ML13099A256

12 Draft Outlines

ML13099A256
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	12/10/2012
From:	Chris Steely Operations Branch IV
To:	Entergy Operations
laura hurley
References
Download: ML13099A256 (138)

Text

ES-401 BWR Examination Outline - RO Form ES-401-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Exam:

RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total

1. 1 3 3 3 4 3 4 20 7 Emergency &

Abnormal Plant 2 1 1 1 N/A 2 1 N/A 1 7 3 Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 4 6 4 5 27 10 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 26 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 3 2 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 295001 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced X Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as 3.5 Core Flow Circulation / 1 & 4 they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION: AA1.01 Recirculation System, 55.41(7) 295003 Partial or Complete Loss of AC / 6 X AA2.04 3.5 295004 Partial or Total Loss of DC Pwr / 6 X G2.1.7 4.4 295005 Main Turbine Generator Trip / 3 X AK3.07 3.8 295006 SCRAM / 1 X AK1.01 3.7 295016 Control Room Abandonment / 7 X AA2.05 3.8 295018 Partial or Total Loss of CCW / 8 X AK3.06 3.3 295019 Partial or Total Loss of Inst. Air / 8 X AK2.01 3.8 295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling / 4 X AA1.05 3.0 295023 Refueling Acc / 8 X G2.1.27 3.9 295024 High Drywell Pressure / 5 X EK1.01 4.1 295025 High Reactor Pressure / 3 X EK1.06 3.5 295026 Suppression Pool High Water X EK3.05 3.9 Temp. / 5 295027 High Containment Temperature / 5 X G2.2.38 3.6 295028 High Drywell Temperature / 5 X EK2.02 3.2 295030 Low Suppression Pool Wtr Lvl / 5 X EA2.03 3.7 295031 Reactor Low Water Level / 2 X EA1.07 3.7 295037 SCRAM Condition Present X EK2.07 4.0 and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown / 1 295038 High Off-site Release Rate / 9 600000 Plant Fire On Site / 8 X G2.4.49 4.6 700000 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid X AA1.01 3.6 Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 4 3 4 Group Point Total: 20

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 295002 Loss of Main Condenser Vac / 3 295007 High Reactor Pressure / 3 295008 High Reactor Water Level / 2 X AK2.06 3.4 295009 Low Reactor Water Level / 2 295010 High Drywell Pressure / 5 X AK1.03 3.2 295011 High Containment Temp / 5 295012 High Drywell Temperature / 5 295013 High Suppression Pool Temp. / 5 X G2.4.4 4.5 295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition / 1 295015 Incomplete SCRAM / 1 295017 High Off-site Release Rate / 9 295020 Inadvertent Cont. Isolation / 5 & 7 295022 Loss of CRD Pumps / 1 X AA1.02 3.6 295029 High Suppression Pool Wtr Lvl / 5 295032 High Secondary Containment Area Temperature / 5 295033 High Secondary Containment Area Radiation Levels / 9 295034 Secondary Containment X EA2.01 3.8 Ventilation High Radiation / 9 295035 Secondary Containment High X EK3.02 3.3 Differential Pressure / 5 295036 Secondary Containment High X EA1.02 3.5 Sump/Area Water Level / 5 500000 High CTMT Hydrogen Conc. / 5 K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 2 1 1 Group Point Total: 7

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 203000 RHR/LPCI: Injection X K6.10 3.0 Mode 205000 Shutdown Cooling X G2.2.12 3.7 206000 HPCI 207000 Isolation (Emergency)

Condenser 209001 LPCS X K4.02 3.0 X K6.11 3.6 209002 HPCS X K3.03 3.9 211000 SLC X K1.05 3.4 212000 RPS X K5.02 3.3 215003 IRM 215004 Source Range Monitor X A2.03 3.0 215005 APRM / LPRM X K1.09 3.6 217000 RCIC X A3.05 3.9 X A4.06 3.6 218000 ADS X K2.01 3.1 223002 PCIS/Nuclear Steam X G2.1.28 4.1 Supply Shutoff 239002 SRVs X K1.04 3.6 X K4.04 3.4 259002 Reactor Water Level X A1.03 3.8 Control 261000 SGTS X A1.04 3.0 262001 AC Electrical X A2.04 3.8 Distribution 262002 UPS (AC/DC) X K3.02 2.9 263000 DC Electrical X K2.01 3.1 Distribution X G2.2.22 4.0 264000 EDGs X A2.04 2.9 X K3.03 4.1

300000 Instrument Air X K5.13 2.9 X A4.01 2.6 400000 Component Cooling X A1.04 2.8 Water K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 Group Point Total: 26

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 201001 CRD Hydraulic 201002 RMCS X K1.01 3.2 201003 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism 201004 RSCS 201005 RCIS X K4.06 3.5 201006 RWM 202001 Recirculation X A2.08 3.1 202002 Recirculation Flow Control 204000 RWCU 214000 RPIS 215001 Traversing In-core Probe 215002 RBM 216000 Nuclear Boiler Inst.

219000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Pool Cooling Mode 223001 Primary CTMT and Aux.

226001 RHR/LPCI: CTMT Spray Mode 230000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Pool Spray Mode 233000 Fuel Pool Cooling/Cleanup X A1.03 3.1 234000 Fuel Handling Equipment 239001 Main and Reheat Steam X K2.01 3.2 239003 MSIV Leakage Control X A4.03 3.3 241000 Reactor/Turbine Pressure X K5.05 2.8 Regulator 245000 Main Turbine Gen. / Aux.

256000 Reactor Condensate 259001 Reactor Feedwater X G2.1.30 4.4 268000 Radwaste X K3.04 2.7 271000 Offgas 272000 Radiation Monitoring 286000 Fire Protection 288000 Plant Ventilation 290001 Secondary CTMT X A3.01 3.9 290003 Control Room HVAC X K6.04 2.6

290002 Reactor Vessel Internals X K3.07 3.1 K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 12 ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant 4.1 operation. 55.41(10) 1.

Conduct 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. 3.8 of Operations 55.41(10) 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated 4.3 with reactivity management. 55.41(1) 2.1.

2.1.

2.1.

Subtotal 3 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. 4.0 55.41(5)

2. 2.2.39 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical 3.9 Equipment Specification action statements for systems. 55.41(7)

Control 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical 3.5 drawings. 55.41(10) 2.2.

2.2.

2.2.

Subtotal 3 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during 3.5 normal or abnormal conditions. 55.41(12)

3. 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise 3.4 Radiation Control during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

55.41(12) 2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal 2 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating 4.5 parameters that are entry level conditions for emergency and

4. abnormal operating procedures. 55.41(10)

Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures. 55.41(10) 3.3 2.4.

2.4.

2.4.

2.4.

Subtotal 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A

ES-401 BWR Examination Outline - SRO Form ES-401-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Exam: October 19, 2012 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total

1. 1 20 4 3 7 Emergency &

Abnormal Plant 2 N/A N/A 7 1 2 3 Evolutions Tier Totals 27 5 5 10 1 26 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 12 1 2 3 Systems Tier Totals 38 4 4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 1 1 3 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 295001 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced X AA2.05 3.4 Core Flow Circulation / 1 & 4 295003 Partial or Complete Loss of AC / 6 295004 Partial or Total Loss of DC Pwr / 6 295005 Main Turbine Generator Trip / 3 295006 SCRAM / 1 X AA2.06 3.8 295016 Control Room Abandonment / 7 295018 Partial or Total Loss of CCW / 8 295019 Partial or Total Loss of Inst. Air / 8 295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling / 4 295023 Refueling Acc / 8 295024 High Drywell Pressure / 5 X G2.1.23 4.4 295025 High Reactor Pressure / 3 295026 Suppression Pool High Water X EA2.03 4.0 Temp. / 5 295027 High Containment Temperature / 5 X G2.4.21 4.6 295028 High Drywell Temperature / 5 295030 Low Suppression Pool Wtr Lvl / 5 295031 Reactor Low Water Level / 2 X G2.2.40 4.7 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown / 1 295038 High Off-site Release Rate / 9 600000 Plant Fire On Site / 8 X AA2.14 3.6 700000 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 4 3 Group Point Total: 7

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 295002 Loss of Main Condenser Vac / 3 295007 High Reactor Pressure / 3 295008 High Reactor Water Level / 2 295009 Low Reactor Water Level / 2 295010 High Drywell Pressure / 5 295011 High Containment Temp / 5 X G2.1.28 4.1 295012 High Drywell Temperature / 5 295013 High Suppression Pool Temp. / 5 X G2.2.25 4.2 295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition / 1 295015 Incomplete SCRAM / 1 295017 High Off-site Release Rate / 9 295020 Inadvertent Cont. Isolation / 5 & 7 295022 Loss of CRD Pumps / 1 295029 High Suppression Pool Wtr Lvl / 5 295032 High Secondary Containment Area Temperature / 5 295033 High Secondary Containment Area Radiation Levels / 9 295034 Secondary Containment Ventilation High Radiation / 9 295035 Secondary Containment High X EA2.01 3.9 Differential Pressure / 5 295036 Secondary Containment High Sump/Area Water Level / 5 500000 High CTMT Hydrogen Conc. / 5 K/A Category Point Totals: 1 2 Group Point Total: 3

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 203000 RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode 205000 Shutdown Cooling 206000 HPCI 207000 Isolation (Emergency)

Condenser 209001 LPCS 209002 HPCS 211000 SLC 212000 RPS X A2.14 4.0 215003 IRM 215004 Source Range Monitor 215005 APRM / LPRM 217000 RCIC X A2.01 3.7 218000 ADS X G2.1.31 4.3 223002 PCIS/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff 239002 SRVs 259002 Reactor Water Level Control 261000 SGTS 262001 AC Electrical Distribution 262002 UPS (AC/DC) X G2.4.45 4.3 263000 DC Electrical Distribution 264000 EDGs 300000 Instrument Air 400000 Component Cooling X A2.02 3.0 Water K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 Group Point Total: 5

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 201001 CRD Hydraulic 201002 RMCS 201003 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism 201004 RSCS 201005 RCIS 201006 RWM 202001 Recirculation 202002 Recirculation Flow Control 204000 RWCU 214000 RPIS X G2.4.4. 4.7 215001 Traversing In-core Probe 215002 RBM 216000 Nuclear Boiler Inst.

219000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Pool Cooling Mode 223001 Primary CTMT and Aux.

226001 RHR/LPCI: CTMT Spray Mode 230000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Pool Spray Mode 233000 Fuel Pool Cooling/Cleanup 234000 Fuel Handling Equipment 239001 Main and Reheat Steam 239003 MSIV Leakage Control 241000 Reactor/Turbine Pressure X A2.07 3.6 Regulator 245000 Main Turbine Gen. / Aux.

256000 Reactor Condensate X G2.4.6 4.7 259001 Reactor Feedwater 268000 Radwaste 271000 Offgas 272000 Radiation Monitoring 286000 Fire Protection 288000 Plant Ventilation 290001 Secondary CTMT 290003 Control Room HVAC 290002 Reactor Vessel Internals K/A Category Point Totals: 1 2 Group Point Total: 3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related 3.8 to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo

1. operation, maintenance of active license status. 55.43(2)

Conduct 2.1.13 Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled 3.2 of Operations access. 55.43(5) 2.1.

2.1.

2.1.

2.1.

Subtotal 2 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration 4.3 or status. 55.43(3) 2.2.

2.

Equipment 2.2.

Control 2.2.

2.2.

2.2.

Subtotal 1 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to 3.8 licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning 3.

filters, etc. 55.43(4)

Radiation Control 2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal 1 2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps. 4.8 55.43(5)

4. 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the 4.6 Emergency status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling Procedures / and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. 55.43(5)

Plan Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination 4.4 2.4.16 with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines. 55.43(5) 2.4.

2.4.

2.4.

Subtotal 3 Tier 3 Point Total 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: 12/10/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT-2012 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. 201001 A4.01 (3.1/3.1) / Rotate Operating CRD Pumps A-D-S 1 GJPM-OPS-2012CR1 b.

c. 239001 2.1.30 (4.4/4.0) / Close and Open a MSIV D-S 3 GJPM-OPS-2012CR3

d. 245000 700000 AA1.03 (3.8/3.7) / Adjust Generator VARs A-N-S 4 GJPM-OPS-2012CR4

e. 219000 295026 EA1.01 (4.1/4.1) / Shift RHR System to A-M-S-EN-L 5 Suppression Pool Cooling GJPM-OPS-2012CR5

f. 264000 A4.05 (3.6/3.7) / Parallel Diesel Generator with the Grid D-S 6 GJPM-OPS-2012CR6

g. 212000 A2.03 (3.3/3.5) / Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test A-P-S 7 GJPM-OPS-2012CR7

h. 272000 A4.02 (3.0/3.0) / Area Radiation Monitor Functional Test D-S 9 GJPM-OPS-2012CR8 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. 295019 AA1.01 (3.5/3.3) / Install Nitrogen Bottle on ADS Air P-E-L-R 3 Supply GJPM-OPS-2012PS1

j. 212000 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6) / Energize RPS Alternate Feed D 7 GJPM-OPS-2012PS2

k. 286000 2.4.25 (3.3/3.7) / Manually Initiate Fire Protection A-D 8 GJPM-OPS-2012PS3

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: 12/10/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT-2012 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function a.

b.

c.

d. 245000 700000 AA1.03 (3.8/3.7) / Adjust Generator VARs A-N-S 4 GJPM-OPS-2012CR4

e. 219000 295026 EA1.01 (4.1/4.1) / Shift RHR System to A-M-S-EN-L 5 Suppression Pool Cooling GJPM-OPS-2012CR5 f.

g.

h. 272000 A4.02 (3.0/3.0) / Area Radiation Monitor Functional Test D-S 9 GJPM-OPS-2012CR8 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. 295019 AA1.01 (3.5/3.3) / Install Nitrogen Bottle on ADS Air P-E-L-R 3 Supply GJPM-OPS-2012PS1 j.

k. 286000 2.4.25 (3.3/3.7) / Manually Initiate Fire Protection A-D 8 GJPM-OPS-2012PS3

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: 12/10/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT-2012 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. 201001 A4.01 (3.1/3.1) / Rotate Operating CRD Pumps A-D-S 1 GJPM-OPS-2012CR1

b. 209001 A4.02 (3.5/3.4) / Quarterly Valve Surveillance M-S 2 GJPM-OPS-2012CR2

c. 239001 2.1.30 (4.4/4.0) / Close and Open a MSIV D-S 3 GJPM-OPS-2012CR3

d. 245000 700000 AA1.03 (3.8/3.7) / Adjust Generator VARs A-N-S 4 GJPM-OPS-2012CR4

e. 219000 295026 EA1.01 (4.1/4.1) / Shift RHR System to A-M-S-EN-L 5 Suppression Pool Cooling GJPM-OPS-2012CR5

f. 264000 A4.05 (3.6/3.7) / Parallel Diesel Generator with the Grid D-S 6 GJPM-OPS-2012CR6

g. 212000 A2.03 (3.3/3.5) / Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test A-P-S 7 GJPM-OPS-2012CR7

h. 272000 A4.02 (3.0/3.0) / Area Radiation Monitor Functional Test D-S 9 GJPM-OPS-2012CR8 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. 295019 AA1.01 (3.5/3.3) / Install Nitrogen Bottle on ADS Air P-E-L-R 3 Supply GJPM-OPS-2012PS1

j. 212000 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6) / Energize RPS Alternate Feed D 7 GJPM-OPS-2012PS2

k. 286000 2.4.25 (3.3/3.7) / Manually Initiate Fire Protection A-D 8 GJPM-OPS-2012PS3

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 12/10/2012 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: LOT-2012 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Conduct of Operations Review Cooldown Record Conduct of Operations P-R GJPM-OPS-2012AR1 2.1.23 (4.3)

Determine Tagging Requirements Equipment Control M-R GJPM-OPS-2012AR2 2.2.41 (3.5)

Emergency Exposure Limits Radiation Control N-R GJPM-OPS-2012AR3 2.3.4 (3.2)

Reactor Water Level Determination Emergency Procedures/Plan N-R GJPM-OPS-2012AR4 2.4.34 (4.2)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 12/10/2012 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: LOT-2012 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Reactor Water Chemistry Required Actions Conduct of Operations N-R GJPM-OPS-2012AS1 2.1.34 (3.5)

Manual Risk Assessment Conduct of Operations M-R GJPM-OPS-2012AS2 K/A 2.1.20 (4.6)

Tagout approval Equipment Control N-R GJPM-OPS-2012AS3 2.2.41(3.9)

Rad limits for Emergency Radiation Control N-R GJPM-OPS-2012AS4 2.3.4 (3.7)

Protective Action Recommendation Determination Emergency Procedures/Plan N-R GJPM-OPS-2012AS5 2.4.44 (4.4)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1 Page 1 of 2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 12/12 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Lower generator output to 1315 MWe.

