ML12277A367
| ML12277A367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/2012 |
| From: | Moore R Constellation Energy Nuclear Group |
| To: | D'Antonio J Operations Branch I |
| Jackson D | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML12067A049 | List: |
| References | |
| U01849 | |
| Download: ML12277A367 (31) | |
Text
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SU8MITTAL Exam Question Number Facility Recommendation Final Resolution RO#30 Accept answers "A" & "8" Not Accepted RO#36 Delete Accepted RO#48 Accept answers "A" & "8" Accepted SRO#76 Accept answers "8" & "C" Not Accepted
- SRO#86 Accept answers "8" & "C" Not Accepted I Simulator JPM #7 Accept facility position Accepted
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Question 30:
The Miscellaneous waste Monitor Tank (MWMT) is being discharged per an approved release permit when the LIQUID WASTE DISCH RMS monitor, O-RIC-2201, alarms high. Upon investigation, the Control Room observes the LIQUID WASTE DISCH CVs, 0-MWS-2201-CV and 0-MWS-2202-CV, have not shut automatically.
Which ONE of the following is the expected operator response?
A. Verify valves O-MWS-2201-CV and 0-MWS-2202-CV shut.
B. Stop the MWMT pump being used to discharge the MWMT.
C. Ensure valves 0-MWS-1 03 and 0-MWS-105 are shut to isolate the Unit-2 SG Blow down overboard discharge path.
D. Continue discharge of MWMT using the procedure for 0-RE-2201 not available and energized.
Answer: A Facility Comments (Q#30):
General - "what is an expected operator response?"
- 1. Expected operator response is to take action to secure the liquid waste discharge.
- 2. In order to secure a discharge, one of two things must be done:
- a. Secure discharge flow path
- b. Secure pump or fluid motive force
- 3. Choice "A" is correct; assuming the control valves 2:201/2202 will close manually.
However, since the valves did not close by RMS signal, this course of action may be unable to achieve the desired outcome since manual valve closure and auto RMS closure signals come from the same valve control circuit. Prior to discharge the high alarm interlock between the radiation monitor and each discharge control valve is verified operational.
- 4. Choice "B" is a correct response since it will secure the discharge during all possible failure mechanisms for control valves 2201/2202. The piping does not allow for a siphon or gravity feed.
Conclusion - Given that the stem of the question did not ask the order of expected operator response choices "A" and "B" are both part of a correct initial response per:
- 1. Applicable waste discharge 01-17D
- 2. Alarm response manual for RMS 2201 alarm
- 3. AOP-6B - Liquid waste release
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SU8MITTAL Either action "A" or "8" will ensure the discharge is secured while ensuring administrative and technical requirements are met. These are the expected operator response.
Regrade request:
In accordance with NUREG-1 021, ES-403:
The post examination review determined that there are two correct answers Question Statistics: Four students chose answer "8", while the remaining nine students selected answer "A".
A.9 8.4 C. 0 D. 0 Supporting Procedures: 01-17D, AOP-68, and Alarm manual
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL 01-170 Rev. 47 MISCELLANEOUS WASTE PROCE~iSING SYSTEM Page 92 of 152 6.19.C Procedure (Continued) INITIALS NOTE A computer alarm should be validated and exist for approximately one minute to avoid unnecessary termination of discharges for momentary electronic spikes in the RMS.
- 34. IF ANY of the following occur:
Discharge activity indicated by the liquid waste RMS exhibits a sustained decrease below the discharge permit background values for greater than 30 seconds.
(the computer low alarm setpoint if the Plant Computer is out of service).
OR Discharge activity exceeds the computer allarm set point for a period of approximately one minute.
2ft Radiation Monitor, 0-RE-2201 automatically shuts UQ WASTE DISCH valves, D-MWS-2201-CV and O-MWS-2202-CV.
OR Conditions change resulting in less than required dilution flow PER the discharge permit THEN PERFORM the following:
(N/A if the above do NOT occur)
- a. STOP MWMT PP OR MWMT MTRG PP.
- b. At O-RIC-2201 on 1C22D, PRESS MENU until Current Activity Channel 1 is displayed.
