Text

Issuance of Amendment Nos. 226 and 219, Revise Technical Specifications Applicable to Movement of Irradiated and Non-Irradiated Fuel Assemblies in the Containment or Fuel Storage Pool
	ML12215A399
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre ; (NPF-010, NPF-015)
Issue date:	10/16/2012
From:	Joseph Sebrosky; Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Peter Dietrich; Southern California Edison Co
	Sebrosky J
References
	TAC ME7090, TAC ME7091
	Download: ML12215A399 (64)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 October 16, 2012 Mr. Peter T. Dietrich Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128

SUBJECT:

SAN ONOFRE GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: REQUEST TO REVISE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS APPLICABLE TO MOVEMENT OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES (TAC NOS. ME7090 AND ME7091)

Dear Mr. Dietrich:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 226 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 and Amendment No. 219 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, respectively. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated September 2, 2011.

The amendments revise a number of TS requirements to impose similar restrictions on the movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies to those currently in place for movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The additional restrictions will limit the movement of all fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel assemblies in containment or in the fuel storage pool.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be Included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Joseph M.

ebrosk Seni Project Manager Plant Licensing Brancli Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 226 to NPF-10

2. Amendment No. 219 to NPF-15

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA DOCKET NO. 50-361 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 226 license No. NPF-10

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al.

(SCE or the licensee), dated September 2, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

-2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 226, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 16.

Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2012

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 226 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10 DOCKET NO. 50-361 Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Operating License REMOVE INSERT 3

3 Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT 3.3-35 3.3-35 3.3-36 3.3-36 3.3-39 3.3-39 3.3-40 3.3-40 3.7-24 3.7*24 3.7-25 3.7-25 3.7-25a 3.7-29 3.7-29 3.8-17 3.8-17 3.8-18 3.8-18 3.8-18a 3.8-27 3.8-27 3.8-28 3.8-28 3.8-36 3.8-36 3.8-37 3.8-37 3.8-40 3.8-40 3.8-41 3.8-41 3.9-4 3.9-4 3.9-5 3.9-5 3.9-10 3.9-10

-3 (3)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; (4)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30,40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 and by the decommissioning of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1.

C.

This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power level Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3438 megawatts thermal).

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 226, are hereby incorporated in the license.

Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

Amendment No. 226

CPIS 3.3.8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)

Leo 3.3.8 One CPIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

.---------------------------NOTE---------------------------

Only required when the penetration is not isolated by appropriate closed and de-activated automatic valve(s),

closed manual valve(s). or blind flange{s}.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

CPIS Actuation Logic.

or one or more required channels of containment airborne radiation monitors inoperable in MODES 1.

2. 3. and 4.

A.1 Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for affected valves of LCO 3.6.3.

"Containment Isolation Valves,u made inoperable by CPIS instrumentation.

Immediately B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met in MODES 1. 2. 3. or 4.

B.1 AND Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-35 Amendment No. ffi.226

3.3.8 CPIS ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One or more required channels of containment airborne radiation monitors inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C.1 Enter applicable conditions and required actions of LCO 3.4.15. uReS Leak Detect ion. II Immediately D.

CPIS Manual Trip.

Actuation Logic, or one or more required channels of containment airborne radiation monitors inoperable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

NOTE-----------

The provisions of LCO 3.0.3 are not applicable.

"-~------------

0.1 Place and maintain containment purge supply and exhaust valves in closed pos ition.

OR 0.2.1 Suspend CORE AL TERATIONS.

Immediately Immediately AND 0.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in eonta i nment.

Immediately SURVEILLANC~ REQUIREMENTS SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on required containment airborne radiation monitor channel.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-36 Amendment No. tSr,226

CRIS 3.3.9 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.9 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS) lCO 3.3.9 One CRIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES I, 2. 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS

NOTES---------------------------

1.

The provisions of lCO 3.0.3 are not applicable.

2.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

CRIS Manual Trip.

Actuation Logic, or one required channel of control room airborne radiation monitors inoperable 1n MODES I, 2, 3, or 4.

A.l

NOTE--------

Place Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) 1n isolation mode if automatic transfer to isolation mode inoperable.

Place one CREACUS train in emergency mode.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-39 Amendment No. ~.226

CRIS 3.3.9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQU IRED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME B.

CRrS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, or required control room airborne radiation monitors inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

B.1 OR B.2.1

NOTE--------

Place CREACUS in isolation mode if automatic transfer to isolation mode i noperabl e.

Place one CREACUS train in emergency mode.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately Immediately B.2.2 AND Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

B.2.3

NOTE--------

Limited plant control operations are allowed provided the changes are accounted for in the calculated SDM.

Immediately Immediately Suspend positive reactivity additions.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the required control room airborne radiation monitor channe1.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-40 Amendment No. +15,226

CREACUS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3,7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS)

LCO 3.7.11 Two CREACUS trains shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE------------------------------

The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES I, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS

NOTES-----------------------------

1.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable when entering MODES 5, 6, or defueled configuration.

2.

Each Unit shall enter applicable ACTIONS separately.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CREACUS train inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

A.I Restore CREACUS train to OPERABLE status.

14 days B.

One or more CREACUS trains inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary in Modes 1,

2. 3, or 4.

B.1 AND B.2 AND B.3 Initiate action to implement mitigating actions.

Verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

Restore eRE boundary to OPERABLE status.

