L-13-040, License Amendment Request for Proposed Revision of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity; TS 3.7.18, Steam Generator Level; TS 5.5.8, Steam Generator Program; and TS 5.6.6..

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License Amendment Request for Proposed Revision of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity; TS 3.7.18, Steam Generator Level; TS 5.5.8, Steam Generator Program; and TS 5.6.6..
ML13018A350
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 01/18/2013
From: Lieb R
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
L-13-040
Download: ML13018A350 (49)


Text

FENOC* 55Ot North StateRouta2 OakHarbot Ahto 43449 frrstEnepyNuclear @rating Campany flaymondA, LIeb 4t9-321-7678 VicePresident,Nuclear Fwc:4tS32t-7582 January 18,2013 L-13-040 10cFR50.90 ATTN:Document ControlDesk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation DocketNo,50-346,LicenseNo.NPF-3 LicenseAmendment Requestfor ProposedRevisionoJ"Tschnical $pecificationffS).

3.4.:17, "StqamGenerator (SG\T-uhgIntegrity": T$ 3.7.18."Steam,.fiBneratorLevel"lTs Q*-$*.9.,j'SteAm,gqnerator (SG)Program": "SteamGenerator andTS 5.6.,S,, Tube lnspection Report" FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company (FENOC) herebyrequests arnendment of Operating LicenseNPF-3forthe Davis-Besse Nuclear PowerStation(DBNPS).The proposedamendment wouldrevisethefollowing Technical Specifications(TS) associated withsteamgenerators (SGs):

a TS 3.4.17,"SteamGenerator (SG)TubeIntegrity" a TS 3.7.18,"SteamGenerator Level"

. TS 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program"

. TS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator TubeInspection Report" Revisionof theseTSsis required to supportplantoperation replacement following of theoriginal SGsduringa refueling outagescheduled to be completed at DBNP$in AprilzAM. Thepropo-sed changesarenecessary becauseof dimensional andmaterial differences betweenthe originalSGsandthereplacement SGs. Additionally,proposed changesareneededto address implementation issuesassociated withinspection periods, andto addressotheradministrative changes consistent andclarifications, with the guidance providedin Technical TaskForceTraveler Specification TSTF-510, Revision 2, "Revisionto SteamGenerator Program Inspection Frequencies andTube SampleSelection," approved bythe Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)on October 27,2011{76FR60763).

TheFENOCevaluation of theproposed amendment is enclosed.Approvalof the proposed licenseamendment is requestedby February 1,2014,to be implemented priorto startupfollowing the refueling outageduringwhichthe SGreplacement is to occur.

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation L-13-040 Page2 Thereareno regulatory commitments containedin thisletter.lf thereareany questions, or if additional information pleasecontactMr.ThomasA. Lentz, is required, Manager - FleetLicensing, at 330-315-6810.

I declareunderpenaltyof perjurythattheforegoing is trueandcorrect.Executed on January 18,2013.

WM

Enclosure:

Evaluation of theProposed Amendment cc: NRCRegionlll Administrator NRCProjectManager NRCResident Inspector Executive Direetor, OhioEmergency Management Agency, Stateof Ohio(NRCLiaison)

UtilityRadiological SafetyBoard

EVALUATION OFTHEPROPOSED AMENDMENT (TS)3.4.17,"SteamGenerator

Subject:

ProposedRevisionof TechnicalSpecification (SG)TubeIntegrity";

TS 3J,18, 'SteamGeneratorLevel";TS 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program";andTS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator TubeInspection Report'forthe Davis-BesseNuclearPowerStation,UnitNumber1 (DBNP$)Operating License NumberNPF-3 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 HazardsConsideration No Significant Analysis 4.2 ApplicabteRegulatoryRequirements/Criteria 4.3 Precedent 4.4 Conclusions 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 REFERENCES

Attachments

1. Proposedchangesto Technical Annotated Specifications, Copy RetypedCopy
2. Proposedchangesto TechnicalSpecifications, Bases,AnnotatedCopy
3. Proposedchangesto TechnicalSpecification

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation Evaluationof Proposed Amendment Page2 of 11 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION Thisevaluation supportsa requestto amendOperating LicenseNumberNPF-3for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit Number 1 (DBNPS). Theproposed change (TS) wouldrevisefourTechnicalSpecifications associated with the steam generators (SGs). Replacement of the SGsis beingperforrned as a designmodification in accordance withthe provisions of 10 CFR50.59,"Changes, testsandexperiments."

NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)reviewandapprovalof the modification is not beingrequestedherein.

Revisionof theT$s is requiredto supportplantoperationfollowingreplacement of the originalSGs,whichis scheduled to be completed at DBNPSin AprilzAM. The proposedchangesare necessary becauseof dimensional and materialdifferences betweentheoriginalSGsandthe replacement SGs. Additionally, proposedchanges are neededto addressimplementation issuesassociated with inspection periods, andto addressotheradministrative changesandclarifications, consistent withtheguidance providedin TechnicalSpecification TaskForceTravelerTSTF-5l0,Revision2, "Revision to SteamGenerator ProgramInspection Frequencies andTubeSample Selection," approved by the NuclearRegulatory Comrnission (NRC) on October27,zOfi.

TheTSs thatwouldbe revisedby the proposedamendment are:

. TS 3.4.17,"SteamGenerator (SG)TubeIntegrity"

. TS 3.7.18,"SteamGenerator Level"

. TS 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program"

. TS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator Tubelnspection Report

Affectedpagesof the currentTSs,annotated to showtheproposedchanges,are providedin Attachrnent 1. Re{ypedTS pages areprovidedin Attachment 2. Proposed changesto theTS Basesare identified by annotation in Attachrnent 3. TS Basesare notpartof theTechnical Specifications,arenotsubmitted for NRCapproval, andare providedfor information only.

TSs3.4.17,5.5,8,and5.6.6imposemonitoring, inspection, repairandreporting requirements thatensureSG tubeintegrity is maintained consistent withDBNPS accidentanalysisassumptions andregulatory requirements. The requirements currentlyimposedby theseTSs arebasedon the analysesandtubematerialsof the originalSGs. Theproposed changeswouldimposerequirements thatreflectthe analysesandtubematerials of the replacement SGs,consistent withthe guidance providedin TSTF-5l0,Revision 2.

TS 3.7.18imposesSGsecondary sideinventory restrictions basedon analyses specific to the originalSG physicaldeslgncharacteristics, to ensurethat plantoperation remains boundedby thevaluesusedin ine MainSteamLineBreak(MSLB)analysespresented in the DBNPSUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport(USAR).Theproposed changeswould imposeinventoryrestrictions thatare appropriate for the physicalcharacteristics of the replacement SGs.

Davis-Besse Nuclear PowerStation Evaluationof Proposed Amendment Page3 of 1 2.0 DETAILEDDESCRIPTION GurrentTS 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program,'provide$requirements to establish andirnplement a programto ensurethatSG tubeintegrityis maintained.Program requirements includethefollowing:

r Provisions for SG condition monitoring (TS5,5,8.a)

. Performance criteriafor SG tubeintegrity(TS5.5.8.b)

. SG tuberepaircriteria(TS5.5.8.c)

I Provisions for SG tubeinspections (TS5.5.8.d) o Provisions for monitoring operational primaryto secondaryLEAI(AGE (TS5.5.8.e)

. Provisions for SG tuberepairmethods(TS5.5.8.0 r Requirements for specialvisualinspections (TS5.5.8.9)

Consistent withT$TF-510,Revision 2, approved tuberepairmethodsfor SGsareto be listedin TS 5.5.S.Becausetherearecurrentlyno approvedrepairmethodsfor the replacement SGsto be installed at DBNPS,TS 5,5.8.a,c, andd wouldbe revisedto eliminate references to repairoptions andTS 5.5.8.fwouldbe deletedin itsentirety.

The requirements for specialvisualinspections of the internalauxiliaryfeedwater header,header-to-shroud attachment weldsandexternalheaderthermalsleevesare uniqueto DBNPS,andwerenecessary dueto operational eventsthatdamagedthe internalauxiliary feedwater headerin theoriginalSGs. Thedesignof the replacement SGsdoesnot incorporate an internalauxiliary feedwater header.Because these requirements arenotapplicable to the replacement SGs, TS 5.5.8.9 would be deletedin its entirety.Minoreditorialcorrections are proposedfor TS 5.5.8.bandthere no are changesproposed for TS 5.5.8.e.Additional proposed changesto T$ 5,5.8are consistent withTSTF-510, Revision 2.

Consistent withthe proposed changesto TS 5.5.8described above,Limiting Condition for Operation {LCO)3,4,17,anditsassociated ACTIONSand SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS, wouldbe revisedto deteteanyreference to tuberepair.Therevised specification wouldonlyallowtubeplugging, anddirectlyreflectsthewordingprovided in TSTF-510, Revision 2.

TS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator Tubelnspection Report," requiresa reportto be submitted within180daysaftertheinitialentryintoMODE4followingcompletion of SG inspections required by TS 5.5.8andspecifies the requiredcontent for such report.

Consistent withthe proposed changesto TS 5.5.8as discussed above, TS 5.6,6 would be revisedto eliminatereferences to SG tuberepairs.The proposedchanges to TS 5.6.6areconsistent withTSTF-510, Revision 2.

TS 3.7.1B,"SteamGenerator Levet,"establishes limitson SG levelbasedon operating MODEandplantoperating conditions. Thefourrestrictions currently established in LCO3.7.18arebasedon thespecificphysical designcharacteristics anddimensions of the originalSGs. Becauseof differences in designcharacteristics anddimensions of the replacement SGs,TS 3.7.18wouldbe revisedto ensureappropriate secondary-side inventory limitsare imposed.

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation Evaluation of Proposed Amendment Page4 ot 11 Specifically,LCO3.7.18.aprovides the maximumSG levelallowedin MODE1 or 2, by reference to TS Figure3.7.18-1 , "Maximum Allowable SteamGenerator Level."

Figure3J,18-1identifies acceptable SteamGenerator OperateRangelevelindication (in percent)as a functionof steamsuperheat(in degreesF). Becauseof secondary-sidedimensional andthermalperformance differences betweenthe originaland replacement SGs,currentTS Figure3,7.18-1 is notappropriate for usewiththe repfacement SGsandis to be replaced.Replacement Figure3.7.18-1 wasdeveloped usingthe samemethodology usedfor the original, withthesupporting analyses based on thedimensions andthermal performance of the replacement SGs.

