NRC 2012-0020, License Amendment Request 268 One-Time Only License Amendment to Add Notes for Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 Actions to Address Nonconformance with Point Beach Nuclear Plant GDC 2

License Amendment Request 268 One-Time Only License Amendment to Add Notes for Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 Actions to Address Nonconformance with Point Beach Nuclear Plant GDC 2

ML121170493
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	04/26/2012
From:	Meyer L Point Beach
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
NRC 2012-0020, LAR 268
Download: ML121170493 (22)

Text

April 26, 2012 EN POINT BEACH NRC 201 2-0020 10 CFR 50.90 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 License Amendment Request 268 One-Time Onlv License Amendment to Add Notes for Technical Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 Actions to Address Nonconformance with Point Beach Nuclear Plant GDC 2 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra), hereby requests an emergency license amendment to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-24 and DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Units 1 and 2, respectively.

NextEra proposes to add notes to the Action section of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 "AC Sources - Operating," and 3.8.2 "AC Sources -

Shutdown," on a one-time only basis to address an apparent nonconformance with PBNP General Design Criteria 2. Enclosure 1 provides a detailed description and analysis of the proposed changes. Attachment 1 to Enclosure 1 provides the annotated TS pages showing the proposed changes. Attachment 2 to Enclosure 1 provides clean TS pages showing the proposed changes. There are no applicable TS Bases changes for the proposed change.

NextEra requests that this license amendment request be reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on an emergency basis pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5). The basis for submitting this license amendment under emergency circumstances is provided in Attachment 3 to Enclosure 1.

The proposed TS changes have been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

This license amendment shall be implemented upon NRC approval.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter is being provided to the designated Wisconsin Official.

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI 54241

Document Control Desk Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 26, 2012.

Very truly yours, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC M

Larry Meyer Site Vice President Enclosure cc:

Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC PSCW

ENCLOSURE I NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 268 DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF CHANGES 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 Proposed Changes

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory RequirementsICriteria 4.2 Precedent 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination 4.4 Conclusions

6.0 REFERENCES

ATTACHMENTS:

I Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-up)

2.

Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Clean)

3.

Basis for Emergency Amendment 11 pages follow

1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION This evaluation supports a request to amend Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-24 and DPR-27 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Units 1 and 2, respectively. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) proposes to add notes to the Action section of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 "AC Sources - Operating" and 3.8.2 "AC Sources - Shutdown" on a one-time only basis to address an apparent nonconformance with PBNP General Design Criteria (GDC) 2 until December 15, 2012. This date is necessary to develop conforming designs, source and procure the appropriate materials, plan the construction activities, implement the modification, and perform the appropriate post modification verifications. The detailed conceptual description is provided in this evaluation.

NextEra has concluded that the "A" Train (G-01 and G-02) Emergency Power Source is inoperable due to the G-01 and G-02 exhaust stacks not being adequately missile protected.

Currently, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are in MODE 1 (Power Operation). Both units entered a 7 day Technical Specification Action Condition (TSAC) 3.8.1, E.3 on April 26, 2012 at 0800 CDT, which expires on May 3, 2012 at 0800 CDT. Upon expiration, entry into TSAC 3.8.1; H.l will require both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Therefore, this request should be processed as an emergency change.

NextEra's preferred path is to install a permanent modification to resolve the apparent nonconformance with PBNP GDC 2. Either a permanent or temporary solution will be in place by December 15, 2012, which conforms to the requirements of PBNP GDC 2.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION On August 16, 201 1, the NRC issued its final disposition on Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 201 1-01 1 (Reference 1). The TIA was raised as a result of an unresolved item (URI) from the 2006 Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) performed at PBNP pertaining to the tornado missile protection of the exhaust stacks for Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) G-01 and G-02. During the CDBI, Region Ill inspectors reviewed the design and configuration of G-01 and G-02. The exhaust stacks for G-01 and G-02 are routed vertically from the EDG rooms along the outside of the turbine building wall. The stacks are approximately 100 feet high and 26 inches in diameter. NextEra has since determined that there is no record to validate that the stacks had been analyzed for the effects of tornado missiles. Consequently, it was postulated that tornado induced missiles could damage the exhaust stacks to a sufficient extent that the exhaust flow would be restricted and the EDGs would not be capable of performing their required safety function.