Immediately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 90 days (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.7-24 Amendment No. m,226

CREACUS 3.7.11 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1.

2. 3. or 4.

D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 5 or 6. or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment. or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

REQUIRED ACTION C.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND C.2 Be in MODE 5.

D.1 OR 0.2.1 AND D.2.2 AND D.2.3 Place OPERABLE CREACUS train in emergency radiation protection mode.

Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

COMPLETION TIME 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 36 hours Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.7-25 Amendment No. rt4,226

CREACUS 3.7.11 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Two CREACUS trains inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

E.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND E.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

AND Immediately Immediately One or more CREACUS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

E.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.7-25a Amendment No.lt4,226

Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.16 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCD 3.7.16 The fuel storage pool water level shall be £ 23 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Fuel storage pool water level not within 1imit.

A.l

NOTE--------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in fuel storage pool.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify the fuel storage pool water level is

~ 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

7 days SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.7-29 Amendment No. irJ,226

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 3.B ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems Shutdown"; and

b.

One diesel generator (OG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION

.REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

NOTE------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.B.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.!

Declare affected required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperfrble.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-17 Amendment No. frr.226

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQU IRED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately A.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Immediately A.2.4 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

Immediately A.2.5 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-18 Amendment No. +r5,226

AC Sources - ShlJtdown 3.8.2 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One required DG inoperable.

B.1 AND B.2 AND B.3 AND B.4 AND B.5 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

Initiate action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-18a Amendment No. 226

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.B.5 3.B ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.B.5 DC Sources Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 The DC e1ectrical power subsystem shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.B.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION A.

NOTE--------

Only applicable to 1800 amp-hour rated batteries.

One or two required battery charger(s) on one train inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.I Restore battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum estatilished float voltage.

AND A.2 Verify battery float current ~ 1.50 amps.

AND A.3.1

.QR Restore required battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status

A.3.2.1 Provide ability to power the spare battery charger from a diesel-backed source.

AND A.3.2.2 Restore required battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.

COMPLETION TIME 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 72 hOlirs 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 7 days (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-27 Amendment No. rtS,226

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION D.

One or more required DC electrical power subsystem(s) inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

D.1 Declare affected reguired feature(s) inoperable.

!ill D.2.1 Sus~end CORE ALT RATIONS.

AND 0.2.2 sus~end movement of fue assemblies within containment.

AND 0.2.3 Sus~end movement of fue assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

AND 0.2.4 Suspend operations invo1vin positive reactivi y additions r

that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

AND 0.2.5 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical )ower SUbs~stem(s to OPER BLE status.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately IITIOediate1y Immediately SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-28 Amendment No. e+8.226

Inverters - Shutdown 3.8.B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 Required inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class IE AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem(s} required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Sys terns - Shutdown. II APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQU I RED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required inverters inoperable.

A.1 Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable.

OR A.2.l Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Immediately Immediately A.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately A.2.3 AND Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

A.2.4 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SOM or boron concentration.

Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-36 Amendment No. f15.226

Inverters - Shutdown 3.B.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A,

(continued)

A.2.5 Initiate action to restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEIllANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage and 7 days alignment to required AC vital buses.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-37 Amendment No. f21.226

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC. DC. and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION A.

One or more required AC, DC, or AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.I Declare associated sup~orted required fea ure(s) inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Sus~end CORE ALI RATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Sus~end movement of fue assemblies within containment.

AND A.2.3 Sus~end movement of fue assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

AND A.2.4 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SOM or boron concentration.

AND COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-40 Amendment No. rlS,226

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.10 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2.5 Initiate actions to restore required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system(s) to OPERABLE status.

AND Immediately A.2.6 Declare associated required shutdown cooling system(s) inoperable and not in operation.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.10.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to reguired AC. DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems.

7 days SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.8-41 Amendment No. rts.226

Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCD 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a.

The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four bolts;

NOTE----------------------------

The equipment hatch may be open if all of the following conditions are met:

1)

The Containment Structure Equipment Hatch Shield Doors are capable of being closed within 30 minutes,

2)

The plant is in Mode 6 with at least 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange,

3)

A designated crew is available to close the Containment Structure Equipment Hatch Shield Doors,

4)

Containment purge is in service, and

5)

The reactor has been subcritical for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

b.

One door in each air lock closed;

NOTE----------------------------

Both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open provided:

a.

one personnel airlock door ;s OPERABLE, and b1. the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, or b2. defueled configuration with fuel in containment (i.e., fuel in refueling machine or upender).

c.

Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge System.

APPLICABILITY:

During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.9-4 Amendment No. +93,226

Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more containment penetrations not in required status.

A.1 AND A.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify each required containment penetration is in the required status.

7 days SR 3.9.3.2 Verify each required containment purge and exhaust valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

24 months SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.9-5 Amendment No. ~226

Refueling Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 Refueling Water Level LCO 3.9.6 Refueling water level shall be maintained ~ 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.

~---------------------NOTE-------------------------------------

Water level may be lowered to a minimum of 23 feet above the top of the fuel for movement of four finger CEAs, coupling and uncoupling of CEA extension shafts or for verifying the coupling and uncoupling.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of fuel reactor pressure vessel.

During movement of fuel assemblies assemblies or CEAs within the within containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Refueling water level not within limit.

A.1 AND A.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 The refueling water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.9-10 Amendment No. -:84.226

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA DOCKET NO. 50-362 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 219 License No. NPF-15

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al.

