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Revision 135 to the Technical Requirements Manual
	ML13134A122
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	04/26/2013
From:	; NextEra Energy Seabrook
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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SEABROOK STATION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL (SSTR) TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS PAGE Page 1 SSTR Rev. 135 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1-1.1 2.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL REVISION HISTORY 1-2.1 CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL SPECIF ICATION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM TAB 2.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Times 2-1.1 2.2 Engineered Safety Features Response Times 2-2.1 2.3 Loose Part Detection System 2-3.1 2.4 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program - Withdrawal Schedule 2-4.1 2.5 Not Used 2-5.1 2.6 Containment Isolation Valves 2-6.1 2.7 Fire Suppression Water System 2-7.1 2.8 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems 2-8.1 2.9 Fire Hose Stations 2-9.1 2.10 Yard Fire Hydrants and Hydrant Hose Houses 2-10.1 2.11 Fire Rated Assemblies 2-11.1 2.12 Fire Detection Instrumentation 2-12.1 2.13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices 2-13.1 2.14 Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices 2-14.1 2.15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources 2-15.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS PAGE Page 2 SSTR Rev. 135 2.16 Not Used 2-16.1 2.17 Accumulator Water Level and Pressure Instrumentation 2-17.1 2.18 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves 2-18.1 2.19 Feedwater Isolation on Low RCS Tave Coincident with Reactor Trip 2-19.1 2.20 Incore Detector System 2-20.1 2.21 Seismic Instrumentation 2-21.1 2.22 Meteorological Instrumentation 2-22.1 2.23 Turbine Overspeed Protection 2-23.1 2.24 Area Temperature Monitoring 2-24.1 2.25 Refueling Communications 2-25.1 2.26 Refueling Machine 2-26.1 2.27 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Areas 2-27.1 2.28 ESF Pump OPERABILITY Requirements 2-28.1 2.29 Boration Systems 2-29.1 2.30 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry 2-30.1 2.31 Supplemental Emergency Power System Availability Requirements 2-31.1 2.32 Hydrogen Monitors 2-32.1 2.33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric 2-33.1 2.34 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices and Protective 2.34.1 Devices for Class 1E Power Sources Connected to Non-Class 1E Circuits CHAPTER 3: CANCELLED CHAPTER 4: FUTURE TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS PAGE Page 3 SSTR Rev. 135 CHAPTER 5:

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT PROGRAMS & PROCEDURES TAB 5.1 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program 5-1.1 5.2 Deleted 5.3 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program 5-3.1 5.4 Standby Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection Program 5-4.1 5.5 Seabrook Station Snubber Inservice Inspection Program 5-5.1 5.6 Post Accident Assessment Program 5-6.1 CHAPTER 6: CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) 6-1.1 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PAGE REV PAGE REV Page 1 SSTR Rev. 135 Cover 135 TOC 1 thru TOC 3 135

LOEP 1 135 1-1.1 and 1-1.2 129 1-2.1 thru 1-2.4 135

2-1.1 and 2-1.2 94 2-2.1 thru 2-2.4 134

2-3.1 and 2-3.2 127 2-4.1 104

2-5.1 63 2-6.1 thru 2-6.11 133 2-7.1 thru 2-7.5 135

2-8.1 and 2-8.2 106 2-9.1 thru 2-9.4 134 2-10.1 and 2-10.2 106 2-11.1 thru 2-11.7 106 2-12.1 thru 2-12.10 130 2-13.1 thru 2-13.43 127 2-14.1 thru 2-14.6 133 2-15.1 thru 2-15.17 128

2-16.1 63

2-17.1 63 2-18.1 thru 2-18.3 63 2-19.1 and 2-19.2 106

2-20.1 106 2-21.1 thru 2-21.3 113 2-22.1 thru 2-22.3 106 2-23.1 and 2-23.2 118 2-24.1 thru 2-24.4 115 2-25.1 78

2-26.1 106

2-27.1 112

2-28.1 and 2-28.2 88 2-29.1 thru 2-29.9 122 2-30.1 and 2-30.2 86 2-31.1 and 2-31.2 99 2-32.1 106

2-33.1 thru 2-33.8 134 2-34.1 thru 2-34.3 126 5-1.1 thru 5-1.4 123 5-3.1 63 5-4.1 and 5-4.2 87 5-5.1 thru 5-5.5 124 5-6.1 80 6-1.1 thru 6-1.15 132 SEABROOK STATION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Chapter 1 - Introduction

1-1.1 SSTR Rev. 129

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The implementation of the Seabrook Station Technical Specification Improvement Program has resulted in certain "Technical Requirements" being removed from the Technical Specifications and incorporated in this manual. The Technical Requirements and changes to them shall be reviewed, approved, and issued in accordance with the instructions in the Regulatory Compliance Manual (NARC) Chapter 6, Section 1.0. The Technical Requirements (TR) maintained a format and language similar to the Technical Specifications (TS) as a matter of convenience. In many instances, however, the TRs require functionality of a structure, system, or component (SSC), rather than operability of the SSCs. Functionality is an attribute of SSCs that is not controlled by the TS. An SSC is functional or has functionality when it is capable of performing its specified function, as set forth in the

current licensing basis. Functionality does not apply to specified safety functions, but does apply to the ability of non-TS SSCs to perform other sp ecified functions that have a necessary support function. The TRs use the term operable only in reference to a TS-controlled attribute of an

SSC. Defined terms are shown in all capital letters in the TRs. The definitions contained in section 1.0, Definitions, of the TS apply to these terms (excluding the term FUNCTIONAL, which is defined in the preceding paragraph). Noncompliance with a Technical Requirement or Technical Requirement Program/Procedure will require action dependent upon the relationship to the Technical Specifications. For those Technical Requirements that maintain a corresponding Technical Specification the action shall

be that required by the corresponding Technical Specification. For those Technical Requirements that do not have a corresponding Technical Specification, the noncompliance constitutes a degraded or nonconforming condition that requires corrective action in accordance with Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 to correct or resolve the condition. Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, "Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, 'Information

to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability,'" provides guidance on the appropriate actions for a failure to conform to the UFSAR. In addition, station procedures initiate a timely risk assessment following a loss of functionality of equipment contained in the PRA model. When a TRM action requires an evaluation in accordance with the corrective action program, a condition report is initiated to document the failure to meet a Technical Requirement limiting

condition for operation. Then, Engineering evaluates the reported condition within 30 days in

accordance with PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action. The evaluation determines if the nonconforming condition should be restored to its current design, repaired to an alternate design, or accepted as-is. A work order is initiated when the evaluation determines the condition should be restored to its current design. When the evaluation determines the condition

will be restored to an alternate design or accepted for use as-is, Engineering will develop a design change. An evaluation is not required for non-compliance with a Technical Requirement limiting condition for operation resulting from surveillance testing or planned maintenance activities. These scheduled activities are managed under Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Risk Assessment (10 CFR 50.65).

1-1.2 SSTR Rev. 129 A Surveillance Requirement associated with a Technical Requirement may be considered met if the surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the stated surveillance interval. This 25%

extension facilitates surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may

not be suitable for conducting the surveillance test. This provision applies only to the surveillance requirements in Chapter 2 of this manual excluding (1) those controlled by the TS, and (2) the surveillance requirements specifically excluded in the individual Technical Requirements. Other programs, such as the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program contain testing requirements and frequencies in accordance with the regulations. This 25% extension

cannot be used to extend a test interval specified in the regulations. Further, this provision does not apply to the initial performance of surveillance test, but only to periodic surveillance tests that follow initial performance. The 25% extension is not intended to be used repeatedly merely

as an operational convenience to extend surveillance intervals, other than those consistent with

refueling intervals, beyond those specified.

1-2.1 SSTR Rev. 135 2.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL REVISION HISTORY Revision #

Description of Change SORC Meeting #

110 Incorporated UFCR 07-062 that implements Cycle 13 reload core per DCR 07-010, DCN-00.08-014 111 Incorporated UFCR 08-021 that removes the reference to OE 4.9 and replaces it with OE 3.6.

N/A 112 Incorporated UFCR 07-052. Added Additional Information on Dry Cask Loading operations.08-030 Incorporated UFCR 08-026. Added Table Notation (12) and (13) for the CBA Emergency Fan/Filter Actuation.

N/A 113 Incorporated UFCR 08-031. This change adds a discussion to TR 21 explaining that the Seabrook instrumentation self resets, and no action is required to restore the instrumentation to functional status following an actuation.

N/A 114 Editorial correction to TR 13, Sheet 14, in column "System Powered", changed CS to CC. (AR 196365196365

N/A 115 Incorporated UFCR 09-017 that revises TR 24 to replace OE 4.5 with EN-AA-203-1001.

N/A 116 Incorporated UFCR 09-015 that revised TR 29 to Eliminate Surveillance 4.1.2.2.b.

N/A 117 Incorporated UFCR 09-023 that implements Cycle 14 reload core and operation per EC145084.09-030 118 Incorporated UFCR 08-039 Rev. 1 that revised TR 23 and implements 07DCR005 (EC12635) Turbine Control System Replacement. Added Additional Information to reflect the difference between the old analog system and the new digital system. N/A Incorporated UFCR 09-028 that revised TR 14 and

incorporates TOL heater changes identified in EC 145115

Rev. 001.

N/A 119 Incorporated UFCR 10-006 that replaces the reference to procedure OE 3.6, Condition Reports, which has been

deleted, with a reference to PI-AA-205, Condition

Evaluation and Corrective Action.

N/A 1-2.2 SSTR Rev. 135 Revision #

Description of Change SORC Meeting #

120 Incorporated UFCR 09-016 that revised TR29-3.1.2.5 refueling water storage tank minimum contained borated water volume from 24,500 to 55,000 gallons.

N/A 121 Incorporated UFCR 10-017 to change FdH surveillance limits from 1.585 and 1.587 to 1.584.

N/A 122 Incorporated UFCR 10-010 Rev. 00 and Rev. 01 that revised TR29-3.1.2.5 and TR29-3.1.2.6 minimum contained borated water volume. In addition, Additional Information was

added to TR29-3.1.2.6.

N/A 123 Incorporated UFCR 10-009 to update referenced ASTM Specifications and Standards to allow for the use of improved analytical techniques and environmentally friendly

reagents.10-032 10-034 124 Incorporated UFCR 10-027 to reflect adopted 2004 Edition of ASME Section XI. IWF-5000 requires that snubbers shall be examined and tested in accordance with ASME/ANSI

OM, Part 4.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 10-028 that revised TR9 to allow

backup coverage for a hose to be a hose reel or a fire hydrant

or an equivalent water source.

N/A 125 Incorporated UFCR 11-006 COLR Chapter 6, Sections 1.0, changed cycle 14 to cycle 15, 2.5.1, changed +4.083 to

+4.089, 2.15.1 changed cycle 14 to cycle 15 and 2180 ppm to 2195 ppm, and replaced Table 1:W(Z, BU) versus Axial

Height.11-004 1-2.3 SSTR Rev. 135 Revision #

Description of Change SORC Meeting #

126 Incorporated UFCR 09-030 that revises TR 13, by removing MM-MM-29 from overcurrent protective devices.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 10-030 that revises TR 13 and TR 14. Approves the motor replacement for the Motor Operated

Valves (MOV) at locations 1-SI-V-17 and 1-RC-V-88.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 11-005, this change incorporates the information in LAR 10-03. The LAR relocated TS 3.8.4.2 as new Technical Requirement (TR) 34. Also, revises TR 13

and TR 15 to replace the reference to TS 3.8.4.2 with a

Reference to TR 34.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 11-013 that revises TR 6. This change

is an editorial change that corrects a cross reference, "Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements (SR) 4.6.3.1 does not exist, the correct reference is SR

4.6.3.3."

N/A 127 Incorporated UFCR 07-027 that revises TR 3. This reflects changes resulting from the complete replacement of the Loose Parts Monitoring System.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 11-007 that revises thermal overload trip time acceptance criteria in TR 13.

N/A 128 Incorporated UFCR 08-019 that revises TR 15. Added 1-RM-SKD-60 to Non-Class 1E Circuits.09-014 129 Incorporated UFCR 11-023 that revised TR 6 to add administrative controls to RC-V23 and RC-V88.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 11-025 that revises TR 12 to correct

inconsistency between TR 12-4.3.3.7.1 and Additional Information.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 11-028 that clarifies definitions in the Technical Specifications applying to terms in the Technical Requirements.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 11-029 that revises TR 7 to match the design and licensing basis requirement for 100% pump capacity at all times.

N/A 130 Incorporated UFCR 11-031 that revises TR 12 to make clearer the frequency of checking the alarm when detection

is nonfunctional.

N/A 1-2.4 SSTR Rev. 135 Revision #

Description of Change SORC Meeting #

131 Incorporated UFCR 12-016 that revises TR 9 to add a reference to provide a means to determine if a fire hose station (reel) is providing primary protection.

N/A 132 Incorporated UFCR 12-024 that revises Chapter 6 as result of the Cycle 16 core reload design safety analysis.12-033 133 Editorial correction to TR 6, Sheet 7, for valve numbers FW-V76#, FW-V82#, FW-V88# and FW-V94#, changed function name from "Feedwater" Isolation Check Valves to "EFW" Isolation Check Valves. (AR 1808128)

N/A Incorporated UFCR 12-028 that revises TR 14, for valve number SW-V4 changes overload heater and current range.

N/A 134 Incorporated UFCR 12-026 that revises TR 33 by removing battery backup time for computer points D8499 and D8500.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 12-031 that revises TR 9 to allow for containment hose stations to not be required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of entering Mode 5 from Mode 4 if containment is not being

opened for general access.

N/A Incorporated UFCR 13-005 that revises TR 2 function listed from "Service Water System" to "Service Water to SCCW

Isolation." N/A 135 Incorporated UFCR 13-002 that revises TR 7 to provide guidance as to the required actions when two or more fire pumps or water supplies are non-functional.

N/A SEABROOK STATION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Chapter 2 - Technical Specification Improvement Program

Technical Requirement 1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Times (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-1.1 SSTR Rev. 94 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

TR1 The response time of each Reactor Trip System (RTS) Function shown in Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1, shall be as specified herein.

APPLICABILITY

As shown in TS 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1.

ACTION: As specified in TS 3/4.3.1, Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The response time of each RTS Function is verified by TS Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.2.

Technical Requirement 1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Times (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-1.2 SSTR Rev. 94 FUNCTIONAL UNIT RESPONSE TIME

1. Manual Reactor Trip N. A. 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux

a. High Setpoint

< 0.5 second* b. Low Setpoint <

0.5 second* 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate

< 0.65 seconds*

4. Deleted

5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux N.A. 6. Source Range, Neutron Flux N.A.

7. Overtemperature T < 4 / < 2 seconds* (1) 8. Overpower T < 4 / < 2 seconds* (1) 9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low <

2 seconds 10. Pressurizer Pressure--High <

2 seconds 11. Pressurizer Water Level--High N.A.

12. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low

a. Single Loop (Above P-8) <

1 second b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8) <

1 second 13. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low <

2 seconds 14. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7) <

1.5 seconds

15. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7) <

0.6 second

16. Turbine Trip (Above P-9)

a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure N.A.

b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure N.A.

17. Safety Injection Input from ESF N.A.

18. Reactor Trip System Interlocks N.A.

19. Reactor Trip Breakers N.A.

20. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic N.A.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.

Note (1) - The acceptance criterion for the RTDs is 4.0 seconds (time constant response). The acceptance criterion for signal processing delay is 2.0 seconds (pure delay). Signal processing (pure) delay analytical margin may be re-allocated to the RTD time constant response upon approval from engineering.

Technical Requirement 2 Engineered Safety Features Response Times (Sheet 1 of 4) 2-2.1 SSTR Rev. 134 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR2 The response time of each Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) associated with the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) functions shown in Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.2, Table 3.3-3, shall be as specified herein.

APPLICABILITY

As shown in TS 3/4.3.2, Table 3.3-3.

ACTION: As specified in TS 3.3.2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The response time of each ESF is verified by TS Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.2.

Initiation Signal and Function Response Time in Seconds(7)(8) 1. Manual Initiation a. Safety Injection N.A. 1) Reactor Trip N.A. 2) Feedwater Isolation N.A. 3) Phase "A" Isolation N.A. 4) Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A. 5) Start Diesel Generator N.A. 6) Emergency Feedwater N.A. 7) CBA Emergency Fan/Filter Actuation N.A. 8) Service Water to SCCW Isolation N.A. b. Containment Spray N.A. 1) Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A. 2) Phase "B" Isolation N.A. c. Steam Line Isolation N.A. d. Phase "A" Containment Isolation N.A. 1) Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

Technical Requirement 2 Engineered Safety Features Response Times (Sheet 2 of 4) 2-2.2 SSTR Rev. 134 Initiation Signal and Function Response Time in Seconds(7)(8) 2. Containment Pressure-Hi-1 a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 30(1)(6) 1) Reactor Trip 2 2) Feedwater Isolation 11(3) 3) Phase "A" Isolation N.A. 4) Containment Ventilation Isolation 3.5 5) Emergency Feedwater N.A.

6) Service Water to SCCW Isolation 210(1) 7) Start Diesel Generator 12 8) CBA Emergency Fan/Filter Actuation 5(13) 3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 30(1)(6)/27(5) 1) Reactor Trip 2 2) Feedwater Isolation 11(3) 3) Phase "A" Isolation N.A. 4) Containment Ventilation Isolation 3.5 5) Emergency Feedwater 77/100 (9) 6) Service Water to SCCW Isolation 210(1) 7) Start Diesel Generators 12 8) CBA Emergency Fan/Filter Actuation 5(13) 4. Steam Line Pressure-Low a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 30(1)(6)/27(5) 1) Reactor Trip 2 2) Feedwater Isolation 11(3) 3) Phase "A" Isolation N.A. 4) Containment Ventilation Isolation 3.5 5) Emergency Feedwater 77/100(9) 6) Service Water to SCCW Isolation 210(1) 7) Start Diesel Generators 12 8) CBA Emergency Fan/Filter Actuation 5(13) b. Steam Line Isolation 6(10)

Technical Requirement 2 Engineered Safety Features Response Times (Sheet 3 of 4) 2-2.3 SSTR Rev. 134 Initiation Signal and Function Response Time in Seconds(7)(8) 5. Containment Pressure-Hi-3 a. Containment Spray 28(2)/37(1) b. Phase "B" Isolation N.A. 6. Containment Pressure-Hi-2

a. Steam Line Isolation 6(3) 7. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate-High

a. Steam Line Isolation 6(10) 8. Steam Generator Water Level-High-High (P-14)

a. Turbine Trip N.A. b. Feedwater Isolation 12(3) 9. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low a. Motor-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump 77/100(9) b. Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump 77/100(9) 10. RWST Level--Low-Low Coincident with Safety Injection

a. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump 30 11. Loss of Power

a. 4.16 kV Bus E5 and E6 (Loss of Voltage) N.A. 1) Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump N.A. 2) Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump N.A.

3) Diesel Generator 12.0 b. 4.16 kV Bus E5 and E6 Degraded Voltage Coincident with Safety Injection N.A. 12. Low RCS Tave Coincident with Rx Trip a. Feedwater Isolation N.A.

13. Containment On Line Purge Radiation - High a. Containment Ventilation Isolation N.A.

14. Control Room - Hi Radiation

a. CBA Emergency Fan/Filter Actuation 5(11) (12) (13)

Technical Requirement 2 Engineered Safety Features Response Times (Sheet 4 of 4) 2-2.4 SSTR Rev. 134 Table Notations (1) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

(2) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delay not included. Offsite power available. (3) Hydraulic-pneumatic gate valve. (4) Not used.

(5) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Only centrifugal charging pumps included. A total of 27 seconds is allowed for establishment of the centrifugal charging pump ECCS injection flow path. The 27-second delay includes time for the RWST and VCT

outlet isolation valves to travel to their required positions. (6) The VCT outlet isolation valve is allowed an additional 10 seconds from the response time shown in the table. (7) No credit was taken in the accident analyses for functional units with response times indicated as N.A. (8) ESF response time is defined as the time interval from when a monitored parameter exceeds its actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing the

safety function. (9) An additional 23 seconds is allowed for isolation of the EFW flow control valve on high EFW flow. (10) Includes 5 seconds for valve stroke time and a conservative value of 1 second for signal actuation time. (11) Not required to demonstrate operability in accordance with TS 3/4.3.2 and Table 3.3-3. (12) Radiation detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the Control Room Hi Radiation signal shall be measured from the control module output. (13) A 30-second delay is conservatively applied in the accident analysis for margin to account for the time to reach the signal, the diesel generator start time and damper actuation and positioning time.

Technical Requirement 3 Loose-Part Detection System (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-3.1 SSTR Rev. 127 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR3-3.3.3.8 The Loose-Part Detection System shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

As determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. An evaluation is not required if the noncompliance is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TR3-4.3.3.8 Each channel of the Loose-Part Detection Systems shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL by performance of:

a. A CHANNEL CHECK on each active channel at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each active channel at least once per 31 days, and c. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

UFSAR Section 4.4.6.4 describes the Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) and provides a comparison of the LPMS with each of the regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide 1.133, Rev. 1, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water Cooled Reactors." The loose parts monitoring system provides for the early detec tion of a loose part within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the acquisition of data to aid plant personnel to determine the significance of the alert

signal and the potential safety significance if a loose part is shown to be present.

Technical Requirement 3 Loose-Part Detection System (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-3.2 SSTR Rev. 127 The Loose Parts Monitoring System consists of sixteen sensor channels to detect loose part impacts in the vicinity of six natural collection regions where a loose part is expected to situate itself in the reactor coolant system. These channels provide audible capability, alert alarms and input into a data acquisition system capable of digitally archiving sensor waveforms for the alarming channel and its three nearest neighbors. Upon alarm, the system defaults to recording and displaying the alarming channel as well as the three nearest channels. The system is capable of immediate visual and audio monitoring of all signals. Data acquisition is normally acquired by automatic actuation when the LPMS alarm is received; however, the data acquisition system is capable of being manually started. Thus, the ability to record data is available whether the data acquisition system is actuated automatically or manually. With a Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) alarm present (i.e., pre-determined alert level exceeded), diagnostic steps are required to be taken within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to determine whether a loose part is present and to determine its safety significance. To perform the diagnosis, the capability must exist to

view sensor signal data and evaluate present and past data for trends. It should be noted that exceeding an alert level cannot be construed that a loose part is present since other events such as Control Rod movement, flow noise and electronic spikes can momentarily cause an alarm condition.

2-4.1 SSTR Rev. 104 Technical Requirement 4 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillan ce Program - Withdrawal Schedule LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR4 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined to determine changes in material properties as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. The results of these examinations shall be used to update TS 3.4.9.1, Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION: As determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE CAPSULE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE The following surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule meets the requirements of ASTM E185-82 and is recommended for future capsules to be removed from the reactor vessel. This recommended removal schedule is applicable to 32 EFPY of operation.

Surveillance Capsule Vessel Azimuthal Location (degrees)

Lead Factor (a) Removal Time (EFPY)(b) Removal After Operation of Cycle Fluence (n/cm 2) U 58.5 3.96 0.91 1 3.142 1018 (c) Y 241 3.74 5.57 5 1.292 1019 (c) V 61 3.78 12.39 10 2.669 1019 (c) X 238.5 4.11 21(d) 16 4.74 1019 (d) W 121.5 4.10 Standby (e) (e) (e) Z 301.5 4.10 Standby (e) (e) (e) Notes (a) Updated in Capsule V dosimetry analysis. (b) Effective Full-Power Years (EFPYs) from plant startup. (c) Actual plant evaluation calculated fluence. (d) Estimated removal of Capsule X near 21 EFPYs at End-of-Cycle 16. Capsule fast fluence approaches a factor of 2 times the maximum vessel base metal IR fast fluence at 32 EFPYs. (e) Capsules W and Z to be withdrawn within one cycle of the removal of Capsule X. Upon removal, Capsules W and Z to be placed in storage.

25% surveillance interval extension is not applicable 2-5.1 SSTR Rev. 63 Technical Requirement 5 NOT USED Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 1 of 11) 2-6.1 SSTR Rev. 133 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR6 The isolation times of each Containment Is olation Valve (CIV) required to be OPERABLE by Technical Specification 3.6.3 shall be as specified herein. Note: The isolation times are for those valves that receive an automatic containment isolation signal (i.e., a Phase A or Phase B containment isolation signal, a containment ventilation isolation signal, or for the charging line isolation valve: a safety injection signal). The valve isolation times are those required to meet 10 CFR 100 limits.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: As specified in TS 3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The isolation time of each CIV is demonstrated by TS Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.3.

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 2 of 11) 2-6.2 SSTR Rev. 133 A PHASE "A" ISOLATION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

CAH-FV6572 Radiation Monitoring Skid 60 Inlet 2 CAH-FV6573 Radiation Monitoring Skid 60 Inlet 2 CAH-FV6574 Radiation Monitoring Skid 60 Outlet 2 CGC-V14 Containment Enclosure Exhaust Filter Isolation 12 CGC-V28 Containment Enclosure Exhaust Filter Isolation 12 CS-V149 Reactor Coolant Letdown 10 CS-V150 Reactor Coolant Letdown 10 CS-V167 RCP Seal Water/Excess Letdown Return 10 CS-V168 RCP Seal Water/Excess Letdown Return 10 IA-530 IA Cross Connect 10 NG-FV4609 Nitrogen Gas Supply 2 NG-FV4610 Nitrogen Gas Supply 2 NG-V13 Accumulator Nitrogen Supply 10 NG-V14 Accumulator Nitrogen Supply 10 RC-FV2830 PZR Steam Sample 2 RC-FV2831 PZR Liquid Sample 2 RC-FV2832 RCS Loop 1 Sample 2 RC-FV2833 RCS Loop 3 Sample 2 RC-FV2836 PZR Relief Tank Gas Sample 2 RC-FV2837 PZR Relief Tank Gas Sample 2 RC-FV2840 PZR Steam/Liquid Sample 2 RC-FV2874 Loop 1 Sample 2 RC-FV2876 RCS Loop 3 Sample 2

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 3 of 11) 2-6.3 SSTR Rev. 133 MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

RH-V27# RHR Test Line 10 RH-V28# RHR Test Line 10 RH-V49# RHR Test Line 10 RMW-V30 Reactor Makeup Water 10 SB-V9# SG Blowdown 10 SB-V1O# SG Blowdown 10 SB-V11# SG Blowdown 10 SB-V12# SG Blowdown 10 SI-V62 Accumulator Fill and Test Line 10 SI-V70 Accumulator Fill and Test Line 10 SI-V131# SI Test Line 10 SI-V134# SI Test Line 10 SI-V157 Accumulator Fill and Test Line 10 SI-V158# SI Test Line 10 SI-V160# SI Test Line 10 SS-FV2857* Post Accident Sample Flush Tank Drain 2 VG-FV1661 Hydrogenated Equipment Vent Header 2 VG-FV1712 Hydrogenated Equipment Vent Header 2 WLD-FV8330 Containment Floor Drains 2 WLD-FV8331 Containment Floor Drains 2 WLD-V81 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank 10 WLD-V82 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank 10

Not subject to Type C leakage test

May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. See page 2-6.11 for administrative control requirements.

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 4 of 11) 2-6.4 SSTR Rev. 133 B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

CC-V57 PCCW Loop A Supply 10 CC-V121 PCCW Loop A Return 10 CC-V122 PCCW Loop A Return 10 CC-V168 PCCW Loop A Supply 10 CC-V175 PCCW Loop B Supply 14 CC-V176 PCCW Loop B Supply 14 CC-V256 PCCW Loop B Return 10 CC-V257 PCCW Loop B Return 10

C. CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

COP-V1 Containment On-Line Purge 2 COP-V2 Containment On-Line Purge 2 COP-V3 Containment On-Line Purge 2 COP-V4 Containment On-Line Purge 2

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 5 of 11) 2-6.5 SSTR Rev. 133 D. MANUAL MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

CGC-V3#* Hydrogen Analyzer Outlet NA CGC-V10#* Hydrogen Analyzer Inlet NA CGC-V15* Containment Exhaust Filter ORC Isolation NA CGC-V24#* Hydrogen Analyzer Outlet NA CGC-V32#* Hydrogen Analyzer Inlet NA CGC-V36* Containment Exhaust Filter ORC Isolation NA CGC-V43* Compressed Air Supply to Containment NA CGC-V44* Compressed Air Supply to Containment NA CGC-V45 Portable Air Compressor Connection NA DM-V4* Demineralized Water Supply NA DM-V5 Demineralized Water Supply NA FP-V592* Containment Fire Protection Header NA LD-V1 Leak Detection NA LD-V2 Leak Detection NA SA-V229 Containment Service Air NA SA-V1042 Containment Service Air NA SF-V86 Refueling Cavity Cleanup NA SF-V87 Refueling Cavity Cleanup NA

Not subject to Type C leakage test

May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. See page 2-6.11 for administrative control requirements.