TS 3.7.18.b, c, andd providetheSG inventory limitationsfor MODE3, basedon plant operating conditions.No changesareproposed to LCO3.7.18.b, whichestabllshes the maximum$G waterlevelwithSteamand Feedwater Rupture Control System ($FRC$)

Instrumentation, MainSteamLinePressure - Low(LCO3.3.11,Function 1),not bypassed.LCO3J.18.cwouldbe revisedto reducethe maximumSGwaterlevelwith LCO3.3.11Function1 bypassed andbothmainfeedwater pumpsnotcapableof supplying feedwater to the SGs. LCO 3,7.18.d would be revised to reducethe maximumSGwaterlevelwithLCO3.3.11Function 1 bypassed and onemain feedwaterpumpcapableof supplyingfeedwaterto the SGs.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION The SGsin pressurized waterreactordesignsremoveheatfromthe reactorcoolant system(RCS)and producestearnto operatethe maingeneratorandotherbalance-of-plantequipment.A principat functionof the steamgenerators at the DBNP$is to providesuperheated steamat a constantpressureoverthe full rangeof power operation.Steamgenerator secondary sidewaterinventory is maintained largeenough to provideadequateprimaryto secondaryheattransfer,andthatinventoryincreases withincreasing plantpower. Inventoryis controlled by the feedwatercontrolsystemto maintainappropriate SG levelandprimarysystemtemperature at variousoperating powerlevels.

SG tubesconstitute the heattransfersurfacebetweenthe primaryandsecondary systems,and,as such,are reliedon to maintainthe primarysystem'spressureand inventory,As an integralpartof the reactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB),the SG tubesisolatethe radioactive fissionproductsin the primarycoolantfromthe secondary systemin the SGs. Maintaining tubeintegrityensuresthatthe tubesarecapableof performing theirintendedsafetyfunctionsconsistent withthe plantlicensingbasisand applicab le regulatory requirements.

The licensing basisfor the DBNPSincludesthe postulation of a SG tuberupture (SGTR)accident.In the eventof a SGTR,primarycoolantis released intothe secondary sideof the SG,andsubsequently canbe released to theenvironment throughmainsteamsafetyvalvesor leakpathsin the secondary system.A SGTRis a Class3 designbasisaccidentforwhichanalysesaresummarized in the Updated SafetyAnalysisReport (USAR), section15.4,2, "Steam Generator TubeRupture,"

ln orderto ensurethatthe probability of a SGTRdoesnotincreaseabovethatassumed in theaccidentanalysisandthatno otherdesignbaslsaccidents or transientsresultin tubefailure,it is nece$sary to maintainSG tube integrity.For that purpose, TS 5.5.8,

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation Evaluation of Proposed Amendment Page5of11 "SteamGenerator ($G) Program," imposesreguirements for monitoring, inspection, and maintenance to ensureSG tubeintegrity remainsconsistent withlicensing basis assumptions relatedto SGTRandotherdesignbasisaccidentsandtransients.

CurrentTS 5,5.8requirements arebasedon manyyearsof industryexperience in operaling andmaintaining the originalSGs. Information developed throughout the commercial nuclearindustryassociated withSG tubedegradation mechanisms and relatedinspection anddetectiontechniques for SG tubingmanufactured fromAlloy600 providesthe basisfor the specificinspections andinspection frequencies currently stipufated in TS 5.5.8.TSTF-510, Revision2, provides the NRC-approved revisions to TS 5.5.8as providedin the StandardTechnicalSpecifications for Babcock and \Mlcox Plants(NUREG-1430, Revision 4). The revisionsstipulate the SG tubeinspections and inspection frequencies that havebeendetermined to be appropriate for replacement SGs. TSTF-510,Revision2, includesseparatesectionsfor the differenttypesof tubing materials thatmaybe usedin replacement SGs. Oneof thetubingmaterials addressed is thermallytreatedAlloy690,the materialthatis beingusedfor the tubes in the DBNPSreplacement SGs, The proposedchangesto TS 5.5.8directlyreflectthe wordingprovidedin TSTF-S10, Revision2,for thermally treatedAlloy090tubing.

Consistent withTSTF-510, TS 5.5.8.cspecifies a plantspecificvaluefor the maxirnum allowedtubeflaw$ize,as the flawdepthin percentof tubewallthickness.By conservative analyses for the DBNPSreplacement SGs,FENOChasdetermined that continued useof a maximumflawdepthof 40%throughwallis appropriate. Although unchanged fromthecurrentspecified valuefor maximum flawdepth,thisvalueis based on conservative calcutations of tubeloadsandflaw geometry appropriate for the DBNPSReplacement SGs,basedon designandindustry experience.

CurrentTS 3.4.17,"SteamGenerator Tubelntegrity," establishes the requirement to maintainSGtubeintegrity in MODEs1, 2, 3, and4 andestablishes the requirements for addressing SG tubesthatsatis! tuberepaircriteriathrougheithertube plugging or repairin accordance withthe SteamGeneratorProgram.TSTF-510,Revision2, specifiesthatreference to repairoptionsbe deletedfromTS 3.4.17if no repairmethods areapproved. Consistent withthe proposed changesto TS 5.5.8described above, LimitingCondition for Operation (LCO)3.4.17,andits associated ACTIONS and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS, wouldbe revisedto deleteanyreference to tube repair.The revisedspecification wouldonlyallowtubeplugging,anddirectlyreflects the wordingprovidedin TSTF-510, Revision 2.

TS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator TubeInspection Report," specifies the required contentfor a reportto be submitted within180daysafterthe inilialentryintoMODE4 following completion of SG inspections requiredby TS 5.5.8.Theproposed changesto TS 5.6'6 reflectthechangesspecifiedin TSTF-510,Revision2, to clarifythe reporting requirements andto ensureconsistency withthe proposedchangesto TS 5.5.8.These changeshaveno'impact on plantoperation or SG inspection requirements.

The licensing basisfor DBNPSalsoincludes analysesof postulated mainsteamline breaks (MSLB), as discussed in the USAR. SG operation must remain boundedby the inputsandassumptions of the MSLBaccidentanalyses at alltimes. In the eventof an MSLB,thereis a rapidreleaseof SGsecondary sidema$sandenergyto the areain whichthe breakis located.A MSLBis a Class3 DesignBasisAccidentforwhich

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation Evaluationof ProposedAmendment Page6 of 11 analysesaresummarized in USARsection6.2,'Containment Systems," andin section 15.4.4,"SteamLineBreak."

TS 3.7.18,"SteamGenerator Level,'establishes limitson SG levelbasedon operating MODEandplantoperating conditions. The SG levellimitsimposedby thisTS ensure thatthe combination of SG secondary-side inventoryandenergyavailablefor releasein the eventof a MSLBdo notexceedthe massandenergyreleasesthat havebeen analyzedfor thisevent.Therefore, operation withinthelimitsof LCO3,7,18ensures thatthe MSLBaccidentanalysesremainbounding.

Therearefourrestrictions statedin LCO3.7,18,basedin parton the specificphysical designcharacteristics anddimensions of theoriginalSGs. Becausethe replacement SGsdifferin someof the designcharacteristics anddimensions thatarethe basesfor thesereslrictions, TS 3.7,18wouldbe revisedto ensureappropriate secondary-side inventorylimitsare imposedon the replacement SGs.

Specifically, LCO3.7.18.aprovides the maximumSGwaterlevelallowedin MODE1 or 2, by reference to TS Figure3J.18-1,"Maximum Allowable SteamGenerator Level."

Figure3.7.18-1is a curveof degreesof mainsteamsuperheat axis on the horizontal andSG level,as indicatedon the SteamGenerator OperateRangeLevel instrumentation, on theverticalaxis. Becauseof secondary-side dimensional and thermalperformance differences betweentheoriginaland replacement SGs, the existingcurveis notappropriate for usewiththe replacement SGs. The proposednew curvewasdeveloped usingthe samemelhodology thatwas usedfor developing the originalcurue,butthesupporting analyses arebased on the dimensions and thermal performance of the replacement SGs. TheexistingUSARMSLBanalysisremains bounding.

The otherthreeTS 3.7.18restrictions, 3.7.18.b, c, andd, providethe SG inventory limitations for MODE3. Thetotatmassandenergyavailable for releasein MODE3 is a functionof boththe initiafSG levelandthe availablefeedwatercapacity,whichis assumedin the MSLBanalysesto continueto feedtheSG for somelengthof time followingthe steainlinebreak. Theassociated MODE3 analysesaddressthe various feedwatercapacities thatcan existandthe associated maximumallowedSG level. The MODE3 LCOrestrictions limitlhe combination of the SG levelandtheavailable initial feedwatercapability to ensurethatthe currentMODE1 MSLBanalysisremains bounding.To providethetechnical basesfor theproposedLCO3.7.18.b, c, andd requirements, calculations wereperformedusingthe samegnethodology as thatusedin the originalcalculations. Thesecalculations utilizethe currentMODE1 MSLBmass and energyreleaseassumptions andthedesigncharacteristics of the replacement SGs. As a result,adjustments to limitson maximumwaterleveland MainFeedwater Pumpcapability areproposed for LCOs3.7.18c andd, as appropriate. No changesto the existingUSARMSLBanalysesare required to supportthe proposed MODE3 TS changes.

4.0 REGULATORYEVALUATION

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Co is requesting amendmenl of Operating License NumberNPF-3for the Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation,UnitNumber1 (DBNPS), to

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation Evaluationof ProposedAmendment Page7 of 11 revisefourTechnical$pecifications (TS)associated withthe steamgenerators (SG).

TheTSs thatwouldbe revisedby the proposedamendment are:

. TS 3.4.17,"SleamGenerator (SG)TubeIntegrity"

. TS 3.7.18,"SteamGenerator Level" I TS 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program"

. TS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator TubeInspection Report" Revisionof the TSs is requiredto supportplantoperationfollowingreplacement of the originalSGs,whichis scheduled to be completed at DBNPSin AprilzAM. Proposed changesarenecessary becauseof dimensional andmaterialdifferences betweenthe originalSGsandthe replacement SGs. Additionally, proposedchangesare neededto addressimplementation issuesassociated withthe inspection periods,andaddress otheradministrative changesandclarifications, consistent with the guidanceprovidedin TechnicalSpecification TaskForceTravelerTSTF-510,Revision2, "Revisionto Steam GeneratorProgramInspection Frequencies andTubeSampleSelection,n approvedby the NucfearRegulatory Commission (NRC)on October27,2011.

4,1 No Significant HazardsConsideration Analysis Pursuant to 10 CFR50.91(a), "Notice forpubliccomment,'FENOG hereby providesthe requiredanalysisaboutthe issueof no significant hazards consideration, usingthe threestandards setforthin 10 CFR50.92,lssuanceof amendment."

1. Doesthe proposed amendment involvea significant increasein the probabilityor consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated?

Respoqse:No.

ForT$ 3.4.17,"SteamGenerator (SG)TubeIntegrity," a steamgenerator tuberupture(SGTR)eventis the relevant designbasisaccidentanalyzedin thelicensing basisfor DBNPS.TS 3.4.17andTS 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program," imposemonitoring andinspection requirements thatensure tubeintegrity is rnaintained. The proposed changesto theseTSswould implement monitoring andinspection requirements appropriate for thedesign andmaterials of the replacement SGs. The proposed SG tube inspection frequency andsampleselection criteriawillcontinue to ensurethatthe $G tubesare inspectedsuchthatthatthe integrityof the SG tubesis verifiedto be maintained at a tevelthatpreventsan increasein the probability of a SGTR. Therefore the proposed changes to theseTSs will not increase the probability of a SGTR.