Upon issuance of the TIA, NextEra initiated an action request in the corrective action program to evaluate the NRC's conclusions. NextEra determined that G-01 and G-02 remained operable but nonconforming with the requirements of PBNP GDC 2 as defined in FSAR Section 1.3.

Based on a further review of this condition, NextEra has concluded that the "A" Train EDGs (G-01 and G-02) are inoperable due to inadequate tornado missile protection for the EDG exhaust stacks.

The NRC URI was closed in inspection report 201 1-004 dated November 2,201 1 where the NRC issued a green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, "Design Control." The finding was screened as very low safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of safety system function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating Page 1 of 11

event. Specifically, the addition of EGDs G-03 and G-04 (1 995-96) provided additional electrical redundancy such that the loss of EDGs G-01 and G-02 would be of very low safety significance.

PBNP GDC 2, Performance Standards, is defined as follows:

"Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention or to the mitigation of the consequences of nuclear accidents which could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to performance standards thaf enable such systems and components to withstand, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, the forces that might reasonably be imposed by the occurrence of an extraordinary natural phenomenon such as earthquake, tornado, flooding condition, high wind, or heavy ice. The design bases so established shall reflect:

(a) appropriate consideration of the most severe of these natural phenomena fhaf have been officially recorded for the site and the surrounding area and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncertainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design. "

On April 24, 2012, the NRC issued TIA 2012-07 (Reference 2). The TIA concluded that the "licensee [NextEra] must reassess the operability of the EDGs and inform the NRC of their conclusions, proposed actions, and timetable for any actions." The NRC staff concluded that the NextEra Prompt Operability Determinations (POD), Revision 5 and the supporting information contained in Revision 4, are inadequate to provide reasonable expectation of operability.

NextEra proposes to add new TS Action notes on a one-time only basis that will remain in effect until December 15, 2012, to permit NextEra an opportunity to develop and implement the necessary modifications to conform to the CLB for PBNP Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes will permit the PBNP TS LC0 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 for the "A" Train EDGs (G-01 and G-02) to be not applicable due to the apparent nonconformance with PBNP GDC 2 regarding tornado protection.

A detailed description of each proposed TS change is provided below. Proposed markups for the TS are provided in Attachment 1. Clean TS pages are provided in Attachment 2. There are no applicable TS Bases changes for the proposed change.

2.1 Proposed Channes:

1.

TS LC0 3.8.1 "AC Sources - Operating" ACTIONS Note Replace:

---

NOTE........................................................

LC0 3.0.4.b is not applicable to standby emergency power sources.

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With:

---

NOTES......................................................

I. LC0 3.0.4.b is not applicable to standby emergency power sources.

2. LC0 3.8.1 for the " A Train standby emergency power source(s) is not applicable regarding tornado protection. This Note will remain in effect until December 15,2012.

Basis for the chanqe: The EDG configuration consists of four shared EDGs. The EDGs are divided into two Trains, "A" and "B." The two Train "A" EDG sets (G-01 and G-02) are located in separate rooms in the seismic Class I section of the turbine building and are connected to the Train "A" 41 60 volt auxiliary system buses of both units. The exhaust stacks for G-01 and G-02 are routed vertically from the EDG rooms, along the outside of the turbine building wall. The stacks are approximately 100 feet high and 26 inches in diameter and separated by approximately 30 feet. They are fabricated from butt-welded 318" thick steel pipe. The exhaust piping for G-01 and G-02 is located outside of the Turbine Building and is not missile protected.