2. Placing suppression pool cooling in service on RHR A when the E12-F064A minimum flow valve fails to automatically reposition.

3. Partial loss of CCW flow.

4. RFPT B Trip and FCV A runback does not occur.

5. FCV A Fails Closed.

6. Loss of 12BE2 LCC / Complete loss of CCW flow.

7. Reactor scram with limited injection capability.

8. Feedwater Line Break in the Drywell.

9. Division 1 ECCS systems fail to initiate.

Initial Conditions: Operating at 95% power. HPCS is tagged out for maintenance (will be available in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />).

Inoperable Equipment: HPCS Turnover:

SSW A is in service.

Suppression pool temperatures are elevated.

HPCS Pump was tagged out for maintenance last shift and will be returned to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.5.1 condition B was entered at 0530 on the previous shift.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario. It was developed in part from plant OE found in CR-GGN-2011-08125 (Recirc FCV fails to Runback). RHR is ranked in the top 5 important systems of the GGNS PRA analysis and is challenged by this scenario.

Validation Time (60-90 min): 80 min Revision 2 9/26/12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1 Page 2 of 2 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description R (ATC) Lower generator output to 1315 MWe (03-1-01-2 IOI Power 1

N (BOP) Operations Attachment VIII temporary downpower)

Placing suppression pool cooling in service on RHR A when the I (BOP) 2 E12275A E12-F064A minimum flow valve fails to automatically reposition (SOI TS (CRS) 04-1-01-C11-1 section 5.2.2; TS 3.3.5.1 and TS 3.5.1) p42f016a C (BOP) 3 p42151b Partial Loss of CCW Flow (05-1-02-V-1 Loss of CCW)

A (CREW) p42R016 RFPT B Trip and FCV A runback does not occur (05-1-02-V-7 RR217A I (ATC) 4 Feedwater System Malfunctions; 05-1-02-III-3 Reduction in fw123b A (CREW)

Recirculation System Flow Rate)

DI_1B33K FCV A Fails Closed (05-1-02-III-3 Reduction in Recirculation 5 TS (CRS) 603AC System Flow Rate; TS 3.4.1)

Loss of 12BE2 LCC / Complete loss of CCW flow (05-1-02-V-1 Loss 6 r21142h C (ATC) of CCW)

Reactor Scram with limited injection capability (EP-2 RPV Control; 05-1-02-I-1 Reactor Scram)

When reactor water level lowers to between -160 (TAF) and e22644 -191, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend 7 fw171b M (CREW) and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or b21f065b_i solenoid valve energized) Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -217. Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task.

fw171b 8 C (CREW) Feedwater Line Break in the Drywell (EP-3 Containment Control) rr063b Division 1 ECCS systems fail to initiate When drywell pressure exceeds 1.39 psig or reactor water level is 9 rr040a I (CREW) below -150.3, the crew recognizes Division 1 ECCS fails to automatically initiate and arms and depresses the LPCS/RHR A MAN INIT push button. Criterion is to align Division 1 ECCS systems for injection prior to Emergency Depressurization.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

• Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events 1 Abnormal Events 2 Reactivity Manipulations 1 Total Malfunctions 6 Instrument/Component Failures 6 EP Entries (Requiring substantive action) 1 Major Transients 1 EP Contingencies 1 Tech Spec Calls 3 Critical Tasks 2 Revision 2 9/26/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 1 of 20 Simulator Setup:

A. Initialization

1. Log off all simulator PDS and SPDS computers (PDS and SPDS must come up after the simulator load for proper operation).

2. Startup the simulator using Simulator Instructors Job Aid section 6.3.

Note:

Prior to running the Schedule File, ensure no Event Files are Open. If an existing Event File is Open prior to running the Schedule File, then any associated Event Files will not automatically load.

3. Open Schedule.exe and Director.exe by clicking on the Icon in the Thunder Bar.

4. Set the Simulator to IC-101 and perform switch check (Using Quick Reset in Director).

5. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2012 NRC Scenario 1.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

6. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the scenario is active (Running).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 2 of 20

7. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section B below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a specific time will not load into the director until triggered.)

8. Take the simulator out of freeze.

9. Log on to all simulator PDS and SPDS computers.

10. Verify or perform the following:

IC-101 SSW A is in service.

HPCS pump is de-energized and red tagged.

HPCS OOSVC to INOP.

Ensure the correct rod movement sequence available at the P680.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens inking properly.

Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

11. Run through any alarms and ensure alarms are on. (Note: On T-Rex, to verify alarms are ON, the indicator will indicate Alarms On).

12. Place the simulator in Freeze.

B. File loaded verification:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 3 of 20 Revision 2 9/26/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 4 of 20 Revision 2 9/26/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 5 of 20 Crew Turnover:

B. Assign the candidates crew positions.

C. Turnover the following conditions:

Power 95%

Pressure 1020 psig EOC EOOS YELLOW Work Week Division 2 SSW A is in service.

Suppression pool temperatures are elevated.

HPCS Pump was tagged out for maintenance last shift and will be returned to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.5.1 condition B was entered at 0530 on the previous shift.

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Lower generator output to 1315 MWe using IOI-2 Attachment VIII Temporary Downpower (notifications have been made).

Place RHR A in suppression pool cooling mode for maximum cooling (EOOS will remain YELLOW).

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

D. Allow the crew to perform pre-shift brief and review procedures for planned evolutions.

E. Bring the crew into the Simulator, place the simulator is in RUN.

F. Allow the crew to walk down panels.

G. When the crew assumes the shift begin Scenario Activities.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 6 of 20 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

A. Start SBT report and any other required recording devices (Video recording not allowed for NRC exams).

Lower Generator Output to 1315 MWe:

B. The crew will lower generator output. No actions require outside the Control Room. The Crew should move from this evolution to placing RHR in SP Cooling without prompting. If required, contact the control room as the Shift Manager to move the scenario along.

C. At the Lead Evaluators discretion, Call the Control Room as SM (2374) and tell the CRS that the Load Dispatcher wants us to hold our generator output at the current level and that the crew should proceed with placing Suppression Pool Cooling in service.

Place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode:

D. The crew will start RHR A in suppression pool cooling using 04-1-01-E12-1, Residual Heat Removal System SOI.

1. If directed by the Control Room to perform pre-start pump checks:

a. Report that pre-start pump check is complete.

2. When the RHR A pump is running and E12-F024A (Test Return to Suppression Pool) is open, E12-F064A (Min Flow Valve) should automatically close; however, it has failed to reposition. The valve will close when the handswitch is repositioned (Auto Event 1).

a. If an operator (or the Control Room directs you as I&C / Control Building Operator) looks at E12-FIS-N652A, report that it is reading erratically between 550 - 3,500 gpm.

b. Also, if acting as the I&C technician, report that you will need to develop a work order to troubleshoot. If the transmitter is failing, it could fail high or low. This instrument is unreliable until we fix it.

c. The CRS should consult TS and enter TS 3.3.5.1 condition E2.

d. When the TS is entered and any transient brief is complete (or lead evaluator directs) begin the next event.

Partial Loss of CCW:

E. Trigger EVENT 2 to simulate a degrading CCW pump as indicated by lowering common pump discharge pressure. When discharge pressure lowers to 100 psig, CCW B pump will automatically start; however, it will trip after 30 seconds (Auto Trigger 3).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 7 of 20

1. When the Control Room directs you as the local operator or maintenance to investigate the CCW pumps:

a. If sent to CCW B pump breaker, report that breaker 52-16302 is tripped and that Electrical Maintenance will need to inspect the breaker before it can be reclosed.

b. If sent to the CCW pumps, report that CCW pumps A and C are running and that the A CCW pump is running warmer than normal and sounds unusual.

2. The crew should take the actions for partial loss of CCW and isolate CCW to the Fuel Pool Cooling HXs by closing P42-F105 and P42-205. This will cause CCW component temperatures to stabilize (Recirc Pump temps on P614 B33-TJR-R601; Auto Trigger 4).

3. The crew may isolate CCW to RWCU and/or lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr although not required to stabilize CCW component temperatures.

4. When the crew stabilizes CCW component temperatures and any transient brief is complete (or lead evaluator directs) begin the next event.

RFPT B Trip and FCV A runback does not occur (CR-GGN-2011-08125):

F. Trigger EVENT 5 to Trip RFPT B.

1. The crew will enter the FW Malfunctions ONEP and Reduction in Recirc ONEP.

2. There are no actions require outside the Control room.

3. When the ATC operator attempts to reposition FCV A, the valve will fail closed (Auto Trigger 6).

FCV A Fails Closed:

G. No actions are required for this event; however, the CRS will enter TS 3.4.1 condition A requiring the crew to shutdown one Recirc loop within 2 hrs.

1. When the TS is entered or the crew begins to insert control rods (or lead evaluator directs) begin the next event.

Loss of 12BE2 LCC / Complete loss of CCW:

H. Trigger EVENT 7 to trip 12BE2 on overcurrent.

1. The crew will determine that there is a complete loss of CCW and manually scram the reactor and trip both Recirc pumps.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 8 of 20 Reactor SCRAM with a FW line break inside the Drywell:

I. Four minutes after the crew scrams the reactor, a feedwater line break (B side) inside the drywell concurrent with a loss of power on B21-F065B will occur (Auto Trigger 8). (Install EP Attachments as directed).

Termination:

J. Once emergency depressurization has been conducted and reactor water level is stabilized above TAF or as directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

Critical Tasks:

When drywell pressure exceeds 1.39 psig or reactor water level is below -150.3, the crew recognizes Division 1 ECCS fails to automatically initiate and arms and depresses the LPCS/RHR A MAN INIT push button. Criterion is to align Division 1 ECCS systems for injection prior to Emergency Depressurization.

When reactor water level lowers to between -160 (TAF) and

-191, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized) Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to -217. Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 9 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 1 Event

Description:

Lower generator output to 1315 MWe TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Conducts reactivity brief for the planned power change. (May be performed prior to taking the shift)

CRS Directs the ATC to lower generator output to 1315 MWe using Recirc FCVs.

Note: If desired, cue the both operator at any point before 1315 MWe to move on to the next event.

Lowers power by closing the Recirc FCVs A & B using loop flow controllers ATC B33K603A & B in slow detent on P680-3B (IOI-2 attachment VIII step 12.3).

Lowers Load Demand as power is lowered by depressing EHC LOAD REF DEMAND BOP LOWER pushbutton (P680-9C) to maintain generator actual load within +/- 25 MW of the load demand limited value during power change (IOI-2 attachment VIII step 12.2).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 10 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 2 Event

Description:

Place suppression pool cooling in service on RHR A TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs the BOP to place suppression pool cooling in service on RHR A in accordance with SOI 04-1-01-E12-1.

Enter TS 3.5.1 condition C when E12-F024A is opened.

When notified that E12-F064A (RHR A MIN FLOW VLV) did not close, the CRS should direct the BOP to manually attempt to close E12-F064A.

Direct the Control Building Operator / I&C to determine cause for E12-F064A failed CRS automatic operation.

When determined that E12-F064A is INOP, enter TS 3.3.5.1 condition E.

Indication of the E12-F064A being INOP is that the valve failed to close followed by the valve being able to manually close and indications reported from the operators outside the Control Room (if asked) the Trip Unit is responding erratically.

Note: There are two (2) Tech Spec entries for this event.

Places suppression pool cooling A in service using SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 section 5.2.2a:

Step (1) is NA - placing SSW A in Service.

Start RHR RM A FAN COIL UNIT on 1H13-P870 OPEN OR CHECK OPEN F003A, HX A OUTL VLV. (Normally Open, Valve Position Indication is located on a P601-20B meter)

Start RHR A PMP OPEN F024A, RHR A TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL. (Opening this valve will cause RHR A to become INOP. The operator should inform the CRS prior to BOP opening)

CLOSE (procedure says throttle, but close for max cooling) F048A, HX A BYP VLV CHECK F064A (RHR A MIN FLOW VLV) is CLOSED (This valve has failed to close and is in the open position)

NOTIFY the CRS that E12-F064A did not automatically close as expected.

The BOP should attempt to close the E12-F064A. (The crew may opt to not close this valve.)

Send the Control Building Operator to the Upper Control Room to look at E12-FIS-N652A Flow indicating switch (Trip Unit for the E12-F064A).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 11 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 3 Event

Description:

Partial Loss of CCW flow TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports a Partial Loss of CCW (CCW pumps A and C are running but discharge pressure is low)

BOP As indicated by annunciator P670-5A-C2, CCW PMP A/C DISCH PRESS LO and P6870-8A-E1, CCW PMP B DISCH PRESS LO and P870-8A-A1, CCW PMP B TRIP. Discharge pressure is below 100 psig. (NOTE: initially, CCW pump B starts, but then trips 30 seconds after it starts.)

Enters the Loss of Component Cooling Water ONEP (may also enter Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP, but this is not an immediate priority).

The CRS will direct actions of the Loss of CCW ONEP starting at step 3.2 and:

Direct an operator to monitor Recirc temperatures on Recorder B33-R601 at the P614 panel.

3.2.2 - Direct the BOP operator to Close P42-F105 and P42-F205. (When the operator takes this action or lowers core flow to 70 mlbm/hr, CCW temperatures will stabilize and further action is not necessary)

CRS The CRS may direct the ATC to lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr and/or isolate CCW flow to RWCU heat exchangers.

Direct an operator to monitor Upper Containment and Spent Fuel Pool Temperatures.

Direct a local operator to monitor CRD pump oil temperature.

When core flow is lowered to 70 mlbm/hr, Enter the Reduction in Recirculation Flow ONEP.

Direct the ATC to establish THI watch without concurrent duties (concurrent duties are allowed when feedwater temperatures have stabilized).

When directed:

Lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr using Recirc Loop A and B flow controllers in fast detent.

ATC Plot power and flow on the power-to-flow map and report entry into the OPRM Trip Enabled Region.

Monitor APRMs, LPRMs, SRM period meters, and OPRM computer trends for indication of THI.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 12 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 3 cont.

Event

Description:

Partial Loss of CCW flow When directed:

Close P42-105 and P42-205 from the P870 panel.

BOP Monitor Recirc temperatures on Recorder B33-R601 at the P614 panel.

Report that Recirc temperatures are stable once P42-105 and P42-205 are closed.

When directed:

Isolate CCW flow to RCWU heat exchangers as follows:

o If time permits, then place RWCU filters in hold and Trip RWCU pumps.

ATC o If RWCU FLTR DMIN INL TEMP HI 130F (P680-11A-D6) annunciator alarms, then trip RWCU pumps.

o Close P42-103 (Local valve, send building operator) o Notify Chemistry.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 13 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 4 Event

Description:

RFPT B Trip and FCV A runback does not occur TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Report annunciator P680-2A-C10, RFPT B GOV VLV CONTR TROUBLE (Note:

This annunciator will come in twice before the feed pump trips).

Report RFPT B is tripped as indicated by annunciator P680-2A-A12, RFPT B TRIP.

Observe and report that a runback occurs on Recirc FCV B but does not occur on ATC Recirc FCV A as indicated by annunciators P680-4A1-C4, RECIRC FCV B PARTIAL CLOSE/RFP TRIP combined with the Recirc FCV B closing to about 20% open. Conversely, these indications are expected on the Recirc FCV A but do not occur.

Manually close Recirc FCV A.

Enters the Feedwater System Malfunction ONEP and Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP.

CRS Direct the ATC to verify Reactor Recirculation System FCV runback occurs Direct the ATC to close the A Recirc FCV to balance loop flows to within 4460 gpm.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 14 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 5 Event

Description:

FCV A Fails Closed TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report that the A Recirc FCV has failed closed. (NOTE: when the ATC takes the A FCV to close in order to balance loop flows, the A FCV will fail ATC closed resulting in a loop flow mismatch)

Recognize and report entry into the Controlled Entry Region of the Power to Flow map as indicated by plotting reactor power and flow on the map posted on the P680.