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 6 of 11) 2-6.6 SSTR Rev. 133 E. OTHER MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

CAH-V12 Radiation Monitoring Skid 60 IRC Check NA CBS-V8# Containment Sump NA CBS-V11 Containment Spray Header NA CBS-V12 Containment Spray Header Check NA CBS-V14# Containment Sump NA CBS-V17 Containment Spray Header NA CBS-V18 Containment Spray Header Check NA CC-V410 PCCW Loop A Return Relief NA CC-V474 PCCW Loop B Return Relief NA CC-V840 PCCW Loop B Supply Relief NA CC-V845 PCCW Loop A Supply Relief NA CC-V1092# PCCW Thermal Barrier Loop B Supply NA CC-V1095# PCCW Thermal Barrier Loop B Return NA CC-V1101# PCCW Thermal Barrier Loop A Supply NA CC-V1109# PCCW Thermal Barrier Loop A Return NA CGC-V4# Hydrogen Analyzer Outlet IRC Check NA CGC-V25# Hydrogen Analyzer Outlet IRC Check NA CGC-V46 Compressed Air Supply IRC Check NA CS-V4# RCP 1A Seal Water Check NA CS-V20# RCP 1B Seal Water Check NA CS-V36# RCP 1C Seal Water Check NA CS-V52# RCP 1D Seal Water Check NA CS-V143# Normal Charging 10

Not subject to Type C leakage test

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 7 of 11) 2-6.7 SSTR Rev. 133 MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

CS-V144# Normal Charging Check NA CS-V154# RCP 1D Seal Water NA CS-V158# RCP 1C Seal Water NA CS-V162# RCP 1B Seal Water NA CS-V166# RCP 1A Seal Water NA CS-V794 RCP Seal Water/Excess Letdown Return Relief NA DM-V18 Containment Demineralized Water Supply Relief NA FP-V588 Containment Fire Protection Header IRC Check NA FW-V30# Feedwater Isolation NA FW-V39# Feedwater Isolation NA FW-V48# Feedwater Isolation NA FW-V57# Feedwater Isolation NA FW-V76# EFW Isolation Check Valves NA FW-V82# EFW Isolation Check Valves NA FW-V88# EFW Isolation Check Valves NA FW-V94# EFW Isolation Check Valves NA IA-V531 IA Cross Connect Check NA MS-PV3001# Atmospheric Steam Dump NA MS-PV3002# Atmospheric Steam Dump NA MS-PV3003# Atmospheric Steam Dump NA MS-PV3004# Atmospheric Steam Dump NA MS-V6# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V7# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V8# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V9# Main Steam Safety NA

Not subject to Type C leakage test

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 8 of 11) 2-6.8 SSTR Rev. 133 MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

MS-V10# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V22# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V23# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V24# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V25# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V26# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V36# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V37# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V38# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V39# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V40# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V50# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V51# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V52# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V53# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V54# Main Steam Safety NA MS-V86# Main Steam Isolation NA MS-V88# Main Steam Isolation NA MS-V90# Main Steam Isolation NA MS-V92# Main Steam Isolation NA MS-V393# EFW Pump Steam Supply Isolation NA MS-V394# EFW Pump Steam Supply Isolation NA MS-V204# Main Steam Isolation Bypass NA MS-V205# Main Steam Isolation Bypass NA MS-V206# Main Steam Isolation Bypass NA MS-V207# Main Steam Isolation Bypass NA MSD-V44# Main Steam Drain Isolation NA

Not subject to Type C leakage test

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 9 of 11) 2-6.9 SSTR Rev. 133 MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

MSD-V45# Main Steam Drain Isolation NA MSD-V46# Main Steam Drain Isolation NA MSD-V47# Main Steam Drain Isolation NA RC-FV2894* RCS Loop 1 Sample NA RC-FV2896* RCS Loop 3 Sample NA RC-V23* RHR Pump Suction From RCS Loop 1 NA RC-V24 RHR Pump Suction Relief NA RC-V88* RHR Pump Suction From RCS Loop 3 NA RC-V89 RHR Pump Suction Relief NA RC-V312 Pressurizer Sample Relief NA RC-V314 RCS Loop 1 Sample Relief NA RC-V337 RCS Loop 3 Sample Relief NA RH-V14# RHR Cold Leg Injection NA RH-V15# RHR Cold Leg Injection Check NA RH-V26# RHR Cold Leg Injection NA RH-V29# RHR Cold Leg Injection Check NA RH-V30# RHR Cold Leg Injection Check NA RH-V31# RHR Cold Leg Injection Check NA RH-V32# RHR Hot Leg Injection NA RH-V50# RHR Hot Leg Injection Check NA RH-V51# RHR Hot Leg Injection Check NA RH-V70# RHR Hot Leg Injection NA RMW-V29 Reactor Makeup Water IRC Check NA SF-V101 Refueling Cavity Cleanup Relief NA

Not subject to Type C leakage test

May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. See page 2-6.11 for administrative control requirements.

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 10 of 11) 2-6.10 SSTR Rev. 133 MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION (Seconds)

SI-V77# SI Hot Leg Injection NA SI-V81# SI Hot Leg Injection Check NA SI-V86# SI Hot Leg Injection Check NA SI-V102# SI Hot Leg Injection NA SI-V106# SI Hot Leg Injection Check NA SI-V110# SI Hot Leg Injection Check NA SI-V114# SI Cold Leg Injection NA SI-V118# SI Cold Leg Injection Check NA SI-V122# SI Cold Leg Injection Check NA SI-V126# SI Cold Leg Injection Check NA SI-V130# SI Cold Leg Injection Check NA SI-V138# CS Cold Leg Injection NA SI-V139# CS Cold Leg Injection NA SI-V140# CS Cold Leg Injection Check NA SI-V247 Accumulator Fill/Test Header Relief NA SS-V273 Post Accident Sample Flush Tank Drain IRC Check NA WLD-V209 Sump "B" to FDT Relief NA WLD-V213 PDT to RC Drain Tank Relief NA

Not subject to Type C leakage test

Technical Requirement 6 Containment Isolation Valves (Sheet 11 of 11) 2-6.11 SSTR Rev. 133 Administrative Control Requirements for Opening of Locked or Sealed Closed Containment Isolation Valves The opening of locked or sealed closed Containment Isolation Valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations pursuant to USNRC Generic Letter 91-08: (1) Stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the Control Room, at the valve controls, (2) Instructing this operator to close these valve(s) in an accident situation, and (3) Assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. The residual heat removal (RHR) suction valves, RC-V23 and RC-V88, may be opened under administrative control to support operation of the RHR system in Mode 4. Because these valves are normally operated from the control room, either of the two required licensed operators in the control room may be credited as the operator required for administrative control to close the valves under

accident conditions as directed by procedures. If the above administrative control requirements are maintained during opening of a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve, entry into the ACTION statement of Technical Specification 3.6.3 is not required.

NOTE In addition to the containment isolation valves having an

in this table, all vents, drains, test connections and instrument isolation valves which are located outside containment (e.g., acceptable environmental conditions), but within the outside containment isolation boundary may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control without entry into the ACTION statement of Technical

Specification 3.6.3.

Technical Requirement 7 Fire Suppression Water System (Sheet 1 of 5) 2-7.1 SSTR Rev. 135 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR7-3.7.9.1 The Fire Suppression Water System shall be FUNCTIONAL with: a. At least three fire suppression pumps with their discharge aligned to the fire suppression header. b. Two separate water supplies, each with a minimum contained volume of 215,000 gallons. c. A FUNCTIONAL flow path capable of taking suction from the fire water tank and transferring the water through distribution piping with FUNCTIONAL sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves, the last valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe, and the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each deluge or spray system required to be FUNCTIONAL per Technical Requirements 8, 9, and 10.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION: a. With a fire pump(s), water supply nonfunctional: 1. With one pump nonfunctional, restore the nonfunctional equipment to FUNCTIONAL status within 7 days or provide an alternate backup pump. 2. With more than one pump nonfunctional, restore the system with at least two pumps FUNCTIONAL within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or pr ovide an alternate backup pump(s). 3. With one water supply nonfunctional, restore the nonfunctional equipment to FUNCTIONAL status within 30 days or provide an alternate backup - supply. 4. With both water supplies nonfunctional, restore at least one water supply to FUNCTIONAL status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or provide an altern ate backup - supply. b. With the Fire Suppression Water System flow path nonfunctiona l and incapable of delivering the required flow to any spray or sprinkler system, fire hose station, or yard fire hydrant required to be FUNCTIONAL by TR 8, 9 or 10, establish a backup Fire Suppression Water System for th e affected spray or sprinkler system, fire hose station, or yard fire hydrant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Technical Requirement 7 Fire Suppression Water System (Sheet 2 of 5) 2-7.2 SSTR Rev. 135 c. With a sectionalizing control or isolation valve nonfunctional and open:

1. Verify the capability exists to isolate the portion of the fire header normally isolated by the nonfunctional valve, or establish a backup fire suppression system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; and

2. Restore the valve to FUNCTIONAL status in a time frame determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Correction Action Program. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR7-4.7.9.1.1 The Fire Suppression Water System shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 7 days by verifying the contained water supply volume of at least 215,000 gallons per tank. b. At least once per 31 days by starting the electric motor-driven pump and operating it for at least 15 minutes on recirculation flow. c. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position. d. At least once per 12 months by performance of a system flush. e. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel. f. At least once per 18 months by performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its operating sequence, and: (1) verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position, (2) verifying that each pump develops at least 900 gpm at a total developed head of 295 feet, (3) cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and (4) verifying that the fire suppression pumps start sequentially to maintain the Fire Suppression Water System pressure gr eater than or equal to 125 psig. g. At least once per 3 years by performing a flow test of the system in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of the Fire Protection Handbook, 14th Edition, published by the National Fire Protection Association.

Technical Requirement 7 Fire Suppression Water System (Sheet 3 of 5) 2-7.3 SSTR Rev. 135 TR7-4.7.9.1.2 Each fire pump diesel engine shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 31 days by verifying: 1) The fuel storage tank contains at least 209 gallons of fuel, and 2) The diesel starts from ambient conditions and operates for at least 30 minutes on recirculation flow. b. By verifying that the new fuel is diesel, pr ior to addition to the st orage tank(s), and has: 1) A Kinematic viscosity, at 40

ºC, of greater than or equa l to 1.4 centistokes but less than or equal to 5.8 centistokes; or 2) An API gravity of greater than or equa l to 30 degrees but less than or equal to 42 degrees; and 3) Verifying that the fuel is free of water and visible debris or particulates. Samples which contain visible particulates shall be verified to contain less than 10 mg/liter total particulate contamination when tested in accordance with Technical Requirement Program 5.1. c. At least once per 92 days verify that the fu el oil is free of water and visible debris or particulates. Samples which cont ain visible particulates shall be verified to contain less than 10 mg/liter total particulate contamination when tested in accordance with Technical Requirement Program 5.1. d. At least once per 18 months by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service. TR7-4.7.9.1.3 The fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery bank shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that: 1) The electrolyte level of each battery is above the plates, and 2) The overall battery voltage is greater than or equal to 24 volts. b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that the specific gravity is appropriate for continued service of the battery. c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that: 1) The batteries, cell plates, and battery r acks show no visual in dication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and

2) The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anticorrosion material.

Technical Requirement 7 Fire Suppression Water System (Sheet 4 of 5) 2-7.4 SSTR Rev. 135 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Technical Requirement 7 deals with functionality of the fire suppre ssion water system (fire protection system). The limiting condition for operation TR7-3.7.9.1.c describes functionality in terms of available flow paths capable of distribution to those branches required by TRs 8, 9, and 10. If the flow path is incapable of delivering the required fl ow of fire water to any spray or sprinkler system, fire hose station, or yard fire hydrant required to be FUNCTIONAL by TR 8, 9, or 10, action b requires establishing a backup Fire Suppression Water System for the affected spray or sprinkler system, fire hose station, or yard fire hydrant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . A functional flow path also requires that the sectionalizing control and isolation valves are functional as demonstrated by periodic surveillance tests that cycle each valve through one complete cycle of full travel. Post indi cator isolation valves ar e provided at strategic locations in the underground loop header to allow for sectionalization during maintenance and repair, and to provide flow from the pumping facilities in either of two different directions in the event of a line break. Post indicator valves are also positioned in the loop header to isolate the loop between the take-offs for primary suppression and secondary systems.

As a result, with a sectionalizing control or isolation valve nonfunctional and open, action c requires verification that capability exists to isolate the portion of the fire header normally isolated by the nonfunctional valve and to maintain availability of the remaining portions (non-isolated sections) of the fire header. If this capability no longer exists such that a break in the fire header could result in a non-isolable leak or a comple te loss of the fire water headers, then the action requires establishing a backup fire suppression system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . In the event a valve becomes nonfu nctional and renders the flow pa th incapable of delivering the required flow to any spray or sprinkler system, fire hose station, or yard fire hydrant required to be FUNCTIONAL by TR 8, 9, or 10, action b is applicable. However, if the nonfunctional valve remains open and does not adversely affect the flow path, the valve should be restored to functional status in a time frame determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. Due to the multi-loop design of the FP system, one or more ring header isolation valves could be closed and still maintain a functional flow path to all of the required branches described by the TRs 8, 9, and 10. Furthermore, unlike other systems, the administra tive closure of a ring head er isolation valve should not be cause to declare an entrance into the action statement because where two functional flow paths had once existed, one functional flow path remains.

The surveillance requiremen t of TR7-4.7.9.1.1.c is to verify that the valves are in the correct position. Therefore, a valve whose "normal" position is open but at the time of the surveillance is administratively controlled (tagged) closed, would ha ve to be closed to be in the "correct" position at the time of the surveillance.

When a valve under administrative control (valve tagging order) is moved from its "normal" position to a different position, this different position (open or closed) becomes the "correct" position of the valve due to the tagging order. Prior to the issuance of a tagging order, an evaluation should be performed to determine the impact on the system of that tagging order and any required actions that would have to be taken due to the order.

Technical Requirement 7 Fire Suppression Water System (Sheet 5 of 5) 2-7.5 SSTR Rev. 135 Fire Tank Supply The system is designed with separa te but not independent tanks and share some common flow paths. The water supply for the fire protection system is stored in two 500,000-ga llon tanks. 300,000 gallons in each tank is reserved exclusively for fire protection by means of vertical standpipes. This standpipe extends up to the 300,000-gallon level in each ta nk and provides a source of water for non-fire protection service. The Technical Requirement minimum volume of water in each tank is 215,000 gallons. The suction piping to the three fire pumps is arranged to permit suction from either or both of the two fire water storage tanks. The manual valves in the suction piping to the fire pumps and in the relief valve header permit isolati on of either storage tank.

The fire tanks are not train redundant water supplies. Two tanks are provided so that the minimum required water supply will be available if one of the tanks is nonfunctional. There is the capability to isolate the water tanks from each other and maintain the water supply to the fire pumps. Placing a tank out of service does not cause any of the fire pumps to become nonfunctional.

As written in the Safety Evaluation Report it is acceptable for the fire pumps to take suction from both water storage tanks. Isolation valves provide the capability to separate the tanks.

Battery Charger The purpose of the battery charger is to maintain the batteries functional. The surveillance verifies the batteries are functional every 7 days thus indirectly verifying the ch arger is functioni ng properly. A non-functioning charger does not di rectly cause the diesel fire pump to become nonfunctional.

Fire Pump Sequential Start Testing The purpose of the sequential start test is to verify the functionality of the system design. The three fire pumps are designed so the electric motor driven fire pump starts at 127 psig decreasing with the time delay relay set at minimal delay. The first diesel driven pump will start at 127 psig decreasing with a ten-second-time delay and the second diesel driven pump will start at 127 psig decreasing with a twenty-second-time delay.

The pumps shall be tested by verifying: (1) that the start pressure switch generates a start signal at a pressure greater than or equal to 125 psig, (2) the time delay relay generates a start signal after the appropriate delay and (3) the pump st arts and restores the fire suppres sion water system pressure greater than or equal to 125 psig. Fire Pump Surveillance For surveillances or minor maintenance activities that remove a fire pump(s) from service, either ENTER TR7-3.7.9.1 action a or personnel shall remain in the vicinity of the pump(s) available to quickly restore the pump(s) to a FUNCTIONAL status in the event of a fire. If personnel remain in the vicinity and the pump(s) is able to be immediately restored, TR entry is not required.

Technical Requirement 8 Spray and Sprinkler Systems (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-8.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR8-3.7.9.2 The Spray and Sprinkler Systems in the following table shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the Spray and/or Sprinkler System is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION: With one or more of the above required Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems nonfunctional, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establis h an hourly fire watch patrol. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR8-4.7.9.2 Each of the required Spray and Sprinkle r Systems shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position, b. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel, c. At least once per 18 months: 1) By performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system, and:

a) Verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a simulated test signal, and b) Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel. 2) By a visual inspection of the dry pipe spray and sprinkler headers to verify their integrity; and 3) By a visual inspection of each nozzle's spra y area to verify the spray pattern is not obstructed.

Technical Requirement 8 Spray and Sprinkler Systems (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-8.2 SSTR Rev. 106 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR8-4.7.9.2 (continued) d. At least once per 3 years by performing an air flow test through each open head spray/sprinkler header and verifying each open head spray/sprinkler nozzle is unobstructed. REQUIRED SPRAY / SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

a. Cable Spreading Room

1) System 1

2) System 2

3) System 3

4) System 4

5) System 5

d. Electrical Tunnel - Train A

b. Diesel Generator Building - Train A

1) Fuel Oil Storage Tank System

2) Redundant Fuel Oil Storage Tank System

3) Fuel Oil Day Tank System

4) Fuel Oil Pipe Trench System

5) Diesel Generator Room System

6) Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room Sump System

e. Electrical Tunnel - Train B

c. Diesel Generator Building - Train B

1) Fuel Oil Storage Tank System

2) Redundant Fuel Oil Storage Tank System

3) Fuel Oil Day Tank System

4) Fuel Oil Pipe Trench System

5) Diesel Generator Room System 6) Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room Sump System f. Primary Auxiliary Building

1) Electrical Chase a. Vertical Portion of Fire Area PAB-F-1G-A b. Horizontal Portion of Fire Area PAB-F-1G-A 2) Elevation 25' Area System

Technical Requirement 9 Fire Hose Stations (Sheet 1 of 4) 2-9.1 SSTR Rev. 134 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR9-3.7.9.3 The fire hose station specified in the following table shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION: With one or more of the fire hose stations nonfunctional, provide gated wye(s) on the nearest FUNCTIONAL hose station(s), fire hydrant or equivalent water source. One outlet of the wye shall be connected to the standard length of hose if provided at that location. The second outlet of the wye shall

be connected to a length of hose sufficient to pr ovide coverage for the area left unprotected by the nonfunctional hose station. The above ACTION requirement shall be accomplished within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Per the BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A Report, there are no fire hose stations that are the primary means of fire suppression. Note: Where it can be demonstrated that the physical routing of the fire hose would result in a recognizable hazard to operating technicians, plant equipment, or the hose itself, the fire hose shall be stored in a roll at the outlet of the FUNCTIONAL hose station, fire hydrant or equivalent water source. Signs shall be mounted above the gated wye(s) to identify the proper

hose to use.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR9-4.7.9.3 The fire hose stations shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 31 days, by a visual inspection of the fire hose stations accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station. b. At least once per 18 months, by: 1) Visual inspection of the stations not accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station, 2) Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and 3) Inspecting all gaskets and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings. c. At least once per 3 years, by: 1) Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve FUNCTIONALITY and no flow blockage, and 2) Conducting a hose hydrostatic (service) test at a minimum pressure of 250 psig.

Technical Requirement 9 Fire Hose Stations (Sheet 2 of 4) 2-9.2 SSTR Rev. 134 LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE REEL NUMBER EMRG. FW BLDG.

West end opposite door 27' 71West end in stairway 27' 62 EQUIPMENT VAULTS North Vault

-50' 27 South Vault

-50' 26 North Vault

-31' 25 South Vault

-31' 24 North Vault 3' 23 South Vault 3' 22 CONTROL BUILDING Stairway 21' 30 Turbine Bldg. by door to Essential Swg Rm. A 21' 8A Stairway 50' 29Turbine Bldg. by door to Cable Spd. Rm.

50' 15A Stairway 75' 28 Turbine Bldg. by tornado door 75' 20A DIESEL GEN. BLDG.

"A" Train in stairway 6'- 6" 67"B" Train in stairway 6'- 6" 70"A" Train in stairway 21' 66"B" Train in stairway 21' 69"A" Train in stairway 51' 65"B" Train in stairway 51' 68 Technical Requirement 9 Fire Hose Stations (Sheet 3 of 4) 2-9.3 SSTR Rev. 134 LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE REEL NUMBER ELECTRICAL TUNNELS "A" Train - West stairway 0' 63A"A" Train - East stairway 0' 63"B" Train - West end of Tunnel

-20' 64A"B" Train - East stairway

-26' 64 PRI. AUX. BLDG. (PAB)

Piping Penetration Area

-26' 37B Piping Penetration Area

-26' 37C North stairway

-6' 37Outside Demineralizer Access Room

-6' 37A North stairway 7' 36 South stairway 7' 38 North stairway 25' 34 South stairway 25' 35 North stairway 53' 33 South stairway 53' 32Outside HVAC Eq. Room 81' 31 FUEL STORAGE BLDG.

Outside SF pump area 7' 49By West doorway 21' 48By West stairway 64' 47 MAIN STM - FW PIPECHASE South stairway 12' 22A South stairway 21' 22B Technical Requirement 9 Fire Hose Stations (Sheet 4 of 4) 2-9.4 SSTR Rev. 134 LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE REEL NUMBER CONTAINMENT 1 2 Approx. 55° on outside wall

-26' 53Approx. 130° by "C" accumulator

-26' 51 Approx. 210°

-26' 60 Approx. 320° by stairway

-26' 57 Approx. 55° 0' 54 Approx. 120° by equip. hatch 0' 52 Approx. 220° opposite inst. rack 0' 61 Approx. 310° 0' 58Approx. 65° behind H2 recom.

25' 55 Approx. 135° by equip. hatch 25' 50 Approx. 225° 25' 59 Approx. 310° by personnel hatch 25' 56 1 a) Containment fire hose stations are not required to be functional a maximum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to establishing containment integrity. b) Containment fire hose stations shall be functional within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of entering Mode 5 from Mode 4, and in Mode 6 unless containment integrity is going to be maintained for the duration of the time the station is in Mode 5 and there is an assigned operator to open valve 1-FP-V-592.

2 Containment fire hose stations are not required to be functional a maximum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to and during the performance of the Type A containment leakage rate test. However, the fire hose stations shall be functional within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the completion of the Type A test.

Technical Requirement 10 Yard Fire Hydrants a nd Hydrant Hose Houses (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-10.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR10-3.7.9.4 The yard fire hydrants and associated hydrant hose houses shown in the following table shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the yard fire hydrants is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION: With one or more of the yard fire hydrants or associated hydrant hose hou ses nonfunctional, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months have sufficient additional lengths of 2 1/2 inch diameter hose located in an adjacent FUNCTIONAL hydrant hose house to provide service to the unprotected area(s) if the nonfunctional fire hydrant or associated hydrant hose house is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise, provide the additional hose within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR10-4.7.9.4 The yard fire hydrants and associated hydrant hose houses shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 31 days, by visual insp ection of the hydrant hos e house to assure all required equipment is at the hose house. b. At least once per 6 months (once duri ng March, April, or May and once during September, October or November), by visual ly inspecting each yard fire hydrant and verifying that the hydrant barrel is dry and that the hydrant is not damaged. c. At least once per 12 months by: 1) Conducting a hose hydrostatic (service) test at a minimum pressure of 250 psig, 2) Inspecting all the gasket s and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings, and 3) Performing a flow check of each hydrant to verify its FUNCTIONALITY.

Technical Requirement 10 Yard Fire Hydrants a nd Hydrant Hose Houses (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-10.2 SSTR Rev. 106 LOCATION HYDRANT NO. HOSE HOUSE NUMBER CONTROL BUILDING Outside "B" Diesel doorway 17A HH9A Opposite stairway door 16 DIESEL GEN. BLDG. Outside "B" Diesel doorway 17A HH9ASoutheast of Diesel Gen. Bldg.

16 FUEL STORAGE BLDG. South of Pri. Aux. Bldg. (PAB) 6 HH4 Opposite Fuel Storage Bldg.

7 Southeast of Fuel Storage Bldg.

8 HH5PRI. AUX. BLDG. (PAB) South of Pri. Aux. Bldg.

6 HH4 Outside "B" Diesel doorway 17A HH9ANorthwest of Primary Aux. Bldg.

16 Southeast of Primary Aux. Bldg.

7 SERV. WTR. PUMP HOUSE Southwest of Serv. Wtr. Pump House 8 HH5South of Serv. Water Pump House 26 SERV. WTR. COOLING TOWER East end of Cooling Tower 5A HH10MAIN STM - FW PIPECHASE Near South entrance to pipechase 9 HH6 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMPHOUSE Near South Entrance to Main Steam Feedwater Pipe Chase (East) 9 HH6

Technical Requirement 11 Fire Rated Assemblies (Sheet 1 of 7) 2-11.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR11-3.7.9.5 All fire rated assemblies (walls, floor/c eilings, cable tray encl osures, and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fi re areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area an d all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable, piping, and ventilation duct penetrat ion seals) shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY: When equipment protected by the fire rated assemblies is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION: With one or more of the above required fire rated assemblies and/or sea ling devices nonfunctional, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either:

a. Establish a continuous fire watch on at leas t one side of the affected assembly, or

b. Verify the FUNCTIONALITY of fire detector s on at least one side of the nonfunctional assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. NOTE HOURLY is defined as "being performed within the clock hour." CAUTION: Management oversight should be exercised to ensure the intent of the requirement to perform patrols hourly is not undermined. For example, although meeting the above definition, it would not be within the intent of this requirement to perform a patrol of an area at one minute before the hour and one minute after the hour to satisfy a 2-hour period.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR11-4.7.9.5.1 At least once per 18 months the above required fire rated assemblies and penetration sealing devices shall be verified FUNCTIONAL by performing a visual inspection of:

a. the exposed surfaces of each accessible fire rated assembly,*

The containment and containment enclosure structures are exempt from this surveillance requirement. These structures are surveilled pursuant to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.

Technical Requirement 11 Fire Rated Assemblies (Sheet 2 of 7) 2-11.2 SSTR Rev. 106 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR11-4.7.9.5.1 (continued) b. at least 10% of the accessible fire dampers and associated hardware. If a fire damper is found to be nonfunctional, a visual inspection of an additional 10% sample shall be made. This inspection shall continue until a 10% sample with no nonfunctional fire dampers is found, or until 100% of the accessible fire dampers are inspected. Samples shall be selected such that each accessible fire damper will be inspected every 15 years.

c. at least 10% of each type of accessible sealed penetration. If an apparent change in appearance or abnormal degrada tion is found that causes the seal to be nonfunctional, a visual inspection of an additional 10% of that type of sealed penetration shall be made. This inspection shall continue until a 10% sample with no apparent change in appearance or abnormal degradation is found that causes th e seal to be nonfunc tional, or until 100% of the accessible seals of that type are inspected. Samples shall be selected such that each accessible penetration will be inspected every 15 years.