The above proposed change to the TS is acceptable based on the following factors:

(1) the "B" Train EDGs are redundant to the "A" Train EDGs; (2) any one of the installed EDGs can carry full accident loads on one unit and simultaneously carry the safe shutdown loads on the other unit; (3) the Diesel Generator Building (DGB) is of rugged design; (4) the "B" Train EDGs are missile protected; (5) there is a low probability of a tornado generated missile striking the G-01 and G-02 exhaust lines and sufficiently restricting exhaust flow to the point where engine performance is affected; and (6) the G-01 and G-02 exhaust stacks are supported to withstand tornado wind loads.

2.

TS LC0 3.8.2 "AC Sources - Shutdown" ACTIONS Add:

NOTE.....................................................

LC0 3.8.2 for the " A Train standby emergency power source(~) is not applicable regarding tornado protection. This Note will remain in effect until December 15,2012.

Basis for the change: The EDG configuration consists of four shared EDGs. The EDGs are divided into two Trains, " A and "B." The two Train " A EDG sets (G-01 and G-02) are located in separate rooms in the seismic Class I section of the turbine building and are connected to the Train "A" 4160 volt auxiliary system buses of both units. The exhaust stacks for G-01 and G-02 are routed vertically from the EDG rooms, along the outside of the turbine building wall. The stacks are approximately 100 feet high and 26 inches in diameter and separated by approximately 30 feet. They are fabricated from butt-welded 318" thick steel pipe. The exhaust piping for G-01 and G-02 is located outside of the Turbine Building and is not missile protected.

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The above proposed change to the TS is acceptable based on the following factors:

(1) the "B" Train EDGs are redundant to the "A" Train EDGs; (2) any one of the installed EDGs can carry full accident loads on one unit and simultaneously carry the safe shutdown loads on the other unit; (3) the DGB is of rugged design; (4) the "B" Train EDGs are missile protected; (5) there is a low probability of a tornado generated missile striking the G-01 and G-02 exhaust lines and sufficiently restricting exhaust flow to the point where engine performance is affected; and (6) the G-01 and G-02 exhaust stacks are supported to withstand tornado wind loads.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

AC Sources - Operating (TS 3.8.1) and AC Sources - Shutdown (TS 3.8.2)

The PBNP EDG configuration consists of four shared EDGs. The EDGs are divided into two Trains, "A" and "B." The two Train "A" EDG sets (G-01 and G-02) are located in separate rooms in the seismic Class I section of the turbine building and are connected to the Train "A" 41 60 volt auxiliary system buses of both units. The exhaust stacks for G-01 and G-02 are routed vertically from the EDG rooms, along the outside of the turbine building wall. The stacks are approximately 100 feet high and 26 inches in diameter and separated by approximately 30 feet. They are fabricated from butt-welded 318" thick steel pipe. The exhaust piping for G-01 and G-02 is located outside of the Turbine Building and is not missile protected.

NextEra previously determined that while the G-01 and G-02 EDG exhaust stacks themselves could withstand the high wind pressure loads associated with extreme wind events, their supports likely could not. Support failure during a postulated event would lead to simultaneous common-cause failure of both "A" Train EDG stacks, and this was found to be a risk-significant concern.

Accordingly, the supports for both stacks and the supporting building structure were reinforced to be able to withstand the wind pressure load from 21 6 mph winds. This wind speed was selected based on approved NRC guidance in NUREGICR-4461 (Reference 2). This document establishes a frequency of exceedance of 1 E-7lyr for winds of 216 mph. This is considered to be consistent with the requirements of PBNP GDC 2, to consider the highest winds officially recorded at the site and surrounding area plus margin for uncertainty. This modification eliminated the risk significant common cause failure mode of the G-01 and G-02 EDG exhaust stacks.

