ML13081A745

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Entergy'S Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion)
ML13081A745
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/22/2013
From: Bessette P, Dennis W, Glew W, Kuyler R, Sutton K
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Entergy Services, Morgan, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 24269, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01
Download: ML13081A745 (112)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and

) 50-286-LR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. )

)

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) )

) March 22, 2013 ENTERGYS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CONTENTION RK-TC-2 (FLOW-ACCELERATED CORROSION)

William B. Glew, Jr., Esq. Kathryn M. Sutton, Esq.

William C. Dennis, Esq. Paul M. Bessette, Esq.

ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. Raphael P. Kuyler, Esq.

440 Hamilton Avenue MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP White Plains, NY 10601 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Phone: (914) 272-3202 Washington, DC 20004 Fax: (914) 272-3205 Phone: (202) 739-3000 E-mail: wglew@entergy.com Fax: (202) 739-3001 E-mail: wdennis@entergy.com E-mail: ksutton@morganlewis.com E-mail: pbessette@morganlewis.com E-mail: rkuyler@morganlewis.com Counsel for Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED FINDINGS ............................... 1 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CONTENTION RK-TC-2 ............................................. 3 A. Application Submittal and Original Contention RK-TC-2 .................................... 3 B. Staff Review of the LRA ....................................................................................... 9 C. Motion for Summary Disposition ........................................................................ 10 D. Motion to Compel ................................................................................................ 12 E. Riverkeeper Pre-filed Written Testimony and Entergys Motion in Limine ....... 13 F. Entergys and the NRC Staffs March 2012 Pre-filed Testimony ....................... 16 G. Riverkeeper Motion in Limine............................................................................. 17 H. Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony ......................................................................... 19 I. Other Prehearing Procedural Matters................................................................... 19 J. The October 15-17, 2012 Hearing ....................................................................... 23 III. APPLICABLE LEGAL AND REGULATORY STANDARDS .................................... 26 A. Scope of License Renewal Review Under 10 C.F.R. Part 54 .............................. 26 B. Reasonable Assurance Standard .......................................................................... 27 C. Demonstration of Reasonable Assurance Through Consistency with the GALL Report ....................................................................................................... 28 D. Burden of Proof.................................................................................................... 30 IV. FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ............................................... 31 A. Witnesses and Evidence Presented ...................................................................... 31

1. Entergys Expert Witnesses ............................................................... 31
2. NRC Staffs Expert Witnesses ........................................................... 36
3. Riverkeepers Witness ....................................................................... 37 B. Technical Background on FAC ........................................................................... 38
1. FAC Is a Chemical Corrosion Phenomenon ...................................... 38
2. FAC and Other Degradation Mechanisms Do Not Occur Simultaneously ................................................................................... 42
3. Under Constant Operating Conditions, the Rate of Degradation Due to FAC Is Constant With Time .................................................. 44
4. FAC Can Be Analyzed by CHECWORKS and Managed as a Line Level Process ......................................................................... 47
5. There Is No Evidence of Any Significant, Unexplained, Localized Wall-thinning Phenomenon at IPEC ................................. 49

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page C. The IPEC FAC Program is Consistent With GALL and the Standard Industry Guidance ................................................................................................ 52

1. The GALL Report and NSAC-202L Provide the NRCs Approved Guidance for an Acceptable FAC Program ..................... 52
2. The Board Concludes that the IPEC FAC Program Is Adequately Documented ................................................................... 54
3. The Board Concludes that the IPEC FAC Program Is Consistent with the GALL Report ..................................................... 56 D. Technical Description of the IPEC FAC Program............................................... 58
1. Scope of Components within the FAC Program................................ 58
2. The FAC Program Uses Multiple, Independent Tools to Select Inspection Locations .......................................................................... 60 E. CHECWORKS is Performing Its Intended Screening Function at IPEC ............ 66
1. CHECWORKS Is Predictive Software Used to Assist in the Selection of Inspection Locations ...................................................... 66
2. CHECWORKS Provides Results that Are Sufficiently Accurate for Its Intended Purpose...................................................... 70
3. CHECWORKS Is Intended to Provide a Best Estimate of FAC Wear Rates, Not a Bounding Estimate .............................................. 72
4. The IPEC CHECWORKS Model Includes and Relies Upon Appropriate Data Going Back Decades ............................................. 75 F. Dr. Hopenfelds Challenges to How the Various Tools Are Used Together Within the FAC Program Lack Merit .................................................................. 78
1. Dr. Hopenfelds Original Claim that CHECWORKS Is the Predominant Feature of the IPEC FAC Program Is Incorrect ........... 78
2. Dr. Hopenfelds Revised Claim that Entergy Has Improperly Relegated CHECWORKS to a Secondary Role within the FAC Program Is Incorrect .......................................................................... 79
3. Dr. Hopenfelds Challenges to the Use of Other Tools in the IPEC FAC Program Lack Merit ........................................................ 81 G. Riverkeepers Remaining Challenges to the Adequacy of the FAC Program Lack Merit ............................................................................................. 85
1. Potential FAC in Steam Generator Components Is Not Managed Through the FAC Program or CHECWORKS .................. 86
2. CHECWORKS Does Not Require 10 to 15 Years of Benchmarking Following a Power Uprate ......................................... 87 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
3. Dr. Hopenfelds Attempts to Distinguish the IPEC FAC Program from the Program Found Acceptable in Vermont Yankee Lack Merit ............................................................................. 89
4. There Is No Evidence Regarding BRT-CICERO that Suggests Any Deficiency in CHECWORKS .................................................... 92
5. Criticisms of the FAC Program Based on Selected IPEC Operating Experience Lack Merit ...................................................... 95
6. Criticisms of CHECWORKS and the FAC Program Based on Operating Experience at Other Facilities Lack Merit ........................ 98
7. Riverkeepers Assorted Remaining Challenges to the FAC Program Lack Merit ......................................................................... 101 V.

SUMMARY

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ....................... 103 VI. ORDER .......................................................................................................................... 106 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and

) 50-286-LR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. )

)

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) )

) March 22, 2013 ENTERGYS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CONTENTION RK-TC-2 (FLOW-ACCELERATED CORROSION)

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.1209 and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (Board)

February 28, 2013 Order,1 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) submits its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions) on Riverkeeper, Inc. (Riverkeeper) Technical Contention 2 (RK-TC-2) concerning flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC). The Proposed Findings and Conclusions are based on the evidentiary record in this proceeding, and are submitted in the form of a proposed Partial Initial Decision by the Board. The Proposed Findings and Conclusions are set out in numbered paragraphs beginning in the next section, with corresponding citations to the record of this proceeding.

I. INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED FINDINGS

1. This Partial Initial Decision presents the Boards Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Contention RK-TC-2. The contention alleges that Entergys aging management program (AMP) for carbon steel components affected by FAC is deficient 1

Licensing Board Order (Granting Parties Joint Motion for Alteration of Filing Schedule) at 1 (Feb. 28, 2013)

(unpublished).

because: (1) it fails to demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation . . . . by not specifying the method and frequency of inspections or the criteria for component repair or replacement;2 and (2) Entergys FAC program relies on the computer code CHECWORKS, which has not been sufficiently benchmarked to Indian Point operating parameters associated with the recent power uprate.3

2. For the reasons set forth below, the Board finds that Entergy has carried its burden of proof to demonstrate the adequacy of the FAC AMP under 10 C.F.R. Part 54. The FAC Program for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 (IP2 and IP3, collectively Indian Point Energy Center or IPEC) is fully consistent with the long-established Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) guidance in NUREG-1801, Rev. 1, Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report, (GALL Report) for an acceptable FAC Program,4 and follows the accepted industry-standard guidance in the Electric Power Research Institutes (EPRIs)5 Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) 202L, Recommendations for an Effective Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program.6 It should be noted that the IPEC FAC Program is not a new program for license renewal, but rather is an existing plant program supported by decades of operating experience at IPEC and at other nuclear power plants.7 The FAC Program consists of 2

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), LBP-08-13, 68 NRC 43, 173 (2008).

3 Id.

4 See NUREG-1801, Rev. 1, Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report at XI M-61 (Sept. 2005) (GALL Report, Rev. 1) (NYS00146C).

5 EPRI is a non-profit organization funded primarily by domestic utilities. The organizations mission is to conduct research, development, and demonstration relating to the generation, delivery, and use of electricity for the benefit of the public.

6 See EPRI, NSAC-202L-R3, Recommendations for an Effective Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (May 2006) (NSAC-202L-R3) (RIV000012).

7 See Indian Point Energy Center License Renewal Application, App. B at B-54 (Apr. 2007) (LRA)

(ENT00015B); NRC Staff Testimony of Matthew G. Yoder and Allen L. Hiser, Jr. Concerning Riverkeeper Technical Contention RK-TC-2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion at 19 (A33) (Oct. 17, 2012) (NRC Staff Testimony) (NRCR00121).

several tools and methods used to select component inspection locations at each plant outage, of which CHECWORKS is only one.8 Those other tools include: (1) the trending of actual measurements of pipe wall thicknesses from past outages; (2) industry experience related to FAC; (3) results from other plant inspection programs; (4) engineering judgment; and (5) the Susceptible Non-Modeled rankings.9

3. We further find that, for those components modeled by the CHECWORKS software, CHECWORKS adequately performs its intended purpose of assisting the IPEC FAC Program engineer identify locations in need of inspections. We find that the comprehensive AMP outlined in NSAC-202L-R3 and implemented by Entergy has a proven track record, in the industry and at IPEC, of effectively addressing potential wall-thinning due to FAC. We therefore conclude that the IPEC FAC Program provides reasonable assurance that the effects of aging due to FAC on components within the scope of the program will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation (PEO). The Board thus enters a ruling on the merits of this contention in favor of Entergy.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CONTENTION RK-TC-2 A. Application Submittal and Original Contention RK-TC-2

4. In October 2004, IP2 underwent a 3.26% stretch power uprate (SPU), and in March 2005, IP3 underwent a 4.85% SPU.10 An SPU is a relatively small increase in the rated power of the plant, typically between two and seven percent.11 As explained below, RK-TC-2, 8

Testimony of Entergy Witnesses Ian D. Mew, Alan B. Cox, Nelson F. Azevedo, Jeffrey S. Horowitz, and Robert M. Aleksick Regarding Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) at 69 (A95) (Oct. 12, 2012) (Entergy Testimony) (ENTR00029); NRC Staff Testimony at 36 (A70) (NRCR00121).

9 Entergy Testimony at 69-71 (A95) (ENTR00029).

10 See Approved Applications for Power Uprates at 3 (Oct. 20, 2011) (ENT000083).

11 See EPRI Report, Plant Engineering: Impact of Electric Power Uprates on Flow-Accelerated Corrosion at 1-2 (July 2011) (ENT000081) (EPRI 2011 Study).

as originally pled and admitted, focused primarily on the alleged need for extensive benchmarking before CHECWORKS could be used effectively at IPEC following the SPUs.12

5. On April 23, 2007, Entergy applied to renew the IP2 and IP3 operating licenses for 20 years beyond their current expiration dates of September 28, 2013, and December 12, 2015, respectively.13 In accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a)(3), the LRA included a description of the IPEC FAC Program, an existing plant program that Entergy will continue to implement during the PEO.14 The NRC published a Federal Register notice of acceptance for docketing and opportunity for hearing.15
6. The Hearing Notice stated that any person whose interest would be affected by the proceeding and who wished to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a petition for leave to intervene within 60 days of the Notice (i.e., by October 1, 2007).16 Subsequently, on October 1, 2007, the Commission extended the period for filing requests for hearing until November 30, 2007.17 12 See Indian Point, LBP-08-13, 68 NRC at 176; Riverkeeper, Inc.s Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene in the License Renewal Proceeding for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, at 20-22 (Nov. 30, 2007) (Riverkeeper Petition), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML073410093.

13 Letter from Fred Dacimo, Site Vice President, Entergy, to NRC, Document Control Desk (April 23, 2007) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML071210512 (supplemented by letters dated May 3, 2007 and June 21, 2007, available at ADAMS Accession No. ML071280700 and ML071800318).

14 See LRA, App. B at B-54 to B-55 (ENT00015B).

15 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3; Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the Application and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64 for an Additional 20-Year Period, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,134 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Hearing Notice).

16 Id.

17 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3; Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the Application and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64 for an Additional 20-Year Period: Extension of Time for Filing of Requests for Hearing or Petitions for Leave To Intervene in the License Renewal Proceeding, 72 Fed. Reg.

55,834 (Oct. 1, 2007).

7. On November 30, 2007, Riverkeeper filed a petition to intervene, proposing various contentions, including RK-TC-2.18 RK-TC-2 alleges that the LRA violates 10 C.F.R.

§ 54.21(a)(3) because it does not demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed for FAC-susceptible components.19 In support of its contention, Riverkeeper first claimed that the FAC AMP lacked sufficient details and failed to address each of the elements identified in the GALL Report.20 Second, Riverkeeper focused on the CHECWORKS software used in the FAC Program, claiming that it is unreliable at IPEC because it is not adequately benchmarked following SPUs at IP2 and IP3, and that the CHECWORKS program has no track record of success at IPEC or in the industry as a whole.21 According to Riverkeeper, Entergy should have performed extended benchmarking of CHECWORKS after the SPUs because those power changes affected the velocities, temperatures, coolant chemistry and steam moisture levelsvariables which can, in turn, affect the rate of FAC and thereby the accuracy of CHECWORKS predictions.22

8. Further, Riverkeeper claimed that CHECWORKS generally has a poor track record of performance, relying on a comment at a 2005 meeting of an Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards subcommittee,23 and a 2007 NRC report which allegedly showed a large number of through the wall failures in pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants due to FAC.24 18 See Riverkeeper Petition.

19 See id. at 15.

20 See id. at 16.

21 See id. at 21-22.

22 See id. at 20-21.

23 See id. at 21-22 (citing Official Transcript of Proceedings, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee, Statement by Dr. F. Peter Ford at 198 (Jan. 26, 2005), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML050400613).

24 See id. at 22 (citing NUREG/CR-6936, Probabilities of Failure and Uncertainty Estimate Information for Passive Components (May 2007) (NUREG/CR-6936) (RIV000023)).

Riverkeepers contention was supported by a declaration from Dr. Joram Hopenfeld.25 At the time, a nearly identical contentionalso supported by Dr. Hopenfeld as an expert witnesswas pending in the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee) license renewal proceeding.26

9. Entergy opposed the admission of the contention on the grounds that: (1) to the extent the contention challenged the adequacy of the CHECWORKS model rather than Entergys LRA, it was outside the scope of this proceeding because CHECWORKS is approved in the GALL Report for use as part of license renewal FAC Programs;27 (2) the contention lacked adequate factual or expert opinion support because Riverkeeper largely relied on vague, conclusory, and mischaracterized statements;28 and (3) the contention failed to raise a genuine dispute on a material issue of law or fact, in that it failed to dispute Entergys compliance with the GALL Report.29 Also, to the extent the contention challenged the LRA, Entergy argued that NSAC-202L, referenced in the LRA, and Entergys subsequent docketed correspondence contained detailed information on the method and frequency of component inspections, as well as criteria for repair or replacement.30 Thus it was Entergys position that no details were missing from its LRA, and that Riverkeepers challenges to CHECWORKS were unfounded, unsupported, and outside the scope of this proceeding.31 25 See Declaration of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld (Nov. 29, 2007).

26 That contention was ultimately resolved in Entergys favor. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee (Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-08-25, 68 NRC 763, 893-94 (2008).

27 See Answer of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Opposing Riverkeeper Inc.s Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene at 48-51 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML080300071.

28 See id. at 51-58 (citing NUREG/CR-6936 at 5.25 (RIV000023)).

29 See id. at 45-48, 58-60.

30 See id. at 51.

31 See id. at 43-60.

10. The NRC Staff (Staff) also objected to the admission of this contention, on similar grounds.32 The Staff argued that the contention was impermissibly vague because Riverkeeper failed to identify any particular system or component that would be adversely affected by the post-SPU conditions.33 In addition, the Staff noted Dr. Hopenfeld failed to provide any empirical proof, data or research to support his conclusory statements that extended benchmarking of CHECWORKS was required after the SPU.34 Finally, the Staff argued that CHECWORKS was approved in the GALL Report and had a proven track record of performance, and that Riverkeeper failed to refute either of these points.35 For these reasons, the Staff concluded that the contention did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact.36
11. In Riverkeepers reply to Entergys and the Staffs Answers,37 Riverkeeper asserted that it had demonstrated that FAC remains a significant problem despite Entergys and the industrys use of CHECWORKS, and as such its challenge to GALL was appropriate.38 Riverkeeper also repeated its claim that Entergy and the Staff failed to demonstrate that extended benchmarking of CHECWORKS was unnecessary, largely repeating arguments it made in its original petition.39 32 NRC Staffs Response to Petitions for Leave to Intervene Filed by (1) Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, (2) Connecticut Residents Opposed to Relicensing of Indian Point, and Nancy Burton, (3) Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., (4) The State of New York, (5) Riverkeeper, Inc., (6) The Town of Cortlandt, and (7) Westchester County, at 118-22 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML080230543.

33 See id. at 119.

34 Id. at 120.

35 See id. at 121-122.

36 See id. at 122.

37 See Riverkeeper, Inc.s Reply to Entergys and NRC Staffs Responses to Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene (Feb. 15, 2008), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML080560247.

38 See id. As noted in Section IV.C.3, below, Riverkeeper appears to have since abandoned any claim that the GALL Report is deficient.

39 See id. at 17-18.

12. The Board heard oral argument on whether RK-TC-2 and Riverkeepers other proposed contentions met the Commissions contention admissibility requirements.40 At oral argument, Riverkeeper asserted that CHECWORKS is generally unreliable41 and following the SPUs, Riverkeeper expected CHECWORKS to be even more inaccurate, requiring 10 to 15 years of benchmarking before it could be used to select inspection locations.42
13. On July 31, 2008, the Board issued a ruling admitted RK-TC-2.43 In admitting RK-TC-2, the Board reiterated the two bases for the contention discussed above, stating the contention as:

(1) Entergys AMP for components affected by FAC is deficient because it does not provide sufficient details (e.g., inspection method and frequency, criteria for component repair or replacement) to demonstrate that the intended functions of the applicable components will be maintained during the extended period of operation; and (2) Entergys program relies on the results from CHECWORKS without benchmarking or a track record of performance at IPECs power uprate levels.44

14. The Board also noted that, while the 2004 and 2005 SPUs at IP2 and IP3 (both less than 5% of rated power) were much smaller than the 20% extended power uprate (EPU) at Vermont Yankee, Entergy had not provided any information to explain what percent change in plant operating parameters would be small enough not to have a material effect on the CHECWORKS results.45 40 Official Transcript of Proceedings, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3 at 562:22 (Mar. 12, 2008)

(Judge McDade).

41 See id. at 566:23-25 (Curran) ([E]very plant in the country uses CHECWORKS to predict pipe thinning and it doesnt work every time.).

42 See id. at 565:20-566:20 (Curran).

43 Indian Point, LBP-08-13, 68 NRC at 176.

44 Id. at 177.

45 Id.

B. Staff Review of the LRA

15. The NRC Staff performed an audit of the IPEC FAC Program as part of its LRA review.46 In its final Safety Evaluation Report (SER),47 the NRC Staff reviewed the IPEC LRA against the GALL Report, Rev. 1, and found the Entergy FAC Program to be consistent with that document, with one exception where Entergy relied upon more recent guidance.48 Based on this finding, the NRC Staff concluded that the effects of aging due to FAC will be adequately managed at IPEC through the PEO.49 The NRC Staff noted that the IPEC FAC Program elements are acceptable and consistent with the ten program elements in the GALL Report, Rev. 1,Section XI.M17.50 The Staff also found NSAC-202L-R3 to be an appropriate guidance document for the program, stating that it provides enhanced guidance on several facets of the program.51
16. Revision 2 of the GALL Report was issued in December 2010, several years after Entergy had submitted its LRA, and after the issuance of the SER for IPEC license renewal.52 With respect to the FAC program, Revision 2 of the GALL Report again endorses the EPRI guidance in NSAC-202L as the basis for an acceptable FAC program, but permits an applicant to 46 See Entergy Testimony at 35-36 (A57) (ENTR00029); NRC Staff Testimony at 13(A18) (NRCR00121); NRC, Audit Report for Plant Aging Management Programs and Reviews (Jan. 13, 2009) (NRC Audit Report)

(ENT000041).

47 NUREG-1930, Vol. 1, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (Nov. 2009) (SER) (NYS00326A-B).

48 Entergy took an exception to the guidance in the GALL Report, Rev. 1, to rely upon the more recent guidance in NSAC-202L-R3 for the FAC Program. See NL-07-153, Letter from Fred R. Dacimo, Entergy, to NRC, Amendment 1 to License Renewal Application (LRA), Attach. 1, at 46-48 (Dec. 18, 2007) (NYS000159);

NRC Audit Report at 22-23 (ENT000041). As explained below, the GALL Report, Rev. 1 approved only the earlier guidance in Revision 2 of NSAC-202L.

49 See SER at 3-30 (NYS00326B).

50 See id. at 3-22 to -30.

51 See id. at 3-24.

52 NUREG-1801, Rev. 2, Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report (Dec. 2010) (NYS00147A-C)

(GALL Report, Rev. 2).

rely on either Revision 2 of NSAC-202L (NSAC-202L-R2) or NSAC-202L-R3 as the basis for its FAC Program. The GALL Report, Rev. 1, by way of comparison, only permitted applicants to rely on NSAC-202L-R2.53 For the FAC program, this change is the primary difference between the two revisions of the GALL Report.54

17. After the issuance of GALL Report, Rev. 2, the NRC Staff reviewed the FAC Program and determined that there were no gaps that would require the issuance of any requests for additional information (RAIs) to Entergy on the subject of the FAC Program at IPEC.55 C. Motion for Summary Disposition
18. On July 26, 2010, Entergy filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of RK-TC-2.56 The NRC Staff supported Entergys Motion.57 Entergy noted that since the admission of RK-TC-2 in 2008, through the mandatory disclosure process, Entergy and the Staff had provided Riverkeeper with substantial additional information about the FAC Program at IPEC.58 This included thousands of pages of CHECWORKS documents and data covering all outages at IP2, since 2004, and at IP3, since 2005, along with many documents that pre-dated those outages.59 According to Entergy, the available information refuted Riverkeepers claims that Entergy 53 See Entergy Testimony at 28 (A48) (ENTR00029) (citing GALL Report, Rev. 2 at IX-31 (NYS00147C);

GALL Report, Rev. 1 at IX-30 (NYS00146C)). The updated guidance in NSAC-202L-R3 did not change the document in any fundamental way from the previous version. See Entergy Testimony at 27 (A45)

(ENTR00029).

54 See id. at 28 (A48).

55 See Official Transcript of Proceedings, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3 at 1892:3-17 (Oct. 17, 2012) (Hiser) (Oct. 17, 2012 Tr.).

56 Applicants Motion for Summary Disposition of Riverkeeper Technical Contention 2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) (July 26, 2010) (Entergy Motion for Summary Disposition), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102140430.

57 See NRC Staffs Answer to Applicants Motion for Summary Disposition of Riverkeeper Technical Contention 2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) (Aug. 16, 2010), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102290354.

58 See Entergy Motion for Summary Disposition at 5 n.10.

59 See id. at 1-5; see also Entergys Answer to Riverkeeper Inc.s Motion to Compel Disclosure of Documents (Aug. 13, 2010), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102300146 (Entergys Answer to Riverkeeper Motion to Compel).

lacked a detailed AMP to manage the effects of FAC and that CHECWORKS lacked a track record of performance at IPEC.60 Entergy also maintained that since the SPUs in 2004 and 2005, the CHECWORKS model had been updated with inspection and testing data from several post-uprate outages.61 Those data from the post-uprate period indicated that the level of correlation between CHECWORKS predictions and measured wear values was consistent with industry and IPEC expectations and acceptable.62 Therefore, Entergy argued that 10 to 15 years of benchmarking is, as claimed by Dr. Hopenfeld, not necessary to rely upon CHECWORKS predictions.63 Entergy also cited the Boards finding in the Vermont Yankee proceeding (where Dr. Hopenfeld also was an expert witness) that Entergys fleet-wide FAC Program, which is implemented at IPEC, provides reasonable assuranceeven in the case of a much larger power uprate than Indian Points.64 Thus, the adequacy of Entergys FAC Program had already been found to be adequate.65

19. In its Opposition to Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition, Riverkeeper largely repeated the claims in its Petition.66 Once again, Riverkeeper asserted that CHECWORKS is generally inadequate to predict component wall-thickness in post-SPU 60 See Entergy Motion for Summary Disposition at 1-5.

61 See id. at 12.

62 See id. at 19-24 (citing Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee LLC & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-08-25, 68 NRC 763, 864-92 (2008)).

63 See id. at 19-22.

64 See id. at 20-21.

65 See id. at 16-17.

66 See generally Riverkeeper Opposition to Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition of Riverkeeper Technical Contention 2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) (Aug. 16, 2010), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102371214.

conditions at IPEC,67 and that Entergys FAC program lacked any other meaningful tools to select and schedule components for inspection.68

20. On November 4, 2010, the Board denied Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition. In so doing, the Board did not weigh the evidence or resolve factual disputes.69 While the Board noted that the NRC Staff also concluded that the IPEC FAC Program satisfied the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 54, and that the reasoning in the Vermont Yankee decision may ultimately be helpful in evaluating the merits of this contention, such evidence must be weighed at an evidentiary hearing.70 D. Motion to Compel
21. On August 3, 2010, while the Motion for Summary Disposition was pending, Riverkeeper filed a Motion to Compel, asking the Board to require Entergy to disclose certain documents purportedly relevant to RK-TC-2.71 Riverkeeper specifically sought the disclosure of CHECWORKS documentation for IP3 prior to 2001more than four years prior to the SPU at that unit.72
22. Entergy opposed the Motion to Compel on the grounds that Riverkeepers requests for additional historical documents were vague, irrelevant, overbroad, beyond the scope of this litigation, and unduly burdensome.73 Specifically, Entergy argued that RK-TC-2, as 67 See id. at 11.