NOTE Stopping the Sample Pump will cause the following:
- 0-RIC-2201 RMS STATUS PNL, 1C22H, amber light (alarm)
- 1C17 "RAD MON PANEL 1C22" annunciator alarms
- LlQ WASTE DISCH ISOL, 0-MWS-2201-CV ANO 0-MWS-2202-CV shuts
- c. HIGHUGHT Pump Control AND PRESS SELECT twice.
(1) CHECK Sample Pump stops.
- d. SHUT MWS DISCH TO CW DISCH ISOL, O-MWS-S24.
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL AOP-6B Rev 10 Page 6 of 14 V. LIQUID RELEASE FROM WPS A~NS lU-TEfLNAT.EA~TION~
[s TERMINATE ANY LIQUID RELEASE FROMWPS. [
- 1. Verify the Liquid Waste Discharge Valves 1.1 IF the Liquid Waste Discharge Valves.
are shut: O-MWS-2201-CVand O-MWS-2202-CV.
will NOT ~.hut.
- O-MWS-2201-CV THEN:
- O-MWS-2202-CV
- a. Stop the pump that was being used for the discharge.
- b. Ensure Shut the following Valves:
- L1Q WASTE DISCH TO U-1 CWo 0-MWS-531
- LlQ WASTE DISCH TO U-2 CWo 0-MWS-532
- AUX BlD, 0-MW8-100
- AUX BlD 2, 0-MW8-103
- TURB BlD. 0-MWS-105
- 2. IF leak is in the turbine building and discharging through the Alternate discharge path (ECP-12-000153),
THEN:
- a. Ensure the Unit 2 Turbine Building Sump Pumps are in STOP.
- b. Notify Chemistry and Radiation Safety Supervision to perform periodic samples for the following:
- Turbine Building Sumps for activity
- c. Obtain Plant Chemistry permission to pump ANY Unit 2 Turbine Building Sumps.
- d. IF Plant Chemistry directs returning the Unit 2 Turbine Building Sump Pumps to automatic control, THEN place Unit 2 Turbine Building Sump Pumps in AUTO.
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL 1C22-ALM RMS ALARM MANUAL. Rev. 38 Page 118 of 200 (continued) 0-3.2 CONDITION RESPONSE
- 1. High activity during Liquid Waste 1. PERFORM the following:
Discharge.
- a. llf the Liquid Waste Discharge RMS Monitor alarms during a release, JHEN SECURE the Liquid Waste Discharge.
(1) IF the Liquid Waste Discharge RMS Monitor alarms HIGH, ItI.ef VERIFY LQD WASTE DISCH valves, O-MSW-2201-CVand 0-MWS-2202-CV, SHUT.
(2) PLACE the UQ WASTE DISCH valves handswitches to SHUT:
- 0-MWS-2201-CV (O-HS-2201 )
- 0-MWS-2202-CV (O-HS-2202)
(3) ~~ the LQD WASTE DISCH valves, O-MSW-2201-CV and 0-MSW-2202-CV, fail to SHUT, IH.~~ IMPLEMENT AOP-6B,
~!&I!:tentaJ~l"iqyi~.YYJ!§.te Release.
- b. REFER to 01-35, RadiatiQ!lMol')jtQ[
~;ystem and OCDM Control 3.3.3.10.
(continued) (con1tinued)
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Question 36:
Given containment pressure on Unit-2 has reached 5.0 PSIG during an event, which ONE of the following valves requires manual action to clOSH if open?
A. IA CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, 2-IA-2080-MOV B. RCS SAMPLE ISOL valve, 2-PS-5464-CV C. DW CNTMT ISOL valve, 2-DW-5460-CV D. SRW SUPP TO 22 BD HX, 2-SRW-1640-CV Answer: C Facility Comments (Q#36):
During the post-examination review it was determined that all answers are correct.
Based on the question stem it can be reasonably interpreted as follows:
- 1. Which valve receives no safety system actuation signal?
This was the intended interpretation. 2-DW-5460-CV receives no automatic actuation signals.
- 2. Which valve failed to automatically reposition on receipt of its actuation signal?
This interpretation results in three possible answers:
- 2-IA-2080-MOV closes at 2.8 psig from a CIS actuation.
- 2-PS-5464-CV closes at 2.8 psig from a SIAS actuation.
- 2-SRW-1640-CV closes at 4.25 psig from a CSAS actuation.