NOTE TYPE is synonymous with category. If the "tamper seal" is broken, then the fitting cover must be removed and fire seal inspected.

The sole purpose of the "tamper seal" is to provid e an indication of the fi re seal condition without removing the fitting cover. A broken "tamper seal" does not cause the fire seal to be nonfunctional.

TR11-4.7.9.5.2 Each of the above required fire doors shall be verified FUNCTIONAL by inspecting the automatic hold-open, release and closing mechanism and latches at least once per 6 months, and by verifying:

- a. The FUNCTIONALITY of the fire door supervision system for each electrically supervised fire door by performing a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days. b. That each locked closed fire door is closed at least once per 7 days.

25% surveillance interval extension is not applicable to 15 year frequency.

- The containment air locks are exempt from this surveillance requirement. They are surveilled pursuant to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.

Technical Requirement 11 Fire Rated Assemblies (Sheet 3 of 7) 2-11.3 SSTR Rev. 106 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR11-4.7.9.5.2 (continued) c. That doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms are free of obstructions at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and a functional test is performed at least once per 18 months, and d. That each unlocked fire door without electr ical supervision is closed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Verification of Functionality Verification of functionality, when required by an ACTION statement, does not require the performance of the Surveillance Requirements for the affected equipment, if the Surveillance Requirements are current. To verify FUNCTIONALITY of equipment, the action required is to review the appropriate logs to ensure that the equipment ha s not been declared nonfunctional and ensure that no conditions exist which could render the affected equipment nonfunctional (i.e. power is available, etc.).

2. Inspection of Exposed Surfaces of Fire Rated Assemblies Technical Requirement Surveillance Requirement TR11-4.7.9.5.1a requires a visual inspection of the exposed surfaces of each Technical Requirement fire rated assembly. The types of fire rated assemblies inspected under this requirement are concrete a nd steel walls, ceilings, floors, fire-wrapped conduits and steel beams/columns with fireproofing.

Inspection of these fire rated assembly surfaces every 18 months using a hand-over-hand inspection technique is clearly onerous and beyond the intent of the requirement.

Such an inspection would be severely labor intensive requiring major scaffolding evoluti ons, ladder usage and ra ppelling. Hand-over-hand inspections using scaffolding, ladders and rappell ing greatly increase the potential for personnel injury.

Technical Requirement 11 Fire Rated Assemblies (Sheet 4 of 7) 2-11.4 SSTR Rev. 106 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

A reasonable visual inspection of the above fire rated assemblies can be accomplished from the floor. Such an inspection may necessitate the use of visual aids such as temporary lighting and binoculars. Precedent currently exists for the performance of inspections from the floor. For example, DRR 92-061 states that a visual inspection of Pyrocrete co ated surfaces from the floor, with binoculars if necessary, will provide a reas onable assurance of func tionality. The general inspection of the Containment/Containment Enclosure accessible surfaces prior to Type A Integrated Leak Rate Tests has also been performed from the floor usin g visual aids. This inspection is performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Concrete and steel surfaces ar e unquestionably less susceptible to inadvertent damage than are fireproofed or wrapped surfaces. The design and work controls in place will ensure that penetrations in concrete or steel fire rated assemblies are strictly controlled. If a fire rated assembly is degraded by the performance of a work order or modification, the required compensatory measures would be implemented.

A baseline inspection of conduits which require fire seals was conducted by FPLE Seabrook (ref. 93WR2796) to ensure that all conduits which require a seal are actually seale

d. This baseline inspection for th e presence of conduit seals was also effective in identifying fire rated assembly surfaces that are degraded.

Floor inspections, using visual aids such as temporary lighting or binoculars, if necessary, will provide an acceptable visual inspection in lieu of a hand-over-hand technique. If the inspection from the floor indicates that the fire rated assembly may be degraded it will become necessary to perform a close inspection to eval uate the condition of the barrier. Undoubtedly, the floor inspections will not be able to cover certain blind-spots on the fire rated assembly surfaces. For example, a section of a wall may not be visible due to the presence of a large ductwork running through/along the wall. In such cases where a blind spot may exist, it is reasonable to conclude that the baseline inspections discussed above provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the fire rated assembly surface is satisfactory. There is no credible mechanism for the wall to become damaged in this blind spot area such that fire barrier would not function. Certain fire barriers are located in posted/locke d high radiation areas. Fi re barriers which are located in posted/locked radiation areas, such as Demin. Alley (PAB elev. 7'), may be considered temporarily or permanently inaccessible. Inspections should be coordinated with other activities which are required to be performed in the area. The Health Physics Department should be contacted to establish the practicality of coordination of the barrier inspection with other locked high radiation area entries in accordance with FPLE Seabrook ALARA policies. If it is determined that inspection of the fire barrie rs cannot be coordinated with other activities in the locked high radiation area, ALARA considerati ons should be the deciding factor in whether the barrier is inspected or considered temporarily or permanently inaccessible. The Maintenance Manager and/or Station Director should review and approve fire barrier inspect ions which are waived due to ALARA considerations.

Technical Requirement 11 Fire Rated Assemblies (Sheet 5 of 7) 2-11.5 SSTR Rev. 106 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

Penetration seals may be deemed inaccessible if their inspection would necessitate the breaching of a fire barrier such as fire wrap, the movement of seismic supports, the breaching of an equipment qualification barrier, e xposure to a high personnel safety risk or if the inspection would be inconsistent with FPLE Seabrook ALARA policies. Specific examples of these conditions are (1) the removal of a metal cover which has an equipment qualification function; (2) the removal of a metal cover which can only be removed by eliminating obstructions such as piping or pipe supports; (3) the removal of fire wr ap; or (4) a high personne l safety risk (to be determined by the Plant Manager or Operations Manager). Penetrati on seals which are not conveniently inspected (e.g., those which require the erection of staging) may not be deemed inaccessible based on inconvenience only. Penetra tion seals which are temporarily inaccessible may be postponed but must be inspected at a later date. Penetration seal s which are located in locked high radiation areas, such as Demin. Alley (PAB elev. 7'), may be considered temporarily inaccessible to allow the inspection to be coordinated with other activities which are required to be performed in the locked high radiation area. For penetration seals which are deemed inaccessible based on the criteri a discussed above, the following procedure and documentation thereof on the applicable surveillance will satisfy the visual inspection requirement of Technical Requirement 11-4.7.9.5.1c:

1) Review penetration seal installation documentation and inspection documentation for correct sealant material, seal depth and QA acceptance. Determine if the penetration seal has been reworked and review rework documentation for the same attributes (material, depth, QA), and

2) Inspect the fire barrier, EQ barrier or obstr ucting piping or pipe s upports to ensure they are intact. If these items are not intact, the penetration seal must be visually inspected.

3. Degraded Fire Doors/Penetration Seals/Fire Rated Assembly Surfaces Technical Requirement Surveillance Requirement TR11-4.7.9.5.2 specifies the surveillance requirements for fire doors. If a surveillance is being performed on a fire door and the door is determined to be nonfunctional, the fire door surveillance must be deemed unsatisfactory and the ACTION requirements of Technical Requireme nt 11 applied. On occasion, concurrent surveillances are performed on a fire door(s) and on the surfaces of the wall through which the door(s) penetrates. Assuming separate tests are being performed for the doors and the wall surfaces, a failure of the door test does not requ ire a failure of the wall test and conversely a failure of the wall test does not require a failure of the door test. A failure of either test for the door or the wall would require entry into the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11.

If, during a fire barrier inspection, a fire door is incidentally discovered to be degraded, the Work Order is the appropriate mechanism for documen ting/correcting the degradation and initiating entry into the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11.

Technical Requirement 11 Fire Rated Assemblies (Sheet 6 of 7) 2-11.6 SSTR Rev. 106 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

As identified in TR11-4.7.9.5.1, the Containment and Containment Enclosure structures are exempt from the 18 month surveillance freque ncy for all fire rated assemblies (walls, floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures, and other fire rated barriers). It is identified in TR11-4.7.9.5.1 that these structures are surveilled pursuant to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2. This exemption from the 18 month surveillance frequency was approved as a result of Technical Requirements Change Request (CR) 94-01 dated 01/07/94. The exemption of the Containment and Containment Enclosure from the requirements of TR11-4.7.9.5.1 was justified on the following basis: 1) The Integrated Leakage Rate Test (ILRT) visual inspection procedure (EX1803.004) has the same inspection characteristics and general acceptance criteria. 2) The robust design of the Containment and Containment Enclosure structures exceeds the requirements for an Appendix R fire barrier. 3) The design, work control process and structure integrity requirements will ensure that the integrity of these structures is not compromised. The containment equipment hatch and personnel hatc h doors are considered fire doors as a result of their function but are exempt from the surveillance requirements outlined in Technical Requirement Surveillance Requirement 11-4.7.9.5.

The design of the air locks in conjunction with the testing requirements specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is adequate to satisfy the inspection requirements of Technical Requirement 11-4.7.9.5.2 for these doors. The intent of the Technical Requirement insp ection of the fire doors is to verify that the doors are functional. The testing requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program provide reasonable assuranc e that the air lock doors are ope rable and the integrity of the fire barrier will be maintained. Failure of the air lock leakage test will not be cause to declare the air lock a nonfunctional fire barr ier provided that one of the air lock doors is closed. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Action (a) 1 and 2 will ensure that the integrity of this fire barrier is maintained.

Technical Requirement Surveillance Requirement TR11-4.7.9.5.1c specifies the surveillance requirements for penetration fire seals. If a surveillance is being performed on a penetration seal and the seal is determined to be degraded, the penetration seal surveillance must be deemed unsatisfactory and the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11 applied. On occasion, concurrent surveillances are performed on penetration fire seals and on the surfaces of the wall containing the sealed penetration. Assuming separate tests are being performed for the penetration fire seals and the wall surfaces, a failure of the penetration fire seal test does not require a failure of the wall test and conversely a failure of the wall test does not require a failure of the penetration fire seal test. A failure of either the test for the penetrati on fire seal or the wall would require entry into the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11.

Technical Requirement 11 Fire Rated Assemblies (Sheet 7 of 7) 2-11.7 SSTR Rev. 106 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

If, during a fire barrier inspection or at any other time, a penetration seal is incidentally discovered to be missing, the Condition Report is the appropriate mechanism for documenting the degradation and initiating entry into the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement

11. Technical Requirement Surveillance Requirement TR11-4.7.9.5.1a requires a visual inspection of the exposed surfaces of each fire rated assembly. The types of fire rated assemblies inspected under this requirement are concre te and steel walls, ceilings, fl oors, fire-wrapped conduits and steel beams/columns with fireproofing.

If, during a fire rated assembly inspection, a breach in the assembly is identified and verified to be under the scope of the work control pro cess and the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11 have been entered, it is not necessary to fail the fire rated assembly test due to the existence of this breach. Assuming the remainder of the fire rated assembly is satisfactory, the test can be deemed satisfactory in spite of the known/planned breach. It is recommended that the surveillance be annotated to st ate that the breach was identified and verified to be under the scope of the work control process and the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11 have been entered. If the breach cannot be verified to be under the scope of the work control process and the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11 have not been entered, the Condition Report is the appropriate mechanism for documenting the degr adation and initiating entry into the ACTION requirements of Technical Requirement 11.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 1 of 10) 2-12.1 SSTR Rev. 130 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR12-3.3.3.7 As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone or group, shown in the following table shall be functional.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION: a. With any, but not more than one-half the total Type X fire detection instruments in any fire zone or group, shown in the following table nonfunctional either:

1) Restore the inoperable instrument(s) to functional status within 14 days, or

2) Establish a fire watch patrol within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to inspect the zone (s) or group(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s) hourly

. b. With more than one-half of the Type X fire detection instruments in any fire zone or group, shown in the following table nonfunctiona l, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) or group(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s) hourly*. c. With any Type Y fire detection instrume nts shown in the following table nonfunctional; within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) or group(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s) hourly*. d. With any two or more adjacent fire detection instruments shown in the following table nonfunctional; within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) or group(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s) hourly*. e. With any charcoal filter fire (CO) detection instrument(s) in any fire zone shown in the following table nonfunctional*: 1) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months establish a continuous fire watch to monitor the operating filter(s) with the nonfunctional instruments.

OR 2) Shut down the filter(s) with the nonfunctional instrument(s) and within one hour establish an hourly fire patrol to monitor the filter(s) temperature.

If the instrument(s) is located inside the containm ent, then, at least once per eight hours, either inspect that containment zone or ensure that the alarm point that monitors CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE HIGH is not in alarm. If the CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE HIGH is in alarm or if the alarm is nonfunctional, monitor the containment air temperature hourly at the locations listed in Tec hnical Specification 4.6.1.5.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 2 of 10) 2-12.2 SSTR Rev. 130 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (continued)

f. With any fire detection control panel(s) unable to communicate with the control room, within one hour establish a watch to monitor the non-communicating fire detection control panel(s).

NOTE HOURLY is defined as "being performed within the clock hour." CAUTION: Management oversi ght should be exercised to ensure the intent of the requirement to perform patrols hourly is not undermined. For example, although meeting the above definition, it would not be within the intent of this requirement to perform a patrol of an area at one minute before the hour and one minute after the hour to satisfy a 2-hour period.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR12-4.3.3.7.1 Each of the required fire detection instruments shown in the following table which are accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated functional at least once per 18 months (Heat detectors - 25% every 18 months, all in 6 years)

by performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST. Fire detectors which are not accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated functional by the performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DE VICE OPERATIONAL TEST during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months unless performed in the previous 18 months (Heat detectors - 25% every 18 months, all in 6 years).

TR12-4.3.3.7.2 The NFPA Standard 72D supervised circu its supervision associated with the detector alarms of each of the above required fire detection instruments shall be demonstrated functional at least once per 12 months.

TR12-4.3.3.7.3 The nonsupervised circuits, associated with detector alarms, between the instrument and the control room shall be demonstrated functional at least once per 31 days.

25% surveillance interval extension is not applicable to 6 year frequency.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 3 of 10) 2-12.3 SSTR Rev. 130 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Activities required to demonstrate that the fire protection instruments are functional may require technicians to work atop ladders and staging while the plant is at power and create a significant personnel safety hazard. This condition is sufficient to determine that the fire detection instruments are not accessible during plant operation. Therefore, these fire detection instruments should be demonstrated functional by the performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months unless performed in the previous 18 months (18 months for smoke detectors).

The logic described above should be applied to any other fire detection instrument which may not be accessible during plant operation. The Station Director or designee should be consulted to determine if other fire detection equipment is inaccessible. When extraordinary means, which can affect the capability to provide safe immediate evacuation or egress for personnel or which constitute a personnel safety hazard, are required to gain access to areas and equipment, that equipment should be considered as inaccessible. Additionally, the appropriate changes should be made to the preventive maintenance scheduling system so that any fire detection instruments determined not to be accessible are demonstrated to be functional duri ng the appropriate COLD SHUTDOWN.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 4 of 10) 2-12.4 SSTR Rev. 130 INSTRUMENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

- 1. CONTAINMENT

- - HEAT (x/y) FLAME (x/y) SMOKE (x/y) Control Panel #376 Zone #1 El. 0' 0" 16/0 Zone #2 El. 0' 0" 19/0 Zone #3 El. 0' 0" 12/0 Zone #4 El. 0' 0" 16/0 Zone #5 El. (-)26' 0" 23/0 Zone #6 El. (-)26' 0" 8/0 Zone #7 El. (-)26' 0" 12/0 Zone #8 El. (-)26' 0" 20/0 Zone #9 El. (-)26' 0" 11/0 2. CONTROL BUILDING

Control Panel #558 Group #1 El. 75' 0" 17/0 Group #2 El. 75' 0" 10/0 Group #3 El. 75' 0" 2/0 17/0 Group #4 El. 75' 0" 9/0 Group #5 El. 21' 6" 12/0 Group #6 El. 21' 6" 12/0 Group #7 El. 21' 6" 3/0 Group #8 El. 21' 6" 3/0 Group #9 El. 21' 6" 3/0 Group #10 El. 21' 6" 3/0 Group #11 El. 21' 6" 12/0 Group #12 El. 21' 6" 1/0 Group #13 El. 21' 6" 1/0 Group #17 El. 50' 0" 14/0 Group #18 El. 50' 0" 12/0 Group #19 El. 75' 0" 2/0 Group #20 El. 21' 6" 9/0 Group #21 El. 21' 6" 9/0 Group #22 El. 21' 6" 30/0 Group #23 El. 75' 0" 13/0 **(x/y): x is number of early warning fire detection and notification only instruments.

y is number of actuation of Fire Suppression Systems and early warning and notification instruments.

- - The fire detection instruments located within the containment are not requ ired to be functional during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 5 of 10) 2-12.5 SSTR Rev. 130 INSTRUMENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

- 3. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING HEAT (x/y) FLAME (x/y) SMOKE (x/y) Control Panel #559 Group #1 El. 7' 0" 2/0 Group #2 El. 7' 0" 2/0 Group #3 El. 53' 0" 9/0 Group #4 El. 81' 0" 12/0 Group #5 El. 7' 0" 10/0 Group #6 El. 7' 0" 2/0 Group #7 El. 53' 0" 14/0 Group #8 El. 53' 0" 18/0 Group #9 El. 7' 0" 4/0 Group #10 El. 7' 0" 8/0 Group #11 El. 7' 0" 17/0 Group #12 El. 53' 0" 2/0 Group #13 El. 53' 0" 2/0 4. SERVICE WATER PUMPHOUSE Control Panel #380 Zone #1 El. 21' 6" 14/0 Zone #2 El. 21' 6" 9/0 5. SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWER Control Panel #381 Zone #3 El. 22' 0" 3/0 Zone #4 El. 22' 0" 3/0 Zone #6 El. 46' 0" 19/0 6. ELECTRICAL TUNNELS (A & B)

Control Panel #560 Group #1 El. (-)26' 0" 0/28 Group #2 El. (-)26' 0" 0/28 Group #3 El. 0' 0" 0/25 Group #4 El. 0' 0" 0/25 Group #7 El. 50' to (-)2' 0/7 Group #8 El. 50' to 0' 0/2 **(x/y): x is number of early warning fire detection and notification only instruments.

y is number of actuation of Fire Suppression Systems and early warning and notification instruments.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 6 of 10) 2-12.6 SSTR Rev. 130 INSTRUMENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

- 7. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING "A" HEAT (x/y) FLAME (x/y) SMOKE (x/y) Control Panel #561 Group #1 El. 25' 0" 0/9 Group #2 El. 25' 0" 8/0 Group #3 El. (-)16' 0" 0/5 0/1 Group #4 El. (-)16' 0" 0/1 0/5 Group #5 El. 51' 0" 0/1 Group #6 El. 51' 0" 0/1 Group #11 El. 51' 0" 10/0 Group #12 El. 25' 0" 27/0 8. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING "B" Control Panel #562 Group #1 El. 25' 0" 0/9 Group #2 El. 25' 0" 8/0 Group #3 El. (-)16' 0" 0/5 0/1 Group #4 El. (-)16' 0" 0/1 0/5 Group #5 El. 51' 0" 0/1 Group #6 El. 51' 0" 0/1 Group #11 El. 51' 0" 10/0 Group #12 El. 25' 0" 27/0 9. CABLE SPREADING ROOM

Control Panel #558 Group #1 El. 50' 0" 0/10 0/11 Group #2 El. 50' 0" 0/8 0/7 Group #3 El. 50' 0" 0/4 0/2 Group #4 El. 50' 0" 0/2 0/4 Group #5 El. 50' 0" 0/3 0/3 Group #6 El. 50' 0" 0/3 0/3 Group #7 El. 50' 0" 0/3 0/3 Group #8 El. 50' 0" 0/3 0/3 Group #9 El. 50' 0" 0/4 0/2 Group #10 El. 50' 0" 0/2 0/4 **(x/y): x is number of early warning fire detection and notification only instruments.

y is the number of actuation of Fire Suppression Systems and early warning and notification instruments.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 7 of 10) 2-12.7 SSTR Rev. 130 INSTRUMENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

- HEAT (x/y) FLAME (x/y) SMOKE (x/y) 10. CABLE TUNNEL C -

(PAB to Control Building Above RHR Vault)

Control Panel #559 Group #1 El. 30' 0" 0/8 Group #2 El. 30' 0" 0/9 11. CONTAINMENT FAN ENCLOSURE Control Panel #559 Group #1 El. 25' 0" 9/0 Group #2 El. 25' 0" 15/0 12. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP BUILDING Control Panel #560 Group #1 El. 27' 0" 11/0 13. MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA Control Panel #446 Zone #1 El. (-)11'2 1/2" and (-)8' 8/0 Zone #2 El. (-)11'2 1/2", (-)8' and (-)20" 19/0 14. EAST - MS AND FW PIPECHASE Control Panel #451 Zone #1 El. 12' 0" 8/0 Zone #2 El. 8' 0" 7/0 Zone #3 El. 28' 0" 2/0 Zone #4 El. 28' 0" (CP-511) 1/0 15. WEST - MS AND FW PIPECHASE

Control Panel #452 Zone #1 El. 12' 0" 6/0 Zone #2 El. 8' 0" 6/0 Zone #3 El. 25' 0" 1/0 Zone #4 El. 28' 0" (CP-512) 1/0 **(x/y): x is number of early warning fire detection and notification only instruments.

y is the number of actuation of Fire Suppression Systems and early warning and notification instruments.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 8 of 10) 2-12.8 SSTR Rev. 130 INSTRUMENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

- 16. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING HEAT (x/y) FLAME (x/y) SMOKE (x/y) Control Panel #453 Zone #1 El. (-)6' 0" 29/0 Zone #3 El. 25' 0" 12/0 Zone #4 El. 25' 0" 16/0 17. FUEL STORAGE BUILDING Control Panel #454 Zone #1 El. 7' 0" 7/0 Zone #2 El. 21' 0" 3/0 3/0 Zone #3 El. 64' 0" 30/0 Zone #4 El. 21' 0" 1/0 6/0 Zone #5 El. 64' 0" 13/0 18. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING Control Panel #559 Group #1 El. 25' 0" 0/30 Group #2 El. 25' 0" 0/29 Group #3 El. 25' 0" 0/17 Group #4 El. 25' 0" 0/21 Group #5 El. 25' 0" 0/10 Group #6 El. 25' 0" 0/10 19. SERVICE WATER PUMPHOUSE (PUMP AREA)

Control Panel #474 Zone #1 El. 21' 6" 21/0 Zone #2 El. 21' 6" 26/0 **(x/y): x is number of early warning fire detection and notification only instruments.

y is the number of actuation of Fire Suppression Systems and early warning and notification instruments.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 9 of 10) 2-12.9 SSTR Rev. 130 INSTRUMENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

- 20. RHR VAULTS HEAT (x/y) FLAME (x/y) SMOKE (x/y) CARBON MONOXIDE Control Panel #475 Zone #1 El. (-)61' to 0' 5/0 Zone #2 El. (-)61' to 0' 5/0 Zone #3 El. (-)61' 0" 2/0 Zone #4 El. (-)61' 0" 2/0 Zone #5 El. (-)50' 0" 2/0 Zone #6 El. (-)50' 0" 2/0 Zone #7 El. (-)31' to 0' 3/0 Zone #8 El. (-)31' to 0' 3/0 Zone #9 El. (-)61' to 20' 7/0 Zone #10 El. (-)61' to 20' 7/0 21. CONTAINMENT Control Panel MM-CP-517 Zone #CAH-F-8 El. 25'0" 1 22. CONTROL BUILDING Control Panel MM-CP-517 Zone #CBA-F-38 El. 75'0" 2 Zone #CBA-F-8038 El. 75'0" 2 23. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING Control Panel MM-CP-517 Zone #PAH-F-16 El. 81'0" 3 Zone #CAP-F-40 El. 53'0" 2 24. CONTAINMENT FAN ENCLOSURE

Control Panel MM-CP-517 Zone #EAH-F-9 El. 25'0" 2 Zone #EAH-F-69 El. 25'0" 2 **(x/y): x is number of early warning fire detection and notification only instruments.

y is the number of actuation of Fire Suppression Systems and early warning and notification instruments.

Technical Requirement 12 Fire Detection Instrumentation (Sheet 10 of 10) 2-12.10 SSTR Rev. 130 INSTRUMENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS

25.

FUEL STORAGE BUILDING HEAT (x/y) FLAME (x/y) SMOKE (x/y) CARBON MONOXIDE Control Panel MM-CP-517 Zone #FAH-F-41 El. 64'0" 2 Zone #FAH-F-74 El. 64'0" 2 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 1 of 43) 2-13.1 SSTR Rev. 127 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR13 The test setpoints and verification times of each containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device required to be FUNCTIONAL by Technical Requirement 34 shall be as specified herein.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: As specified in TR 34 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The test setpoints and verification time of each containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device is demonstrated by Surveillance Requirement TR 34-4.8.4.2.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Prior to replacement of any circuit breakers, ensure that the replacement is the same as existing (i.e., frame size, trip size, manufacturer) including consideration of any usage restrictions given on applicable drawings. This is necessary for test setpoints and verification times listed in the Table to remain applicable. Replacements that are not the same must be evaluated by

Engineering prior to installation. Approved replacement breakers of a different type, as indicated on design drawings and in this table, can be used without any additional Engineering evaluation. 2. Certain Type HE breakers with the same trip rating may have different test criteria specified because of usage restrictions. 3. Whenever the tie breakers between US

-E53 & US-E51 and US

-E63 & US-E61 are closed and the incoming breakers opened on US

-E53 and US

-E63, penetration protection for the loads supplied from US

-E53 and US

-E63 must be considered nonfunctional. The incoming breakers on US-E51 and US

-E61 have not been analyzed for penetration protection and are not listed in the following table of Technical Requirement 13. 4. Type ED thermal magnetic breakers may be used as replacements for Type E thermal magnetic breakers as designated in this table. Applicable test setpoints and verification times are provided as appropriate. This substitution is approved for all applicable panels except EDE

-PP-112A & 112B branch breakers. Type ED thermal magnetic breakers are considered a different type of breaker than the type E thermal magnetic breakers when performing surveillance testing.

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 2 of 43) 2-13.2 SSTR Rev. 127 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

5. Type KD thermal magnetic breakers may be used as replacements for type JL thermal magnetic breakers as designated in this table. Applicable test setpoints and verification times are provided as appropriate. Type KD thermal magnetic breakers are considered a different type of breaker than the type JL thermal magnetic breakers when performing surveillance testing. 6. Verification that a breaker trips at the specified current within the required time demonstrates compliance with TR 34. This method of testing is consistent with NEMA AB

-2 and the vendor's (Telemecanique & NLI) recommendations. Resetting the breaker immediately following a trip provides additional verification that the instantaneous trip device and not the thermal element was responsible for the trip, but is not required to satisfy the surveillance requirement. As the acceptance criterion for response time is 0.167 seconds (equivalent to 10 cycles), the thermal element would not respond quickly enough to provide the trip. Therefore, meeting the time and current acceptance criteria provides verification that the instantaneous trip device functions as required. However, to ensure that the repeated pulsing of current has not resulted in the thermal element tripping the breaker, the breaker should be allowed to cool and then retested at the current which resulted in a successful test or a current higher but still within the allowed range to demonstrate that the instantaneous trip element was responsible for the trip. Based on the foregoing, the inability to immediately reset a tripped breaker does not constitute a failure of the instantaneous trip test and does not affect the operability of the instantaneous trip function. However, if an attempt to reset the breaker after it has cooled fails, an investigation into the cause of the failure to reset is required to be performed. 7. Type HFD thermal magnetic breakers are used as replacements for Type HE3 thermal magnetic breakers as designated in this table. Applicable test setpoints and verification times are provided as appropriate. Type HFD thermal magnetic breakers are considered a different type of breaker than the Type HE3 thermal magnetic breakers when performing surveillance testing. 8. Similarly, type HMCP motor circuit protectors are used as replacements for AMPCAP motor circuit protectors as designated in this table, with appropriate testing data provided for these

different type devices. 9. Similarly, type CR123 thermal overload relays are used as replacements for G30 thermal overload relays as designated in this table, with appropriate testing data provided for these

different type devices.