68 See id. at 12-13.

69 See Licensing Board Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition of Riverkeeper TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) at 2 (Nov. 4, 2010) (Ruling on Motion for Summary Disposition) (unpublished).

70 See id. at 7-8 (referring to the Vermont Yankee Boards finding that the Entergy FAC program was adequate, and to Riverkeepers alleged distinctions between the Vermont Yankee and IPEC plants).

71 Riverkeeper, Inc. Motion to Compel Disclosure of Documents Relevant to Riverkeeper Contention TC-2 (Aug.

3, 2010), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102250183.

72 See id. at 6.

73 See Entergys Answer to Riverkeeper Motion to Compel.

proposed by Riverkeeper and as admitted by the Board, was specifically focused on the performance of CHECWORKS after the SPUs, which did not occur until 2004 for IP2 and 2005 for IP3.74 Entergy also pointed to the voluminous documentation relevant to RK-TC-2 that it had already produced as part of the mandatory disclosure process, which, as noted above, included thousands of pages of CHECWORKS documents and data from IP2 and IP3, from both before and after the SPUs at each unit.75 Entergy did not, however, concede that documents that pre-dated the SPUs were relevant to the admitted contention, which focused on whether CHECWORKS was performing adequately after the SPUs.76

23. The Board denied Riverkeepers Motion to Compel, because: (1) data generated during seven post-power uprate outages at IPEC were already available; and (2) Riverkeeper did not demonstrate how the potential value of the additional information it sought would outweigh the burden and expense of producing it.77 In its decision, the Board also questioned the relevance of historical data generated several years or more prior to the SPUs at IPEC, and how such information could impact Riverkeepers opinion regarding the adequacy of Energys AMP to address FAC after such uprates.78 E. Riverkeeper Pre-filed Written Testimony and Entergys Motion in Limine
24. In accordance with our scheduling orders, on December 22, 2011, Riverkeeper filed its initial statement of position, Dr. Hopenfelds direct testimony, his report, and supporting 74 See id. at 7.

75 See id. at 7-10.

76 See id.

77 See Licensing Board Order (Ruling on Riverkeepers Motion to Compel) at 4-5 (Nov. 4, 2010) (unpublished)

(Ruling on Motion to Compel).

78 See id. at 4.

exhibits.79 In brief, Riverkeeper and its expert, Dr. Hopenfeld, asserted that: (1) FAC is an erosion-corrosion process which can occur at variable rates and in localized portions of components;80 (2) the IPEC CHECWORKS data show that CHECWORKS does not accurately predict FAC wear rates and would require extended benchmarking at IPEC in order to be reliable;81 and (3) that there are no meaningful tools in Entergys FAC Program that are separate and apart from the allegedly unreliable CHECWORKS program.82 Based on these arguments, Riverkeeper and Dr. Hopenfeld concluded that the IPEC FAC Program is inadequate.83

25. On January 30, 2012, Entergy filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude portions of Riverkeepers direct testimony and exhibits raising four new issues that were not included in RK-TC-2, as pled and admitted.84 Entergy asserted that Riverkeepers new issues alleged that undetected FAC: (1) poses a risk of loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) and associated alleged deficiencies in the IPEC probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs); (2) could affect the integrity of components under seismic loads; (3) could affect the integrity of components under station blackout (SBO) loads; and (4) could affect the likelihood of 79 Riverkeeper Initial Statement of Position Regarding Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow Accelerated Corrosion) (Dec.

22, 2011) (RIV000002) (Riverkeeper Position Statement); Prefiled Written Testimony of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld Regarding Riverkeeper Contention Riverkeeper Contention TC Flow Accelerated Corrosion (Dec. 22, 2011) (Riverkeeper Testimony) (RIV000003); Report of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld in Support of Riverkeeper Contention RK-TC Flow Accelerated Corrosion (Sept. 7, 2012) (Hopenfeld Report)

(RIVR00005).

80 See Hopenfeld Report at 2-3 (RIVR00005).

81 See id. at 4-18.

82 See id. at 23.

83 See id. at 25-26; Riverkeeper Position Statement at 46 (RIV000002).

84 Entergys Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, Expert Report, Exhibits, and Statement of Position for Contention Riverkeeper TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) (Jan. 30, 2012),

available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12030A215.

components succumbing to the effects of metal fatigue.85 These issues were never raised in Riverkeepers original contentionwhich, as previously noted, focused on the adequacy of CHECWORKS at uprated power levelsand Entergy did not make any subsequent submissions that arguably would have allowed Riverkeeper to proffer new arguments.86 Entergy also argued that Riverkeeper had not shown that Dr. Hopenfeld had the requisite expertise to testify on these four new issues.87

26. The NRC Staff supported Entergys Motion in Limine, also objecting to these issues as newly-raised and because Riverkeeper had failed to demonstrate that Dr. Hopenfeld had special expertise in the area of PRA, seismic design, and SBO.88 Riverkeeper opposed Entergys motion, arguing that the originally-proffered contention explicitly raised the safety consequences of undetected FAC and that its testimony merely expanded on those alleged consequences.89
27. The Board denied the motion, stating that these four issues, while not central to Riverkeepers original claims, were relevant to whether FAC will be adequately managed during the PEO.90 85 See id. at 5-14.

86 See id. at 3-4 (citing Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-11, 71 NRC 287, 309 (2010) (holding that the contention pleading rules do not allow for the introduction of distinctly new complaints as litigation progresses, to stretch a contention beyond its reasonably inferred bounds).

87 See id. at 13-14.

88 See NRC Staffs Response in Support of Entergys Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Pre-Filed Direct Testimony, Expert Report, Exhibits, and Statement of Position for Contention Riverkeeper TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) at 5-7 (Feb. 9, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12040A348.

89 See Riverkeeper, Inc. Opposition to Entergys Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Pre-Filed Testimony, Expert Report, Exhibits, and Statement of Position for Contention Riverkeeper TC-2 (Flow Accelerated Corrosion) at 4-18 (Feb. 17, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12048B483.

90 See Board Order (Granting in Part and Denying in Part Applicants Motions in Limine) (Mar. 6, 2012)

(unpublished) (Ruling on Motions in Limine).

F. Entergy and NRC Staff Pre-filed Written Testimony

28. On March 28, 2012, Entergy filed its statement of position, the Testimony of Entergy Witnesses Ian D. Mew, Alan B. Cox, Nelson F. Azevedo, Jeffrey S. Horowitz, and Robert M. Aleksick, and supporting exhibits.91 In its testimony, Entergy explained that: (1)

FAC is a chemical corrosion process, distinct from other erosive phenomena, which typically affects components on the same lines at similar rates;92 (2) the CHECWORKS software adequately performs its intended screening and prioritization function to ensure that inspections are focused on the higher-susceptibility locations; and (3) CHECWORKS is only one portion of the IPEC FAC Program and is used in conjunction with other inspection selection tools, which together form a robust and multi-faceted FAC Program.93

29. On March 31, 2012, the NRC Staff filed its statement of position and the testimony of Matthew G. Yoder and Allen L. Hiser.94 The NRC Staff witnesses testified that the Staff had performed an extensive audit of the IPEC FAC Program as part of the SPU process, and again for purposes of license renewal.95 Mr. Yoder and Dr. Hiser concluded that: (1)

CHECWORKS is performing well at the new uprated levels,96 and (2) CHECWORKS is one of 91 See Entergy Statement of Position Regarding Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) (Mar. 28, 2012) (ENT000028); Testimony of Entergy Witnesses Ian D. Mew, Alan B. Cox, Nelson F. Azevedo, Jeffrey S. Horowitz, and Robert M. Aleksick Regarding Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) (Mar. 28, 2012) (ENT000029). On October 12, 2012, Entergy revised its testimony to make minor clerical corrections.

See Entergy Testimony (ENTR00029).

92 See id. at 29-33 (A49-54).

93 See id. at 21-23 (A36).

94 See NRC Staffs Statement of Position Regarding RK-TC2 (Mar. 31, 2012) (NRC000120); NRC Staff Testimony of Matthew G. Yoder and Allen L. Hiser, Jr. Concerning Riverkeeper Technical Contention RK-TC-2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (Mar. 31, 2012) (NRC000121). On October 17, 2012, the Staff revised these documents to make minor clerical corrections. See NRC Staffs Statement of Position Regarding RK-TC2 (Oct. 17, 2012) (NRCR00120); NRC Staff Testimony (NRCR00121).

95 See NRC Staff Testimony at 30-33 (A50-56) (NRCR00121).

96 See id.

multiple criteria used at IPEC to select inspection locations, and the various inspection selection tools work well together in the overall FAC Program.97 G. Riverkeeper Motion in Limine

30. On April 30, 2012, Riverkeeper filed a Motion in Limine to exclude portions of Entergys testimony that referred to certain historical data contained in the CHECWORKS software models used in the IPEC FAC Program.98 Riverkeeper alleged that Entergy failed to produce certain older CHECWORKS data, and then relied on those data to support its testimony.99
31. In opposition, Entergy stated that its testimony relied on documents which had been produced to Riverkeeper, in accordance with its disclosure obligations, many months before.100 Indeed, in the preparation of his direct testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld admittedly reviewed the same documents Entergy relied upon.101 Entergy also explained that the data referenced in its testimony were contained within the CHECWORKS model, and were fully available for review and analysis in the reports Entergy had disclosed to Riverkeeper.102 The NRC Staff also opposed Riverkeepers Motion in Limine because it lacked foundation.103 97 See id. at 36-37 (A70).

98 Riverkeeper, Inc. Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Pre-Filed Testimony and Statement Of Position Regarding RK-TC-2 (Flow Accelerated Corrosion) (Apr. 30, 2012) (Riverkeeper Motion in Limine),

available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12122A222.

99 See id. at 2-5.

100 See Entergys Answer Opposing Riverkeeper, Inc. Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Pre-Filed Testimony and Statement of Position Regarding RK-TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) at 5-6 (May 14, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12135A714 (Entergys Answer to Riverkeepers Motion in Limine).

101 See id. (citing Hopenfeld Report at 9 (RIVR00005)).

102 See id.

103 Riverkeeper Motion in Limine, Certification at 1.

32. The Board held Riverkeepers motion in abeyance pending further discussion of this issue at the hearing.104
33. At the October 2012 hearing, after obtaining further evidence on this matter from both parties, the Board denied the Motion in Limine.105 We hold that, contrary to Riverkeepers argument, Entergys testimony is based on documents that not only are in the record but were also previously disclosed to Riverkeeper and reviewed by its expert.106 There is no missing relevant data.107 On the contrary, the ultrasonic testing (UT) inspection data used today in the IPEC CHECWORKS models were appropriately disclosed to the Intervenors and appropriately relied upon by the applicant.108 Dr. Hopenfelds statements suggesting that it was too burdensome for him to review Entergys documents support our conclusion that Riverkeepers Motion in Limine lacks merit.109 We also deny Riverkeepers Motion in Limine because of Riverkeepers inadequate consultation, initiated late in the afternoon on the day the motion was filed.110 104 See Board Order (Denying New Yorks Motion in Limine and Holding Riverkeepers Motion in Limine in Abeyance) (June 1, 2012) (unpublished).

105 See Official Transcript of Proceedings, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3 at 2923:5-14 (Oct. 24, 2012) (Judge McDade).

106 Most pertinently, those documents are the 2010 and 2011 CHECWORKS model reports for IP2 and IP3, CHECWORKS SFA Model Calculations for IP3, No. 0705.100-01, Rev. 2, App. I (Aug. 2, 2011) (IP3 SFA Calculations) (ENT000051); CHECWORKS SFA Model Calculations for IP2, No. 0705.101-01, Rev. 2, App.

I (July 7, 2010) (IP2 SFA Calculations) (ENT000050).

107 See Official Transcript of Proceedings, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3 at 1775:1-8 (Oct. 16, 2012) (Aleksick) (Oct. 16, 2012 Tr.) (stating that component inspection results are contained within the model dating back to 1992 for IP2); Official Transcript of Proceedings, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3 at 1363:3-9 (Oct. 15, 2012) (Aleksick) (Oct. 15, 2012 Tr.).

108 See Entergy Testimony at 93-94 (A129) (ENTR00029).

109 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1726:24-1727:5, 1773:7-9, 1776:12-1777:16 (Hopenfeld) (stating that although he absolutely reviewed the CHECWORKS reports, he didnt delve into the possibility that there could be historical inspection data in the more recent reports); see also id. at 1777:11-12 (Hopenfeld) (stating that theres limited time that we can spend looking at every data point in the reports).

110 See Entergys Answer to Riverkeepers Motion in Limine at 3-4 (citing Licensing Board Memorandum and Order (Summarizing Pre-Hearing Conference) at 3 (Feb. 4, 2009) (unpublished) (voicing displeasure at prior minimal efforts by Riverkeeper to consult with the parties)).

H. Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony

34. On June 29, 2012, Riverkeeper filed its revised statement of position, the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, and supporting exhibits.111 In his rebuttal testimony, Dr.

Hopenfeld again asserted that there was a complete lack of correlation between CHECWORKS predictions and measured wear rates,112 and that Entergy had no intention of properly calibrating the model.113 Dr. Hopenfeld also testified that CHECWORKS fails to provide a bounding analysis for FAC at IPEC,114 and concluded that Entergy had relegated CHECWORKS to a secondary role in the FAC program,115 both allegedly contrary to the GALL Report. Finally, Dr. Hopenfeld reiterated his position that given the alleged deficiencies in CHECWORKS, the other inspection selection tools in the FAC Program were not adequate stand-alone tools.116 I. Other Prehearing Procedural Matters

35. On August 8, 2012, the State of New York (New York) filed a motion with respect to its seven Track 1 contentions,117 seeking to invoke its purported statutorily-granted cross-examination rights under Section 274(l) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C.

111 See Riverkeeper Revised Statement of Position Regarding Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow Accelerated Corrosion)

(June 29, 2012) (RIV000107); Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld Regarding Riverkeeper Contention TC Flow Accelerated Corrosion (June 29, 2012) (Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony)

(RIV000108).

112 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 26:9-11 (RIV000108).

113 Id. at 19:10-19.

114 See id. at 18:2-14.

115 See id. at 10:15-27.

116 See id. at 9:29-17:15.

117 Track 1 contentions consist of Riverkeeper TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion), NYS-12C (SAMA Analysis -

Decontamination Costs), NYS-16B (SAMA Analysis - Population Estimate), NYS-17B (Land Values), NYS-37 (Energy Alternatives), Clearwater EC-3A (Environmental Justice), NYS-5 (Buried Piping), NYS-6/7 (Non-EQ Cables), and NYS-8 (Transformers). Prior to the October 2012 hearings, the parties settled another Track 1 contention, Riverkeeper EC-3/Clearwater EC-1 (Spent Fuel Pool Leaks to Groundwater). The Board approved that settlement agreement on October 17, 2012. Licensing Board Consent Order (Approving Settlement of Consolidated Contention Riverkeeper EC-3 and Clearwater EC-1) (Oct. 17, 2012) (unpublished).

§ 2021(l).118 Specifically, New York claimed that as the host state to IPEC, Section 274(l) confers upon it expansive cross-examination rights that take precedence over the more restrictive cross-examination rights allowed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.315(c) and 2.1204(b)(3).119 New Yorks Motion did not apply to Riverkeepers contentions, including RK-TC-2, nor did Riverkeeper file a motion to cross-examine witnesses.

36. Both Entergy and the Staff opposed New Yorks Motion, stating that it lacked a legal basis,120 and arguing that New York mischaracterized as an absolute right what is actually a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.121
37. On August 29, 2012, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.1207(a)(3) and the Boards Scheduling Order, Entergy (and the other parties) submitted in camera proposed questions for the Board to consider asking to the other parties witnesses on Contention RK-TC-2.122
38. In an Order issued on September 21, 2012, the Board granted, in part, New Yorks request for cross-examination of witnesses during the evidentiary hearings.123 The Board concluded that New York had complied with 10 C.F.R. § 2.1204(b) by filing a motion for cross-examination and proposed examination questions before the August 29, 2012, deadline for those submittal.124 It thus ruled that during the hearing, New York could examine witnesses following 118 State of New York Motion to Implement Statutorily-Granted Cross-Examination Rights Under Atomic Energy Act § 274(l) at 1 (Aug. 8, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12221A483.

119 Id. at 15.

120 See Entergys Answer Opposing New York States Motion to Cross-Examine (Aug. 20, 2012) (Entergy Answer Opposing New York Motion), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12233A371; NRC Staffs Answer to State of New Yorks Motion to Implement Statutorily-Granted Cross-Examination Rights under Atomic Entergy Act § 274(l) (Aug. 20, 2012) (Staff Answer Opposing New York Motion), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12233A742.

121 See Entergy Answer Opposing New York Motion at 3-4; Staff Answer Opposing New York Motion at 9.

122 10 C.F.R. § 2.1207(a)(3)(iii).

123 Licensing Board Order (Order Granting, in part, New Yorks Motion for Cross Examination) at 7 (Sept. 21, 2012) (unpublished).

124 Id.

the Boards examination, as long as its questions were relevant, reasonable, and non-repetitive.125

39. The Board discussed its Order in a pre-hearing conference call in response to questions from the NRC Staff and Entergy.126 During that conference, Chairman McDade confirmed that New York would have the opportunity to examine witnesses on areas that the Board missed in its own witness examinations.127 He also stated that other parties would have a reasonable opportunity to interrogate witnesses on discrete issues through oral motions at the hearing if they made a sufficiently compelling request and avoided repetitive questions.128
40. Subsequently, on September 28, 2012, Entergy filed an emergency petition for interlocutory review of the Boards order with the Commission.129 Entergy requested, and was granted, expedited briefing on its petition.130 New York opposed Entergys petition131 and the Staff supported it.132
41. On October 12, 2012, the Commission issued an Order denying Entergys request for interlocutory review, noting that the Board has the responsibility in the first instance to 125 See id.

126 Official Transcript of Proceedings, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1 & 2 [sic2 & 3] at 1236:11 (Sept.

24, 2012) (Sept. 24, 2012 Tr.).

127 Id. at 1238:1-6.

128 Id. at 1239:21-23.

129 Entergys Emergency Petition for Interlocutory Review of Board Order Granting Cross-Examination to New York State and Request for Expedited Briefing (Sept. 28, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12272A363.

130 See id. at 1; Commission Order (Oct. 2, 2012) (unpublished).

131 State of New York Combined Opposition to Entergys Requests for Emergency Stay and Interlocutory Review of the Board Order Granting Limited Cross Examination (Oct. 1, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12275A327. Entergy replied in opposition to New Yorks answer. See Entergys Reply to New York States Opposition to Entergys Emergency Petition for Interlocutory Review (Oct. 8, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12282A002.

132 NRC Staffs Answer to Entergys Emergency Petition for Interlocutory Review, and Application for Stay, of the Boards Order of September 21, 2012 (Oct. 5, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12279A309.

oversee the development of an adequate case record.133 In so ruling, the Commission cited Chairman McDades assurances, made during the September 24, 2012 prehearing conference call, that the Board would prohibit open-ended, lengthy, repetitive, and immaterial cross-examination, and allow all parties a full and fair opportunity to request cross-examination.134 The Commission further stated its expectation that the Board would act on cross-examination requests fairly and evenhandedly, rigorously oversee any cross-examination it allows, and limit the cross-examination to supplemental and genuinely material inquiries, necessary to develop an adequate and fair record.135

42. During the hearing on contention RK-TC-2, the Board indicated that it would allow questioning of the witnesses by Riverkeeper, Entergy, and the NRC Staff.136 Entergy objected to examination of witnesses by any party, and requested that the Board close the record.

In support of its position, Entergy: (a) noted that Riverkeeper had not made, nor been required to make, the sort of showing contemplated by the Subpart L regulations, which was a circumstance that the Commission had found troubling; (b) argued that no sufficient constraints had been placed on examination by parties; (c) noted that the procedure, rather than constituting the rare occurrence contemplated by the Commission, was apparently being undertaken as the norm for these proceedings; and (d) argued that, with two full days of Board questioning, additional questioning by the parties was not truly necessary, as mandated by the Commission.137 In the 133 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), CLI-12-18, 76 NRC __, slip op. at 6 (Oct. 12, 2012).

134 Id. at 3-4.

135 Id. at 7.

136 Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1769:11-1771:19 (Judge McDade).

137 Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1794:11-1797:14 (Fagg).

alternative, Entergy requested reciprocal treatment; i.e., that it be afforded the same direct and cross-examination rights as the other parties.

43. The Board denied Entergys motion to preclude party examination of witnesses, stating any additional showing need not be articulated, and that the Board envisioned allowing Riverkeeper, then Entergy, and then the Staff brief opportunities to conduct limited interrogation of the witnesses.138 J. The October 15-17, 2012 Hearing
44. Four days before the hearing, Riverkeeper moved for leave to submit five new exhibits, including four technical articles on a range of subjects from the mechanism of erosion corrosion to the use of computational fluid dynamics to develop mass transfer coefficients for elbows, and one Entergy inspection report.139 Entergy objected to the introduction of these new exhibits as untimely and prejudicial, as Riverkeeper sought to introduce voluminous new technical documentsall of which were at least nine years oldinto evidence just four days before the hearing.140 The NRC Staff also opposed the admission of these exhibits as untimely and prejudicial due to their submission so close to the date of the hearing.141 At the hearing, the Board admitted the exhibits, as they had the potential to be discussed during the course of the evidentiary hearing.142 138 See id. at 1797:16-1798:8 (Judge McDade).

139 See Riverkeeper, Inc. Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits Concerning Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow Accelerated Corrosion) (Oct. 11, 2012) (Riverkeeper Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits),

available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12285A836.

140 See Entergys Answer Opposing Riverkeepers Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits Concerning Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow Accelerated Corrosion) at 1-2 (Oct. 12, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12286A404. Entergy also objected because of a lack of adequate consultation, as Riverkeepers motion sought to introduce one exhibit that it did not raise in consultations. See id. at 2 (referring to Entergy Ultrasonic Examination Report, IPEC00020853 (Apr. 3, 2003) (Entergy 2003 UT Report) (RIV000130)).

141 See Riverkeeper Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits, Certification at 1.

142 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1267:2-6 (Judge McDade); Licensing Board Order (Granting Riverkeepers Motion for Leave to File Additional Exhibits) at 2 (Oct. 15, 2012) (unpublished).

45. On October 15, 2012, the Board commenced the evidentiary hearing and admitted into evidence the testimony and exhibits offered by the parties.143 The Board held the hearing on this contention from October 15 through 17, 2012, at the DoubleTree Hotel in Tarrytown, New York. The Board conducted the hearing in accordance with the provisions of Subpart L to 10 C.F.R. Part 2.
46. The Board requested that the hearing begin with an initial presentation from Entergy witness Dr. Jeffrey Horowitz on how the CHECWORKS program works in general, including a discussion of its input parameters, the general mathematical analogues used in its calculations, the types of output data, and the calibration process.144 The presentation was not to include any discussion of how CHECWORKS is specifically implemented at IPEC.145
47. Riverkeeper requested an opportunity for Dr. Hopenfeld to make a responsive presentation.146 The Board granted that request, subject to the same constraints that applied to Entergys presentation.147 143 Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1268:21-1270:6 (Judge McDade). For contention RK-TC-2, the following exhibits were admitted: Entergy Exhibits ENTR90001, ENT00015A-B, ENT000028, ENTR00029, ENT000030 through ENT000089, and ENT000573; Riverkeeper Exhibits RIVR80001, RIV000002 through RIV000004, RIVR00005, RIV000006 , RIV000007, RIVR00008, RIV000009 through RIV000033, RIV000107 through RIV000112, RIV000127 through RIV000131; NRC Staff Exhibits NRCR50001, NRCR00120, NRCR00121, and NRC000122 through NRC000131. In addition, certain exhibits which were identified as relevant to other contentions were referenced by both parties in the testimony on this contention (e.g., the GALL Report, Rev. 1 (NYS00146A-C)). Finally, as explained below, on the third day of the hearing the Board admitted two additional Riverkeeper exhibits, RIV000132 and RIV000133.

144 See Licensing Board Order (Evidentiary Hearing Administrative Matters) at 2 (Sept. 14, 2012) (Sept. 14, 2012 Order) (unpublished); see also Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1279:1-6 (Judge McDade).

145 See Sept. 14, 2012 Order at 2; see also Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1279:7-11 (Judge McDade) (This has nothing to do with Indian Point itself or how it operates at Indian Point. What we want to do is to understand and make sure we properly understand what the [CHECWORKS] program is, how its supposed to work.).

146 See Sept. 24, 2012 Tr. at 1226:13-1227:1 (Brancato).

147 See id. at 1227:2-16 (Judge McDade); id. at 1279:18-23 (Judge McDade) (stating that Dr. Hopenfelds presentation is not going to be getting into specifics about how the program operates at Indian Point. Its only going to be an overview of the design of the program and how theoretically the program works or doesnt work).

48. The Entergy presentation made by Dr. Horowitz, with the assistance of Mr.

Robert Aleksick, satisfied the Boards request, in that it focused on how the CHECWORKS software functions in general, without focusing on IPEC in particular.148 Dr. Hopenfelds presentation, however, did not fully comply with the Boards direction, as he sought to address the use of CHECWORKS at IPEC.149 Nevertheless, the Board allowed Dr. Hopenfeld to make his presentation.

49. Following the presentations, the hearing continued for approximately two days, with questions from the Board and responses from the witnesses.150 The scope of the testimony and findings of the Board are described further in Section IV below.
50. At the beginning of the third day of hearings, Riverkeeper sought to introduce two new exhibits: (1) RIV000132, a FAC Program UT thickness inspection report from 2005 for a feedwater system pipe elbow at IP3; and (2) RIV000133, an inspection report from 2009 of a pipe reducer at IP2.151 Riverkeeper also sought to reference a third new exhibit for this contention, an inspection report from 2005 of a pipe elbow at IP3, RIV000049, which had previously been filed by Riverkeeper as part of the record of a different Riverkeeper contention on metal fatigue (NYS-26B/RK-TC-1B).152 Entergy again objected to the introduction of these new exhibits as prejudicial, noting that Riverkeeper had several opportunities to introduce these 148 See Horowitz Presentation (BRD000001); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1293:15-1314:10 (Horowitz and Aleksick).