The radiological consequences of a SGTRareboundedby using conservative assumptions in the designbasisaccidentanalysis,andare dependent uponthe pre-existing primary-to-secondary leakrate,the flowrate throughthe rupturedtube,the radiological isotopiccontentof the RCSand the releasepaths. The monitoring andinspection requirements imposedby TS 3.4.17andTS 5.5.8areintended to ensurethatSG tubeintegrity is maintained. The proposed changes to these TSs would irnplement monitoring andinspection requirements appropriate for the designand

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation Evaluation of ProposedAmendment Page8of11 materialsof the replacementSGs and would not affect radiologicalreleases in the event of an SGTR. The radiologicalisotopiccontentof the RC$ and the releasepathsare notaffectedby anyof the requirements in the current TS 3.4.17or TS 5.5.8or proposedrevisionsthereto.Therefore, the proposed changesto theseTSswill notincreasethe consequences of a SGTR.

TS 5,6.b,"SteamGenerator Tubetnspection Report,"specifiesinformation thatis to be reportedto the NRCfollowingSG inspections performedin accordance withthe SteamGeneratorProgramrequirements containedin TS 5.5.8.The requirement to provide thisreport is administrative in nature andthe contentof thisreportcan haveno effecton the probability or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

LCO3.7.18,"SteamGenerator Level,"ensuresthatthe plantis operated withinthe SG inventory limitsthatwereusedas initiatconditions in the current accidentanatysis for a MainSteamLineBreak(MSLB).TheSG inventory is notan accidentinitiatoranddoesnot atfectanyaccidentinitiator.Therefore, the proposedchangesin SG inventorylimitswill not increasethe probability of a MSLBaccident.

The radiological consequences of a MSLBaredependent uponthetotalSG inventoryreleased,the SG primary-to-secondary leakagerale,the radiological isotopiccontentof the RCS,andthe releasepaths.The revision to LCO3,7.18willensurethatthetotalinventory released remainsbounded by the existinganalysis.Noneof the otherfactorslistedaboveareaffected by the revisedoperatinglimitson SG inventory thatare proposedin the revisions to LCO3.7.18.Therefore, the proposed changesin SG inventory limitswillnot increase the consequences of a MSLB.

Basedon the above,the proposed changesdo notinvolvea significant increasein the probability or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluaied.

2, Doesthe proposedamendment createthe possibility of a newor different kindof accidentfrornanyaccidentpreviously evaluated?

Response:No.

The proposed changessupportreplacement of theSGsat the DBNPS.

Replacement of the SGsis being performed as a designmodification in accordance withthe provisions of 10 CFR50.59,"Changes, tests and experiments," The proposed changesto TS 3.4.17,TS 5.5.8andTS 5.6.6 wouldimplement monitoring andinspection requirements appropriate for the designandmaterials of the replacement SGs,andestablish appropriate reportingrequirements. Thesechangeswouldnotaffectthe methodof operation of the SGs. Theproposed changesto TS 3.7.18wouldensurethat the replacement SGswill be operatedin accordance withexistinganalyses.

Noneof the proposed changeswouldintroduce anychangesto the plant design.ln addition, theproposed changeswouldnotimpactanyotherplant system,or component.

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation Evaluationof ProposedAmendrnent Page9 of 11 Theproposed changeswouldcontinueto preventlossof SG tubeintegrity, andwouldensureoperation withinthe boundsof existingaccidentanalyses.

Thereare no accidentinitiatorscreatedor affectedby thesechanges.

Therefore, the proposedchangeswill notcreatethe possibility of a newor differentkindof accidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

3. Doesthe proposedamendment invotvea significant reductionin a marginof safety?

Response:No.

The SG tubesin pressurized waterreactorsarean integralpartof the reactor coolant'system (RCS)pressureboundaryand,as such,are reliedupol !q maintainihe primarysystem'spressureand inventory.As partof the RCS pressureboundary,the SG tubesare uniquein thattheyare alsoreliedupon as a heattransfersurfacebetweenthe primaryandsecondary systemssuch thatresidualheatcanbe removedfromthe primarysystem.In addition,the

$G tubesalsoisolatethe radioactive fissionproductsin the primarycoolant fromthe secondary system.In sumrnary, the safetyfunctionof a SG is maintained by ensuringthe integrityof itstubesandthe abilityto remove residualheatfromthe primarysystem.

The proposedchangeswill ensurethatthe existingmarginsof safetyare._

maintained following tne replacement of SGs. Thechangesto LCO3.4.17 andTSs 5.5.8and5.6.6imposerequirements for SG tubeintegrity monitoring, inspection, andreporting thatwillensurethatthereis no reduction in the abilityof the tubesto performtheirRCSpressureboundaryand heat transferfunctions.Thechangesto LGO3.7.18ensurethe MSLBaccident analysesremainbounding.Therefore, the proposed changesdo notinvolve a significant reduction in a marginof safety.

Basedon the aboveresponses, FENOCconcludes thatthe proposed amendment doesnotinvolvea significant hazardsconsideration underthe standards setforth in 10 CFR50,92(c), and,accordingly, a findingof "nosignificant hazards consideration" is j ustified.

4.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The followingliststhe regulatory requirements andplant-specificbasesrelatedto the proposed changes.

. The regulatory basisfor TS 3.4,17,"SteamGenerator TubeIntegrity,'

TS 5.5.S,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program," andTS 5.5.6,"SteamGenerator TubeInspection Report,"is to ensurethatthe integrityof the reactorcoolant pressureboundaryis maintained consistent withdesignrequirements and accident analyses, and to ensure that appropriate information relativeto SG inspection activitiesis reportedto the NRC.

. The regulatory basisforTS 9J,18,"SteamGenerator Level"is to ensurethat operation is bbundedby the initialcondition assumptions for themassand energyreleased to containment in the MSLBaccidentanalysis.Failureto mainiiintheseinitialconditions couldresultin an increasein the maximurn

Davis-Besse NuclearPower$tation Evaluationof ProposedAmendment Pagefi ol 11 temperature and pressurein containment, exces$ive coolingof the RCS,and relatedcore reactivityeffects.

The proposed amendment hasbeenevaluated againstthefollowing NUREG-0800 StandardReviewPlansectionsto determine whetherapplicableregulations and requirements wouldcontinueto be met.

. Section5.4,ReactorGoolantSystemComponent and $ubsystemDesign

. Section5,4,2.1,$teamGenerator Materials o Section5.4.2.2,SteamGenerator (SG)Program

. Section10.3,MainSteamSupplySystem

. Section10.4.9,AuxiliaryFeedwater System(PWR)

FENOChasdetermined thatthe proposed amendment doesnotrequireany exemptions or relieffromregulatory requirements, and does notaffect conformance to any 10 CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria as described in the NUREGsectionsor in the DBNPSUSAR.

4.3 Precedent The proposed changesto TS 3.4,17,"SteamGenerator TubeIntegrity," TS 5.5.8, "SteamGenerator (SG)Program," andTS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator Tube Inspection Report," areconsistent withsections 3.4.17,"$teamGenerator Tube Integrity,u5,5.9,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program," and 5.6.7, "Steam Generator TubeInspeclionReport"of the StandardTechnicalSpecifications - Babcockand WilcoxPiants(NUREG-1430, Revision 4) andTSTF-S10, Revision 2, approved by the NRCon October 27,2011.

4.4 Gonclusions The proposedchangesare intendedandstructured to maintaincompliance with the appiicable regulitoryrequirernents andcriteriaidentified in section 4.2 and with the guidanceprovidedin NR0-approved TSTF-510,Revision2.

The proposed changesto TS 3.4.17,TS 5.5.8,andTS 5.6.6implement NRC-approved guidance that provides reasonable assurance that tube integritywill be maintained in the interyalbetweenSG inspections.These proposed changes resultin continued assurance of thefunctionand integrity of $G tubes.

Thechange$to LCO3,4.17,"SteamGenerator TubeIntegrity," andTS 5.5.8, "SteamGbnerator(SG)Program," willensurethatSG tube integrity is maintained at a highlevel,consistent withthe assumptions andprobabilities previously applied to SG iuberuptureeventsandotherptanteventsthatchallenge SG tubeintegrity' Thesechangesalsoimplement the NRC-approved guidance disseminated in TSTF-sl0, Revision 2.

The change$ to TS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator Tubelnspection Report,"clarifiJ the requiredcontentsof thisreportandirnplement the NRC-approved guidance disseminated in TSTF-510, Revision 2.

The proposed changesto TS 9J.18,nsteamGenerator Level,"implement the sametypeof controlsthatexistfor theoriginalSGs. Thechangeswouldonly

Davis-Besse NuclearPower$tation Evaluationof ProposedAmendrnent Page11of 11 revisethe specificvaluesto be appropriate for the designcharacteristics and dimensional ditferences in the replacement SGs. The proposedchangesprovide thesameasburance of conformance to thecurrentlicensing basis.

The changesto LCO3.7.18,"SteamGenerator Level,"willensurethatthe secondary sideinventoryin the replacement SGsis maintained withinthe limits previously analyzedfor an MSLBevent.

Basedon the considerations discussedabove:(1) thereis reasonable as$urance thatthe healthandsafetyof the publicwillnotbe endangered by operation in the proposedmanner;(2)suchactivities will be conductedin compliance withthe Commission's regulations;and(3) issuance of the amendment willnotbe inimical to the commondefenseandsecurityor to the healthandsafetyof the public.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION FENOChasdetermined thattheproposed licenseamendment wouldchangea requirement withrespectto the installation or useof a facilitycomponent locatedwithin the restricted area,as delinedin 10 CFR20,or wouldchangean inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendrnent does not involve:(i) a significant hazard'sconsideration; (ii)a significant changein the typesor significant increasein the amountsof anyeffluentsthatmaybe releasedoffsite;or (iii)a significant increasein individual or cumulative occupational radiationexposure.Accordingly, the proposedchangesmeetthe eligibility criterionfor categorical exclusionset forthin t0 CFR51.22(cXg). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR51.22(b), no environmental impact statementor environmental assessment needbe prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. DBNPSLicense No.NPF-3,Amendment No.286,DatedOctober 2,2012.
2. TechnicalSpecification TaskForce,TSTF-510,Revision2, "Revisionto SteamGenerator ProgramInspection Frequencies andTubeSample Selection,"October27,2011
3. DBNPSUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport

. Section15.4,2,"SteamGenerator TubeRupture"

. Section15.4.4,"SteamLineBreak"

4. Codeof FederalRegulations, Title10,Energy r 10 CFR51,"ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING AND RELATED REGULATORY FUNCTION$-

ProposedRevlslonof Technlcal (TS)3.4.17, Specification e'Steam (SG)

Generator TubeIntegrlty";

T$ 3.7.18, "SteamGenerator Level";TS5.5.8,"$teamGenerator (SG)Program"landTS 5.6.6,"SteamGenerator TubeInspectlonReport"for the Davis-Besse NuclearPower Unit Station, Number 1 (DBNPS)

OperatingLicenseNumberNPF-3 1,

Attaqh!4.qnf

, ProposedGhanges to TechnlcalSpecifications Annotated Copy (12PagesFollow)

SGTubeIntegrity 3.4.17 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS) 3.4.17 $teamGenerator (SG)TubeIntegrity LCO 3,4.17 SG tubeintegrityshallbe maintained.