(SCE or the licensee), dated September 2, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted In compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 219, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 16, Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2012

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 219 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15 DOCKET NO. 50-362 Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating license No. NPF-15 and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Operating license REMOVE INSERT -3 Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT 3.3-35 3.3-35 3.3-36 3.3-36 3.3-39 3.3-39 3.3-40 3.3-40 3.7-24 3.7-24 3.7-25 3.7-25 3.7-25a 3.7-29 3.7-29 3.8-17 3.8-17 3.8-18 3.8-18 3.8-18a 3.8-27 3.8-27 3.8-28 3.8-28 3.8-36 3.8-36 3.8-37 3.8-37 3.8-40 3.8-40 3.8-41 3.8-41 3.9-4 3.9-4 3.9-5 3.9-5 3.9-10 3.9-10

-3 (3)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; (4)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear materials as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70 to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6)

SCE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 3 and by the decommissioning of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1.

C.

This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3438 megawatts thermal).

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 219, are hereby incorporated in the license.

Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

Amendment No. 219

CPIS 3.3.8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)

LCO 3.3.8 One CPIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2, 3, and 4, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

NOTE---------------------------

Only required when the penetration is not isolated by appropriate closed and de-activated automatic valve(s),

closed manual valve(s). or blind flange{s).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

CPIS Actuation Logic, or one or more required channels of containment airborne radiation monitors inoperable in MODES 1.

2, 3. and 4.

A.l Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for affected valves of LCO 3.6.3, IIContainment Isolation Valves."

made inoperable by CPIS instrumentation.

Immediately B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met in MODES I, 2, 3. or 4.

B.1 AND Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-35 Amendment No. t2!.219

CPIS 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One or more required channels of containment airborne radiation monitors inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C.1 Enter applicable conditions and required actions of LCO 3.4.15, "RCS Leak Detection.

1I Immediately D.

CPIS Manual Trip.

Actuation Logic, or one or more required channels of containment airborne radiation monitors inoperable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

NOTE-----------

The provisions of LCO 3.0.3 are not applicable.

~--------------

0.1 Place and maintain containment purge supply and exhaust valves in closed position.

OR 0.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATI ONS.

Immediately Immediately AND 0.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in containment.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on required containment airborne radiation monitor channel.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-36 Amendment No. trt.219

CRIS 3.3.9 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.9 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)

LCO 3.3.9 One CRIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2. 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS

NOTES---------------------------

1.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.3 are not applicable.

2.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable.

CONDITION REQU I RED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.

CRIS Manual Trip.

Actuation Logic, or one required channel of control room airborne radiation monitors inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3. or 4.

A.l,

NOTE--------

Place Control Room Emergency Air Cleanop System (CREACUS) in isolation mode if automatic transfer to isolation mode inoperable.

Place one CREACUS train in emergency mode.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-39 Amendment No. ~,219

3.3.9 CRIS ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION B.

eRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, or required control room airborne radiation monitors inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies ;n the fuel storage pool.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS B.1 OR B.2.1 AND B.2.2 AND B.2.3 REQUIRED ACTION

NOTE--------

Place CREACUS in isolation mode if automatic transfer to isolation mode inoperable.

Place one CREACUS train in emergency mode.

sus~end movement of fue assemblies within containment.

Sus~end movement of fue assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

NOTE--------

Limited plant control o~erations are a lowed provided the changes are accounted for in the calculated SDM.

Suspend positive reactivity additions.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the required control room airborne radiation monitor 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channel.

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-40 Amendment No. +&6.219

CREACUS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS)

LCD 3.7.11 Two CREACUS trains shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE------------------------------

The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4. 5. and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS

NOTES-----------------------------

1.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicabl~ when entering MODES 5, 6, or defueled configuration.

2.

Each Unit shall enter applicable ACTIONS separately.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CREACUS train inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

A.I Restore CREACUS train to OPERABLE status.

14 days B.

One or more CREACUS trains inogerable due to inopera le CRE boundary in Modes 1, 2~ 3, or 4.

B.1 AND B.2 AND B.3 Initiate action to implement mitigating actions.

Verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant ex~osures to radiolo~ica,

chemica, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

Restore CRE boundary to OPERABLE status.

Immediately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 90 days (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-24 Amendment No. ~.219

CREACUS 3.7.11 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, C.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 2, 3, or 4.

C.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

0.1 Place OPERABLE CREACUS train in emergency radiation protection mode.

illi 0.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND 0.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

AND 0.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-25 Amendment No. r96,219

CREACUS 3.7.11 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION E. Two CREACUS trains inoperable in MODE 5 or 6~ or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment. or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

One or more CREACUS trains inoperable due to an inoperable eRE boundary in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of fuel assemblies within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

REQUIRED ACTION E.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND

[,2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

AND

[,3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

COMPLETION TIME Ill1I1ediately Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-25a Amendment No, reb,219

Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.16 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.16 The fuel storage pool water level shall be 2 23 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Fuel storage pool water level not within limit.

A.l

NOTE--------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in fuel storage pool.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify the fuel storage pool water level is 2 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

7 days SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-29 Amendment No. t+6.219

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One qualifted circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.B.10.

"Distribution Systems Shutdown U ; and

b.

One diesel generator (06) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class lE AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

NOTE------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCD 3.8.10. with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-17 Amendment No. f!6,219

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately A.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage poo 1.