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 3 of 43) 2-13.3 SSTR Rev. 127 Device Number and Location CT Secondary Test Current (amps)

Verification Time System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime I. 13.8 kV a. Circuit Breakers

1. Bus 1 - Overcurrent Trip Devices - IAC Relays RAT-X3A (S) 40* 0.37-0.43 RC Incoming Line Breaker 12 3.7-4.3 RC-P-lA (P) 35.6-39.4 0-0.08 RC Reactor Coolant Pump 15 26-30 Feeder Breaker RC-P-lB (P) 35.6-39.4 0-0.08 RC Reactor Coolant Pump 15 26-30 Feeder Breaker UAT-X2A (S) 40* 0.37-0.43 RC Incoming Line Breaker 12 3.7-4.3 2. Bus 2 - Overcurrent Trip Devices - IAC Relays RAT-X3B (S) 40* 0.37-0.43 RC Incoming Line Breaker 12 3.7-4.3 RC-P-1C (P) 35.6-39.4 0-0.08 RC Reactor Coolant Pump 15 26-30 Feeder Breaker RC-P-1D (P) 35.6-39.4 0-0.08 RC Reactor Coolant Pump 15 26-30 Feeder Breaker UAT-X2B (S) 40* 0.37-0.43 RC Incoming Line Breaker 12 3.7-4.3 3. The opening response time to a trip signal for all 13.8 kV circuit breakers should be less than 0.042 seconds for verification time purposes. The response time of the lock out relays for these breakers should be less than 0.020 seconds for verification time purposes.

Note: (P) - Primary (S) - Back-up/Secondary (*) - Short-Time Value Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 4 of 43) 2-13.4 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime II. 480 V a. Unit Substations Bus E53 (S) 9600* 0.48-0.84 CAH Secondary Breaker (Note 3) 4800 10-28 Bus E63 (S) 9600* 0.48-0.84 CAH Secondary Breaker (Note 3) 4800 10-28 CAH-FN-1A (P) 3000-4500 0-0.070 CAH Containment Structure Cooling Fan 990 10-28 CAH-FN-1B (P) 2160-3240 0-0.080 CAH Containment Structure Cooling Fan 900 10-28 CAH-FN-1C (P) 3000-4500 0-0.070 CAH Containment Structure Cooling Fan 990 10-28 CAH-FN-1D (P) 2160-3240 0-0.080 CAH Containment Structure Cooling Fan 900 10-28 CAH-FN-1E (P) 3000-4500 0-0.070 CAH Containment Structure Cooling Fan 990 10-28 CAH-FN-1F (P) 2160-3240 0-0.080 CAH Containment Structure Cooling Fan 900 10-28 RC-PP-6A(S) 2000-3000 0-0.11 RC Pressurizer Heater Backup 1800 7-35 Group A RC-PP-6B(S) 2000-3000 0-0.11 RC Pressurizer Heater Backup 1800 7-35 Group B Note: (*) - Short-Time Value

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 5 of 43) 2-13.5 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker MCC-E522 SI-V3 (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 SI Accum. Tk. 9A Outlet Iso.

120 20-125 Valve SI-V32 (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 SI Accum. Tk. 9C Outlet Iso.

120 20-125 Valve MCC-E531 ED-X-16H Feeder (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 ED Lighting Transformer 300 6-125 ED-X-16H Feeder (S) 450-2800 0-0.167 ED Lighting Transformer 300 6-125 Power Receptacle (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 ED 180 6-125 Power Receptacle (S) 450-2800 0-0.167 ED 180 6-125 SA-C-4A (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 SA Containment Building Air 120 20-125 Compressor

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 6 of 43) 2-13.6 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued) MCC-E622 SI-V17 (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 SI Accum. Tk. 9B Outlet Iso. Valve 120 20-125 SI-V47 (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 SI Accum. Tk. 9D Outlet Iso. Valve 120 20-125 MCC-E631 ED-X-16A Feeder (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 ED Lighting Transformer 300 6-125 ED-X-16A Feeder (S) 450-2800 0-0.167 ED Lighting Transformer 300 6-125 SA-C-4B (P) 450-2800 0-0.167 SA Containment Building Air 120 20-125 Compressor

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 7 of 43) 2-13.7 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued) MCC-111 Incore Detector Drive A (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-A-P 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive A (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-A-S 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive B (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-B-P 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive B (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-B-S 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive C (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-C-P 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive C (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-C-S 45 3-70 MM-MM-30 (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 MM Containment Building 45 3-70 Personnel Air-Lock MM-MM-30 (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 MM Containment Building 45 3-70 Personnel Air-Lock

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 8 of 43) 2-13.8 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued) MCC-111 (Continued)

RC-P-1A (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-1A (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-1B (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-1B (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-229A (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1A Oil Lift Pump 90 3-70 RC-P-229B (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1B Oil Lift Pump 90 3-70 WLD-P-33A (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 WLD RC Drain Tank Pump 90 3-70 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 9 of 43) 2-13.9 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued) MCC-231 Incore Detector Drive D (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-D-P 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive D (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-D-S 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive E (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-E-P 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive E (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-E-S 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive F (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-F-P 45 3-70 Incore Detector Drive F (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 IC NI-MM-8010-F-S 45 3-70 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 10 of 43) 2-13.10 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued) MCC-231 (Continued)

RC-P-1C (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-1C (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-1D (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-1D (S) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC Motor Space Heater 45 3-70 RC-P-229C (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1C Oil Lift Pump 90 3-70 RC-P-229D (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1D Oil Lift Pump 90 3-70 WLD-P-33B (P) 300-2100 0-0.167 WLD RC Drain Tank Pump B 90 3-70 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 11 of 43) 2-13.11 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS a.1 Type HFD-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker MCC-111 ED-X-16E Feeder (P) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED ED-X-16E Feeder (S) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED ED-X-16J Feeder (P) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED ED-X-16J Feeder (S) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED MCC-231 ED-X-16F Feeder (P) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED ED-X-16F Feeder (S) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED ED-X-16K Feeder (P) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED ED-X-16K Feeder (S) Lighting Transformer 525-2030 300 0-0.167 12-170 ED Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 12 of 43) 2-13.12 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS a.1 Type HFD-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued) MCC-E512 CAH-FN-3A (P) 600-2310 0-0.167 CAH Containment Structure 375 10-250 Recirc Filter Fan MCC-E515 CC-P-322 A (P) 450-1750 0-0.167 CC Thermal Barrier PCCW Recirculating Pump 210 11-150 MCC-E531 CAH-FN-2A (P) 450-1750 0-0.167 CAH Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling Fan 210 11-150 MCC-E612 CAH-FN-3B (P) Containment Structure Recirc. Filter Fan 600-2310 375 0-0.167 10-250 CAH MCC-E615 CC-P-322B (P) Thermal Barrier PCCW Recirculating Pump 450-1750 210 0-0.167 11-150 CC Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 13 of 43) 2-13.13 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS a.1 Type HFD-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued) MCC-E631 CAH-FN-2B (P)

Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling Fan 450-1750 210 0-0.167 11-150 CAH CAH-FN-2D (P)

Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling Fan 450-1750 210 0-0.167 11-150 CAH Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 14 of 43) 2-13.14 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector MCC-E512 CC-V428 (P) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1A to PCCW Iso. Valve CC-V428 (S) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1A to PCCW Iso. Valve CC-V439 (P) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1D to PCCW Iso. Valve CC-V439 (S) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1D to PCCW Iso. Valve CS-V149 (P) 44-81 0-0.167 CC Regen. HT Exch Letdown Iso. Valve CS-V149 (S) 44-81 0-0.167 CC Regen. HT Exch Letdown Iso. Valve Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 15 of 43) 2-13.15 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued) MCC-E521 CGC-V14 (P) 8.6-16 0-0.167 CGC Containment Purge Iso. Valve CGC-V14 (S) 8.6-16 0-0.167 CGC Containment Purge Iso. Valve RC-V23 (P)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 1 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V23 (S)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop l RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V88 (P)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V88 (S)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V122 (P) 39-73 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 4 Pressurizer Press.

Relief Iso. Valve RC-V122 (S) 39-73 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 4 Pressurizer Press.

Relief Iso. Valve

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 16 of 43) 2-13.16 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued) MCC-E522 SI-V3 (S) 317-591 0-0.167 SI Accum Tk 9A Outlet Iso. Valve SI-V32 (S) 317-591 0-0.167 SI Accum Tk 9C Outlet Iso. Valve MCC-E531 CS-HCV-189 (P) 5.3-10 0-0.167 CS Letdown Control Valve CS-HCV-189 (S) 5.3-10 0-0.167 CS Letdown Control Valve RC-V81 (P) 17-31 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 3 Letdown to Regen.

HX Iso. Valve RC-V81 (S) 17-31 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 3 Letdown to Regen.

HX Iso. Valve SA-C-4A (S) 252-470 0-0.167 SA Containment Bldg. Air Compressor

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 17 of 43) 2-13.17 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued) MCC-E612 CC-V395 (P) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1B to PCCW Iso. Valve CC-V395 (S) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1B to PCCW Iso. Valve CC-V438 (P) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1C to PCCW Iso. Valve CC-V438 (S) 32-59 0-0.167 CC RC-P-1C to PCCW Iso. Valve CS-V168 (P) 29-55 0-0.167 CS RCP Seal Water Iso. Valve CS-V168 (S) 29-55 0-0.167 CS RCP Seal Water Iso. Valve RC-V323 (P) 27-50 0-0.167 RC Reactor Vent Valve RC-V323 (S) 27-50 0-0.167 RC Reactor Vent Valve

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 18 of 43) 2-13.18 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued) MCC-E621 CGC-V28 (P) 9.2-17 0-0.167 CGC Containment Purge Isolation Valve CGC-V28 (S) 9.2-17 0-0.167 CGC Containment Purge Isolation Valve RC-V22 (P)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 1 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V22 (S)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 1 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V87 (P)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V87 (S)67-125 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve RC-V124 (P) 39-73 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 1 Pressurizer Press.

Relief Iso. Valve RC-V124 (S) 39-73 0-0.167 RC RC Loop 1 Pressurizer Press.

Relief Iso. Valve

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 19 of 43) 2-13.19 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued) MCC-E622 SI-V17 (S) 317-591 0-0.167 SI Accum Tk 9B Outlet Iso. Valve SI-V47 (S) 317-591 0-0.167 SI Accum Tk 9D Outlet Iso. Valve MCC-E631 CS-HCV-190 (P) 5.3-10 0-0.167 CS Letdown Control Valve CS-HCV-190 (S) 5.3-10 0-0.167 CS Letdown Control Valve SA-C-4B (S) 252-470 0-0.167 SA Containment Bldg. Air Compressor MCC-111 CC-V434 (P) 27-50 0-0.167 CC Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Valve CC-V434 (S) 27-50 0-0.167 CC Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Valve

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 20 of 43) 2-13.20 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued) MCC-111 (Continued)

RC-P-229A (S) 129-241 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1A Oil Lift Pump RC-P-229B (S) 129-241 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1B Oil Lift Pump RC-P-271 (P) 29-55 0-0.167 RC Pressure Relief Tank Cooling Pump RC-P-271 (S) 29-55 0-0.167 RC Pressure Relief Tank Cooling Pump WLD-P-5A (P) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump A Pump WLD-P-5A (S) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump A Pump WLD-P-5C (P) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump B Pump WLD-P-5C (S) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump B Pump WLD-P-33A (S) 185-344 0-0.167 WLD RC Drain Tank Pump A

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 21 of 43) 2-13.21 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued) MCC-231 RC-P-229C (S) 129-241 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1C Oil Lift Pump RC-P-229D (S) 129-241 0-0.167 RC RC-P-1D Oil Lift Pump WLD-P-5B (P) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump A Pump WLD-P-5B (S) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump A Pump WLD-P-5D (P) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump B Pump WLD-P-5D (S) 51-95 0-0.167 WLD Containment Structure Sump B Pump WLD-P-33B (S) 185-344 0-0.167 WLD RC Drain Tank Pump B

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 22 of 43) 2-13.22 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS b.1 Type HMCP Motor Circuit Protector MCC-E512 CAH-FN-3A (S) 450-840 0-0.167 CAH Containment Structure Recirc. Filter Fan MCC-E515 CC-P-322A (S) Thermal Barrier PCCW Recirculating Pump 375-700 0-0.167 CC MCC-E531 CAH-FN-2A (S)

Control Rod Drive Mech.

Cooling Fan 375-700 0-0.167 CAH MCC-E612 CAH-FN-3B (S) Containment Structure Recirc.

Filter Fan 450-840 0-0.167 CAH MCC-E615 CC-P-322B (S) Thermal Barrier PCCW Recirculating Pump 375-700 0-0.167 CC Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 23 of 43) 2-13.23 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS b.1 Type HMCP Motor Circuit Protector (Continued)

MCC-E631 CAH-FN-2B (S)

Control Rod Drive Mech.

Cooling Fan 375-700 0-0.167 CAH CAH-FN-2D (S)

Control Rod Drive Mech.

Cooling Fan 375-700 0-0.167 CAH Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 24 of 43) 2-13.24 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays MCC-E512 CC-V428 (P) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1A to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CC-V428 (S) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1A to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CC-V439 (P) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1D to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CC-V439 (S) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1D to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CS-V149 (P) 8.0 27-140 CS Regen. Heat Exchanger Letdown 12.0 12-65 Iso. Valve CS-V149 (S) 8.0 27-140 CS Regen. Heat Exchanger Letdown 12.0 12-65 Iso. Valve

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 25 of 43) 2-13.25 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays (Continued)

MCC-E521 CGC-V14 (P) 1.8 27-140 CGC Containment Purge Iso. Valve 2.6 12-65 CGC-V14 (S) 1.8 27-140 CGC Containment Purge Iso. Valve 2.6 12-65 RC-V23 (P) 14 27-140 RC RC Loop 1 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 20 12-65 RC-V23 (S) 14 27-140 RC RC Loop 1 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 20 12-65 RC-V88 (P) 15 27-140 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 22 12-65 RC-V88 (S) 15 27-140 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 22 12-65 RC-V122 (P) 7.2 27-140 RC RC Loop 4 Pressurizer Press.

11 12-65 Relief Iso. Valve RC-V122 (S) 7.2 27-140 RC RC Loop 4 Pressurizer Press.

11 12-65 Relief Iso. Valve

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 26 of 43) 2-13.26 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays (Continued)

MCC-E522 SI-V3 (S) 64 27-140 SI Accumulator Tank 9A Outlet 96 12-65 Iso. Valve SI-V32 (S) 64 27-140 SI Accumulator Tank 9C Outlet 96 12-65 Iso. Valve MCC-E531 CS-HCV-189 (P) 1.2 27-140 CS Letdown Control Valve 1.8 12-65 CS-HCV-189 (S) 1.2 27-140 CS Letdown Control Valve 1.8 12-65 RC-V81 (P) 3.2 27-140 RC RC Loop 3 Letdown to Regen.

4.8 12-65 HX Iso. Valve RC-V81 (S) 3.2 27-140 RC RC Loop 3 Letdown to Regen.

4.8 12-65 HX Iso. Valve SA-C-4A (S) 68 27-140 SA Containment Building Air 102 12-65 Compressor

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 27 of 43) 2-13.27 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays (Continued) MCC-E612 CC-V395 (P) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1B to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CC-V395 (S) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1B to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CC-V438 (P) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1C to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CC-V438 (S) 4.8 27-140 CC RC-P-1C to PCCW Iso. Valve 7.2 12-65 CS-V168 (P) 3.6 27-140 CS RCP Seal Water Iso. Valve 5.4 12-65 CS-V168 (S) 3.6 27-140 CS RCP Seal Water Iso. Valve 5.4 12-65 RC-V323 (P) 3.6 27-140 RC Reactor Vent Valve 5.4 12-65 RC-V323 (S) 3.6 27-140 RC Reactor Vent Valve 5.4 12-65 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 28 of 43) 2-13.28 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays (Continued) MCC-E621 CGC-V28 (P) 2.0 27-140 CGC Containment Purge Isolation Valve 2.9 12-65 CGC-V28 (S) 2.0 27-140 CGC Containment Purge Isolation Valve 2.9 12-65 RC-V22 (P) 14 27-140 RC RC Loop 1 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 20 12-65 RC-V22 (S) 14 27-140 RC RC Loop 1 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 20 12-65 RC-V87 (P) 14 27-140 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 20 12-65 RC-V87 (S) 14 27-140 RC RC Loop 4 RHR Inlet Iso. Valve 20 12-65 RC-V124 (P) 8.0 27-140 RC RC Loop 1 Pressurizer Press.

12 12-65 Relief Iso. Valve RC-V124 (S) 8.0 27-140 RC RC Loop 1 Pressurizer Press.

12 12-65 Relief Iso. Valve

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 29 of 43) 2-13.29 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays (Continued)

MCC-E622 SI-V17 (S) 64 27-140 SI Accumulator Tank 9B Outlet 96 12-65 Isol. Valve SI-V47 (S) 64 27-140 SI Accumulator Tank 9D Outlet 96 12-65 Isol. Valve MCC-E631 CS-HCV-190 (P) 1.2 27-140 CS Letdown Control Valve 1.8 12-65 CS-HCV-190 (S) 1.2 27-140 CS Letdown Control Valve 1.8 12-65 SA-C-4B (S) 68 27-140 SA Containment Bldg. Air 102 12-65 Compressor MCC-111 CC-V434 (P) 4.8 27-140 CC Excess Letdown Heat Exch. Valve 7.2 12-65 CC-V434 (S) 4.8 27-140 CC Excess Letdown Heat Exch. Valve 7.2 12-65 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 30 of 43) 2-13.30 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays (Continued) MCC-111 (Continued)

RC-P-229A (S) 35 27-140 RC RC-P-1A Oil Lift Pump 52 12-65 RC-P-229B (S) 35 27-140 RC RC-P-1B Oil Lift Pump 52 12-65 RC-P-271 (P) 7.2 27-140 RC Pressure Relief Tank Cooling Pump 11 12-65 RC-P-271 (S) 7.2 27-140 RC Pressure Relief Tank Cooling Pump 11 12-65 WLD-P-5A (P) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump A 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-5A (S) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump A 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-5C (P) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump B 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-5C (S) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump B 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-33A (S) 48 27-140 WLD Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pump 71 12-65 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 31 of 43) 2-13.31 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays (Continued) MCC-231 RC-P-229C (S) 35 27-140 RC RC-P-1C Oil Lift Pump 52 12-65 RC-P-229D (S) 35 27-140 RC RC-P-1D Oil Lift Pump 52 12-65 WLD-P-5B (P) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump A 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-5B (S) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump A 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-5D (P) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump B 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-5D (S) 10 27-140 WLD Containment Structure Sump B 15 12-65 Pump WLD-P-33B (S) 48 27-140 WLD Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pump 71 12-65 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 32 of 43) 2-13.32 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS c.1 Type CR123 Thermal Overload Relays MCC-E512 CAH-FN-3A (S) 184 53-110 CAH Containment Structure Recirc.

Filter Fan 276 24-47 MCC-E515 CC-P-322A (S) 103 53-110 CC Thermal Barrier PCCW Recirculating Pump 154 24-47

MCC-E531 CAH-FN-2A (S) 86 53-110 CAH Control Rod Drive Mech.

Cooling Fan 129 24-47

MCC-E612 CAH-FN-3B (S) 184 53-110 CAH Containment Structure Recirc.

Filter Fan 276 24-47

MCC-E615 CC-P-322B (S) 103 53-110 CC Thermal Barrier PCCW Recirculating Pump 154 24-47

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 33 of 43) 2-13.33 SSTR Rev. 127 Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS c.1 Type CR123 Thermal Overload Relays (Continued)

MCC-E631 CAH-FN-2B (S)

Control Rod Drive Mech.

Cooling Fan 86 129 53-110 24-47 CAH CAH-FN-2D (S) 86 53-110 CAH Control Rod Drive Mech.

Cooling Fan 129 24-47

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 34 of 43) 2-13.34 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

d. Type JL and Type KD-Thermal Magnetic MCC-E521 CGC-MM-284A (P) JL 563-1050 0-0.167 CGC Hydrogen Recombiner 375 32-150 or KD 586-976 0-0.167 CGC 375 65-250 CGC-MM-284A (S) JL 563-1050 0-0.167 CGC Hydrogen Recombiner 375 32-150 or KD 586-976 0-0.167 CGC 375 65-250 MCC-E621 CGC-MM-284B (P) JL 563-1050 0-0.167 CGC Hydrogen Recombiner 375 32-150 or KD 586-976 0-0.167 CGC 375 65-250 CGC-MM-284B (S) JL 563-1050 0-0.167 CGC Hydrogen Recombiner 375 32-150 or KD 586-976 0-0.167 CGC 375 65-250 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 35 of 43) 2-13.35 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac)

a. Type BQ Thermal Magnetic 120 V ac Vital Instrument Distr. Panel 11E Circuit #3 (P) 263-980 0-0.167 RM 45 7-50 120 V ac Vital Instrument Distr. Panel 11F Circuit #3 (P) 263-980 0-0.167 RM 45 7-50 MCC-E512, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #1 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 RC 60 5-50 Circuit #14 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CC/CAH 45 5-50 Circuit #15 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50 MCC-E515, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #13 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50 MCC-E521, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #7 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 SI 45 5-50 Circuit #10 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50 Circuit #13 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CGC 45 5-50 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 36 of 43) 2-13.36 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac) a. Type BQ Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

MCC-E531, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #2 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 RC/CS 45 5-50 SA/CAH Circuit #11 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50 MCC-E612, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #9 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 RC 45 5-50 Circuit #10 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 RC 45 5-50 Circuit #11 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 VG 60 5-50 Circuit #13 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CAH/RC 45 5-50 Circuit #15 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50 MCC-E615, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #10 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 CAH 60 5-50 Circuit #11 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 NG 60 5-50 Circuit #12 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 RC 60 5-50 Circuit #13 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 37 of 43) 2-13.37 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac) a. Type BQ Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

MCC-E621, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #1 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 WLD 60 5-50

Circuit #4 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 SI 45 5-50

Circuit #6 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50

Circuit #13 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CGC 45 5-50 MCC-E631, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #1 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 CS/CAH 45 5-50

Circuit #2 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 SA 45 5-50

Circuit #10 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 CC 45 5-50 ED-PP-8C 120/240 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #5 (S) 263-980 0-0.167 CAH 45 7-50 Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 38 of 43) 2-13.38 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac) a. Type BQ Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

MCC-111, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #1 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 SF/

45 5-50 CC Circuit #2 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 WLD 45 5-50 Circuit #12 (S) 263-980 0-0.167 CAH 60 7-50 Circuit #21 (S) 120-420 0-0.167 RC 45 5-50 Circuit #28 (P) 263-770 0-0.167 IC 105 5-50 Circuit #31 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 RMW 45 5-50 MCC-231, 120 V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #4 (P) 120-420 0-0.167 WLD 45 5-50 Circuit #5 (P) 263-770 0-0.167 IC 105 5-50 Circuit #14 (P) 263-770 0-0.167 IC 105 5-50

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 39 of 43) 2-13.39 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac)

NOTE In cases where both the primary and secondary protective devices are not listed, the required protection is provided by fuses that are not listed in this table.

b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic EDE-PP-111A 125 V dc Distr. Panel Circuit #4 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 CAH 60 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 CAH E2 or ED4 60 5-200 Circuit #6 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 NG 60 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 NG E2 or ED4 60 5-200 Circuit #14 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 SB 60 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 SB 60 5-200 E2 or ED4 EDE-PP-111B 125 V dc Distr. Panel Circuit #4 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 CAH 60 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 CAH E2 or ED4 60 5-200

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 40 of 43) 2-13.40 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-112A 125 V dc Distr. Panel Circuit #2 (P)

E2 300-980 0-0.167 RH 60 4.5-70 Circuit #7 (P)

E2 300-980 0-0.167 SI 60 4.5-70 Circuit #19 (P)

E2 300-980 0-0.167 RC 60 4.5-70 EDE-PP-112B 125 V dc Distr. Panel Circuit #1 (P) E2 300-980 0-0.167 RC 60 4.5-70

Circuit #2 (P) E2 300-980 0-0.167 RH 60 4.5-70

Circuit #3 (P) E2 300-980 0-0.167 COP 60 4.5-70

Circuit #5 (P) E2 300-980 0-0.167 WLD 60 4.5-70

Circuit #7 (P) E2 300-980 0-0.167 SI 60 4.5-70

Circuit #16 (P) E2 300-980 0-0.167 CAP 60 4.5-70

Circuit #19 (P) E2 300-980 0-0.167 RC 60 4.5-70

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 41 of 43) 2-13.41 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-113A 125 V dc Distr. Panel Circuit #4 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 CC 60 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 CC E2 or ED4 60 5-200 Circuit #7 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 SI 60 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 SI E2 or ED4 60 5-200 EDE-PP-113B 125 V dc Distr. Panel

Circuit #4 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 CC 60 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 CC

E2 or ED4 60 5-200 Circuit #7 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 SI 60 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 SI

E2 or ED4 60 5-200

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 42 of 43) 2-13.42 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

ED-MM-167N 125 V dc Lighting Distr. Panel Circuit #20 (P) 450-1260 0-0.167 ED 120 4.5-70 450-1400 0-0.167 ED E2 or ED4 120 5-200 Circuit #20 (S) 450-1260 0-0.167 ED 120 4.5-70 450-1400 0-0.167 ED E2 or ED4 120 5-200 EDE-PP-1E 120 V ac Vital Instrument Distr. Panel Circuit #3 (S) 300-980 0-0.167 ML 45 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 ML E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #9 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 SI 45 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 SI E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #16 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 RC 45 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 E2 or ED4 45 5-200 RC

Technical Requirement 13 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (Sheet 43 of 43) 2-13.43 SSTR Rev. 127 Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125 V dc & 120 V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-1F 120 V ac Vital Instrument Distr. Panel Circuit #3 (S) 300-980 0-0.167 ML 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 ML

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #9 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 SI 45 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 SI E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #16 (P) 300-980 0-0.167 RC 45 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 RC E2 or ED4 45 5-200

Technical Requirement 14 Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices (Sheet 1 of 6) 2-14.1 SSTR Rev. 133 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR14 The heater current range for each thermal overload protection device for safety-related motor-operated valves required to be OPERABLE by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.4.3 shall be as specified herein.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor-operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION: As specified in TS 3.8.4.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The heater current range for each thermal overload protection device for safety-related motor-operated valves is demonstrated by TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.4.3.

Technical Requirement 14 Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices (Sheet 2 of 6) 2-14.2 SSTR Rev. 133 VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION/SYSTEM OVERLOAD HEATER CAT. NO. HEATER CURRENT RANGE (AMPERES)*

AS-V175 Auxiliary Steam Isolation G30T37A (8.05-8.95)

AS-V176 Auxiliary Steam Isolation G30T37A (8.05-8.95)

CBS-V2 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T40 (11.2-12.3)

CBS-V5 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T40 (11.2-12.3)

CBS-V8 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T30 (3.51-3.93)

CBS-V11 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T32A (4.27-4.63)

CBS-V14 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T30 (3.51-3.93)

CBS-V17 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T32A (4.27-4.63)

CBS-V38 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T13 (0.643-0.706)

CBS-V43 ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T13 (0.643-0.706)

CBS-V47 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T23 (1.75-1.91)

CBS-V49 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CBS-V51 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T27 (2.61-2.86)

CBS-V53 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CC-V137 Primary Component Cooling G30T15 (0.783-0.863)

CC-V145 Primary Component Cooling G30T15 (0.783-0.863)

CC-V266 Primary Component Cooling G30T15 (0.783-0.863)

CC-V272 Primary Component Cooling G30T15 (0.783-0.863)

CC-V395** Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T24 (1.92-2.12) CC-V428** Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T24 (1.92-2.12)

_______________________

Overload heater trip current is equal to 1.25 times the minimum value of the heater current range. ** This Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload may not be bypassed as it provides penetration protection.