The ability of the G-01 and G-02 exhaust stacks was also the subject of a site specific study on the subject commissioned by the NRC (NUREGICR-4458, Reference 3). This NUREG study identified two discrete hazards to the EDG stacks; wind pressure overload and missile strike. The occurrence of either event was assumed to cause loss of function of the associated EDG(s), and failure of both EDGs was assumed to lead directly to core damage (no other EDGs were present at the time). The study concluded that the risk of core damage due to simultaneous failure of both stacks was 6.0 E-5lyear prior to reinforcing the stack supports. However, after resolving the common mode failure due to wind overload, the likelihood of core damage due to stack failure (i.e., the probability of both stacks being struck in the same event) was less than 1 E-8lyr.

The NUREG study did not explicitly evaluate the likelihood of failure of a stack given that a missile strike occurs. However, a recently completed study on the subject reveals that Page 4 of 11

a high speed end-on impact from the postulated plank on the stacks themselves would not result in a loss of function of the Train " A EDGs. Rather, as the velocity of the missile is increased, only moderate deformation occurs until the kinetic energy of the missile is high enough to cause perforation of the stack wall. At that point, the missile may intrude and reduce the effective cross section of the stack by direct blockage. This area reduction is the bounding failure from a licensing basis missile strike. The evaluation concluded that in the event of such an impact, the EDG would continue to be capable of carrying at least 99.5% of its full rated load.

In the mid-1990s, PBNP installed two additional EDGs (G-03 and G-04), and re-trained the original two EDGs (G-01 and G-02). The current configuration has G-01 and G-02 as "A" Train EDGs, and G-03 and G-04 as the redundant "8" Train EDGs. Since any one of the installed EDGs can carry full accident loads on one unit and simultaneously carry the safe shutdown loads on the other unit, only one EDG per Train is required to be OPERABLE by the TS. The "B" Train EDGs are missile protected.

The two Train "B" EDGs are located in separate rooms in the seismic Class I DGB and are connected to both Train "B" 41 60 volt auxiliary system buses of both units. The "BJJ Train EDGs are missile protected by being located within a Class I reinforced concrete structure.

Additional Considerations Assuming a tornado renders the " A Train EDGs out of service (OOS), safe shutdown of both units can be achieved and maintained. The reactor protection system is fully missile protected. Thus, the ability to shut down the reactors is not affected.

Emergency power is available from either of the "B" Train EDGs (G-03 and G-04). The "BJJ Train EDGs are fully missile protected and would both remain available to support safe shutdown loads. Either of the two Train "B" EDGs are capable of carrying full accident loads on one unit and simultaneously carry the safe shutdown loads on the other unit.

The Service Water (SW) system is fully missile protected. The SW system will be available on the "BJJ Train powered SW pumps. Thus, required SW cooling for necessary components and the back up source of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) will be available.

Steam Generator AFW for decay heat removal can be supplied from either the "B" Train motor-driven AFW (MDAFW) pump, or the "B" Train Standby Steam Generator (SSG) feed pump. These pumps are operated remotely from the control room. Following local manual operator actions to align the system cross-ties appropriately, any one of the SSG feed pumps can feed any of the four steam generators on site.

The Component Cooling Water (CCW) system is fully protected from missiles. The "BJ1 Train CCW pump will maintain CCW cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals. Thus, there will not be any significant RCS leakage via the RCP seals.

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Reactor Coolant System (RCS) make-up and boration can be provided from the Chemical and Volume Control Systems (CVCS). The CVCS system is fully missile protected. The " B Train powered charging pump(s) will remain functional on the "B" Train EDGs. Borated water can be obtained from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BASTS).

The PBNP electrical distribution system has the capability to cross-tie the "A" and "B" Train buses on the 480 volt level, which maximizes the availability of SW, SSG pump feed, CCW, and CVCS.

The Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), and the Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG) fully integrate the use of these redundant and alternate SSCs, and the plant Operators are knowledgeable and proficient in exercising the procedures from training and simulator scenarios.

Compensatory Actions

1.

Upgrade the existing EDG stack supports to withstand the maximum credible wind pressure force from a postulated tornado. This action has been completed.