Immediately A.2.4 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

AND A.2.5 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-18 Amendment No. tt6.219

3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION B.

One required DG inoperable.

B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND B.2 Sus~end movement of fue assemblies within containment.

AND 8.3 Sus~end movement of fue assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

AND B.4 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

AND B.5 Initiate action to restore re~uired DG to OPERABL status.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-18a Amendment No. +&&.219

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 The DC electrical power subsystem shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCD 3.8.10. UDistribution Systems - Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

NOTE--------

Only applicable to 1800 amp-hour rated batteries.

One or two required battery charger(s~ on one train inopera leo A.I Restore battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum estaolished float voltage.

AND A.2 Verify battery float current ~ 1.50 amps.

AND A.3.I Restore required battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.

OR A.3.2.1 Provide ability to power the spare battery charger from a diesel-backed source.

AND A.3.2.2 Restore required battery charger(s}

to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 72 hours 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 7 days (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-27 Amendment No. rtl.219

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.B.5 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

One or more required DC electrical power subsystem(s) inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

0.1 Declare affected reguired feature(s) inoperable.

OR 0.2.1 Sus~end CORE ALT RATIONS.

Immediately Immediately AND 0.2.2 Sus~end movement of fue assembli es within containment.

Immediately AND 0.2.3 sus~end movement of fue assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Immediately AND 0.2.4 Suspend operations invo1vin~ positive reactivi y additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

Immediately AND 0.2.5 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical )ower sUb~stem(s to OPE BlE status.

Immediately SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 Amendment No.

r+t.219

Inverters - Shutdown 3.8.8 3.B ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown LCO 3.8.B Required inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class IE AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10. IIDistribution Systems Shutdown. II APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQU I REO ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required inverters inoperable.

A.1 QR A.2.1 AND A.2.2 AND A.2.3 AND A.2.4 AND Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable.

Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

sus~end movement of fue assemblies within containment.

Sus~end movement of fue assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-36 Amendment No. +&&,219

Inverters - Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2.5 Initiate action to restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage and 7 days alignment to required AC vital buses.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-37 Amendment No. +16,219

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC. DC. and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABI LITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION A.

One or more required AC, DC, or AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.l Declare associated supported required feature(s) inoperable.

.oR A.2.l AND Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

A.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately A.2.3 AND Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

A.2.4 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

Immediately Immediately (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-40.

Amendment No. rtl,219

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.10 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2.5 Initiate actions to restore required AC, DC. and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system(s) to OPERABLE status.

Immediately AND A.2.6 Declare associated required shutdown cooling system{s) inoperable and not in operation.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.10.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems.

7 days SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.8-41 Amendment No.

~.219

Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status!

a.

The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four bolts;

NOTE----------------------------

The equipment hatch may be open if all of the following conditions are met:

I}

The Containment Structure Equipment Hatch Shield Doors are capable of being closed within 30 minutes,

2)

The plant is in Mode 6 with at least 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange,

3)

A deSignated crew is available to close the Containment Structure Equipment Hatch Shield Doors,

4)

Containment purge 1s in service, and

5)

The reactor has been subcritical for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

b.

One door in each air lock closed;

NOTE----------------------------

Both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open provided:

a.

one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE. and bl. the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel. or b2. defueled configuration with fuel in containment (i.e ** fuel in refueling machine or upender).

c.

Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve.

blind flange. or eqUivalent, or

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge System.

APPLICABILITY:

During CORE ALTERATIONS.

During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.9-4 Amendment No. 184,219

.Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more A.I containment penetrations not in required status.

AND A.2

\\

Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify each required containment penetration is in the required status.

7 days SR 3.9.3.2 Verify each required containment purge and exhaust valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

24 months SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.9-5 Amendment No. +/-+/-6t219

Refueling Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 Refueling Water Level LCO 3.9.6 Refueling water level shall be maintained z 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.

NOTE------------------------------------

Water level may be lowered to a minimum of 23 feet above the top of the fuel for movement of four finger CEAs, coupling and uncoupling of CEA extension shafts or for verifying the coupling and uncoupling.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement reactor pressure vessel, Durin~ movement of fuel of fuel assemblies assemblies or CEAs within the within containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET ION TIME A.

Refueling water level not within limit.

A.I AND A.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 The refueling water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.9-10 Amendment No. tr3.219

lINITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 226 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10 AND AMENDMENT NO. 219 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE. CALIFORNIA SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-362

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated September 2,2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11252B110), Southern California Edison Company (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Units 2 and 3.

The licensee's design-basis fuel handling accident (FHA) evaluation for SONGS shows that fuel damage may occur from dropping either a non-irradiated fuel assembly or an irradiated fuel assembly resulting in radiological consequences. SONGS current TSs only address handling of irradiated fuel assemblies. Because of this, the licensee implemented administrative controls related to the movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies in addition to the TS controls for movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Thus SONGS, through the LAR, proposes to change the TSs to include both irradiated and non-irradiated fuel assemblies. The amendments would revise a number of TS requirements to impose additional restrictions to the movement of all fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel assemblies. In addition, as part of the LAR, the NRC staff reviewed a new FHA evaluation for movement of fuel inside the fuel handling building and inside containment at SONGS 2 and 3.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Background

In Amendment No. 210 to Facility Operating License (FOL) No. NPF-10 for SONGS, Unit 2, and Amendment No. 202 to FOL No. NPF-15 for SONGS, Unit 3, issued December 29, 2006

- 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML063400359), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved a full-scope implementation of the alternative source term (AST) in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.67, "Accident Source Term," and following the guidance and methodology provided in applicable sections of NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors" July 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003716792). The NRC staff evaluated the proposed changes to the FHA to verify that the licensee's postulated design basis radiological consequence analyses continue to meet the dose criteria listed in 10 CFR 50.67.