Technical Requirement 14 Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices (Sheet 3 of 6) 2-14.3 SSTR Rev. 133 VALVE NUMBER

FUNCTION/SYSTEM OVERLOAD HEATER CAT. NO. HEATER CURRENT RANGE (AMPERES)*

CC-V438** Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T24 (1.92-2.12) CC-V439** Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T24 (1.92-2.12) CC-V1092 Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T9 (0.430-0.474) CC-V1095 Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T9 (0.430-0.474) CC-V1101 Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T9 (0.430-0.474) CC-V1109 Primary Component Cooling Thermal Barrier G30T9 (0.430-0.474) CGC-V14** Combustible Gas Control G30T14 (0.707-0.782) CGC-V28** Combustible Gas Control G30T15 (0.783-0.863)

CS-LCV-112B Chemical and Volume Control G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CS-LCV-112C Chemical and Volume Control G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CS-LCV-112D ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T28 (2.87-3.18)

CS-LCV-112E ECCS/CS Fluid Supplies G30T28 (2.87-3.18)

CS-V142 Chemical and Volume Control G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CS-V143 Chemical and Volume Control G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CS-V149** Chemical and Volume Control G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CS-V154 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V158 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V162 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V166 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V167 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V168** Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V196 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

Overload heater trip current is equal to 1.25 times the minimum value of the heater current range. ** This Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload may not be bypassed as it provides penetration protection.

Technical Requirement 14 Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices (Sheet 4 of 6) 2-14.4 SSTR Rev. 133 VALVE NUMBER

FUNCTION/SYSTEM OVERLOAD HEATER CAT. NO. HEATER CURRENT RANGE (AMPERES)*

CS-V197 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V426 Chemical and Volume Control G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

CS-V460 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CS-V461 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

CS-V475 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T29 (3.19-3.50) FW-FV-4214A Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-FV-4214B Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-FV-4224A Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-FV-4224B Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-FV-4234A Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-FV-4234B Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-FV-4244A Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-FV-4244B Feedwater G30T18 (1.06-1.16) FW-V346 Feedwater G30T24 (1.92-2.12) FW-V347 Feedwater G30T24 (1.92-2.12)

MS-V204 Main Steam Isolation Bypass G30T26 (2.34-2.60)

MS-V205 Main Steam Isolation Bypass G30T26 (2.34-2.60)

MS-V206 Main Steam Isolation Bypass G30T26 (2.34-2.60)

MS-V207 Main Steam Isolation Bypass G30T26 (2.34-2.60) MSD-V44 Main Steam Drain G30T14 (0.707-0.782) MSD-V45 Main Steam Drain G30T14 (0.707-0.782) MSD-V46 Main Steam Drain G30T14 (0.707-0.782) MSD-V47 Main Steam Drain G30T14 (0.707-0.782)

________________________

Overload heater trip current is equal to 1.25 times the minimum value of the heater current range.

Technical Requirement 14 Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices (Sheet 5 of 6) 2-14.5 SSTR Rev. 133 VALVE NUMBER

FUNCTION/SYSTEM OVERLOAD HEATER CAT. NO. HEATER CURRENT RANGE (AMPERES)*

RC-V22** Reactor Coolant Loop 1 (RHR) G30T34 (5.45-5.93) RC-V23** Reactor Coolant Loop 1 (RHR) G30T34 (5.45-5.93) RC-V87** Reactor Coolant Loop 4 (RHR) G30T34 (5.45-5.93) RC-V88** Reactor Coolant Loop 4 (RHR) G30T35 (5.94-6.42) RC-V122** Reactor Coolant Pressurizer G30T28 (2.87-3.18) RC-V124** Reactor Coolant Pressurizer G30T29 (3.19-3.50) RC-V323** Reactor Vessel Head Vent G30T21 (1.42-1.57) RH-FCV-610 Residual Heat Removal G30T21 (1.42-1.57) RH-FCV-611 Residual Heat Removal G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

RH-V14 Residual Heat Removal G30T40 (11.2-12.3)

RH-V21 Residual Heat Removal G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

RH-V22 Residual Heat Removal G30T28 (2.87-3.18)

RH-V26 Residual Heat Removal G30T40 (11.2-12.3)

RH-V32 Residual Heat Removal G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

RH-V35 Residual Heat Removal G30T28 (2.87-3.18)

RH-V36 Residual Heat Removal G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

RH-V70 Residual Heat Removal G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

SI-V3** Safety Injection Accumulators G30T47A (25.4-27.1)

SI-V17** Safety Injection Accumulators G30T47A (25.4-27.1)

SI-V32** Safety Injection Accumulators G30T47A (25.4-27.1)

SI-V47** Safety Injection Accumulators G30T47A (25.4-27.1)

SI-V77 SI Hot Leg Injection G30T24 (1.92-2.12)

SI-V89 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T22 (1.58-1.74)

SI-V90 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

SI-V93 Safety Injection G30T21 (1.42-1.57)

SI-V102 SI Hot Leg Injection G30T24 (1.92-2.12)

_________________________

Overload heater trip current is equal to 1.25 times the minimum value of the heater current range.

- This Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload may not be bypassed as it provides penetration protection.

Technical Requirement 14 Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices (Sheet 6 of 6) 2-14.6 SSTR Rev. 133 VALVE NUMBER

FUNCTION/SYSTEM OVERLOAD HEATER CAT. NO. HEATER CURRENT RANGE (AMPERES)*

SI-V111 Safety Injection G30T24 (1.92-2.12)

SI-V112 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T24 (1.92-2.12)

SI-V114 Safety Injection Cold Leg G30T24 (1.92-2.12)

SI-V138 CS Cold Leg Injection G30T32A (4.27-4.63)

SI-V139 CS Cold Leg Injection G30T32A (4.27-4.63) SW-V2 Service Water G30T29 (3.19-3.50) SW-V4 Service Water G30T16 (0.864-0.955) SW-V5 Service Water G30T15 (0.783-0.863) SW-V15 Service Water G30T28 (2.87-3.18) SW-V17 Service Water G30T27 (2.61-2.86) SW-V19 Service Water G30T27 (2.61-2.86) SW-V20 Service Water G30T28 (2.87-3.18) SW-V22 Service Water G30T29 (3.19-3.50) SW-V23 Service Water G30T27 (2.61-2.86) SW-V25 Service Water G30T26 (2.34-2.60) SW-V27 Service Water G30T29 (3.19-3.50) SW-V29 Service Water G30T29 (3.19-3.50) SW-V31 Service Water G30T29 (3.19-3.50) SW-V34 Service Water G30T27 (2.61-2.86) SW-V54 Service Water G30T27 (2.61-2.86) SW-V56 Service Water G30T29 (3.19-3.50) SW-V74 Service Water G30T27 (2.61-2.86) SW-V76 Service Water G30T27 (2.61-2.86) SW-V139 Service Water G30T28 (2.87-3.18) SW-V140 Service Water G30T29 (3.19-3.50)

_________________________

Overload heater trip current is equal to 1.25 times the minimum value of the heater current range.

2-15.1 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 1 of 17)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR15 The test setpoints and verification times of each protective device for Non-Class 1E circuits connected to Class 1E power sources required to be FUNCTIONAL by Technical Requirement 34 shall be as specified herein.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

ACTION: As specified in TR 34.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The test setpoints and verification times of each protective device for Non-Class 1E circuits connected to Class 1E power sources is demonstrated by Surveillance Requirement TR 34-4.8.4.2.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Prior to replacement of any circuit breakers, ensure that the replacement is the same as existing, i.e., frame size, trip size, manufacturer. This is necessary for test setpoints and verification times listed in the Table to remain applicable. Replacements that are not the same must be evaluated by Engineering prior to installation. 2. Type ED may be used as replacements for Type E thermal magnetic breakers as designated in this table. Applicable test setpoints and verification times are provided as appropriate. This

substitution is approved for all applicable panels except EDE-PP-112A & 112B branch breakers.

Type ED thermal magnetic breakers are considered a different type of breaker than the type E thermal magnetic breakers when performing surveillance testing.

2-15.2 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 2 of 17)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

3. Verification that a breaker trips at the specified current within the required time demonstrates compliance with TR 34. This method of testing is consistent with NEMA AB-2 and the vendor's (Telemechanique) recommendations. Resetting the breaker immediately following a trip provides additional verification that the instantaneous trip device and not the thermal element was responsible for the trip, but is not required to satisfy the surveillance requirement. As the acceptance criterion for response time is <0.067 seconds (equivalent to 4 cycles), the thermal element would not respond quickly enough to provide the trip. Therefore, meeting the time and

current acceptance criteria provides verification that the instantaneous trip device functions as required. However, to ensure that the repeated pulsing of current has not resulted in the thermal element tripping the breaker, the breaker should be allowed to cool and then retested at the current which resulted in a successful test or a current higher but still within the allowed range to demonstrate that the instantaneous trip element was responsible for the trip. Based on the foregoing, the inability to immediately reset a tripped breaker does not constitute a failure of the instantaneous trip test and does not affect the functionality of the instantaneous trip function. However, if an attempt to reset the breaker after it has cooled fails, an investigation into the cause of the failure to reset is required to be performed.

2-15.3 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 3 of 17)

Device Number and Location CT Secondary Test Current (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime I. 4.16 kV CIRCUIT BREAKER

a. Bus 5 - Overcurrent Trip Devices - IAC Relays EDE-X-5E 59.4-65.6 0-0.08 EDE 480 V Bus-E53 Transformer 18 3.4-4.0 FW-P-113 45.1-49.9 0-0.08 FW Start-up Feed Pump 12 9.3-10.7

b. The opening response time to a trip signal for all 4.16kV circuit breakers should be less than 0.035 second for verification time purposes. The response time of the lockout relays for these breakers should be less than 0.020 second for verification time purposes.

2-15.4 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 4 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime II. 480V a. Unit Substation Bus E53 Secondary 9600* 0.48-0.84 EDE Breaker 4800 10-28 Bus E63 Secondary 9600* 0.48-0.84 EDE Breaker 4800 10-28 MCC E511 Feeder 3600* 0.14-0.35 EDE Breaker 1440 10-30 MCC E523 Feeder 3600* 0.14-0.35 EDE Breaker 1800 10-30 MCC E611 Feeder 3600* 0.14-0.35 EDE Breaker 1800 10-30 RC-PP-6A 2000-3000 0-0.11 RC Pressurizer Heater 1800 7-35 Back-up Group A RC-PP-6B 2000-3000 0-0.11 RC Pressurizer Heater 1800 7-35 Back-up Group B SA-SKD-137A 1760-2640 0-0.07 SA Service Air Compressor Skid 840 10-30 UPS ED-I-2B 1200-1800 0-0.07 ED 450 7-35

_____________________ (*) - Short time value.

2-15.5 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 5 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3 Thermal-Magnetic Circuit Breaker MCC-E513 15 KVA XFMR for 22 450-2800 0-0.167 - Circuit Distr. Panel 120 6-125 ED-MM-170C 450-2800 0-0.167 ED Security Lighting Panel 180 6-125 ED-X-29 450-2800 0-0.167 ED 25KVA XFMR for Lighting Panel 210 6-125 HT-CP-428 300-2100 0-0.167 HT SW System Process Heat Tracing 45 3-70 Dist. Panel Power Receptacles 450-2800 0-0.167 -

300 6-125 SFD-PP-179 450-2800 0-0.167 SFD 15 KVA XFMR for Sec.

120 6-125 and Fire Det. Power Panel SW-H-67A 300-2100 0-0.167 SW Cooling Tower Fan 51A 45 3-70 Gear Red. Imrs. Heater SWA-UH-112 300-2100 0-0.167 SWA Cooling Tower SWGR RM 45 3-70 Train A Heater SWA-UH-113 300-2100 0-0.167 SWA Cooling Tower SWGR RM 45 3-70 Train A Heater

2-15.6 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 6 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3 Thermal-Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued)

MCC-E514 15 KVA XFMR for 22 Circuit 450-2800 0-0.167 - Distr. Panel 120 6-125 ED-MM-159C 450-2800 0-0.167 ED Lighting Panel 120 6-125 ED-MM-159D 450-2800 0-0.167 ED Lighting Panel 120 6-125 ED-MM-159E 300-2100 0-0.167 ED Security Lighting 60 3-70 M-159E SFD-PP-180 450-2800 0-0.167 SFD 15 KVA XFMR for Sec.

120 6-125 and Fire Det. Power Panel MCC-E641 2-SW-H-67B 300-2100 0-0.167 SW Cooling Tower Fan 51B 45 3-70 Gear Red. Imrs. Heater HT-CP-429 300-2100 0-0.167 HT SW System Process 45 3-70 Heat Tracing Distr. Panel

2-15.7 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 7 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

a. Type HE3 Thermal-Magnetic Circuit Breaker (Continued)

MCC-E641 (Continued)

SW-H-67B 300-2100 0-0.167 SW Cooling Tower Fan 51B 45 3-70 Gear Red. Imrs. Heater SWA-UH-114 300-2100 0-0.167 SWA Cooling Tower SWGR RM 45 3-70 Train B Heater SWA-UH-115 300-2100 0-0.167 SWA Cooling Tower SWGR RM 45 3-70 Train B Heater a.1 Type HFD-Thermal Magnetic Circuit Breaker MCC-E512 RM-SKD-60 375-1120 0-0.167 RM Containment Recirc Leak Detection 45 12-70 Radiation Monitor Skid

b. AMPCAP Motor Circuit Protector MCC-E514 CW-P-136A 129-241 0-0.167 CW CW Pumps Lube Booster Pump 2-15.8 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 8 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime 200% 300% 200% 300% III. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

c. Type G30T Thermal Overload Relays MCC-E514 CW-P-136A 31 27-140 CW CW Pumps Lube 46.5 12-65 Booster Pump 2-15.9 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 9 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac)

a. Type BQ Thermal Magnetic MCC-E512, 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #8 120-420 0-0.167 CS 45 5-50 Subpanel Feeder 525-1680 0-0.167 ---

Breaker 300 7-70 MCC-E515, 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #2 120-420 0-0.167 SB 45 5-50 Circuit #4 120-420 0-0.167 FW 45 5-50 Subpanel Feeder 525-1680 0-0.167 --- Breaker 300 7-70 MCC-E521, 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #4 120-420 0-0.167 RC 45 5-50 Subpanel Feeder 525-1680 0-0.167 --- Breaker 300 7-70 MCC-E612, 120V ac Distr. Panel Subpanel Feeder 525-1680 0-0.167 --- Breaker 300 7-70

2-15.10 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 10 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac) a. Type BQ Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

MCC-E614, 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #2 120-420 0-0.167 SWA 45 5-50 Circuit #3 120-420 0-0.167 SEC 45 5-50 Circuit #5 120-420 0-0.167 EDE 45 5-50 MCC-E615, 120V ac Distr. Panel Subpanel Feeder 525-1680 0-0.167 --- Breaker 300 7-70 MCC-E621, 120V ac Distr. Panel Subpanel Feeder 525-1680 0-0.167 --- Breaker 300 7-70 MCC-E641, 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #1 120-420 0-0.167 ED 45 5-50 Circuit #2 263-980 0-0.167 EDE 60 7-50 Circuit #12 120-420 0-0.167 ED 45 5-50 EDE-PP-11E 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #4 263-980 0-0.167 VI 45 7-50

2-15.11 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 11 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac) a. Type BQ Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-11F 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #4 263-980 0-0.167 VI 45 7-50 Circuit #11 263-980 0-0.167 MM 45 7-50 2-15.12 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 12 of 17)

Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac)

b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic EDE-PP-1A 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #10 300-980 0-0.167 ED 45 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 ED E2 or ED4 45 5-200 EDE-PP-1B 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #10 300-980 0-0.167 ED 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 ED

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 EDE-PP-1C 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #14 450-1260 0-0.167 ED 90 4.5-70 450-1400 0-0.167 ED E2 or ED4 90 5-200 EDE-PP-1D 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #9 300-980 0-0.167 ED 45 4.5-70 300-980 0-0.167 ED E2 or ED4 45 5-200

2-15.13 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 13 of 17)

Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-1E 120V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #3 300-980 0-0.167 ML 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 ML

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #5 300-980 0-0.167 EDE 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 EDE

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #6 300-980 0-0.167 EDE 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 EDE

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #8 300-980 0-0.167 SM 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 SM

E2 or ED4 45 5-200

2-15.14 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 14 of 17)

Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-1E 120V ac Distr. Panel (Continued)

Circuit #14 300-980 0-0.167 ED 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 ED

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #15 300-980 0-0.167 EDE 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 EDE

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #20 450-1260 0-0.167 ED 180 4.5-70

450-1400 0-0.167 ED

E2 or ED4 180 5-200 EDE-PP-1F 20V ac Distr. Panel Circuit #3 300-980 0-0.167 ML 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 ML

E2 or ED4 45 5-200

2-15.15 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 15 of 17)

Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-1F 120V ac Distr. Panel (Continued) Circuit #5 300-980 0-0.167 EDE 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 EDE

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #6 300-980 0-0.167 EDE 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 EDE

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #14 300-980 0-0.167 ED 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 ED

E2 or ED4 45 5-200 Circuit #15 300-980 0-0.167 EDE 45 4.5-70

300-980 0-0.167 EDE

E2 or ED4 45 5-200

2-15.16 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 16 of 17)

Breaker Type Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Longtime Instant Longtime IV. LOW VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (125V dc and 120V ac) b. Type E2/ED4 Thermal Magnetic (Continued)

EDE-PP-111B 125V dc Distr. Panel Circuit #18 450-1260 0-0.167 EDE 300 4.5-70 450-1400 0-0.167 EDE E2 or ED4 300 5-200 EDE-PP-112A 125V dc Distr. Panel Circuit #19 300-980 0-0.167 RC E2 60 4.5-70 2-15.17 SSTR Rev. 128 Technical Requirement 15 Protective Devices for Non-Class 1E Circuits Connected to Class 1E Power Sources (Sheet 17 of 17)

Test Setpoint (amps)

Verification Time (seconds)

System Powered Instant Short-time Longtime Instant Short-time Longtime V. 125V DC CIRCUIT BREAKER UPS ED-I-2A 2400-3600 0-0.11 EDE 3600 0.07-0.35 1800 10-30

2-16.1 SSTR Rev. 63 Technical Requirement 16 NOT USED 2-17.1 SSTR Rev. 63 Technical Requirement 17 Accumulator Water Level a nd Pressure Instrumentation LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR17-3.5.1.1 Each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator shall be OPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1.1 and the requirements presented below.

APPLICABILITY

As per Technical Specification 3.5.1.1 ACTION: As per Technical Specification 3.5.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR17-4.5.1.1 Each accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. at least once per 92 days by the performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATION TEST, and b. at least once every 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Technical Requirement 18 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves (Sheet 1 of 3) 2-18.1 SSTR Rev. 63 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR18 The maximum allowable leakage for each Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valve required to be OPERABLE by Technical Specifi cation 3.4.6.2f shall be as specified herein.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: As specified in Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Determination of leakage for each Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valve below the maximum allowable leakage limit is demonstrated by TS Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.2.

Technical Requirement 18 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves (Sheet 2 of 3) 2-18.2 SSTR Rev. 63 VALVE MAX. ALLOWABLE VALVE NUMBER SIZE FUNCTION LEAKAGE (GPM)

SI-V144 1-1/2" SI to RCS Loop 1 Cold-Leg Injection 0.75 SI-V148 1-1/2" SI to RCS Loop 2 Cold-Leg Injection 0.75 SI-V152 1-1/2" SI to RCS Loop 3 Cold-Leg Injection 0.75 SI-V156 1-1/2" SI to RCS Loop 4 Cold-Leg Injection 0.75 SI-V81 2" SI to RCS Loop 3 Hot-Leg Injection 1.0 SI-V86 2" SI to RCS Loop 2 Hot-Leg Injection 1.0 SI-V106 2" SI to RCS Loop 4 Hot-Leg Injection 1.0 SI-V110 2" SI to RCS Loop 1 Hot-Leg Injection 1.0 SI-V118 2" SI to RCS Loop 1 Cold-Leg Injection 1.0 SI-V122 2" SI to RCS Loop 2 Cold-Leg Injection 1.0 SI-V126 2" SI to RCS Loop 3 Cold-Leg Injection 1.0 SI-V130 2" SI to RCS Loop 4 Cold-Leg Injection 1.0 SI V140 3" SI to RCS Cold-Leg Injection 1.5 RH-V15 6" RHR to SI Loop 1 Cold-Leg Injection 3.0 RH-V29 6" RHR to SI Loop 3 Cold-Leg Injection 3.0 RH-V30 6" RHR to SI Loop 4 Cold-Leg Injection 3.0 RH-V31 6" RHR to SI Loop 2 Cold-Leg Injection 3.0 RH-V52 6" SI to RCS Loop 1 Hot-Leg Injection 3.0 RH-V53 6" SI to RCS Loop 4 Hot-Leg Injection 3.0 SI-V82 6" SI to RCS Loop 3 Hot-Leg Injection 3.0 SI-V87 6" SI to RCS Loop 2 Hot-Leg Injection 3.0 RH-V50 8" RHR to SI Loop 4 Hot-Leg Injection 4.0 RH-V51 8" RHR to SI Loop 1 Hot-Leg Injection 4.0 SI-V5 10" SI to RCS Loop 1 Cold-Leg Injection 5.0 SI-V6 10" SI Tank 9A Discharge Isolation 5.0 SI-V20 10" SI to RCS Loop 2 Cold-Leg Injection 5.0 SI-V21 10" SI Tank 9B Discharge Isolation 5.0 SI-V35 10" SI to RCS Loop 3 Cold-Leg Injection 5.0 SI-V36 10" SI Tank 9C Discharge Isolation 5.0 SI-V50 10" SI to RCS Loop 4 Cold-Leg Injection 5.0 SI-V51 10" SI Tank 9D Discharge Isolation

5.0 Technical

Requirement 18 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves (Sheet 3 of 3) 2-18.3 SSTR Rev. 63 VALVE VALVE MAX. ALLOWABLE NUMBER SIZE FUNCTION LEAKAGE (GPM)

RC-V22* 12" RHR Pump 8A Suction Isolation 5.0 RC-V23* 12" RHR Pump 8A Suction Isolation 5.0 RC-V87* 12" RHR Pump 8B Suction Isolation 5.0 RC-V88* 12" RHR Pump 8B Suction Isolation 5.0 RC-V475**

1/2" RC-V22 Bypass Check 0.25 RC-V479**

1/2" RC-V87 Bypass Check 0.25

Testing per Technical Specification 4.4.6.2.2d not required. ** Testing per Technical Specification 4.4.6.2.2d is require d if there has been flow through the valve. "Flow through the valve" is defined as forward flow greater than 0.25 gpm. Flow in excess of 0.25 gpm is not expected to occur under normal operation or plant cooldown conditions.

Technical Requirement 19 Feedwater Isolation on Low RCS T ave Coincident with Reactor Trip (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-19.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR19: The Feedwater Isolation on Low RCS T ave Coincident with Reactor Trip control function shall be FUNCTIONAL. Total No. of Channels - 4 Minimum Channels for actuation - 2 Minimum Channels FUNCTIONAL - 3 Trip Setpoint - greater than or equal to 557°F Allowable Value - greater th an or equal to 554.3°F.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1 and 2 ACTION: As determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. An evaluation is not re quired if the noncomplian ce is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL CHECK shall be performed at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be performed at least once per 92 days. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The purpose of the feedwater is olation function on low RCS T avg coincident with a reactor trip is to preclude overcooling events due to continued feedwater flow following a reactor trip. It also has a role in establishing the design transients which form the basis of the system and components design. After a reactor trip, the average RCS Temperature (T avg) will decrease to the no-load temperature due to steam dump actuation and continued feedwater flow. Additionally, for reactor trips from power levels above 50%, the shrink in steam gene rator level typically goes below th e lo-lo level setpoint, actuating emergency feedwater (EFW). If feedwater flow is not isolated while the RCS is cooling down, T avg will undershoot the target value of no-load temperature. The addition of EFW will further aggravate the undershoot effects. This undershoot could subsequently result in safety inject ion actuation on low RCS pressure as well as loss of required minimum shutdown margin. Cons equently, a feedwater isolation on low RCS T avg coincident with reactor trip has been provided in the design.

However, while the feedwater flow is olation feature is not credited in the safety analysis it does perform a control function. It is intended that the function will remain functional and any changes to the setpoint or function will be controlled pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

Technical Requirement 19 Feedwater Isolation on Low RCS T ave Coincident with Reactor Trip (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-19.2 SSTR Rev. 106 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

Westinghouse Electric Corporation performs the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and related analyses for Seabrook Station. Westinghouse confirmed that the LOCA analyses and related analyses, including large and small break LOCA, reactor vessel and loop LOCA blowdown forces, post-LOCA long term core cooling subcriticality, post-LOCA long term core cooling minimum flow and hot leg switchover to prevent boron precipitation are not affected by the low RCS T avg feedwater isolation setpoint. Feedwater isolation in these analyses is achieved as the result of the initiation of a Safety Injection (SI).

Technical Requirement 20 Incore Detector System (Sheet 1 of 1) 2-20.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR20-3.3.3.2 The Incore Detector System shall be FUNCTIONAL with: a. At least 75% of the detector locations, and b. A minimum of two detector locations per core quadrant, c. A FUNCTIONAL incore detector location consists of a fuel assembly containing a fixed detector string with a minimum of three FUNCTIONAL detectors or a FUNCTIONAL movable incore detector capable of mapping the location.

APPLICABILITY: When the Incore Detector System is used for: a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or c. Measurement of F H N and F Q (Z). ACTION: With the Incore Detector System nonfunctional, do not use the system for the above applicable monitoring or calib ration functions.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Plant procedures are used to determine that the Incore Detector System is FUNCTIONAL.)

Technical Requirement 21 Seismic Instrumentation (Sheet 1 of 3) 2-21.1 SSTR Rev. 113 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR21-3.3.3.3 The seismic monitoring instrumentation listed on the following table shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION: As determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. An evaluation is not required if the noncompliance is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR21-4.3.3.3.1 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments shown in the seismic monitoring instrumentation surveillance requirements table shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL by the performance of: a. A Monthly CHANNEL CHECK, and

b. A Semiannual CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and

c. A Refueling Interval CHANNEL CALIBRATION TR21-4.3.3.3.2 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments which is actuated during a seismic event greater than or equal to 0.01 g, and which does not self-reset, shall be restored to

FUNCTIONAL status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION performed within 30 days following the seismic event. Data shall be retrieved from actuated instruments and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the vibratory ground motion.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The function of the seismic instrumentation is to provide information in the event of an earthquake to support a prompt evaluation of the response of Category I structures and components and comparison to the design basis. The seismic instrumentation is capable of recording seismic event after seismic event without operator intervention. Therefore, following actuation of the system by a seismic event or a false trigger, the seismic instrumentation remains functional. Further, the requirements in TR21-4.3.3.3.2 to restore actuated seismic instruments to functional status and perform channel calibrations apply only to instruments that do not self reset. Since the Seabrook instruments self reset, these requirements are normally not applicable following actuation of the seismic instruments.

Technical Requirement 21 Seismic Instrumentation (Sheet 2 of 3) 2-21.2 SSTR Rev. 113 MINIMUM MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS RANGE FUNCTIONAL

1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs

+ 1g 1* a. 1-SM-XT-6700, Free Field Control Room East Air Intake, elevation 11'-6"

+ 1g 1* b. 1-SM-XT-6701, Containment Foundation, elevation -26'-0"

+ 1g 1* c. 1-SM-XT-6710, Containment Operating Floor, elevation 25'-0"

+ 1g 1 d. 1-SM-XR-6707, Primary Auxiliary Building, elevation 53'-0"

+ 1g 1 e. 1-SM-XR-6708, Service Water Pump House, elevation 22'-0"

With reactor control room indication.

Technical Requirement 21 Seismic Instrumentation (Sheet 3 of 3) 2-21.3 SSTR Rev. 113 CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL

INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS CHECK CALIBRATION TEST**

1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs

a. M R SA

1-SM-XT-6700, Free Field Control Room East Air Intake,* elevation 11'-6"

b. 1-SM-XT-6701, Containment Foundation,* elevation -26'-0" M R SA

c. 1-SM-XT-6710, Containment Operating Floor,* elevation 25'-0" M R SA

d. 1-SM-XR-6707, Primary Auxiliary M R SA Building, elevation 53'-0"

e. 1-SM-XR-6708, Service Water Pump M R SA House, elevation 22'-0"

With reactor control room indication.

