. Please explain why the cutset is removed and not retained (without the basic event that was set to a value of TRUE).
- d. The above observations above imply a two-step "TRUE" setting approach. A compliant case sets the compliant basic events value to TRUE, and then the non-compliant case sets the non-compliant cases value to TRUE. Please clarify the "TRUE" approach and provide a general discussion on how the FRE compliant and non-compliant cases are used with the software.
- e. By letter dated September 27, 2012, the licensee responded to PRA RAI58 and stated that every VFDR entry in the 8-3 table with "open" status is associated with a modification and that for every open case the 8-3 disposition identifies an AttachmentS implementation item. In addition, the response stated that for all of these cases, the risk measurement for the corresponding VFDR for the fire area (delta (II) CDF and IILERF) is provided in the FRE calculations identified for each fire area. The NRC staff noted that risk measures for the VFDRs of open status were not found to be provided in the LAR. If an FRE had been performed
for such VFDRs, please provide the risk associated with each open VFDR (l>CDF and l>LERF) for the fire areas.
PRA RAI60 The NRC staff noted that if any HEP is set to a value of TRUE, then the joint human error probability (JHEP) is set to 0. Please explain why the JHEP is apparently removed from the FPRA if any of its HEPs are set to a value of TRUE.
PRA RAI61
- a. The NRC staff noted that a JHEP basic event, ZHF-C2-014, involves an action of failure to isolate component cooling water (CCW) cross-connections after the safety injection actuation system (SIAS) fails. Given the importance of CCW, please discuss how this condition of failing to isolate CCW cross-connections arises for the FPRA and its impact on CCW success criteria. Describe whether fire events have the potential to preclude isolating the CCW cross-connects, and if so, discuss how this was this considered in the FPRA
- b. In addition, with respect to CCW success criteria, the CCW makeup system is not included in the FPRA according to Table B-3 of the LAR. Please describe what assurance there is that CCW makeup will not be necessary for fire scenarios considered for the NFPA 805 application. Describe whether the VFDRs related to the CCW surge tank level control and indications have the potential to result in opening a surge tank relief valve leading to the need for CCWmakeup.
ML13157A062 *via email OFFICE NRRIDORULPL41PM NRRIDORULPL4/LA NRRIDRNAPLAIBC NRR/DORULPL41BC NRRIDORULPL41PM NAME NKalyanam JBurkhardt HHamzehee" Flyon for MMarkley NKalyanam DATE 6126113 6/6113 05124113 6126113 6126113