Enter TS 3.4.1 Condition A requiring the crew to shutdown one Recirc loop within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Direct the ATC and BOP to insert control rods to exit the Controlled Entry Region CRS Note: The next event will be triggered before the crew can actually insert control rods.

This event is for CRS benefit of calling a TS and the Lead Evaluator may cue the booth operator to start next event at anytime.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 15 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 6 Event

Description:

Loss of 12BE2 LCC / Complete loss of CCW TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports a loss of 12BE2 LCC.

BOP As indicated by annunciators P807-2A-E4, 480V LCC 12BE2 UNDERVOLT and P807-2A-C4, 480V LCC 12BE2 INCM FDR-MCC FDR TRIP.

The CRS will enter the Loss of AC ONEP; however, there are no direct actions to take from this ONEP CRS Direct the BOP and ATC to walk down panels and determine all out of service equipment.

Refer to 04-1-01-R21-12 BOP BUS 12HE for a complete load list and plant impact.

Recognize and report the loss of CCW pump C and complete loss of CCW cooling as BOP indicated by P870-5A-B2, rising CCW cooled component temperatures, and P870-5A-C1 CCW DISCH HDR PRESS LO-LO.

ATC Manually inserts a reactor scram by placing the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 16 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 7 Event

Description:

Reactor Scram with Limited Injection Capability TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct the ATC to insert a manual reactor scram.

CRS Enter the SCRAM ONEP and the Turbine and Generator Trips ONEP.

Enter EP-2 Provides a scram report to the CRS:

Reactor Mode SW in SHUTDOWN.

All Rods are IN.

Reactor power is 0%.

ATC Reactor water level and trend.

Reactor pressure and trend.

Feedwater is available.

Bypass valves are available.

Establish a level band of 11.4 - 53.5 and a pressure band of 800 - 1060 psig.

CRS Direct the ATC to place Startup Level Control in Automatic.

NOTE: 4 minutes after the scram, a FW line break will occur in the drywell.

Recognize and announce a FW line break B side in the drywell.

CREW Indicated by rising Drywell pressure above 1.23 psig, rising Drywell temperatures, FW line B indicating high flow and no indicated flow in FW line A, and multiple Drywell Floor and Equipment drain sump temperature annunciators.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 17 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Line B break in the Drywell TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Report the Feed water leak to the CRS.

Trip all condensate pumps.

ATC Attempt to close B21-F065B (this valve will lose power on stroke and remain open)

Inform the CRS the Feedwater line break is unisolable and all Condensate Pumps have been tripped.

Ensure all condensate pumps are tripped and the B21-F065B is closed.

CRS The CRS will enter EP-3 (NOTE: there are no significant actions expected for this EP during this scenario)

Send an electrician to the B21-F065B breaker to inspect and restore power to this valve.

CREW Secure RCIC flow (RCIC is feeding the leak and not assisting to maintain reactor water level)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 18 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 9 Event

Description:

Division 1 ECCS systems fail to initiate TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize the failure of Division 1 ECCS systems to automatically initiate when Drywell pressure exceeds 1.39 psig.

Indicated by P601-21A-E7, DRWL PRESS HI annunciator in and the white light above the LPCS/RHR A INIT RESET pushbutton is out.

Arm and depress the LPCS/RHR A MAN INIT pushbutton.

BOP When drywell pressure exceeds 1.39 psig or reactor water level is below -150.3, the crew recognizes Division 1 ECCS fails to automatically initiate and arms and depresses the LPCS/RHR A MAN INIT push button. Criterion is to align Division 1 ECCS systems for injection prior to Emergency Depressurization.

Inform the CRS that DW Pressure Transmitter for Div 1 ADS logic has failed as indicated by the A white light on ADS A HI DRWL PRESS REST being out (located on P601-19B; NOTE:

This pressure transmitter failing is the cause for the Division 1 ECCS to not initiate).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 19 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 7 cont.

Event

Description:

Reactor Scram with Limited Injection Capability TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enter the alternate level control leg of EP-2 Establish a new reactor level band of -30 to +30 Direct the ATC to monitor reactor level and provide periodic updates (20 updates is CRS standard)

Direct the ATC to INHIBIT ADS Direct the BOP to initiate SLC.

Direct the BOP to maximize CRD for flow.

When directed, maximize CRD for flow Re-energize 15B42 and 16B42 on P864 Start the CRD A & B Aux Oil Pump Start the CRD A & B Pump o Start the first pump by placing the CRD SYS FLO CONT C11-R600 in manual and reducing output to 0 zero (with no CRD pumps BOP initially running).

Place CRD SYS FLO CONT C11-R600 in MANUAL.

Using CRS SYS FLO CONT C11-R600, fully open C11-F002A, CRD FLO CONT VLV Fully open C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WTR PRESS CONT VLV.

When directed, initiate SLC Insert keys and turn SBL Pmp A and B pump key switches to START.

When directed, Inhibit ADS by placing both ADS inhibit switches to INHIBIT.

ATC Update the CRS with reactor water level as it continues to lower.

When reactor water level reaches -160 and before -191, enter Emergency Depressurization leg of EP-2 Verify Suppression Pool level is above 10.5 Direct the BOP to open 8 ADS/SRVs CRS When reactor water level lowers to between -160 (TAF) and

-191, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized) Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs before RPV level drops to

-217. Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task.

BOP When directed, Opens at least 7 ADS valves.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 20 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 1 Event No: 7 cont.

Event

Description:

Reactor Scram with Limited Injection Capability TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitors for ECCS injection and ensure level is re-established above TAF.

ATC Restores reactor water level to -30 to +30 Revision 2 9/26/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 1 Page 21 of 20 Give this page to the CRS Turnover the following conditions:

Power 95%

Pressure 1020 psig EOC EOOS YELLOW Work Week Division 2 SSW A is in service.

Suppression pool temperatures are elevated.

HPCS Pump was tagged out for maintenance last shift and will be returned to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.5.1 condition B was entered at 0530 on the previous shift.

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Lower generator output to 1315 MWe using IOI-2 Attachment VIII Temporary Downpower (notifications have been made).

Place RHR A in suppression pool cooling mode for maximum cooling (EOOS will remain YELLOW).

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

Revision 2 9/26/12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Page 1 of 2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 12/12 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Start a Condensate Pump.

2. Withdraw Control Rods to Establish Main Turbine BCVs 10% open.

3. RPS A MG failure.

4. Electric Power Monitoring Assembly INOPERABLE.

5. Two IRM channel failures.

6. Loss of TBCW

7. CST Rupture to CST/RWST Dike.

8. Scram with an unisolable recirc line break.

9. Major Electrical transient that limits injection sources.

10. Failure of automatic HPCS suction swap.

Initial Conditions: Reactor startup in progress.

Reactor pressure is 400 psig Reactor power is 5%

IRM G is Bypassed Inoperable Equipment: IRM G Turnover:

Crane operations are in progress on the south side of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building.

A reactor startup is in progress.

o Step 135 of Control Rod Movement Sequence is complete o SJAE B is in warm up 04-01-N62-1 step 4.2.2r o Step 6.2.13 of 03-1-01-1 IRM G is bypassed.

The Condensate system is lined up as follows:

o CFFF is in service o Precoat Filters are not in service o 4 Deepbed demins are in service Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario. It was developed in part from plant OE found in CR-GGN-1996-00517 (Low CST Level).

Validation Time (60-90 min): 70 min Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Page 2 of 2 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N (BOP) Start a Condensate Pump (04-1-01-N19-1 Condensate System)

Withdraw Control Rods to Establish Main Turbine BCVs 10% open 2 R (ATC)

(04-1-01-C11-2 Rod Control and Information System)

I (BOP, ATC) 3 c71077a RPS A MG failure (05-1-02-III-2 Loss of One or Both RPS Buses)

A (CREW) 4 TS (CRS) Electric Power Monitoring Assembly INOPERABLE (TS 3.3.8.2) c51005g I (ATC) 5 Two IRM channel failures (TS 3.3.1.1) c51005a TS (CRS)

Loss of TBCW (05-1-02-V-2 Loss of Turbine Building Cooling 6 p43152b I (BOP)

Water)

CST Rupture to CST/RWST Dike (05-1-02-IV-1 Control Rod/Drive Malfunctions)

With no CRD pumps operating and reactor pressure less than 600 psig, when one scram accumulator associated with a withdrawn 7 fw273 C(ATC) Control Rod is declared INOP, place the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN. Criterion is to give the highest priority to place the mode switch to SHUTDOWN when any HCU Accumulator Fault associated with a withdrawn control rod is verified to be due to low accumulator pressure.

8 rr063a M (Crew) Scram with an unisolable recirc line break (EP-2, EP-3) fw226a fw115a 9 r21139b C (Crew) Major Electrical transient that limits injection sources r21139e e12188e Failure of automatic HPCS suction swap 10 e22f015_j I (Crew) When CST level is less than 5ft, OPEN E22-F015 (HPCS Suction from Suppression Pool). Criterion is to OPEN E22-F015 before reactor water level lowers to -191.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

• Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events 1 Abnormal Events 1 Reactivity Manipulations 1 Total Malfunctions 6 Instrument/Component Failures 6 EP Entries (Requiring substantive action) 1 Major Transients 1 EP Contingencies 0 Tech Spec Calls 2 Critical Tasks 2 Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 1 of 18 Simulator Setup:

A. Initialization

1. Log off all simulator PDS and SPDS computers (PDS and SPDS must come up after the simulator load for proper operation).

2. Startup the simulator using Simulator Instructors Job Aid section 6.3.

Note:

Prior to running the Schedule File, ensure no Event Files are Open. If an existing Event File is Open prior to running the Schedule File, then any associated Event Files will not automatically load.

3. Open Schedule.exe and Director.exe by clicking on the Icon in the Thunder Bar.

4. Set the Simulator to IC-102 and perform switch check (Using Quick Reset in Director).

5. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2012 NRC Scenario 2.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

6. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the scenario is active (Running).

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 2 of 18

7. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section B below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a specific time will not load into the director until triggered.)

8. Take the simulator out of freeze.

9. Log on to all simulator PDS and SPDS computers.

10. Verify or perform the following:

IC-102 IRM G Bypassed and Caution Tagged.

Ensure the correct rod movement sequence available at the P680 and marked up to step 135 complete.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens inking properly.

Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

11. Run through any alarms and ensure alarms are on. (Note: On T-Rex, to verify alarms are ON, the indicator will indicate Alarms On).

12. Place the simulator in Freeze.

B. File loaded verification:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 3 of 18 Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 4 of 18 Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 5 of 18 Crew Turnover:

B. Assign the candidates crew positions.

C. Turnover the following conditions:

Power 4%

Pressure 400 psig EOC EOOS GREEN Work Week Division 2 Crane operations are in progress on the south side of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building.

A reactor startup is in progress.

o Step 135 of Control Rod Movement Sequence is complete o SJAE B is in warm up 04-01-N62-1 step 4.2.2r o Step 6.2.13 of 03-1-01-1 IRM G is bypassed.

The Condensate system is lined up as follows:

o CFFF is in service o Precoat Filters are not in service o 4 Deepbed demins are in service Planned Evolutions this shift:

Continue with startup IOI-1 step 6.2.13 o Start Condensate Pump C (Pre-start Pump Checks are complete and all prerequisites are met).

o Withdraw control rods to establish main turbine BCVs 10% open.

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

D. Allow the crew to perform pre-shift brief and review procedures for planned evolutions.

E. Bring the crew into the Simulator, place the simulator is in RUN.

F. Allow the crew to walk down panels.

G. When the crew assumes the shift begin Scenario Activities.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 6 of 18 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

A. Start SBT report and any other required recording devices (Video recording not allowed for NRC exams).

Start a Condensate Pump:

B. The crew will start Condensate Pump C using 04-1-01-N19-1, Condensate System SOI.

1. If asked as the local operator, report that FK-R001 and FK-R003 are in cascade.

2. When directed to isolate PI-R002C, report that N19-FX019 was closed to isolate PI-R002C.

3. When directed to un-isolate PI-R002C, report that N19-FX019 is open.

Withdraw Control Rods to Establish Main Turbine BCVs 10% OPEN:

C. The crew will withdraw control rods per 04-1-01-C11-2, Rod Control and Information System SOI (Information Use Procedure), to establish 10% Bypass Valve opening.

1. There are no actions for this outside the Control Room.

2. When the crew has completed step 137 of the sequence sheet or at the Lead Evaluators discretion, Trigger Event 1 to trip RPS A MG.

RPS A MG failure:

D. The crew will enter the Loss of One or Both RPS Buses ONEP and:

1. Re-energize RPS A by placing the MG Set A transfer switch to Alternate A.

2. Reset the Half-Scram

3. Ensure MSIVs are open.

a. When the BOP comes to the booth and asks the status of the pilot solenoids amperage on the back panels, reply that all MSIVs indicate normally.

E. When asked to investigate the cause of the bus trip, and after the half-scram is reset, inform the control room that (if not asked, report as Control Building Operator while taking rounds):

1. the RPS A MG EPA breaker C71S003A and C71S003C (located on the Control Building, 189 el.) are tripped and the undervoltage flags are tripped. The motor-generator is operating normally.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 7 of 18

2. you have also noted that the alternate feeder EPA breaker C71S003G underfrequency flag is tripped, but the breaker is still closed (ensure that the CRS understands that this is the breaker currently powering the RPS A Bus).

3. If sent as Electrical, report that underfrequency flag is a valid trip and the breaker should have opened.

F. When the CRS enters LCO 3.3.8.2 Condition A, insert malfunction c51009d by triggering Event 2 to cause IRM A to fail downscale.

Two IRM channel failures:

G. Since IRM G is already in bypass, no operator action is required for this situation; however.

1. When the CRS enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition A, Trigger Event 10 to insert a loss of TBCW.

Loss of TBCW:

H. The crew will respond per Loss of TBCW ONEP.

1. When the crew has stabilized TBCW by starting the C TBCW pump Trigger Event 3 to insert a leak in the CST.

CST Rupture to CST/RWST Dike (CR-GGN-1996-00517):

I. The crew will respond to a CST Dike Sump Level alarm and dispatch an operator to check the CST dike.

1. When dispatched as the local operator to the CST Dike, wait 3 min then report to the control room that a crane has tipped over onto the CST and there is a large hole in the side of the CST.

a. If ask about the location of the hole, say you cant tell.

2. When the CRD pump trips on low suction pressure, The CRS will enter 05-1-02-IV-1, CRD Malfunctions.

3. Since reactor pressure is below 600 psig, the first accumulator associated with a withdrawn control rod being declared INOP will require placing the Mode Switch to shutdown.

Reactor SCRAM with an Unisolable line break:

J. When the crew scrams the reactor, Condensate Pump A will trip and Condensate Booster Pump A will have a shaft shear (prevents feeding with condensate until loss of 14AE). One minute later the 14AE bus will trip. This prevents using condensate to feed the reactor (Auto Triggers 5,6,7). All low pressure ECCS systems will fail so that only HPCS, RCIC, and SLC will be available for injection.

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 8 of 18 K. Four minutes after the crew scrams the reactor, a recirc line break (A side) will occur (Auto Trigger 5). (Install EP Attachments as directed).

Termination:

L. Once the HPCS suction has been aligned to the Suppression Pool and reactor level has stabilized in band (-30 to 30) or as directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

Critical Tasks:

With no CRD pumps operating and reactor pressure less than 600 psig, when one scram accumulator associated with a withdrawn Control Rod is declared INOP, place the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN. Criterion is to give the highest priority to place the mode switch to SHUTDOWN when any HCU Accumulator Fault associated with a withdrawn control rod is verified to be due to low accumulator pressure.

When CST level is less than 5ft, OPEN E22-F015 (HPCS Suction from Suppression Pool). Criterion is to OPEN E22-F015 before reactor water level lowers to -191.

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 9 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 1 Event

Description:

Start a Condensate Pump TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Directs the BOP to start Condensate Pump C using 04-1-01-N19-1.

Start Condensate Pump C by:

Direct a local operator to ENSURE FK-R001 AND FK-R003 on 1H22-P171 are in cascade.

Direct a local operator to CLOSE the Instrument Isolation valve for the pressure indicator associated with Condensate Pump C.