- Channel Functional Test (Secondary Calibration) is defined as the determination without adjustment that an instrument, sensor, or system responds to a known input of such character that it will verify the instrument, sensor, or system is functioning in a manner that can be calibrated.

Technical Requirement 22 Meteorological Instrumentation (Sheet 1 of 3) 2-22.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR22-3.3.3.4 The meteorological monitoring instrument ation channels shown in the following table shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION: As determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. An evaluation is not required if the noncompliance is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR22-4.3.3.4 Each of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shown in the following table shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL by the performance of: a. A Daily CHANNEL CHECK, and

b. A Semiannual CHANNEL CALIBRATION. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Meteorological data can be obtained from either the Primary or Backup Meteorological Monitoring Systems. The Primary Meteorological System (Prima ry Met Tower) is included in the Seabrook Station Technical Requirements manual. This system is a 210 foot (ft) tower which provides data on the wind speed and direction at 43 ft and 209 ft nominal elevations, and the temperature differential between 43 ft

and 150 ft, and 43 ft and 209 ft. The Backup Meteorological System (Backup Met Tower) is a 53 ft tower which provides wind speed and direction at the elevation corresponding to the 43 ft elevation of the Primary Met Tower. An algorithm is used to compute the average upper wind speed, wind direction, and delta-T. The Backup Met Tower was installed to provide meteor ological data in the event the Primary Met Tower became unavailable and was not designed to replace the Primary Met Tower for Technical Requirement compliance.

Technical Requirement 22 Meteorological Instrumentation (Sheet 2 of 3) 2-22.2 SSTR Rev. 106 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (continued)

A CHANNEL CHECK is defined as follows: "A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of channel indication and/

or status with other i ndications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter." The meteorological instrumentation on the various leve ls of the Primary Met Tower and on the Backup Met Tower may be subject to variations in local weather conditions. This may cause variances in the data obtained from similar instruments in proximity to one another.

In addition, the Backup Me t Tower does not directly measure upper wind speed, upper wind direction, and air temperature delta T, but instead uses an algorithm to estimate this data. Consequently, variations in data values among the various Primary and Backup Met Tower channels requ ire further evaluation before a determination of channel nonfunctionality can be made. The evaluation should be in accordance with the guidance provided in YAEC memorandum REG 100/86, "Criteria for Implemen ting Daily Meteorological Channel Checks" dated April 17, 1986. The preferred method for performing a CHANNEL CHECK is to compare the upper level and lower level wind speed, wind direction, and air temperature delta T. This comparison can be done using the Main Plant Computer (MPC) or the chart recorders locally at the Primary Met Tower. If this method cannot be performed, a CHANNEL CHECK may be done by comparing data from the Primary Met Tower with similar data from the Backup Met To wer. If neither of the two CHANNEL CHECK methods described above is available, then a comparison of Primar y Met Tower data with apparent outside weather conditions is acceptable and satisfies the intent of a CHANNEL CHECK. The following are examples of operational situ ations and an appropriate CHANNEL CHECK methodology:

Main Plant Computer not available Utilize the chart recorders located locally at the Primary Met Tower to compare upper and lower level wind speed, wind direction, and air temperature delta T. Primary Met Tower upper wind speed not available Enter Technical Requirement TR22-3.3.3.4 for the upper wind speed instrument. Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the lower wind speed instrument by comparison with lower wind speed from the Backup Met Tower. Primary Met Tower upper wind speed and Backup Met Tower not available Enter Technical Requirement TR22-3.3.3.4 for the upper wind speed instrument. Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the lower wind speed instrument by comparison with apparent outside weather conditions.

Technical Requirement 22 Meteorological Instrumentation (Sheet 3 of 3) 2-22.3 SSTR Rev. 106 MINIMUM INSTRUMENT LOCATION FUNCTIONAL

1. Wind Speed a. Lower Level Nominal Elev. 43 ft 1

b. Upper Level Nominal Elev. 209 ft 1

2. Wind Direction

a. Lower Level Nominal Elev. 43 ft 1

b. Upper Level Nominal Elev. 209 ft 1

3. Air Temperature - T

a. Lower Level Between Elev. 43 ft and 150 ft 1

b. Upper Level Between Elev. 43 ft and 209 ft 1

Technical Requirement 23 Turbine Overspeed Protection (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-23.1 SSTR Rev. 118 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR23-3.3.4 At least one Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION: With the Turbine Overspeed Protection System nonfunctional, restore the system to functional status within the time period determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. An ev aluation is not required if the noncompliance is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR23-4.3.4.1 The above required Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 90 days by cycling each of the following valves through at least one complete cycle from the running position: 1) Four high pressure turbine stop valves, and

2) Six low pressure combined intermediate valves. b. At least once per 90 days by direct observation of the movement of each of the above valves and the four high pressure turbine control valves through one complete cycle from the running position, c. At least once per 18 months by performance of the following: 1) a CALIBRATION of the analog to digital conversion devices and 2) a digital channel operation test on the Primary and Emergency Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems.

d. At least once per 40 months by disassembling at least one of each of the above valves and performing a visual and surface inspection of valve seats, disks, and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosi on. If unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion is found, all other valves of that type shall be inspected.

Technical Requirement 23 Turbine Overspeed Protection (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-23.2 SSTR Rev. 118 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Surveillance Requirements TR23-4.3.4.1a and TR23-4.3.4.1b both require cycling each valve "from the running position." The requirements of Surveillance Requirements TR23-4.3.4.1a and TR23-4.3.4.1b

must be satisfied within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of being able to cycle each valve from its "running position."

Typically, the "running position" for the turbine control valves is greater than 10% open; however, certain plant conditions may result in a "running condi tion" less than 10% open. In these cases any open valves should be tested.

If the unit is operated at low power levels for extended periods (>90 da ys), the Surveillance should be performed on those valves which are in their running position to demonstr ate their functionality.

The calibration of the analog to digital conversion is the verificat ion that a known frequency input results in a digital output that matches within a defined tolerance. Since these devices are not adjustable, calibration in this context is simply verification of expected performance and does not include adjustment. The digital channel operational test shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using database manipulation and/or injecting simulated proc ess data and/or actual operating conditions to verify operability of alarm and/or trip functions for turbine overspeed protection.

Calibration of the sensor is not required because the system performs the automated equivalent of a continuous channel check and will provide alarms if a sensor deviates from other sensors by a predefined amount. As part of 07DCR005 (EC12635) the mechanical turbine overspeed protection system was removed and replaced with a redundant diverse, electrical overspeed protection system, therefore this surveillance requirement includes tests of both the primary and emergency overspeed protection systems. The digital turbine control system includes additional protective features/trips associated with the speed signal faults and acceleration/deceleration. These addi tional protective features/t rips are not considered part of the primary and emergency overspeed protection systems. Also, the emergency overspeed protection system includes redundant channels, only one of which is required to be demonstrated as being functional.

Technical Requirement 24 Area Temperature Monitoring (Sheet 1 of 4) 2-24.1 SSTR Rev. 115 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR24-3.7.10 The temperature of each area shown in Table 24-1 shall not be exceeded for more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or by more than 30ºF. (See Note.)

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION: If Technical Specification (TS) equipment cannot perform its specified function due to non-functional air conditioning or ventilation equipment (HVAC), then it is necessary to enter the Technical Specification action statement(s) for the affected equipment. Figure 1 provides a listing of HVAC systems and the corresponding most limiting Technical Specification or Technical Requirement for equipment affected by the HVAC systems. For systems with approved Compensatory Ventilation Plans (CVPs), the OPERABILITY of supported equipment may be satisfied by aligning equipment in the manner specified. The CVPs may include specific time allowances for system re-alignment based on Engineering Area Heat

Rate Calculations. For the duration of the approved CVP re-alignment, no additional HVAC limits apply to OPERABLE equipment. In those instances where compensatory ventilation measures have not been established and an allotted time allowance for room heatup has been provided in OS1023.74, 50% of the time allowance may be used and reset as an iterative process provided that the room temperature is

re-evaluated on a periodic basis and efforts continue to restore the air conditioning and ventilation system to normal. Re-evaluation periods shall be based on application of no more than 50% of the allotted time. During this time, the room temperature shall be monitored to ensure compliance with the requirements of TR24-3.7.10.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR24-4.7.10 The temperature in each of the areas shown in Table 24-1 shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

NOTE: The maximum exceedence temperature for the Control Room is limited to 15°F above the maximum operating limit vs. 30°F for all other areas.

Technical Requirement 24 Area Temperature Monitoring (Sheet 2 of 4) 2-24.2 SSTR Rev. 115 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The following administrative limitations shall apply during the performance of HVAC system maintenance or testing. This is done to limit the time HVAC equipment is unavailable, assuring the continued ventilation support function for OPERABLE equipment. For those instances where compensatory ventilation measures have not been established and an iterative allotted time allowance has been applied, a seventy-two (72) hour administrative limit will be applied to ensure expedient efforts are taken to restore the HVAC system to normal. Exceedance of this limit will

require approval by the Shift Manager. For short periods of time (e.g., maintenance, testing, troubleshooting), the substitution of manual action for an automatic system function or for the immediate restoration of HVAC service is allowed. These specific actions must be contained in a procedure or evaluated and documented in approved written instructions with approval by the on-duty Shift Manager. The evaluation shall consider the limitations and requirements of procedure EN-AA-203-1001, Attachment 3, Item 17, which addresses use of manual action in place of automatic action. When air conditioning/ventilation systems alignment not covered by CVPs are not functional and the OPERABILITY of Technical Specification equipment is called into question, OPERABILITY shall be documented using procedure EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments. Some TS systems are supported by non-TS ventilation systems that consist of two redundant 100%

capacity trains, each capable of supporting both trains of a TS system. These include the following ventilation systems: emergency feedwater pump house, hydrogen analyzer room and hydrogen analyzer electrical room, PCCW pump area, service water pump house, service water pump house electrical rooms, service water cooling tower pump room, and containment enclosure cooling system. A loss of one train of these ventilation systems does not result in a loss of support for either train of TS equipment provided the functional train is capable of being powered from an emergency diesel generator. Both TS trains remain operable, despite a loss of support function redundancy, because the TS definition of operability does not require a TS subsystem's necessary support function to meet single-failure design criterion. Therefore, the TS for the supported system does not limit the duration of the non-TS support system outage even though the single failure design criterion for the supported TS system is not met. The duration that a redundant 100% capacity ventilation train may remain non-functional for preventative or corrective maintenance is determ ined in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). If, however, the supporting ventilation train will be nonfunctional for more than 90 days, an evaluation of

the configuration change, including consideration of the single failure design consideration, must be made under 10 CFR 50.59. If both trains of the ventilation system are non-functional, then both trains of the supported TS system must be declared inoperable unless an operability determination concludes that the support system is not actually required for operability of the supported TS system or implementation of compensatory actions provides the required support.

Technical Requirement 24 Area Temperature Monitoring (Sheet 3 of 4) 2-24.3 SSTR Rev. 115 FIGURE 1 AIR CONDITIONING AND VENTILATION UNITS AFFECTED EQUIPMENT MOST LIMITING T.S./TR Service Water Cooling Tower Ventilation

3.7.4 Service

Water Pumphouse Ventilation

3.7.4 Containment

Enclosure Cooling System 3.6.2.1 3.5.3.1 (Mode 4) Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse Ventilation System 3.7.1.2 PCCW/Boron Injection Pump Auxiliary

Fans (Part of PAB HVAC) 3.7.3 East Pipe Chase Hydrogen Analyzer and Electrical Room Ventilation TR32-3.6.4.1 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System 3.8.1.1 CBA Switchgear and Battery Room Ventilation 3.8.3.1 Technical Requirement 24 Area Temperature Monitoring (Sheet 4 of 4) 2-24.4 SSTR Rev. 115 TABLE 24-1 AREA MAXIMUM OPERATING TEMPERATURE LIMIT (°F)

1. Control Room 90 2. Cable Spreading Room 104

3. Switchgear Room - Train A 104

4. Switchgear Room - Train B 104

5. Battery Rooms - Train A 97

6. Battery Rooms - Train B 97

7. ECCS Equipment Vault - Train A 104 8. ECCS Equipment Vault - Train B 104 9. Centrifugal Charging Pump Room - Train A 104 10. Centrifugal Charging Pump Room - Train B 104 11. ECCS Equipment Vault Stairwell - Train A 104 12. ECCS Equipment Vault Stairwell - Train B 104 13. PCCW Pump Area 104 14. Cooling Tower Switchgear Room - Train A 104 15. Cooling Tower Switchgear Room - Train B 104 16. Cooling Tower SW Pump Area 127 17. SW Pumphouse Electrical Room - Train A 104 18. SW Pumphouse Electrical Room - Train B 104 19. SW Pump Area 104 20. Diesel Generator Room - Train A 120 21. Diesel Generator Room - Train B 120 22. EFW Pumphouse 104 23. Electrical Penetration Area - Train A 100 24. Electrical Penetration Area - Train B 85 25. Fuel Storage Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Area 104 26. Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase - East 130 27. Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase - West 130 28. Hydrogen Analyzer Room 104 29. MSFW East Pipe Chase Electrical Room 104 2-25.1 SSTR Rev. 78 Technical Requirement 25 Refueling Communications (Sheet 1 of 1)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

TR25-3.9.5 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTION:

When direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refu eling station cannot be maintained, suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TR25-4.9.5 Direct communications be tween the control room and pers onnel at the refueling station shall be demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months prior to the start of and at least on ce per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months during CORE ALTERATIONS.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The requirement for communi cations capability ensures that refueli ng station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

Technical Requirement 26 Refueling Machine (Sheet 1 of 1) 2-26.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR26-3.9.6 The refueling machine and auxiliary hoist shall be used for movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies and shall be FUNCTIONAL with: a. The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies having: 1) A minimum capacity of 4000 pounds, and 2) An overload cutoff limit less than or equal to 3900 pounds.

b. The auxiliary hoist used for latc hing and unlatching drive rods having:

1) A minimum capacity of 2100 pounds, and

2) A load indicator which shall be used to prevent lifting loads in excess of 1000 pounds.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

ACTION: With the requirements for refueling machine and/or hoist FUNCTIONALITY not satisfied, suspend use of any nonfunctional refueling machine and/or auxiliary hoist from operations involving the movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR26-4.9.6.1 The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL within 100 hour0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months s prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 4000 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cutoff when the refueling machine load exceeds 3900 pounds.

TR26-4.9.6.2 The auxiliary hoist and associated load indicator used for movement of drive rods within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated FUNCTI ONAL within 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 2100 pounds.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The FUNCTIONALITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that: (1) refueling machine will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) each hoist has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

Technical Requirement 27 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Areas (Sheet 1 of 1) 2-27.1 SSTR Rev. 112 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR27-3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2100 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool.

APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.

ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR27-4.9.7 Crane interlocks that prevent crane trav el with loads in excess of 2100 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL within 7 days prior to crane us e and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical arra

y. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses. During Dry Cask Loading operations, the single-failure-proof (in accordance with NUREG-0554, 'Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants', and compliant with NUREG-0612, 'Control of Heavy Loads') Cask Handling Crane (1-FH-RE-1) shall be utilized for the movement of heavy loads over fuel assemblies located in the Cask Loading Pool. This TR does not apply when using the single-failure-proof crane in accordance with NUREG-0612 requirements.

Technical Requirement 28 ESF Pump OPERABILITY Requirements (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-28.1 SSTR Rev. 88 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR28-3.1 Each ESF Pump, as listed below, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when tested in accordance with the Inservice Test Program and/or ASME OM Code per the criteria specified herein.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the ESF pumps are require d to be OPERABLE per the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement as tabulated below.

ACTION:

As specified per the applicab le Technical Specification.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TR28-4.1 Demonstrate OPERABILITY of each ESF Pump as listed below:

Technical Specification/ Requirement ESF Pump Operability Requirements TR29-4.1.2.3.1 Centrifugal

Charging By verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across the pump of greater than or equal to 2330 psid is developed.

TS 4.5.2f.1)

Centrifugal

Charging By verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across each pump of grea ter than or equal to 2330 psid is developed.

TS 4.5.2f.2)

Safety Injection By verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across each pump of grea ter than or equal to 1357 psid is developed.

TS 4.5.2f.3) RHR By verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across each pump of grea ter than or equal to 169 psid is developed.

TS 4.6.2.1b.

Containment

Spray By verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across each pump of grea ter than or equal to 262 psid is developed.

TS 4.7.1.2.1b.1)

Motor-driven EFW By verifying that the pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1460 psig at a flow of greater than or equal to 270 gpm.

TS 4.7.1.2.1b.2)

Turbine-driven EFW By verifying that the pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1460 psig at a flow of greater than or equal to 270 gpm when the secondary steam s upply pressure is greater than 500 psig.

TS 4.7.1.2.1b.3)

Startup Feedwater By verifying that the pump deve lops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1375 psig at a flow of greater than or equal to 425 gpm.

Technical Requirement 28 ESF Pump OPERABILITY Requirements (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-28.2 SSTR Rev. 88 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREM ENTS (continued)

TR28-4.2. Perform a flow balance te st, during shutdown, following comple tion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1) For centrifugal charging pump lines, with a single pump running:

a. The sum of the injection line flow rate s, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 298.3 gpm, and

b. The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 549 gpm.

2) For Safety Injection pump lines, with a single pump running:

a. The sum of the injection line flow rate s, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 410.4 gpm, and

b. The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 669 gpm.

3) For RHR pump lines, with a single pump running, the sum of the injection line flow rates is greater than 4150 gpm, if the surveillance test is performed with suction from the hot leg, or 4190 gpm if the surveillance test is performed with suction from the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Periodic surveillance testing of ESF pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is re quired by Technical Speci fications which either

1) invokes inservice testing per Sp ecification 4.0.5 pursuant to the requirements of ASME OM Code, and/or 2) require testing to ensure safety analyses criteria continue to be met. Such testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point of the pump characteristic curve. This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the plant safety analysis.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 1 of 9) 2-29.1 SSTR Rev. 122 FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR29-3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be FUNCTIONAL and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source: a. A flow path from the boric acid tanks via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System, or b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 4, 5, and 6

. ACTION: With none of the above flow paths FUNCTIONAL or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operati ons involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR29-4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow

path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

An alternate boron injection flow path is available in Mode 6 and is included as one of the boron injection flow paths in Mode 6 that shall be FUNCTIONAL and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source. This is the flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank in Requirement TR29-3.1.2.5b. is FUNCTIONAL.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 2 of 9) 2-29.2 SSTR Rev. 122 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION In general, vents, drains, sampling system connections, and instrument taps are not required to be included in the Surveillance Requirements to verify a system's correct lineup per Technical Requirements. For flowpaths addressed by Technical Requirements, only those valves and other components in the direct flowpath through safety-related equipment whose position is critical to the proper functioning of safety-related equipment, are considered part of the safety-related flowpath.

Sampling connections and instrument taps are not considered to be essential components and thus are

not required to be verified in their correct position per Technical Requirements. Vents, drains, and other components not directly in the flowpath, whose pos ition is not critical to the proper functioning of safety-related equipment, are also not required to be verified in their correct position. A valve that receives an accident signal is allowed to be in a non-accident position provided the valve will automatically re-position upon receipt of an actuation signal within the required stroke time. Upon a failure to meet the LCO, the action requires suspension of core alterations and positive reactivity changes. Operations that individually add limited, positive reactivity are acceptable when, combined

with other actions that add negative reactivity, the overall net reactivity addition is zero or negative. For example, a positive reactivity addition caused by temperature fluctuations from inventory addition or temperature control fluctuations is acceptable if it is combined with a negative reactivity addition such that the overall, net reactivity addition is zero or negative. Refer to TS Bases 3/4.9.1, Boron Concentration, for limits on boron concentration and water temperature for Mode 6 action statements

involving suspension of positive reactivity changes.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 3 of 9) 2-29.3 SSTR Rev. 122 FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR29-3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be FUNCTIONAL: a. The flow path from the boric acid tanks via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the RCS.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, and 3

. ACTION: With only one of the above required boron injecti on flow paths to the RCS FUNCTIONAL, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to FUNCTIONAL status within the time period determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. An evaluation is not required if the non-compliance is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR29-4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

b. Deleted c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Requirement TR29- 3.1.2.2a. delivers at least 30 gpm to the RCS.

The Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance Requirements are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the centrifugal charging pump declared inoperable pursuant to Requirement TR29-4.1.2.3.2 provided that the centrifugal charging pum p is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 375ºF, whichever comes first.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 4 of 9) 2-29.4 SSTR Rev. 122 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION In general, vents, drains, sampling system connections, and instrument taps are not required to be included in the Surveillance Requirements to verify a system's correct lineup per Technical Requirements. For flowpaths addressed by Technical Requirements, only those valves and other components in the direct flowpath through safety-related equipment whose position is critical to the proper functioning of safety-related equipment, are considered part of the safety-related flowpath.

Sampling connections and instrument taps are not considered to be essential components and thus are

not required to be verified in their correct position per Technical Requirements. Vents, drains, and other components not directly in the flowpath, whose pos ition is not critical to the proper functioning of safety-related equipment, are also not required to be verified in their correct position. A valve that receives an accident signal is allowed to be in a non-accident position provided the valve will automatically re-position upon receipt of an actuation signal within the required stroke time.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 5 of 9) 2-29.5 SSTR Rev. 122 PUMPS - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR29-3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Requirement TR29-3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency

power source.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 4, 5, and 6

. ACTION: With no pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR29-4.1.2.3.1 The above required pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when tested pursuant to Technical Requirement TR28-3/4.1.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Upon a failure to meet the LCO, the action requires suspension of core alterations and positive reactivity changes. Operations that individually add limited, positive reactivity are acceptable when, combined

with other actions that add negative reactivity, the overall net reactivity addition is zero or negative. For example, a positive reactivity addition caused by temperature fluctuations from inventory addition or temperature control fluctuations is acceptable if it is combined with a negative reactivity addition such that the overall, net reactivity addition is zero or negative. Refer to TS Bases 3/4.9.1, Boron Concentration, for limits on boron concentration and water temperature for Mode 6 action statements

involving suspension of positive reactivity changes.

In Mode 6, a safety injection pump is available as an alternative to the charging pump provided the operability restrictions in Technical Specification 3.5.3.2 are satisfied. This safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE in the boron injection flow path required by TR29-3.1.2.1 and shall be capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 6 of 9) 2-29.6 SSTR Rev. 122 TR29-3.1.2.4 This requirement number is not used.

BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR29-3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be FUNCTIONAL as required by TR29-3.1.2.1 for MODES 5 and 6: a. A Boric Acid Storage System with: 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 14,000 gallons, 2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and 3) A minimum solution temperature of 65ºF. b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with: 1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 55,000 gallons,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 2400 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 50ºF.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION: With no borated water source FUNCTIONAL, suspe nd all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR29-4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 7 days by: 1) Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2) Verifying the contained borated water volume, and

3) Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water. b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWST temperature.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 7 of 9) 2-29.7 SSTR Rev. 122 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Upon a failure to meet the LCO, the action requires suspension of core alterations and positive reactivity changes. Operations that individually add limited, positive reactivity are acceptable when, combined

with other actions that add negative reactivity, the overall net reactivity addition is zero or negative. For example, a positive reactivity addition caused by temperature fluctuations from inventory addition or temperature control fluctuations is acceptable if it is combined with a negative reactivity addition such that the overall, net reactivity addition is zero or negative. Refer to TS Bases 3/4.9.1, Boron Concentration, for limits on boron concentration and water temperature for Mode 6 action statements

involving suspension of positive reactivity changes.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 8 of 9) 2-29.8 SSTR Rev. 122 BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR29-3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source shall be FUNCTIONAL as required by TR29-3.1.2.2 for MODES 1, 2 and 3 or TR29-3.1.2.1 for MODE 4: a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:

1) A minimum contained borated water volume of 29,500 gallons, 2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 65ºF.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: a. With the Boric Acid Storage System nonfunctional and being used as the above required borated water source, restore the system to FUNCTIONAL status within the time period determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. An evaluation is not required if the non-compliance is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR29-4.1.2.6 The borated water source shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL: a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the boron concentration in the water,

2) Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and

3) Verifying the Boric Acid Storage System solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

Technical Requirement 29 Boration Systems (Sheet 9 of 9) 2-29.9 SSTR Rev. 122 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Based on the Seabrook Station 10CFR50 Appendix R report, the BATs are required to meet the requirements provided in TR29-3.1.2.6 during Modes 1, 2, and 3. During power operation, the BATs are routinely recirculated to establish a uniform boron concentration and associated surveillance. In addition, the BATs may be isolated for maintenance. The alignment of the BATs to the charging pumps is, however, not required for the system to be considered functional for Appendix R purposes. The following provides the basis for this consideration.

As discussed in 07DCR003 (EC-12633):

Fire safe shutdown analyses assume at the onset of the postulated fire event that all safe shutdown systems (including applicable redundant trains) are operable and available for post-fire safe shutdown. Systems are assumed to be operational with no repairs, maintenance, testing, Limiting Conditions for Operation, etc. in progress. The units are assumed to be operating at full power under normal conditions and normal lineups. These statements are based on NEI document NEI-00-01, Section 3.1.1.3

[now 3.1.1.5].

Based on this, an Appendix R event is not assumed to occur with the system in a surveillance or maintenance alignment. In accordance with the requirements of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1, safety grade cold shutdown includes a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months hot standby period followed by a cooldown to RHR cut-in conditions in approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months . Per calculation C-S-1-84214, the BATs need to be aligned by the commencement of plant cooldown. Therefore, operator action to align the BATs is required in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . This provides adequate time for any additional required operator action, should the tanks not be in the normal lineup.

2-30.1 SSTR Rev. 86 Technical Requirement 30 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry (Sheet 1 of 2)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR30-3.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be maintained within the following limits: Parameter Steady-State Limit Transient Limit Dissolved Oxygen

< 0.10 ppm 1.00 ppm Chloride < 0.15 ppm 1.50 ppm Fluoride 0.15 ppm 1.50 ppm

Limit not applicable with T avg less than or equal to 250ºF APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION: With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Steady-State Limit or its Transient Limit, restore the parameter to within its Steady-State Limit within the time period determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Corrective Action Program.

2-30.2 SSTR Rev. 86 Technical Requirement 30 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry (Sheet 2 of 2)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR30-4.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be determined to be within the limits by analysis of those parameters specified in Requirement TR30-3.4.7 at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The following actions are required when it is not possible to sample the reactor coolant system during

refueling operations: a. Obtain a sample prior to securing flow in the reactor coolant system and analyze for chloride and fluoride concentrations. Ensure these concentrations are sufficiently below the steady state limit.

If not, reduce the chloride/fluoride concentrations prior to securing flow. b. Samples of the reactor coolant are not required once obtaining these samples using sample system sample points is not possible. c. When reactor coolant flow is restored, and more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months has elapsed since the last sample, obtain and analyze a sample as soon as possible. In no case shall pressure be increased above 500 psig before the reactor coolant is sampled and chloride and fluoride concentrations are determined to be below the steady state limits. If they are not within the steady state limits, remain below 500 psig pending the results of an engineering evaluation as required by Technical Requirement TR30-3.4.7.