Operators are provided the following guidance in NO-1-200 for ESFAS Actuations:
When conditions exist such that an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation may occur, as a minimum, Licensed Operators shall monitor ESF parameters for automatic actuation, and on actuation, verify ESF components actuated.
- 1. Licensed Operators shall initiate ESF actuations if ESF parameters exceed automatic actuation setpoints and actuation has not occurred.
[B0240]
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Regrade Request:
In accordance with guidance provided in NUREG-1 021, ES-403, this meets the following:
- a question with an unclear stem that confused the applicants or did not provide all the necessary information All answer choices can be interpreted as correct, therefore, the post examination review based on the information provided above, has determined that this question be deleted.
Question Statistics: Question was missed by 10 of the 13 candidates.
A-4 B-2 C-3 0-4
References:
EOP-Attachments 2, 3, & 4; NO-1-200
WRITrEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Question 48:
Following a reactor trip, which ONE of the following bus losses would require operator actions to maintain the Core and RCS heat removal safety function?
A. 2Y09 B. MCC-107 C. 13B 480V Bus D. 12 4KV Bus Answer: B Facility Comments (Q#86):
During the post-examination review it was determined that 2 answers are correct.
Answer A is correct AOP-71 provides guidance for a loss of 2Y09. Following verification of the correct bus loss, the first Operator action directed for a loss of 2Y09 is the following:
The purpose of this action is included in AOP-71 basis:
When power is lost to 2Y09 relay K4 may de-energize and the FRV BYP valve go to the post trip position. Depressing the 21 SG FRV BYP RESET allows the K4 relay to be re-energized and Main Feedwater control returned to the Feed Regulating System.
The post trip feed bypass valve position is designed to feed at a rate commensurate with decay heat generated from a trip at 100%. A reactor trip requires the Operator to reset the Feed Regulating System bypass valves as decay heat lowers. If this action was not performed, an overfeed condition would result and Core and RCS Heat Removal safety function would not be maintained. If a loss of 2Y09 occurs after the Operator has reset the Feed Regulating System bypass valves, the Operator must again perform the Operator Action to reset the Feed Regulating System bypass valves or Core and RCS Heat Removal safety function would not be maintained.
Answer B is Correct The original justification for this answer is correct.
WRITIEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Regrade Request:
In accordance with NUREG-1 021, ES-403:
- .... it is determined that there are two correct answers' Therefore, two selections should be counted as correct for question #48.
- Answer A should be counted as correct based on the information described above.
- Answer B is still a correct answer, as originally justified in the answer key.
Question Statistics: Question was missed by 11 of 13 candidates.
A-10 B-2 C-O 0-1
References:
EOP-O, AOP-71, AOP-71 Basis, OP-3
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Question 76:
Unit-1 is performing a reactor startup at 300 MWD/MTU. Critical data has been recorded and reactor power stabilized at the POAH with Group 4 CEAs at 90 inches.
The TBV controller, 1-PIC-4056, output signal fails to 10% in automatic resulting in a plant cooldown. The RO monitoring the reactor reports the following:
- Reactor power is below 1OE-1 % and continuing to lower
- SUR is negative
- RCS T COLD is 530 0 F and lowering slowly As the CRS, which ONE of the following actions would YOLi direct the crew to perform?
A. Withdraw Regulating Group CEAs to restore RCS T COLD .
B. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-O.
C. Place the TBV controller in manual at 0% output.
D. Fully insert Regulating Group 4 CEAs in manual sequential.
Answer: B Facility Comments (Question 76):
During the post-examination review it was determined that both answers Band Care correct.
The question asks which OI\IE of the following actions is required but two of the listed would be expected to be performed. For the listed plant conditions, both actions Band C are independently necessary and are appropriate in accordance with the applicable procedures.
The question as written does not require a prioritized action. Further, it is reasonable and consistent with plant standards that stabilizing actions would be taken in parallel with the assessment of primary status.
Per station procedure NO-1-200 (Conduct of Operations) page 34 Section 5.9.B:
During any abnormal transient or malfunction the primary concern of the CRS should be to stabilize the plant by doing the following:
- 1. Stabilizing actions shall be taken in a deliberate and conservative manner as directed by the CRS and should be consistent with applicable AOPs, Operating Procedures, Operating Instructions, or Alarm Manual.
- 2. It is expected that the immediate stabilizing actions will be followed by timely implementation of the applicable AOP, Alarm Manual, and other technical procedures.