DEPRESS CNDS PMP C START pushbutton. (Condensate Pump C BOP discharge valve will automatically open after 5 seconds)

CHECK discharge pressure is approximately 250 psig on PI-R607.

CHECK total condensate flow by observing CNDS PMPS MIN FLO indicator FI-R621 for minimum pump flow indication of > 5.0 mlbm/hr.

Direct a local operator to un-isolate the pressure indicator for Condensate Pump C.

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 10 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 2 Event

Description:

Withdraw Control Rods to Establish Main Turbine BCVs 10% open TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Conduct a reactivity brief (this was performed prior to the crew entering the simulator)

Directs the BOP and ATC to coordinate and withdraw control rods IAW the approved Control Rod Movement Sequence and 04-1-01-C11-2, Rod Control and Information CRS System.

NOTE: Event 3 will begin when step 137 of the Control Rod Movement Sequence is complete or when directed by the Lead Evaluator (CRS Evaluator).

ATC Peer Check Control Rod Selection while monitoring reactor parameters.

Select Control Rods per step 136 of the Control Rod Movement Sequence sheets (Should be in Gang mode and may use either continuous or notch withdraw, Rods selected should be 28-05, 36-61, 60-29, 04-37).

BOP For continuous withdraw, simultaneously DEPRESS and HOLD WITHDRAW and CONT WITHDRAW pushbuttons.

For notch withdraw MOMENTARILY DEPRESS WITHDRAW pushbutton and observe proper response.

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 11 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 3 Event

Description:

RPS A MG failure TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports a half-scram with no additional annunciators and a trip of the RPS bus has occurred.

As indicated by annunciator P680-7A-A-2, RX SCRAM TRIP coupled with a ATC 1/2 scram and no other indications for why the 1/2 scram occurred.

The GENERATOR A NORMAL FEED AVAILABLE light is out on the P610 back panel.

Enters the Loss of One or Both RPS Buses ONEP.

Direct the BOP to re-energize the A RPS bus using the alternate power source.

CRS Direct the ATC to reset the half-scram.

Send a local operator to investigate the cause of the RPS A MG failure.

When directed, Re-energize the A RPS Bus using the Alternate power source.

BOP Place the MG SET A TRANSFER switch on the CONTROL ROD TEST INSTRUMENT PANEL (P610) to ALT A When directed, reset the half-scram.

ATC Place the division 1 & 3 scram RESET switches to RESET on the P680.

CRS Direct the BOP to ensure all MSIVs are energized.

When directed, ensure all MSIV solenoid lights are on and all MSIV pilot solenoids indicate amperage on the P622 and P623 panels.

BOP (This is not modeled in the simulator. The operator should go to the instructor booth behind the P807 and simulate performance by stating to the instructor his intentions to perform the step. The instructor will provide the operator with a verbal cue concerning indications the operator observes).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 12 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 4 Event

Description:

Electric Power Monitoring Assembly INOPERABLE TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes entry conditions and enters TS 3.3.8.2 Condition A.

There are no indications in the control room for the EPMA breaker failure; however, the following report will be made to the control room:

When asked to investigate the cause of the bus trip, when the half-scram is reset, inform the control room that:

CRS

1. the RPS A MG EPA breakers C71S003A & C71S003C (located on the Control Building, 189 el.) is tripped and the undervoltage flag is tripped.

2. you have also noted that the alternate feeder EPA breaker C71S003G underfrequency flag is tripped, but the breaker is still closed (ensure that the CRS understands that this is the breaker currently powering the RPS A Bus).

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 13 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 5 Event

Description:

Two IRM channel failures TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports IRM A has failed upscale.

As indicated by annunciators P680-4A2-C5, CONT ROD WITHDRAW ATC BLOCK, and P680-7A-B9, IRM DNSC IRM Ch-A will be pegged low.

CRS Recognizes entry conditions and enters TS 3.3.1.1 Condition A.

Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 6 Event

Description:

Loss of TBCW TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports TBCW B pump tripped and the standby TBCW C pump failed to auto start.

BOP As indicated by annunciators P870-5A-B4, TBCW PMP B TRIP TBCW PMP C STBY white light is on but the pump is not running.

Enter the Loss of TBCW ONEP and direct the BOP to start the standby TBCW pump.

CRS Note: No other actions of the ONEP are required.

BOP When directed, start TBCW C Pump.

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 14 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 7 Event

Description:

CST Rupture to CST/RWST Dike TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports the following when they occur:

P870-5A-D5, CST DIKE SMP LVL HI BOP P870-5A-D4, CST LVL HI-LO In addition, the BOP should evaluate CST level as indicated by P11-LI-R601 on P870 and report lowering CST level.

Send an operator to the CST Dike to determine if there is a leak to the CST Dike.

Recognize the imminent loss of CRD and subsequent required reactor scram.

Perform a transient brief to prepare the crew for the loss of CRD.

When CRD pumps are tripped, enter the CRD Malfunctions ONEP, 05-1-02-IV-1.

CRS When the first HCU accumulator fault associated with a withdrawn control rod is determined to be due to low pressure, direct the ATC to manually scram the reactor.

NOTE: The CRS may opt to scram the reactor sooner based on conservative decision making these action are based on the limits of Tech Specs and procedures.

BOP Keep the crew updated with CST level and the status of the CRD system.

With no CRD pumps running and reactor pressure <600 psig, when one scram accumulator associated with a withdrawn control rod is declared INOP, manually inserts a reactor scram by placing the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

With no CRD pumps operating and reactor pressure less than 600 psig, when one scram accumulator associated with a withdrawn Control Rod is declared INOP, place the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN. Criterion is to give the highest priority to place the mode switch to SHUTDOWN when any HCU Accumulator Fault associated with a withdrawn control rod is verified to be due to low accumulator pressure.

Provides a scram report to the CRS:

ATC Reactor Mode SW in SHUTDOWN.

All Rods are IN.

Reactor power is 0%.

Reactor water level and trend.

Reactor pressure and trend.

Feedwater is recoverable.

Bypass valves are available.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 15 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 8 Event

Description:

Scram with an unisolable recirc line break TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Following the reactor scram the CRS will:

Enter the SCRAM ONEP, 05-1-02-I-1.

Enter EP-2 CRS Evacuate Containment Establish a level band of 11.4 - 53.5.

When Drywell pressure exceeds 1.23 psig, the CRS will enter EP-3 May attempt to restore Condensate Pumps; however, 50 seconds following the scram the 14AE bus will lockout preventing the restoration of feedwater.

Manually initiate RCIC by arming and depressing the RCIC MAN INIT pushbutton.

ATC May also manually initiate HPCS by arming and depressing the HPCS MAN INIT pushbutton.

Maintain the reactor within the established level band.

CRS After entering EP-3, direct the BOP to energize H2 igniters.

When directed to energize H2 igniters, Place the H2 IGNITER SYS A & B switches to BOP the ON position.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 16 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 9 Event

Description:

Major Electrical transient that limits injection sources TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report loss of the 14AE bus.

As indicated by:

Loss of Recirc Pump B P807-2A-B3, 4.16KV BUSS 14AE INCM FDR TRIP Recognize and report loss of the 15AA bus.

As indicated by:

P864-1A-A3, 4.16KV BUS 15AA UNDERVOLTAGE P864-1A-A4, 4.16KV BUSS 15AA INCM FDRS TRIP Recognize and report loss of RHR Pump B CREW As indicated by:

P601-17A-H2, RHR B SYS OOSVC P601-17A-A1, RHR PMP B OVERLD RHR PMP B OVERLD/PWR LOSS status light Recognize and report loss of power to E12-F042C, RHR C INJ VLV (vlv closed)

A indicated by:

P601-17A-H3, RHR C SYS OOSVC Red and Green indicating lights for E12-F042C are out RHR C MOV OVERLD/PWR LOSS status light Enter the Loss of AC Power ONEP, 05-1-02-I-4 (The only actions in this ONEP the CRS crew can take are to send personnel to restore the affected components and busses)

Direct the BOP to perform an ECCS Status Report.

When directed, report to the CRS that only HPCS, RCIC, SSW, and SLC are available BOP for injection.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 17 of 18 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 10 Event

Description:

Failure of automatic HPCS suction swap TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize the failure of the automatic HPCS suction swap.

CST level below 5 and HPCS flow to reactor at 0 gpm combined with E22-F001 OPEN and E22-F015 CLOSED. The (HPCS) CST LVL LO annunciator P601-16A-C4 will not come in but the (RCIC) CST LVL LO annunciator P601-21A-B5 will come in.

BOP Manually align HPCS suction to the Suppression Pool by placing the handswitch for E22-F015 to OPEN.

When CST level is less than 5ft, OPEN E22-F015 (HPCS Suction from Suppression Pool). Criterion is to OPEN E22-F015 before reactor water level lowers to -191.

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 2 Page 18 of 18 Give this page to the CRS Turnover the following conditions:

Power 4%

Pressure 400 psig EOC EOOS GREEN Work Week Division 2 A reactor startup is in progress.

IRM G is bypassed.

The Condensate system is lined up as follows:

o CFFF is in service o Precoat Filters are not in service o 4 Deepbed demins are in service Planned Evolutions this shift:

Continue with startup IOI-1 step 6.2.13 o Start Condensate Pump C (Pre-start Pump Checks are complete and all prerequisites are met).

o Withdraw control rods to establish main turbine BCVs 10% open.

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 Page 1 of 2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 12/12 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Secure the Division 1 Diesel Generator

2. Raise reactor power to 100%

3. HPCS spurious initiation (DW Press)

4. RFPT B Manual/Auto Controller Failure

5. Suppression Pool Leak

6. Loss of ESF 11 Transformer

7. ADS Valve fails to open Initial Conditions: 95% power Inoperable Equipment: B21-PIS-N667C , Drywell press hi, is failed high (TS 3.3.5.1 Condition B entered)

Turnover: Division 1 DG is running tied to the grid. 06-OP-1P75-M-0001, Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 11 Functional Test is in progress ready for step 5.2.25.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario. HPCS and Division 1 Diesel Generator are ranked in the top 10 important systems of the GGNS PRA analysis.

Validation Time (60-90 min): 60 min Revision 0 5/30/12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 Page 2 of 2 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description DI_1R21M608A I (BOP) Secure the Division 1 Diesel Generator (04-1-01-P75-1, Standby 1 DI_1P75M601A p864_1a_b_2 TS (CRS) Diesel Generator System section 4.4; TS 3.8.1 condition B)

Raise reactor power to 100% (03-1-01-2 attachment VIII, Power 2 R (ATC)

Operations - Temporary Downpower) e22055 I (BOP) HPCS spurious initiation (02-S-01-27, Operations Philosophy 3

e22159a TS (CRS) section 6.6.3 - Spurious HPCS Initiation; TS 3.5.1 condition B) fw121b A (Crew) RFPT B Manual/Auto Controller Failure (05-1-02-V-7, Feedwater 4 p680_2a_e_12 I (ATC) System Malfunctions)

Suppression Pool Leak (EP-4 Aux Building Control; EP-3 Containment Control; EP-2 RPV Control)

Crew manually scrams the reactor before SP level drops below 14.5 M (Crew) ct218d When it is determined that Suppression Pool level cannot be 5 C (BOP, ct219a maintained above 14.5, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes ATC) lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized). Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs prior to Suppression Pool level reaching 14.5 (In cases where Emergency Depressurization is anticipated, Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task).

6 r21134g C (Crew) Loss of ESF 11 Transformer (05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power)

ADS Valve fails to open (EP-2, RPV Control Emergency 7 DI_1B21M605D I (Crew)

Depressurization)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

• Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events 0 Abnormal Events 1 Reactivity Manipulations 1 Total Malfunctions 6 Instrument/Component Failures 6 EP Entries (Requiring substantive action) 2 Major Transients 1 EP Contingencies 1 Tech Spec Calls 2 Critical Tasks 2 Revision 0 5/30/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 1 of 19 Simulator Setup:

A. Initialization

1. Log off all simulator PDS and SPDS computers (PDS and SPDS must come up after the simulator load for proper operation).

2. Startup the simulator using Simulator Instructors Job Aid section 6.3.

Note:

Prior to running the Schedule File, ensure no Event Files are Open. If an existing Event File is Open prior to running the Schedule File, then any associated Event Files will not automatically load.

3. Open Schedule.exe and Director.exe by clicking on the Icon in the Thunder Bar.

4. Set the Simulator to IC-103 and perform switch check (Using Quick Reset in Director).

5. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2012 NRC Scenario 3.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

6. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the scenario is active (Running).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 2 of 19

7. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section B below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a specific time will not load into the director until triggered.)

8. Take the simulator out of freeze.

9. Log on to all simulator PDS and SPDS computers.

10. Verify or perform the following:

IC-103 Division 1 DG is running and tied to the grid near full load.

Provide a copy of 06-OP-1P75-M0001 marked up to step 5.2.25.

Ensure the correct rod movement sequence available at the P680.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens inking properly.

Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

11. Run through any alarms and ensure alarms are on. (Note: On T-Rex, to verify alarms are ON, the indicator will indicate Alarms On).

12. Place the simulator in Freeze.

B. File loaded verification:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 3 of 19 Revision 0 5/30/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 4 of 19 Revision 0 5/30/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 5 of 19 Crew Turnover:

A. Assign the candidates crew positions.

B. Turnover the following conditions:

Power 95%

Pressure 1020 psig BOC EOOS GREEN Work Week Division 1 B21-PIS-N667C is failed upscale (DW pressure sensor for HPCS). TS 3.3.5.1 Condition B was entered.

The Division 1 DG is running tied to the grid.

06-OP-1P75-M-0001, Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 11 Functional Test is in progress ready for step 5.2.25 (DG has run for 1.5hrs at full load and vibration data is complete)

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Continue with the 06-OP-1P75-M-001 Surveillance at step 5.2.25 (Chemistry has requested that SSW A remain in service until next shift).

Raise reactor power to 100% using IOI-2 attachment VIII, Temporary Downpower (all preconditioning requirements are met).

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

C. Allow the crew to perform pre-shift brief and review procedures for planned evolutions.

D. Bring the crew into the Simulator, place the simulator is in RUN.

E. Allow the crew to walk down panels.

F. When the crew assumes the shift begin Scenario Activities.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 6 of 19 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

A. Start SBT report and any other required recording devices (Video recording not allowed for NRC exams).

Secure the Division 1 Diesel Generator:

B. The crew will unload and shutdown the Div 1 diesel generator using 06-OP-1P75-M-0001, Standby Diesel Generator 11 Functional Test step 5.2.25.

1. The crew will establish phone communications with the local operator (Control Building Operator).

2. The crew will lower Div 1 DGs output to below 350KW.

a. When Div 1 DGs output is below 450KW (4.5MW) the reverse power relay will pickup (Auto Event 1).

b. Div 1 DG output breaker 152-1508 will trip open; however, the DG will not trip due to a failure of SV-F541A. This will also prevent the Remote Stop PB in the control room from operating (This is due to failure of SV-F541A, see E-1042).

3. When asked or 1 minute after breaker trip, report the following indications:

a. Annunciator P400-1A-E4, TRIP GENERATOR FAULT

b. Annunciator P400-1A-D10, LOSS OF EXCITATION OR REVERSE POWER

c. Div 1 Diesel Generator is running

4. If asked to depress the LOCAL (EMERGENCY) STOP PB, modify the override DI_1P75M601A to PB (This will trip the DG).

5. If asked to place the Div 1 DG in Maintenance Mode, coordinate with the Control Room and when directed Trigger Event 2 (Insert remote Fxn p75057 to MAINT).

a. Report that the diesel generator stopped when placed in MAINT.

6. When the CRS has entered LCO 3.8.1 Condition B and any transient briefs are complete, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, call the Control Room phone (2374) as the Shift Manager and prompt the crew to raise reactor power to 100%.

Raise reactor power to 100%:

C. The crew will raise reactor power to 100% using FCVs.

1. No operations outside the control room are required.

2. When Total Core Flow is above 101 mlbm/hr, HPCS will initiate due to a second DW Pressure Transmitter failing upscale, B21-PIS-N667G (Auto Event 3).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 7 of 19 HPCS Spurious Initiation:

D. When the crew shuts E22-F004, it will experience a loss of power (Auto Events 4 & 5).

E. If asked:

1. Indications on the HPCS back panel P625 are:

a. B21-PIS-N667G and B21-PIS-N667C are tripped/pegged hi.