2.2 Regulatory Review Criteria The proposed changes provide new applicability and/or action language that include load movements over irradiated fuel assemblies. The NRC staff's evaluation of the proposed changes is based upon the following regulations, regulatory guides, and standards:

1.

In 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," the NRC established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TSs are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.

10 CFR 50.36(b) states, in part, that the TSs "will be derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report... "

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) states, in part, that A technical specification limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor must be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria...

(B) Criterion 2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

(C) Criterion 3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

2.

10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, tests and experiments"

3.

10 CFR 50.67, "Accident source term"

- 3

4.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criterion [GDG] for Nuclear Power Plants," GDC 19, "Control room."

5.

NRC RG 1.183, "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents" at Nuclear Power Reactors," July 2000.

6.

Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments"

7.

NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Section 6.4, "Control Room Habitability Systems," for control room (CR) dose; Section 15.7.4, "Radiological Consequences of Fuel Handling Accidents"; and Section 15.0.1, "Radiological Consequence Analyses Using Alternative Source Terms."

The applicable 10 CFR 50.67 acceptance criteria are:

5 roentgen equivalent man (rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) in the CR during the duration of the accident,

25 rem TEDE to an individual at any point on the boundary of the exclusion area for any 2-hour period following the onset of the postulated fission product release, and

25 rem TEDE to an individual located at any point on the outer boundary of the low population zone (LPZ), who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release during the entire period of its passage.

RG 1.183 and SRP 15.0.1 provide additional guidance of 6.3 rem TEDE for FHAs for the exclusion area boundary (EAB) and LPZ for a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months release.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Description of Technical Specification Changes The license amendment requested revising the following TSs:

TS 3.3.8, "Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)"

TS 3.3.9, "Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)"

TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS)"

TS 3.7.16, "Fuel Storage Pool Water Level" TS 3.8.2, "AC [Alternating Current] Sources - Shutdown" TS 3.8.5, "DC [Direct Current] Sources - Shutdown" TS 3.8.8, "Inverters - Shutdown" TS 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown" TS 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations" TS 3.9.6, "Refueling Water Level"

-4 The proposed changes revise the applicability of these TSs to add a new specified condition to the Applicability statement. The proposed specified condition will apply to movement of any fuel assembly (irradiated or non-irradiated) over irradiated fuel assemblies in containment or the fuel storage pool. The added specific condition of movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies is achieved by deleting the word "irradiated." Conforming changes are made to the Actions portion of the TSs as appropriate.

The following changes are proposed:

LCO 3.3.8, "Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)"

Current:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

Revised:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

Conforming change to delete "irradiated" from Condition 0 and from Required Action 0.2.2 LCO 3.3.9, "Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)"Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)

Current:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Revised:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool Conforming change are made to Condition B to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool." Condition B.2.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment." The following new Required Action B.2.2 is added with an "Immediately" Completion Time:

B.2.2 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Previous Required Action B.2.2 is renumbered to B.2.3 because of the addition of the above new Required Action.

- 5 LCO 3.7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS)"

Current:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Revised:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool Conforming change are made to Condition 0 to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pooL" Condition 0.2.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment." The following new Required Action D.2.3 is added with an "Immediately" Completion Time:

0.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Conforming change are made to Condition E to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment, or during the movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pooL" Condition E.2.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment." The following new Required Action E.2.3 is added with an "Immediately" Completion Time:

E.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

LCO 3.7.16, "Fuel Storage Pool Water Level" Current:

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Revised:

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

- 6 LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown" Current:

MODES 5. and 6.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Revised:

MODES 5. and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool Condition A,2.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment."

The following new Required Action A.2.3 is added with an "Irnmediately" Completion Time:

A,2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Previous Required Action A.2.3. and A.2A are renumbered to A.2A, and A.2.5, respectively, because of the addition of the above new Required Action.

Condition B.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment."

The following new Required Action B.3 is added with an "Immediately" Completion Time:

B.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Previous Required Action B.3. and BA are renumbered to BA, and B.5, respectively. because of the addition of the above new Required Action.

LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown" Current:

MODES 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Revised:

MODES 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool Condition D.2.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment."

The following new Required Action D.2.3 is added with an "Immediately" Completion Time:

- 7 D.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Previous Required Action D.2.3. and D.2.4 are renumbered to D.2.4, and D.2.5, respectively, because of the addition of the above new Required Action.

LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters - Shutdown" Current:

MODES 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Revised:

MODES 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool Condition A.2.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment."

The following new Required Action A.2.3 is added with an "Immediately" Completion Time:

A.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Previous Required Action A.2.3. and A.2.4 are renumbered to A.2.4, and A.2.5, respectively, because of the addition of the above new Required Action.

LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution System - Shutdown" Current:

MODES 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Revised:

MODES 5, and 6, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment, During movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool Condition A.2.2 is changed to delete "irradiated" and add "within containment."