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SU8MITTAL Per Fleet Procedure CNG-OP-1.01-1 000, Conduct of Operations:
Transients induced by the malfunction of an automatic system should be terminated by operator action to establish manual control with a proper demand signal.
The overcooling event caused the reactor to go subcritical and reactor power continues to lower based on a + MTC (BOC) given in the stem. Taking stabilizing action(s) prior to AOP implementation is the expectation.
Regrade Request:
In accordance with guidance provided in NUREG-1021, ES-403, this meets the following:
- a question with an unclear stem that confused the applicants or did not provide all the necessary information Therefore, the post examination review based on the information provided above, has determined that BOTH answers "8" and "C" are correct.
Question Statistics: Question was missed by 4 of the 9 candidates.
A-1 8-5 C-2 D-1
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Question 86:
Using provided reference(s):
Unit-2 enters AOP-2A due to an RCS leak which required a reactor trip.
Prior to the trip RCS boron was 813 PPM Given the following post-trip conditions:
- Both BAST concentrations are 7.25%
- CEAs 38 and 46 are stuck at 120 inches withdrawn
- The Pressurizer emptied in EOP-O
- RCS pressure is 1380 PSIA and continuing to lower
- The Crew transitioned to the appropriate Optimal Recovery Procedure fifteen (15) minutes after entering EOP-O Fifteen (15) minutes after requested, Plant Chemistry reports the RCS boron sample result is 1100 PPM.
Which ONE of the following presents: (1) The status of the boron concentration for Shutdown Margin (SOM) and (2) the required action for the existing plant conditions?
A. (1) Present boron concentration meets required SOIVl; (2) Align Charging pump suction to the RWT B. (1) Present boron concentration is below required SOM; (2) Borate until BAST volume or Charging Pp run time requirement is met.
C. (1) Present boron concentration is below required SOM; (2) Borate until SOM requirement for both EOP-O and the optimal EOP is met.
O. (1) Present boron concentration meets required SOM; (2) Align Charging pump suction to VCT after SIAS has been reset.
Answer: C Facility Comments (Q#86):
During the post-examination review it was determined that both answers Band Care correct.
The question asks if (1) Shutdown Margin (SOM) is satisfied and (2) when can the required Boration be terminated.
All candidates correctly determined SOM was not satisfied. Seven of Nine candidates selected the "Borate until BAST volume or Charging Pp run time requirement is met."
The expected response, "Borate until SOM requirement for both EOP-O and the optimal EOP is met." was answered by 2 candidates.
Simply put, answer B says to borate until calculated values are reached. Answer C says to borate until proceduralized requirements are met. Both are correct responses.
WRITTEN EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Answer B is correct.
The volume of BAST water to raise RCS concentration to the required 2300 PPM is determined using 01-2B Figure 1 (provided reference). ThE~re are no Control Room indicators displaying ReS boron concentration. As a practical matter the amount of BAST level change and charging pump run times are determined and used by operators for Boration verification. Using tank volume changes or pump run-times are both proceduralized methods of implementing Boration requirements. Answer B 'Borate until BAST volume or Charging Pp run time requirement is met' was read by the seven candidates to mean 'borate until the calculated amount has been injected for the required 2300 PPM.'
Answer C is correct.
As previously stated in the original justification.
Regrade Request:
In accordance with NUREG-1021 , ES-403:
- ' ... it is determined that there are two correct answers' Therefore, the post examination review determined that two selections should be counted as correct for question #86.
- Answer B should be counted as correct based on the information described above.
- Answer C is still a correct answer, as originally justified in the answer key.
Question Statistics: Question was missed by '7 of 9 candidates.
A-O B-7 C-2 D-O
References:
EOP-O, EOP-5, 01-2B, 01-2C, EOP-O Basis, EOP-5 Basis, I\IEOP-23
OPERATING EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Job Performance Measure (JPM) Sim-7 "IPM Sim-7 presented the examinees with a situation in which a dilution event occurs while the reactor is subcritical with a reactor startup in progress.
Initial Conditions:
- 1. A reactor startup is in progress on Unit-1, OP-2 at step 6.6.G.