149 See generally Hopenfeld Presentation (BRD000002); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1317:18-1337:23 (Hopenfeld); see also id. at 1319:14-17 (Judge McDade) (But what Id like you to do right now is to focus on the design of CHECWORKS, not the fact that it doesnt produce conservative results, but why you think it is defective as a program.). Entergy objected to the slides it believed did not comply with the Boards direction. See id. at 1314:20-1315:9 (Kuyler).

150 See generally Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1339:14; Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1843:23.

151 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1768:4-22 (Brancato); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1787:21-1788:6 (Brancato); Excerpt of IP3, RO13 FAC Inspection Report (2005) (IP3 RO13 FAC Inspection Report) (RIV000132); Excerpt of IP3, RO15 FAC Inspection Report (2009) (IP3 RO15 FAC Inspection Report) (RIV000133).

152 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1768:4-22 (Brancato); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1787:21-1788:6 (Brancato); Entergy Indian Point U3, FAC, 3RF13 Outage (2005) (IP3 Outage Inspection Report) (RIV000049).

documents into evidence, including in rebuttal testimony, but failed to do so until two and a half days into the hearing.153 The Board admitted the documents de bene, because these exhibits became relevant based on the oral testimony at hearing.154

51. Following witness examinations by lawyers for Riverkeeper, Entergy, and the NRC Staff, the hearing on RK-TC-2 was concluded on October 17, 2012.155
52. The parties jointly submitted proposed corrections to the hearing transcripts on December 5, 2012.156 The Board issued an Order on December 27, 2012, adopting the parties proposed transcript corrections with some minor revisions.157 In that Order, the Board stated that it would issue an order closing the evidentiary record for Track 1 contentions at a later date.158
53. On March 22, 2013, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the form of a proposed Initial Decision by the Board.

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL AND REGULATORY STANDARDS A. Scope of License Renewal Review Under 10 C.F.R. Part 54

54. In the context of license renewal, the Commission has specifically limited its safety review of LRAs to the matters specified in 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.21 and 54.29(a)(2), which focus on the aging management of certain systems, structures, and components.159 The Commissions license renewal regulations reflect the distinction between 10 C.F.R. Part 54 aging 153 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1788:13-1790:4 (Fagg).

154 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1790:5-1791:23 (Judge McDade).

155 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1892:21-23 (Judge McDade).

156 Letter from Counsel for Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Counsel for Riverkeeper, Inc., Counsel for the State of New York, Counsel for the NRC Staff, and Counsel for Hudson [River] Sloop Clearwater, Inc., to Lawrence G. McDade, Chairman, Dr. Michael F. Kennedy, and Dr. Richard Wardwell, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Dec. 5, 2012), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12340A546.

157 Licensing Board Order (Adopting Proposed Transcript Corrections with Minor Edits) (Dec. 27, 2012)

(unpublished).

158 Id. at 3.

159 See Fla. Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 7-8 (2001); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1& 2), CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358, 363 (2002).

management issues on the one hand, and ongoing 10 C.F.R. Part 50 regulatory process (e.g.,

security and emergency planning issues) on the other.160 The NRCs longstanding regulatory framework is premised upon the notion that, with the exception of aging management issues, the NRCs ongoing regulatory process is adequate to ensure that the current licensing basis (CLB) of an operating plant provides and maintains an acceptable level of safety.161

55. Consequently, the matters before the Board in this proceeding are limited to whether IP2 and IP3 can be safely operated in the PEO, that is, beyond the current expiration of the licenses in 2013 and 2015, respectively.162 Issues regarding the adequacy of the design, construction, and operation of the facility are, therefore, outside the scope of matters appropriately considered here.163 B. Reasonable Assurance Standard
56. For safety issues, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 54.29(a), the NRC will issue a renewed license if it finds that actions have been identified and have been or will be taken by the applicant, such that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed license will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB.
57. Longstanding Commission and judicial precedent makes clear that the reasonable assurance standard does not require an applicant to meet an absolute or beyond a reasonable doubt standard.164 Rather, the Commission evaluates an application on a case-by-case 160 Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC at 7.

161 See Final Rule, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal; Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 64, 943, 64,946 (Dec. 13, 1991).

162 Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC at 8.

163 In that regard, when the Commission issues an initial license, it makes a comprehensive determination that the design, construction, and proposed operation of the facility satisfied the Commissions requirements and provided reasonable assurance of adequate protection to the public health and safety and common defense and security. Final Rule, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal; Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,947.

164 AmerGen Energy Co. LLC (Oyster Creek Generating Station), CLI-09-7, 69 NRC 235, 263-64 (2009), affd sub nom. N.J. Envtl. Fedn v. NRC, 645 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2011); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, approach, applying sound technical judgment and verifying the applicants compliance with Commission regulations.165 A touchstone for determining whether the reasonable assurance standard is satisfied is compliance with Commission regulations.166

58. Commission precedent makes clear that the reasonable assurance standard does not require an applicant to show that aging effects are precluded.167 The regulatory requirement is to adequately manage aging effects.168 C. Demonstration of Reasonable Assurance Through Consistency with the GALL Report
59. The NRC Staff verifies compliance with the NRCs license renewal regulations through its comprehensive LRA review process, which includes, among other things, review of the LRA and final safety analysis report (FSAR) supplement, the issuance of RAIs, the conduct of onsite audits and inspections, and the preparation of a detailed safety evaluation report. To determine whether an LRA complies with Commission regulations, the NRC Staff reviews an LRA against the requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 54, as well as Staff guidance contained in NUREG-1800, Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants.169 Units 1 & 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 421 (1980); N. Anna Envtl. Coal. v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 667-68 (D.C.

Cir. 1976) (rejecting the argument that reasonable assurance requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt and noting that the licensing board equated reasonable assurance with a clear preponderance of the evidence).

165 See Oyster Creek, CLI-09-7, 69 NRC at 263; Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-14, 71 NRC 449, 465-66 (2010).

166 See Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Me. Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003, 1009 (1973).

167 See NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-12-05, 75 NRC __, slip op. at 17 (Mar. 8, 2012).

168 See id. (citation omitted).

169 NUREG-1800, Rev. 1, Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (Sept. 2005) (NUREG-1800) (NYS000195).

60. The GALL Report provides the technical basis for NUREG-1800 and identifies AMPs that the Staff has accepted as meeting the requirements of Part 54.170 For each AMP, the GALL Report describes 10 program elements that the Staff evaluates: (1) Scope of the Program; (2) Preventive Actions; (3) Parameters Monitored or Specified; (4) Detection of Aging Effects; (5) Monitoring and Trending; (6) Acceptance Criteria; (7) Corrective Actions; (8) Confirmation Process; (9) Administrative Controls; and (10) Operating Experience.171
61. As noted in the guidance, the GALL Report is treated in the same manner as an NRC-approved topical report that is generically applicable.172 Therefore, an applicant may reference the GALL Report in an LRA to demonstrate that its AMPs correspond to those that the NRC Staff previously reviewed and approved in the GALL Report.173 As the Staff has indicated, adherence to GALL Report guidance thus constitutes one acceptable way to manage aging effects for license renewal.174
62. The Commission confirmed this approach in Oyster Creek: a license renewal applicants use of an aging management program identified in the GALL Report constitutes reasonable assurance that it will manage the targeted aging effect during the renewal period.175 In Oyster Creek, the Commission expressly interpreted section 54.21(c)(1) to permit a demonstration [that the aging effects will be adequately managed for the PEO] after the issuance 170 See GALL Report, Rev. 1 at 1 (NYS00146A).

171 GALL Report, Rev. 2 at 6 (NYS00147A).

172 Id. at 8.

173 Id.

174 Id. Although the GALL Report is a guidance document, it is entitled to special weight in an adjudicatory proceeding. Seabrook, CLI-12-05, slip op. at 16 n.78 (quoting Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Indep. Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-22, 54 NRC 255, 264 (2001)).

175 See Oyster Creek, CLI-08-23, 68 NRC at 468 (emphasis added); see also Seabrook, CLI-12-05, slip op. at 18.

of a renewed license.176 Accordingly, as the Commission reiterated in Vermont Yankee, a commitment to implement an AMP that the NRC finds is consistent with the GALL Report constitutes one acceptable method for compliance with 10 C.F.R. § 54.21(c)(1)(iii).177

63. Adherence to the GALL Report constitutes an acceptable way to manage aging effects for license renewal,178 and it is, in fact, standard practice for an applicant to refer to information in the GALL Report. There is no need to repeat that same GALL information in the LRA.179
64. The Staffs evaluation of an applicants proposed AMPs against the AMPs described in the GALL Report is a long-standing, well-established process. The nearly 40 license renewal applications that have been submitted and approved since the issuance of the original GALL Report in July 2001 have been subject to the same review process.180 D. Burden of Proof
65. At the hearing stage, an intervenor has the initial burden of going forward; i.e.,

it must provide sufficient evidence to support the claims made in the admitted contention.181 176 Seabrook, CLI-12-05, slip op. at 18 (citing Oyster Creek, CLI-08-23, 68 NRC at 468) (emphasis in original)).

177 Vt. Yankee, LLC (Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-17, 72 NRC 1, 37 (2010); 10 C.F.R.

§ 54.21(a)(3), which governs aging management programs not associated with time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs) such as the FAC Program, contains substantially the same text as Section 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

Therefore, the Commissions holding in Oyster Creek applies to this contention.

178 See Vt. Yankee, CLI-10-17, 72 NRC at 37.

179 Id. at 37 n.204 (A license renewal application may reference the GALL Report to demonstrate that the applicants AMP corresponds to one that has been reviewed and approved in that Report.).

180 See Status of License Renewal Applications and Industry Activities, available at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html.

181 Oyster Creek, CLI-09-7, 69 NRC at 269 (quoting Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 345 (1973)) (The ultimate burden of proof on the question of whether the permit or license should be issued is . . . upon the applicant. But where . . . one of the other parties contends that, for a specific reason . . . the permit or license should be denied, that party has the burden of going forward with evidence to buttress that contention. Once he has introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the applicant who, as part of his overall burden of proof, must provide a sufficient rebuttal to satisfy the Board that it should reject the contention as a basis for denial of the permit or license.) (emphasis in original)); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 554 (1978)

(upholding this threshold test for intervenor participation in licensing proceedings); Phila. Elec. Co. (Limerick The mere admission of the contention does not satisfy that burden. Moreover, an intervenor cannot meet its burden by relying on unsupported allegations and speculation.182 Rather, it must introduce sufficient evidence during the hearing phase to establish a prima facie case.183 If it does so, then the burden shifts to the applicant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the intervenors contention.184

66. From an evidentiary standpoint, the applicants position must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.185 IV. FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS A. Witnesses and Evidence Presented
1. Entergys Expert Witnesses
67. Entergy presented testimony by a panel of five witnesses on this contention: Mr.

Ian D. Mew, Mr. Alan B. Cox, Mr. Nelson F. Azevedo, Dr. Jeffrey S. Horowitz, and Mr. Robert M. Aleksick. Entergys witnesses submitted pre-filed written testimony and gave oral testimony at the hearing.186 Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-262, 1 NRC 163, 191 (1975) (holding that the intervenors had the burden of introducing evidence to demonstrate that the basis for their contention was more than theoretical).

182 See Oyster Creek, CLI-09-7, 69 NRC at 268-70; see also Phila. Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-857, 25 NRC 7, 13 (1987) (stating that an intervenor may not merely assert a need for more current information without having raised any questions concerning the accuracy of the applicants submitted facts).

183 See Oyster Creek, CLI-9-07, 69 NRC at 268-70.

184 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.325; La. Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1093 (1983) (citing Midland, ALAB-123, 6 AEC at 345).

185 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571, 577 (1984) (In order to prevail . . . , the applicants position must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.). A preponderance of the evidence requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

186 See generally Entergy Testimony (ENTR00029).

68. Mr. Ian Mew is employed by Entergy as a Senior Engineer in Programs and Components Engineering at IPEC.187 He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the Polytechnic Institute of New York and has more than 30 years of experience in the nuclear power industry.188 For the last 16 years, Mr. Mew has been directly involved in FAC and steam generator program development and related inspections.189 As the FAC program owner, Mr. Mew has extensive experience with the implementation of the FAC AMP at IPEC, including the CHECWORKS software.190 His testimony focuses on the Entergy fleet-wide FAC Program, as set forth in EN-DC-315, Rev. 6191 and its implementation at IPEC.
69. Mr. Alan Cox is the Technical Manager for License Renewal at Entergy.192 He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Oklahoma and a Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.) from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.193 Mr. Cox has more than 34 years of experience in the nuclear power industry, having served in various positions related to engineering and operations of nuclear power plants. He has held NRC-issued licenses for reactor operator and senior reactor operator.194 Since 2001, he has worked full-time on license renewal matters, supporting the integrated plant assessment and 187 Mr. Mews professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (ENT000030) and summarized in his testimony. See Entergy Testimony at 1-3 (A2-4) (ENTR00029); Curriculum Vitae for Ian D. Mew (ENT000030).

188 See Entergy Testimony at 1-2 (A3) (ENTR00029).

189 See id. at 2 (A4).

190 See id. at 2-3 (A4).

191 Entergy, EN-DC-315, Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program, Rev. 6, at 6 (Mar. 1, 2010) (EN-DC-315)

(ENT000038).

192 Mr. Coxs professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (ENT000031) and summarized in his testimony. See Entergy Testimony at 4-5 (A5-7) (ENTR00029); Curriculum Vitae for Alan B. Cox (ENT000031).

193 See Entergy Testimony at 4 (A7) (ENTR00029).

194 See id.

LRA development for Entergy license renewal projects, as well as projects for other utilities.195 Mr. Cox was directly involved in preparing the LRA and developing or reviewing AMP descriptions for IP2 and IP3, including the FAC Program.196 He also has been directly involved in developing or reviewing Entergy responses to NRC Staff RAIs concerning the LRA and necessary amendments or revisions to the application.197

70. Mr. Nelson Azevedo is employed by Entergy as the Supervisor of Code Programs at Indian Point Energy Center.198 He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical and materials engineering from the University of Connecticut, a Master of Science in mechanical engineering and an M.B.A. from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York.199 Mr.

Azevedo has 30 years of professional experience in the nuclear power industry.200 In his current position, he oversees the IPEC engineering section responsible for implementing American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code programs, including the FAC Program.201 As Supervisor of Code Programs, he has been responsible for FAC-related issues at IPEC since January 2001.202

71. Dr. Jeffrey Horowitz is an independent consultant with more than 40 years of experience in the field of nuclear energy and related disciplines, and over 25 years of 195 See id.

196 See id. at 5 (A8).

197 See id.

198 Mr. Azevedos professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (ENT000032) and summarized in his testimony. See id. at 5-7 (A10-12); Curriculum Vitae for Nelson F. Azevedo (ENT000032).

199 See Entergy Testimony at 6 (A11) (ENTR00029).

200 See id.

201 See id. at 7 (A11).

202 See id. at 7 (A12).

specialization in FAC and nuclear safety analysis.203 Dr. Horowitz holds four degrees in mechanical engineering, including a doctor of science degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.204 He was the co-developer of the computer program CHEC (Chexal-Horowitz Erosion Corrosion) and demonstrated and released it to U.S. utilities in 1987.205 Later, he led the development of new and revised CHEC-related codesCHECMATE and, ultimately, CHECWORKS (Chexal-Horowitz Engineering Corrosion Workstation)which expanded on CHECs capabilities.206 Dr. Horowitz also played a key role in drafting NSAC-202L, and its subsequent revisions.207 This NRC-approved guidance document is relied upon by Entergy at IPEC and by utilities throughout the U.S. nuclear industry.208 Dr. Horowitz also is familiar with the FAC Program as implemented at IPEC, based on an audit of the IPEC FAC Program he conducted in March 2012.209 In sum, Dr. Horowitz possesses extensive knowledge of the CHECWORKS model and has vast experience assessing and auditing FAC Programs at IPEC and at industry facilities in general.210

72. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Robert Aleksick was the President and founder of CSI Technologies, Inc., which specialized in FAC services and software development.211 He has 203 Dr. Horowitzs professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (ENT000033) and summarized in his testimony. See id. at 7-13 (A14-19) (ENTR00029); Curriculum Vitae for Jeffrey S.

Horowitz (ENT000033).

204 See Entergy Testimony at 8 (A15) (ENTR00029).

205 See id. at 9 (A17).

206 See id. at 9-10 (A17).

207 See id. at 10-11 (A18).

208 See id. (citing GALL Report, Rev. 1 at XI M-61 (NRC00146C)).

209 See id. at 8 (A16) (citing J. Horowitz, ScD, Independent Review of the Indian Point Energy Center Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (Mar. 22, 2012) (ENT000034)).

210 See id. at 8-12 (A16-18).

211 Mr. Aleksicks professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (ENT000037) and summarized in his testimony. See id. at 13-15 (A21-23); Curriculum Vitae for Robert M. Aleksick assisted IPEC and other plants with numerous FAC-related projects for nearly two decades.212 Mr. Aleksick has worked on or managed nearly 1000 FAC-related projects at over 100 nuclear units.213 His clients include EPRI, INPO, and approximately 75% of U.S. nuclear power plants.214 Mr. Aleksick has managed the CHECWORKS model and prepared other key FAC Program documents at IPEC since 1992.215 Accordingly, he has direct knowledge of the Entergy FAC Program as implemented at IPEC.

73. In pre-filed rebuttal testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld criticized the testimony of Dr.

Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick, alleging that they had a financial interest in the continued use of CHECWORKS at IPEC.216 There is, however, no evidence in the record that would justify such a criticism. Further, the value of a witness testimony is not undermined merely by the fact that the witness is a consultant of a licensee.217 Allegations of bias require substantial evidentiary support,218 which has not been offered by Riverkeeper. We conclude that Riverkeeper has provided no reason for us to question the validity of Entergys expert witness testimony on the basis of any witnesses financial interest.

74. Based on the foregoing, and the respective backgrounds and experience of Entergys witnesses, the Board finds that all of Entergys witnesses are qualified to testify as expert witnesses relative to the issues raised in Contention RK-TC-2.

(ENT000037). As of January 1, 2013, CSI Technologies has merged with Altran Technologies. Mr. Aleksick is now the Executive Director of Nuclear for North America at Altran.

212 See Entergy Testimony at 13-14 (A22) (ENTR00029).

213 See id.

214 See id.

215 See id. at 14 (A23).

216 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 9:16-20 (RIV000108).

217 Metro. Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1211 (1984), revd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

218 See id.

2. NRC Staffs Expert Witnesses
75. The NRC Staff presented testimony by two witnesses on this contention: Mr.

Matthew G. Yoder and Dr. Alan L. Hiser. Mr. Yoder and Dr. Hiser submitted pre-filed written testimony and gave oral testimony at the hearing.219

76. Mr. Matthew Yoder is employed as a Senior Chemical Engineer in the Steam Generator Tube Integrity and Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC, in Washington, D.C.220 He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemical Engineering from Florida State University.221 His responsibilities include the technical, safety, and regulatory compliance reviews of a variety of chemistry and chemical engineering topics, including FAC Programs for applicants for license renewals and power uprates.222 The results of his reviews are documented in safety evaluations which represent the NRCs position.
77. Dr. Allen Hiser is employed as the Senior Technical Advisor for License Renewal Aging Management in the Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC, in Washington, D.C.223 He holds a Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland at College Park and a Ph.D. in Materials Science and Engineering from Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.224 Dr. Hiser has been employed at the NRC for 22 years in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and 219 See generally NRC Staff Testimony (NRCR00121).

220 Mr. Yoders professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (NRC000122) and summarized in his testimony. See NRC Staff Testimony at 1-3 (A1-3) (NRCR00121); Matthew Yoder Statement of Professional Qualifications (NRC000122).

221 See NRC Staff Testimony at 1 (A1) (NRCR00121).

222 See id. at 2-3 (A2-3).

223 Dr. Hisers professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (NRC000103) and summarized in his testimony. See id. at 1-3 (A1-3) (NRCR00121); Allen Hiser Statement of Professional Qualifications (NRC000103).

224 See NRC Staff Testimony at 1 (A1) (NRCR00121).

the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.225 His responsibilities include serving as a lead technical expert for aging management evaluation and assisting other NRC Staff as they review license renewal applications.226

78. Based on the foregoing, and the respective backgrounds and experience of the NRC Staffs witnesses, the Board finds that Mr. Yoder and Dr. Hiser are qualified to testify as expert witnesses relative to the issues raised in Contention RK-TC-2.
3. Riverkeepers Witness
79. Riverkeeper presented one witness on this contention, Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, the CEO of Noverflo, Inc., who submitted pre-filed written direct and rebuttal testimony and gave oral testimony at the hearing.227 Dr. Hopenfeld holds a Ph.D in Engineering from the University of California at Los Angeles.228 He was employed by the NRC for 18 years, from 1982 to 2001.229 He currently consults with law firms and citizen groups regarding steam generators, thermal hydraulics, corrosion, and metal fatigue in license renewal and power uprate proceedings.230
80. The Board has previously found that Dr. Hopenfeld is qualified to testify as an expert witnesses relative to the issues raised in Contention RK-TC-2.231 Nevertheless, as further discussed throughout this decision, Dr. Hopenfelds CV, as well as his direct, rebuttal, and oral 225 See id. at 2 (A2).

226 See id. at 2-3 (A2-3).

227 See generally Riverkeeper Testimony (RIV000003); Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony (RIV000108).

228 Dr. Hopenfelds professional qualifications are provided in his statement of qualifications (ENT000032) and summarized in his testimony. See Riverkeeper Testimony at 1:6-14 (RIV000003); Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 4:11-8:16 (RIV000108); Curriculum Vitae of Joram Hopenfeld (Dr. Hopenfelds CV) at 3 (Dec. 22, 2011) (RIV000004).

229 See Dr. Hopenfelds CV at 3 (RIV000004).

230 See id. at 2.

231 See Ruling on Motion for Summary Disposition at 6.

testimony, indicate that he has limited direct experience with the management of the effects of aging due to FAC at nuclear power plants such as IPEC.232 Moreover, Dr. Hopenfeld admitted at the hearing that he had only conducted a limited review of the FAC Program documents provided by Entergy to Riverkeeper through the disclosure process.233 Finally, as discussed below, Dr. Hopenfelds testimony in this proceeding contains certain inconsistencies with the testimony he offered in the Vermont Yankee license renewal FAC contention hearing.234 Therefore, the Board accords limited weight to Dr. Hopenfelds testimony, particularly in instances where it conflicts with other record evidence.

B. Technical Background on FAC

1. FAC Is a Chemical Corrosion Phenomenon
81. At the outset, there is disagreement among the parties regarding the definition of FAC and, therefore, the proper scope of the FAC Program. We now address this threshold issue.
82. Consistent with the standard industry guidance in NSAC-202L-R3, Entergys witnesses, Dr. Horowitz, Mr. Aleksick and Mr. Mew, define FAC as the [d]egradation and consequent wall thinning of a component by a dissolution phenomenon, which is affected by variables such as temperature, steam quality, steam/fluid velocity, water chemistry, component 232 See generally Dr. Hopenfelds CV (RIV000004).

233 See, e.g., Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1777:11-12 (Hopenfeld) (stating that theres limited time that we can spend looking at every data point in the IPEC CHECWORKS reports).

234 Compare, e.g., Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 888 (discussing Dr. Hopenfelds claim that the applicant should abandon the CHECWORKS software and rely instead on a dedicated FAC engineer) with Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 16:15-17:15 (RIV000108) (arguing that Entergy relies far too much on the subjective judgment of the FAC engineer).

material composition and component geometry.235 The NRC Staffs witnesses, Dr. Hiser and Mr. Yoder, concur with this standard definition.236

83. Although in the past FAC has been referred to as erosion-corrosion,237 the standard definition of FAC is that it is a chemical corrosion phenomenon, distinct from other mechanical or erosive phenomena that may cause pipe wall thinning, such as cavitation, liquid droplet impingement, and solid particle erosion.238 For FAC-susceptible systems such as the condensate, feedwater, extraction steam, and major drain systems, FAC is by far the predominant degradation mechanism.239
84. Therefore, as understood throughout the industry, including Entergy, and by the NRC Staff, FAC is defined and managed as a chemical corrosion process and is not an erosive phenomenon.
85. In contrast, Dr. Hopenfeld argues that FAC should also include wall thinning caused by phenomena such as cavitation, wet steam, galvanic corrosion, and jet impingement/erosion.240 As a result, he states that CHECWORKS generally fails to meet the 235 Entergy Testimony at 29 (A49) (ENTR00029) (citing EN-DC-315 at 6 (ENT000038)); see also NSAC-202L-R3 at v, 1-2 (RIV000012) (proving a similar definition); see also Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1438:9-10 (Aleksick)

(Flow-accelerated corrosion is a pure corrosion process.).

236 See NRC Staff Testimony at 7-8 (A9) (NRCR00121) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at v (RIV000012)); see also Oct.

16, 2012 Tr. at 1701:20-21, 1702:1-2 (Hiser) ([W]e consider [FAC] to be the chemical dissolution process. . .

. FAC is not [] erosion forces. Its not mechanical wall thinning.).

237 See Entergy Testimony at 29-30 (A49) (ENTR00029); NRC Staff Testimony at 10-13 (A13-17) (NRCR00121)

(citing Generic Letter 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning (May 2, 1989) (ENT000042)).

238 See Entergy Testimony at 29-30 (A49) (ENTR00029) (citing B. Chexal, et al., Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants, Rev. 1 at 2-1 to -8 (1998) (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants) (ENT00036A)).

Cavitation is the repeated growth and collapse of bubbles because of local pressure fluctuations. See Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants at 2-8 (ENT00036A).

239 See Entergy Testimony at 29-30 (A49) (ENTR00029) (citing Frank Ammirato, Status of NDE Research in the U.S.Contributions of NDE to Reactor Safety and Implementation of NDE Technology at 3 (May 1999)

(Status of NDE Research) (ENT000039)).