AI\tA shallbe pluggeder All SG tubessatistyingthe tubercpaipplUggingcriteria reBaire+lnaccordance withthe SteamGeneratorProgram, APPLICABILITY: MODES1,2,3, and4.

ACTIONS


NOTE----

SeparateCondition entryis allowedforeachSGtube.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Oneormore$Gtubes A.1 VerifytubeintegritY of the 7 days satisffingthetube reBair affected tube(s) is olugging andnot criteria maintained untilthe next plugged er+epairedin refuelingoutageor $G tube accordance withthe inspection.

SteamGenerator Program. AND A.2 Pluge+repatrtheaffected Priorto entering tube(s)in accordance with MODE4 followingthe the SteamGenerator nextrefueling outage Program. or SGtubeinspection B. RequiredActionand Be in MODE3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Timeof Condition A not met.

Be in MODE5. 36hours oR SG tubeinteg;itynot maintained.

Davis-Besse 3.4.17-1

SGTubelntegritY 3.4.17 SURVEILLANCI FREQUENCY sR 3.4.17.1 in accordance VeriffSGtubeintegrity withthe In accordance SteamGenerator Program. withtheSteam Generator Program sR 3.4.17.2 VeriffthateachinspectedSGtubethatsatisfiesthe Priorto entering is plugged tuberpaiFplggging-criteria er repairedin MODE4 following accordance withtheSteamGenerator Program. a $G tube inspection Davis-Besse 3.4.17-2

Level StearnGenerator 3,7.18 3.7 PLANTSYSTEMS 3.7.18 SteamGeneratorLevel LCO 3.7.18 WaterLevelof eachsteamgeneratorshallbe:

a. Lessthanor equalto the maximumwaterlevelshownin Figure3.7.18-1 whenin MODE1 ar 2i
b. s 96%OperateRangewithLCO3.3.11,"Steamand FeedwaterRuptureControlSystem(SFRCS)

Instrumentation,"Function1 (MainSteamLlnePressure-Low)notbypassed whenin MODE3;

c. 396.]!0/oOperateRangewithLCO3.3.11,Function1 bypassedand bothmainfeedwater(MFW)pumpsnot capableof supplyingfeedwaterto the steamgenerators whenin MODE3; and
d. s 50 inchesStartupRangewithLCO3.3.11,Function1 bypassedand oneer$ettrMFWpumpecapableof supplyingfeedwaterto the steamgeneratorswhenin MODE3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES1,2, and3.

ACTIONS Enterapplicable Conditlons and Required Actionsof LCO3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN wtrenhighsteamgenerator (SDM),'I waterlevelresuttsin exceedingthe SDMlimits.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Waterlevelin oneor A.1 Restoresteamgenerator 15mlnutes morestearngenerators levelto withinlimit.

notwithinlimits.

B. RequiredActionand 8.1 Be in MODE3.

associated Completion Timenot met, ANq 8.2 Be in MODE4. 12hours Davis-Besse 3.7.18-1

Level StearnGenerator SURVEI LLANCEREQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY sR 3.7.18.1 Verifysteamgenerator waterlevelto bewithin limits.

Providedfor contextonly. Thereare no changes proposed for thispage.

Davis-Besse 3.7.18-2

SteamGeneratorLevel 3.7.18 Unaccepteble Operrtlng Brglon trble Oper\lng Reglon paoe.

(page1 of 1)

Figure3.7.18-1 MaxlmumAllowableSteamGeneratorLevel Davis-Besse 3.7.18-3

100.0 95.0 90.0 85.0 80.0 75.0 UNACCEPTABLE 70.0 bs 65.0

-L o

o 60.0 J

o 55.0 ct)

(E 50.0 tr, o

  • , 45.0 g ACCEPTABLE a,

e 40,0 o

o q

35.0 30.0 (0,31.5) 25.0 20.0 15.0 10,0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 MalnSteamSuPerheat(deg.F) nsert1, Figure3.7,18-1

Programs andManuals 5.5 andManuals Prograrns 5.5.8 $teqm GeneratorJS,G) Prqg.rarn A SteamGeneratorProgramshallbe established and irnplemented to ensure thatSG tubeintegrityis maintained.In addition, the Steam Generator Program shallincludethe following4revisiene:

a, Provisions forcondition monitoring asses$ments. Condition monitoring assessment meansanevaluation of the"asfound"condition of thetubing withrespectto theperformance criteriaforstructural integrity andaccident

. induced leakage. The "asfound" condition refersto the condition of the tubingduringanSGInspection outage, asdetermined fromtheinservice inspection resultsor byothermeans,priorto theplugging ++epiFof tubes.Condition monitoring assessments shallbeconducted duringeach outageduringwhichtheSGtubesareinspectedl pl pluggedr-er+epaireel to thattheperformance confirrn criteriaarebeingmet.

Performance criteriaforSGtubeintegrity.SGtubeintegrity shallbe maintained by meeting the performance for criteria tube structuralintegrity,

. accident induced leakage, andoperational LEAKAGE.

1. Structuralintegrityperformance criterion:AII in-servicestearn generatortubel dfrbltretainstructuralintegri$overthe full rangeof normaloperating conditions (including staftup,operationln the power range,hot standby,and cooldownl-andall anticipated transients includedin the designspecification)* anddesignbasisaccidents.

Thisincludesretaininga safetyfactorof 3,0 againstburstunder normalsteadystatefull poweroperationprimary-to-secondary pressuredifferentialanda safetyfactorof 1.4 againstburstappliedto ihe designbasisaccidentprimary-to-secondary pressuredifferentials.

Apartfromthe aboverequirements, additional loadingconditions associated withthe designbasisaccidents, or combination of accidentsin accordance withthe designandlicenslng basis, shall atsobe evaluatedto determineif the associated loads contribute significantlyto burstor collapse.In the a$se$$ment of tubeintegrity' thoseloadsthat do significantlyatfectburst or collapse shallbe determined andassessedin combination withthe loadsdueto pressurewltha safetyfactorof 1.2on the combinedprimaryloads and 1.0on axialsecondary loads.

2. Accidentinducedleakageperformance criterion:Theprimaryto secondary accidentinducedleakageratefor anydesignbasis accident,otherthana SGtuberupture,shallnot exceedthe leakage rateassurnedin the accidentanalysisin termsof totalleakageratefor all SGsandleakageratefor an individual SG. Leakageis notto exceedl gprn $4 psl .

Davis-Besse

Programs andManuals 5.5 5.5 ProgramsandManuals 5.5.8 SteamGenerator (9G),Prggram(continued)

3. The operational LEAKAGEperformance criterionis specifiedin LCO3.4.13,"RCSOperational LEAKAGE."

Provisions for SGtuberepaieplUggingcriteriai. Tu.bq$ f.oundbyinse inspection to cbntain flawswitha denthgo.u.al,to or exceedino 40Yoof the norninal tubewallthickness shallbeqlggggd.

1, Tubeefeundby ineeruie+inspeetien t eentainflawsrina regionof the tubethat eenteinene-reBairt withs depthqualte e'exeeeding the eleevethat ent 3 Tubeewitha fla$hin-either Barenttuhe er the sleeve;within-a'sleeve 4,.' Tubeewitha flawln a repairrelfhalfb+pfugged'

d. Provisions for SG tubeinspections. PeriodicSG tubeinspections shallbe perforrned.Thenumberand portionsof thetubesinspected and methods of inspectionshallbe performedwith the objectiveof detectingflawsof any type (e.g.,volumetricffaws,axialandcircumferential cracks)that maybe presentalongthe lengthof the tube,fromthe tube-to-tubesheet weldat the tubeinlotto thetube-to-tubesheet weldat the tubeoutlet,andthatmay satisfythe applicabIe tuberepaieBlgggingcriteria.The tube-to-tubesheet weld is not partof the tube. in$

the tub+and-tube rell,eutbeardef the new rellarea in'thetube sheet an inspeetionbeeauseit ie ne lengeFparfefthe pressurebeundatyeHe+tho eteirv+l+instette+lnadditlonto meetingthe requirements of d.1' d.? and dj3.tnreugh45 below, the inspectionscope, inspection methods, and inspectionintervalsshallbe suchas to ensurethat SG tubeintegrityis maintaineduntilthe nextSG inspection.*+A degladatiqnassessment ef Sgmdatio+shall be performedto determinethe typeand locationof flaws to whichthetubesmaybe susceptible and,basedon thisassessment, to

' deterrnine whichinspection methodsneedto be employedand at what locations.

1. tnspect100%of thetubesin eachSG duringthe firstrefueling outagefollowingSG@.

Davis-Besse

Programs andManuals 5.5 5.5 Prograrns andManuals 5.5.8 SteamGenerator (SG)Program(continued) pewermenths,Th lng

2. Afreithe firgtlefgeilngouiagefollowina$G installation. inspecte4c.h q-9 at leastevery72 effectivefull powermonth$or at leest?very thirdrefuelingoutaqe{whicheverresultsin mo[gJrequent iffidition. the rUinimum numberottuhes insnpqtedat

. eachscneduied Insnection snallbgthg numberof tubesin ell $Gq

@er pjgg,inspectionoutagesscneduledin eqgh inspectiorulqrig.d.Fs definedin a. b. c and d below. lf a d.egr3datiQn nsqessrnent lnOicates the notentialfor a tvpe of deqradqtign tgoqcur at alocationnot breviously inspected witha technique.capable--qf.

Cetecting tfristyoe of degr-adation at ttrislocelip-n,and that maysatisfy the applicable iube plugaino.g-titpria. the minimumnumberof locations inspeCted witnsug. h q.capableinsnection technique9urilg t-rerem.ai,rlder d tion periodmavbe prorated.The-Jrflct'pn oi Iocationsto be inspectedfor this potentiel,-typ"e of dporadation-at tfrislocationat lhe end of-thpinspection period shall be no lessthelt tfre ratioof tfrenr,mherof times $G the is scheduled to be lnspecled in @ aner tne Uetermin qtion-t nat.a rlgUv-f-o n!. .oI.

Oe iv ne ogqr..rf.ripq,atthiqlocationdivided,Ptt thetotalnunlbgl.o.f-t the SG is scheduled to be inspected,in thq Eachinspectionperioddefinedbejow$Ay be exlerrdedup t,o3 effectivefull powermonthsto includea $G inspection outagein an insnection periodAndthe su,bg,eqH9nl irrspection periodbeginsat the conctusionof the include-L SQ inspection outage.

g) Afletlhe firstrefueling outagefollowingSG installation. lnsDec!