2. Indication for E22-F004 are:

a. Breaker 52-170101 is tripped. Need a work order to investigate further.

b. Valve is stuck and cannot be repositioned manually.

3. All other indications are normal.

F. When the CRS enters LCO 3.5.1 Condition B, and any transient briefs are complete, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, insert malfunction fw121b by triggering Event 6 to cause RFPT B M/A Controller to fail max demand.

RFPT B Manual/Auto Controller Failure:

G. The crew will respond by placing the RFPT B controller in MANUAL. The crew may, in the course of executing the FW Malf ONEP, trip RPFT B. This is not required, but acceptable.

H. If sent to investigate/reset RFPT B vibrations at P846:

1. Use Draw.exe Index Drawing C86-8 to view vibrations.

2. Pump vibration alarm occurs at 8 mils.

3. If feed pump flows have been matched or the RFPT B was tripped, reset annunciators if asked, by inserting remote c86014 to RESET (click on C86 014 button on soft panel).

I. When the plant is stabilized and any transient briefs are complete, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, insert malfunction ct218d by triggering Event 8 to cause an unisolable suppression pool leak in the LPCS room.

Suppression Pool Leak and Reactor Scram:

J. When the crew scrams the reactor, ESF Transformer 11 will lockout 45 seconds later. This is not recoverable. The crew will have to manually realign power to the 15AA bus (Auto Trigger 9).

K. The crew will send an operator to investigate the status of the leak and LPCS room door. The first operator sent will not respond (He becomes injured and does not report back). In any Revision 0 5/30/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 8 of 19 case, wait until the crew has initiated SPMU before reporting any status back to the Control Room.

L. When the crew blows down the reactor, ADS valve B21-F041D will not respond to P601 switch manipulations.

M. (Install EP Attachments as directed).

Termination:

N. Once the crew has emergency depressurized and established reactor level in band, Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

Critical Tasks:

Crew manually scrams the reactor before SP level drops below 14.5.

When it is determined that Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 14.5, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized). Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs prior to Suppression Pool level reaching 14.5 (In cases where Emergency Depressurization is anticipated, Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 9 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 1 Event

Description:

Secure the Division 1 Diesel Generator TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs the BOP to continue surveillance 06-OP-1P75-M-0001 (Standby Diesel CRS Generator 11 Functional Test) step 5.2.25.

Note: Brief was performed prior to the crew assuming the watch.

Stop the Division 1 DG as follows:

Adjust DG 11 GOV NAN CONT AND DG 11 VR AUTO SET PT CONT to lower SDG 11 load to less than 350 kW and reactive load to less than 0.25 mVAR.

When the Division 1 DG output breaker trips (indicated by annunciator P864-1A-B2, 4.16KV BUS 15AA INCM FDR 152-1508):

Notify the CRS of the breaker trip/generator fault.

Determine that the Div 1 DG should have tripped but did not.

o This is indicated by the ARIs for P400-1A-E4, P400-1A-D10 and the diesel generator still running. Also, the Diesel Ready to Load status light indicates the DG is >200 rpm.

Attempt to trip Div 1 DG by depressing the DIV 1 DSL ENG RMT MAN STOP (this action will not trip the Div 1 DG)

BOP Coordinate with the Control Building Operator to place the Div 1 DG in Maintenance Mode (ARIs 04-1-02-1H22-P400-1A-D10/E4).

o BOP depresses the DG 11 MAINT PERM pushbutton.

o Direct the Control Building Operator to depress and release the Maintenance Mode pushbutton locally at P400.

o BOP releases the DG 11 MAINT PERM pushbutton.

Note: The Control Building Operator will report the following

a. Annunciator P400-1A-E4, TRIP GENERATOR FAULT

b. Annunciator P400-1A-D10, LOSS OF EXCITATION OR REVERSE POWER

c. Div 1 Diesel Generator is running Direct the BOP to place the Division 1 DG in Maintenance Mode.

CRS Recognizes entry conditions and enters LCO 3.8.1 Condition B.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 10 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 2 Event

Description:

Raise reactor power to 100%

TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Conducts reactivity brief for the planned power change. (May be performed prior to taking the shift)

CRS Directs the ATC to raise reactor power to 100% using Recirc FCVs.

Note: When core flow exceeds 101 mlbm/hr the next event will be inserted.

Raises power by opening the Recirc FCVs A & B using loop flow controllers ATC B33K603A & B in slow detent on P680-3B (IOI-2 attachment VIII step 12.3).

Raises Load Demand as power is raised by depressing EHC LOAD REF DEMAND RAISE pushbutton (P680-9C) to maintain generator actual load within +/- 25 MW of BOP the load demand limited value during power ascension (IOI-2 attachment VIII step 12.2).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 11 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 3 Event

Description:

HPCS spurious TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports spurious HPCS initiation as indicated by:

Annunciator P601-16A-C3, HPCS INIT coupled with the Division 3 diesel generator starting and the HPCS pump starting and the HPCS INJ VLV (E22-BOP F004) opening.

Spurious initiation is identified in accordance with Operations Philosophy, 02-S-01-27 step 6.6.3a by at least two independent means CRS Directs the BOP to verify the initiation was spurious and secure HPCS.

Takes actions in accordance with Operations Philosophy step 6.6.3 Trip HPCS pump.

Close E22-F004 Note: When the E22-F004 is stroking closed, it will experience a loss of power.

Recognize and report that E22-F004 has failed as indicated by:

BOP Annunciator P601-16A-H5, HPCS SYS OOSVC with Status Light HPCS MOV OOFILE/PWR LOSS and E22-F004 indicating lights out.

Dispatch an operator to breaker 52-170101 to determine the cause of the trip.

Determines the cause of the initiation to be due to Drywell Pressure Trip Units.

Note: The operator has indication via annunciator P601-16A-B4, DRWL PRESS HI; however, the HPCS panel is not modeled in the simulator. The expectation is that the operator will come to the instructor booth side entrance and ask for indications on this panel.

Recognizes entry conditions and enters LCO 3.5.1 condition B (LCO 3.6.1.3 CRS condition A is also applicable but less limiting).

Direct the BOP operator to reset the HPCS initiation (not required).

When directed to reset the HPCS initiation, depresses and releases the HPCS INIT BOP RESET pushbutton.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 12 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 4 Event

Description:

RFPT B Manual/Auto Controller Failure TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports the failure of RFPT B M/A Controller Indicated by annunciator P680-2A-E12, RFP B VIBR HI and comparing the operation of the RFPT A / B SP CONT compared to the demand signal ATC from the FW LVL MASTER CONT.

Places the RFPT B SP CONT in MANUAL per EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations step 5.5[2] and Feedwater Systems Malfunctions ONEP.

Enter the Feedwater Systems Malfunctions ONEP, 05-1-02-V-7 Direct the ATC to place the RFPT B SP CONT in MANUAL Direct the ATC to balance Feed Pump discharge pressures by lowering the output of CRS RFPT B to match the output of RFPT A.

Note: the CRS may choose to trip RFPT B per step 3.2 of the Feedwater Systems Malfunctions ONEP. This is unnecessary as the controller is still operational in manual.

If this action is taken, then the CRS will enter the Reduction in Recirc Flow ONEP, 05-1-02-III-3; however, no actions are required.

When directed, balance Feed Pump discharge pressures by lowering the output of RFPT B to match the output of RFPT A.

ATC If directed to trip RFPT B then depress and release the red TRIP pushbutton for RFPT B and observe that a recirc valve runback occurs.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 13 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 5 Event

Description:

Suppression Pool Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports a suppression pool leak in the LPCS pump room as indicated by:

Annunciator P680-8A1-A4, LPCS RM SMP LVL HI-HI CREW Annunciator P870-4A(10A)-C3, SUPP POOL LVL HI-LO Annunciator P870-2A-F1, LPCS PMP RM FLOODED Lowering SP water level.

Enter EP-4 when the LPCS RM SMP LVL HI-HI is announced.

Direct the BOP to attempt to isolate the suppression pool leak by closing E21-F001, LPCS Suction from SP valve.

Send an operator to look for the location of the suppression pool leak.

Establish suppression pool level as a critical parameter and have the BOP give periodic updates.

Enter EP-3 when SP level is below 18.34 ft.

Direct the BOP to manually initiate suppression pool makeup.

When it is determined that suppression pool level cannot be maintained above 14.5:

Direct the ATC to place the MODE SW in SHUTDOWN.

CRS Enter EP-2, Scram and Turbine Trip ONEPs.

Establish reactor level band of 11.4 - 53.5.

Establish reactor pressure band of 800 - 1060 psig.

Direct the ATC or BOP to Emergency Depressurize the reactor.

Crew manually scrams the reactor before SP level drops below 14.5.

When it is determined that Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 14.5, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized). Criterion is to open at least seven SRVs prior to Suppression Pool level reaching 14.5 (In cases where Emergency Depressurization is anticipated, Rapid Depressurization with the BPVs satisfies this critical task).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 14 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 5 cont.

Event

Description:

Suppression Pool Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Attempt to isolate the suppression pool leak by closing E21-F001, LPCS Suction from SP valve.

Report updates to the CRS as directed (CRS specifies frequency).

Manually initiate suppression pool makeup by:

BOP Place the SPMU MODE SEL handswitch to AUTO Place the SPMU DUMP TEST switch to TEST Depress both SPMU MAN INIT pushbuttons (simultaneously)

Verify suppression pool level rising.

Place the MODE SW to SHUTDOWN when directed Provides a scram report:

Reactor Mode SW in SHUTDOWN.

All Rods are IN.

ATC Reactor power is 0%.

Reactor water level and trend.

Reactor pressure and trend.

Feedwater is AVAILABLE.

Bypass valves are AVAILABLE Revision 0 5/30/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 15 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 5 cont.

Event

Description:

Suppression Pool Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Transfer to startup level control:

If two RFPTs are in operation, then trip one by depressing the red TRIP pushbutton.

For the running RFPT, select SPEED AUTO or SPEED MANUAL and adjust RFPT speed as required to control reactor level.

CLOSE o N21-F009A, FW HTR 6A OUTL VLV o N21-F009B, FW HTR 6B OUTL VLV OPEN o N21-F001, SU FCV OUTL ISOL VLV o N21-F010A, HP FW HTR STRNG A SU OUTL VLV ATC o N21-F010B, HP FW HTR STRNG B SU OUTL VLV VERIFY CLOSED o N21-F513, X WTR LVL SU CONTR Valve (1C34-LK-R602) o N21-F510, FW CU RECIRC VLV o N21-F040, FW SU BYP VLV Ensure the running RFPT is running in SPEED AUTO with a discharge pressure approximately 250 psig above reactor pressure.

Verify OPEN N21-F014A(B), RFP DISCH VLV, for at least one pump.

Adjust N21-F513, RX WTR LVL SU CONT valve, as necessary in MANUAL or AUTO to maintain desired reactor level. N21-040 and/or N21-F009A(B) may also be used as necessary to maintain level.

Maintain the reactor water level within the band of 11.4 - 53.5.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 16 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 6 Event

Description:

Loss of ESF 11 Transformer TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and Report a loss of ESF 11 Transformer as indicated by:

Annunciator P864-1A-A3, 4.16KV BUS 15AA UNDERVOLTAGE Annunciator P864-1A-H1, DIV 1 LSS SYS FAIL CREW Multiple 15 Bus LCC Under Voltage annunciators Control Room lighting loss (partial)

Multiple annunciators resulting from loss of power Reenergize the 15AA Bus by closing an alternate feeder breaker Enter Loss of AC Power ONEP, 05-1-02-I-4 CRS Direct an operator to reenergize the 15AA bus from an alternate feeder breaker Direct an operator to RESTORE THE AUX BUILDING Reenergize 15AA using alternate feeder breaker.

When directed to RESTORE THE AUX BUILDING:

OPEN o P53-F001 (After 30 sec TD) o P53-F007 (After 30 sec TD)

CREW If all drywell temperatures are < 200 F, and Drywell Chillers are available o If required, reenergize 15B42 and 16B42 on P864 OPEN o P72-F121, P72-F122, P72-125, P72-123, P72-126, P72-124 (After 30 sec TD)

Ensure at least one Drywell Chiller Water pump is running Ensure Drywell Coolers are in operation.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 17 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 5 cont.

Event

Description:

Suppression Pool Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the CRS determines that suppression pool level cannot be maintained above 14.5:

Enter EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION in EP-2 Verify suppression pool level is above 10.5 CRS Direct an operator to OPEN 8 ADS/SRVs Note: the CRS may have an operator open the Manual Bypass Valve Jack prior to Emergency Depressurizing the reactor. A malfunction has been inserted to prevent this operator action to ensure that the crew enters the Emergency Depressurization in a timely manner. For the same reason, Turb Stm Press Demand has been disabled.

When directed to OPEN 8 ADS/SRVs:

CREW OPEN 8 ADS/SRVs Restore reactor water level to within band (Startup Level Control should still be in AUTO).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 18 of 19 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 3 Event No: 7 Event

Description:

ADS Valve Fails to Open TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report that ADS valve B21-F041D failed to OPEN as indicated by the CREW valve status lights remaining green ON and red OFF.

OPEN an alternate SRV.

CRS Ensure that an operator opens a total of 8 ADS/SRVs.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 3 Page 19 of 19 Give this page to the CRS Turnover the following conditions:

Power 95%

Pressure 1020 psig BOC EOOS GREEN Work Week Division 1 B21-PIS-N667C is failed upscale (DW pressure sensor for HPCS). TS 3.3.5.1 Condition B was entered.

The Division 1 DG is running tied to the grid.

06-OP-1P75-M-0001, Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 11 Functional Test is in progress ready for step 5.2.25 (DG has run for 1.5hrs at full load and vibration data is complete)

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Continue with the 06-OP-1P75-M-001 Surveillance at step 5.2.25 (Chemistry has requested that SSW A remain in service until next shift).

Raise reactor power to 100% using IOI-2 attachment VIII, Temporary Downpower (all preconditioning requirements are met).

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 Page 1 of 3 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 12/12 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Place RHR A in Standby Mode

2. Reactor Water Level Narrow Range C fails downscale

3. High Pressure Heater 6A tube leak

4. Spurious Division 1 ECCS initiation

5. Multiple Control Rod Drifts

6. ATWS

7. Failure of RCIC to initiate

8. Failure of EHC Pressure Control Systems Initial Conditions: 100% power Inoperable Equipment: B21-PT-N094E , Drywell Pressure, is failed high (TS 3.3.5.1 Conditions B and F, 3.3.6.1 Condition A, 3.3.6.3 Condition B, and 3.3.6.4 Condition B were entered)

Turnover:

B21-PT-N094E has failed last shift.

o Annunciators P601-21A-E7 (DRWL PRESS HI) and P601-18A-B2 (ADS A HI DRWL PRESS SEALED IN) o TS 3.3.5.1 Conditions B and F, 3.3.6.1 Condition A, 3.3.6.3 Condition B, and 3.3.6.4 Condition B were entered (no other actions are required at this time).

RHR A is lined up for Suppression Pool Cooling.

o TS 3.5.1 Condition A was entered.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario. The Condenser is a power conversion system (PCS) important to events leading to core damage of the GGNS PRA analysis. This scenario takes the Condenser away as a heat sink early in a high power ATWS. This event will challenge the crew to maintain the containment within the limits of HCTL.

Validation Time (60-90 min): 75 min Revision 1 9/14/12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 Page 2 of 3 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description Place RHR A in Standby Mode (04-1-01-E12-1, Residual Heat 1 N (BOP)

Removal System section 5.2.2) 2 fw126c TS (CRS) Reactor Water Level NR C fails downscale (TS 6.3.7 Condition A)

C (ATC) High Pressure Heater 6A tube leak (05-1-02-V-5, Loss of Feedwater 3 fw129c A (Crew) Heating)

Spurious Division 1 ECCS initiation (04-1-01-E12-1, Attachment IX; TS 3.5.1 Condition C) ptb21n094e_a I (BOP) 4 ltb21n091a_b TS (CRS) When Division 1 ECCS spuriously initiates, the crew secures the Division 1 Drywell Purge Compressor prior to the Drywell reaching 1.23 psig (causing a reactor scram).

z021021_20_21 Multiple Control Rod Drifts (05-1-02-IV-1, Control Rod/Drive 5 z021021_40_53 I (ATC)

Malfunctions)

ATWS (EP-2A, ATWS RPV Control)

Entry into EP2A step L8. Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S-01-27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by available instrumentation.