If a site meteorological instrument indicates a valid wind speed in excess of the design bases 108 mph for general plant buildings, or in the event that a tornado is confirmed on site (within the owner controlled property), an orderly shutdown of both units shall be commenced within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and shall continue until a damage assessment has confirmed that the G-01 andlor G-02 EDGs have remained operable and the requirements of TS LC0 3.8.1 andlor 3.8.2 as applicable are met. This action shall not be construed as requiring maneuvering of the plant while simultaneously monitoring and coping with the immediate wind event. The immediate assessment shall consist of a walk down by Operations to visually check for indications of structural distress (i.e. denting, bending, twisting, cracking, etc.) of the stacks and supports (one deadweight support and two brackets per stack). If indications of structural distress are apparent, the associated EDG(s) shall be considered inoperable until further evaluation is completed by Engineering.

An exclusion area shall be maintained to the east of the turbine building. The exclusion area shall extend from the northern most extension of the north service building to the southernmost extension of the Technical Support Center building, and from the east wall of the turbine building (or maintenance shop, north service building, or TSC as applicable) to the lakeshore. No outdoor storage or staging of materials is permitted in the exclusion area. No vehicles are permitted to remain unattended within the exclusion area. No dumpsters, bins, trash barrels, or other receptacles, whether empty or full are permitted within the exclusion area. Items and vehicles may transit the exclusion area while in route to acceptable storage locations (e.g., inside the turbine building, pump house, maintenance shop) or to acceptable outdoor locations outside the exclusion area). Exceptions to this exclusion area compensatory measure may be made on a case-by-case basis with prior evaluation from Engineering or approved administrative controls.

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4.

Prior to performing a planned activity that removes G-01, G-02, G-03 and/or G-04 from service (e.g., monthly surveillance testing as required by TS that results in brief periods of inoperability), a weather look-ahead shall be performed for the period of the planned activity. If the National Weather Service forecast for the PBNP vicinity includes a forecast of "high winds" during the scheduled activity, the activity shall be deferred until weather no longer threatens.

5.

Elective maintenance shall not be performed on the G-03 and/or G-04 EDGs if it would result in a configuration that cannot be promptly restored to a functional condition. This shall not preclude the performance of routine and required surveillances (e.g., running of an EDG to comply with TS surveillance requirements), even if the EDG is rendered inoperable for brief periods to permit manually barring over.

6.

If it becomes necessary to perform corrective maintenance on either G-03 or G-04 that renders the EDG non-functional for an extended period, the remaining EDGs and both turbine-driven AFW pumps (1 P-29 and 2P-29) shall be placed in "protected" status until the affected "B" Train EDG has been restored to operable status.

Detailed Description of Permanent Solution NextEra is nearing the completion of the conceptual design for missile protecting the G-01IG-02 EDG exhaust stacks and the following is a description:

Missile protection for the exhaust stacks will be provided by installing an alternate exhaust route and a steel plated barrier protecting the exhaust piping from the penetration of the control building to the discharge of the alternate exhaust path.

The steel plated tube steel framed barrier structure will be designed to withstand worst case wind loading as defined in the FSAR (i.e., winds having a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a forward progression of 60 mph) concurrent with either; (I) one 4x12" wooden plank, 12 ft. long weighing 108 lbs and traveling 440 fps (300 mph); or (2) one Automobile weighing 4,000 Ibs traveling 74 fps (approximately 50 mph) no greater than 25 ft above the ground. Per FSAR Section 1.3.1, "The design criteria of the containment and the Class I portions of the auxiliary and turbine buildings to withstand the effects of a tornado, including wind force, pressure differential, and missile impingement are described in Bechtel Topical Report B-TOP-3, 'Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants Against Tornadoes."' 9-TOP-3 defines a tornado missile as described above.

The structure will be designed to meet seismic 1111 criteria. The barrier will be fabricated out of tube steel and steel plating welded together.

In the event of missile damage and complete blockage to the existing discharge piping the alternate discharge will allow continuous operation of the emergency diesel generators without adversely affecting their specified safety functions.