100%_of ,th-e_lubesdurinqthe next144 etfectivefull Power monlhs.Thisconstitutes the flrstInsnectlon period:

b) Duringthe next120.effeQ!i.V.,g fullpowermonths.inspect1Q0%of tho tubes. Thlsconstitutes thg qpcondinsp-ection period:

c) Duringthe next96 effectivefull oowerm,onthg. insqect.J-0,.0,.% of tfreiubes.fnis c d) purinqthe remalnino lifeof the SGs.insoect10070of thetube-$

every72 effectivejullpowermgnlhq,-.This g,p.nstitutes the fourth and subseouentinspectionl?gllqd$..

' 3. lf crackindications arefoundin anySG tube,thenthe next inspectionfor eachaffected-and potentially affectedSG for the Davls-Besse

Programs andManuals 5.5 5.5 Programsand Manuals 5.5.8 StearnGeneJertor (SG)Prooram(continued) degradatlon mechanism thatcausedthe crackindication shallnot exceed24 etfectlvefull powermonthsor one refuellngoutage (whlchever +s-lessresultsin morefrequ igES)'lf definitive information,suchas fromexamination of a pulledtube,diagnostic non-deslructivetesting,or englneering evaluationindicatesthata

, Grack-likeindicationis not associated a crack(s),thenthe with indicationneednot be treatedas a crack.

- 4- Duringeael,rBeriedieSGtube inspeetienr inspeet'l00Yo ef the tHbes thaffrevebeenrepeiredby the-repair-rell proes,Thisspeeial e++ne+etl-reBain 6- InsBeetBeriBheral tubesin the vioinigef the eeeuredinternal t,

the,NEth tubeuppert ptateduringeehpesiediesG tube i

theentireeireurnferenee eFtheeteamgenerater andshalltetal

e. Provisions forrnonitoring operational prirnaryto secondary LEAIGGE' ir the purBbsesef theseSpeifieatienst.'tube pluggingie net a repalpAll 1, Sleeving-in.aeeerdanee with TeBiealRepertBAW,*I20P' nei gaps"tass thani/4 ineh'or hai wi eleves shallb+perfermed entheaffeeted S thresgh{heauxlliary iene' 5.5.9 Secondary Water-Ch.emistrv Program Thisprogram provides controlsformonitoring secondary waterchemistry to inhibitSGtubedegradation. Theprogram shallinclude:

Davis-Besse

Programsand Manuals 5,5

a. ldentificationof a samplingschedulefor the criticalvariablesandcontrol pointsfor thesevariables;
b. ldentificationof the proceduresusedto measurethe valuesof the critical variables;
c. ldentificationof processsamplingpoints;
d. Procedures for the recordingand management of data;
e. Proceduresdefiningcorrectiveactionsfor all off controlpointchemistry conditions; and A procedureldentifying the authorityresponsible for the interpretationof the dataandthe sequence and timing of admlnistrative events,which is required to Initiatecorrective action.

5.5.10 FilterTesting V"-e,.ntilation Program (VFTP)

A program shaltbeestablished to implement thefollowing requiredtesting of safetyrelated filterventilation systems in accordance withRegulatory Guide1.52,Revision 2,ANSI/ASME N510-1980, andASTMD 3803-1989.

a. , Demonstrate foreachof thesafetyrelatedsystems thataninplacetestof thehighefficiency particulate air(HEPA) filtersshowsa penetration and systembypass< 1.lo/owhen testedin accordance withRegulatory Guide1.52,Revision 2, andANSI/ASME N510-19S0 atthesystem flowrate specifiedbelow.

SafetyRelatedVentilationSystem Flowrate(cfrn)

StationEmergencyVentilationSystem(EVS) > 7200and 5 8800 ControlRoornEmergency VentllationSystem e 2970and5 3030 (cREVS)

Davis-Besse

Reportin g Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6.6 $le.Ar:n GeneratorTubeInspectionReport A reportshatlbe submitted within180daysafterthe initialentryintoMODE4 followingcompletionof an inspectionperformedin accordance with the Specification 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program."The reportshallinclude:

a. Thescopeof inspections performed on eachSG;
b. ne*v+gDegradationmechanisrnsfound;
c. Nondestructive examination techniquesulilizedfor eachdegradation mechanism;
d. Location,orientation (if linear),andmeasuredsizes{if avaitable) of service

, inducedindications;

e. Numberof tubespluggeder+epair+during the inspectionoutagefor each aetfu+degradationmechanism  ;
t. +otal-Ihe-nurnber and percentageof tubespluggeder+epa+re+to date; andthe effectivepluggingpercentagein ea,chSG:
g. Theresultsof conditionmonltorlng, includingthe resultsof tubepullsand

. in-situtesting; SG-anC

, i, ReBairmethedutili=edend th numbepef+ubee repairedby eaehreBair 5.6.7 RemoteShutdownSystemRenort

\A/hena reportis requiredby Condition C of LCO3.3.18,"RemoteShutdown System,"a reportshallbe submitted withinthefollowing30 days. The report shalloutlinethe actiontaken,the causeof the inoperability, andthe plansand schedulefor restoringthe controlcircuitor transferswitchof the Functionto OPERABLE status.

Davis-Besse 5.&1

ProposedRevisionof TechnlcalSpecification(TS)3.4.17,"SteamGenerator(SG)

Tube lntegrity";T$ 3.7.18,"$teamGeneratorLevel";TS 5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program";and TS 5.6.6,"SteamGeneratorTube InspectlonReport"for the Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation,Unit Number1 (DBNPS)

OperatingLicenseNumberNPF-3 Attachment2 ProposedGhangesto TechnlcalSpecifications RetypedGopy page$.

The followingis a listof the affectedTechnicalSpecification 3.4,17-1 3.4.17-2 3,7.18-1 3.7.18-2*

3.7.18-3 5.5-5 5.5-6 5.5-7 5.5-8*

5.6-1

  • No Ghange.Pageprovided for contextonly.

SGTubeIntegrity 3.4.17 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS) 3.4.17 SteamGenerator (SG)TubeIntegrity LCO 3.4.17 SG tubeintegrityshallbe maintained.

AN.D-All SG tubessatisfyingthe tubepluggingcriteriashallbe pluggedin accordance withthe SteamGenerator Program.

APPLICABILITY: M O D E S 1 , 2 , 3 ,a n d4 .

ACTIONS NOTE----

SeparateCondition entryis allowedfor eachSG tube.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or moreSG tubes A.1 Veriff tube integritYof the satisfying the tube affeetedtube(s) is pluggingcriteriaand not maintained untilthe next pluggedin accordance refuelingoutageor SG tube withthe Steam inspection.

GeneratorProgram.

AND A.2 Plugthe affectedtube(s)in Priorto entering accordance withthe $team MODE4 followingthe Generator Program. nextrefuelingoutage or SG tube RequiredActionand Be in MODE3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associatedCompletion Timeof Condition A not met.

Be in MODE5. 36hours OR SGtubeintegrity not maintained.

Davis-Besse 3.4.17-1

SGTubeIntegri$

3.4.17 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILIANCE FREQUENCY sR 3.4.17.1 VerifySGtubelntegrigin accordance withthe ln accordance SteamGenerator Program. withtheSteam Generator Program sR 3,4.17.2 Veriff that eachinspectedSG tubethatsatisfiesthe Priorto entering tubepluggingcriteriais pluggodin accordance with MODE4 following the SteamGeneratorPrograrn. a SG tubo inspection Davis-Besse 3.4.17-2

SteamGenerator Level 3.7.18 3.7 PLANTSYSTEMS 9.7.18 SteamGenerator Level LCO 3.7.18 WaterLevelof eachsteamgenerator shallbe:

a. Lessthanor equalto themaximum waterlevelshownin Figure3.7.18-1 whenin MODE1 or 2;
b. < 90%Operate Range withLCO3.3.11, "$teamand Feedwater Rupture ControlSystem(SFRCS)

Instrumenlation,"Function 1 (MainSteamLinePressure -

Low)notbypassed whenin MODE3;

c. s74%Operate Range withLGO3.3.11, Function1 bypassed andbothmainfeedwater (MFW) purnps not capableof supplying feedwater to thesteam generators whenin MODE3;and
d. s 50inches StartupRange withLCO3.3.11, Function 1 bypassedandoneMFWpumpcapable ofsupplying feedwaterto thesteamgenerators whenin MODE3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES1, 2, and3.

ACTIONS NOTE---'

Enterapplicable andRequired Conditions Actionsof LGO3,1,1,"SHUTDOWN MARGTN (SDM),"whenhighsteamgenerator waterlevelresults in exceeding the SDM limits.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Waterlevelin oneor A.1 Restore steamgenerator 15minutes moresteamgenerators levelto withinlimit.

notwithinlimits.

B . RequiredActionand 8.1 Be in MODE3.

associated Completion Timenot met.' AND 8.2 Be in MODE4. 12hours Davis-Besse 3.7.18-1

Level StearnGenerator 3.7.18 SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY sR 3.7.18.1 Verifysteamgeneratorwaterlevelto be within limits.

Providedfor contextonly. Thereare no changes proposed for thispage.

Davis-Besse 3.7.18-2

SteamGenerator Level

].7,18 100.0 95.0 90.0 (60.3,96) 85.q 80.0 75.0 UNACCEPTABLE 70.0

e 65.0

..t 0) d)

60.0 J

o 55.0 crl tr 50.0 uG, o

45.0 ACGEPTABLE e

d) ct 40.0 o

o 35.0 a

30.0 (0,31.5) 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 s.0 0.0 0.0 5,0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 Ta.a MalnSteam $uPerheat (deg.F)

(page1 of 1)

Figure3,7.1S-1 MaximumAllowableStearnGeneratorLevel Davis-Besse 3.7.18-3

Programs andManuals 5.5 5.5 ProgramsandManuals 5.5.8 Stea.mGenerator(SG)Prosram A SteamGeneratorProgramshallbe established and irnplemented to ensure that$G tubeintegrityis maintained.In addition,the SteamGenerator Program shallincludethe following:

a. Provisions for conditionmonitoring assessments. Conditionmonitoring

. assessment meansan evaluation of the "as found" conditionof the tubing to with respect the performance criteria for structural integrityandaccident inducedleakage.The"asfound"conditionrefersto the conditionof the tubingduringan SG inspection outage,as detennined fromthe inservice inspection resultsor by othermeans,priorto the pluggingof tubes.