The following new Required Action A.2.3 is added with an "Immediately" Completion Time:

A.2.3 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

- 8 Previous Required Action A.2.3. A.2.4, and A.2.5 are renumbered to A.2.4, A.2.5, and A.2.6, respectively, because of the addition of the above new Required Action.

LCO 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations" Current:

During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

Revised:

During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

LCO 3.9.6, "Refueling Water Level" Current:

During movement of fuel assemblies or CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel when either the fuel assemblies being moved or the fuel assemblies seated within the reactor pressure vessel are irradiated, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

Revised:

During movement of fuel assemblies or CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel During movement of fuel assemblies within containment.

3.2

NRC Staff Evaluation

3.2.1 Radiological Consequences The SONGS final safety analysis report (FSAR) Section 15.7, "Radioactive Release From a Subsystem or Component," describes the design basis FHA analysis of record (AOR) that assumes that a fuel assembly drop occurs during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the fuel building and/or reactor building. The FHA is modeled as the dropping of a single fuel assembly and handling tool or of a heavy object onto other spent fuel assemblies. The licensee's proposed new FHA considers changes to two assumptions in the FHA AOR: (1) the assumed number of fuel pins failed; and (2) the assumed fuel bundle weight was increased as stated above. The methodology and all other inputs, parameters, and/or assumptions used in the radiological model remained unchanged and are consistent with the licensee's current licensing basis and their previously approved AST amendment.

The licensee's updated analysis for an FHA inside the fuel handling building (FHA-FHS) predicts that a dropped irradiated fuel assembly would result in a failure of 472 irradiated fuel pins, and that a new (non-irradiated) fuel assembly drop would result in a failure of 236 irradiated fuel pins. These updated irradiated fuel pin failures are above the licensee's current AOR value of 60 irradiated fuel pins failing for a FHA-FHB. Similarly, the licensee's updated analysis for a FHA inside the containment (FHA-IC) assumes that a dropped irradiated fuel

- 9 assembly would result in a failure of 472 irradiated fuel pins. This updated number is above the licensee's current AOR value of 226 irradiated fuel pins failing for an FHA-IC. The FHA-FHB is the more limiting analysis.

The proposed change to the FHA alters the assumed fuel failure resulting from the postulated FHA. Proposed TS changes related to the applicability and/or actions regarding load movements over irradiated fuel assemblies in containment and in the fuel storage pool are reflective of the new FHA.

RG 1.183, Appendix B, "Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident," states, in part, that The number of fuel rods damaged during the accident should be based on a conservative analysis that considers the most limiting case. This analysis should consider parameters such as the weight of the dropped heavy load or the weight of a dropped fuel assembly (plus any attached handling grapples), the height of the drop, and the compression, torsion, and shear stresses on the irradiated fuel rods. Damage to adjacent fuel assemblies, if applicable (e.g., events over the reactor vessel), should be considered.

The licensee identified that the current FHA AOR did not include the use of heavier bundle weights, nor the weights of components such as control element assemblies, neutron source, or handling grapples. Additionally, the fuel bundle weights used at the site have increased due to changes in fuel assembly design. Therefore, the licensee performed a revised analysis of a postulated FHA which included the heavier bundle weights, weights of any additional components, and a discretionary margin of 50 pounds (Ibs) which had not been accounted for in previous fuel assembly drop fuel rod failure analyses.

For the fuel bundle drop scenarios in the fuel storage pool and core locations, the licensee's updated postulated FHA analysis assumes that all the fuel pins in both the dropped fuel assembly and the struck fuel assembly fail (472 pins total; 236 pins per assembly). The licensee's updated postulated FHA analysis assumes various fuel bundle weight combinations (bundle/discretionary weight/grapple weight) up to 2,065 Ibs.

The NRC staff conducted a quantitative analysis multiplying the current FHA-FHB AOR doses by the ratio of assumed fuel pin failure in the proposed FHA-FHB to those in the current AOR (472 pins/60 pins - an increase of a factor of 8). For the FHA-FHB exclusion area boundary (EAB) doses the results of the licensee's analysis (i.e., doses going from 0.2 rem TEDE to 1.7 rem TEDE) are consistent with an increase of a factor of 8.

Likewise, the NRC staff conducted a quantitative analysis multiplying the current FHA-IC AOR doses by the ratio of assumed fuel pin failure in the proposed FHA-IC to those in the current AOR (472 pins/226 pins - a doubling).

For the FHA-IC EAB doses, and for the FHA-IC control room (CR) doses the doubling of the doses is consistent with the licensee's analysis (Le., doses for the FHA-IC EAB case increasing from 0.8 rem TEDE to 1.7 rem TEDE and for the FHA-IC CR doses increasing from 0.3 rem TEDE to 0.6 rem TEDE).

Performing this numerical comparison for some of the FHA-FHB AOR values in the initial analysis is not possible because the initial analysis results are reported as less than 0.1 rem

- 10 TEDE. This is the case for the following analysis: FHA-FHB at the outer boundary of the low population zone (LPZ), FHA-FHB CR and FHA-IC LPZ. The staff notes that by multiplying a value of less than 0.1 rem TEDE by a factor of 8 for the FHA-FHB cases and by a factor of 2 for the FHA-IC LPZ case, will result in doses that are well within regulatory guidance limits found in RG 1.183 and SRP 15.0.1.