Criterion is to give the highest priority to terminate and prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching criteria specified in EP2A step L8.

Criteria specified in EP2A step L-9 are satisfied. Crew restores injection using Condensate/Feedwater as evidenced by feedwater flow to RPV or RPV level trend. Criterion is to give the highest priority to c11164 reinitiate injection flow and establish the appropriate level band.

C (Crew) 6 c11027 M (Crew) IF Emergency Depressurization is Entered:

c41263 When EP-2A requires Emergency Depressurization, Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S 27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by available instrumentation. Criterion is to give the highest priority to prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching MSCP.

Reactor pressure decreases to MSCP. Crew commences and slowly raises injection utilizing available EP-2A Table 4 and/or Table 5 systems with RPV level restored and maintained to greater than -

191". Criterion is to give the highest priority to restore RPV level greater than -191".

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 Page 3 of 3 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description e51043 Failure of RCIC to initiate (04-1-01-E51-1, Reactor Core Isolation 7 DI_1E51M625 C (CREW)

Cooling System Attachment VI)

Failure of EHC Pressure Control Systems (EP-3,Containment Control)

When it is determined that Suppression Pool temperature and RPV 8 tc079 C (CREW) pressure cannot be maintained below HTCL, the crew opens 8 SRVs DI_1N32M624 and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized).

Criterion is to open a sufficient number of SRVs to active lower reactor pressure to prevent exceeding HCTL and opens at least 8 SRVs prior to exceeding HCTL.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

• Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events 1 Abnormal Events 1 Reactivity Manipulations 0 Total Malfunctions 7 Instrument/Component Failures 6 EP Entries (Requiring substantive action) 2 Major Transients 1 EP Contingencies 1-2 Tech Spec Calls 2 Critical Tasks 4-6 Revision 1 9/14/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 1 of 23 Simulator Setup:

A. Initialization

1. Log off all simulator PDS and SPDS computers (PDS and SPDS must come up after the simulator load for proper operation).

2. Startup the simulator using Simulator Instructors Job Aid section 6.3.

Note:

Prior to running the Schedule File, ensure no Event Files are Open. If an existing Event File is Open prior to running the Schedule File, then any associated Event Files will not automatically load.

3. Open Schedule.exe and Director.exe by clicking on the Icon in the Thunder Bar.

4. Set the Simulator to IC-104 and perform switch check (Using Quick Reset in Director).

5. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2012 NRC Scenario 4.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

6. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the scenario is active (Running).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 2 of 23

7. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section B below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a specific time will not load into the director until triggered.)

8. Take the simulator out of freeze.

9. Log on to all simulator PDS and SPDS computers.

10. Verify or perform the following:

IC-104 RHR A is lined up for Suppression Pool Cooling.

Ensure the correct rod movement sequence available at the P680.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens inking properly.

Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

11. Run through any alarms and ensure alarms are on. (Note: On T-Rex, to verify alarms are ON, the indicator will indicate Alarms On).

12. Place the simulator in Freeze.

B. File loaded verification:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 3 of 23 Revision 1 9/14/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 4 of 23 Revision 1 9/14/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 5 of 23 Crew Turnover:

B. Assign the candidates crew positions.

C. Turnover the following conditions:

Power 100%

Pressure 1030 psig BOC EOOS GREEN Work Week Division 1 B21-PT-N094E has failed last shift.

o Annunciators P601-21A-E7 (DRWL PRESS HI) and P601-18A-B2 (ADS A HI DRWL PRESS SEALED IN) o TS 3.3.5.1 Conditions B and F, 3.3.6.1 Condition A, 3.3.6.3 Condition B, and 3.3.6.4 Condition B were entered (no other actions are required at this time).

RHR A is lined up for Suppression Pool Cooling.

o TS 3.5.1 Condition A was entered.

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Place RHR A in standby mode.

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

D. Allow the crew to perform pre-shift brief and review procedures for planned evolutions.

E. Bring the crew into the Simulator, place the simulator is in RUN.

F. Allow the crew to walk down panels.

G. When the crew assumes the shift begin Scenario Activities.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 6 of 23 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

A. Start SBT report and any other required recording devices (Video recording not allowed for NRC exams).

Place RHR A in Standby Mode:

B. The crew will place RHR A in standby using 04-1-01-E12-1 section 5.2.2.c (Shutdown of Suppression Pool Cooling A).

1. When the RHR A pump is secured, reactor NR C level instrument (C34-LT-004C) will begin to slowly fail downscale (Auto Event 1).

Narrow Range C Failed Downscale A. This event will require no actins. It is given only for the LCO entry.

B. The When the CRS enters LCO 6.3.7 Condition A, and any transient briefs are complete, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, insert malfunction fw129c by triggering Event 3 to a Feedwater Tube Leak in HP Heater 6A.

High Pressure Heater 6A Tube Leak:

C. The crew will respond using the ARI for FW HTR 6A LVL HI.

1. If sent as the building operator to P171 to check N23-LK-R051A, open Drawing P171-3 (the dump valve controller is the bottom middle controller R051A)

2. After 3 1/2 minutes, the leak will get worse (Auto Events 4 & 5). This will cause the FW HTR 6A LVL HI-HI annunicator. This will cause extraction steam to the heater to isolate. The crew will enter the Loss of FW Heating ONEP.

3. The crew will reduce core flow to 70 mlbm/hr.

4. The crew will determine that Rod Line is above 105% and insert cram rods to reduce reactor power below 105% Rod Line.

5. The crew will take action per 04-1-01-N23-1 section 6.1 to isolate HP Heater 6A.

a. If directed as a local operator to close N35-F008A, use Remote fxn ms020 to close valve.

D. When the crew has lowered core flow to 70 mlbm/hr and lowered power to < 105% Rod Line and the crew has determined a course of action to isolate the affected heater string, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, insert malfunctions ltb21n091a_b and ltb21n091e_b by triggering Event 2 to cause reactor WR A and E level instruments (B21-LT-N091A/E) to experience a current transient (common power source) causing Division 1 ECCS to initiate.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 7 of 23 Division 1 ECCS Spurious Initiation:

E. The Crew will use 04-1-01-E12-1 attachment IX (Recovery form a Division 1ECCS Initiation Signal) to recover from the initiation.

F. If contacted by the control room to investigate a cause, say that it sounds like someone may have keyed a radio in the area where the transmitters are and that you will ask the Aux Building Operator if he was in the area. Wait 3 minutes and call the control room to confirm that the Aux Building Operator did bump his radio on something while taking rounds in a no radio transmission area.

G. The LPCS pump will trip upon initiation. If asked, wait 2 minutes and report that the breaker is tripped on overcurrent.

H. If sent to verify that ESF PWR light and BOP PWR light is on at LSS panel, wait 2 minutes and report that the lights are on.

I. The When the CRS enters LCO 3.5.1 Condition A, and any transient briefs are complete, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, insert malfunction z021021_20_21 by triggering Event 6 to cause a control rod 20-21EE to drift in.

Multiple Control Rod Drifts:

J. The crew will enter the CRD Malfunctions ONEP and fully insert the drifting control rod.

After 90 seconds, control rod 40-53KN will drift in.

K. The crew will manually scram the reactor.

ATWS:

L. The crew will respond to a high power ATWS and loss of EHC pressure controls (Auto Event 7).

1. The crew will have to take actions to avoid exceeding HCTL.

2. RCIC will not auto start. It must be manually lined up using the hard card.

3. C11-F002 (Flow Control Valve) will fail closed preventing the crew from inserting control rods. Also, the ATWS will increase in severity. This is to ensure the crew is required to take actions to avoid HCTL.

M. (Install EP Attachments as directed).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 8 of 23 Termination:

N. Once the crew has emergency depressurized or is actively taking action to avoid exceeding HCTL and maintaining the reactor within established level and pressure bands, Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

Critical Tasks:

When Division 1 ECCS spuriously initiates, the crew secures the Division 1 Drywell Purge Compressor prior to the Drywell reaching 1.23 psig (causing a reactor scram).

Entry into EP2A step L8. Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S-01-27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by available instrumentation. Criterion is to give the highest priority to terminate and prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching criteria specified in EP2A step L8.

Criteria specified in EP2A step L-9 are satisfied. Crew restores injection using Condensate/Feedwater as evidenced by feedwater flow to RPV or RPV level trend. Criterion is to give the highest priority to reinitiate injection flow and establish the appropriate level band.

When it is determined that HCTL will be exceeded, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized). Criterion is to open a sufficient number of SRVs to actively lower reactor pressure to prevent exceeding HCTL and to open at least 8 SRVs prior to exceeding HCTL.

If the crew enters Emergency Depressurization When EP-2A requires Emergency Depressurization, Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S-01-27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by available instrumentation. Criterion is to give the highest priority to prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching MSCP.

Reactor pressure decreases to MSCP. Crew commences and slowly raises injection utilizing available EP-2A Table 4 and/or Table 5 systems with RPV level restored and maintained to greater than -191". Criterion is to give the highest priority to restore RPV level greater than -

191".

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 9 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 1 Event

Description:

Place RHR A in Standby Mode TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs the BOP to place RHR A in Standby Mode using 04-1-01-E12-1 section CRS 5.2.2.c (Shutdown of Suppression Pool Cooling A)

Note: Brief was performed prior to the crew assuming the watch.

Place RHR A in standby as follows:

Close E12-F024A, RHR A TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL When flow decreases below 1154 gpm, Verify that E12-F064A, RHR A MIN BOP FLO VLV opens (8 second delay)

Stop RHR PMP A Note: When RHR PMP A is stopped, the next event will automatically begin. The remaining steps of the procedure would be performed outside the control room.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 10 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 2 Event

Description:

Reactor Water Level Narrow Range C fails downscale TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report that RX WTR LVL NARROW RANGE C has failed downscale as indicated by:

Annunciator P680-2A-C9, DFCS TROUBLE ATC Annunciator P680-4A2-A2, RX WTR LVL SIG FAIL HI-LO C34-R606C, RX WTR LVL NARROW RANGE C, lowers to 0 ATC Verify that the feedwater control system is maintaining the desired reactor water level.

CRS Recognizes entry conditions and enters TRM 6.3.7 Condition A.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 11 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 3 Event

Description:

High Pressure Heater 6A Tube Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports a High Pressure Heater 6A Tube Leak as indicated by:

Annunciator P680-2A-A9, FW HTR 6A LVL HI The leak is verified by (1) Observing on the N23 (Heaters and Drain) PDS process diagram that the HP FW HTR 6A DRN valve is open and the HP FW HTR 6A DUMP ATC valve is controlling level.(This is also part of the ARI response)

(2) Calculating the difference in RFPT suction flow and Feedwater flow to the vessel.

Refer to the ARI for annunciator P680-2A-A9 and verify that heater 6A dump valve N23-LV-F515A is controlling level using a listed computer point or process diagram.

Report when annunciator P870-6A-A4, FW HTR 6A LVL HI-HI comes in.

Verify that:

N36-BTV-F012A closes BOP N36-F011A closes N36-F008A opens N35-LV-F505A closes N23-F053A opens (PDS process diagram or local operator at P171)

Direct operators actions per the appropriate ARIs.

Enter Loss of Feedwater Heating, 05-1-02-V-5 CRS Direct the ATC to lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr and enter Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate, 05-1-02-III-3.

When Loss of Feedwater Heating is entered lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr in fast ATC detent.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 12 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 3 cont.

Event

Description:

High Pressure Heater 6A Tube Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report when Rod Line is determined to be above 105%. This is determined by plotting power and flow on the power-to-flow map or when indicated on the CYCLOPS computer.

ATC Plot power and flow on the power-to-flow map and report entry into the OPRM Trip Enabled Region.

Direct the ATC to establish THI watch without concurrent duties (concurrent duties are allowed when feedwater temperatures have stabilized).

Direct the ATC and BOP to insert Control Rods to lower power to below the 105%

CRS Rod Line per the approved Rod Sequence Sheets (CRAM RODS).

Note: The CRS may direct power be lowered to 50% per 04-1-01-N23-1 section 6.1 (Isolation/Restoration of 1 HP Heater String).

Monitor APRMs, LPRMs, SRM period meters, and OPRM computer trends for ATC indication of THI.

Act as peer checker for Control Rod movements.

Sequentially insert Control Rods using the approved Rod Sequence Sheets (CRAM BOP RODS) to lower reactor power as directed by the CRS.

Direct the ATC and BOP to insert Control Rods to lower reactor power to 50% (If not previously directed).

Direct the BOP to isolate FW Heater 6A using 04-1-01-N23-1 section 6.1 CRS (Isolation/Restoration of 1 HP Heater String)

Note: If it is not desired to observe the isolation of FW Heater 6A, the lead examiner may cue the next event anytime after the first Control Rod movement.

When directed to isolate FW Heater 6A, Close N21-F012A on P870 BOP Check Closed N21-F010A on P870 Close N21-F009A on P680 Close N36-F010A and N36-F011A on P870 Direct the local operator to Close N35-F008A on P177 Revision 1 9/14/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 13 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 4 Event

Description:

Spurious Division 1 ECCS initiation TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports spurious Division 1 ECCS initiation as indicated by:

Annunciator P601-21A-E8, RX LVL 1 (-150) LO BOP Spurious initiation is identified in accordance with Operations Philosophy, 02-S-01-27 step 6.6.3a by at least two independent means. In this case, only the Division 1 ECCS system indicates low level. All level indications are still indicating normal water level.

Directs the BOP to verify the initiation was spurious.

Direct the BOP to recover from Division 1 ECCS initiation using SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 Attachment IX (Hard Card).

OR CRS Direct the BOP to secure the A DW purge compressor using SOI 04-1-01-E61-1 section 5.2.2 step a. (Note that if this path is taken, the CRS should enter TS 3.6.3.3)

When Division 1 ECCS spuriously initiates, the crew secures the Division 1 Drywell Purge Compressor prior to the Drywell reaching 1.23 psig causing a reactor scram.

Complete actions of SOI 04-1-01-E12-1 Attachment IX (hard card).

Press the LPCS/RHR A INIT RESET pushbutton (on P601-21B).

Press the DIV 1 LSS PNL RESET pushbutton (on P864-1C).

Reset the Division 1 CGCS logic using the keylock switch (on P870-4B).

Stop the Drywell Purge Compressor A (on P870-4C).

BOP Close E61-F003A (on P870-4C).

OR Complete actions of SOI 04-1-01-E61-1 section 5.2 Direct the local plant operator to manually trip the 52-15105 A DW purge compressor breaker and pull the lockout tab.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 14 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 4 cont.

Event

Description:

Spurious Division 1 ECCS initiation TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Develops a plan of action to restore affected systems to standby lineup.

Refers to SSW SOI (04-1-01-P41-1) to place SSW A in standby.

CRS Refers to RHR SOI (04-1-01-E12-1) to place RHR A in standby.

Note: The CRS will not have time to implement these actions prior to the next event, but the CRS should pursue these actions.

Recognizes and reports that the LPCS pump tripped when Division 1 ECCS initiated.

As indicated by the amber pump trouble light above the LPCS hand switch being illuminated (indicates pump trip when an auto start signal is present).

LPCS PMP AUTO TRIP status light is lit.

BOP Annunciators P601-21A-A-7, LPCS PMP OVERLD, and P601-21A-H-8, LPCS SYS OOSVC will be in also.

If directed to place RHR A in standby:

Stop RHR A pump.

(all other actions should be verification with no actual manipulations)

CRS Recognizes entry conditions and enters TS 3.5.1 Condition A.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 15 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 5 Event

Description:

Multiple Control Rod Drifts TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and report Control Rod 20-21EE is drifting in as indicated by:

Annunciator P680-4A2-E4, CONT ROD DRIFT Determine Control Rod(s) that have drifted by depressing the ROD DRIFT pushbutton and observe the red LEDs of the drifted Control Rod(s) on the ATC Control Rod Display Module. (from annunciator ARI)

Apply continuous insert signal until Control Rod reaches zero.

Reset drift alarms using the RESET DRIFT pushbutton on P680 RC&IS (from annunciator ARI)

Enter Control Rod/Drive Malfunctions, 05-1-02-IV-1 Direct the ATC to apply continuous insert signal until Control Rod reaches zero.