Conditlonmonitoring assessments shallbe conducted duringeachoutage duringwhichthe SG tubesareinspected or pluggedto confirmthatthe perforrnance criteriaare beingmet.

b. ' Performance criteriafor SG tube integrity.SG tube integrityshallbe maintainedby meetingthe performance criteriafor tubestructuralintegrity, accidentinducedleakage,andoperational LEAI(AGE.
1. Structural integrityperformance criterion:All in-service steam generator tubesshallretainstructural integrity over the full rangeof normaloperatingconditions (includlng startup, operation in the power range,hotstandby, and cool down), all anticipated transients included in the designspecification, and designbasisaccidents.Thisincludes retaininga safetyfactorof 3.0 againstburstundernormalsteadystate full poweroperationprlmary-to-secondary pressuredifferential and a safetyfactorof 1.4againstburstappliedto the designbasisaccident primaryto-secondary pressuredifferentials.Apartfromthe above requirements, additionalloadingconditions associated withthe deslgn basisaccidents,or combination of accidentsin accordance withthe designandlicensingbasis,shallalsobe evaluated to deterrnine if the associated loadscontribute significantly to burstor collapse. In the assessment of tube integrity,thoseloadsthatdo significantly affect burstor collapseshallbe determined and assessed in cornbination withthe loadsdueto pressure witha safetyfactorof 1.2on the combinedprlmaryloadsand 1,0on axialsecondaryloads.
2. Accidentinducedleakageperformance criterion:The primaryto secondary accidentinducedleakageratefor anydesignbasis accident,otherthana SG tuberupture,shallnotexceedthe leakage rateassumedin the accidentanalysisin termsof totalleakageratefor

, all SGsandleakageratefor an individual SG. Leakageis notto exceed1 gpm per SG.

Davis-Besse 5,5-5

Programs andManuals 5.5 5.5 Programsand Manuals 5.5.8 SteamGenerator.(9G) Program(continued)

' 3. Theoperatlonal LEAMGE performance criterionis specifiedin LCO3.4.13,"RCSOperational LEAKAGE."

c. Provisions for SGtubepluggingcriteria.Tubesfoundby inservice inspectionto containflawswith a depthequalto or exceeding4A%of the nominaltubewallthicknessshallbe plugged.
d. Provisions for SG tubeinspections.PeriodicSG tubeinspections shallbe pefformed.Thenumberandportionsof the tubesInspected and methods of inspectionshallbe performedwith the objectiveof detectingflawso{ any typeie.g.,volumetricflaws,axialand circumferential cracks)that maybe_

presentalongthe lengthof the tube,fromthe tube-to-tubesheet weld at the tube inletto the tube-totubesheet weldat the tubeoutlet,andthat may satisfythe applicable tubepluggingcriteria.Thetube-to-tubesheet weldis to meetingthe requirements not pirt of ttii'tube. tn aOciition of d.1, d.2and d.3 below,the inspection scope,inspection methods,and inspection intervalsshallbe suchas to ensurethatSGtubeintegrityis maintained

' untilthe nextSG inspection.A degradation assessmentshallbe performed to determinethe typeand locationof flawsto whichthe tubesmaybe susceptible and,basedon thisa$sessment, to determine whichinspection methodsneedto be employed and at whatlocations.

1. Inspect100%of the tubesin each$G duringthe firstrefueling outagefollowingSG installation.

Davis-Besse

Programs andManuals 5.5 5.5 Programs andManuals 5.5.8 StearnGenerator (SG)Program(continued) 2, Afterthe firstrefuelingoutagefollowingSG installation, inspecteach SG at leastevery72 etfectivefull powel months or at least every thirdrefuelingoutage (whichever results in rnore frequent inspections). In addition,the minimumnumberof tubesinspected at eachscheduled inspection shallbe the numberof tubesin all SGs dividedby the nurnberof SG inspection outagesscheduledin each inspection periodas definedin a, b, c andd below. lf a degradation assessment indicatesthe potentialfor a typeof degradation to occur at a locationnot previouslyinspectedwith a techniquecapableof detectingthistype of degradation at this locationand that maysatisfy the applicable tubepluggingcriteria,the minimumnumberof locationsinspected withsucha capableinspection techniqueduring the remainder of the inspection periodmaybe prorated. Thafraction of locationsto be inspectedfor this potential of type degradation at thislocationat the end of the inspection period shall be no less than the ratioof the numberof timesthe SG is scheduled to be inspected in the inspection period afterthe deterrnination that a newformof degradation could potentiatlybe occurring at this location dividedby the totalnumberof timesthe SG is scheduled to be inspected in the inspection period.Eachinspection perioddefinedbelowmaybe extendedup to 3 effectivefull powerrnonthsto includea SG inspection iutage in an inspection periodandthe subsequent inspection periodbeginsat the conclusion of the includedSG

, inspection outage.

a) Afterthe first refuelingoutagefollowing$G installation, inspect 100o/oof the tubesduringthe next144effectivefull power months.Thisconstitutes thefirstinspection period; b) Duringthe next 120ettective full powermonths,inspect100%of thetubes.Thisconstltutes secondinspection the period; c) Duringthe next96 effective full powermonths,inspect1009oof the tubes.Thisconstitutes thethirdinspection period;and d) Duringthe remaining lifeof the SGs,inspect100%of the tubes every72 effectivefull powermonths.Thisconstitutes the fourth andsubseguent inspection periods.

3. If crackindications arefoundin anySGtube,thenthe next inspectionfor eachaffectedandpotentiallyaffectedSG for the Davis-Besse 5.5-7

Programsand Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs andManuals 5,5.8 SteamGenerator(SG)Program(continued) degradation mechanism thatcausedthe crackindication shallnot exceed24 etfectivefull powermonthsor one refuelingoutage (whichever resultsin morefrequentinspections). lf definitive information, suchas frornexamination of a pulled tube, diagnostic non-destructive testing,or engineering evaluation indicates thata crack-like indication ls notassociated with a crack(s), then the indicatlonneednot be treatedas a crack.

e. Provisions for monitoring operational primaryto secondary LEAKAGE.

5.5.9 Secgndanl$/.gterChemistryProgram Thisprogramprovidescontrolsfor monitoring secondary waterchemistry to inhibitSG tubedegradation. Theprogramshallinclude:

a. of a samplingschedulefor the criticalvariables ldentification andcontrol pointsfor thesevariables;
b. of the proceduresusedto measurethe valuesof the critical tdentification

, variables;

c. of processsamplingpoints; ldentlficatlon
d. Procedures for the recording and management of data;
e. Proceduresdefiningcorrectiveactionsfor all off controlpolntchemistry conditions; and
f. A procedureidentiffingthe authorityresponsible for the interpretation of tho dataandthe sequenceandtimlngof administrative events,which is requiredto initiatecorrectlveaction, 5.5.10 VentilationFilterTestinoProqr-qm ffFTP)

A programshallbe established to lmplement the followingrequiredtestingof safetyrelatedfilterventilationsystemsin accordance with Regulatory Guide1.52,Revlsion 2, ANSI/ASME N510-1980, ASTMD 3803-1989.

and a, Demonstrate for eachof the safetyrelatedsystemsthatan inplacetestof the highefficiency particulate air (HEPA)filtersshowsa penetration and systembypass< 1,Oo/owhen testedin accordance withRegulatory duide 1.52,Revlsion 2, andANSI/A$ME NSt0-1980 at thesystemflowrate specifiedbelow.

SafetyRelatedVentilationSvslqm. Flowrate,(qfm).

StationEmergencyVentilatlonSystem{EVS) > 7200ands 8800

. ControlRoomEmetgency VentilationSystem > 2970ands 3630 (cREVS)

Davis-Besse 5.5-8

Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6.6 SteqmGenera-tor Tubelnspection Report A reportshallbe submitted within180daysafterthe initialentryintoMODE4 followingcompletionof an inspectionperformedIn accordance withthe Specificatlon5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program."Thereportshallinclude:

a. Thescopeof inspections performed on eachSG;
b. Degradation mechanisms found; Nondestructive examination techniquesutilizedfor eachdegradation mechanism; d, Location, (if linear),andmeasured orientation sizes(if available) of service inducedindications;
e. Numberof tubespluggedduringthe inspection outagefor each degradation mechanism;
f. The numberand percentageof tubespluggedto date,and the effective pluggingpercentage in eachSG; The resultsof conditionmonitoring, including the resultsof tubepullsand In-situtestlng; 5.6.7 BCmojp.$.hU!*our,s-$ystem Bepo$

Whena reportis required byCondition C of LCO3.3.18, "Remote Shutdown System," a reportshallbe submitted within thefollowing30 days. Thereport shalloutlinethe actiontaken, the cause of theinoperability,and the plansand schedute forrestoringthecontrolcircuitor transfer switchof theFunction to OPERABLE StAtUS.

Davis-Besse 5.6-1

ProposedRevisionof TechnlcalSpecification(TSl 3.4,17,"SteamGenerator(SG)

Tube Integrity";TS 3.7.18,"SteamGeneratorLevel";TS 5.5.8,"$teamGenerator (SG)Program";and TS 5,6.6,"SteamGeneratorTube InspectlonReporf' for the Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStatlon,Unit Number{ (DBNPS}

OperatlngLicenseNumberNPF-3 Attachment-9.

ProposedGhangesto TechnlcalSpecificationBases AnnotatedCopy (11PagesFollow) are not Basesare notpartof the TechnicalSpecifications, TechnicalSpecification submittedfor NuclearRegulatoryCommission Approvaland are providedfor information only,

ProvjC.gd for InformationOnly SGTubeIntegrity g 3.4.17 B 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)

No changesto thispage.

B 3.4.17 SteamGenerator (SG)TubeIntegrity Providedfor contextonlY.

BASES BACKGROUND Steamgenerator(SG)tubesaresmalldiarneter, thinwalledtubesthat carryprirnarycoolantthroughthe primaryto secondaryheatexchangers.

The SG tubeshavea numberof importantsafetyfunctions.$team generatortubesare an integralpartof the reactorcoolantpressure boundary(RCPB)and,as such,are reliedon to rnaintaln the primary system'spressureand inventory.The SG tubesisolatethe radioactive fisslonproductsin the primarycoolantfromthe secondary system.In addition,as partof the RCPB,the SG tubesare unique in thattheyactas the heattransfersurfacebetweenthe primary and secondary systerns to removeheatfromthe primary system. Thls Specification addresses only the RGPBintegrity functionof the SG. TheSG heatremovalfunctionis addressed by LCO 3.4.4,"RCSLoops- MODES1 and2," LCO3.4.5' "RCS Loops- MODE 3," LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops- MODE4," and LCO3.4.7,.'RCSLoops- MODE5, LoopsFilled."

SG tube integritymeansthatthe tubesare capableof performing their intendedRCPBsafetyfunctionconsistent withthe licensingbasis, includingapplicable regulatory requirements.

$teamgenerator tubingis subjectto a varietyof degradation mechanisms.Steamgenerator tubesmayexperience tubedegradation relatedto corrosion phenomena, suchas wastage,pitting,intergranular attack,andstresscorrosioncracking,alongwithothermechanically inducedphenornena suchas dentingandwear. Thesedegradation mechaniimscan irnpairtubeintegrityif theyare not managedeffectively.