- 2. Shutdown CEAs are fully withdrawn
- 3. Regulating group CEAs are being withdrawn per OP-2 (There has been no rod motion for several minutes)
- 5. Neutron counts unexpectedly begin to rise (30 CPS over the last five minutes)
- 6. The "SID MON HI" annunciator (1 C05, window 0-33) alarms
- 7. 11 Purification Ion Exchanger has been in service for three weeks
- 8. You are performing the duties of the Unit-1 CRO Initiating Cue:
The CRS directs you to respond to the reactivity excursion per the appropriate procedure. Are there any questions? You may begin.
Task Standard:
Terminates an Inadvertent Dilution During Reactor Startup and Restores Required Shutdown Margin Examinees were expected to implement AOP-1A, Inadvertent Boron Dilution, as directed by the Alarm Manual and complete the critical tasks of bypassing the CVCS Ion Exchangers and commencing Boration of the RCS until CPS indication begins lowering andlor the dilution source has been isolated per the appropriate procedure.
OPERATING EXAMINATION POST-EXAM SUBMITTAL Facility Comments:
Several examinees, feeling the increase in countrate could not be stopped, responded to the conditions presented them by bypassing the CVCS Ion Exchangers and subsequently tripping the reactor per direction provided in the AOP for controlling reactor power.
AOP-1A, Inadvertent Boron Dilution, specifies:
IF the rate of power rise can NOT be stopped, THEN perform the following actions:
- a. Trip the Reactor.
- b. IMPLEMENT EOP-O, POST TRIP IMMEDIATE ACTIONS.
The facility believes that the act of tripping the reactor satisfies the intent of the "IPM to control the countrate, as directed by AOP-1A, Inadvertent Boron Dilution, for the following reasons:
- 1. The CVCS Ion Exchangers were bypassed per procedure
- 2. Power level continued to rise.
- 3. Tripping the reactor added negative reactivity to the reactor core
- 4. Tripping the reactor from a subcritical condition dm~s not induce a transient on the plant RO#30 Not Accepted. The reference procedure provided by the facility requires the original answer, with the facility proposed second answer as an alternate action if the first action fails.
RO#36 Accepted. The question stem does not clearly ask which valve receives an auto closure signal, and applicants are not expected to infer the meaning of the stem from the distractors.
RO#48 Accepted. Resource assessment criteria for the Heat Removal safety function requires control of steam generator level within a band, the proposed second correct answer addresses a potential steam generator overfill challenge.
SRO# 76 Not Accepted. The rationale for the proposed second answer being wrong was questioned during the exam review. This question presents the applicant with a
OPERATING EXAMINATION POST-EXAIVI SUBMITTAL subcritical reactor and an inadvertent cooldown. The action procedurally called for per AOP-7K is to scram the reactor, the original correct answer. NO-1-200 (Conduct of Operations) requires that stabilizing action be consistent with the applicable AOP.
AOP-7K does not call for the operator to try to address the cause of a cooldown with a subcritical reactor prior to scramming the reactor because of those conditions. In addition, shutting the TBVs to stop the cooldown does not remove the need for a scram.
The question asks the perator for what ONE action he would take, and given the need for a trip the NRC does not accept the facility argument that NO-1-200 requires addressing the cause of the cooldown first.
SRO# 86 Accepted. The distinction between distracters "B" and "C" was questioned during exam review. The EOPs make a distinction between borating for charging pump run time, borating for BAST level, and borating for actual boron concentration. The EOP basis for this distinction is that run time or tank level may be used when there is not sufficient time to calculate required concentration. The applicants were provided with a reference for this question in order to calculate required SDM; given that number, borating for that number is the single correct answer. The facility contention claims in part that the applicants interpreted distractor liB" to mean distractor "C"; given the distinction made in the EOPs and basis, C would be the only correct answer. However, the wording in the EOP simply offers the operator one of three options, with distractor liB" describing two of them. The examiners therefore consider "C" to be the most correct answer, but "B" is also correct due to the EOP step wording.
JPM 7 Accepted. The NRC accepts scramming the reactor in response to an unexpected increasing countrate as a conservative and safe action.
2012 NRC SRO EXAM MASTER KEY Unit-1 is performing a reactor startup at 300 MWD/MTU. Critical data has been recorded and reactor power stabilized at the POAH with Group 4 CEAs at 90 inches.
