ML121180750
| ML121180750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/2012 |
| From: | Beltz T Plant Licensing Branch III |
| To: | Jim Costedio Point Beach |
| beltz T, NRR/DORL/LPL3-1, 301-415-3049 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ml121180749 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC ME8488, TAC ME8489 | |
| Download: ML121180750 (3) | |
Text
REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request (LAR) dated April 26, 2012 (TAC Nos. ME8488 and ME8489)
The following requests for additional information are associated with the NRC staffs review:
Electrical Engineering Branch (EEEB)
EEEB-1 Provide a detailed technical justification (e.g., loading, emergency diesel generator (EDG) capacity, test results, etc.) that supports the statement made in the license amendment request that states: any one of the installed EDGs can carry full accident loads on one unit and simultaneously carry the safe shutdown loads on the other unit.
EEEB-2 Assuming a tornado missile renders EDGs G01 or G02 incapable of performing their design function, provide a detailed discussion on the duration (i.e., run time) that either EDG G03 or G04 can be expected to perform their design function (i.e., supply full accident loads (design basis accident (loss-of-offsite power event with a loss of coolant accident) on one unit and supply the safe shutdown loads (loss-of-offsite power event) on the other unit).
In your response, discuss any known limitations for EDGs G03 and G04 that could prevent maintaining each unit in a safe shutdown condition for an extended period of time.
EEEB-3 Explain how each EDG can be connected to each bus. Identify the procedures, describe the process (including any manual actions), and provide the required time to perform each connection in your response. Also explain, how adequate separation and electrical protection schemes will be maintained.
EEEB-4 Provide a detailed discussion that supports the December 15, 2012, deadline proposed in the Technical Specification (TS) Note for Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 (i.e, justify the need for this specific date).
Include in your response the actions that need to be taken and the expected schedule to complete these actions.
EEEB-5 Explain which TS Condition would be entered if either G03 or G04 EDG were to become inoperable between now and December 15, 2012. Besides monthly surveillance testing, is other surveillance testing planned for G01, G02, G03, G04?
Component Performance & Testing Branch (EPTB)
EPTB-1 Has an analysis/calculation been performed to determine if EDGs G-01 and G-02 can continue to operate at 100 percent if the EDG exhaust gas is recirculated into the EDG room.
What would be the EDG loading if it can still operate under this condition?
Balance of Plant Branch (SBPB)
SBPB-1 Compensatory Action 2 states the following:
If a site meteorological instrument indicates a valid wind speed in excess of the design an orderly shutdown of both units shall be commenced within one hour and shall continue until a damage assessment has confirmed that This permits both units to be operating at the time the tornado strikes the plant. It would appear more appropriate to take action before the plant potentially loses the switchyard and other damage that may result from a tornado, such that actions would be taken that require plant shutdown when the national weather service, or other government agency, issues a tornado warning for specified area surrounding the plant.
Please provide further clarification/justification for this compensatory action.
Technical Specifications Branch (STSB)
STSB-1 Proposed LCO 3.8.1, Actions Note 2 and LCO 3.8.2, Actions Note respectively state: LCO 3.8.X for the A Train standby emergency power source is not applicable regarding tornado protection. This Note will remain in effect until December 15, 2012.
In accordance with TS usage rules Notes placed above the ACTIONS Tables modifies how the Conditions, Required Actions and Completion Times are applied.
The proposed Notes change the A Train operability requirements by not requiring application of the Conditions in LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 regarding design features that protect the A Train standby emergency power source(s) from damage due to tornados. However, the licensing basis for protecting G-01/02 from the effects of tornado is still a requirement.
- 1. Reformat the amendment request in a TS ACTIONS Conditions, Required Actions and Completion Time format to be added to LCOs 3.8.1 and 3.8.2. The Actions Condition should be specific to the reason for running a CT clock for the inoperable G-01/02 power sources. The remedial actions should establish a requirement to meet the compensatory actions. Appropriate SRs should be added that periodically verify the compensatory actions are being performed and met. Also, what current TS Actions would be entered upon discovery that a compensatory action is not met?