The SG performance areusedto manageSG tubedegradation.

criteria Specification5.5.8,"SteamGenerator (SG)Program," requiresthata programbe established andlmplemented to ensurethatSG tubeintegrity is rnaintained.Pursuantto Specification 5.5.8,tubeintegrityis maintainedwhenthe SG performance criteriaare met. Thereare three SG performance integrity, criteria:structural accidentinducedleakage, andoperationat LEAKAGE,TheSG performance criteriaaredescribed in Specification5.5.8. Meetingthe SG performance criteriaprovides reasonable assurance of maintainingtubeIntegrity at normaland accidentconditions.

The processesusedto meetthe SG performance criteriaare definedby the SteamGenerator Program Guidelines (Ref. 1).

Davis-Besse

SGTubeIntegritY Providedfor Inforrnatlon Only B 3.4.17 BASES APPLICABLE Thesteamgenerator tuberupture (SGTR) accident is thellmitingdesign SAFETY basiseventforSGtubesandavoiding anSGTRis thebasisforthis ANALYSES Specification. Theanalysis of a SGTReventassumes a bounding primaryto secondary LEAI(AGE rateequalto theoperational LEATGGE ratelimitsin LCO3,4.13, URCS Operational LEAKAGE," plustheleakage rateassociated witha double-ended rupture of a singletube.The accident analysls fora SGTRassumes thecontaminated secondary fluid is released to theatmosphere vlamalnsteamsafetyvalves.

Theanalysis fordesignbasisaccidents andtransients otherthana SGTR assume theSGtubesretaintheirstructural integrity (i.e.,theyare assumed notto rupture.) Intheseanalyses, thesteamdischarge to the atmosphere is basedonthetotal primary to secondary LEAIGGE fromall

$Gsoi 1 gallonperminute.DOSEEQUIVALENT l-131 is assumed to be equivalent to 1%failedfuelin theaccident analysis. The dose consequences of theseeventsarewithinthelimitsof GDC19(Ref.2)'

10CFR100(Ref.3)or theNRCapproved licensing basis(e.9.,a srnall fractionof theselimits).

Steamgenerator tubeintegrity satisfies Criterion 2 of t0 cFR50.36(cX2xii).

LCO The LCOrequiresthatSG tubeintegritybe maintained.The LCOalso requiresthat all SG tubesthat satisfrT the reBaiFplgggigcriteriabe pluggedr+pair+inaccordance withthe SteamGeneratorProgram.

Duringan SG inspection, anyinspected tubethatsatisfiesthe Steam Geneiator ProgramseBaieplUggj3gcriteria is reBaired+eremoved from serviceby plugging. lf a tubewas determined to satisfy the repair plUgginq priteriabut was not plugged+r+pai+x*,the tubemaystillhave tubeintegrity.

In the contextof thisSpecification, ag SG tubeis definedas theentire lengthof the tub betweenthe tube-to-tubesheet weld at the tube inletandthe tube-to-tubesheet weldat the tubeoutlet.includinsthe tub . Thetube-to-tubesheet weldis notconsidered partof the tube.

A SG tube hastube integritywhenit satisflesthe SG performance criteria.

TheSG performance criteriaaredefinedin $pecification 5.5.8,and describeacceptableSG tube performance.The SteamGenerator Programalsoprovidesthe evaluation processfor determining conformance with the SG performance criterla.

TherearethreeSG performance criteria:structuralintegrity, accident inducedleakage,andoperational LEAIGGE.Fallureto meetanyone of thesecriteriais considered failureto meetthe LCO.

Davis-Besse

Providedfor Information Onlv Nochanges to thispage. SGTubelntegrityI Provided forcontextonly. B 3.4.17 LCO (continued)

The structuralIntegrityperformance criterionprovidesa marginof safety againsttubeburstor collapseundernormalandaccidentconditions, and ensuresstructuratintegrityof the SG tubesunderall anticipated transientsincludedin the designspecification. Tubeburstis definedas, "Thegrossstructural failureof thetubewall. Theconditiontypically corresponds to an unstableopeningdisplacement (e.9.,openingarea increasedin responseto constant pressure) accompanied by ductite (plastic)tearingof the tubematerialat the ends of the degradation." Tube collapsels deflnedas, "Forthe loaddisplacement curve for a given structure, collapseoccursat the top of the loadversusdisplacement curvewherethe slopeof the curyebecomeszeroJ The structural integrityperformance criterlonprovidesguidanceon assessingloadsthat havea significant etfecton burstor collapse.In thatcontext,theterm "significant"is definedas'An accidentloadingconditionotherthan diffbrentialpressureis considered significantwhenthe additionof such loadsin the assessment of the structuralintegrityperformance criterion couldcausea lowerstructural limitor limitingbursUcollapse condition to be established."Fortube integrityevaluations, exceptfor circumferential degradation, axialthermalloadsareclassified as secondary loads. For circumferential degradation, the classificationof axialthermalloadsas primaryor secondary loadswill be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

The divisionbetween prirnary andsecondary classificationswill be based on detailedanalysisand/ortesting.

Structuralintegrityrequiresthatthe primarymembranestressintensityin a tubenot exceedtheyieldstrengthfor all ASMECode,Sectionlll,

$erviceLevelA (normaloperatingconditions)and ServiceLevelB (upset or abnormatconditions) transients includedin thedesignspecification.

Thisincludessafetyfactorsand applicable designbasisloadsbasedon ASMECode,Sectionlll, Subsection NB (Ref.4) andDraftRegulatory Guide1.121(Ref. 5).

The accidentinducedleakageperformance criterionensursthatthe primaryto secondaryLEAKAGEcausedby a designbaslsaccldent,other thana'SGTR,is wlthlnthe accidentanalysisassumptions. Theaccident analysisassumesthataccldentinduced leakage does not exceed 1 gpm per SG. Theaccidentinducedleakagerateincludesany primaryto secondaryLEAI$GEexistingpriorto the accidentIn additionto primary to secondaryLEAI(AGEinducedduringthe accident, Theoperational LEAMGE performance criterionprovidesan obsorvable indication of SG tubeconditions duringplantoperation.The limiton operational LEATGGE is contained in LCO3.4.13,"RCSOperational LEAlfiGE,"andlirnitsprirnaryto secondary LEAI(AGEthroughanyone Davis-Besse

Providedfor lnformation Onlv SGTubeIntegrity B 3.4.17 BASES LCO (continued)

$G to 150gallonsperday. Thislirnitis basedon the assurnption thata singlecrackleakingthisamountwouldnotpropagate to a SGTRunder the stressconditlons of a LOCAor a mainsteamlinebreak. lf this amountof LEAMGE is due to morethanone crack,the cracksare very small,andthe aboveassumption is conservative.

APPLICABILITY Steamgeneratortubeintegrityis challenged whenthe pressure differentialacrossthe tubesis large. Largedifferentialpressuresacross SGtubescanonlybe experienced in MODE1,2,3, or 4, RCSconditlons arefar lesschallenging in MODES5 and6 thanduring MODES1,2,9, and4. In MODES5 and6, prirnary to secondary differentialpressureis low,resultingin lowerstregsesand reduced potentialfor LEAIGGE.

ACTIONS TheACTIONS aremodified bya Noteclariffing thattheConditions may beentered independently foreachSGtube.Thislsacceptable because theRequired Actionsprovideappropriate compensatory actionsforeach affected SGtube,Complying withtheRequired Actions mayallowfor continued operatlon, andsubsequent affected SGtubesaregoverned by subsequent Condition entryandapplication of associated Required Actions.

A.1andA.2 Condition A applies if it is discovered thatoneor moreSGtubes examined In aninservice inspection satisfythetuberBaiFplwg!ru criteriabutwerenot plugged er+epai+e*in accordance withtheStearn Generator Program asrequired by SR 3.4.17.2. An eveluatien of gg Steamgenerator tubeintegrity is basedonmeeting the$G performance described criteria in theSteamGenerator Program.TheSGfBeiFpigggiry-criteria define SGtubedegradation. Themea,sured valuernustbeadjusted formeasurement uncertaintlr and-thaLallo$t4or predicted flawgrowthbetween inspections ptovideassurance thattheSGperformance criteriawillcontinue to be rnet.Inorderto determine lf a SGtubethatshouldhavebeenplugged er reBaire+has tubeintegrity, anevaluation mustbecompleted that demonstrates thattheSGperformance criteria willcontinue to bemet untitthenextrefueling outageor SGtubainspection. The tube integrity determination is basedonthemeasured flaw gize ffi th+tsbe-at thetimethesituation is discovered qndadjgstments fg.[

meagqrenent qnpgf-tFintypnd the estimated growth ofthedegradation priorto ahenextSGtunainspection. lf it is determined thattubeIntegrlty is notbeingmaintained, Gondition B applies.

Davis-Besse

for lnformationOnly SGTubeIntegritY P.[o..vj.ded B 3,4.17 BASES ACTIONS A.1andA.2 (continued)

A Completlon Tlmeof 7 daysis sufficient to complete theevaluation while minimizing theriskof plantoperation witha $G tube thatmay not have tubeintegrity.

lf theevaluation determines thattheaffected tube(s)havetubeintegrity, Required ActionA.2allows plantoperation to continue untilthenext refueling outageor SGinspection provided theinspection interval continues to besupported byan operational assessment thatreflects the affected tubes.However, theaffected tube(s)mustbeplugged-+r rpair+prior to entering MODE4 following thenextrefueling outageor-SGinspection. ThisCompletion Timeis acceptable sinceoperation until thenextinspection is supported bytheoperational assessment.

8.1an{-F.?

lf theRequtred Actions andassociated Completion Timesof Condition A arenotmetor if SGtubeintegrity is notbeing maintained, the reactor mustbe broughtto MODE3 within6 hoursandMODE5 within36 hours.

Thealtowed Completion Timesarereasonable, basedonoperating experience, to reachthe desiredplantconditions fromfullpower conditions in an orderlymannerandwithoutchallenging plantsystems.

SURVEILLANCE sR 3.4.17.1 REQUIREMENTS Duringshutdown periods theSGsareinspected as required bythisSR andtheSteamGenerator Program.NEI97-0G, SteamGenerator Program Guidelines (Ref.1),anditsreferenced EPRIGuidelines, establish thecontentoftheSteamGenerator Program.Useof theSteam Generator Program ensures thattheinspection is appropriate and consistent withaccepted industry practices.

DuringSGinspections a condition monitoring assessment of theSG tubes-is performed. The condition monitoring assessment determines the "as found" condition of the SG tubes. The purpo$e of the condition monitoring assessment is to ensure thattheSGperformance have criteria beenmetforthepreviou$ operating period.