The TBV controller, 1-PIC-4056, output signal fails to 10% in automatic resulting in a plant cooldown. The RO monitoring the reactor reports the following:
- Reactor power is below 1OE-1 % and continuing to lower
- SUR is negative
- RCS T COLD is 530 of and lowering slowly As the CRS, which ONE of the following actions would you direct the crew to perform?
A. Withdraw Regulating Group CEAs to restore ReS T COLD.
B. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-O.
C. Place the TBV controller in manual at 0% output.
D. Fully insert Regulating Group 4 CEAs in manual sequential.
Answer: B Answer Explanation:
A. Incorrect - OP-2 states the following precaution: Primary plant anomalies caused bv secondary plant transients are rarely, if ever, successfully mitigated by adding positive reactivity, especiallv by withdrawing CEAs. Do NOT use CEAs to control RCS temperature without an approved procedure. Events have occurred in the industry where CEAs have been withdrawn to reestablish critical conditions.
Conditions indicate the reactor has gone subcritical and AOP-7K Section IV Actions require a reactor trip and implement EOP-O.
B. Correct - Per AOP-7K, which is entered due to overcooling event and plant is in MODE 2, this is the correct action based on reactor conditions provided.
C. Incorrect - Although this is part of the recovery action to restore from overcooling event, conditions indicate the reactor has gone subcritical and AOP-7K Section IV Actions require a reactor trip and implement EOP-O.
D. Incorrect - OP-2 directs with conditions of reactor above, to FULLY insert ALL regulating CEAs not just Group 4. However, an overcooling event has occurred and actions of AOP-7K are required and operators will trip the reactor and implement EOP-O.
Page 2 of 55
NRC SRO EXAM MASTER KEY Actions required when Rx goes subcritical from overcooling event in Mode 2 Tier/Group: 3 2.4 - Emergency Procedures / Plan
- KIA Info:
- 2.4.11 - Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
SRO Importance: 4.2 Proposed references to be None provided to applicant:
- Given an overcooling event in progress, determine and Learning Objective: implement the applicable actions to mitigate the event per plant operating procedures.
10 CFR Part 55 Content:
- Cognitive level: 0 Memory/Fundamental C8J Comprehension/Analysis I Last NRC Exam used on: New question Exam Bank History: None AOP-7K, Overcooling Event iin Modes 1 and 2; OP-2, Plant Technical references:
Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load Comments: None
AOP-7K Rev 3/Unit 1 Page 4 of 17 I. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide the actions to be taken if an Overcooling Event occurs during operation in Mode One or Two.
II. ENTRY CONDITIONS A. liT AVG IT REF "alarm.
S. "HI POWER TRIP RESET DEMAND" alarm.
C. Low Pressurizer pressure and level.
, D.
E.
Abnormal SG pressure and level.
Unexpected valve open indication on the TBVs or ADVs.
~
F. Unexpected risa in II or thermal...a.legawatts.
~ Unexpected T COLD indication lowering.
~~
AOP-7K Rev 3/Unit 1 Page 6 of 17 IV. ACTIONS ACTIONS ALTERNATE ACTIONS A. DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE I 0300 EMERGENCY RESPONSE.
- 1. Determine the appropriate emergency 0300 response actions PER the ERPIP. 1
- 2. Determine reporting requirements of 0300 RM-1-101, REGULATORY REPORTING. 1
<< DETERMINE IF A REACTOR TRIP IS
( REQUIRED.
'- -..- .~
- 1. IF ANY or me TOllo~ns occur:
- A Reactor trip is imminent
- TcoLD lowersto515°F
- The cooldown causes a critical reactor to be subcritical as indicated by the followinn' ,__,
~
- Reactor Power less than "
, 10-1%
- Flux level lowering
- Sustalnea negative SUR THEN, with the approval of the SM/CRS, perform the following actions:
- a. Trip the Reactor.
- b. IMPLEMENT EOP-O, PQST TRIP IMMEDIATE ACTIONS.