The NRC staff also determined that the increase in the load to 2,065 Ibs conservatively includes and/or models the use of the heavier bundle and weights, and the weights of components within the radiological analyses. The NRC staff also considers the change in assumptions for the FHA-FHB and FHA-IC that the dropped fuel assembly falls on an irradiated fuel assembly and the pins (472 or 236 per assembly) in both the dropped and impacted fuel assemblies fail to be reasonable. The staff concludes that the licensee's analysis is consistent with the guidance found in RG 1.183 because the assumed weight of the fuel assembly. and the assumed number of fuel rods damaged during the accident are based on a conservative analysis that considers the most limiting case.

NRC Approval of Changes to FHA-FHB and FHA-IC The licensee identified that the changes to the radiological doses for the FHA-FHB require NRC approval. Guidance in this area is provided in RG 1.187, which endorses Revision 1 of NEI 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," dated November 2000. NEI 96-07 provides criteria and examples of changes that result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated that would therefore require prior NRC approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(iii). A more than minimal increase in consequences from a proposed activity is defined as an increase that is greater than 10 percent of the difference between the current calculated dose value and the regulatory limit.

The FHA-FHB CR dose increases by more than 10% of the difference between the current dose to the regulatory limit. Ten percent of the difference for this case is 0.59 rem TEDE <<5.0 rem 0.1 rem) x 10% + 0.1 rem = 4.9 rem x 10% + 0.1 rem =0.59 rem). The FHA-FHB CR dose is 0.6 rem TEDE which is greater than 0.59 rem. Therefore, the staff concludes that the change to the FHA-FHB CR dose is more than minimal and meets the requirement of 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(iii) for requiring NRC prior approval. The staff also concludes that because the revised dose is below the regulatory limit of 5 rem TEDE that the revised FHA-FHB CR dose of 0.6 rem TEDE is acceptable.

Table 1 below contains a column that provides the value for the FHA-FHB and FHA-IC for the EAB, LPZ, and the CR that if exceeded trips the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2)(iii) of more than a minimal increase in the doses that would require NRC prior approval. The table includes the regulatory limit found in 10 CFR 50.67 and the regulatory guide value for these doses. For purposes of the calculations to determine 10% of the difference the regulatory limit found in 10 CFR 50.67 is used in accordance with the guidance found in NEI 96-07. For example the FHA-FHB EAB value that would result in more than a minimal increase is <<25 rem-0.2 rem) x 10% +0.2 rem =24.8 rem x 10% + 0.2 rem =2.7 rem). The staff notes that based on the Table results below the FHA-FHB CR dose is the only dose that exceeds the more than a minimal increase value calculated in accordance with NEI 96-07 guidance. The staff also notes that for all cases the proposed revised FHA dose values are less than the RG 1.183 and SRP 15.0.1 guidance.

- 11 Therefore, the staff concludes that the FHA-FHB EAB, FHA-FHB LPZ, FHA-IC EAB, FHA-IC LPZ, and FHA-IC CR increase in doses do not exceed the values requiring prior NRC approval.

Nevertheless, the staff reviewed the resulting change in doses for these cases and also concludes that because they are below the RG 1.183 and SRP 15.0.1 criteria that the revised doses are acceptable.

TABLE 1 Comparison of the Radiological Consequence Results of Revised Postulated Fuel Handling Accident at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (Limiting Case of 472 Pins Failed)

FHA Inside Fuel Handling Building Baseline Case (rem TEDE)

Proposed Amendment (rem TEDE)

Value if Exceeded Requires NRC approval (rem TEDE)

RG 1.183 and SRP 15.0.1 Acceptance Criteria (rem TEDE) 10 CFR 50.67 limit (rem TEDE)

Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) 0.2 1.7 2.7 6.3 25 i

Low Population Zone (LPZ)

<0.1

<0.1 2.59 6.3 25 Control Room (CR)

<0.1 0.6 0.59 5.0 5

FHA Inside Containment Baseline Case (rem TEDE)

Proposed Amendment (rem TEDE)

Value if Exceeded Requires NRC approval (rem TEDE)

RG 1.183 and SRP 15.0.1 Acceptance Criteria

(rem TEDE) 10 CFR 50.67, limit (rem TEDE)

Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) 0.8 1.7 3.22 6.3 i

25 Low Population Zone (LPZ)

<0.1

<0.1 2.59 6.3 25 Control Room (CR) 0.3 0.6 0.77 5.0 5

I 3.2.2 Evaluation of Technical Specification Changes The previous version of the TSs was based on movement of irradiated fuel only. Because of the changes in assumptions for the FHA-FHB and the FHA-IC discussed above, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that changes to appropriate TSs are necessary for the reasons described below.

The licensee proposed changes to TSs 3.3.8,3.3.9,3.7.11,3.7.16,3.8.2,3.8.5,3.8.8.3.8.10, 3.9.3. and 3.9.6 to conform with the assumptions of the revised FHA. The staff finds the TS changes ensure compliance with regulations for the following reasons:

TS 3.3.8. "Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS)." generates a train related containment purge isolation signal upon detection of high gaseous radiation in

- 12 containment to help to minimize the escape of fission products in the event of a FHA-IC.

The revised FHA assumes that movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel can cause a FHA. The CPIS is credited in mitigating the FHA, which is a design basis accident found in FSAR Section 1S.7, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36(c)(2)(ii)(C) for a limiting condition for operation (LCD) in the TSs.