_____________________ ** Sample and analysis for dissolved oxygen is not required with T avg 250ºF Technical Requirement 31 Supplemental Emergency Power System Availability Requirements (Sheet 1 of 2) 2-31.1 SSTR Rev. 99 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR 31-3.1 The Supplemental Emergency Power System (SEPS) shall be available for standby service. APPLICABILITY: At All Times ACTION: With the requirements of the LCO not satisfied, initiate corrective action to restore the SEPS to available status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR 31-4.1 The SEPS shall be demonstrated available: a. Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months prior to removing an emergency diesel generator (EDG) from service in Modes 1 through 4 for planned maintena nce that is expect ed to extend beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months by performing an operational readiness status check per surveillance c. below. b. Prior to exceeding 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from the time the EDG initially became inoperable during an unplanned corrective maintenance outage in Modes 1 through 4 by performing an operational readiness status check per surveillance c. below. c. At least once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months while an EDG is inoperable in Modes 1 through 4 by performing an operational readiness status check that consists of the following: 1) Verifying the SEPS is operationally ready for automatic start and energization of the selected emergency bus; 2) Verifying the fuel oil level in each fuel oil storage tank is greater than or equal to 4775 gallons; 3) Verifying the SEPS 5 kV circuit breaker and transfer switch are aligned to the selected emergency bus; and 4) Verifying the 480 volt circuit breaker for the SEPS support systems is aligned to the non-emergency bus. d. At least once every 31 days by: 1) Verifying each diesel starts from manual or automatic initiation and attains a steady-state generator volta ge and frequency of 4160 420 volts and 60 1.2 Hz; Technical Requirement 31 Supplemental Emergency Power System Availability Requirements (Sheet 2 of 2) 2-31.2 SSTR Rev. 99 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR 31-4.1 (continued) 2) Verifying load-sharing capability of each generator while synchronized together and loaded to 50% rated capacity (1080 kW to 1620kW); 3) Verifying the SEPS 5 kV circuit breaker and transfer switch are aligned to the selected emergency bus; and 4) Verifying the 480 volt circuit breaker for the SEPS support systems is aligned to the non-emergency bus; and 5) Verifying the fuel oil level in each fuel oil storage tank is greater than or equal to 4775 gallons. e. At least once every 92 days by checking for and removing accumulated water from the fuel oil storage tanks. f. At least once every 12 months by: 1) Verifying both diesel generator sets automatically start together on a simulated loss of power signal, auto-synchronize together, energize the SEPS non-safety related common bus and attain a stea dy-state voltage and frequency of 4160 420 volts and 60 1.2 Hz. 2) Performing an inspection, following initial startup, of each diesel generator set in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with

- its manufacturer's recommendations fo r this class of standby service. 3) Verifying the structural integrity, following initial startup, of the SEPS hurricane proof enclosure. g. At least once every 24 months, following initial startup, by loading each diesel generator set to 100% rated capacity (2430 kW to 2700 kW) for at least one hour.

- The words "prepared in conjunction with" do not mean that compulsory acceptance of all vendor recommendations is necessary.

Technical Requirement 32 Hydrogen Monitors (Page 1 of 1) 2-32.1 SSTR Rev. 106 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR32-3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment hydrogen monitors nonfunctional, re store the nonfunctional monitor to FUNCTIONAL status within a period determined by an evaluation conducted in accordance with the requirements of the corrective action program. An eval uation is not required if the noncompliance is a consequence of surveillance testing or planned maintenance.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR32-4.6.4.1 Each containment hydrogen monitor shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL:

a. at least every 9 months by performing a channel functional test

- , and b. at least every 18 months by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using sample gas containing

1. one volume percent hydroge n, balance nitrogen, and

2. four volume percent hydr ogen, balance nitrogen.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The monitoring of hydrogen concentrations in containment is not the primary means of detecting a significant abnormal degradation of the reac tor coolant pressure boundary. Therefore, FUNCTIONALITY of the containment hydrogen monitoring equipment is intended to ensure the capability to diagnose the course of beyond design basis accidents. Returning of nonfunctional containment hydrogen channels to FUNCTIONAL status shall be performed as soon as practicable.

- Channel function test is defined as a test which verifi es that without adjustment(s) an instrument, sensor, or system responds in a manner such that it can be calibrated when a known input is applied.

Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 1 of 8) 2-33.1 SSTR Rev. 134 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR 33.3.1 The Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric System shall be in service with a. The Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System FUNCTIONAL b. The Main Plant Computer System AVAILABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, > 3587 MWt ACTION: a. With the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System NONFUNCTIONAL: 1. Restore the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System to FUNCTIONAL status or reduce reactor core power to 3587 MWt or less within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . 2. If reactor core power is reduced to 3587 MWt or less, limit maximum allowable reactor core power to 3587 MWt. b. With the Main Plant Computer System UNAVAILABLE: 1. Restore the Main Plant Computer System to AVAILABLE status or reduce reactor core power to 98% of rated thermal power (RTP) or less prior to performing the nuclear instrumentation / power calorimetric comparison. 2. If reactor core power is reduced to 98% RTP or less, limit maximum allowable reactor core power to 98% RTP.

Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 2 of 8) 2-33.2 SSTR Rev. 134 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The maximum allowable reactor core power levels discussed in this Technical Requirement are based on the analyzed reactor core power level assumed in the reactor safety analysis of 3659 MWt and the magnitude of the calorimetric power determination uncertainty which is a function of the calorimetric power determination method.

Safety Analysis Power Level Calorimetric Power Determination Uncertainty (Reference Calculation) Maximum Allowable Indicated Reactor

Core Power Level Allowable Calorimetric Power Determination

Mode(s) 3659 MWt 0.3% (C-S-1-50035) 3648 MWt Ultrasonic 3659 MWt 2.0% (C-S-1-50031) 3587 MWt Feedwater Flow or Steam Flow Operation at core power levels above 3587 MWt requires a calorimetric power determination uncertainty of less than 2.0%. Th is is only possible if the Ultrasonic mode calorimetric is used. Therefore, except for the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) described later, operation at reactor core power levels greater than 3587 MWt requires the use of the Ultrasonic mode calorimetric. The Ultrasonic mode calorimetric is unique in that it receives feedwater mass flow, feedwater temperature and feedwater pressure inputs directly from the LEFM Ultrasonic flow measurement system (1-FW-FIQ-4343). The LEFM system measures and transmits this data more accurately than the equivalent instrumentation for the feedwater flow or steam flow calorimetric modes. This is the basis for the reduced uncertainty that is characteristic of the Ultrasonic mode calorimetric. The Ultrasonic mode calorimetric can be performed using either of two methods: automatically by the Main Plant Computer System (MPCS) or manually using a non-MPCS calculation. The MPCS method is performed entirely by the MPCS with no operator participation required. The calculated core power for MPCS Ultrasonic mode calorimetric is disp layed on Main Control Board (MCB) indicator 1-CP-JI-412 and via several MPCS Satellite Display System (SDS) displays. The manual method is performed by station personnel on a calculating devi ce other than the MPCS and is controlled by a station procedure. The manual Ultrasonic mode calorimetric requires input data gathered directly from the LEFM via the local display on the LEFM system electronics panel as well as supporting process data provided by either analog points displayed by the MPCS or by alternate measurement methods which satisfy the Ultrasonic mode calorimetric uncertainty assumptions. MCB indicators shall not be used as the source of input data for the manual Ultrasonic mode calorimetric because the increased uncertainty associated with the use of these indicators has not been included in the Ultrasonic mode calorimetric uncertainty analysis.

Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 3 of 8) 2-33.3 SSTR Rev. 134 Both the MPCS and manual methods of performing the Ultrasonic mode calorimetric power determination meet the requirements of the uncerta inty analysis supporting ope ration at power levels greater than 3587 MWt. Whenever possible, the MPCS Ultrasonic mode calorimetric should be used to determine reactor core power when operati ng at power levels greater than 3587 MWt.

LEFM System Functional Status:

For this Technical Requirement, "Functional Status" of the LEFM system is defined as the ability to provide feedwater mass flow, feedwater temperature and feedwater pressure at the required uncertainty level to be used as input for either the MPCS Ultrasonic mode calorimetric calculation or the manual Ultrasonic mode calorimetric calculation. The LEFM data may be retrieved via the LEFM/MPCS datalink application (for the MPCS Ultrasonic mode calorimetric) or locally via the display on the LEFM system electronics panel (for the manual Ultrasonic mode calorimetric). The LEFM electronics package (1-FW-FIQ-4343) and the MPCS/LEFM datalink application (DALEFZZ.EXE) perform extensive self monitoring and internal diagnostics to ensure proper operation. The LEFM system provides a number of alarms to the Main Plant Computer System (MPCS) Video Alarm System (VAS) to annunciate degraded or failed conditions. These alarms and their associated functional status are descri bed in the table below. Alarm Alarm Description Alarm Condition LEFM System Status B8324 LEFM/MPCS DATALINK TROUBLE One of the two Ethernet communication links is not functioning properly. LEFM data is being transferred from the LEFM to the MPCS via the functional Ethernet link.

FUNCTIONAL B8325 LEFM/MPCS DATALINK INOP Both of the two Ethernet communication links are not functioning properly. LEFM data is not being transferred from the LEFM

to the MPCS. NON-FUNCTIONAL (Note 1) B8330 LEFM MASS FLOW NO CHANGE IN 5 MINS The LEFM system mass flow rate retrieved by the MPCS (C0117) has remained constant for 5 minutes indicating a possible problem with the LEFM or LEFM/MPCS datalink.

FUNCTIONAL D8499 LEFM UPS B TROUBLE LEFM UPS B has lost input line power and is providing battery backup power to LEFM CPU B. When the battery power is exhausted CPU B will shutdown resulting in an LEFM MAINTENANCE alarm (D8505) and LEFM NONFUNCTIONAL alarm (F8127). FUNCTIONAL Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 4 of 8) 2-33.4 SSTR Rev. 134 Alarm Alarm Description Alarm Condition LEFM System Status D8500 LEFM UPS A TROUBLE LEFM UPS A has lost input line power and is providing battery backup power to LEFM CPU A. When the battery power is exhausted CPU A will shutdown resulting in an LEFM MAINTENANCE alarm (D8505) and LEFM NONFUNCTIONAL alarm (F8127). FUNCTIONAL D8504 LEFM FAILURE The LEFM system has experienced a failure affecting both CPU A and CPU B. The LEFM system has failed or cannot meet the

uncertainty requirements for the Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric. NON-FUNCTIONAL D8505 LEFM MAINTENANCE The LEFM system has experienced a failure

affecting either CPU A or CPU B. The LEFM system cannot meet the uncertainty requirements for the Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric. NON-FUNCTIONAL D8506 LEFM PANEL TEMP HI The interior of the LEFM electronics cabinet is above the temperature setpoint. The LEFM system can continue to meet the uncertainty requirements for the Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric. Continued operation at high internal LEFM panel temperatures will adversely affect component service life but will not affect the ability of the LEFM to meet the uncertainty requirements for the Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric.

FUNCTIONAL F8127 LEFM NONFUNCTIONAL The LEFM system or MPCS/LEFM Datalink has experienced a failure and cannot meet the

uncertainty requirements for the Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric. Calorimetric mode must be changed from Ultrasonic to Steam Flow

or Feed Flow. NON-FUNCTIONAL (Note 1)

Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 5 of 8) 2-33.5 SSTR Rev. 134 Alarm Alarm Description Alarm Condition LEFM System Status NONE Failure or shutdown of MPCS IRTU #8 IRTU8 processes the discrete input signals for hardwired LEFM system VAS alarms; D8504, D8505, D8506, D8499 and D8500.

D8504 and D8505 are inputs into the "Healthy OR" (HOR) block F8127. If IRTU8 is out of service, the D points listed above and F8127 will become status NCAL.

This will cause the Ultrasonic mode calorimetric to become invalid. Calorimetric mode must be changed from Ultrasonic to Steam Flow or Feed Flow. NON-FUNCTIONAL (Note 1) Notes: 1. If the MPCS/LEFM datalink is no nfunctional or IRTU8 is out of service, upon approval from Design Engineering, the LEFM System may be declared FUNCTIONAL to provide data for input to the manual Ultrasonic mode calorimetric calculation. This data would be retrieved via the local display on the LEFM system electronics panel. MPCS Availability Status:

For this Technical Requirement, "Availability" of th e MPCS is defined as the ability of the MPCS to either perform an MPCS Ultrasonic mode calorimetric calculation or to provide supporting process input data for a manual Ultrasonic mode calorimetric calc ulation via analog points displayed on the MPCS. "Availability" for various faults is defined in the following table. Fault Discussion MPCS Availability Failure or shutdown of MPCS IRTU #8 IRTU #8 processes the discrete input signals for hardwired LEFM system VAS alarms;

D8504, D8505, D8506, D8499 and D8500. AVAILABLE B8324, LEFM/MPCS DATALINK TROUBLE One of the two Ethernet communication links to the LEFM is malfunctioning. LEFM data is being transferred from the LEFM to the MPCS

via the functional Ethernet link. AVAILABLE F8127, LEFM NONFUNCTIONAL The LEFM system or MPCS/LEFM Datalink has experienced a failure and cannot meet the uncertainty requirements for the Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric. Calorimetric mode must be changed from Ultrasonic to Steam Flow or

Feed Flow. AVAILABLE Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 6 of 8) 2-33.6 SSTR Rev. 134 Fault Discussion MPCS Availability B8330, LEFM MASS FLOW NO CHANGE IN 5

MINS The LEFM system mass flow rate retrieved by the MPCS (C0117) has remained constant for 5 minutes indicating a possible problem with the LEFM or LEFM/MPCS datalink. AVAILABLE Malfunction of the MPCS calorimetric power calculation caused by a malfunction or abort of the

MPCS application performing the calorimetric

calculation or a loss of required calorimetric input

data. Results in a display of "8888.8" on MCB indicator 1-CP-JI-412 and an NCAL status for the MPCS calorimetric calculated results displayed on the Satellite Display System, SDS. Manual calorimetric power calculation

and control of core power using the power range NI indicators is required. UNAVAILABLE (Note 2) MPCS Failover Brief loss of MPCS Calorimetric power calculation and I/O points (typical failover duration is less than 5 minutes). AVAILABLE MPCS Coldstart Loss of MPCS Calorimetric power calculation and I/O points. Manual calorimetric power calculation and control of reactor core power using the power range NI indicators is

required. UNAVAILABLE Complete MPCS Failure Complete loss of all MPCS functions. Manual calorimetric power calcu lation and control of reactor core power using the power range NI

indicators is required. UNAVAILABLE Notes: 2. Upon approval from Design Engineering, the MPCS may be declared AVAILABLE if the calorimetric input data required to perform a manual (non MPCS) Ultrasonic mode secondary calorimetric power calculation is being displayed by the MPCS or can be measured by alternate methods which satisfy the calorimetric uncertainty assumptions. Reactor Control Using the NI Power Indicators While the Main Plant Computer System is Unavailable:

Reactor core power limitations for this Technical Requirement shall be based on the highest reading Power Range NI channel. The readability of these indicators is 0.5% of rated thermal power (RTP). The required power level of 98.3% RTP (3587 MWt) has been conservatively rounded down to 98% RTP.

Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 7 of 8) 2-33.7 SSTR Rev. 134 A main plant computer system (MPCS) unavailab ility will be treated as if the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System had also concurrently become nonfunctional. Operation at the rated thermal power level of 3648 MWt (100% RTP) may continue until the next required nuclear instrumentation / power calorimetric comparison, which could be up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The main plant computer system unavailability will result in reducing maximum reactor core power to 98% RTP or less by NI indication, as needed, to support a manual calorimetric power calculation without MPCS display of calorimetric input points or input from the LEFM system. The 48-hour time period will not apply in this specific case.

LEFM System Allowed Outage Time:

The allowed outage time for operation at any reactor core power level in excess 3587 MWt with the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System nonfunctional, is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , pr ovided steady-state conditions persist (i.e., no power changes below 3587 MWt) throughout th e 48-hour period. The bases for the proposed allowed outage time are: Alternate plant instruments (feedwater venturies and main steam flow) shall be used if the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System is nonfunctional for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . Specifically, the main steam flow instruments will be normalized to the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System, and their accuracy will gradually degrade over time as a result of nozzle fouling and transmitter drift. However, values of drift are typically in the range of te nths of a percent of the calibrated span over 18 to 24 months or more. This typical drift value will not result in any significant drift for the instrumentation associated with the calorimetric measurem ents over a 48-hour period. Most repairs to the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System can be made within an eight-hour shift. Forty-eight hours will give plant personnel time to plan the work, make repairs, and verify normal operation of the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System within its original uncertainty bounds at the same power level and indicati ons as before the failure. Operations personnel will operate the plant based on the calibrated alternate plant instruments when the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System is nonfunctional. A reduction in power could, and in many cases, will be avoided altogether since repairs would typically be accomplished prior to the expiration of the 48-hour period. License amendment 110 requires that if the plant experien ces a power change of greater than ten percent during the 48-hour period, then the permitted maximum allo wable reactor core power level will be reduced to 3587 MWt, since a plant transient may result in calibration changes to the alternate instruments. Action statements a and b require that maximum allowable reactor core power be limited to 3587 MWt (98% RTP) if reactor core power is reduced below 3587 MWt (98% RTP). These action statement limits are sel ected to be consistent with other Technical Specification actions and are conservative to the License Amendment 110 requirements. For the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System nonfunctional condition, the 48-hour "clock" will start at the time of the failure. Failure will be annunciated in the control room.

Technical Requirement 33 Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric (Sheet 8 of 8) 2-33.8 SSTR Rev. 134 Use of Alternate Flow Instrume nts While the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System is Nonfunctional:

The power calorimetric calculation flow inputs using the alternate instrumentat ion (feedwater venturies or main steam flow) and the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System calorimetric are completely separate, and the calculations of reactor core thermal power are performed independently by the main plant computer system. The preferred alternate met hod to provide flow input to the calorimetric power calculation is the main steam flow instruments normalized to the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System flow. The steam flow normalization is performed periodically as needed while the LEFM system is functional by taking the ratio of total steam flow to the feedwater flow from the Caldon LEFM CheckPlus TM System. In addition, the flow input can be provided by either the main steam flow normalized to the venturies, or the feedwater venturies directly. All three methods are bounded by the 2% uncertainty for the maximum reactor core power level of 3587 MWt.

Technical Requirement 34 Containment Penetration Conductor Ov ercurrent Protective Devices and Protective Devices for Class 1E Power Sources Connected to Non-Class 1E Circuits (Sheet 1 of 3) 2-34.1 SSTR Rev. 126 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION TR34-3.8.4.2 Each containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device and each protective device for Class 1E power sources co nnected to non-Class 1E circuits shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,* and 6.*

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) nonfunctional:

1) Restore the protective device(s) to FUNCTIONAL status or deenergize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated circuit breaker or racking out or removing the nonfunctional protective device within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , declare the affected system or component inoperable or nonfunctional, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the nonfunctional protective device to be racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter; or

2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b. With one or more of the Class 1E power source protective device(s) nonfunctional, restore the protective device(s) to FUNCTIONAL status or deenergize the circuit(s) by tripping the circuit breaker or racking out or rem oving the nonfunctional protective device within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , declare the affected component i noperable or nonfunctiona l, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the nonfunctional protective device to be racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TR 34-4.8.4.2 Each containment penetration conduct or overcurrent and Class 1E power source protective device shall be demonstrated FUNCTIONAL:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1) By verifying that the medium voltage 13.8-kV and 4.16-kV circuit breakers are FUNCTIONAL by selecting, on a rotating ba sis, at least one of the circuit breakers, and performing the following:

Only for protective devices for Class 1E pow er sources connected to non-Class 1E loads.

Technical Requirement 34 Containment Penetration Conductor Ov ercurrent Protective Devices and Protective Devices for Class 1E Power Sources Connected to Non-Class 1E Circuits (Sheet 2 of 3) 2-34.2 SSTR Rev. 126 a) A channel calibration of the associat ed protective relays (because of the large currents involved, it is impractical to inject primary side signals to current transformers; therefore, the channel calibration will be performed by injecting a signal on the secondary si de of those transformers at their test plug), b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed, and c) For each circuit breaker f ound nonfunctional duri ng these functional tests, one additional circuit breaker of the nonfunctional type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested. 2) By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers and overload devices. Circuit breakers and overload devices selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of air circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the pickup of the long-time delay trip element and 150% of the pickup of the short-time delay trip element. The instantaneous element shall be tested by injecting a current equal to +/-20% of the pickup value of the element. Testing of thermal magnetic molded-case circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the circuit breaker trip rating and

-25% to +40% of the circuit breaker instantaneous trip range or setpoint. Testing of combination starters (a magnetic only molded-case circuit breaker in series with a motor starter and integral overload device) shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to -25% to

+40% of the circuit breaker instantaneous trip setpoint, and 200% and 300% of the thermal overload device trip rating to the respective devices. Circuit breakers and/or overload devices found nonfunctional during functional testing shall be restored to FUNCTIONAL status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker and or overload devices found nonfunctional during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers and or overload devices of the nonfunctional t ype shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circ uit breakers and or overload devices of that type have been functionally tested.

Technical Requirement 34 Containment Penetration Conductor Ov ercurrent Protective Devices and Protective Devices for Class 1E Power Sources Connected to Non-Class 1E Circuits (Sheet 3 of 3) 2-34.3 SSTR Rev. 126 3) Corrective actions for any generi c degradation of ove rcurrent protective devices, such as setpoint drift, manufacturing deficiencies, material defects, etc., shall be applicable to all (Class 1E and non-Class 1E) protective devices of identical design. b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Containment electrical penetrations and penetrat ion conductors are protected by demonstrating the FUNCTIONALITY of primary and backup overcurre nt protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance. The Surveillance Requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's air circuit breakers, molded case circuit breakers, and overload devices are grouped into representative samples which are th en tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

SEABROOK STATION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Chapter 5 - Programs and Procedures

Technical Requirement Program 5.1 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program (Sheet 1 of 4) 5-1.1 SSTR Rev. 123 This program complies with TS 6.7.6i. It provides cont rols for the required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil. For the intent of this program, new fuel oil shall re present diesel fuel oil that has not been added to the DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank(s). Once the fuel oil is added to the DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank(s), the diesel fuel oil is considered stored fuel oil and shall meet the applicable requirements for stored fuel oil.

APPLICABILITY: When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE.

a. New Fuel Oil The sampling and analysis requirements for new fuel oil are a means to verify that the fuel is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion. The following sampling and analysis requirements apply to new fuel oil: 1. New fuel oil is sampled from the delivery tanker in accordance with ASTM D4057-81, "Standard Practice for Manual Sampling of Petroleum and Petroleum Products," prior to addition to the storage tanks. 2. Prior to addition to the storage tank(s) the sample is verified using the guidance of the tests specified in ASTM D975-09b, "S tandard Specification for Diesel Fuel Oils," to have: a) An API gravity of within 0.3 degr ees at 60ºF, or a specific gravity of within 0.0016 at 60/60ºF, when compared to the bill of lading, or an absolute specific gr avity at 60/60ºF of 0.81 and 0.88, or an API gravity of 30 degrees and 42 degrees; b) A flash point 125ºF; c) A kinematic viscosity of 1.9 centistokes and 4.1 centistokes at 40ºC, if gravity was not determined by comparison with the supplier's certification; and d) A clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM D4176-82, "Test Method for Free Water and Particulate Contamination in Distillate Fuels." The centrifuge method specified in ASTM D2709-82, "Test Method for Water and Sediment in Distillate Fuels By Centrifuge," is an acceptable quantitative method of performing this verification. These tests verify that the fuel oil is free of visible water and particulates, and is congruent w ith the bases identified in T.S. 6.7.6i.

Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new fuel oil, but is not an OPERABILITY concern since th e fuel oil has not been added to the diesel fuel oil storage tanks.

Technical Requirement Program 5.1 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program (Sheet 2 of 4) 5-1.2 SSTR Rev. 123 In addition to the tests specified in AS TM D975-09b, the fuel oil is tested to verify a biodiesel content of < 0.1%, which is based on the lower limit of detection for the biodiesel detection equipment. A screening method can be used to verify a biodiesel content of < 2.0%, which is the lower limit of detection for the biodiesel screening equipment, provided that a sample of the fuel oil is tested to verify a biodiesel content of < 0.1% within 31 days. The 31 day period is based on the degradation of stored fuel oil which contains biodiesel being a long term process, allowing remediati on of an affected storage tank before it can impact the performance of the emergency di esel generator. If the biodiesel results indicate a biodiesel content > 0.1%, then the storage tank is sampled to verify a biodiesel content < 0.1%. If the biodiesel in the storage tank is > 0.1% then the tank is monitored for particulates and ac tion taken as directed by the corrective action program. The tank is not consider ed inoperable solely due to biodiesel

> 0.1% if particulates are within the acceptable limit as discussed in section b. 3. Verify within 31 days of obtaining the new fuel oil sample that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-09b are met when tested in accordance with ASTM D975-09b, except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM D5453-09, "Test Method for Determination of Total Sulfur in Light H ydrocarbons, Spark Ignition En gine Fuel, Diesel Engine Fuel, and Engine Oil by Ultraviolet Fluorescence", D7039-07, "Test Method for Sulfur in Gasoline and Diesel Fuel by Monochromatic Wavelength Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence Spectrometry" or AS TM D2622-07, "Test Method for Sulfur in Petroleum Products by Wavelengt h Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence Spectrometry".

If any of the results exceed the required values then the storage tank is sampled to determine if the storage tank values are within the required values and action taken as directed by the corrective action program.

b. Stored Fuel Oil Fuel oil degradation during long-term stor age generally shows up as an increase in particulate contamination, primarily due to oxidation. The presence of particulate contamination does not mean that the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. The particulate contamination can, however, cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment, which can cause engine failure. The following sampling and analysis requirements apply to stored fuel oil:

Technical Requirement Program 5.1 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program (Sheet 3 of 4) 5-1.3 SSTR Rev. 123

1. At least once every 31 days, obtain a sample of stored fuel oil in accordance with ASTM D2276-06, "Standard Test Methods for Particulate Contaminant in Aviation Fuels by line Sampling," or ASTM D5452-08, "Standard Test Method for Particulate Contamination in Avia tion Fuels by Laboratory Filtration" and verify that total particulate contamination is less than 10 mg/liter when checked in accordance with D6217-98, "Standard Test Method for Particulate Contaminant in Middle Distillate Fuels by Labor atory Filtration" or ASTM D5452-08, "Standard Test Method for Particulate Contamination in Aviation Fuels by Laboratory Filtration." It is acceptable to obtain a field sample in accordance with ASTM D4057-81, "Standard Practice for Manual Sampling of Petroleum and Petroleum Products," for subsequent labo ratory testing in lieu of field testing. Where the total stored fuel oil volume is contained in two or more interconnected storage tanks, each storage tank must be considered and tested separately. The

31-day frequency of this analysis consid ers fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate contamination is not likely to change significantly during the interval. Note: A composite sample should be ta ken at multi levels within the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. This method of sampling will provide for more consistent data acquisition to enhance trend analysis of particulate matter. (See Engineering Evaluation 90-33 for additional details.) 2. Stored fuel oil total particulates not within limits shall be restored within limits within 7 days. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine , and particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Survei llance Frequency intervals, and proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declari ng the associated EDG inoperable. The 7 day completion time allows for further evaluation, re-sampling and re-analysis

of the EDG fuel oil, and re storation actions, as required. 3. Stored fuel oil, when mixed with new fuel oil having properties not meeting the requirements specified in TRP 5.1a.3, above, shall have its fuel oil properties restored within limits within 30 days. The 30 day time interval considers that even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval, with fuel oil properties outside the limits, there is a high likelihood that the DG would still be capable of performing its intended function. 4. TS 4.8.1.1.2b and 4.8.1.1.2c set the frequency and conditional requirements for checking for water in the day and storage tanks. The analytical methodology to be used shall be ASTM D4176, ASTM D2709 or ASTM equivalent test for water in the fuel oil.

Technical Requirement Program 5.1 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program (Sheet 4 of 4) 5-1.4 SSTR Rev. 123 c. At least once per 10 years, each fuel oil storage tank shall be drained, the accumulated sediment removed, and the tanks cleaned using a sodium hypochlorite solution, or equivalent.

The presence of sediment does not necessarily represent a failure of this surveillance requirement, provided that accumulated sediment is removed during performance of the Surveillance.

Technical Requirement Program 5.3 Containment Leakage Ra te Testing Program (Sheet 1 of 1) 5-3.1 SSTR Rev. 63 This Technical Requirement Program implements the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 6.15, Containment Leakage Rate Testi ng Program (CLRTP). The program implements the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CF R 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. The program is in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program, dated September 1995," as modified by approved exceptions. The specific implementation details are located in the Leakage Test Reference Manual (SLTR).

The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable to the CLRTP.

The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.3 are applicable to the CLRTP.