OP-2 Rev. 46/Unit 1 PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM Page43ofS7 LOAD 6.7 TAKE THE REACTOR CRITICAL {Continued} INITIALS J. SECURE the Shutdown Monitor PER 01-30, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION. [B0138]
K. IF RCS T COLD is less than 525 0 F, THEN LOG T COLD in the CRO Log every 30 minutes, in fulfillment of Tech Spec SR 3.4.2.1. [B0140]
L. STABILIZE Reactor power at 10-4% power ~ND LOG the following critical data in the CRO Log Book AND on the ECC form:
- date and time of critical data
- positions of ALL CEA groups
- Reactor power
- TAVG
M. CHECK WRNI channels indicating approximately 10-4% AN.Q 1C05 annunciator "StU RATE TRIP A,B,C,D ENABLE" in alarm.
NOTE The trending range of NRRH02 (wide range) is from 10-5% to 100% reactor power.
N. PLACE NRRH02 on pen recorder trending PER 01-50A, PLANT COMPUTER.
O. NOTIFY Radiation Safety Supervision that the Reactor is critical at 10-4% power.
P. NOTIFY Plant Chemistry that they can secure taking 30 minute RCS boron samples .
. -...."'fP~a'r'tA'ftI~t!l=m~e~,-::;;--:C:;i:ti~:'"i'R:~o-;-;~m~-:bcritical as indicated b?
the following: [B2412]
- Reactor power less than 10-1%
- Flux level lowering THEN FULLY INSERT ALL Regulating CEAs.
2012 NRC SRO EXAM MASTER KEY Answer Explanation:
A. Incorrect - The status of boron concentration is incorrect. However, based on question stem two CEAs are stuck out and NEOP-23 Fig. 2-1I-A.5 requires a boron concentration of.::: 2300 PPM.
B. Incorrect - The present boron concentration does not meet the requirement of SOM for two stuck CEAs. Using Fig. 1 of 01-2B determines gallons of boric acid needed to reach 2300 PPM are 8,812. Applying EOP-5 requirements for BAST volume or charging pump run times adds the following:
- 134 inches X 58.8 gallons I inch (Fig. 2 of 01-2C provided) = 7879 gallons
- =
60 minutes X 132 gallons/minute 7920 gallons Second part is plausible if examinee fails to recognize that two stuck CEAs requires.::: 2300 PPM for SOM.
C. Correct - Boration during the LOCA must continue until boron concentration is.:::
2300 PPM per NEOP-23 Fig. 2-II-A-5 for two stuck CEAs. Using Fig. 1 of 01-2B determines gallons of boric acid needed to reach 2300 PPM are 8,812. Applying EOP-5 requirements for BAST volume or charging pump run times adds the following:
- 134 inches X 58.8 gallons / inch (Fig. 2 of 01-2C provided) =7879 gallons
- 60 minutes X 132 gallons/minute = 7920 gallons O. Incorrect - EOP-5 does not direct continue to borate until SIAS is verified and reset. There are specific criteria to meet required SOM for 2 stuck CEAs. If SIAS is verified and reset, one of the paths to realign charning pump suction to is the VCT.
Page 26 of 56
2012 NRC SRO EXAM MASTER KEY QUQstion Topic: SOM requirement for SGTR and two stuck CEAs Tier/Group: 1/2 024 - Emergency Boration
- AA2 - Ability to determine and interpret the following as KIA Info: they apply to the Emergency Boration:
- AA2.05 - Amount of boron to add to achieve required SOM SRO Importance: 3.9 01-2S, Figure 1(So ration Volume (RCS Not On SOC)
Proposed references to 01-2C, Figure 2 Soric Acid Storage Tank volume be provided to applicant: EOP-5, Step IV.H. Commence RCS Soration NEOP-23, Figures 2-1 I.A. 1 & 2-1I.A.3 Learning Objective:
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)
Cognitive level: ~2J Comprehension! Analysis Last NRC Exam used on.
Technical references: NEOP-23, Figs. 2-1 I. A. 1, Soluble Boron Concentration versus burnup NEOP-23, Figs. 2-1 I.A. 3: Shutdown Boron Concentration for All Rods In NEOP-23 Fig. 2-11.A.5: Shutdown Boron Concentration for More than One CEA Stuck EOP-5 Step H and Technical Bases Page 27 of 56
01-28 FIGURE 1 eves BORAnON, DILUTION AND MAKEUP OPERAnoNS Rev. 34 Page 1 of1 BORATION VOLUME (ReS NOT ON SOC)
NOTE
- Figure 1 was calculated at a statepoint of 532 degrees F. When calculating the volume of boration , the closer the RCS temperature is to 532 dt~rees F, the more accurate the calculation will be.