240 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 29:3-12 (RIV000108); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1435:22-1437:15 (Hopenfeld)

(discussing impingement corrosion and cavitation only).

guidance of the GALL Report because it does not ensure that all forms of FAC (as he defines FAC) will be adequately managed.241

86. In response, Dr. Horowitz, Mr. Aleksick and Mr. Mew testified that, even considering such an expansive definition of FAC, the IPEC FAC Program appropriately accounts for other mechanisms that may induce wear in FAC-susceptible systems.242 Of the phenomena identified by Dr. Hopenfeld, cavitation rarely occurs in FAC-susceptible systems, but when it is identified, it is addressed as a design issue, not an aging management issue, and is therefore corrected when it is found.243 For the remaining erosive mechanisms, Mr. Aleksick and Mr. Azevedo testified for Entergy that while they are not considered FAC, to the extent other mechanisms are significant for particular components and are not corrected immediately, they are managed in the IPEC FAC Program, through direct wall-thickness measurements.244 As Mr.

Aleksick and Mr. Azevedo explained, this can be done because the wall-thickness measurements taken under the FAC Program will detect degradation regardless of the cause (i.e., whether caused by erosion or corrosion), and these measurements are then trended to predict future wall thicknesses.245 241 Hopenfeld Report at 19:14-21 (RIVR00005).

242 See, e.g., Entergy Testimony at 29-30 (A49), 31-32 (A51-52) (ENTR00029).

243 See id. at 32 (A51) (citing EPRI, Non-Class 1 Mechanical Implementation Guideline and Mechanical Tools, Rev. 4 at 3-7 (Jan. 2006) (NYS00320A)); see also Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 860, 864 (reaching the same conclusion).

244 See Entergy Testimony at 61 (A89) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1438:4-1440:25 (Aleksick, Azevedo);

Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1711:16-1712:4 (Azevedo) (stating that instances of erosion have been detected in the IPEC auxiliary feedwater system, and that as a result, Entergy performs inspections on that system that are tracked in the FAC Program).

245 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1438:4-1440:25 (Aleksick, Azevedo), 1445:1-1446:3 (Aleksick); see also id. at 1444:10-11 (Hopenfeld).

87. In addition, the CHECWORKS calibration process, which, as explained in Sections IV.E.1 and IV.E.2, below, compares predicted and actual measured wall thicknesses, also can account for potential wall-thinning due to other mechanisms.246
88. On these points, Dr. Hopenfeld acknowledged at the oral hearing that pipe wall thickness measurements and inspections do not distinguish between particular wall-thinning mechanisms.247
89. Also on this topic, the NRC Staff issued draft Interim Staff Guidance (Draft ISG) in July 2012, proposing to revise the GALL Report description of the FAC Program.248 The primary purpose of this Draft ISG is to explicitly recognize that the FAC program can be used to address wall thinning due to other mechanisms, and to provide guidance for how that can be done.249 The Draft ISG specifies that, if there is operating experience showing that another mechanism is a contributor to wear in FAC-susceptible components at a plant, then the program could appropriately account for the potential effects through program inspections (i.e., not through CHECWORKS).250 According to NRC Staff witness Dr. Hiser, the Draft ISG does not propose to broaden the definition of FAC to include other wall-thinning mechanisms.251 246 See id. at 1445:1-1446:3 (Aleksick) (agreeing with the statement that the CHECWORKS calibration process by necessity looks at whatever is thinning the pipe, not just corrosion if something else was taking place).

247 See id. at 1444:10-11 (Hopenfeld) (The probe doesn't know [what caused the degradation]. It just measures whatever [the wall-thickness] is.).

248 Letter from Brian E. Holian, Director, NRC, to Jason Remer, Nuclear Energy Institute, Draft License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance, LR-ISG-2012-01, Wall Thinning Due to Erosion Mechanisms (July 5, 2012) (Draft ISG) (ENT000573).

249 Id., Attach. at 1 (ENT000573) (stating that the purpose of this guidance is to provide an acceptable approach to manage the effects of aging during the period of extended operation for wall thinning due to various erosion mechanisms for piping and components within the scope of the License Renewal Rule.).

250 See id. Attach. at 3-4.

251 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1702:5-6 (Hiser). Instead, the Draft ISG is a permissive guidance document that merely would allow licensees to modify or expand the scope of their FAC Programs to address these other mechanisms as well. See id.; see also id. at 1708:22-1709:3 (Yoder). The Staff still expects that most erosion mechanisms can be addressed through design changes, rather than aging management. See id. at 1702:19-22, 1705:7-11 (Hiser).

Entergys experts, Mr. Azevedo, Mr. Aleksick, and Mr. Cox, confirmed that, when necessary, the IPEC FAC Program manages wall thinning due to other mechanisms, consistent with the Draft ISG.252

90. Based on the foregoing evidence and testimony, we conclude that the IPEC FAC Program is appropriately focused on addressing the most significant aging mechanism that affects FAC-susceptible systems, which is the chemical corrosion phenomenon of FAC.

Nevertheless, through operating experience, wall thickness measurements, and the CHECWORKS calibration process, the IPEC FAC Program can and does address the effects of aging due to other wall-thinning phenomena in secondary plant systems, when such aging effects require management.253 Therefore, we disagree with Dr. Hopenfeld that the industry definition of FAC must be broadened and the FAC Program modified to address the various other wall thinning mechanisms he identifies.

2. FAC and Other Degradation Mechanisms Do Not Occur Simultaneously
91. As previously noted, Entergy witnesses Dr. Horowitz, Mr. Aleksick and Mr. Mew testified that FAC is the predominant degradation mechanism for FAC-susceptible systems.254 Other degradation mechanisms are rarely, if ever, active in piping systems when FAC is occurring.255 In addition, FAC and other degradation mechanisms do not normally occur 252 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1438:15-1440:25 (Aleksick, Azevedo) (stating that through operating experience and engineering judgment the FAC program addresses other degradation mechanisms like impingement or cavitation); id. at 1445:1-1446:3 (Aleksick) (agreeing that if erosion were taking place, Entergys wall measurements would detect that degradation and the model would account for it regardless of its cause); Oct.

16, 2012 Tr. at 1709:12-1710:2 (Cox) (describing how the IPEC FAC Program has addressed mechanisms like droplet impingement).

253 See also Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 864 (reaching a similar conclusion).

254 See Entergy Testimony at 29-30 (A49) (ENTR00029) (citing Status of NDE Research at 3 (ENT000039)).

255 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1438:15-18 (Aleksick).

simultaneously at the same specific location, because of the nature of the FAC process.256 The Staff concurred that FAC and other degradation processes do not occur simultaneously.257

92. In response to this point, at the hearing, Dr. Hopenfeld referenced a paper by Dr.

Digby MacDonald,258 which allegedly suggests that, in systems where there is very high turbulence, erosion and corrosion can occur simultaneously.259 Dr. Horowitz responded for Entergy, explaining that Dr. MacDonalds discussion of erosion was based on the assumption that the flow reaches a critical velocity.260 This critical velocity does not occur under actual plant conditions at IPEC.261 Dr. Hopenfeld did not refute this point.262

93. The Staffs witness, Dr. Hiser, further explained that even if erosion did occur in piping covered by the IPEC FAC Program, it would be highly localized.263 As a result it would not cause degradation that would challenge the functionality of the components at issue, because it would result in smaller, localized leaks.264 FAC degradation, on the other hand, can impact a broader surface area and thereby challenge component functionality.265 Similarly, Mr. Cox testified for Entergy that because erosion mechanisms are more localized, if they did somehow 256 See Entergy Testimony at 32 (A52) (citing Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants at 2-2 (ENT00036A));

see also Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1441:15-18 (Horowitz) (The reason [erosion and corrosion do not occur simultaneously] is for the corrosion you need an oxide layer. And the erosion tends to destroy the oxide with everything else.).

257 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1707:21-25 (Yoder) ([W]e dont believe that you have flow-accelerated corrosion as well as these what we termed local effects such as erosion or droplet impingement occurring in the same location.).

258 See Digby D. Macdonald, The Point Defect Model for the Passive State, J. of the Electrochemical Society, Vol.

139, Issue No. 12 (Dec. 1992) (RIV000127).

259 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1443:7-11 (Hopenfeld).

260 See id. at 1444:16-21 (Horowitz).

261 See id. Moreover, as described above, the IPEC FAC Program would in any event account for and address degradation caused by such a phenomenon.

262 See id. at 1447 (Hopenfeld).

263 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1706:23-1707:7 (Hiser).

264 See id.

265 See id.

go undetected, they would result in a leak, rather than a catastrophic failure.266 Dr. Horowitz also testified that, to his knowledge, operating experience shows that there have been no significant failures due to erosion in FAC-susceptible systems.267

94. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Board concludes that the high-turbulence conditions that might be argued to cause erosion and corrosion to occur simultaneously are not present at IPEC. The Board further concludes that to the extent erosion may impact FAC-susceptible systems at IPEC, its effects are likely to result in smaller leaks that would not challenge the functionality of the affected components.
3. Under Constant Operating Conditions, the Rate of Degradation Due to FAC Is Constant With Time
95. Dr. Hopenfeld next asserts that FAC can occur at a non-linear rate.268 As a result, he alleges that IPECs use of CHECWORKS and trending within the FAC Program are deficient because they rely on the principle of linearity in the progression of FAC under constant operating conditions.269
96. In contrast, Entergys witnesses, Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick, testified that there is considerable research and other evidence to indicate that under constant operating conditions and water chemistry, the rate of FAC is essentially constant over time.270 Based on 266 See id at 1710:18-1711:10 (Cox); see also Entergy Testimony at 32 (A52) (citing Steve Gosselin, Pac. Nw.

Natl Lab., Fatigue in Operating Nuclear Power Plants Components After 60 Years at 3 (Feb. 2008)

(ENT000040)).

267 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1710:12-15 (Horowitz) (There has not been to my knowledge any significant erosion failures such as Surry, such as Mihama, such as whatever, as long as Ive gone back and looked.).

268 Hopenfeld Report at 2 (RIVR00005); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1421:17-25 (Hopenfeld) (stating that he has not seen any data suggesting that the rate of FAC is linear with time).

269 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 14:1-15 (RIV000108) (regarding trending); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1539:17-1540:24 (Hopenfeld) (regarding CHECWORKS).

270 See Entergy Testimony at 33 (A53) (ENTR00029) (citing Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants at B-3 to B-4 (ENT00036B) (detailing the ample laboratory testing and field experience that demonstrate that the rate of FAC is constant)); see also Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 892 (FAC wear rates are constant with time, since the variation in wear rates with roughness is small and, given the existing age of the piping, further this evidence, the CHECWORKS software relies upon this principle of linearity.271 In addition, the trending of data under the FAC Program also relies upon this principle.272

97. While operating conditions at IPEC are generally constant, to address potential changes, Mr. Aleksick testified that the inputs to CHECWORKS are routinely updated and maintained by FAC Program engineers.273 When modifications to plant operating conditions (e.g., due to a power uprate or a design change) are made, FAC Program engineers address those changes.274
98. In support of his hypothesis of non-linearity, Dr. Hopenfeld referred to a recent paper describing the BRT-CICERO software, which is used in France rather than CHECWORKS.275
99. As Dr. Horowitz explained, however, the French BRT-CICERO software is, in fact, based on laboratory data showing that FAC progresses at a constant rate under constant surface changes are likely to be minimal.); see also Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1423:3-4 (Aleksick) ([U]nder constant operating and chemistry conditions FAC rates are linear.).

271 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1805:5-23, 1882:8-10 (Horowitz) (stating that both CHECWORKS and the analogous French BRT-CICERO software are based on a linear assumption).

272 See Entergy Testimony at 54-55 (A80) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1350:24-1351:11 (Azevedo)

(describing the trending process).

273 See Entergy Testimony at 62 (A90) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1429:17-22 (Aleksick); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1747:1-13 (Aleksick) (stating that new temperatures, flow rates, and pH changes were incorporated into CHECWORKS at the time of the IPEC SPUs).

274 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1429:17-1430:6 (Aleksick) (noting that FAC Program engineers maintain awareness of the . . . state of the plant and that makes the appropriate determinations on how [those changes] might affect the wear rates.).

275 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1549:2-10 (Hopenfeld) (When I read the French articles . . . the velocity independent was not a straightforward Reynolds type of an equation. . . . At some places, the velocity was to the cube . . .)

(referring to Stephane Trevin and Marie-Pierre Moutrille, Optimization of EDFs NPPs Maintenance Due to Flow Accelerated Corrosion and BRT-CICERO improvement by NDT Results Analysis (Apr. 2012) (BRT-CICERO Paper) (RIV000110)). Entergy understands that these statements reflect Dr. Hopenfelds opinion, based on the BRT-CICERO Paper, that the rate of wear due to FAC can increase over time in a non-linear fashion.

operating conditions.276 Thus, the BRT-CICERO Paper does not support Dr. Hopenfelds hypothesis that CHECWORKS and the FAC program are deficient because they assume a constant rate of FAC.277 100. Likewise, Mr. Aleksick testified at the hearing that, in his 23 years of experience reviewing and managing FAC programs at nuclear power plants, the rate of FAC at constant operating conditions is generally constant with time.278 He testified that his review of the CHECWORKS data at IPEC, based on approximately 3700 inspections of the thickness of CHECWORKS-modeled components, shows that FAC has generally proceeded at a constant rate.279 101. With the exception of the additional exhibits discussed in Section IV.B.5 (and which do not support his contentions for the reasons described further below), Dr. Hopenfeld offered no other evidence to support his assertions that the rate of FAC is non-linear.280 We find Dr. Hopenfelds theory of non-linearity, including his criticisms of CHECWORKS on this point, to be unsupported by the record.281 Instead, the considerable contrary evidence presented by Entergy shows that under constant operating conditions, the rate of FAC is constant with time.

276 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1882:8-21 (Horowitz) (citing Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants at 7-6 (ENT00036B) (describing the French data as follows: The thinning is directly proportional to time, as evidenced by comparing results of laboratory tests of 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> duration with plant results after 60,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation.)).

277 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1882:8-21 (Horowitz).

278 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1431:1-5 (Aleksick).

279 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1766:18-23 (Aleksick); see also Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1837:15-23 (Azevedo) (stating that there is no technical basis for the hypothesis of non-linearity as it is not consistent with the data we have).

280 See Entergy 2003 UT Report (RIV000130); IP3 RO13 FAC Inspection Report (RIV000132); IP3 RO15 FAC Inspection Report (RIV000133); IP3 Outage Inspection Report (RIV000049).

281 We also note that the Vermont Yankee Board reached a similar conclusion based on the record of that hearing.

See Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 892.

4. FAC Can Be Analyzed by CHECWORKS and Managed as a Line-Level Process 102. Next, we address Dr. Hopenfelds claim that FAC is a local phenomenon, and that pitting and grooving caused by wear can lead to geometry changes that further intensify local turbulence, thereby causing highly localized wear due to FAC.282 According to Dr. Hopenfeld, CHECWORKS is an inadequate tool to measure and track such a localized process.283 As a result, Dr. Hopenfeld contends that localized areas with a high propensity for FAC may go unidentified.284 103. Entergys witnesses disagree with Dr. Hopenfeld, asserting that such highly-localized degradation is inconsistent with industry operating experience. Specifically, Dr.

Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick explained that although FAC is influenced by local conditions, it is a line-level phenomenon.285 This means that when one component is wearing, it is reasonable to expect that other components with similar characteristics and operating conditions will be wearing at similar rates.286 At hearing, Entergy witness Mr. Aleksick confirmed this point, explaining that if degradation due to FAC is occurring on one component, then it also is likely occurring on components up or downstream of it, or on identical components in other areas of the plant.287 282 See, e.g., Hopenfeld Report at 2 (RIVR00005); see also Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1514:1-1515:5 (Hopenfeld).

283 See Hopenfeld Report at 2 (RIVR00005).

284 See id.

285 See Entergy Testimony at 33(A54) (ENTR00029).

286 See id. (citing Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants at 1-5, 4-2 (ENT00036A)). Local geometric discontinuities may lead to more rapid wearing at a particular location of a component. See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr.

at 1423:24-25-1424:1 (Aleksick) (One portion of the elbow may wear more rapidly than another. But at each location under consistent conditions the wear rate will be linear at that point.). But as explained further in Section IV.B.5 below, NSAC-202L-R3 (RIV000012) provides guidance on UT inspection grid sizes to address this issue.

287 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1553:9-10 (Aleksick).

104. In addition, Dr. Horowitz testified that, if FAC could act on a singular component, rather than on a line, then the considerable operating experience accumulated over many years at dozens of plants would have made this apparent.288 CHECWORKS and its predecessor programs have been used for over 25 years.289 According to Dr. Horowitz, localized erosion of the sort Dr. Hopenfeld postulates simply has not been observed in the operating experience.290 Mr. Aleksick similarly testified that, based on his many years of experience with managing the effects of FAC, FAC is generally predictable on a line level.291 105. Dr. Hopenfeld responded to this evidence regarding the line-level nature of FAC by reference to an alleged incident at Sequoyah Nuclear Generating Station, where one steam generator J-tube experienced severe wear while an adjacent J-tube was allegedly unaffected.292 The information he provided in support of his position, however, was vague and speculative.

There is no evidence in the record supporting Dr. Hopenfelds interpretation of such unspecified events at the Sequoyah plant. Moreover, Dr. Hopenfelds testimony regarding steam generator J-tubes is unpersuasive because it is not pertinent to the IPEC FAC Program or to its reliance on the line-level nature of FAC. As explained in Section IV.G.1, below, steam generator components are not managed under the IPEC FAC Program; nor is CHECWORKS used to analyze wear in steam generator feed rings or J-tubes.

106. Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude that FAC can generally be predicted as a line-level phenomenon, as CHECWORKS does.

288 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1884:2-8 (Horowitz) (CHECWORKS and [its] predecessor programs have been used for just about 25 years now. If we were seeing the sort of behavior that Dr. Hopenfeld has postulated, wed have seen all sorts of problems. Weve had 25 years experience. We havent seen them.).

289 See id.

290 See id.

291 Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1553:7-1554:11 (Aleksick).

292 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1449:15-1450:4 (Hopenfeld).

5. There Is No Evidence of Any Significant, Unexplained, Localized Wall-thinning Phenomenon at IPEC 107. Riverkeeper offered, and the Board admitted at hearing, additional exhibits to support Dr. Hopenfelds testimony that there is unexplained, localized wall-thinning in secondary plant components inspected under the IPEC FAC Program, and that this wall thinning may be taking place at a non-linear rate.293 We now consider Riverkeepers evidence and conclude, based on the weight of the evidence, that the variations in wall thickness in the components shown in these exhibits were, in many cases, by design.294 In no case are they indicative of wall-thinning beyond the minimum allowable wall-thickness; nor do they support Dr. Hopenfelds assertions regarding a localized wall-thinning phenomenon.

108. To support Dr. Hopenfelds hypothesis of unexplained localized wall-thinning, Riverkeeper introduced four documents excerpted from Entergys FAC inspection results.295 First, Riverkeeper introduced RIV000130, showing UT thickness inspection results taken in 2003 for a main feedwater elbow at IPEC.296 Dr. Hopenfeld asserted that the variations in wall thickness in locations on the component were due to an unexplained, undetected localized wall-thinning phenomenon.297 Mr. Azevedo and Mr. Aleksick, however, explained that the exhibit showed that the apparent variations were due to readings arising from component lamination during manufacturinga well-understood circumstance that did not impact the structural 293 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1844:10-1848:15 (Brancato, Hopenfeld);Section II.J above.

294 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1879:6-9 (Azevedo) ([W]hen you buy a reducer, the small diameter end is, by definition, thinner because the hoop stress is a lot thinner and then it progresses, gets thicker and then the larger end is thicker.); 1887:15-24 (Aleksick) (stating that wall thickness on elbows varies across the component and that the example Dr. Hopenfeld identified closely resembles a brand new, uninstalled component[]); see also id. at 1855:25-1856:10 (Judge Wardwell) (reaching similar conclusions).

295 See Entergy 2003 UT Report (RIV000130); IP3 RO13 FAC Inspection Report (RIV000132); IP3 RO15 FAC Inspection Report (RIV000133); IP3 Outage Inspection Report (RIV000049).

296 See Entergy 2003 UT Report (RIV000130).

297 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1543:18-1546:7 (Hopenfeld) (stating that local erosion can cause a one inch change within six inches [of an elbow]. Thats a big change.).

integrity of the component.298 Dr. Hiser, the NRC Staff witness, concurred that laminations in components are addressed by the ASME Code.299 109. In response to this testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld did not dispute that the inspection data were the result of component lamination, and did not dispute Entergy and the Staffs conclusion that lamination is not a concern from a structural engineering perspective.300 Instead, Dr. Hopenfeld and Riverkeeper offered to provide the Board with additional examples of localized wall thinning at IPEC.301 110. The additional examples provided by Riverkeeper, however, fail to support Dr.

Hopenfelds conclusion. First, RIV000049 shows a component that is not modeled in CHECWORKS.302 Dr. Hopenfeld did not provide any testimony on how this exhibit supports his conclusion, and nothing about the document on its face establishes Dr. Hopenfelds theory of unexplained, localized wall thinning. Second, Mr. Aleksick explained that RIV000132 shows a new elbow, where the variations in wall thickness were due to the way the component was manufactured, not FAC or any other degradation mechanism.303 And third, Mr. Azevedo explained that RIV000133 shows a reducer, where again the thickness variations were due to the 298 See id. at 1557:16-1560:7 (Aleksick) ([T]he example that alleges huge differences in measured pipe wall thicknesses is in fact due completely to a lamination, not due to any kind of wall thinning or reduction in wall thickness.); id. at 1561:6-14 (Azevedo) (explaining that because a lamination is parallel to the pipe load it in no way impacts the integrity of the component).

299 See id. at 1573:12-22 (Hiser) (The orientation of [the lamination] would be such that it would not have a significant impact on structural integrity.).

300 See id. at 1568:22-25 (Hopenfeld) (I dont know enough about it, but if this is a fluke, if this is an outlier, if this doesnt represent anything, thats fine.).

301 See id. at 1569:15-24 (Hopenfeld); 1768:4-22 (Brancato).

302 See IP3 Outage Inspection Report (2005) (RIV000049). As previously noted, RIV000049 was also never introduced as an exhibit on this contention. Riverkeeper introduced it as an exhibit on a different contention.

After the hearing on RK-TC-2, on October 17, 2012, Riverkeeper filed an updated exhibit list which, for the first time, listed RIV00049 as addressing RK-TC-2. Compare Riverkeeper Hearing Exhibit List at 6 (Oct. 11, 2012) (RIVR90001) with Riverkeeper Hearing Exhibit List at 6 (Oct. 17, 2012) (RIVR10001).

303 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1887:15-1889:18 (Aleksick); IP3 RO13 FAC Inspection Report (RIV000132).

design of the component, not any wall thinning mechanism.304 Mr. Aleksicks and Mr.

Azevedos testimony is supported by NSAC-202L-R3, which recognizes that components like elbows and reducers can have thickness variations due to the manufacturing process.305 111. Beyond these exhibits, Dr. Hopenfeld alleged both that Entergys inspection results already demonstrate that localized wear is occurring,306 and that more refined techniques (i.e., UT inspections using a small grid size) are necessary to detect this localized, non-linear degradation on a more consistent basis.307 Mr. Aleksick agreed that FAC wear rates may not be uniform across an entire component.308 For instance, one portion of an elbow may wear more rapidly than another.309 That said, while the wear rates may vary at different locations within a component, each location will experience that wear at a constant rate.310 But in recognition of these facts, Entergyconsistent with the standard industry guidance in NSAC-202L-R3 inspects these components with a grid pattern designed to detect all FAC wear, and analyzes the inspection data to determine which portions of the component are wearing the fastest.311 The dimensions of the grid are specified by the guidance, and if degradation is found, Entergy 304 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1878:24-1879:9 (Azevedo); IP3 RO15 FAC Inspection Report (RIV000133).

305 See NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-17 (RIV000012) ([D]epending on the component type, the variation in thickness attributable to manufacturing variations should be separated from the FAC wear. . . . Elbows, tees, nozzles, reducers and expanders are examples of components in which there is significant variation in thickness due to the manufacturing process.).

306 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1333:16-1334:5 (Hopenfeld).

307 See id. at 1422:12-14 (Hopenfeld) (The only way you can do it is by very close inspection and using a smaller grid that they are using.).

308 See id. at 1423:22-25 (Aleksick).

309 See id. at 1423:23-1424:1 (Aleksick) (stating that FAC wear rates are not consistent within an elbow. One portion of the elbow may wear more rapidly than another. But at each location under consistent conditions the wear rate will be linear at that point.).

310 See, e.g., id.

311 See id. at 1424:2-17 (Aleksick).

performs additional, more-focused inspections on the identified location with a smaller grid size or scan.312 112. Based on the evidence presented at hearing, we conclude that Dr. Hopenfelds theory that significant, unexplained, localized, non-linear wall thinning is occurring in IPEC components within the scope of the FAC Program is unsupported speculation. There is no credible evidence supporting his theory.

C. The IPEC FAC Program Is Consistent With the GALL Report and the Standard Industry Guidance 113. In this section, the Board evaluates the IPEC FAC Program, as described in the LRA and the key documents referenced therein, against the NRC Staff guidance in the GALL Report and the industry guidance in NSAC-202L-R3. We conclude that the program is adequately documented and consistent with the GALL Report, including the guidance in NSAC-202L endorsed by the NRC Staff in the GALL Report.

1. The GALL Report and NSAC-202L Provide the NRCs Approved Guidance for an Acceptable FAC Program 114. The NRC Staff witnesses, Dr. Hiser and Mr. Yoder, testified that the GALL Report, Rev. 1 describes an acceptable FAC Program as a program including the following key actions: (1) conducting an analysis to determine critical locations;313 (2) performing limited baseline inspections to determine the extent of thinning at these locations;314 and (3) performing follow-up inspections to confirm the predictions, or repairing or replacing components as 312 See id. at 1424:23-1425:7 (Mew) (referring to NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-15 (RIV000012)); see also id. at 1426:14-17 (Aleksick) ([I]f wall thinning is observed at a point on the grid the procedures call for what's called a refined grid or a scan.).