Technical Requirement Program 5.4 Standby Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection Program (Sheet 1 of 2) 5-4.1 SSTR Rev. 87 Requirement:

Each diesel generator shall be demonstr ated OPERABLE at least once per 18 m onths*, during shutdown#, by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance w ith procedures prepared in conjunction with its vendor/owner's group recommenda tions for this class of standby service. In addition, other diesel generator in spection / surveillance activities identified on the following table shall be performed at the frequencies specified.

Note: The words "prepared in conjunction with" do not mean that compulsory acceptance of all vendor/owner's group recommendations is necessary.

Ensuring EDG OPERABILITY and reliability is the overall goal of this Requirement and considering vendor/owner's group recommendations contributes to the achievement of that goal. The bases for demonstrating OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108, "Periodic Testi ng of Diesel Generator Units Us ed as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977. This Gu ide does not include any level of detail addressing specific maintenance activities or the need for verbatim compliance with vendor/owner's group recommendations.

In some instances vendor/owner's group recommendations may be overly conserva tive, prescriptive, or not applicable due to site specific applications. The FPL Energy Seabrook system engineer and maintenance personnel are cognizant of the site specific EDG operating experience which may be used to develop superior inspection alternatives that have a decided time savings advantage or cost benefit over vendor/owner's group recommendations.

Vendor/owner's group inspection recommendations are not regulatory requirements. FPL Energy Seabrook should use sound engineering judgment regarding the inclusion of, or omission of, vendor/owner's group recommendations in maintena nce and inspection procedures. The safety significance of the EDGs warrants that any omission of vendor/owner's group recommendations or any use of alternatives should be justified by an ev aluation that shows there is no compromise in EDG reliability or OPERABILITY. This evaluation shall be documented in the Preventative Maintenance Technical Basis. Basis for recommendations that will not be implemented shall be documented in the Corrective Action System.

Selected inspection activities may be performed at frequencies other than 18 months provided a documented evaluation supports performance of that activity at a different frequency. Frequency changes shall be documented in the Preventative Maintenance Technical Basis.

Selected surveillance requirements, or portions thereof, may be performed during conditions or modes other than shutdown, provided an eval uation supports safe conduct of th at surveillance in a condition or mode that is consistent with safe operation of the plant. (ref. NRC GL 91-04)

Technical Requirement Program 5.4 Standby Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection Program (Sheet 2 of 2) 5-4.2 SSTR Rev. 87 Inspection Activity Frequency Reference Basis

1.

Visually inspecting the lagging in the area of the flanged joints on the silencer

outlet of the diesel exhaust system for leakage.

At least once every 31 days (also after an extended operation of greater than 24

hours) License Amendment Request (LAR) 01-01 / Amendment No. 80

2.

Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel

generator starting:

a) Barring device engaged, or b) Differential lockout relay.

At least once every 18 months during shutdown

License Amendment Request (LAR) 01-01 / Amendment No. 80

Selected surveillance requirements, or portions thereof, may be performed during conditions or modes other than shutdown, provided an evaluation supports safe conduct of that surveillance in a condition or mode that is consistent with safe operation of the plant. (ref. NRC GL 91-04)

Technical Requirement Program 5.5 Seabrook Station Snubber Inservice Inspection Program (Sheet 1 of 5) 5-5.1 SSTR Rev. 124

1.0 OBJECTIVE

To dem onstrate that each snubber is OPERABLE by the performance of this inservice inspection program. This program is based on 10CFR50.55a(b)(3)(v).

2.0 REFERENCES

1. Technical Specifications, Section 3/4.7.7 2. Technical Specifications, Section 4.0.5 3. Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50.55a , Codes and standards, dated 1-1-10 4. Generic Letter 90-09

5. ASME Section XI, 2004 Edition

6. ASME OM Code, Subsection ISTD, 2004 Edition

7. Letter NYN 91053

8. EX1805.01, Visual Examination and Functional Testing Program for Snubbers

3.0 SCOPE

Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the following inservice inspection program and the requirements of Technical Specifications 4.0.5.

4.0 INSTRUCTIONS

4.1 General

Requirements Snubbers shall be examined and tested in accordance with the ASME OM Code, Subsection ISTD, 2004 Edition. Snubber attachment hardware shall be examined in accordance with ASME Section XI, Subsection IWF, 2004 Edition. Refer to program implementing procedure EX1805.01, Visual Examination and Functional Testing Program for Snubbers. 4.2 Snubber Visual Examination Snubber Visual Examination shall be performe d in accordance with ISTD-4000 of the ASME OM Code. The visual examination of snubber attachment hardware shall be performed in accordance with Article IWF-5000 of ASME Section XI, 2004 Edition. 4.2.1 Snubber Categorization Each snubber has been categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Based on the inaccessible and accessible categorization, each category of snubbers may be considered separately for examination.

Technical Requirement Program 5.5 Seabrook Station Snubber Inservice Inspection Program (Sheet 2 of 5) 5-5.2 SSTR Rev. 124 4.2.2 Snubber Visual Examination Acceptance Criteria Snubber visual examinations shall meet all the following requirements to be considered OPERABLE:

Restrained Movement: Snubbers shall be installed so they are capable of restraining movement when activated. Examinations shall include observations for the following and the conditions shall be evaluated when found: (a) loose fasteners, or members that are corroded or deformed; (b) Disconnected components or other conditions that might interfere with the proper restraint of movement. Snubbers evaluated to be incapable of restraining movement shall be classified unacceptable.

Thermal Movement: Snubber installations shall not restrain thermal movement to an extent that unacceptable stresses could develop in the snubber, the pipe, or other equipment that the snubber is designed to protect or restrain. This requirement is satisfied if no indication of binding, misalignment, or deformation of the snubber is observed.

Design-Specific Characteristics: Snubbers shall be free of defects that may be generic to particular designs as may be detected by visual examination. For example, fluid supply or content for hydraulic snubbers shall be observed. An observation that the fluid level is equal to or greater than the minimum specified amount that is sufficient for actuation at its operating extension is considered to satisfy this requirement. If the fluid is less than the minimum amount, the installation shall be identified as unacceptable, unless a test establishes that the performance of the snubber is within specified limits. The initia l test shall start with the piston at the as-found setting and be performed in the extension (tension) direction, or in a mode that more closely resembles the operating and design requirements of the snubber. Attachment Hardware: Snubber attachment hardware shall be free of the following conditions: (a) deformations or structural degradations of fasteners, springs, clamps, or other support items; (b) missing, detached, or loosened support items; (c) arc strikes, weld spatter, paint, scoring, roughness, or general corrosion on close tolerance machined or sliding surfaces; (d) misalignment of supports; (e) improper clearances of guides and stops.

Technical Requirement Program 5.5 Seabrook Station Snubber Inservice Inspection Program (Sheet 3 of 5) 5-5.3 SSTR Rev. 124 4.2.3 Snubber Visual Examination Failure Evaluation Snubbers that do not meet examination requirements of 4.2.2 shall be evaluated to determine the root cause of the unacceptability. Snubber attachment hardware that does not meet the requirements of 4.2.2 shall be evaluated. 4.2.4 Snubber Visual Examination Corrective Action Unacceptable snubbers and snubber attachment hardware shall be adjusted, repaired, modified, or replaced. Repairs and replacements shall be in accordance with ASME Section XI, Article IWA-4000. Additional action regarding the examination interval shall be taken as required. 4.3 Snubber Testing Snubbers shall be tested for operational readiness during each fuel cycle. Tests are required to be in accordance with a specified sampling plan. Testing shall be performed during normal system operation, or during system or plant outages. The Seabrook administrative procedures govern removing snubbers from operable system(s). For each snubber determined to be unacceptable by operational readiness testing, additional snubbers shall be tested as determined by the type of failure and the corrective action taken. 4.3.1 Snubber Testing Defined Test Plan Groups (DTPGs)

Seabrook snubbers are separated into Types or Defined Test Plan Groups, which are based on the snubber design and manufacturer (and not the snubber capacity). 4.3.2 Snubber Testing Sampling Plan Seabrook has elected to implement the 10% Testing Sample Plan.

Technical Requirement Program 5.5 Seabrook Station Snubber Inservice Inspection Program (Sheet 4 of 5) 5-5.4 SSTR Rev. 124 NOTE Prior to initiation of the first Seabrook snubber testing program per the ASME OM Code, the NRC Regional Administrator was notified that the 10% Sampling

Plan would be used (Ref. NYN 91053). Because the current snubber testing program also utilizes the 10% Sampling Plan, no additional NRC notifications are required. If another plan were to be used, these Technical Requirements must be revised and the NRC Regional Administrator must be notified of the change in writing prior to use of the new sample plan. 4.3.3 Snubber Testing Acceptance Criteria Snubber testing shall meet all of the following requirements to be considered OPERABLE: (a) activation is within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in tension and in compression. (b) release rate, when applicable, is within the specified range in tension and in compression.

For units specifically required not to displace under continuous load, ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement. (c) for mechanical snubbers, drag force is within specified limits, in tension and in compression. 4.3.4 Transient Event Inspection An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event.

In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel. 4.3.5 Test Failure Evaluation Snubbers that do not meet test requirements specified in 4.3.3 or the applicable Qualitative Tests shall be evaluated to determine the root cause of the failure, as follows: (a) The evaluation shall include review of information related to other unacceptable snubbers found during testing that refueling outage. (b) The evaluation results shall be used, as applicable, to determine Failure Mode Groups (FMGs) to which snubbers should be assigned. Additional justifying information should be used to assign snubbers with failures previously identified as unexplained or isolated

to an appropriate FMG.

Technical Requirement Program 5.5 Seabrook Station Snubber Inservice Inspection Program (Sheet 5 of 5) 5-5.5 SSTR Rev. 124 4.3.6 Corrective Action Unacceptable snubbers shall be adjusted, repaired, modified, or replaced. Snubbers that do not meet the test requirements of 4.3.3 or the applicable Qualitative Tests shall be functionally tested

as required. 4.4 Snubber Service Life Monitoring Program Service life shall be evaluated at least once each fuel cycle, and increased or decreased, if warranted. Evaluation shall be based upon technical data from representative snubbers that have been in service in the plant, or other information related to service life. If the evaluation indicates that service life will be exceeded before the next scheduled system or plant outage, one

of the following actions shall be taken: (a) the snubber shall be replaced with a snubber for which the snubber life will not be exceeded before the next scheduled system or plant outage. (b) technical justification shall be documented for extending the service life to or beyond the next scheduled system or plant outage. (c) the snubber shall be reconditioned such that its service life will be extended to or beyond the next scheduled system or plant outage. Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE. The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with the Quality Assurance

Topical Report (QATR).

Technical Requirement Program 5.6 Post Accident Assessment Program (Sheet 1 of 1) 5-6.1 SSTR Rev. 80 This Technical Requirement Program establishes, implements and maintains the Post Accident Assessment Program (PAAP) at Seabrook Station. The PAAP ensures the capability to obtain information about the radionuclides existing post-accident. The information would allow those with decision-making responsibilities to plan for long-term recovery operations and limit the public's ingestion of radioactive materials. The program includes the following:

1) The capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold of 300 microcuries per ml dose equivalent iodine (DEI) or 3000 microcuries per ml gross activity.

2) Contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump (including pH), and containment atmosphere (including

hydrogen).

3) The capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs.

NOTE

Changes to the PAAP and associated implementing procedures will require the following determinations:

1. Whether the change decreases the effectiveness of the emergency plan in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(q) requirements, and

2. Assess the impact on Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM).

References

1. License Amendment Request (LAR) 00-06, "Application For Technical Specification Improvement To Eliminate Requirements For Post Accident Systems Using The Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process". Approved as License Amendment 78.

2. WCAP-14986-A Revision 2, Westinghouse Owners Group Post Accident Sampling System Requirements: A Technical Basis, dated July 2000.

3. Industry/TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-366 (WOG-149, Rev. 0), Elimination of Requirements for a Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).

4. Design Basis for the Seabrook Station Emergency Classification System.

6-1.1 SSTR Rev. 132 1.0 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)

This Core Operating Lim its Report for Seabrook Station Unit 1, Cycle 16 has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1.6.

The Technical Specifications affected by this report are: 1) 2.2.1 Limiting Safety System Settings 2) 2.1 Safety Limits 3) 3.1.1.1 Shutdown Margin Limit for MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 4) 3.1.1.2 Shutdown Margin Limit for MODE 5 5) 3.1.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient 6) 3.1.2.7 Minimum Boron Concentration for MODES 4, 5, 6

7) 3.1.3.5 Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit 8) 3.1.3.6 Control Rod Insertion Limits

9) 3.2.1 Axial Flux Difference 10) 3.2.2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor 11) 3.2.3 Nuclear Enthalpy Ri se Hot Channel Factor 12) 3.2.5 DNB Parameters

13) 3.5.1.1 Boron Concentration Limits for MODES 1, 2, 3 14) 3.5.4 Boron Concentration Limits for MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 15) 3.9.1 Boron Concentration Limits for MODE 6 2.0 Operating Limits The cycle-specific parameter limits for the specifi cations listed in Section 1.0 are presented in the following subsections. These limits have been developed using the NRC-approved methodologies specified in Technical Specification 6.8.1.6. 2.1 Limiting Safety System Settings: (Specification 2.2.1)

2.1.1 Cycle

Dependent Overtemperature T Trip Setpoint Paramete rs and Function Modifier:

2.1.1.1 K 1 = 1.210 2.1.1.2 K 2 = 0.021 / F 2.1.1.3 K 3 = 0.0011 / psig T = Measured RCS T avg ( F ), and T 1 = Indicated RCS T avg at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for T instrumentation, 589.1 F). P 1 = Nominal RCS operating pressure, 2235 psig 6-1.2 SSTR Rev. 132 2.1.1.4 Channel Total Allowance (TA) = N.A. 2.1.1.5 Channel Z = N.A.

2.1.1.6 Channel Sensor Error (S) = N.A.

2.1.1.7 Allowable Value - The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than 0.5% of T span. Note that 0.5% of T span is applicable to OTT input channels T, Tavg and Pressurizer Pressure; 0.25% of T span is applicable to I. 2.1.1.8 f 1 (I) is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with nominal gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during pl ant startup tests calibrations such that: (1) For q t - q b between -20% and +8%, f 1 (I) 0; where q t and q b are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the upper and lower halves of the core, respectively, and q t + q b is the total THERMAL POWER in percent RATED THERMAL POWER; (2) For each percent that the magnitude of q t - q b exceeds -20%, the T Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 2.87% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER. (3) For each percent that the magnitude of q t - q b exceeds +8%, the T Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 1.71% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER. See Figure 5.

2.1.1.9 1 = 0 seconds 2.1.1.10 2 = 0 seconds 2.1.1.11 3 2 seconds 2.1.1.12 4 28 seconds 2.1.1.13 5 4 seconds 2.1.1.14 6 2 seconds 6-1.3 SSTR Rev. 132 2.1.2 Cycle Dependent Overpower T Trip Setpoint Parameters and Function Modifier:

2.1.2.1 K 4 = 1.116 2.1.2.2 K 5 = 0.020 / F for increasing average temperature and K 5 = 0.0 for decreasing average temperature.

2.1.2.3 K 6 = 0.00175 / F for T > T 11 and K 6 = 0.0 for T T 11 , where: T = Measured Tavg (F ), and T 11 = Indicated Tavg at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for T instrumentation, 589.1 F ). 2.1.2.4 Channel Total Allowance (TA) = N.A. 2.1.2.5 Channel Z = N.A.

2.1.2.6 Channel Sensor Error (S) = N.A.

2.1.2.7 Allowable Value - The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than 0.5% of T span. Note that 0.5% of T span is applicable to OPT input channels T and Tavg.

2.1.2.8 f 2 (I) is disabled.

2.1.2.9 1 as defined in 2.1.1.9, above.

2.1.2.10 2 as defined in 2.1.1.10, above.

2.1.2.11 3 as defined in 2.1.1.11, above.

2.1.2.12 6 as defined in 2.1.1.14, above.

2.1.2.13 7 10 seconds. It is recognized that ex actly equal values cannot always be dialed into the numerator and denominator in the protection system hardware, even if the nominal values are the same (10 seconds). Thus given the inequality sign in the COLR (greater than or equal to) the intent of the definition of this time constant applies primarily to the rate time constant (i.e. the Tau value in the numerator). The lag time constant (denominator Tau value) may be less than 10 seconds or less than the value of the numerator Tau value (e.g., if the numerator is set at 10.5, the denominator may be set to 10 or 9.5) and still satisfy the intent of the anticipatory protective feature.

6-1.4 SSTR Rev. 132 2.2 Safety Limits: (Specification 2.1.1) 2.2.1 In Modes 1 and 2, the combination of Thermal Power, reactor coolant system highest loop average temperature and pressurizer pressure shall not exceed the limits in Figure 6. 2.3 Shutdown Margin Limit for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4: (Specification 3.1.1.1) 2.3.1 The Shutdown Margin shall be greater than or equal to 1.3% K/K, in MODES 1, 2 and 3. 2.3.2 The Shutdown Margin shall be greater than or equal to 2.3% K/K, in MODE 4. 2.3.3 The Boric Acid Storage System boron concentration shall be greater than or equal to 7000 ppm. 2.4 Shutdown Margin Limit for MO DE 5: (Specification 3.1.1.2) 2.4.1 The Shutdown Margin shall be greater than or equal to 2.3% K/K. 2.4.2 The RCS boron concentration shall be gr eater than or equal to 2000 ppm when the reactor coolant loops ar e in a drained condition. 2.4.3 The Boric Acid Storage System boron concen tration shall be greater than or equal to 7000 ppm. 2.5 Moderator Temperature Coeffici ent: (Specification 3.1.1.3) 2.5.1 The Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) shall be less positive than

+3.945 x 10

-5K/K/ F for Beginning of Cycle Life (B OL), All Rods Out (ARO), Hot Zero Thermal Power conditions. 2.5.2 MTC shall be less negative than -5.5 x 10

-4 K/K/ F for End of Cycle Life (EOL), ARO, Rated Thermal Power conditions. 2.5.3 The 300 ppm ARO, Rated Thermal Power MTC shall be less negative than -4.6 x 10

-4 K/K/F (300 ppm Surveillance Limit). 2.5.4 The Revised Predicted near-EOL 300 ppm MTC shall be calculated using the algorithm contained in WCAP 13749-P-A: Revised Predicted MTC = Predicted MT C + AFD Correction - 3 PCM/degree F If the Revised Predicted MTC is less negative than the SR 4.1.1.3.b 300 ppm surveillance limit and all the benchmark data contained in the surveillance procedure are met, then an MTC measurement in ac cordance with SR 4.1.1.3.b is not required to be performed.

6-1.5 SSTR Rev. 132 2.6 Minimum Boron Concentration for MODES 4, 5, 6 (Specification 3.1.2.7) 2.6.1 The Boric Acid Storage System boron concen tration shall be greater than or equal to 7000 ppm. 2.7 Shutdown Rod Insertion Li mit: (Specification 3.1.3.5) 2.7.1 The shutdown rods shall be fully withdraw

n. The fully withdrawn position is defined as the interval within 225 steps withdrawn to the mechanical fully withdrawn position inclusive. 2.8 Control Rod Insertion Limi ts: (Sp ecification 3.1.3.6) 2.8.1 The control rod banks shall be limited in physical inserti on as specified in Figure 1.

Control Bank A shall be at least 225 steps withdrawn. 2.9 Axial Flux Difference:

(Specification 3.2.1) 2.9.1 The indicated AFD must be within the Acceptable Operation Limits specified in Figure 2. 2.10 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor: (Specification 3.2.2) 2.10.1 F RTP Q = 2.50 2.10.2 K(Z) is specified in Figure 3. 2.10.3 W(Z) is specified in Table 1. The W(Z) data is applied over the cycle as follows:

BU < 150 MWD/MTU, linear extrapolation of 150 and 3000 MWD/MTU W(Z) data 150 BU < 6500 MWD/MTU, quadratic interpolation of 150, 3000, and 10000 MWD/MTU data 6500 BU <18000 MWD/MTU, quadr atic interpolation of 3000, 10000, and 18000 MWD/MTU W(Z) data BU > 18000 MWD/MTU, linear extrapolation of 10000 and 18000 MWD/MTU W(Z) data Note: The FQ(Z) surveillance exclusion zone is specified by Technical Specification 4.2.2.2.g

6-1.6 SSTR Rev. 132 2.10.4 The F M Q (Z) penalty factor is applied over the cycle as follows:

0 BU < 472 MWD/MTU, F M Q (Z) penalty factor is 1.020 472 BU < 633 MWD/MTU, F M Q (Z) penalty factor is 1.025 633 BU < 954 MWD/MTU, F M Q (Z) penalty factor is 1.030 954 BU < 1115 MWD/MTU, F M Q (Z) penalty factor is 1.027 1115 BU < 1276 MWD/MTU, F M Q (Z) penalty factor is 1.023 BU > 1276 MWD/MTU, F M Q (Z) penalty factor is 1.020 2.11 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Cha nnel Factor: (Specification 3.2.3) 2.11.1 F NH F NH (RTP) x ( 1 + PF x ( 1 - P ))

where P = THERMAL POWER / RATED THERMAL POWER. 2.11.2.a For F NH measured by the fixed incore detectors:

F NH (RTP) = 1.584. 2.11.2.b For F NH measured by the movable incore detectors:

F NH (RTP) = 1.584. 2.11.3 Power Factor Multiplier for F NH = PF = 0.3.

2.12 DNB Parameters (Specification 3.2.5) 2.12.1 The Reactor Coolant System Tavg shall be less than or equal to 595.1 degrees F. 2.12.2 The Pressurizer Pressure shall be greater than or e qual to 2185 PSIG.

Note: Technical Specification Bases 3/4.2.5, "DNB Parameters" indicates that the limits on DNB-related parameters assure consistency with the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses. Operating procedures include allowances for measurement and indication uncertainty so that the limits in the COLR for T avg and pressurizer pressure are not exceeded. Consistent with the Bases, the values of these DNB parameters are the limiting T avg and pressurizer pressure assumed in the transient and accident analyses. 2.13 Accumulator Boron Concentration Limits for MODES 1,2,3 (Specification 3.5.1.1) 2.13.1 Each Accumulator shall have a boron concentration between 2300 and 2600 ppm.

6-1.7 SSTR Rev. 132 2.14 Refueling Water Storage Tank Boron Co ncentration Limits for MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 (Specification 3.5.4) 2.14.1 The RW ST shall have a boron conc entration between 2400 and 2600 ppm.

2.15 Refueling Boron Concentration Limi ts for MODE 6 (Specification 3.9.1) 2.15.1 The Refueling Boron Concentration during Cycl e 16 shall be greater than or equal to 2235 ppm.

2.15.2 The Boric Acid Storage System boron concentr ation shall be greater than or equal to 7000 ppm.

6-1.8 SSTR Rev. 132 Figure 1: Control Bank Insertio n Limits Versus Thermal Power (0.216,0.0)(1.0,166)(0.0,71)(0.726,225)(0.0,188)(0.173,225) 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 2250.00.20.40.60.81.0Fraction of Rated Thermal Power Rod Bank Position (Steps Withdrawn)Bank B Bank CBank D 6-1.9 SSTR Rev. 132 Figure 2: Axial Flux Difference Opera ting Limits Versus Thermal Power

Note: %DI = %I (8,100)(-14,100)(28,50)(-34,50) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 50 30-20-10 010203040 50 60Axial Flux Difference (%DI)

Percent Rated Thermal Powe r UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION ACCEPTABLE OPERATION 6-1.10 SSTR Rev. 132 Figure 3: K(Z) Versus Core Height (12.00,0.925)(6.0,1.000)(0.0,1.000) 00.20.40.60.8 11.20123456789101112Core Height (Feet)

K(Z) 6-1.11 SSTR Rev. 132

FIGURE 4 DELETED

6-1.12 SSTR Rev. 132 Figure 5: f 1 (I) Function

10 20 30 40 50 60 40 -20 02 0 40 60I Band (percent)- 40.91, 60

+43.09, 60

-20, 0+8, 0 0 6-1.13 SSTR Rev. 132 Figure 6: Safety Limits 2425 psia2400 psia2250 psia2000 psia1935 psia 6-1.14 SSTR Rev. 132 Table 1: W(Z,BU) versus Axial Height (Sheet 1 of 2) HEIGHT (Z) W(Z,BU) W(Z,BU) W(Z,BU) W(Z,BU) (Feet) 150 3000 10000 18000 MWD/MTU MWD/MTU MWD/MTU MWD/MTU 1.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.2 1.2820 1.3157 1.3302 1.2935 1.4 1.2702 1.3027 1.3188 1.2841 1.6 1.2564 1.2876 1.3053 1.2728 1.8 1.2410 1.2707 1.2902 1.2602 2.0 1.2247 1.2527 1.2738 1.2465 2.2 1.2075 1.2353 1.2565 1.2322 2.4 1.1901 1.2180 1.2387 1.2171 2.6 1.1726 1.2006 1.2205 1.2014 2.8 1.1548 1.1824 1.2025 1.1893 3.0 1.1495 1.1683 1.1845 1.1791 3.2 1.1456 1.1612 1.1748 1.1735 3.4 1.1417 1.1577 1.1720 1.1717 3.6 1.1387 1.1533 1.1681 1.1713 3.8 1.1352 1.1492 1.1637 1.1705 4.0 1.1312 1.1450 1.1589 1.1708 4.2 1.1268 1.1401 1.1536 1.1705 4.4 1.1218 1.1355 1.1477 1.1692 4.6 1.1174 1.1315 1.1413 1.1670 4.8 1.1140 1.1270 1.1344 1.1638 5.0 1.1102 1.1219 1.1268 1.1595 5.2 1.1059 1.1163 1.1189 1.1545 5.4 1.1019 1.1101 1.1104 1.1493 5.6 1.1029 1.1029 1.1007 1.1455 5.8 1.1078 1.1008 1.1003 1.1496 6.0 1.1139 1.1026 1.1059 1.1602 6.2 1.1210 1.1086 1.1172 1.1679 6.4 1.1302 1.1129 1.1273 1.1744 6.6 1.1384 1.1161 1.1364 1.1797 6.8 1.1460 1.1191 1.1443 1.1854 7.0 1.1551 1.1264 1.1511 1.1905 7.2 1.1651 1.1336 1.1565 1.1938 7.4 1.1735 1.1397 1.1605 1.1955 7.6 1.1805 1.1447 1.1630 1.1957 7.8 1.1855 1.1497 1.1643 1.1943 8.0 1.1904 1.1559 1.1633 1.1912 8.2 1.1964 1.1612 1.1618 1.1867 8.4 1.2012 1.1654 1.1638 1.1805 8.6 1.2083 1.1682 1.1649 1.1722 8.8 1.2152 1.1727 1.1668 1.1653 6-1.15 SSTR Rev. 132 Table 1: W(Z,BU) versus Axial Height (Sheet 2 of 2) HEIGHT (Z) W(Z,BU) W(Z,BU) W(Z,BU) W(Z,BU) (Feet) 150 3000 10000 18000 MWD/MTU MWD/MTU MWD/MTU MWD/MTU 9.0 1.2250 1.1847 1.1724 1.1596 9.2 1.2411 1.2019 1.1823 1.1652 9.4 1.2616 1.2242 1.1953 1.1865 9.6 1.2957 1.2487 1.2131 1.2092 9.8 1.3342 1.2795 1.2370 1.2298 10.0 1.3703 1.3151 1.2627 1.2491 10.2 1.4043 1.3482 1.2848 1.2664 10.4 1.4349 1.3755 1.3033 1.2879 10.6 1.4631 1.3965 1.3179 1.3059 10.8 1.4796 1.4144 1.3317 1.3185 11.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Note: The FQ(Z) surveillance exclusion zone is specified by Technical Specification 4.2.2.2.g

ML13134A122

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5.0 Technical

3.7.4 Service

3.7.4 Containment

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3.0 SCOPE

4.0 INSTRUCTIONS

4.1 General

2.1.1 Cycle

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.5 seconds

0.6 second

5.0 Technical

3.7.4 Service

3.7.4 Containment

1.0 OBJECTIVE

2.0 REFERENCES

3.0 SCOPE

4.0 INSTRUCTIONS

4.1 General

2.1.1 Cycle

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