Therefore, the CPIS must be operable when needed. Prohibiting fuel movement when the CPIS is inoperable assures that the performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the plant is maintained.

TS 3.3.9, "Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)," terminates the normal supply of outside air to the control room and initiates actuation of the control room emergency air cleanup system to minimize operator radiation exposure in the event of a FHA. The revised FHA assumes that movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel can cause a FHA. The CRIS is credited in mitigating the FHA, which is a design basis accident found in FSAR Section 1S.7, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36(c)(2)(ii)(C) for a LCD in the TSs. Therefore, the CRIS must be operable when needed. Prohibiting fuel movement when the CRIS is inoperable assures that the performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the plant is maintained.

TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS)," consists of two independent, redundant trains that recirculate and filter air in the control room envelope and control room envelope boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air, helping to protect control room personnel in the event of a FHA. The revised FHA assumes that movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel can cause a FHA. The CREACUS is credited in mitigating the FHA, which is a design basis accident found in FSAR Section 1S.7, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36(c)(2){ii)(C) for a LCD in the TSs. Therefore, the CREACUS must be operable when needed. Prohibiting fuel movement when the CREACUS is inoperable assures that the performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the plant is maintained.

TS 3.7.16, "Fuel Storage Pool Water Level," establishes a minimum water level in the fuel storage pool to be consistent with the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a FHA. The revised FHA assumes that movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel can cause a FHA. The fuel storage pool water level is an operating restriction that is credited in mitigating the FHA, which is a design basis accident found in FSAR Section 1S.7, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36(c)(2)(ii)(8) for inclusion in the TSs. Therefore, the fuel storage pool water level must be maintained when needed. Prohibiting fuel movement when the fuel storage pool water level is lower than the minimum water level assures that the performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the plant is maintained.

TS 3.8.2, "AC Sources Shutdown," TS 3.8.S, "DC Source - Shutdown," TS 3.8.8, "Inverters-Shutdown," TS 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown," ensure that adequate electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a FHA. The revised FHA assumes that movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel can cause a FHA. The AC Sources - Shutdown, DC

- 13 Sources - Shutdown, Inverters - Shutdown, and Distribution Systems - Shutdown, are credited in mitigating the FHA, which is a design basis accident found in FSAR Section 1S.7, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36(c)(2)(ii)(C) for LCOs in the TSs.

Therefore, the AC Sources - Shutdown, DC Sources - Shutdown, Inverters Shutdown, and Distribution Systems - Shutdown, must be operable when needed.

Prohibiting fuel movement when these systems are inoperable assures that the performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the plant is maintained.

TS 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations," limits the consequences of a FHA in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment. The revised FHA assumes that movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel can cause a FHA The Containment Penetrations system is credited in mitigating the FHA, which is a design basis accident found in FSAR Section 1S.7 and meets the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36(c)(2)(ii)(C) for a LCO in the TSs. Therefore, the Containment Penetrations must be operable when needed.

Prohibiting fuel movement when the Containment Penetrations are inoperable assures that the performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the plant is maintained.

TS 3.9.6, "Refueling Water level," establishes a water level that is used as an initial condition design parameter in the analysis for the FHA in containment and allows a decontamination factor of 100 to be used in the accident analysis for iodine in the event of a FHA The revised FHA assumes that movement of non-irradiated fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel can cause a FHA The refueling water level is an operating restriction that is credited in mitigating the FHA, which is a design basis accident found in FSAR Section 1S.7, and meets the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36(c)(2)(ii)(B) for inclusion in the TSs. Therefore, the refueling water level must be maintained when needed. Prohibiting fuel movement when the refueling water level is lower than the minimum water level assures that the performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the plant is maintained.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed TS changes to TSs 3.3.8, 3.3.9,3.7.11,3.7.16,3.8.2, 3.8.S, 3.8.8, 3.8.10, 3.9.3, and 3.9.6 are in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR SO.36. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

S.O ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The

- 14 Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on December 13, 2011 (76 FR 77572). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: LaRay J. Benton Joseph M. Sebrosky Date: October 16, 2012

ML12215A399 OFFICE NAME NRRlLPL4/PM

~L JSebrosky PL4/LA rkhardt NRRlDE/EEEB/BC NRRlDE/EICB/BC JThorp NRRlDRAlAADB/BC TTate (lDozier for)

NRRlDSS/SBPBIBC GCasto DATE 10/3112 8117112 8/27/12 8/23/12 10/3/12 8121/12 OFFICE NRRlDSS/SCVB/BC NRRlDSS/STSB/BC OGC NLO NRRlLPL4/BC NRRlLPL4/PM NAME HWalker RElliott DRoth MMai'Kley JSebrosky DATE 8/21/12 8/24/12 10/9/12 10116/12 10/16/12

v t e Letter Sequence Approval
TAC:ME7090, (Approved, Closed) TAC:ME7091, (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other: ML11252B110
MONTHYEAR2011-04-13 [Table View]

Person / Time
ML12215A399
Site:	San Onofre (NPF-010, NPF-015)
Issue date:	10/16/2012
From:	Joseph Sebrosky Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Peter Dietrich Southern California Edison Co
Sebrosky J
References
TAC ME7090, TAC ME7091
Download: ML12215A399 (64)
v • d • e

ML12215A399

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Mr. Dietrich:

Enclosures:

Attachment:

Attachment:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Background

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

NRC Staff Evaluation

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

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