TheSteamGenerator Program deterrnines thescopeof theinspection andthemethods usedto determine whetherthetubescontainflaws satisfuing thetuberepair-BlUgghtrcriteria, lnspection scope(i.e.,which tubegorareasof tubingwitnintneSGareto be inspected) is a functionof existing andpotential degradation locations. The Steam Generator Prograrn also Davis-Besse

Provi4ed,.forlnformation Only SGTubeIntegrity B 3.4,17 BASES SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.17.1(continued) specifiesthe inspectionrnethodsto be usedto find potentialdegradattbn.

Inspection methodsarea functionof degradation morphology, non-destructive examinatlon (NDE)techniquecapabilities, andinspection locations.

The StearnGenerator Programdefinesthe Frequency of SR 3.4,17.1.

The Frequency is determlned by the operational assessment andother Iimitsin the SG examination guidelines (Ref.6). The $teamGenerator Programusesinformation on existingdegradations and growthratesto determine an inspection Frequency that provides reasonable assurance thatthetubingwill meetthe SG performance criteriaat the next scheduled inspection.In addition,Specification 5.5.8contains prescriptive requirements concernlnginspectionintervalsto provide addedassurancethatthe SG performance criteriawill be metbetween scheduled inspections.lf crackindicatiglgarefoundin any $G tubeotFq maximuminsnectionintervalfof all,affectedand potentiallvaffgctedSQs is restriCied bv Specification 5.5.8untilsubseauent inspections sunPort extending the inspection interval.

qR..3.4.17.?

Duringan SG inspectlon, anyinspected tubethatsatisfiesthe $team GeneiatorProgramreBaie.BlUgging-crite ria is repaireekreremoved frorn serviceby plugging. Thetube pluooing repai+criteria delineated in Specificatlon 5.5.8are intendedto ensurethattubesacceptedfor continuedservicesatisffthe SG performance criteriawith allowancefor errorIn the flawsizemeasurement andfor futureflawgrowth.In addition, the tuberepai+BlUggingcriteria, in conjunction with otherelernentsof the StearnGeneraloiPiogram, ensurethatthe SG performance criteriawill continueto be met untilthe nextinspectionof the subjecttube(s).

Reference1 providesguidancefor performingoperationalassessments to veriff thatthetubesremaining in servlcewill continueto meetthe SG performance criteria.

The Frequency of priorto enteringMODE4 followinga SG inspection ensuresihatttreSurveillance has beencompleted andall tubesmeeting the repaiFpluggi$Lcriteria are pluggeder+epaire+priorto subiectingthe SG tubesto significant prirnaryto secondary pre$suredifferential.

Davis-Besse

Providedfor Information Only No changesto thispage. SGTubeIntegrity Providedfor contextonly. B 3.4.17 BASES REFERENCES "$teamGenerator 1 . NEI97-06, Program Guidelines."

2. 10CFR50Appendix A, GDC19.
3. 10cFR100.
4. ASMEBoilerandPressure VesselCode,Section NB.

lll, $ubsection

5. Guide1.121,"BasisforPlugging DraftRegulatory Degraded Steam Tubes,"

Generator August1976.

6. EPRI,"PressurizedWaterReactor SteamGenerator Exarnination Guidelines."

Davis-Besse

Providedfor Information Only SteamGenerator Level B 3.7.18 B 3.7 PLANTSYSTEMS B 3.7.18 SteamGeneratorLevel BASE$

BACKGROUND A principalfunction of thesteamgenerators is to providesuperheated steamat a constant pressure (935psia)overthepowerrange.Steam generator waterinventory is maintained largeenoughto provide adequate primary to secondary heattransfer.Massinventory and indicatedwaterlevelin thestearngenerator increases withloadasthe lengthof thefourheattransfer regions withinthesteamgenerator vary.

Inventory is controlled indirectly as a function of power and maintenance of a constant average primary systemtemperature bythefeedwater controlsintheIntegrated Control System.

Themaximum operating steamgenerator levetis basedprimarily on preservlng theinitialcondition assumptions forthesteamgenerator inventory usedin themainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)accident analysis (Ref.1). Themassandenergyrelease datathatareinputintothepealc pres$ure analysis of thecontainment vesselweregenerated withthe ifEnpS/MOD2-B&W computer code.Theanalysis wasperformed with thebounding plantconditions to maximize heatgenerated intheReactor CoolantSystem(RCS),heattransfer fromtheprimary to secondary systems, ind maxirnum inventory in thesteamgenerators. Eachof these cbnditions maxirnizes themassandenergyrelease from the MSLB.The analysisincludes evaluation ofthereactivi$ transient due to theMSLB.

gen{t+1er+pel'ating at 100%Bo r 55s0o1b, As a steamgenerator becomes fouledandtheoperating level approaches ine limitof 96%,themassinventory inthedowncomer region increases.Inmatching unitdataof startuplevelversuspower,thesteam generator performance codeshaveshownthatfoulingof thebwertube support platesdoesnotsignificantly change theheattransfer characteristics of thesteamgenerator. Thus,thesteamtemperature, or superheat, is notdegraded dueto thefouling of thetubesupport plates, andmassinventory changes aremalnlydueto theaddedlevelin the downcomer.

However,increasingthe foulingof the steamgeneratortubesurfacesgg ingrgasing levelsof tubeplugqinqdegradesthe heattransfercapabllity of ne steam generator, increases the mass inventory, and decreaSes the steamsuperheatat 1000/o RTP. The resulFwere presentedas the ameuntel meesinventeryin eeeheteamgeneratervereueeBrating Davis-Besse

Provided forInformation Only SteamGenerator Level B3.7.18 BASE$

BACKGROU ND (continued)

The lirnitingcurve,whichwas determinedfromseveralsteamgenerator performance coderunsr conservatively bounds lhg_steam generatormassinventoryvalue,when operating at power levels< 1000/6. Thecurvepresentsthe limiton eachsteamSenerator'$

(in massinventory OnerateRangelevelifrdication) as a functionof ste.SFl superheat.

The pointsdisplayed in Figure3.7,18-1 representa 56#4e56J00Ib massvalue,at the @

OperateRangelevelx andsteamsuperheatvaluesbasedon a conservatively calculatedmassinventory..Thev.elueusedfor mass invgEtpJyjs conslstent.with the 56.000lbmvalueassumedin calculations supportinq.lhg_[4 $"tB an-a Iyqlq, The eteam generaterperfermanee analyetealse+ndieated theLstaFtuFand fulI rangelevelinstflJmenbare inadeguabinCieatoref-eteam generatr lf the mixturewaterlevelshouldriseabovethe 9G7oupperlimit,the steamsuperheat wouldtendto decreasedueto reducedfeedwater heatingthroughthe aspiratorports. Normally, a reductionin watertevel is manually initiatedto maintain steam flow throughthe aspiratorportby reducingthe powerlevel. Thus,the superheat versuslevelllmitation alsotendsto ensurethat,in normal operation,waterlevelwill remainclearof the aspiratorports.

Feedwaternozzlefloodingwouldimpairfeedwaterheatlng,and could resultin excessivetubeto shelltemperature dlfferentials, excessive tubesheettemperaturedifferentials, and largevariationsin pressurizer level.

APPLICABLE ThemostlimitingDesignBasisAccident thatwouldbeaffected bystearn SAFETY generator operaiing levelis a mainsteamlinefailure, This accident is ANALYSES ivaluatedin Reference 1. The pararneter of interest is the rnas$ of water, or inventory, contained in thesteamgenerator dueto itsrolein towering Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature (return to criticalityconcern),

andin ralsing containment pressure duringanMSLBaccident. A higher inventory causestheeffectsof theaccident to bernoresevere.

Figure3.7.18-1 is baseduponmaintaining inventory < 5#4,S50J0@lbnU qgnsistent Uthigh.j-E VUi![ lhg valgg assurned (56.000.1bm) in calculations diipporting ihe-lgure 3,7,1 MSLBanalysis. ' whiehassurned epp Ire plantresponsewhenoperatlngat the limitof the Figureis be+mdingt ferbpunded_by the MSLBanalysis.considering all planteffects(e.9.'

steamsuperheat anddowncomer voiding).

Davis-Besse

Providedfor InformationOnly No changesto thispage. StearnGenerator Level Providedfor contextonly. B 3.7.18 Thesteamgenerator levelsatisfies Criterion 2 of 10CFR50.36(cX2XiD.

BASES LCO ThisLCOis requiredto preseruethe initialcondition assumptions of the accidentanatyses.Failureto meetthe rnaximumsteam generator level LCOrequirements canresultin additional mass and energy released to contalnment, and excessive cooling (and related core reactivityeffects) followingan MSLB.In addition,feedwater nozzlefloodingwouldimpair feedwaterheating,andcouldresultin excessivetubeto shelltemperature differentialsandexcessivetubesheetternperaturegradients.

APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1,2, and3, a maximum steamgenerator waterfevelis required to preserve theinitialcondition assumption forsteamgenerator inventory usedin themainsteamlinefailureaccident analysis (Ref.1). In MODE3, limitsonsteamgenerator waterlevel(inconjunction with meeting therequirements of LCO3.1.1,'SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)")

willalsoprevent a returnto criticalityin theeventof an MSLB.

In MODES 4, 5, and6,thewaterinthesteamgenerator hasa low specificenthalpy; therefore, thereis no need to limitthe steam generator inventory whentheunit is in thiscondition.

ACTIONS ln the eventa highsteamgenerator waterlevelresultsin exceeding !he-SDMlimitsof LCO3.1,1,"SHUTDOWN MARGIN(SDM),"theACTIONS Notedirectsentryintothe applicable Conditions and RequiredActionsof LCO3.1.1.Thisis an exception to LCO3.0,6andensurestheproper actionsareiakenfor SDMnotwithinthe requiredlimits.

AJ Wth the steamgeneratorlevelin excessof the maximurnlimit,action mustbe takento restorethe levelto withinthe boundsassumedin the analysis.To achievethis status,the waterlevelis restoredto withinthe limit. The 15 minuteCompletion Timeis considered to be a reasonable timeto performthisevolution.

8.1 lf the waterlevelin oneor moresteamgeneratorscannotbe restoredto withlnthe limits,the unitmustbe placedin a MODEthatminimizes the accidentrisk. To achievethisstatus,the unitmustbe placedin at least MODE3 within6 hoursand In MODE4 within12 hours.The allowed Completion Timesarereasonable, basedon operatlng experience, to reachthe requiredunitconditionsfrom full power conditions in an orderly mannerandwithoutchallenging unitsystems.

Davis-Besse

Providedfor Information Only No changesto this page. SteamGenerator Level Providedfor contextonly. B 3.7.18 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.18.1 REQUIREMENTS ThisSR verifiesthe steamgeneratorlevelto be withinacceptablelimits.

The 12 hourFrequency is adequatebecausethe operatorwill be aware of unitevolutionsthat can affectthe steamgeneratorlevelbetween checks.Furthermore, the 12 hourFrequency is considered adequatein viewof otherindications availablein the controlroorn,includingalarms,to the operatorto steamgeneratorlevelstatus.

.alert REFERENCES 1. UFSAR,Section15.4.4, Davis-Besse