313 See NRC Staff Testimony at 9 (A12) (NRCR00121) (citing GALL Report, Rev. 1, at XI M-61 (NYS00146C)).

314 Id.

necessary.315 The GALL Report states that the use of a predictive code, such as CHECWORKS, constitutes one aspect of an effective FAC Program.316 115. Entergy witnesses Mr. Mew, Mr. Cox, Dr. Horowitz, and Mr. Aleksick testified that the FAC Program described in the GALL Report explicitly references and relies on implementation of the guidelines in NSAC-202L, the comprehensive and detailed guidance document developed by EPRI.317 By way of background, NSAC-202L forms the basis for nuclear power plant FAC Programs in the United States.318 As described in Entergys pre-filed testimony, NSAC-202L describes the elements of an effective FAC Program (Chapter 2),319 identifies the need for and suggested scope of program implementation procedures and documentation (Chapter 3),320 recommends specific FAC Program tasks (Chapter 4),321 and explains how to develop a long-term strategy for reducing plant FAC susceptibility (through the use of FAC-resistant materials, optimization of water chemistry, and system design changes)

(Chapter 5).322 315 Id.

316 See GALL Report, Rev. 1, at XI M-61 (NYS00146C); see also Entergy Testimony at 27-28 (A46)

(ENTR00029); NRC Staff Testimony at 9 (A12) (NRCR00121).

317 See Entergy Testimony at 26 (A43) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1355:16-19 (Cox) (agreeing that the GALL Report call[s] out this NSAC-202 document for these level of detail issues); see also GALL Report, Rev. 1, at XI M-61 (NYS00146C) (The FAC program, described by the EPRI guidelines in NSAC-202L-R2, includes procedures or administrative controls to assure that the structural integrity of all carbon steel lines containing high-energy fluids (two phase as well as single phase) is maintained.).

318 See Entergy Testimony at 26 (A44) (ENTR00029) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 (RIV000012)); NRC Staff Testimony at 17-18 (A28-30) (NRCR00121); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1346:24-1355:1 (Cox, Azevedo) (stating that the IPEC FAC Program implements the guidance in NSAC-202L, which includes details like inspection frequencies).

319 See Entergy Testimony at 26 (A44) (ENTR00029) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 2-1 to 2-4 (RIV000012)).

320 See id. (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 3-1 to 3-3 (RIV000012)).

321 See id. (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-1 to 4-28 (RIV000012)).

322 See id. (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 5-1 to 5-8 (RIV000012)).

2. The Board Concludes that the IPEC FAC Program, as Set Forth in the LRA, and EN-DC-315, Is Adequately Documented 116. Before evaluating whether Entergys FAC Program is consistent with the guidance in the GALL Report, we turn first to the question of whether the IPEC FAC Program is adequately documented.

117. At the hearing, the Board questioned the witnesses about where the FAC Program is documented in the LRA, and whether the program description in the LRA provides sufficient information for review.323 Mr. Cox testified for Entergy that both Appendices A and B of the LRA contain a description of the program.324 118. To show that the IPEC FAC Program is consistent with the GALL Report, the Appendix B description references the GALL Report, and the GALL Report program description is incorporated by reference into IPECs LRA.325 Because the NRC Staff expects licensees to show verbatim consistency with the program in the GALL Report, it serves no purpose to require applicants to recite or paraphrase the contents or requirements of the GALL Report in their LRA.326 The NRC Staff verifies an applicants statements of consistency with the GALL Report through audits and inspections.327 119. The GALL Report, in turn, references NSAC-202L as the approved guidance document which describes a program to manage aging due to FAC.328 Using the guidance in NSAC-202L-R3, Entergy developed EN-DC-315 (ENT000038), its fleet-wide procedure 323 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1340:24-1341:23 (Judge Kennedy).

324 See id. at 1342:5-9 (Cox).

325 See id. at 1344:14-25 (Cox).

326 See id. at 1404:18-1405:6 (Cox); see also id. at 1408:24-1411:25 (Hiser) (defining verbatim consistency).

327 See id. at 1388:3-4 (Hiser).

328 See id. at 1346:19-21 (Cox).

governing the FAC Program.329 This implementing procedure is the document Entergy uses to guide its day-to-day practices and ensure compliance with the procedures described in NSAC-202L-R3.330 Based on the guidance in NSAC-202L-R3, EN-DC-315 describes how inspections are conducted, how the inspection data are evaluated, the acceptance criteria for inspection components, criteria for the disposition of components failing to meet acceptance criteria, sample expansion criteria, and instructions for incorporating inspection data into the CHECWORKS model.331 120. Together, the GALL Report, NSAC-202L-R3, the LRA Appendix A and B, and EN-DC-315 specify the activities to be conducted under the FAC Program.332 Under the FAC Program, Entergy also prepares numerous supporting documents, including periodic reports (such as the CHECWORKS Steam Feedwater Analysis (SFA) model reports prepared after each outage),333 audits and self-assessments,334 and other documents.335 121. We therefore conclude that there is a discrete set of documents sufficiently describing the IPEC FAC Program. Although it may have been possible for Entergy to have 329 See Entergy Testimony at 37 (A59) (ENTR00029).

330 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1351:20-1352:12 (Azevedo).

331 See Entergy Testimony at 26 (A44), 37 (A59) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1355:20-1356:22 (Cox)

(agreeing that the GALL Report references NSAC-202L and that EN-DC-315 provides the specifics of how the NSAC-202L will be applied by Entergy in your plant. Thats where the specific details are for the people on the ground to get guidance.).

332 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1355:20-1356:22 (Cox). The Entergy procedures referenced in EN-DC-315 further specify how specific activities under the FAC program will be conducted. See generally EN-DC-315 (ENT000038); see also, e.g., EN-CS-S-008-MULTI, Pipe Wall Thinning Structural Evaluation, Rev. 0 (Jan. 1, 2010) (ENT000065).

333 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1363:3-9 (Aleksick) (citing IP2 SFA Calculations (ENT000050); IP3 SFA Calculations (ENT000051)).

334 See Entergy Testimony at 48 (A75) (ENTR00029).

335 See, e.g., IP2 System Susceptibility Evaluation (SSE) Report No. 0700.104-02, Rev. 2 (Oct. 14, 2011) (IP2 SSE Report) (ENT000048); IP3 System Susceptibility Evaluation (SSE) Report No. 0700.104-17, Rev. 2 (Oct. 14, 2011) (IP3 SSE Report) (ENT000049); Indian Point Unit 2, CHECWORKS Power Uprate Analysis, Calc. No. 040711-02 (Mar. 23, 2005) (IP2 Power Uprate Analysis) (ENT000072); Indian Point Unit 3, CHECWORKS Power Uprate Analysis, Calc. No. 040711-01 (Mar. 23, 2005) (IP3 Power Uprate Analysis) (ENT000073).

provided more information directly in the text of the LRA, the level of detail provided in the LRA is consistent with the NRC Staffs guidance and expectations and provided sufficient information for the NRC Staff to conduct its review. The LRA and its supporting documents and incorporated references, taken together, sufficiently and specifically document the FAC Program.

3. The Board Concludes that the IPEC FAC Program Is Consistent with the GALL Report 122. With respect to the question of whether the IPEC FAC Program is consistent with the GALL Report, Mr. Mew, Mr. Cox, Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick testified, based on Entergys LRA, that the IPEC FAC Program is consistent with all ten elements of an adequate aging management program, as specified in the GALL Report, Rev. 1,336 with one exception for an updated guidance document previously noted.337 The IPEC FAC Program also meets the intent of the GALL Report, Rev. 2.338 123. Mr. Mew, Mr. Cox, Dr. Horowitz, and Mr. Aleksick also testified that Entergys corporate FAC Program set forth in EN-DC-315 is implemented at IPEC, as it is at other Entergy plants.339 Entergy has maintained the IPEC FAC Program since it purchased IP2 and IP3.340 Entergys EN-DC-315 is based on the EPRI guidance in NSAC-202L-R3 and implements the 336 See Entergy Testimony at 35 (A56) (ENTR00029) (citing LRA, Section B.1.15 (ENT00015B); Entergy Engineering Report No. IP-RPT-06-LRD07, Aging Management Program Evaluation Results - Non-Class 1 Mechanical, Revision 5 at 106-13 (Mar. 18, 2009) (RIV000014)); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1353:17-18 (Cox)

(stating that to ensure consistency with GALL Entergy ma[de] sure that [Entergys implementing procedure]

included the elements that are described in the GALL program description).

337 See Section II.B, above.

338 See Entergy Testimony at 28-29 (A48) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1348:21-23 (Cox) (the FAC Program meets the intent of Gall Rev. 2); Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1892:3-17 (Hiser) (stating that the Staff considered the impact of GALL Report Rev. 2 on its review of the IPEC LRA and concluded that there were no implications . . . . [as the IPEC FAC Program] also is consistent with Revision 2 [of the GALL Report]).

339 See Entergy Testimony at 90 (A124) (ENTR00029); EN-DC-315 at 1 (ENT000038); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1351:22-23 (Azevedo).

340 See SER at 3-22 (NYS000326B).

program described in the LRA.341 It also is undisputed that the fleet-wide Entergy FAC Program set forth in EN-DC-315 is substantially the same FAC Program that the Vermont Yankee Board found acceptable in 2008.342 124. Dr. Hopenfeld disputes whether the IPEC FAC Program is, in fact, consistent with the GALL Report.343 For example, Dr. Hopenfeld argued that given the inadequate performance of CHECWORKS, Entergy cannot simply rely on procedural documents, such as NSAC-202L-R3 and EN-DC-315, which depend heavily upon the proper use of CHECWORKS to comply with the GALL Report and the SRP-LR.344 125. Dr. Hopenfelds assertions are premised on the validity of his critique of CHECWORKS. As explained in Section IV.E, below, however, this critique lacks merit.

126. It does not appear to us that Dr. Hopenfeld is directly challenging the adequacy of the GALL Report or NSAC-202L-R3, but instead is focused on how this guidance has been implemented at IPEC.345 In any event, to the extent his testimony may be interpreted as a challenge to those guidance documents, his testimony has not overcome the special weight accorded to the GALL Report in the reasonable assurance analysis, including the GALL Reports endorsement of NSAC-202L.346 341 See Entergy Testimony at 38 (A60) (ENTR00029) (citing EN-DC-315 (ENT000038); NSAC-202L-R3 (RIV000012)) Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1355:20-1356:22 (Cox).

342 See Entergy Testimony at 90 (A124) (ENTR00029); Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 871 (Based on the information in the LRA and subsequent testimony, this Board finds that Entergys corporate program [i.e., the then-current version of EN-DC-315 (ENT000038)] does implement the recommendations of [the GALL Report], as well as the more detailed guidelines provided in EPRIs NSAC-202L-R3.).

343 See, e.g., Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 42:1-3 (RIV000108).

344 See Hopenfeld Report at 25 (RIVR00005); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1332:18-23 (Hopenfeld) (stating that he does not believe that the CHECWORKS program can adequately take into consideration the geometry of pipe corrosion).

345 See, e.g., Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 42:1-27 (RIV000108) (asserting that Entergys FAC Program does not meet the guidance in the GALL Report).

346 See Vt. Yankee, CLI-10-17, 72 NRC at 32 n.185; Seabrook, CLI-12-05, slip op. at 16 n.78.

127. Based on the foregoing evidence, and because the GALL Report specifically endorses NSAC-202L-R3, which is the basis for Entergys fleet-wide FAC Program as documented in EN-DC-315, we find that the IPEC FAC Program is consistent with the GALL Report, Rev. 1, and meets the intent of the GALL Report, Rev. 2.347 D. Technical Description of the IPEC FAC Program

1. Scope of Components within the FAC Program 128. In this section, we provide technical background on the scope of components covered by the IPEC FAC Program, including the distinction between modeled and non-modeled components, as background for our evaluation of the remaining technical disputes in this contention.

129. As previously noted, the GALL Report endorses NSAC-202L as the basis for the FAC Program.348 NSAC-202L describes the process applicants must follow to identify and classify FAC-susceptible components.349 Under the IPEC FAC Program, once a piping system, sub-system, or line is classified as FAC-susceptible, that piping is further subcategorized as either modeled or susceptible non-modeled (SNM).350 130. Modeled piping (i.e., piping that is modeled in CHECWORKS) includes the majority of large-bore (nominal pipe size greater than two inches) secondary plant piping that 347 In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Vermont Yankee Board reached the same conclusion regarding essentially the same program. See Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 871.

348 See also NRC Staff Testimony at 9 (A12) (NRCR00121).

349 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1380:22-24 (Cox); NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-3 to 4-5 (RIV000012); see also Entergy Testimony at 42 (A67) (ENTR00029).

350 See Entergy Testimony at 42-43 (A68) (ENTR00029).

typically poses the highest consequences of failure.351 This category typically includes the major piping systems, including condensate, feedwater, extraction steam, and major drains.352 131. SNM piping includes all small-bore piping (less than or equal to two inches nominal pipe size) or other piping that is unsuitable for modeling in CHECWORKS because of nonstandard configuration, non-steady state operating conditions, or other reasons.353 132. Plant systems that are not susceptible to FAC due to system materials or operating conditions, such as primary plant components manufactured from or clad with stainless steel,354 raw water systems, and lube oil systems, are outside the scope of the FAC Program.355 With the exception of steam generator components discussed in Section IV.G.1, below, Riverkeeper does not dispute that these systems are appropriately outside the scope of the FAC Program.

133. Over 75% of FAC-susceptible Analysis Lines at IPEC are SNM lines that are not modeled in CHECWORKS.356 At IP2, approximately 22%, and at IP3, 20% of susceptible Analysis Lines are modeled in CHECWORKS.357 Dr. Hopenfeld does not dispute this information.358 As discussed in the next section, the majority of FAC-susceptible lines at IPEC that are non-modeled are addressed by the other tools in the FAC Program, rather than CHECWORKS.

351 See id.

352 See id.

353 See id.

354 See id. at 107 (A144).

355 See id. at 42 (A67).

356 See id. at 69 (A95).

357 See id. at 49 (A76), 68 (A94).

358 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 10:19-22 (RIV000108) ([I]t appears that the total CHECWORKS contribution to the FAC program is about 25%.); see also Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1591:18-1592:5 (Hopenfeld).

134. Given these facts, the Board concludes that the scope of the IPEC FAC Program includes both CHECWORKS-modeled and non-modeled lines. CHECWORKS is used as an inspection selection tool for less than 25% of the susceptible lines within the IPEC FAC Program.

2. The FAC Program Uses Multiple, Independent Tools to Select Inspection Locations 135. In his direct testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld alleged that the IPEC FAC Program is inadequate because it relies primarily on CHECWORKS to identify and select components for inspection.359 In rebuttal, he made the opposite claim, alleging that Entergys use of multiple tools to select inspection locations was inconsistent with the GALL Report and NSAC-202L-R3.360 Both claims are mischaracterizations. The IPEC FAC Program employs several tools for selecting components for inspection at each outage. In using multiple tools to select inspection locations, the IPEC FAC Program follows the NRC Staff-approved recommendations in NSAC-202L-R3 for an effective FAC program.

136. We note that Dr. Hopenfeld appears to be arguing that Entergy relies on CHECWORKS both too much (i.e., it has inherent deficiencies in its design),361 and too little (i.e., GALL specifies that CHECWORKS should be the predominant feature of the program).362 As discussed throughout this section and the next, we find both points to be unsupported.

137. Entergy witnesses Mr. Mew, Mr. Aleksick, and Dr. Horowitz, as well as the NRC Staff witnesses Mr. Yoder and Dr. Hiser, all testified that the FAC Program uses numerous independent, complementary tools to identify locations to perform UT thickness measurements 359 See Hopenfeld Report at 4 (RIVR00005).

360 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 3:5-8, 10:1-27 (RIV000108).

361 See id at 24:5-6, 30:15-16.

362 See id. at 10:24-27; see also id. at 3:22-24.

(inspections) at each outage.363 The following methods are used to select inspection locations at IPEC: (1) predictive evaluations performed using the CHECWORKS computer code; (2) the SNM rankings; (3) the trending of actual measurements of pipe wall thicknesses from past outages; (4) industry operating experience; (5) results from other plant programs; and (6) engineering judgment.364 138. First, the CHECWORKS software tool is used only for modeled piping.365 This tool is described further in the next section.

139. Second, the SNM susceptibility rankings, used only for SNM piping, prioritizes those components based on operating conditions, consequence of failure, maintenance history, and industry experience.366 140. There are approximately 1200 lines of SNM systems at IPEC.367 SNM components include both critical piping components that are used on a daily basis, as well as floor drains and other components which have no safety significance and may only be used infrequently.368 As documented in ENT000048 and ENT000049, the System Susceptibility Reports for IP2 and IP3, Entergy has ranked and classified those lines to set inspection priorities.369 SNM components are ranked based on two primary factors: (1) consequence of failure; and (2) susceptibility (i.e., the likelihood of FAC occurring).370 At IP3, more than 90%

363 See Entergy Testimony at 69 (A95) (ENTR00029); NRC Staff Testimony at 36-37 (A70) (NRCR00121); Oct.

15, 2012 Tr. at 1299:8-11 (Aleksick); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1705:25 -1706:6 (Hiser).

364 See Entergy Testimony at 69-71 (A95) (ENTR00029) (citing EN-DC-315 at 17-18 (ENT000038)).

365 See id. at 43 (A69), 69 (A95); see also Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1298:9-13 (Aleksick).

366 See Entergy Testimony at 45-46 (A72), 71 (A95 (ENTR00029); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1511:1-1512:6 (Aleksick).

367 Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1509:22-23 (Aleksick).

368 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1868:11-18 (Aleksick).

369 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1509:19-1510:18 (Aleksick); see also IP2 SSE Report (ENT000048); IP3 SSE Report (ENT000049).

370 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1511:1-24 (Aleksick).

of the high consequence/high susceptibility SNM components have been inspected to date.371 At IP2, more than 60% have been inspected.372 141. Third, trending based on actual thickness measurements is used to select inspection locations for modeled and non-modeled components.373 Trending of wear based on measured thicknesses is a reliable process because, as explained above, FAC wear rates under constant operating conditions are generally constant with time,374 and decades of FAC Program operating experience have shown trending to be reliable.375 142. Mr. Aleksick testified that once CHECWORKS-modeled components are inspected, the data are trended in an identical manner as data from a non-modeled component.376 Thus, re-inspections of CHECWORKS-modeled locations are based on trending, not CHECWORKS.377 Trending is accomplished independent of CHECWORKS, through a separate calculation.378 But trending does not stand alone, in that the original basis for the inspection may have been information from CHECWORKS.379 Once a component is inspected, the interval until subsequent inspections and any decisions on repair and replacement are based on actual data, not CHECWORKS.380 371 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1867:22-24 (Mew).

372 See id.

373 See Entergy Testimony at 54-55 (A80), 69-70 (A95) (ENTR00029).

374 See id. at 33 (A53).

375 See id. at 69-79 (A95).

376 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1506:6-11 (Aleksick).

377 See id. at 1753:9-12 (Aleksick).

378 See Entergy Testimony at 54-55 (A80) (ENTR00029); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1506:6-11 (Aleksick).

379 See id. at 54-55 (A80), 57-58 (A84), 69-60 (A95). A CHECWORKS component could also have been selected for initial inspection for other reasons, such as operating experience or results from other plant inspection programs. See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1637:2-6 (Aleksick).

380 See Entergy Testimony at 54-55 (A80), 71-72 (A96-97) (ENTR00029); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1479:10-14 (Mew)

(Once we get measured data [inspections] are done in accordance with our procedures.); see also id. at 143. Fourth, industry operating experience is used to select inspection locations for modeled and non-modeled components.381 For example, based on the Mihama operating experience, Entergy performed specific additional FAC inspections at IPEC.382 Operating experience at IPEC also is used directly to select components for inspection. For example, the detection of wall-thinning in SNM piping could lead to immediate inspections of other components on the same line, as well as further inspections during the next outage.383 144. Fifth, the results from other plant programs, such as the valve maintenance program are used for modeled and non-modeled components.384 For example, if an isolation valve is discovered to be leaking by (i.e., not isolating the fluid on the high-pressure side of the pipe), then it would be appropriate to inspect the piping downstream of the leaking valve.385 145. Sixth, engineering judgment is used for modeled and non-modeled components.386 According to Mr. Mew, Dr. Horowitz, and Mr. Aleksick, engineering judgment is the use of sound engineering facts and principles to select the most susceptible components for inspections, beyond those locations identified by other tools.387 Engineering judgment at IPEC is subject to rigorous controls and review, including a self-assessment by the FAC Engineer after 1480:19 (Mew) (agreeing that remaining service life is based on measured values, not CHECWORKS predictions).

381 See Entergy Testimony at 70 (A95) (ENTR00029).

382 See Entergy Testimony at 100-01 (A135) (ENTR00029) (citing Entergy Corrective Action LO-NOE-2006-00611-CA13, at 3 (July 2006) (ENT000085) (The piping components upstream and downstream of the boiler feed pump suction ROs [restricting orifice], similar to the failure location at Mihama, were inspected during 2R16 and 3R13. No wall thinning was evident from any of the inspections.)). As discussed further in Section IV.G.6, in 2004, FAC caused a rupture in the secondary plant at Mihama in Japan, resulting in several deaths.

383 See Entergy Testimony at 97 (A132) (ENTR00029).

384 See id. at 70-71 (A95).

385 See NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-8 (RIV000012) (Plant experience over the past operating cycle(s) should be reviewed to add components as appropriate to the inspection plan. These locations should include: . . .

Components downstream of a leaking steam trap or isolation valve.).

386 See Entergy Testimony at 48 (A75), 71 (A95) (ENTR00029).

387 See id. at 48 (A75).

identification of the outage FAC inspection scope, which includes a review of the use of engineering judgment.388 Other qualified FAC engineers from other plants or Entergy corporate offices also review the outage scope.389 146. Engineering judgment does not impact repair or replacement decisions. Under NSAC-202L and EN-DC-315, if a component does not have adequate wall thickness, then it must be repaired or replaced; subjective judgment is not involved.390 147. At the hearing, Mr. Aleksick estimated that roughly half of all inspections during each outage are re-inspections.391 Of the remaining first-time inspection locations, half of those (i.e., 25% of the total) typically are based on CHECWORKS predictions.392 The other 25% are typically selected using other tools, such as operating experience, engineering judgment, and SNM rankings.393 These percentages can vary between outages. The specific distributions for five recent outages at IP2 and IP3 are shown in Figures 1 and 2 in Entergys written testimony.394 148. In his rebuttal, Dr. Hopenfeld asserted that tools other than CHECWORKS may only be used to select inspection locations for components that experience widely-varying operating conditions.395 Dr. Hopenfeld relied upon NSAC-202L-R3, stating this guidance recommends the use of a predictive model like CHECWORKS whenever possible, and stating that other inspection tools should only be used when plant operations vary widely.396 Neither the 388 See id. at 48 (A75), 72 (A99) (citing EN-DC-315 at 17 (ENT00038)).

389 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1851:4-19 (Azevedo).

390 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1853:11-15 (Azevedo).

391 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1486:7-9 (Aleksick).

392 See id. at 1486:9-12.

393 See id. at 1486: 13-15.

394 See Entergy Testimony at 49-52 (A77) (ENTR00029).

395 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 11:3-5 (RIV000108).

396 See id. (citing NSAC-202L-R3 §§ 3.3, 4.4.1.3 (RIV000012)).

GALL Report,397 nor NSAC-202L-R3, however, contains any statement to suggest that the use of tools other than CHECWORKS should be limited to the circumstances Dr. Hopenfeld describes.398 Indeed, Dr. Hopenfeld conceded this point at the hearing.399 149. In fact, contrary to Dr. Hopenfelds claim, NSAC-202L-R3 specifically states that for a given outage, the inspection sample should be composed of components selected from a variety of sources.400 The guidance then goes on to identify the many methods that should be used to select inspection locations; at no point does the document limit when any of these may be used.401 150. Based on the foregoing evidence, we disagree with Dr. Hopenfeld that CHECWORKS is required to be the main tool in the FAC Program.402 Instead, we credit the testimony of Entergy witnesses Dr. Horowitz (who was one of the authors of NSAC-202L), Mr.

Aleksick, and Mr. Mew, and the Staffs witness, Dr. Hiser, that the use of multiple, complementary tools to select inspection locations in the IPEC FAC Program is consistent with the standard industry guidance in NSAC-202L-R3.403 The IPEC FAC Program is consistent with NSAC-202L-R3 in that it includes both CHECWORKS-modeled and non-modeled components.404 Of particular importance, we agree with Mr. Aleksick that once a component is 397 See generally GALL Report, Rev. 1, at XI.M-61 to 62 (NYS00146C); GALL Report, Rev. 2 at XI M17-1 to M17-2 (NYS00147D).

398 See generally NSAC-202L-R3 (RIV000012).

399 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1599:6-12 (Hopenfeld) (conceding that his previous statement that NSAC-202L-R3 and GALL clearly emphasize that CHECWORKS should be the main tool to select components for inspection was incorrect).

400 NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-5 (RIV000012) .

401 See id. at 4-5 to 4-6.

402 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 43:8-17 (RIV000108).

403 See Entergy Testimony at 45-46 (A72) (ENTR00029); NSAC-202L-R3 at 2-3 to -4, 3-2, 4-5 (RIV000012);

Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1705:25-1706:6 (Hiser).

404 See NSAC-202L-R3 at 2-3 to -4, 3-2, 4-5 (RIV000012).

inspected, subsequent inspections and corrective actions are based on actual data.405 This is, again, consistent with the NSAC-202L-R3 guidance endorsed in the GALL Report.406 Therefore, we conclude that the IPEC FAC Program is consistent with NSAC-202L-R3, because it appropriately uses CHECWORKS as one of several tools to select component inspection locations at each outage.

E. CHECWORKS is Performing Its Intended Screening Function at IPEC

1. CHECWORKS Is Predictive Software Used to Assist in the Selection of Inspection Locations 151. In this section, we summarize the evidence in the record on the purpose and function of the CHECWORKS software and how the software is calibrated and used as part of the FAC Program.

152. Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick testified that CHECWORKS is a predictive software tool, based on algorithms developed from test data, used to assist the FAC engineer in identifying locations for inspection.407 The software is designed to provide a best estimate of wear due to FAC.408 CHECWORKS predictions are used to focus the attention of the FAC Program on those components that may either be experiencing wear or on locations where CHECWORKS is not well-calibrated or where there are other indicia of uncertainty in CHECWORKS predictions.409 Then, appropriate corrective action is taken based on actual, measured data.410 405 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1506:6-11 (Aleksick).

406 See NSAC-202L-R3 at § 4.7 (RIV000012).

407 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1294:24-1295:17 (Aleksick); Entergy Testimony at 57 (A83) (ENTR00029).

408 See Entergy Testimony at 76-77 (A102-03) (ENTR00029) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-6 (RIV000012)).

409 See id. at 59-61 (A86-88), 81 (A109) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-1, 4-7 (RIV000012)); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1604:1-20 (Aleksick) (noting that components are selected for inspection from CHECWORKS for two purposes: (1) because there may be degradation occurring; or (2) to improve the calibration of the model).

410 See Entergy Testimony at 77 (A103) (ENTR00029).

153. Entergys and the NRC Staffs witnesses testified that CHECWORKS has been specifically endorsed by the NRC Staff in the GALL Report, Rev. 1411 and it is also endorsed in Rev. 2.412 CHECWORKS is used universally in the United States and is widely used in other countries as well.413 It is used at over 150 nuclear units worldwide.414 154. Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick testified that CHECWORKS evaluates FAC based on analysis lines; i.e., sets of components with similar characteristics and conditions.415 This is appropriate because, as explained above, FAC is generally a line-level phenomenon.

155. Analysis lines are either calibrated or not.416 Calibrated analysis lines have a reasonably good correlation between the predicted and measured wall thicknesses.417 Thus, CHECWORKS predictions can be relied upon to determine when to first inspect these components.418 Non-calibrated analysis lines lack good correlation between predicted and measured wall thicknesses.419 Additional inspections are conducted on non-calibrated analysis 411 See id. at 27-28 (A46) (citing GALL Report, Rev. 1, at XI.M-61 (NYS00146C), which states that the use of a predictive code, such as CHECWORKS, constitutes one aspect of an effective FAC Program); NRC Staff Testimony at 6 (A8) (NRCR00121).

412 See GALL Report, Rev. 2 at XI M17-1 (NYS00147D).

413 See Entergy Testimony at 84 (A114) (ENTR00029).

414 See id. at 22 (A36).

415 See id. at 59 (A86).

416 See id. at 59-61 (A86-87); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1305:10-19 (Aleksick).

417 See Entergy Testimony at 59-60 (A86) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1305:10-13 (Aleksick).

418 See Entergy Testimony at 60 (A86), 77 (A103) (ENTR00029); Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1305:10-13 (Aleksick)

(stating that calibrated lines reasonably represent actual conditions in the field and can therefore be relied on with some degree of confidence). Re-inspections of CHECWORKS-modeled components are generally determined through trending, not CHECWORKS. See Entergy Testimony at 83-84 (A113) (ENTR00029).

419 See id. at 60-61 (A87), 77 (A103).

lines.420 But in either case, Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick stated that the CHECWORKS analysis provides useful information for the engineer.421 156. According to the Entergy witnesses, Entergy relies on the criteria in NSAC-202L-R3 to determine if a line is calibrated.422 After every IPEC outage, each modeled analysis line is evaluated individually using the criteria in NSAC-202L-R3.423 As Mr. Aleksick explains, if a line is calibrated, then the CHECWORKS predictions of wall thickness can be relied upon to determine whether inspections of previously uninspected components are needed or not.424 But if a line is not calibrated, then additional inspections are conducted on that line, or the affected components are repaired or replaced.425 In other words, when CHECWORKS cannot properly model wear rates in a particular analysis line, this is a signal to the FAC engineer that this line should be inspected to measure the wall thickness at more locations.426 It is not an indication that CHECWORKS is not performing properly.427 157. In written testimony and at the hearing, Dr. Hopenfeld took issue with one of the criteria used to determine if a line is calibrated: the LCF. The LCFs are statistically determined 420 See id.

421 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1639:9-15, 1641:17-1642:9 (Aleksick) (We use [CHECWORKS] to predict whats going on in uninspected components, and in order to use those results effectively, we need to know where the model is -- where we can treat the model with high confidence and where we cant. In those areas where we cant [treat the model with high confidence] . . . . We would typically inspect a significantly larger number of components.).

422 See Entergy Testimony at 59 (A86) (ENTR00029) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-1 (RIV000012)); Tr. at 1751-52 (Aleksick). Those criteria are: (1) whether the line is properly defined (i.e., whether the components on the line experience sufficiently similar operational and chemistry conditions); (2) at least five inspections have been performed on that line; (3) the line correction factor (LCF) is between 0.5 and 2.5; (4) there is a reasonably good correlation on the scatter plots; and (5) the inspection line contains a variety of component geometries. See NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-1 (RIV000012).

423 See, e.g., IP2 SFA Calculations, App. B (ENT000050).

424 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1305:10-13 (Aleksick).

425 See id.; Entergy Testimony at 61 (A88) (ENTR00029).

426 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1641:17-1642:9 (Aleksick).

427 See Entergy Testimony at 61 (A88), 77 (A103) (ENTR00029).

to produce a best estimate correlation (or best fit) with the inspection data.428 A LCF between 0.5 and 2.5 is one indication that a line is calibrated.429 Dr. Hopenfeld challenges the LCF criterion, asserting that Entergy had failed to explain the basis for the 0.5 to 2.5 range that defines whether a line is acceptable (and therefore whether the CHECWORKS estimates can be relied upon).430 Dr. Horowitz, however, explained that decades of operating experience has shown this range to be a useful standard to use as one of the five elements of a calibrated line.431 Dr. Hopenfeld responded that if he were preparing a code, specific safety concerns would guide his selection of the appropriate range.432 But when questioned by the Board about why the 0.5 to 2.5 range was unacceptable, or how he would derive an alternative range, Dr. Hopenfeld was unable to provide an alternative.433 We find that the selected range is reasonable because it assists the FAC Program engineer in identifying when components require further attention.

158. Entergy relies on all data, including data with a good fit and outliers, to understand how the model is performing, and to determine the level of confidence in the model for each individual line.434 This process is documented in Entergys SFA Calculations, prepared after each outage. The most recent examples of such reports in the record are ENT000050 and ENT000051, for IP2 and IP3, respectively.435 428 See id. at 58 (A85).

429 See id. at 60 (A86) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-1 (RIV000012)).

430 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. 1756:10-13 (Hopenfeld); see also Hopenfeld Report at 8 (RIVR00005).

431 See id. at 1754:9-14 (Horowitz).

432 See id. at 1756:15-20 (Hopenfeld).

433 See id. at 1756:25-1757:4 (Hopenfeld) (I cant answer your question here right know. I would have to do a lot of thinking . . . .).

434 See id. at 1634:20-1635:16 (Aleksick).

435 See IP2 SFA Calculations (ENT000050); IP3 SFA Calculations (ENT000051).

159. Based on the foregoing evidence and as further explained throughout the remainder of this decision, we find that the CHECWORKS predictive software, as analyzed under the guidance in NSAC-202L-R3, plays a useful role as one inspection location selection tool within the larger FAC Program.436 It serves this purpose by identifying locations where either: (1) components may be experiencing wear due to FAC; or (2) the rate of FAC cannot be accurately predicted.

2. CHECWORKS Provides Results that Are Sufficiently Accurate for Its Intended Purpose 160. We next turn to the question of whether CHECWORKS results at IPEC are sufficiently accurate for the software to serve its purpose of providing one source of information for the FAC program engineer to use in selecting inspection locations. Dr. Hopenfelds claim is that CHECWORKS is not accurate, and components which are assigned a low inspection priority may wear ten times faster than those that are assigned a higher priority.437 161. Entergys witnesses Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick testified that for those IPEC FAC Program components modeled by CHECWORKS, the software adequately performs its intended purpose of assisting the FAC engineer in identifying locations in need of inspection.438 As noted in the previous section, CHECWORKS does this by helping the FAC engineer focus 436 We again note that the Vermont Yankee Board reached a similar conclusion on this issue. See Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 892 ([W]e find that the accuracy of CHECWORKS is sufficient for its intended purpose - being one of five means to select locations for UT measurements during plant inspections.); see also id. (We agree that the CHECWORKS model cannot fully account for all the potential factors associated with FAC, determine the absolute wear (even with many recalibrations), or predict all potential leaks in the carbon steel piping. No one has claimed that it could, and that was never the intended purpose for using this model or for the FAC Program itself.).

437 See, e.g., Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1652:2-15 (Hopenfeld); see also Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 19:1-2 (RIV000108).

438 See Entergy Testimony at 77 (A103) (ENTR00029).

inspection attention on those analysis lines that are most likely to experience FAC, and on those analysis lines where the rate of FAC cannot be accurately predicted.439 162. Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick also testified that, based on the recent IPEC CHECWORKS reports, an average of approximately 55% of the analysis lines across both plants are calibrated and the LCFs are in range approximately 70% of the time.440 These results are typical of FAC Programs that Entergys witnesses have reviewed throughout their careers, and sufficient for CHECWORKS to serve its intended screening function of focusing the attention of the FAC engineer on lines that may be experiencing wear and on lines where the wear rate is not being accurately predicted.441 In understanding these results, it also is important to keep in mind that a primary reason why analysis lines are not calibrated is very low wear.442 Entergys witnesses therefore conclude that this means that CHECWORKS is providing useful information to the IPEC FAC Program engineer.443 163. According to Dr. Hopenfeld, the wear plots in Appendix J of Entergys SFA Model Reports (discussed further in Section IV.E.4, below) which show that CHECWORKS predictions can be off as much as by a factor of ten.444 164. We first note that Dr. Hopenfelds claim that CHECWORKS is inaccurate by a factor of ten is ultimately based on two isolated points in Entergys CHECWORKS reportstwo 439 See id. at 64 (A92); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1641:24- 1642:9 (Aleksick), 1670:19-1671:13 (Azevedo) ([W]eve been talking about this specific line. This specific line was not calibrated. So were not making the argument this is a good line that we rely on. This is a non-calibrated line, so we recognize the scatter on this line.).

440 See Entergy Testimony at 63-64 (A92) (ENTR00029).

441 See id. at 64 (A92).

442 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1753:19-22 (Aleksick).

443 See Entergy Testimony at 64 (A92) (ENTR00029).

444 Hopenfeld Report at 7 (RIVR00005) (citing Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program CHECWORKS Analysis Enhancement, Rev. 0 (00130-TR-001) at I-39, J-33 (Dec. 2000) (RIV000016A)); Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 19:1-2 (RIV000108).

points out of thousands.445 The IPEC FAC Program appropriately addresses outliers such as these. As Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick explained, if there is a significant discrepancy between measured and predicted wear for a particular component, such an occurrence would be readily identifiable in the CHECWORKS model and visible in the Appendix J plots as an outlier.446 That outlier component would then be evaluated and dispositioned.447 For example, if the component did not meet the acceptance criteria, then it would be repaired or replaced.448 If the acceptance criteria are met and the component remains in service, then the measured value would be trended and future inspections would be based on the resulting prediction of actual thickness, rather than the CHECWORKS prediction.449 CHECWORKS predictions for similar components and other components on the same analysis line would be updated using this measured value.450 165. Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude that CHECWORKS, as it is used in the IPEC FAC Program, is sufficiently accurate to serve its intended purpose.

3. CHECWORKS Is Intended to Provide a Best Estimate of FAC Wear Rates, Not a Bounding Estimate 166. We now address the question of whether CHECWORKS is required to provide a bounding or conservative estimate of the rates of FAC, or whether it is acceptable for the program to provide a best estimate of wear rates due to FAC. Dr. Hopenfeld asserts that the use 445 See Hopenfeld Report at 7 (RIVR00005).

446 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1632:2-1633:25 (Aleksick) (noting that the lines in the wear plots help guide the eye towards outliers).

447 See id. at 1307:23-1309:3 (Aleksick).

448 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1653:9-14 (Horowitz) ([A]ny outlier, and youre interested obviously in the outliers that are wearing more than you think they should be, or have been inspected, if theyre too thin at this point theyll be replaced. If they arent, theyll return them [to service].).

449 See id. at 1753:9-12 (Aleksick).

450 See id. at 1744:16-23 (Aleksick) (providing an overview of the CHECWORKS calibration process, which includes importing actual wall thickness data into the model).

of CHECWORKS at IPEC does not comply with the GALL Report, Rev. 2, which states that CHECWORKS is acceptable because it provides a bounding analysis for FAC and provides an inspection schedule.451 Because of the allegedly non-conservative predictions, Dr. Hopenfeld also concludes that the IPEC FAC Program, as described in Entergys testimony, is not compliant with the program approved in the Staffs SER.452 167. As previously noted, CHECWORKS is designed to provide a best-estimate of wear rates, not a bounding estimate.453 Consequently, after calibration, half of the inspected components wall thicknesses will be greater than predicted and the other half less.454 It is appropriate for CHECWORKS to follow a best-estimate approach, because CHECWORKS is primarily a prioritization tool.455 It functions to assist the FAC Engineer in identifying inspection locations, based on the rankings provided by CHECWORKS.456 Those rankings would not change if CHECWORKS were calibrated to provide a bounding estimate of FAC wear rates rather than a best estimate.457 168. One key benefit of using CHECWORKS as a best-estimate, rather than a bounding, code is that one can look at the scatter-plots generated by the model and quickly 451 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 18:4-9 (RIV000108) (citing GALL Report, Rev. 2, § XI.M17 (NYS00147D)); see also id. at 42:5-9.

452 See id. at 17:24-18:14 (RIV000108) (stating that the use of CHECWORKS as a best-estimate tool is not reflected in NRC Staffs assessment of Entergys FAC program in its SER) (citing SER at 3-21 to 3-30 (NY00326C)).

453 See Entergy Testimony at 76 (A102) (ENTR00029); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1648:22-1649:18 (Horowitz).

454 See Entergy Testimony at 76-77 (A102) (ENTR00029). Although CHECWORKS provides a best estimate of component wear rates, it is conservative in that CHECWORKS predicts the maximum rate of thinning on each component, i.e., the rate of wall thinning at the location of the component which is wearing the fastest. See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1654:24-1655:3 (Horowitz).

455 See id. at 1671:6-13 (Azevedo) (We dont necessarily use the wear rate alone; we look at it, but the benefit of CHECWORKS is the ranking tool, and the highest ranking locations. Those are the ones that we inspect.).

456 See Entergy Testimony at 77 (A103) (ENTR00029) (citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-6 (RIV000012)).

457 See id.

determine whether the model is generally producing accurate results for that line.458 Dr.

Horowitz testified that another benefit is that FAC engineers throughout the industry now have many years of experience using CHECWORKS as a best-estimate code.459 169. Because it is a best-estimate code, the calibration process in CHECWORKS is designed so that 50% of the results will be conservative and 50% will be non-conservative.460 Dr. Hopenfelds observation that CHECWORKS predictions are non-conservative 40-60% of the time461 is therefore no surprise. Dr. Hopenfelds broad observation essentially confirms that CHECWORKS is properly providing a best estimate of the wear rates at IPEC.462 170. The statement Dr. Hopenfeld points tothat CHECWORKS is appropriate because in general the predicted wear rates and component thicknesses are conservative when compared to actual field measurements463appears in the GALL Report, Rev. 2, but not Rev.

1.464 It also is not correct as a technical matter. The July 2012 Draft ISG proposes the removal of the language Dr. Hopenfeld relies upon.465 This was addressed at the hearing by Mr. Yoder of the NRC Staff who explained that it was never the [Staffs] intent to state that CHECWORKS 458 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1641:17-23 (Aleksick). But as explained in NSAC-202L-R3, the FAC engineer uses quantitative standards to analyze the CHECWORKS resultsin addition to any visual review of the scatter plots. See NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-5 (RIV000012).

459 See id. at 1649:10-18 (Horowitz).

460 See Entergy Testimony at 76-77 (A102), 81 (A109) (ENTR00029).

461 See, e.g., Hopenfeld Report at 15 (RIVR00005).

462 See Entergy Testimony at 81 (A109) (ENTR00029).

463 GALL Report, Rev. 2, § XI.M17 (NYS00147D).

464 Compare id. at XI M17-1 to M17-2 (NYS00147D) (The analysis is bounding because in general the predicted wear rates and component thicknesses are conservative when compared to actual field measurements.) with GALL Report, Rev. 1 at XI M-61 to M-62 (NYS00146C) (omitting this text).

465 See Draft ISG, App. D at D-7 (ENT000573);Section IV.B, above.

should be used as a bounding rather than a best-estimate model.466 Dr. Hiser testified that the Draft ISG, although not yet final, sets forth the Staffs proposed position, and reflects the Staffs intent to clarify the GALL Report, Rev. 2 and prevent misinterpretations of how CHECWORKS should be used.467 171. Based on Entergys and the Staffs testimony, we disagree with Dr. Hopenfeld that CHECWORKS is only acceptable if it provides a conservative analysis of FAC wear rates.

Instead we conclude that CHECWORKS is designed and used as a best estimate code, and that is how it functions at IPEC. Further, we disagree with Dr. Hopenfelds contention that applicants should use CHECWORKS as a bounding model, based upon the GALL Report, Rev. 2. Instead we credit the testimony of the NRC Staff witnesses Mr. Yoder and Dr. Hiser that the reference to CHECWORKS providing a bounding or conservative analysis in the GALL Report, Rev. 2 was not intended to require a change to FAC Programs at IPEC and elsewhere throughout the industry. The use of CHECWORKS as a best estimate code at IPEC is consistent with the GALL Report, Rev. 1, and meets the intent of the GALL Report, Rev. 2, as that intent is clarified by the Draft ISG.

4. The IPEC CHECWORKS Model Includes and Relies Upon Appropriate Data Going Back Decades 172. Next, we turn to the question of whether there is sufficient UT thickness data in the IPEC CHECWORKS model for the software to play its role as an effective inspection location selection tool within the IPEC FAC Program.

466 Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1674:22-25 (Yoder); see also id. at 1675:14-15 (Yoder) (The staff recognizes that CHECWORKS is a best estimate model.); id. at 1648:25-1649:1 (Horowitz) (stating that CHECWORKS was originally designed to be a best-estimate model).

467 See id. at 1684:12-15 (Hiser).

173. Dr. Hopenfeld testified that in the Vermont Yankee proceeding, data going back to 1989 had assisted in calibrating the CHECWORKS model, but that such data are not available at IPEC.468 Dr. Hopenfeld disputes the validity of Entergys testimony that similar historical data are part of the IPEC CHECWORKS model and therefore the CHECWORKS predictions at IPEC are less reliable, as they allegedly lack years of calibration data.469 174. Dr. Hopenfelds opinion regarding the amount of historical data incorporated into the IPEC CHECWORKS models is based on his visual review of the graphic wear plots in Appendix J of Entergys SFA Model Reports.470 The Appendix J plots display, in graphic format, the wear data that typically appears in Appendix I of these reports.471 Dr. Hopenfeld testified that he reviewed the Appendix J wear plots,472 but that these plots did not include older data that Entergy has relied upon.473 175. We disagree. It appears that Dr. Hopenfeld did not recognize that the source of each data point used in the current IPEC CHECWORKS models is available in the SFA Model Reports, and incorrectly assumed that each report only contained data from the immediately preceding outage.474 Appendix I of each SFA model report includes tables that show when each 468 See Hopenfeld Report at 20 (RIVR00005).

469 See id.

470 See, e.g., Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1777:20-21 (Hopenfeld) (I didnt go through each point in the back to see where it came from.).

471 See IP2 SFA Calculations, App. J (ENT000050); IP3 SFA Calculations, App. J (ENT000051).

472 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 21:24-27 (RIV000108) (My assessment of Entergys CHECWORKS data involved reviewing every graph included in every CHECWORKS modeling report that was provided to me for review by Entergy.) (emphasis in original).

473 See id. at 38:14-26 (In order to assess [Entergys claims that CHECWORKS has been adequately benchmarked], it would be necessary for me to actually review the data. . . . And yet, despite the fact that no older data was required to be disclosed based on Entergys representations in this case and the fact that I have, therefore, not reviewed any historical data, Entergy now appears to want to rely on it to support its reliance on CHECWORKS.).

474 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1777:20-21 (Hopenfeld) (admitting that he only reviewed the Appendix J plots in the SFA Calculations and not the underlying numerical data, including the information on when each UT measurement was taken).

data point in the Appendix J plots was taken.475 The tables in Appendix I show that the Appendix J wear plots include data from the most recent inspections on each inspected component in the run.476 In many cases, these data go back to outages from the 1990s.477 At the hearing, Dr. Hopenfeld admitted that he had not reviewed the SFA Calculations in sufficient detail to dispute these facts.478 176. Based on the information in the IPEC CHECWORKS SFA Model Reports and the written and oral testimony of Entergys witnesses, we find that inspection data collected during earlier outages have been incorporated into, and remain a part of, the IPEC CHECWORKS model.479 The SFA Model Reports prepared after each outage at IPEC are cumulative, and contain the most recent data for all inspected components, not just the results of inspections at the most recent outage.480 Thus, the data used in the current CHECWORKS model are available in the most recent SFA Model Reports, regardless of when the data were collected.481 177. For these reasons, we conclude that the IPEC CHECWORKS model appropriately includes and relies upon sufficient historical data, as documented in Entergys SFA Model Reports. No relevant IPEC FAC Program data have been lost. On the contrary, Riverkeeper and 475 See, e.g., IP2 SFA Calculations, App. I (ENT000050).

476 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1774:21-1775:8 (Aleksick).

477 See id.

478 See id. at 1777:16-18 (Hopenfeld) (I didnt delve into the possibility there would be some two, or three, or four points that were provided from 1992.).

479 See Entergy Testimony at 93-94 (A129) (ENTR00029).

480 See Tr. at 1775:1-8 (Aleksick) (testifying that component inspection results are contained within the model dating back to 1992 for IP2).

481 See id.; see also IP2 SFA Calculations, App. I (ENT000050); IP3 SFA Calculations, App. I (ENT000051).

its expert, Dr. Hopenfeld, had full access to the relevant data. In fact, Dr. Hopenfeld cited the data in his direct testimony.482 F. Dr. Hopenfelds Challenges to How the Various Tools Are Used Together Within the FAC Program Lack Merit

1. Dr. Hopenfelds Original Claim that CHECWORKS Is the Predominant Feature of the IPEC FAC Program Is Incorrect 178. Initially, in his direct testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld asserted that CHECWORKS is the predominant feature of the IPEC FAC Program.483 179. Entergys witnesses, Dr. Horowitz, Mr. Mew and Mr. Aleksick, responded to this point in their written testimony and during hearing. They established that, in any given outage, first-time inspections based on CHECWORKS predictions normally only constitute 25 to 33% of the FAC inspections during an outage.484 This is consistent with percentages typical for the U.S.

nuclear fleet.485 This also is consistent with the recommendations in NSAC-202L-R3.486 180. At hearing, Dr. Hopenfeld conceded that, at the time of his direct testimony, he did not know that CHECWORKS constituted about 25% of Entergys FAC inspections.487 This 482 See Hopenfeld Report at 6-7 (RIVR00005) (citing Indian Point Unit 2 CHECWORKS SFA Model (Dec. 2000)

(RIV00016A); id. at 8 (citing Indian Point Unit 3 CHECWORKS SFA Model, Calculation No. 0705.100-01, Rev. 2 (Aug. 2, 2011) (RIV000020)); id. at 15 (citing Indian Point Unit 3 CHECWORKS SFA Model, Calculation No. 0705.100-01, Rev. 2, Appendix K (Aug. 2, 2011) (RIV000021)).

483 Id. at 23 (RIVR00005); see also id. at 4 (Entergys method of selecting components for wall measurements and determining the time between successive thickness measurements is primarily based on predictions generated from the computer code, CHECWORKS.).

484 See Entergy Testimony at 49-52 (A77) (ENTR00029) (providing specific data and charts showing inspection breakdowns for recent IPEC outages); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1484:8-11 (Aleksick) (It varies a bit from cycle to cycle. But on average, its around one quarter of the total inspection scope would be newly identified, previously uninspected components that come from CHECWORKS.); see also id. at 1484:25-1485:5 (Mew).

485 See Entergy Testimony at 49 (A77) (ENTR00029). It is also consistent with practices at Vermont Yankee, as demonstrated in the hearing on its LRAwhere Dr. Hopenfeld was a witness. See id. at 94 (A130) (citing Vt.

Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 881 (only one-third of the inspection locations [at Vermont Yankee] were based on the results from CHECWORKS.)).

486 See NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-5 to 4-6 (RIV000012).

487 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1668:1-6 (Hopenfeld) (When they gave us the color, the color chart, it became obvious they were using [CHECWORKS] for like total 25 percent.). We note that this should not have been a information, however, was available in the reports Entergy disclosed and cited in its testimony.488 181. For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Entergys and the NRC Staffs testimony that CHECWORKS is a significant tool used to select inspection locations for the FAC Program, but disagree with Dr. Hopenfeld that it is the only or predominant tool, at IPEC or elsewhere.489

2. Dr. Hopenfelds Revised Claim that Entergy Has Improperly Relegated CHECWORKS to a Secondary Role within the FAC Program Is Incorrect 182. In his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld revised his approach, and claimed that Entergys relegation of CHECWORKS to a secondary role is inconsistent with the GALL Report and NSAC-202L, which clearly emphasize the use of quantitative predictions of a computer code such as CHECWORKS as the main tool to predict wall thinning and manage FAC.490 183. As noted, use of CHECWORKS is not an all or none proposition, and both of Dr. Hopenfelds characterizations are inaccurate. The GALL Report (Revisions 1 and 2) and NSAC-202L-R3, however, do not specify that CHECWORKS should be the main tool or the predominant feature of the FAC Program.491 Indeed, as previously noted, Dr. Hopenfeld surprise to Dr. Hopenfeld, given his experience as a witness in the Vermont Yankee proceeding. See supra note 485.