Direct the ATC to reset the ROD DRIFT in accordance with the ARI (P680-4A2-E4)

CRS When the second Control Rod begins to drift in, direct the ATC to place the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Note: The CRS may use conservative bias and direct the crew to place the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN when the first Control Rod drift begins.

When directed or the second Control Rod (40-53KN) begins to drift in, report the rod drift and place the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN. (Indication is the same as before).

Provides a scram report:

Reactor Mode SW in SHUTDOWN.

All Rods are NOT Inserted (Hyd Block ATWS).

ATC Reactor power is above 4% (Value depends when data taken).

Reactor water level and trend.

Reactor pressure and trend.

Feedwater is available Bypass valves are available.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 16 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 6 Event

Description:

ATWS TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enter SCRAM ONEP and EP-2A, ATWS RPV CONTROL Direct actions of EP-2A steps 1 - 4:

Directs ATC to Verify Recirc Pumps transferred to LFMG.

CRS Directs ATC to Verify ARI/RPT initiation.

Directs BOP to inhibit ADS.

Directs BOP to Override HPCS injection.

Verify Recirc Pumps transferred to LFMG.

ATC Verify/Initiate ARI/RPT.

Inhibits ADS.

Place ADS A and ADS B keylock switches to INHIBIT Override HPCS injection.

BOP Place the HPCS pump handswitch to the STOP position.

Place the E22-F004, HPCS injection valve, handswitch to the CLOSE position.

Enter EP-2A step L-7 and direct the ATC to establish level band -70 to -130 on Startup Level Control.

Enter EP-2A step Q-4. (SLC will not inject, Attachment 28 is required)

CRS Enter EP-2A step P-4 and direct the BOP to establish a pressure band 800 - 1060 psig using IPC and BCV Manual Jack.

Call for EP Attachments 8, 12, 18, 19, 20, and 28.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 17 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 6 Cont.

Event

Description:

ATWS TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Line up Feed and Condensate systems for Startup Level Control using hard card.

If two Feed pumps are running, trip one.

Close N21-F009A and N21-F009B.

Open N21-F001, N21-F010A and N21-F010B.

Verify Closed N21-F513, N21-F510, N21-F040.

If no Feed pumps are in operation, start one.

o Ensure RFPT A(B) controls Manual pushbutton is backlit.

o Verify AC lube oil pump is running ATC o Open N21-F014A(B) o Depress the TRIP RESET pushbutton o Depress the RAISE pushbutton to establish Feed pump discharge pressure above reactor pressure by approx. 250 psig.

Open/Verify Open N21-F014A or N21-F014B Maintain reactor level in Auto or Manual using the Startup level controller or Manually using N21-F040 or N21-F009A(B).

Feed the reactor using the Startup Level Controller to maintain reactor level within the set level band (-70 to -130).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 18 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 8 Event

Description:

Failure of EHC Pressure Control Systems Note: ATWS actions are continued in this event since it becomes the main driver of crew actions.

TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report that EHC Pressure Control has failed as indicated by:

Annunciator P680-9A-D2, TURB IPC CAB FAIL Annunciator P601-19A(18A)-B6, LO-LO SET PT SEALED IN CREW Rising reactor pressure Open SRVs Note: The ability to open the manual jack has also been removed.

Direct the BOP to manually control reactor pressure in the band of 800 to 1060 psig using SRVs.

CRS Direct the BOP to lineup RHR A and B for Suppression Pool Cooling using 04 01-E12-1 Attachment VI, Maximizing Suppression Pool Cooling.

Open and Close SRVs as required to maintain reactor pressure within the established band. (This will be a continuing action for the remainder of the scenario)

When directed to lineup RHR A and B for Suppression Pool Cooling:

Ensure SSW is in service by observing the following:

o SSW A(B) Pump running o P41-F001A(B), SSW PMP A(B) DISCH VLV is Open BOP o P41-F005A(B), SSW LOOP A(B) RTN TO CLG TWR is Open o P41-F014A(B), SSW INL TO RHR HX A(B) OUTL VLV is Open o P41-F006A(B), SSW PMP RECIRC VLV is closed Verify Open E12-F003A(B), RHR HX OUTL VLV Start RHR PMP A(B)

Open E12-F024A(B), RHR TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL Revision 1 9/14/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 19 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 8 Cont.

Event

Description:

Failure of EHC Pressure Control Systems TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When Suppression Pool Temperature reaches 110F Enter EP-2A step L-8 and direct the following:

ATC: Terminate and prevent Feedwater by Closing the Startup Level Control valve, N21-F040, N21-F009A, and N21-F009B.

BOP: Terminate and prevent high pressure and low pressure ECCS injection by ensuring ECCS is initiated and overriding LPCS, RHR A/B/C, HPCS pump off and injection valve shut.

Allow level to lower until:

Power is below 4%

OR Level drops to -167 (Compensated Fuel Zone)

OR CRS All SRVs stay closed and DW pressure stays below 1.23 psig Establish a new level band of -191 to level lowered from above Entry into EP2A step L8. Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S-01-27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by available instrumentation. Criterion is to give the highest priority to terminate and prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching criteria specified in EP2A step L8.

Criteria specified in EP2A step L-9 are satisfied. Crew restores injection using Condensate/Feedwater as evidenced by feedwater flow to RPV or RPV level trend. Criterion is to give the highest priority to reinitiate injection flow and establish the appropriate level band.

ATC Reestablish Feedwater to maintain level within the new level band.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 20 of 23 Take action to avoid exceeding HCTL (EP-1, EP/SAP Figure 1) by one or both of the following methods:

1. Per EP-2A step P1:

a. SP temperature cannot be maintained in the Safe zone of the HCTL, maintain RPV pressure in the Safe zone of HCTL (OK to exceed 100F/hr)

b. This is accomplished by establishing progressively lower pressure bands for the BOP to maintain; however, there is no specific procedural guidance on what pressure bands to use in this case.

2. Per EP-3 step SPT-5:

a. SP temperature and RPV pressure cannot be maintained within the Safe zone of the HCTL, Enter Emergency Depressurization.

b. Direct the ATC and BOP to Terminate and Prevent Feedwater, High Pressure and Low Pressure ECCS injection systems.

c. Direct BOP to Open 8 ADS/SRVs

d. Direct ATC to reestablish Feedwater in accordance with 02-S-01-27, Operations Philosophy step 6.2.11 when RPV pressure is below MSCP (206 psig).

o Feedwater is reestablished by raising flow initially to ~ 2 mlbm/hr and then in ~ 0.5 mlbm/hr increments until RPV level begins to turn. This is controlled by the CRS.

CRS o The level band should be the same as prior to ED.

When it is determined that HCTL will be exceeded, the crew opens 8 SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized). Criterion is to open a sufficient number of SRVs to actively lower reactor pressure to prevent exceeding HCTL and to open at least 8 SRVs prior to exceeding HCTL.

Note: HCTL is defined by EP Figure 1 and is a function of SP Temperature, RPV Pressure, and SP Level. The graph will automatically display on the SPDS computer prior to exceeding. This screen may also be placed on a computer screen visible only to the evaluator prior to the scenario if desired.

If Emergency Depressurization When EP-2A requires Emergency Depressurization, Crew terminates and prevents all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC per 02-S-01-27 Operations Philosophy. Feedwater and ECCS system alignments prevent injection into the RPV as evidenced by available instrumentation. Criterion is to give the highest priority to prevent all injection except boron, CRD, and RCIC until reaching MSCP.

Reactor pressure decreases to MSCP. Crew commences and slowly raises injection utilizing available EP-2A Table 4 and/or Table 5 systems with RPV level restored and maintained to greater than -191". Criterion is to give the highest priority to restore RPV level greater than -191".

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 21 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 8 Cont.

Event

Description:

Failure of EHC Pressure Control Systems TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Control RPV pressure to avoid exceeding HCTL as directed by the CRS by:

Open SRVs as required to maintain the given pressure band BOP OR When directed, verify high pressure and low pressure ECCS systems are overridden.

When directed, Open 8 ADS/SRVs If Emergency Depressurization is entered, When directed, Terminate and Prevent Feedwater injection When directed, reestablish feed ATC o Feedwater is reestablished by raising flow initially to ~ 2 mlbm/hr and then in ~ 0.5 mlbm/hr increments until RPV level begins to turn. This is controlled by the CRS.

o Maintain level within the established level band When RCIC does not automatically initiate at -41.6 reactor water level or when directed, Manually align RCIC as follows:

Shift RCIC Flo controller to manual and reduce output to minimum Open E51-F046 Start the Gland Seal Compressor Open E51-F095 BOP After ~ 6 seconds, Open E51-F045 Raise turbine speed using flow controller in manual to develop pressure greater than reactor pressure Open E51-F013 Adjust flow as necessary Note: The normal method of arming and depressing the RCIC MAN INIT pushbutton has also failed for this event.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 22 of 23 Op-Test No: 12/12 Scenario No: 4 Event No: 7 Event

Description:

Failure of RCIC to initiate TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When RCIC does not automatically initiate at -41.6 reactor water level or when directed, Manually align RCIC as follows:

Shift RCIC Flo controller to manual and reduce output to minimum Open E51-F046 Start the Gland Seal Compressor Open E51-F095 BOP After ~ 6 seconds, Open E51-F045 Raise turbine speed using flow controller in manual to develop pressure greater than reactor pressure Open E51-F013 Adjust flow as necessary Note: The normal method of arming and depressing the RCIC MAN INIT pushbutton has also failed for this event.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 4 Page 23 of 23 Give this page to the CRS Turnover the following conditions:

Power 100%

Pressure 1030 psig BOC EOOS GREEN Work Week Division 1 B21-PT-N094E has failed last shift.

o Annunciators P601-21A-E7 (DRWL PRESS HI) and P601-18A-B2 (ADS A HI DRWL PRESS SEALED IN) o TS 3.3.5.1 Conditions B and F, 3.3.6.1 Condition A, 3.3.6.3 Condition B, and 3.3.6.4 Condition B were entered (no other actions are required at this time).

RHR A is lined up for Suppression Pool Cooling.

o TS 3.5.1 Condition A was entered.

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Place RHR A in standby mode.

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1 will not be provided for this scenario.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 5 Page 1 of 2 Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 12/12 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Place SSW A in STANDBY.

2. Raise reactor power using Recirc Flow Control.

3. Two APRM channel failures.

4. Loss of ESF Transformer 21.

5. Division 2 LSS failure.

6. Fuel cladding leak.

7. RCIC fails to start on initiation.

8. RCIC room unisolable steam leak.

Initial Conditions: Operating at 85% power.

Inoperable Equipment: APRM Ch 1 is failed downscale and bypassed.

Turnover:

A plant startup is in progress with all steps complete up to step 6.8 of Attachment II in 03-1-01-2 (Power Ascension From 60% to Full Power). The crew will place SSW A in STANDBY upon assuming the shift. When SSW A is in STANDBY, raise reactor power to 100% of rated.

Scenario Notes:

This scenario was developed for the GGNS 2011 NRC License Operating Test. It has been modified to meet the requirements of NUREG-1021ES-301, but is not considered significantly modified.

Validation Time (60-90 min): 50 minutes Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 5 Page 2 of 2 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 p41f005a_i C (BOP) Place SSW A in Standby (SOI 04-1-01-P41-1 section 4.6) 2 N (BOP) Raise Reactor power using FCVs (IOI 03-1-01-2 Att. 2 step 6.8)

R (ATC) c51010_1 I (ATC) 3 Two APRM channel failures (ARI/TS 3.3.1.1) c51009_4 TS (CRS)

C (BOP) 4 r21180 Loss of EST Transformer 21 (05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power)

A(CREW) 5 r21218 TS (CRS) Division 2 LSS Failure (TS 3.8.1)

Fuel cladding leak (Off-Gas Activity High (05-1-02-II-2) and SCRAM (05-1-02-I-1) ONEP) rr071 Fuel failure is occurring and main steam line radiation is greater than rm157a 3 times normal full power background as indicated by MSL B / MSL rrd21k648a_d C RAD HI-HI or MSL A / MSL D RAD HI-Hi alarms, the crew closes 6 M (CREW) MSIVs and MSL drains per EP-4. The crew closes the MSIVs and rrd21k648b_d rrd21k648c_d MSL drains and observes valve position indications and lowering rrd21k648d_d pressure trend downstream of the MSIVs. Criterion is to give the highest priority to close the four inboard MSIVs or the four outboard MSIVs and MSL drains when MSL radiation is greater than 3 times normal full power background.

e51043 I (ATC /

7 RCIC fails to start on initiation (SOI 04-1-01-E51-1)

DI_1E51M625D BOP)

RCIC room unisolable steam leak (EP-4) e51187a A primary system is discharging outside primary containment and area temperatures, radiation levels, or water levels are above their e51187b I/C (ATC / max safe values in two or more areas. The crew opens 8 ADS/SRVs 8 and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications rrd21k603 BOP)

(tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized).

Criterion is to give the highest priority to open at least seven SRVs rrd21k613 when area temperatures, radiation levels, or water levels are above their maximum safe values in two or more areas.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

• Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Quantitative Attributes Table Normal Events 1 Abnormal Events 1 Reactivity Manipulations 1 Total Malfunctions 7 Instrument/Component Failures 5 EP Entries (Requiring substantive action) 2 Major Transients 1 EP Contingencies 1 Tech Spec Calls 2 Critical Tasks 2 Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 1 of 20 Simulator Setup:

A. Initialization

1. Log off all simulator PDS and SPDS computers (PDS and SPDS must come up after the simulator load for proper operation).

2. Startup the simulator using Simulator Instructors Job Aid section 6.3.

Note:

Prior to running the Schedule File, ensure no Event Files are Open. If an existing Event File is Open prior to running the Schedule File, then any associated Event Files will not automatically load.

3. Open Schedule.exe and Director.exe by clicking on the Icon in the Thunder Bar.

4. Set the Simulator to IC-105 and perform switch check (Using Quick Reset in Director).

5. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2011 NRC Scenario 5.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

6. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the scenario is active (Running).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 2 of 20

7. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section B below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a specific time will not load into the director until triggered.)

8. Take the simulator out of freeze.

9. Log on to all simulator PDS and SPDS computers.

10. Verify or perform the following:

IC-105 SSW A started normally.

After SSW A is running, trigger event 30 to setup malfunction p41f005a_c (thermal ol/49 device)

APRM 1 is bypassed and caution tagged Ensure the correct rod movement sequence available at the P680.

Advance all chart recorders and ensure all pens inking properly.

Clear any graphs and trends off of SPDS.

11. Run through any alarms and ensure alarms are on. (Note: On T-Rex, to verify alarms are ON, the indicator will indicate Alarms On).

12. Place the simulator in Freeze.

B. File loaded verification:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 3 of 20 Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 4 of 20 Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 5 of 20 Crew Turnover:

A. Assign the candidates crew positions.

B. Turnover the following conditions:

Power 85%

Pressure 1010 psig BOC EOOS GREEN A reactor startup is in progress with all steps complete up to step 6.8, Attachment II of 03-1-01-2 (Power Ascension from 60% to full power)

SSW A is in service.

APRM Channel 1 has failed downscale and is in BYPASS (a tracking LCO was written).

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1.b will not be provided for this scenario.

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Place SSW A in STANDBY using 04-1-01-P41-1 SSW SOI.

Once SSW A is in STANDBY, continue with plant startup and raise reactor power to 100%. Ramp rates are not required until reactor power reaches 95%.

C. Allow the crew to perform pre-shift brief and review procedures for planned evolutions.

D. Bring the crew into the Simulator, place the simulator is in RUN.

E. Allow the crew to walk down panels.

F. When the crew assumes the shift begin Scenario Activities.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 6 of 20 SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

A. Start SBT report and any other required recording devices (Video recording not allowed for NRC exams).

Place SSW A in STANDBY B. The crew will place SSW A in STANDBY.

1. When the operator attempts to close P41-F005A, it will not shut due to tripped thermal device.

2. If directed by the control room to manually shut P41-F005A, wait 3 minutes and report that the valve is stuck and the motor is hot to the touch.

3. If asked to check the breaker, report that the breaker is tripped and you will submit a work request to further determine the cause.

4. When the CRS enters TS 3.5.1 condition D and/or the lead evaluator is satisfied with the crew response, call the CRS (2374) and prompt the crew to go ahead and raise power.

Raise reactor power to 100%: 2 C. The crew will raise reactor power to 100% using FCVs.