- Figures should be used for ESTIMATING boration or dilution volumes only. Actual boron concentrations during large changes should be verified b)' frequent sampling.
- To change BAST boron concentration from a % to ppm: Multip~, the % by 1748.41
- IF calculating boration volume for Unit 1, THEN use the following: [80814]
C b-I V =65,947
- In [ - - - - - ]
C b - (I + LlB)
WHERE:
=
V Boric Acid Volume in Gallons
=
Cb BAST Boric Acid concentration (ppm)
=
I Initial RCS Boric Acid concentration (ppm)
=
t..B Change in RCS Boric Acid concentration In = natural log
- IF calculating boration volume for Unit 2,
~ use the following: [80814]
C b-I V =65,947
- In [ - - - ,
C b - (I + LlB)
WHERE:
=
V Boric Acid Volume in Gallons Cb = BAST Boric Acid concentration (ppm)
=
1 Initial RCS Boric Acid concentration (ppm)
LlB = Change in RCS Boric Acid concentration
=
In natural log
OI-2C FIGURE 2 CONCENTRATED BORIC ACID SYSTEM OPERATIONS Rev. 19 Page 1 of 1 BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK I-CT-TC-~ I T
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TECHNICAL DATA BOOK (U-2) NEOP-23 Revision 02702 Page 18 of 62 FIGURE 2-II.A.1 SOLUBLE BORON CONCENTRATION vs BURNUP HFP, ARO, EQUILIBRIUM XENON ANt) SAMARIUM NO BORON-10 DEPLETION INCLUDED UNIT 2 CYCLE 19 (Page 1 of 2) 0 0
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700 ASSUMPTIONS [B9263]
A chem istry sam piing uncertainty of 1% was included.
An initial 8-10 concentration of 19.7% was assumed.
8-10 was depleted through the cycle with no B-10 replenishment. :::u
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CDON NNW
EOP-5 Rev 22/Unit 2 Page 24 of 100 IV. ACTIONS RECOVERY ACTIONS ALTERNATE ACTIONS H. (continued)
CAUTION To prevent boric acid precipitation, do NOT continue boration for greater than the following:
- 134 inches from the BAST
- 60 minutes if THREE CHG PPs are operating
- 90 minutes if TWO CHG PPs are operating
- 180 minutes if ONE CHG PP is operating
- 5. Continue boration until ONE of the following conditions is met:
- a. Shutdown margin requirement has been achieved PER the NEOPs.
- b. BAST level has been lowered a total of 90 inches.
- c. Boration has been in progress as follows:
- For 44 minutes if THREE CHG PPs are operating
- For 66 minutes if TWO CHG PPs are operating
- For 132 minutes if ONE CHG PP is operating
EOP-S Rev 22/Unit 2 Page 22 of 100 IV. ACTIONS RECOVERY ACTIONS ALTERNATE ACTIONS IH. COMMENCE RCS BORATION.
I
- 1. IF SIAS has actuated, THEN verify boration is in progress as follows:
- a. VCT M/U valve, 2-CVC-S12-CV, is shut.
- b. BA DIRECT M/U valve, 2-CVC-S14-MOV, is open.
- c. BAST GRAVITY FD valves are open:
- 2-CVC-508-MOV
- 2-CVC-509-MOV
- d. ALL available SA PPs are running.
- e. VCT OUT valve, 2-CVC-S01-MOV, is shut.
- f. All available CHG PPs are running.
(continue)
EOP-5 Rev 22/Unit 2 Page 23 of 100 IV. ACTIONS RECOVERY ACTIONS ALTERNATE ACTIONS H. (continued)
- a. Shut VCT M/U valve, 2-CVC-512-CV.
- b. Open BA DIRECT M/U valve, 2-CVC-514-MOV.
- c. Open BAST GRAVITY FD valves:
- 2-CVC-508-MOV
- 2-CVC-509-MOV
- d. Verify the M/U MODE SEL SW, 2-HS-210, is in MANUAL.
- e. Start ALL available BA PPs.
- f. Shut VCT OUT valve, 2-CVC-501-MOV.
- g. Start ALL available CHG PPs.
- 3. Record the time RCS boration was commenced:
- 4. Record BAST levels:
- 21 BAST:
- 22 BAST:
(continue)