488 See Entergy Testimony at 49-50 (A77) (ENTR00029) (citing, e.g., Scope of Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Inspection Points for 2R19 Outage (Apr. 4, 2010) (ENT000057); Scope of Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Inspection Points for 3R15 Outage (Mar 2009) (ENT000064)).

489 See, e.g., NRC Staff Testimony at 36-37 (A70) (NRCR00121).

490 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 10:25-27 (RIV000108) ([T]he GALL Report and NSAC-202L clearly emphasize the use of quantitative predictions of a computer code such as CHECWORKS as the main tool to predict wall thinning and manage FAC.).

491 See GALL Report, Rev. 1, at XI.M-61 to M-62 (NYS00146C); GALL Report, Rev. 2 at XI M17-1 to M17-2 (NYS00147D); NSAC-202L-R3 at 2-3, 2-4 (RIV000012); Tr. at 1598:13-1601:4 (Hopenfeld).

acknowledged that, contrary to his written testimony, neither the GALL Report nor NSAC-202L clearly emphasized this point.492 184. Dr. Hopenfeld also contended that the NRC Staffs approval of Entergys FAC Program appears to have been based on an assumption that CHECWORKS is the predominant feature of the program, which, on rebuttal, Dr. Hopenfeld disputed.493 185. This claim appears to be based on a misreading by Dr. Hopenfeld of the NRC Staffs SER. The SER states that CHECWORKS is used as one of several bases for establishing which in-scope piping component locations should be scheduled for inspection at the next outage.494 Nowhere in the SERs discussion of the FAC Program does the Staff state that CHECWORKS is a predominant feature of the overall program. The NRC Staff witnesses Mr. Yoder and Dr. Hiser testified that the Staff was aware of the other tools Entergy used as part of its FAC Program and verified that the FAC Program used CHECWORKS as one of several bases for establishing inspection locations as part of its review.495 186. Finally, in rebuttal, Dr. Hopenfeld raised the question why, if CHECWORKS is so reliable, its contribution is limited only to 25% of Entergys total FAC Program?496 187. Entergys witnesses, Dr. Horowitz, Mr. Aleksick, Mr. Azevedo, and Mr. Mew, had previously explained, however, that the proportion of modeled piping is dictated primarily by the plant design, rather than any feature of CHECWORKS.497 CHECWORKS is used to 492 See, e.g., Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1598:13-1601:4 (Hopenfeld) (There was no clear definition in NUREG-1801

[the GALL Report] that says CHECWORKS is the main tool. There is none in [NSAC-]202[L]).

493 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 3:22 (RIV000108); see also id. at 10:9-13 (citing SER at 3-21 to 3-31 (NYS00326B)).

494 SER at 3-25 (NYS00326B).

495 See NRC Staff Testimony at 36-27 (A70) (NRCR00121).

496 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 28:1-3 (RIV000108).

497 See Entergy Testimony at 42-42 (A68) (ENTR00029).

model as many components as possible, but it is not possible to model small-bore piping or certain types of large-bore piping in CHECWORKS.498 Those components are categorized as SNM. In addition, as a FAC Program matures, more components are inspected and more data become available.499 Therefore, through this process, over time, trending becomes more significant to the inspection location selection process, and CHECWORKS predictions become less significant.500 188. Based on the testimony of Entergys and the NRC Staffs witnesses, we find that Entergys use of CHECWORKS as one tool among many is consistent with the applicable guidance in NSAC-202L-R3 and the GALL Report, and standard practice in the industry.

CHECWORKS contribution to the IPEC FAC Program is appropriate given the plant design and the proportion of modeled components is comparable to other facilities. We reject Dr.

Hopenfelds unsupported claim that the IPEC FAC Program is deficient upon the basis that Entergy has improperly relegated CHECWORKS to a minor role within that program.

3. Dr. Hopenfelds Challenges to the Use of Other Tools in the IPEC FAC Program Lack Merit 189. In this section, we consider Dr. Hopenfelds challenges to the adequacy of the various other tools used by Entergy to select inspection locations as part of the FAC Program:

trending, operating experience, information from other inspection programs, and engineering judgment.501 Dr. Hopenfeld claims that, even assuming that the other tools employed by Entergy 498 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1338:7-12 (Horowitz).

499 See Entergy Testimony at 83-84 (A113) (ENTR00029); see also Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1302:15-20 (Aleksick);

Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1861:22-1862:3 (Aleksick) (noting that as time goes on, the FAC program collect[s] more and more inspection data).

500 See Oct. 15, 2012 Tr. at 1299:1-5 (Aleksick) ([O]nce we inspect a component, the CHECWORKS prediction becomes much less important. Once weve inspected it, we know how thick it is, we know what its thickness profile is and what its wear rate will be.).

501 See Hopenfeld Report at 21-23 (RIVR00005); Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 9:29-17:15 (RIV000108).

Dr. Hopenfeld does not appear to challenge the IPEC SNM ranking tool. Specifically, Dr. Hopenfelds written as part of the IPEC FAC Program are truly independent, the FAC Program is still deficient because those tools are ill-defined and unreliable.502 190. As an initial matter, as previously explained in Section IV.D.2, we find that Entergy does not use the various FAC Program tools as stand-alone methods, as Dr. Hopenfeld states.503 The various FAC Program inspection selection tools complement each other, and their use in this manner is consistent with the GALL Report and NSAC-202L-R3.504 Mr. Mew, Dr.

Horowitz, and Mr. Aleksick showed that the various other tools are independent of CHECWORKS in the sense that inspections can be selected and scheduled based on any one of the various tools.505 The inspection data are collected and maintained in a trending database called FAC Managerthat is separate from CHECWORKS.506 Dr. Hopenfeld misinterprets Entergys testimony that the various tools in the FAC Program are independent when he seeks to evaluate each as a stand-alone tool.507 On the contrary, as Mr. Aleksick testified at the hearing, the tools are complementary in that they each select components for different reasons, offering robust inspection coverage of FAC-susceptible systems.508 testimony did not address this topic and at hearing he was not prepared to discuss the SNM rankings. See Oct.

16, 2012 Tr. at 1501:6-12 (Hopenfeld) (stating that he did not come prepared to discuss SNM components in detail and that he really [had not] put sufficient thought into managing FAC of these components).

502 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 9:29-17:15 (RIV000108).

503 Hopenfeld Report at 21 (RIVR00005).

504 See Section IV.D.2, above.

505 See Entergy Testimony at 45-52 (A72-77) (ENTR00029); see also Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1480:11-1481:12 (Mew) (stating CHECWORKS is not used to select all inspections at IPEC and that there are different elements of the FAC program).

506 See Entergy Testimony at 54 (A80) (ENTR00029); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1506:6-10 (Aleksick) (Once a component is initially inspected, regardless of its origin or the reason for that selection, whether it was CHECWORKS or anything else, it goes into our trending database.). For modeled components, the inspection data is also entered into CHECWORKS to recalibrate the model. See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1744:16-23 (Aleksick).

507 See Entergy Testimony at 55 (A80), 57-58 (A84), 69 (A95) (ENTR00029).

508 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1610:22-1611:3 (Aleksick) (stating that Entergy uses a variety of techniques in a combined and complementary manner . . . that gives the best coverage).

191. With respect to engineering judgment, Dr. Hopenfeld again asserts that engineering judgment, as applied by Entergy in the FAC Program, is too subjective and lacks the requisite quantitative rigor to be an effective stand-alone inspection selection tool.509 But as we have noted, none of the various tools stand alone. In light of the other, more quantitative and analytical tools in the program, such as CHECWORKS, the SNM rankings, and trending of past measurements, we find that the subjectivity of engineering judgment is not a deficiency in the FAC Program. Engineering judgment, moreover, is only used to select a relatively small percentage of the inspection scope in any given outage.510 192. With respect to operating experience, Dr. Hopenfeld apparently misunderstands the use of this tool. He claims that Entergy must provide more information in order to show how this tool is used to estimate wear rates and predict wall thinning.511 Entergys witnesses Mr.

Azevedo, Mr. Aleksick, and Mr. Mew testified that, consistent with NSAC-202L-R3, operating experience is used directly to select inspection locations based on events.512 It is not used in any numerical calculations of predicted wear rates.513 In any event, the use of operating experience in the selection of inspection locations is documented in detail in Attachment A of the IPEC System Susceptibility Evaluation (SSE) Reports.514 Dr. Hopenfeld does not address or 509 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 16:15-17:15 (RIV000108). As previously noted, in the Vermont Yankee license renewal proceeding, Dr. Hopenfeld testified that the FAC Program should dispense with the quantitative CHECWORKS analysis and instead rely on a dedicated, experienced engineer. See Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 888. Thus, Dr. Hopenfeld appears to be criticizing engineering judgment as too subjective in this proceeding, after advocating the sole reliance on such judgment in the prior proceeding.

510 See Entergy Testimony at 53-54 (A77, Figs. 1 & 2) (ENTR00029).

511 Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 14:24-29 (RIV000108).

512 See Entergy Testimony at 47 (A74) (ENTR00029) (If new operating experience is applicable to IPEC, then Entergy performs inspections based upon it, or, alternatively, documents the reason(s) why an inspection is not required in a particular instance.); id. at 53-54 (A77) (showing the proportion of inspections selected based on operating experience at each recent outage) .

513 See id. at 47 (A74), 53-54 (A77).

514 See IP2 SSE Report, Attach. A (ENT000048); IP3 SSE Report, Attach. A (ENT000049).

respond to this documentation when he seeks more information on the use of operating experience.515 193. With respect to trending, Dr. Hopenfeld asserted that trending as a stand-alone tool would only be reliable if a very large portion of the susceptible components were inspected on a regular basis and if the rate of wear due to FAC was linear.516 But there is ample inspection data available in the FAC Program,517 including over 6,500 data pointsby Dr.

Hopenfelds own countthat he has reviewed.518 In addition, as Mr. Mew, Dr. Horowitz, and Mr. Aleksick explained, trending is not a stand-alone tool. Instead it is used in concert with other inspection location selection tools at IPEC.519 194. As to the reliance of trending on the principle of linearity in the rate of FAC, Dr.

Hopenfeld testified at the hearing that if the rate of FAC is constant with time, then trending would be an effective tool to manage FAC.520 Given that we have previously concluded, in Section IV.B.3, that the rate of FAC is constant under constant operating conditions, we find this statement to be a qualified concession regarding the effectiveness of trending. We therefore conclude that neither of Dr. Hopenfelds criticisms of trending is valid. On the contrary, we find that it is a useful tool within the larger FAC Program.

195. More generally, we find that Dr. Hopenfelds critiques of all of these other inspection location selection tools are premised on the assumption that CHECWORKS provides 515 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 14:20-29 (RIV000108).

516 See id. at 11:23-14:15.

517 Hopenfeld Report at 20 (RIVR00005).

518 Id. at 5.

519 See Section IV.D.2, above.

520 Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1493:17-20 (Hopenfeld) ([I]f the assumption is correct, then the rate is linear and it could be, as I said, a straight pipe or even if you use some averages, [trending is] not too bad.).

no useful information and thus each tool must be considered in isolation.521 But as discussed throughout this section, Entergy has shown that all of the tools are complementarythey are designed to be used together with CHECWORKS, not as a substitute for it.522 We therefore conclude that Entergy has a robust set of complementary tools that allow it to select FAC Program inspection locations as the circumstances require.523 Nothing in Dr. Hopenfelds testimony leads us to question this conclusion. Indeed, even if we were to find a deficiency in one of those tools (which we do not), we would still find that the overall program provides a robust set of tools for the FAC engineer to use.

G. Riverkeepers Remaining Challenges to the Adequacy of the FAC Program Lack Merit 196. Dr. Hopenfeld raises several other challenges to the IPEC FAC Program, including: (1) the potential for FAC in steam generator components; (2) the alleged need for extended benchmarking of the CHECWORKS model following the power uprates; (3) alleged distinctions between IPEC and the Vermont Yankee plant, such that the findings of the Vermont Yankee Board should not apply here; (4) the alleged superior alternative software used by

Électricité de France (EDF), known as BRT-CICERO, (5) alleged deficiencies based on industry and plant-specific operating experience; and (6) Entergys alleged disregard for certain design basis events and other aging mechanisms. As discussed below, we find no valid basis for any of these criticisms. The IPEC FAC Program, including CHECWORKS, is consistent with the GALL Report and, overall, provides reasonable assurance that the effects of aging due to FAC on in-scope components will be adequately managed throughout the PEO.

521 See, e.g., Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 17:9-13 (RIV000108) (stating that the other tools do not substitute for a reliable predictive software package).

522 See also, e.g., Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1610:21-1611:3 (Aleksick).

523 See Entergy Testimony at 45-52 (A72-77), 73 (A98) (ENTR00029).

1. Potential FAC in Steam Generator Components Is Not Managed Through the FAC Program or CHECWORKS 197. In direct and rebuttal testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld claimed that components in the steam generators are susceptible to FAC and should be, but are not, included in the IPEC FAC Program.524 Specifically, Dr. Hopenfeld asserted that components inside the steam generators, like the feedwater inlet rings, are subject to very high turbulence and thus are susceptible to FAC, but are not modeled in CHECWORKS.525 198. In response, Mr. Azevedo, Mr. Mew, and Mr. Cox testified that the effects of aging on steam generator components are managed under the IPEC Steam Generator Integrity Program.526 The adequacy of this program is outside the scope of this contention. In addition, while the original IPEC steam generators may have had FAC-susceptible components such as the feedwater inlet rings and J-tubes, the steam generators have been replaced at both IP2 and IP3, such that the feedwater inlet rings and J-tubes in the new steam generators are significantly less susceptible to FAC.527 Dr. Hopenfeld did not dispute this testimony, and instead acknowledged that his claims assumed that Indian Point had not replaced these steam generator components.528 199. Dr. Hopenfeld also identified steam generator blowdown lines as a component of concern, stating that he has not seen any CHECWORKS data on blowdown lines.529 The blowdown lines are within the scope of the IPEC FAC Program, but are categorized as SNM 524 See Hopenfeld Report at 24 (RIV000003) (Notably, Entergy has not provided data on CHECWORKS predictions for components inside the steam generators.); Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 28:16-26 (RIV000108).

525 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 28:18-23 (RIV000108).

526 See Entergy Testimony at 40 (A64) (ENTR00029); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1522:6-10 (Azevedo) (noting the same).

527 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1521:15-1522:5 (Azevedo).

528 See id. at 1522:20-1523:12 (Hopenfeld).

529 See id. at 1524:15-22 (Hopenfeld).

components, not CHECWORKS-modeled components.530 Thus, the absence of CHECWORKS data on the blowdown lines is expected. As previously noted, Dr. Hopenfeld has provided no specific criticisms of Entergys SNM ranking process used to address potential FAC in the blowdown lines and other non-modeled components.

200. We therefore conclude that there is no evidence in the record suggesting any deficiency in Entergys management of potential FAC in steam generator components or steam generator blowdown lines. On the contrary, the record shows that aging effects on the IPEC steam generators are managed under IPECs Steam Generator Integrity Program, not the FAC Program, and that the new steam generators at IPEC have feedwater inlet rings that are significantly less susceptible to wear from FAC. As for the steam generator blowdown lines, we find that Riverkeeper has raised no valid criticism of how these components are addressed within the IPEC FAC Program.

2. CHECWORKS Does Not Require 10 to 15 Years of Benchmarking Following a Power Uprate 201. We now consider one of the original allegations in Riverkeepers contention, which is that following the 2004 and 2005 SPUs at IPEC, there will need to be an extended period of benchmarking, of up to 10 to 15 years, before CHECWORKS can be used as part of the FAC Program.531 202. As noted previously, in 2004, IP2 underwent a 3.26% SPU, and in 2005, IP3 underwent a 4.85% SPU.532 Entergy updated the IP2 and IP3 CHECWORKS models in 2005 to 530 See id. at 1526:8-12 (Mew); see also, e.g., IP2 SSE Report at C-16 (ENT000048).

531 See Riverkeeper Petition at 21-22; Hopenfeld Report at 3-4 (RIVR00005).

532 See Entergy Testimony at 62 (A91) (ENTR00029); Approved Applications for Power Uprates (Oct. 28, 2009)

(ENT000083).

include SPU operating parameter changes, such as flow rates and operating temperatures.533 The updated CHECWORKS results were used in the inspection planning for the subsequent outages.534 Entergy conducted numerous FAC inspections at locations specifically selected because of the SPU.535 203. We find no support in the record for Dr. Hopenfelds claim that 10 to 15 years of post-uprate benchmarking is required before CHECWORKS can be useful.536 There is no need for extended post-SPU benchmarking because, as we concluded above in Section IV.E, CHECWORKS is properly performing its intended screening and ranking function.537 204. This conclusion also is supported by the Vermont Yankee Board decision, which rejected a similar claim from Dr. Hopenfeld, holding that his claim was unreasonable and not defensible in light of the goal of CHECWORKS to merely identify locations for plant inspections.538 This conclusion applies equally to IPEC.539 205. In addition, Entergy introduced as evidence a recent EPRI study examining the impact of uprates of up to 20% on FAC Programs and found that CHECWORKS reasonably matched actual inspection conditions after the power uprates.540 533 See Entergy Testimony at 62 (A91) (ENTR00029); NRC Staff Testimony at 29 (A49) (NRCR00121).

534 See Entergy Testimony at 62 (A91) (ENTR00029) (citing IP2 Power Uprate Analysis (ENT000072); IP3 Power Uprate Analysis (ENT000073); NRC Audit Report at 15 (ENT000041)).

535 See Entergy Testimony at 49-50 (A77) (ENTR00029) (citing Scope of Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Inspection Points for 3R14 Outage (Apr. 2, 2007) (ENT000061)); see also Scope of Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Inspection Points for 2R15 and 2R16 Outages (Aug. 2002; June 2005) (ENT000060).

536 See Hopenfeld Report at 4 (RIVR00005).

537 See Section IV.E.2, above; see also Entergy Testimony at 78-80 (A105-06), 85-86 (A115) (ENTR00029).

538 Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 889.

539 The SPUs at IP2 and IP3 (3.26% and 4.85%, respectively) are much smaller than the 20% EPU at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. See Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 811.

540 See Entergy Testimony at 86-87 (A116) (ENTR00029); EPRI 2011 Study (ENT000081).

206. In response, Dr. Hopenfeld asserted that the EPRI 2011 Study did not include IPEC.541 But as we have discussed throughout this decision, the Board finds that at IPEC, CHECWORKS is used in a manner that is consistent with NRC and industry guidance and experience.542 Therefore, we do not find valid Dr. Hopenfelds attempt to distinguish the IPEC FAC Program from the findings of the EPRI Report.

207. Furthermore, Mr. Aleksick, Mr. Mew, and Dr. Horowitz have reviewed the extensive ultrasonic testing data collected under the IPEC FAC Program since the 2004 and 2005 uprates and found the correlation between the CHECWORKS model-predicted wear and the measured wear to be consistent with the level of correlation prior to SPU.543 208. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the extended benchmarking that Dr.

Hopenfeld describes is unreasonable and unnecessary for IPEC, just as it was for Vermont Yankee.544

3. Dr. Hopenfelds Attempts to Distinguish the IPEC FAC Program from the Program Found Acceptable in Vermont Yankee Lack Merit 209. Dr. Hopenfeld raises a variety of reasons why, in his opinion, the conclusions of the Vermont Yankee Board should not apply here. First, he states that the Vermont Yankee decision does not apply to IPEC because Vermont Yankee is a smaller plant.545 In rebuttal, Dr.

Hopenfeld quotes a portion of Entergys testimony in the Vermont Yankee proceeding to indicate 541 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 32:11-13 (RIV000108). The EPRI 2011 Study focused on plants that had undergone much larger power uprates than the SPUs at IPEC. See EPRI 2011 Study at 3-1 (ENT000081).

542 See Section IV.C.3, IV.D.2.

543 See Entergy Testimony at 62-66 (A91-92) (ENTR00029); see also Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1747:25-1748:5 (Aleksick) (stating that likewise the SPU had a very small impact on predicted wear rates).

544 See Entergy Testimony. at 85-86 (A115) (ENTR00029); see also Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 883.

545 See Hopenfeld Report at 19-20 (RIVR00005).

that Entergy has allegedly previously testified that the size of a plant affects the rate of FAC.546 In Vermont Yankee, Entergys witness testified that:

[Vermont Yankee] is a relatively small and simple plant. There are fewer FAC-susceptible systems and piping components than at a typical plant, and many of those were either originally constructed of FAC-resistant materials or have been replaced with FAC-resistant materials since their initial installation. The original plant design and the component replacements result in a significantly smaller amount of FAC-susceptible piping at Vermont Yankee as compared to the typical nuclear power plant of similar size.547 210. According to Dr. Hopenfeld, this testimony conflicts with Dr. Horowitzs testimony that the absolute size of a plant is not strongly related to the rate of wear due to FAC.548 211. As is clear from the foregoing quotation, however, Entergys testimony in Vermont Yankee did not discuss local wear ratesit concerned the number of FAC-susceptible components in a smaller plant. Thus, there is no inconsistency between Dr. Horowitzs testimony in this proceeding and Entergys testimony in Vermont Yankee. We therefore find no reason to question Dr. Horowitzs testimony, supported by standard technical references, that the rate of FAC is largely influenced by local water velocity, which is not significantly influenced by the size of the plant.549 546 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 36:19-37:7 (RIV000108).

547 Entergys Initial Statement of Position on New England Coalition Contentions at 36 (May 15, 2008), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML081750035 (emphasis added) (quoted in part in Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 36:19-37:7 (RIV000108)).

548 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 37:4-7 (RIV000108).

549 See Entergy Testimony at 30 (A50), 91 (A126) (ENTR00029) (citing Flow-Accelerated Corrosion in Power Plants at 3-1 to -2 (ENT00036A); NSAC-202L-R3 at 1-2 (RIV000012)).

212. Dr. Hopenfelds next point is that the Vermont Yankee decision is inapplicable because that plant is a boiling water reactor (BWR), which is allegedly less susceptible to FAC than the PWRs at IPEC.550 213. Dr. Horowitz and Mr. Aleksick responded that while PWRs were originally considered more susceptible to FAC, today, the rates of FAC are roughly comparable in the two types of reactors due to improved PWR water chemistry practices.551 In rebuttal, Dr. Hopenfeld did not respond to this evidence.552 We therefore find his claim that PWRs today are generally more susceptible to FAC than BWRs to be unsupported.

214. Finally, Dr. Hopenfeld claims that Entergys evidence suggests that further recalibration of CHECWORKS at IPEC is not likely to generate conservative predictions, as Entergys attempts over the last decade (including following the uprates) have not had a positive effect.553 Moreover, according to Dr. Hopenfeld, Entergys alleged acknowledgment and acceptance of non-conservative results suggests that it has no intention of properly recalibrating the model.554 215. In response, the Staff witnesses Dr. Hiser and Mr. Yoder testified that CHECWORKS is self-benchmarked by incorporating plant-specific inspection data into the model.555 This process improves the accuracy of CHECWORKS wear predictions, improving 550 See Hopenfeld Report at 20 (RIVR00005).

551 See Entergy Testimony at 91-92 (A127) (ENTR00029) (citing EPRI, PWR Advanced Amine Application Guidelines, Rev. 2, at 1-1 (Oct. 1997) (ENT000067)).

552 See generally Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony (RIV000108).

553 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1732:15-24 (Hopenfeld) (stating that CHECWORKS results are so poor at IPEC that they cannot be benchmarked).

554 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 19:13-18 (RIV000108).

555 See NRC Staff Testimony at 15 (A24) (NRCR00121).

the model over time as more inspections occur and data are incorporated.556 Moreover, the effect of the SPU on IPEC was previously reviewed by the Staff when the uprate was sought.557 Nonetheless, the Staff re-reviewed the uprate as part of the LRA review and sought additional information from Entergy pertaining to the uprates to verify that the process variables were changed to account for the power uprated conditions.558 216. We also find that Dr. Hopenfelds criticism is fundamentally premised on the assumption that CHECWORKS is not adequately performing its intended function, a claim we have already rejected.559 Moreover, we simply cannot credit Dr. Hopenfelds unsupported, broad-brush criticisms of CHECWORKS, a program which, as discussed above, has been endorsed by the NRC and has been used for decades at every U.S. nuclear plant and at many other plants around the world.560 For these reasons, we find Dr. Hopenfelds claim that the IPEC CHECWORKS model cannot be calibrated to be unpersuasive.

217. Therefore, we disagree with Dr. Hopenfelds attempts to distinguish the facts of this case from the Vermont Yankee proceeding. Instead, we agree with the Vermont Yankee Boards finding that Entergys fleet-wide FAC Programimplemented at Vermont Yankee and IPEC561is adequate.

4. There Is No Evidence Regarding BRT-CICERO that Suggests Any Deficiency in CHECWORKS 218. In rebuttal, Dr. Hopenfeld raised a new issue, alleging that because CHECWORKS is inherently deficient, Entergy should use a different software, such as EDFs 556 See id.at 16 (A25).

557 See id.at 29-30 (A49); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1697:19-24 (Yoder) (noting the same).

558 See NRC Staff Testimony at 29-30 (A49) (NRCR00121).

559 See Section IV.E.2 above.

560 See Entergy Testimony at 22 (A36) (ENTR00029).

561 See id. at 90 (A124).

BRT-CICERO program, which is allegedly more accurate at predicting wall thickness than CHECWORKS.562 219. Dr. Hopenfelds reliance on the BRT-CICERO Paper and its description of EDFs program, however, presents numerous problems. First, it is not the Boards role to direct an applicant to use one program over another, or to select the better programthat is beyond our authority.563 220. Second, we do not agree with Dr. Hopenfeld that the BRT-CICERO Paper shows that this program can provide better accuracy than CHECWORKS predictions.564 Dr.