The conceptual design identified workable challenges in a few key areas that will be addressed in the detailed design phase. These are in the areas of structural analyses, mechanical flow analyses, and diesel intake and exhaust gas interactions. A finalized Page 7 of 11

detailed design will address each of the aforementioned challenges through structural calculations, mechanical calculations and an exhaust gas flow model. Continued integration with our stakeholders will ensure installation is a success and limit the amount of unavailability for the emergency diesel generators.

NextEra's preferred path is to install a permanent modification to resolve the apparent nonconformance with PBNP GDC 2. Either a permanent or temporary solution will be in place by December 15, 2012, which conforms to the requirements of PBNP GDC 2.

Conclusions Based on the foregoing, the proposed change to the TS is acceptable based on the following factors: (1) the "B" Train EDGs are redundant to the " A Train EDGs; (2) any one of the installed EDGs can carry full accident loads on one unit and simultaneously carry the safe shutdown loads on the other unit; (3) the DGB is of rugged design; (4) the "B" Train EDGs are missile protected; (5) there is a low probability of a tornado generated missile striking the G-01 and G-02 exhaust lines and sufficiently restricting exhaust flow to the point where engine performance is affected; (6) the ability of the G-01 and G-02 exhaust stacks to withstand tornado wind loads; and (7) the ability to safely shut down both units is not affected.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Requlatory RequirementslCriteria NextEra has determined that the proposed TS changes do not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements and do not affect conformance with any GDC differently than described in the PBNP FSAR, except for PBNP GDC 2.

PBNP was licensed prior to the 1971 publication of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, GDC (ML003674718). As such, PBNP is not licensed to Appendix A GDCs. FSAR Section 1.3 lists the plant-specific GDCs to which the plant was licensed. The PBNP GDCs are similar in content to the draft GDCs proposed for public comment in 1967.

PBNP GDC 2 - Performance Standards:

Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention or to the mitigation of the consequences of nuclear accidents which could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to petformance standards that enable such systems and components to withstand, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, the forces that might reasonably be imposed by the occurrence of an extraordinary natural phenomenon such as earthquake, tornado, flooding condition, high wind, or heavy ice. The design bases so established shall reflect: (a) appropriate consideration of the most severe of these natural phenomena that have been officially recorded for the site and the surrounding area and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncerfainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design.

4.2 Precedent None Page 8 of 11

4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1)

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Technical Specifications (TS) will not affect the performance of the standby emergency power sources and will not affect previously performed accident analyses and the components will continue to function in a manner consistent with the plant design basis. The exclusion of entry into the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) for the prescribed period due to the apparent nonconformance with PBNP GDC 2 does not result in a condition where the design, material, and construction standards that were applicable prior to the change are altered. The proposed change will not modify any system interface. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators.

There will be no change to the normal plant operating parameters or accident mitigation performance. The proposed change will not alter any assumptions or change any mitigation action in the radiological consequence evaluations in the FSAR.

The proposed one-time only change to the TS does not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions or the manner in which the plant is normally operated and maintained. The proposed change does not affect source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2)

Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change does not result in a change in the manner in which standby emergency power sources provide plant protection. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The exclusion of entry into the LC0 for the prescribed period due to the apparent nonconformance with PBNP General Design Criteria (GDC) 2 does not change any existing accident scenarios, nor create any new or different accident scenarios. The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice.

I Page 9 of 1 1

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3)

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Based upon the availability of redundant systems, and the low probability of a missile impact to the subject components, NextEra concludes that the proposed changes to TS 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 do not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design functions during and following an accident situation. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment system. The performance of the fuel cladding, containment and the reactor coolant system will not be significantly impacted by the proposed change.