1. No operations outside the control room are required.

2. When Core Flow reaches 88 Mlbm/hr, a second APRM, Channel 4, will fail downscale (Auto Event 1).

APRM Channel 4 fails downscale D. Since APRM channel 1 is already in bypass, no operator action is required for this situation; however, the CRS may choose to insert a 1/2 scram as required by TS 3.3.1.1 Condition A (This action is not required for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />).

1. If the BOP operator comes to the booth for indications on APRM 4, report that it is in alarm and the trip status is for flux downscale.

2. When the CRS enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition B, trigger Event 2 to Lockout ESF Transformer 21 and loss of Division 2 LSS.

4 ESF Transformer 21 Lockout/Div 2 LSS Failure E. The crew will enter Loss of AC ONEP and reenergize 16AB via an alternate feeder.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 7 of 20 F. If requested to reset RC&IS, use remote c11647 to reset RC&IS.

G. When the CRS enters LCO 3.8.1 Condition F and any transient briefs are complete, at the Lead Evaluators discretion, insert a fuel cladding leak by triggering Event 3.

6 Fuel Cladding Leak H. When the OG PRE-TREAT RAD HI annunciator alarms, the crew will enter the Off-Gas Activity High ONEP.

1. If asked as RP to report local Pre-treat rad levels, report them as above normal and trending up.

2. Prior to Pre-treat radiation levels reaching 700 mR/hr, the CRS will direct the ATC to lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr.

3. When core flow is below 73 mlbm/hr, Auto Event 4 will trigger causing the Fuel Cladding Leak to worsen.

a. The crew will enter the Reduction in Recirc Flow ONEP and the ATC will become the THI watch with concurrent duties.

4. When the crew determines that Pre-treat radiation levels cannot be maintained below 14,000 mR/hr, the crew will manually scram the reactor and enter the Reactor Scram and Turbine Trip ONEPs and EP-2. Insert EP Attachments as directed by the Control Room.

5. 15 seconds after the scram Auto Event 5 will trigger causing Condensate Pumps to trip on low condenser level (due to failed trip unit, this is unrecoverable)

6. 2 minutes after the scram, MSL RAD HI annunciator will alarm and the CRS will enter EP-4.

7. 4 1/2 minutes after the scram, MSL A-D HI-HI annunciators will alarm. The CRS will direct the BOP operator to close all MSIVs per EP-4 step 1.

Unisolable steam leak RCIC room/RCIC fail to start on initiation I. After all MSIVs are closed the CRS will direct the ATC/BOP operator to control reactor level using RCIC and HPCS.

1. The CRS should establish a reactor pressure band of 800-1060 psig using ADS/SRV valves and a reactor level band of +30 to -30.

2. Once the operating feed pump trips, RCIC will fail to initiate (when started by the operator or on low level). The operator must manually line up RCIC.

J. When E51-F045 opens, an unisolable steam leak will occur in the RCIC room.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 8 of 20

1. The crew will receive RCIC room high temperature and radiation alarms. The E51-F063 and E51-F064 will fail to close (loss of power, motor pinion key failed respectively).

2. The crew should enter the reduced pressure band 450-600 psig to reduce driving head of the steam leak.

3. Five minutes after RCIC is started, report to the control room as Security that there is a plume of steam coming from the Auxiliary Building Roof.

4. When 2 max safe values (Rad levels) from EP-4 Table 10 are reached, the crew will enter the emergency depressurization procedure of EP-2.

Termination:

K. Once emergency depressurization has been conducted and reactor water level is stabilized above TAF, or as directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 9 of 20 Critical Tasks:

Fuel failure is occurring and main steam line radiation is greater than 3 times normal full power background as indicated by MSL B / MSL C RAD HI-HI or MSL A / MSL D RAD HI-Hi alarms, the crew closes MSIVs and MSL drains per EP-4. The crew closes the MSIVs and MSL drains and observes valve position indications and lowering pressure trend downstream of the MSIVs. Criterion is to give the highest priority to close the four inboard MSIVs or the four outboard MSIVs and MSL drains when MSL radiation is greater than 3 times normal full power background.

A primary system is discharging outside primary containment and area temperatures, radiation levels, or water levels are above their max safe values in two or more areas.

The crew opens 8 ADS/SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized). Criterion is to give the highest priority to open at least seven SRVs when area temperatures, radiation levels, or water levels are above their maximum safe values in two or more areas.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 10 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 5 Event No: 1 Event

Description:

Place SSW A in Standby TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Directs the BOP operator to place SSW A in standby.

Places SSW A in Standby using SOI 04-1-01-P41-1 section 4.6:

Verifies all prerequisites are met N/As steps 4.6.2a - 4.6.2h.

Places the SSW A MOV test switch to TEST Open/check open P41-F006A.

Close P41-F005A - P41-F005A will fail to close As indicated by annunciator P870-1A-C2, SSW DIV 1 OOSVC SSW D1 MOV OVERLD PWR LOSS status light turns on The operator refers to ARI for P870-1A-C2 and:

BOP Does not proceed with securing SSW and report that P41-F005 lost power and is still open. At this point, if the crew chooses to stop the SSW pump they will cause the SSW head tank to drain.

Look in Attachment IIIA of 04-1-01-P41-1 and determine breaker number for P41-F005A (52-155112).

Direct the local operator to the breaker for P41-F005A on 15B51to determine the cause of loss of power.

Using ARI and control room indications, determine that the valves breaker has tripped on overload.

As indicated by the SSW D1 MOV OVERLD PWR LOSS status light lit and the valve positions indicating lights for P41-F005A on the P870 are still lit.

Reports diagnosis to the CRS.

Ensure an operator and/or electrical maintenance is dispatched to investigate the problem.

The CRS should opt to leave SSW A running. In order to secure SSW A, P41-F005A CRS would have to be manually closed. Without power to the valve, SSW A would have to be declared INOPERABLE.

Declare SSW A INOPERABLE, enters TS 3.7.1 Condition D.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 11 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 5 Event No: 2 Event

Description:

Raise reactor power using Recirc Flow Control TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Conducts reactivity brief for the planned power change. (May be performed prior to CRS taking the shift)

Directs the ATC to raise reactor power to 100% using Recirc FCVs.

Raises power by opening the Recirc FCVs A & B using loop flow controllers ATC B33K603A & B in slow detent on P680-3B (IOI-2 attachment VIII step 12.3).

Raises Load Demand as power is raised by depressing EHC LOAD REF DEMAND RAISE pushbutton (P680-9C) to maintain generator actual load within +/- 25 MW of BOP the load demand limited value during power ascension (IOI-2 attachment VIII step 12.2).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 12 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 5 Event No: 3 Event

Description:

Two APRM channel failures TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports APRM Channel 4 has failed downscale.

As indicated by annunciators P680-4A2-C-5, CONT ROD WITHDRAWAL ATC BLOCK, and P680-5A-C-10, APRM DNSC/TRBL APRM Ch-4 will read 0% and will have the DNSC light on.

Recognizes entry conditions and enters LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition A.

The CRS may direct the ATC to insert a 1/2 scram in order to comply with the LCO (No action required for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />). If so, the CRS will:

CRS

-Direct the ATC to insert a 1/2 scram.

Note: The ARI directs the crew to bypass the APRM channel if possible. In this case it is not possible since one other channel is already bypassed.

Note: The BOP operator may go to the back panels to read the APRM channel locally.

BOP This is not modeled in the simulator. The operator should go to the booth operator to obtain indications if desired.

If directed, Insert a 1/2 scram by arming and depressing one of four MAN SCRAM push buttons on ATC the P680 panel.

Report completed actions to the CRS.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 13 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 5 Event No: 4/5 Event

Description:

Loss of ESF Transformer 21/Division 2 LSS failure TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report ESF Transformer Lockout as indicated by:

Annunciator P807-4A-B5, ESF XFMR 21 LOCKOUT TRIP CREW Annunciator P807-4A-F2, ESF XFMR 21 TROUBLE There are also other alarms associated with the loss of power.

Enter Loss of AC Power ONEP.

CRS Direct the BOP to Reenergize 16AB using an alternate feeder breaker and Reenergize 16B42.

Reenergize 16AB with an alternate feeder breaker using one of the following sources:

ESF 12 via 152-1611 ESF 21 via 152-1614 Div 2 DG via 152-1608 BOP Reenergize 16B42 via 52-16405 Perform a board walk down and determine and report the cause for 16AB not automatically reenergizing was due to a failure of Division 2 LSS as indicated by annunciator P864-2A-H1, DIV 2 LSS SYS FAIL and the DIV 2 LSS PNL FAIL status light being lit.

Recognize and Enter LCO 3.8.1 Condition F CRS Note: The CRS will begin to develop a plan to restore plant systems to normal; however, due to time restraints the next event should be initiated when satisfied with the crews response.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 14 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 5 Event No: 6 Event

Description:

Fuel Cladding Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes and reports to the CRS when the OG PRE-TREAT RAD HI annunciator alarms.

BOP Directs the CRS to the Off-Gas Activity High ONEP per the OG PRE-TREAT RAD HI ARI.

Enters the Off-Gas Activity High ONEP.

CRS Establish Off-Gas Pre-Treat Radiation Level as a critical parameter.

ATC / Monitor Off-Gas Pre-Treat Radiation Level.

BOP Report Off-Gas Pre-Treat Radiation Levels as directed by the CRS.

When the CRS anticipates exceeding the limits of step 3.1 Pre-Treatment Monitor CRS Limit (700mR/hr), directs the ATC to lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr in fast detent.

Lower core flow to 70 mlbm/hr using Recirc A and B FCV flow controllers in fast ATC detent when directed by the CRS.

Enters the Reduction in Recirculation Flow Rate ONEP.

CRS Ensures THI watch with concurrent duties is established.

Plot the power to flow map.

Recognize and report to the CRS entry into the OPRM Trip Enabled Region as ATC determined by the power to flow map plot.

Establish THI watch with concurrent duties.

Perform subsequent actions of the Off-Gas Activity High ONEP.

Consult with the Reactor Engineer or Duty Manager for further power reductions.

CRS Activate the Emergency Plan when limits of step 3.3 are exceeded (pre-treat rad monitor limit of 700 MR/HR).

Notify Chemistry to monitor ventilation release points.

When the CRS determines that Off-Gas Pre-Treat Radiation Levels cannot be CRS maintained below 14,000 mR/hr, direct the ATC to scram the reactor.

Enter the Scram ONEP, Turbine/Generator Trip ONEP, EP-2 Revision 2 9/27/12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 15 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 6 cont.

Event

Description:

Fuel Cladding Leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Places the Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN when directed by the CRS.

Provides a scram report:

Reactor Mode SW in SHUTDOWN.

Reactor power is 0%.

ATC Reactor water level and trend.

Reactor pressure and trend.

Feedwater is NOT available.

Bypass valves are available.

ATC / Start RCIC by arming and depressing the RCIC initiation push button (RCIC will fail BOP to start; see event 7 on page 17).

Recognizes and reports EP-4 entry condition when MSL RAD HI annunciator alarms BOP on P601-19A-D4.

CRS Enters EP-4 when any entry condition is met.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 16 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 6 cont.

Event

Description:

Fuel Cladding Leak ATC / Recognize and report when MSL A-D HI-HI radiation annunciators alarm.

BOP Close all MSIVs (per EP-4 step 1).

When MSL A-D HI-HI radiation annunciators alarm, direct the ATC/BOP to close all MSIVs.

• Fuel failure is occurring and main steam line radiation is greater than 3 times normal full power background as indicated by MSL B / MSL C RAD HI-HI or MSL A / MSL D RAD HI-Hi alarms, the crew closes MSIVs and MSL drains per EP-4. The crew closes the MSIVs and MSL drains and observes valve position indications and lowering pressure trend downstream of the MSIVs.

CRS Criterion is to give the highest priority to close the four inboard MSIVs or the four outboard MSIVs and MSL drains when MSL radiation is greater than 3 times normal full power background.

Establish reactor pressure band of 800 - 1060 psig using ADS/SRV valves.

Establish reactor level band of +30 to -30 using Feed and Condensate system (this band is established per Ops Philosophy Level Band Strategies since reactor pressure is now being controlled with ADS/SRVs).

Maintain pressure band of 800 - 1060 psig using ADS/SRV valves (cycle open and BOP closed as required to stay within band).

Maintain level band of +30 to -30 using HPCS (May use the Startup Level Controller ATC in Auto or Manual).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 17 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 7 Event

Description:

RCIC fails to start on initiation TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes that RCIC does not start when manually initiated using Initiate push button.

As indicated when nothing happens after the Initiate PB is depressed.

Manually starts RCIC using SOI 04-1-01-E51-1 Attachment VI.

Shift RCIC Flo controller to manual and reduce output to minimum.

Open E51-F046.

Start Gland Seal Compressor.

ATC / Open E51-F095.

BOP After 6 seconds, Open E51-F045.

Raise turbine speed using flow controller in manual to develop pressure greater than reactor pressure.

Open E51-F013.

Adjust flow as necessary with Flo controller.

Verify SSW A is running with adequate flow path.

Establish and maintain reactor water level in the established band (11.4 to 53.5)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 18 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 8 Event

Description:

RCIC room unisolable steam leak TIME Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report unisolable steam leak in the RCIC room after RCIC is initiated.

As indicated by annunciators P601-21A-G-3, RCIC EQUIP AREA TEMP HI, ATC / P601-21A-H-2, RCIC PIPE/EQUIP AMBIENT TEMP HI, and BOP P601-21A-H-3, RCIC EQUIP AREA dT HI.

E51-F063 loss of power and E51-F064 will not close.

RCIC room temperature remains high.

Go to EP-4 at 22 (will be on step 10 until 2 max safe values are reached).

CRS Direct the BOP to monitor EP-4 parameters.

Monitor EP-4 parameters using EP-4 table 3.

BOP Monitor for 2 Max Safe values Establish a reduced pressure band of 450 - 600 psig to reduce the driving head of the steam leak in accordance with the Ops Philosophy Pressure Control Strategy.

CRS Establish a level band of +30 to -30 in accordance with Ops Philosophy Level Control Strategy.

Control reactor pressure in the 450 - 600 psig band using ADS/SRV valves when BOP directed.

Manually initiate HPCS to maintain reactor water level within the established band by ATC arming and depressing the HPCS initiation pushbutton.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 19 of 20 Op-Test No: 12/11 Scenario No: 2 Event No: 8 cont Event

Description:

RCIC room unisolable steam leak BOP / Recognize and report to the CRS when 2 max save values of EP-4 Table 10 are ATC exceeded.

When 2 max save values of EP-4 Table 10 are exceeded, enters the Emergency Depressurization procedure of EP-2.

• A primary system is discharging outside primary containment and area temperatures, radiation levels, or water levels are above their max safe values in two or more areas. The crew opens 8 ADS/SRVs and observes lowering pressure trend and valve position indications (tailpipe pressure indication lamps or solenoid valve energized). Criterion is to give the highest priority to open at least seven SRVs when area temperatures, radiation levels, or water CRS levels are above their maximum safe values in two or more areas.

The Two Max Safe values for this scenario are:

- SGTS Rad levels of 800 mr/hr (8 x102 mr/hr)

- RCIC Room Rad levels of 80,000 mr/hr (8 x104 mr/hr)

Verify SP level is above 10.5 ft.

Direct the BOP operator to open 8 ADS valves.

BOP Opens at least 7 ADS valves when directed by the CRS.

Maintain reactor level band of +30 to -30 following Emergency Depressurization.

ATC (The CRS may establish a level band of 11.4 to 53.5)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario 5 Page 20 of 20 Give this page to the CRS Turnover the following conditions:

Power 85%

Pressure 1010 psig BOC EOOS GREEN A reactor startup is in progress with all steps complete up to step 6.8, Attachment II of 03-1-01-2 (Power Ascension from 60% to full power)

SSW A is in service.

APRM Channel 1 has failed downscale and is in BYPASS (a tracking LCO was written).

Note that an independent Reactivity Management SRO per Operations Philosophy 6.8.1.b will not be provided for this scenario.

Planned Evolutions this shift:

Place SSW A in STANDBY using 04-1-01-P41-1 SSW SOI.

Once SSW A is in STANDBY, continue with plant startup and raise reactor power to 100%. Ramp rates are not required until reactor power reaches 95%.

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