Hopenfelds point appears to be based on a visual assessment of the graph of predicted against actual thickness measurements in Figure 7 in the BRT-CICERO paper. But, as stated in the BRT CICERO Paper, in creating Figure 7 the authors excluded unspecified wrong input data that are responsible for artificial non conservative predictions.565 Given the exclusion of unspecified data from Figure 7, any comparison between the BRT-CICERO results and the various IPEC CHECWORKS graphs in the SFA Model Reports is of little value.

221. Figure 7, moreover, is a scatter-plot of wall thickness, not wear.566 Although wall thickness and wear are closely related, they are different parameters. A wall thickness plot will generally show less scatter than the same data plotted as wear, because a components wall thickness is usually a much larger value than the amount of degradation, or wear.567 Thus, the 562 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 24:6-11, 30:14-15 (RIV000108).

563 See Pilgrim, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC at 315-16 (stating that the question is not whether a better model exists, but rather whether the one the applicant has selected is reasonable); see also Seabrook, CLI-12-05, slip op. at 28-29 (We have held that contentions admitted for litigation must point to a deficiency in the application, and not merely suggestions of other ways an analysis could have been done . . . .).

564 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 24:6-11 (RIV000108).

565 BRT-CICERO Paper at 9 (RIV000110).

566 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1812:5-1814:11 (Judge Wardwell, Hopenfeld).

567 See id.

same data will look like there is less scatter when plotted as wall thickness instead of wear.568 But Dr. Hopenfelds review of Figure 7 appears to have been a cursory visual review, rather than any mathematical review.569 His testimony therefore did not address this problem. Thus, while Figure 7 may, at first glance, appear to show results that are superior to CHECWORKS, we find that there is no basis to so conclude.

222. Third, Dr. Hopenfeld relies on the BRT-CICERO Paper to argue that EDF uses a broader definition of FAC than U.S. plants do, and that BRT-CICERO addresses phenomena such as cavitation and droplet impingement.570 The BRT-CICERO Paper, however clearly focuses on FAC.571 When asked to identify where erosion is accounted for in the equations that underpin BRT-CICERO, Dr. Hopenfeld conceded that his point was unsupported by any information in the BRT-CICERO paper.572 223. Finally, Dr. Hopenfeld suggested that EDFs approach to managing degradation due to FAC was superior, in part because it measures chromium in components.573 Mr.

Azevedo, however, responded that where appropriate, chromium measurements are performed 568 See id. The BRT-CICERO graph also looks better from a visual perspective because the scale is in millimeters (0.04 inches) rather than mils (0.001 inches), which is the scale of the CHECWORKS SFA Model report graphs. See id. at 1812:4-14 (Hopenfeld, Judge Wardwell).

569 See id. at 1812: 2-3 (Hopenfeld) (I didnt spend more than 20 minutes on [it].).

570 See id. at 1816:19-1817:24 (Hopenfeld).

571 BRT-CICERO Paper at 1 (RIV000110) (Among the various degradation modes that causes pipe wall thinning in the secondary system of Nuclear Power Plants (Corrosion, Galvanic Corrosion, Environmental Corrosion, Flow Accelerated Corrosion, Cavitation, Droplet impingement, Erosion and Abrasion) FAC is the one that is the more widespread . . . and that requires constant efforts to fight.) (quoted in Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1816-17 (Judge Wardwell)).

572 See Oct. 17, 2012 Tr. at 1819:6-1821:18 (Hopenfeld) (I originally thought that one of those [variables] did deal with erosion because the way we were talking about it, but I may be wrong about that.).

573 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1536:23-1537:5, 1742:1-2 (Hopenfeld). Steels containing appreciable amounts of chromium, such as stainless steel, are immune to FAC. See Entergy Testimony at 30 (A50) (ENTR00029)

(citing NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-3 (RIV000012)).

under the IPEC FAC Program.574 Mr. Azevedo also explained that these measurements can be imprecise, because levels of chromium can vary within components.575 In any event, we do not agree with Dr. Hopenfeld that the allegedly greater reliance on chromium measurements in the EDF approach undermines the adequacy of the NRC-endorsed NSAC-202L-R3 approach to managing FAC.

224. We therefore find that there is no evidence in the record that BRT-CICERO is superior to CHECWORKS, or that the EDF approach to managing FAC is superior to the approach in this country. Indeed, there are many similarities between the U.S. and French approaches. Moreover, even if we found that BRT-CICERO would somehow be an improvement over CHECWORKS (which we do not), nothing in the record suggests that the differences between BRT-CICERO and CHECWORKS mandate a finding that CHECWORKS, as one element of the overall FAC Program, is inadequate.

5. Criticisms of the FAC Program Based on Selected IPEC Operating Experience Lack Merit 225. Dr. Hopenfeld next points to certain Entergy corrective action program reports which he believes document numerous leaks and reports of excessive wall thinning to show that the IPEC FAC Program has been ineffective.576 226. As a threshold matter, the reasonable assurance standard does not require perfection.577 Nor does NSAC-202L-R3, which states that, even with an effective FAC Program, 574 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1748-50 (Azevedo); see also, e.g., NSAC-202L-R3 at 4-16 (RIV000012) (Measuring Trace Alloy Content).

575 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1748:22-1750:4 (Azevedo).

576 Hopenfeld Report at 17 (RIVR00005) (citing Entergy Operating Experience Review Report IP-RPT LRD05, Rev. 3 (2008) (RIV000024); Daily DER Report, DER-01-01522 (April 25, 2001) (RIV000025);

Entergy Wall Thinning Condition Report Part 1 (Sept. 2008) (RIV000026); Entergy Wall Thinning Condition Report Part 2 (Sept. 2008) (RIV000027); Entergy Condition Report, CR-IP2-2001-10525 (Oct. 31, 2001)

(RIV000028); Entergy Condition Report, CR-IP3-2006-02270 (July 23, 2006) (RIV000029)).

577 See Entergy Testimony at 97-98 (A132) (ENTR00029).

it will never be possible to prevent all FAC-related leaks and ruptures from occurring.578 Instead, the goal is to provide reasonable assurance of the structural integrity of all carbon steel lines containing high-energy fluids such that they will continue to perform their intended functions under 10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a)(3).579 Thus, the fact that a small number of leaksthat, as explained below, did not involve the loss of component intended functionhave occurred in FAC-susceptible systems in the past at IPEC does not reflect poorly on the IPEC FAC Program.580 227. Mr. Cox and Mr. Mew testified that the examples cited in Riverkeepers exhibits reveal a small number of leaks in FAC-susceptible systems over a period of many years.581 Indeed, most of the items identified in Riverkeepers exhibits are simply not deficiencies in the IPEC FAC Program, but instead show examples where wall thinning was identified through FAC Program inspections for correction before loss of component intended function.582 All of these items were of low safety significance; all were documented in Entergys corrective action program and addressed, and, when appropriate, were used as operating experience to inform the inspection scope for future outages.583 None involved the loss of intended function.584 578 NSAC-202L-R3 at 1-3 (RIV000012) (cited in Entergy Testimony at 97-98 (A132) (ENTR00029)).

579 See Entergy Testimony at 26 (A44) (ENTR00029); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1594:2-12 (Azevedo) (agreeing that for license renewal, the key issue is loss of intended function and that since at least 2005 there have been no incidents of the loss of intended function for non-modeled piping at IPEC).

580 We also note that this finding is consistent with the conclusions of the Vermont Yankee Board. See Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 880 (We find that it is reasonable and prudent to differentiate between the catastrophic pipe ruptures that result from the widespread impacts of FAC and the smaller leaks associated with smaller diameter piping and with localized erosion, droplet impingement, and other causes of metal wear that can be detected and repaired prior to any severe damage.); id. at 888 (EPRI, the owner of the CHECWORKS model, and Entergy recognize that the model cannot fully account for all the potential factors associated with FAC and predict all potential leaks in the carbon steel piping.); id. at 892 (We agree that the CHECWORKS model cannot . . . predict all potential leaks in the carbon steel piping. No one has claimed that it could, and that was never the intended purpose for using this model or for the FAC Program itself.).

581 See Entergy Testimony at 95-98 (A131-A133) (ENTR00029).

582 See id.

583 See id.

228. At the hearing, Dr. Hopenfeld admitted that many of the instances of wall-thinning identified in Riverkeepers exhibits were examples where wall-thinning was detected before component failure.585 Therefore, we do not conclude that Riverkeepers exhibits provide evidence of a programmatic problem at IPEC.

229. Even if Dr. Hopenfeld had identified one or more examples of a component loss of intended functionwhich he did notwe would not necessarily conclude that this is evidence of any deficiency in the IPEC FAC Program for the PEO. As we noted previously, reasonable assurance does not mean that the FAC Program must prevent all leaks in FAC-susceptible systems; instead it focuses on preserving the integrity of susceptible systems, such that they can continue to perform their intended functions.586 230. In summary, we agree with Mr. Cox and Mr. Mew that the vast majority of the events discussed in the exhibits cited by Dr. Hopenfeld would be better characterized as FAC Program successes rather than failures.587 We find that Exhibits RIV000024, RIV000025, RIV000026, RIV000027, RIV000028, and RIV000029 are evidence of a FAC Program that provides reasonable assurance that the effects of aging will be adequately managed. Indeed, the record shows that the IPEC FAC Program routinely identifies, documents, and corrects wall-thinning in FAC-susceptible components before a loss of intended function.

584 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1591:3-4 (Azevedo).

585 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1696:4-10 (Hopenfeld) (agreeing that Entergy detected wall thinning before failure many times).

586 See Vt. Yankee, LBP-08-25, 68 NRC at 880, 888, 892-94.

587 See Entergy Testimony at 95-98 (A131-32) (ENTR00029).

6. Criticisms of CHECWORKS and the FAC Program Based on Operating Experience at Other Facilities Lack Merit 231. In his direct testimony, Dr. Hopenfeld discussed [n]umerous instances of undetected FAC have previously resulted in catastrophic events, citing pipe failures at the Surry, San Onofre, Fort Calhoun, and Mihama plants.588 232. In his written testimony, Dr. Horowitz responded by explaining that none of the examples Dr. Hopenfeld cited involved plants that were properly implementing either NSAC-202L or CHECWORKS, and that some of these incidents actually occurred before NSAC-202L or CHECWORKS existed.589 We now consider each of the four events in turn.

233. Surry - In 1986, an elbow failed in the condensate system of Surry, Unit 2.590 Dr.

Horowitz testified that Surry had no FAC Program when the pipe rupture event occurredwhich was before CHECWORKS and before any EPRI guidance on the FAC program was published.591 As indicated in NRC Bulletin 87-01, post-accident investigations reveal that FAC (known at the time as erosion/corrosion) caused the degradation of the elbow.592 The Surry accident resulted in the development of CHEC, the first EPRI computer program used to predict FAC.593 Based on Dr. Horowitzs testimony, we conclude that the Surry accident was a significant impetus for the development of the modern FAC programs in the United States and elsewhere, not an indication of a deficiency in the existing program at IPEC or anywhere else.

588 Hopenfeld Report at 3 (RIVR00005).

589 See Entergy Testimony at 99-101 (A135) (ENTR00029).

590 See id. at 9 (A17).

591 See id. at 9 (A17), 100 (A135).

592 See id. at 9 (A17) (citing NRC Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants at 1 (July 1987)

(RIV000007)).

593 See id. at 100 (A135).

234. San Onofre - In 1993, FAC caused steam generator feedwater inlet rings and J-tubes to fail at San Onofre.594 CHECWORKS was not used (even today, is not used) to analyze these internal steam generator components.595 At IPEC, those components are inspected under the IPEC Steam Generator Integrity Program, the adequacy of which is not a question within the scope of this contention.596 Given that these components are not modeled in CHECWORKS or inspected under the FAC Program, we find that this incident suggests no problem with the reliability of CHECWORKS or the adequacy of the IPEC FAC Program.

235. Fort Calhoun - In 1997, there was an extraction steam piping rupture at the Fort Calhoun Station.597 As Dr. Horowitz testified, although Fort Calhoun used CHECWORKS, personnel made several errors, including a data input error that was the direct cause of the failure to inspect the problem location.598 Entergys FAC Program incorporates peer reviews and independent assessments intended to minimize the potential for errors like those experienced at Fort Calhoun.599 We therefore find that the events at Fort Calhoun suggest no deficiency in the IPEC FAC Program. And as previously noted, we would not necessarily conclude that a single event is indicative of a deficient FAC program.

236. Mihama - Dr. Horowitz explained that the pipe rupture at Mihama in 2004 occurred at a plant that had a FAC Program that did not use CHECWORKS or the NSAC-202L 594 See Hopenfeld Report at 3 (RIVR00005); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1516:4-15 (Hopenfeld).

595 See Entergy Testimony at 100 (A135) (ENTR000029).

596 See id. at 40 (A64); Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1522:6-10 (Azevedo).

597 See Hopenfeld Report at 3 (RIVR00005).

598 See Entergy Testimony at 100 (A135) (ENTR00029); NRC-Information Notice-IN 97-84, Rupture in Extraction Steam Piping as a Result of Flow-Accelerated Corrosion (Dec. 11, 1997) (ENT000084).

599 See Entergy Testimony at 100 (A135) (ENTR00029).

program.600 Mr. Yoder noted that no computer code that models wear rates was used at Mihama.601 We therefore find that, once again, the events at Mihama suggest no deficiency in the IPEC FAC Program.

237. Dr. Horowitz testified that these various events have, in fact, led to great strides in improving FAC programs.602 Dr. Hiser similarly testified that in the decades since the Surry event (the trigger for the creation of modern-day FAC programs) no major FAC-related issues at U.S. plants have occurred.603 Dr. Hiser attributed this to the effectiveness of the NSAC-202L program and its implementation at facilities across the United States.604 238. With respect to these examples of operating experience, we note that the IPEC FAC Program incorporates independent assessments and self-assessments to minimize the potential for the types of problems experienced at the plants discussed above.605 For example, based on the events Fort Calhoun and Mihama, Entergy performed specific additional FAC inspections.606 Ultimately, as the testimony of Entergys and the NRC Staffs witnesses shows, the FAC program draws upon decades of such operating experience.

239. Based on this evidence, the Board concludes that the industry operating experience events discussed by Dr. Hopenfeld do not show any material deficiency in the IPEC FAC Program or the use of CHECWORKS at IPEC. On the contrary, the record shows that 600 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1518:12-1519:7 (Horowitz) (They did not use CHECWORKS. They didnt use anything similar to CHECWORKS.).

601 See id. at 1529:20-24 (Yoder).

602 See Entergy Testimony at 99-100 (A135) (ENTR00029).

603 See Oct. 16, 2012 Tr. at 1528:12-16 (Hiser).

604 See id.

605 See Entergy Testimony at 100-01 (A135) (ENTR00029).

606 See id.

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Entergy has incorporated the relevant operating experience into the IPEC FAC Program, further demonstrating the robust nature of the overall program.

7. Riverkeepers Assorted Remaining Challenges to the FAC Program Lack Merit 240. As previously noted, Dr. Hopenfelds direct testimony alleged that undetected FAC: (1) poses a risk of LOCAs and associated alleged deficiencies in the IPEC PRAs; (2) could affect the integrity of components under seismic loads; (3) could affect the integrity of components under SBO loads; and (4) could affect the likelihood of components succumbing to the effects of metal fatigue.607 Although these claims are not central to the original contention,608 we now consider these four issues.

241. Entergys witnesses Mr. Azevedo and Mr. Cox explained that, when FAC Program inspections reveal wall thinning, the data are evaluated against the appropriate design loading conditions and applicable ANSI B31.1 requirements, including seismic and LOCA loads.609 The IPEC FAC Program requires that any wall thinning below 87.5% nominal thickness is evaluated under system design requirements, including the ANSI B31.1 code specifications.610 Dr. Hopenfelds claims that undetected FAC could lead to problems related to LOCA or seismic loads, purported loads related to SBO events, and fatigue of FAC-susceptible components therefore presuppose a deficiency in the FAC Program, but do not show that there is such a deficiency.611 607 See Hopenfeld Report at 24-25 (RIVR00005).

608 Ruling on Motions in Limine at 23.

609 See Entergy Testimony at 40 (A63), 106-7 (A143), 107-08 (A144) (ENTR00029).

610 See id. at 107 (A144) (citing EN-DC-315 at 21 (ENT000038)).

611 See id. at 106-07 (A143).

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242. In addition, Mr. Azevedo and Mr. Cox testified that the effects of fatigue on secondary, balance-of-plant piping systems are addressed through the fatigue TLAAs under ANSI B31.1.612 These TLAAs ensure that the appropriate margins exist to address potential fatigue cracking in FAC-susceptible piping.613 The adequacy of Entergys evaluation of these TLAAs is not at issue in this contention.

243. In rebuttal, Dr. Hopenfeld responded by stating that Entergys Testimony demonstrates that Entergy does not understand the interplay between and the consequences of the synergistic effects of metal fatigue and FAC.614 He points to the reactor vessel nozzles as components allegedly exposed to high velocity flow, making them susceptible to FAC; for this reason FAC must be included in the fatigue analyses for that component and any like it.615 244. Contrary to Dr. Hopenfelds statements, however, Entergys written testimony addresses this issue. Mr. Cox and Mr. Azevedo testified that FAC affects secondary plant systems, not primary components which are fabricated from or clad with FAC-resistant material such as stainless steel.616 Indeed, Dr. Hopenfeld has conceded that such components are not susceptible to FAC.617 245. Thus, we find that these additional issues raised by Dr. Hopenfeld are only a concern to the extent the FAC Program does not provide reasonable assurance that the effects of aging due to FAC would be adequately managed. However, as we explain throughout this 612 See id. at 107 (A144).

613 See id. at 105-08 (A142-44).

614 See Riverkeeper Rebuttal Testimony at 45:14-46:12 (RIV000108).

615 See id.

616 See Entergy Testimony at 106 (A142) (ENTR00029).

617 See Riverkeeper, Inc. Opposition to Entergys Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Pre-filed Testimony, Expert Report, Exhibits, and Statement of Position for Contention NYS-26B/RK-TC-1B (Metal Fatigue)

Attach. 1 (Feb. 17, 2012) (Declaration of Joram Hopenfeld ¶ 21 (I am well aware that stainless steel is not affected by flow accelerated corrosion.)).

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decision, we find that the FAC Program does provide such reasonable assurance, and we find it unnecessary to consider these remaining issues further, except to note that Dr. Hopenfelds allegations do not alter our findings.

V.

SUMMARY

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 246. Based upon a review of the entire record of this proceeding and the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties, and based upon the findings set forth above, which are supported by reliable, probative, and substantive evidence in the record, the Board has decided all matters in controversy on RK-TC-2 and the reaches the following conclusions.

247. We find that the term flow accelerated corrosion, as used in NSAC-202L-R3, the NRC-approved standard industry guidance document on FAC, refers to the chemical corrosion of carbon steel piping and components, and not erosive mechanisms. FAC is the predominant degradation mechanism for FAC-susceptible systems, and is more likely than erosion to challenge the functionality of components. In addition, FAC and erosive mechanisms do not normally occur simultaneously at the same location. Nevertheless, through operating experience, wall thickness measurements, and the CHECWORKS calibration process, the IPEC FAC Program can and does address the effects of other wall-thinning phenomena in secondary plant systems, when such phenomena are present. We therefore conclude that, regardless of any disputes over the specific definition of FAC, there is no need to broaden the definition of FAC or alter the FAC program to address erosive mechanisms.

248. We find that, under constant operating conditions, the rate of FAC is essentially constant with time. This conclusion supports the adequacy of the use of CHECWORKS and the trending of actual wall thickness measurements. We also find that FAC can be analyzed and managed as a line-level phenomenon, as CHECWORKS does, meaning that when one

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component is wearing, usually other components with similar characteristics and operating conditions will be wearing at similar rates. We do not find Dr. Hopenfelds contrary claim, that there is significant, unexplained, localized, non-linear wall thinning at IPEC, to be credible.

249. Consistent with the NRC Staff's conclusions in its audit and review of the LRA, we find that Entergys FAC Program is indeed consistent with the program described in the GALL Report, Revision 1, and meets the intent of the program described in the GALL Report, Revision 2. We also find that the IPEC FAC Program follows the standard NRC Staff-endorsed EPRI guidance in NSAC-202L-R3, which is the basis for all FAC programs in the U.S. and many overseas as well. The NSAC-202L program has proven effective. There is no evidence in the record of this proceeding showing that any plant that was properly implementing the guidance in NSAC-202L, including the use of CHECWORKS, has experienced a significant failure of plant piping due to FAC.

250. The LRA and the Entergy fleet-wide FAC Program in EN-DC-315, supported by the guidance in NSAC-202L-R3 and the GALL Report, provide the requisite detail to demonstrate that the IPEC FAC Program will adequately manage the effects of aging during the PEO. These documents specify how inspections are conducted, how the inspection data are evaluated, the acceptance criteria for inspection components, the criteria for the disposition of components failing to meet acceptance criteria, and the sample expansion criteria, and provide instructions for incorporating inspection data into the CHECWORKS model.

251. As at other plants, under the IPEC FAC Program, FAC-susceptible piping is categorized as either modeled or susceptible non-modeled (SNM) piping. CHECWORKS is not used for SNM piping. The CHECWORKS software is one of several tools and processes used at IPEC to assist Entergy in selecting component locations for inspection. The various

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complementary FAC program inspection selection tools (CHECWORKS, trending, operating experience, other inspection programs, engineering judgment, and SNM rankings) are not stand-alone tools that must be evaluated individually. The use of these complementary tools is consistent with the recommendations in the GALL Report and NSAC-202L-R3 for an effective FAC program. We conclude that these tools provide adequate bases for the IPEC FAC engineer to select inspection locations.

252. For those IPEC components modeled by CHECWORKS, the software adequately performs its intended purpose of assisting the FAC engineer in identifying locations in need of inspection. It appropriately provides a best estimate of wear due to FAC in modeled lines.

CHECWORKS predictions are used to focus the attention of the FAC Program on those components that may be experiencing wear or on components where CHECWORKS is not well-calibrated. Then, based on actual, measured data, the appropriate corrective action is taken.

Thus, the fact that a particular CHECWORKS line is not well calibrated is not an indication of any deficiency in the FAC Program. The lack of calibration itself is information for the FAC engineer to use to help select inspection locations.

253. Entergy has incorporated all relevant historical UT thickness data into the CHECWORKS models. Dr. Hopenfelds claims that various older data have been lost were based on an incomplete review of the documentation Entergy provided.

254. Dr. Hopenfelds remaining challenges to the FAC Program lack merit. The effects of aging on steam generator components are not managed through the IPEC FAC Program or through CHECWORKS. Entergy has updated the CHECWORKS models for post-uprate conditions, and there is no need to further benchmark CHECWORKS against plant-specific measured wear rates of components operating under post-SPU conditions. We disagree

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with Dr. Hopenfelds claims regarding various distinctions between IPEC and Vermont Yankee, the alleged superior performance of EDFs BRT-CICERO software in comparison to CHECWORKS, and the problems with the IPEC FAC Program allegedly revealed by industry and plant-specific operating experience. Nothing about Dr. Hopenfelds allegations on these points changes our prior conclusions that the IPEC FAC Program, including CHECWORKS, is consistent with the GALL Report. The FAC Program therefore provides reasonable assurance that the effects of aging due to FAC on in-scope components will be adequately managed throughout the PEO.618 255. In summary, we have reviewed all the issues, motions, and arguments presented for this contention and conclude that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the effects of aging for FAC will be managed for the PEO and that actions with respect to FAC have been or will be taken to reasonably assure that activities authorized by the renewed license for IPEC will continue for the PEO. Accordingly, the Board finds that Entergy has carried its burden of proof, and satisfied its obligations under 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.21 and 54.29. Issues, motions, and arguments presented by the parties but not addressed herein have been found to be without merit, unnecessary, or not relevant to the Boards findings on RK-TC-2.

VI. ORDER WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.1210, that the Riverkeepers Contention RK-TC-2 is resolved on the merits in favor of Entergy.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, this Partial Initial Decision will constitute a final decision of the Commission forty (40) days from the date of issuance (or the first agency business day following that date if it is a Saturday, Sunday, or federal holiday, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.306(a)),

618 See Oyster Creek, CLI-08-23, 68 NRC at 468; Seabrook, CLI-12-05, slip op. at 18.

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unless a petition for review is filed in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.1212, or the Commission directs otherwise.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party wishing to file a petition for review on the grounds specified in 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(4) must do so within twenty-five (25) days after service of this Partial Initial Decision. The filing of a petition for review is mandatory for a party to have exhausted its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Within twenty-five (25) days after service of a petition for review, parties to the proceeding may file an answer supporting or opposing Commission review. Any petition for review and any answer shall conform to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(2)-(3).

Although this ruling resolves all matters before the Board in connection with Contention RK-TC-2, NRC Staff issuance of the renewed operating licenses under 10 C.F.R. Part 54 must abide, among other things, the resolution of the remaining admitted contentions, including those contentions designated for future hearings.

Respectfully submitted, Executed in Accord with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)

William B. Glew, Jr., Esq. Kathryn M. Sutton, Esq.

William C. Dennis, Esq. Paul M. Bessette, Esq.

ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. Raphael P. Kuyler, Esq.

440 Hamilton Avenue MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP White Plains, NY 10601 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Phone: (914) 272-3202 Washington, DC 20004 Fax: (914) 272-3205 Phone: (202) 739-3000 E-mail: wglew@entergy.com Fax: (202) 739-3001 E-mail: wdennis@entergy.com E-mail: ksutton@morganlewis.com E-mail: pbessette@morganlewis.com E-mail: rkuyler@morganlewis.com COUNSEL FOR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

Dated in Washington, D.C.

this 22nd day of March 2013

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and

) 50-286-LR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. )

)

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) )

) March 22, 2013 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.305 (as revised), I certify that, on this date, copies of Entergys Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law For Contention RK-TC-2 (Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) were served upon the Electronic Information Exchange (the NRCs E-Filing System), in the above-captioned proceeding.

Signed (electronically) by Lance A. Escher Lance A. Escher, Esq.

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20004 Phone: (202) 739-5080 Fax: (202) 739-3001 E-mail: lescher@morganlewis.com COUNSEL FOR ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

DB1/ 72923981

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