Therefore, the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, NextEra concludes that the proposed changes present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.4 Conclusions In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (I) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

The Plant Operations Review Committee has reviewed the proposed TS changes and concurs with this conclusion.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(~)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

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6.0 REFERENCES

(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Evaluation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis," Final Task lnterface Agreement (TIA 201 1-01 I),

August 16,201 1 (MLI 1228A257)

(2)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Applicability of GDC Requirements in Operability Determinations and Assessment of the Point Beach Operability Determination for Emergency Diesel Generators with Respect to Tornado Missiles," Final Task Interface Agreement (TIA 2012-07), April 24, 2012 (ML12115A080)

(3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Tornado Climatology of the Contiguous United States," NUREGICR-4461, Rev. 2, February 2007 (ML070810400)

(4)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Analysis of a Westinghouse 2-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor," NUREGICR-4458, March 1987 (ML9704060155)

Page I 1 of 11

ENCLOSURE I ATTACHMENT 1 NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 268 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (MARK-U P) 2 pages follow

AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating LC0 3.8.1 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the associated unit's 4.16 kV Class 1 E safeguards buses, A05 and A06, utilizing the associated unit's 345113.8 kV (X03) transformer or the opposite unit's 345113.8 kV (X03) transformer with the gas turbine in operation, and the associated unit's 13.814.1 6 kV (X04) transformer;

b.

One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the opposite unit's 4.1 6 kV Class 1 E safeguards buses, A05 and A06; and

c.

One standby emergency power source capable of supplying each 4.1 6 kVl480 V Class 1 E safeguards bus.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACT I 0 N S NOTE--------------------------------------------------

1.

LC0 3.0.4.b is not applicable to standby emergency power sources.

2.

LC0 3.8.1 for the "A" Train standbv emeraencv power source(s) is not applicable reaardina tornado protection. This Note will remain in effect until December 15. 2012.

CONDITION I

REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME A.

Associated unit 34511 3.8 kV (X03) transformer inoperable.

Gas turbine not in operation when utilizing opposite unit's 34511 3.8 kV (X03) transformer.

A. 1 Verify one circuit between the offsite transmission network and the associated unit's 4.16 kV Class l E safeguards buses, A05 and A06, utilizing the opposite unit's 34511 3.8 kV (X03) transformer.

AND Point Beach 3.8.1-1 Unit 1 -

Unit 2 -

Amendment No. 2%

Amendment No. 22Q

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LC0 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the 480 V Class 1E safeguards bus(es) B03 and B04, required by LC0 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown";

and

b.

One standby emergency power source capable of supplying one of the associated unit's 480 V Class 1 E safeguards bus(es)

B03 or B04, required by LC0 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS NOTE-------------------------------------------------

LC0 3.8.2 for the "A" Train standbv emeraencv power source(s) is not applicable reaarding tornado protection. This Note will remain in effect until December 15. 2012.

(continued)

CONDITION A.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

Point Beach Unit 1 - Amendment No. ;181 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 296 REQUIRED ACTION A. 1 Declare affected required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

AND A.2 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately

ATTACHMENT 2 NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS I AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 268 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (CLEAN) 2 pages follow

AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating LC0 3.8.1 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the associated unit's 4.1 6 kV Class 1 E safeguards buses, A05 and A06, utilizing the associated unit's 345113.8 kV (X03) transformer or the opposite unit's 345113.8 kV (X03) transformer with the gas turbine in operation, and the associated unit's 13.814.1 6 kV (X04) transformer;

b.

One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the opposite unit's 4.1 6 kV Class 1 E safeguards buses, A05 and A06; and

c.

One standby emergency power source capable of supplying each 4.1 6 kVl480 V Class 1 E safeguards bus.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS NOTE--------------------------------------------------

1.

LC0 3.0.4.b is not applicable to standby emergency power sources.

2.

LC0 3.8.1 for the "A" Train standby emergency power source(s) is not applicable regarding tornado protection. This Note will remain in effect until December 15, 2012.

Point Beach CONDITION A.

Associated unit 34511 3.8 kV (X03) transformer inoperable.

OR -

Gas turbine not in operation when utilizing opposite unit's 34511 3.8 kV (X03) transformer.

Unit 1 - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

REQUIRED ACTION A. 1 Verify one circuit between the offsite transmission network and the associated unit's 4.16 kV Class I E

safeguards buses, A05 and A06, utilizing the opposite unit's 34511 3.8 kV (X03) transformer.

AND COMPLETION TIME 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (continued)

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LC0 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the 480 V Class 1 E safeguards bus(es) B03 and B04, required by LC0 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown";

and

b.

One standby emergency power source capable of supplying one of the associated unit's 480 V Class 1 E safeguards bus(es)

B03 or B04, required by LC0 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS NOTE-------------------------------------------------

LC0 3.8.2 for the "A" Train standby emergency power source(s) is not applicable regarding tornado protection. This Note will remain in effect until December 15, 2012.

(continued)

Point Beach COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately CONDITION A.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

Unit I - Amendment No.

Unit 2 - Amendment No.

REQUIRED ACTION A. 1 Declare affected required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

AND A.2 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

ENCLOSURE I ATTACHMENT 3 NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS I AND 2 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 268 BASIS FOR EMERGENCY AMENDMENT 1 page follows

Basis for Emeraencv Amendment The Commission's regulations, 10 CFR 50.91, contain provisions for issuance of amendments when the usual 30-day public comment period cannot be met. One type of special exception is an emergency. An emergency is a case where the NRC staff and licensee need to act promptly.

10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) states: "Where the Commission finds that an emergency situation exists, in that failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant, or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, it may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or for public comment. In such a situation, the Commission will not publish a notice of proposed determination on no significant hazards consideration, but will publish a notice of issuance under 3 2.1 06 of this chapter, providing for opportunity for a hearing and for public comment after issuance. The Commission expects its licensees to apply for license amendments in timely fashion. It will decline to dispense with notice and comment on the determination of no significant hazards consideration if it determines that the licensee has abused the emergency provision by failing to make timely application for the amendment and thus itself creating the emergency. Whenever an emergency situation exists, a licensee requesting an amendment must explain why this emergency situation occurred and why it could not avoid this situation, and the Commission will assess the licensee's reasons for failing to file an application sufficiently in advance of that event."

Whv Emerqencv Circumstances Exist NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) has concluded that the "A" Train (G-01 and G-02)

Emergency Power Source is inoperable due to the G-01 and G-02 exhaust stacks not being adequately missile protected. Currently, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are in MODE 1 (Power Operation). Both units entered a 7 day Technical Specification Action Condition (TSAC) 3.8.1, E.3 on April 26, 2012 at 0800 CDT, which expires on May 3, 2012 at 0800 CDT. Upon expiration, entry into TSAC 3.8.1; H.l will require both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Therefore, this request should be processed as an emergency change.

Whv NextEra Could Not Avoid the Emeraencv Circumstances NextEra completed a Prompt Operability Determination (POD) after issuance of NRC Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 201 1-01 1 on August 16, 201 1. The POD concluded that as a result of the apparent nonconformance with Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) General Design Criteria (GDC) 2, the "A" Train emergency diesel generators (G-01 and G-02) remain operable but nonconforming. On April 24, 2012, the NRC issued TIA 2012-07 (Reference 4). The TIA concluded that the "licensee [NextEra] must reassess the operability of the EDGs and inform the NRC of their conclusions, proposed actions, and timetable for any actions." The NRC staff concluded the NextEra Prompt Operability Determinations (POD), Revision 5 and the supporting information contained in Revision 4, are inadequate to provide reasonable expectation of operability. Based on a further review of the PBNP current license basis (CLB) and the NRC conclusions in TIA 2012-012, NextEra has concluded that the "A" Train emergency diesel generators (G-01 and G-02) are inoperable due to inadequate tornado missile protection for the EDG exhaust stacks. Therefore, NextEra could not avoid the emergency circumstances.