ML12089A520

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Entergy Prefiled Hearing Exhibit ENT000280 - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, IP-EP-120, Rev. 6, Emergency Classification
ML12089A520
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/2011
From: Glander L
Entergy Corp
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
Shared Package
ML12089A514 List:
References
RAS 22118, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01 IP-EP-120, Rev 6
Download: ML12089A520 (30)
v • d • e


Text

ENT000280 Submitted: March 29, 2012 ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 Page 1

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~------------.--------------~----------------~--------------------~

Emergency Classification

{,d~[IJ ate Prepared by:

Lori Glander Print Name Approval:

Brian Sullivan fa/bUI Print Name Date Effective Date: June 9, 2010 IP-EP-120 (Class) R6.doc

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Table of Contents Section 1.0 PURPOSE......................................................................................................... 3

2.0 REFERENCES

...........,....................................................................................... 3 3.0 DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................... 3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES.......................................................................................... 3 5.0 DETAILS............................................................................................................ 5 5.1 Recognizing an Emergency..................................................................... 5 5.2 Initial Emergency Declaration from the Control Room............................. 5 5.3 While In a Classified Emergency............................................................. 6 5.4 Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications................................ 6 5.5 Compensatory Measures of Out-of-Service EAL Instruments................. 7 6.0 INTERFACES.................................................................................................... 7 7.0 RECORDS......................................................................................................... 7 8.0 REQUIREMENTS AND COMMITMENTS.......................................................... 7 9.0 ATTACHMENTS................................................................................................ 7 9.1: Emergency Action Levels............................................................................. 8 9.2:Fission Product Barrier Thresholds............................................................ 29

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Emergency Classification 1.0 PURPOSE To describe the method for classification of emergencies at IPEC as a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE), Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE) or General Emergency (GE). It also described actions to take regarding Out-of-Service instruments that are used to evaluate EAL's.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Indian Point Energy Center Emergency Plan 2.2 NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 2.3 IP-EP-AD13 IPEC Emergency Action Level Technical Bases 2.4 Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action, May 2005 (Revised November 18, 2005) 2.5 IP-EP-AD40 Equipment Important to Emergency Response 3.0 DEFINITIONS Refer to Reference 2.3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapacitated) of the affected unit shall implement this procedure for the initial emergency classification. For classifiable events that potentially impact both units (security, natural or man-made events), the Shift Managers for each unit shall confer about the need to classify the event. If it is determined that emergency classification is warranted, the Unit 2 Shift Manager shall declare the event in accordance with this procedure. Once an initial emergency classification has been made, the unit Shift Manager making the initial declaration shall be responsible for any subsequent emergency classifications, regardless of which unit is affected, until such time as relieved by the on-call Emergency Director.

4.2 The Shift Manager, upon initial emergency classification, shall assume the role of Emergency Director and shalf act as the Emergency Director until relieved by the On-Call Emergency Director or other qualified Emergency Director (Plant Operations Manager).

4.3 The Emergency Director is responsible for overall command and control of the emergency response, including classifications; notifications, PARs and ensuring all resources are available to mitigate emergency conditions. The Emergency Director is the final authority for determining the emergency classification level (initial

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classification, upgrading, or terminating to recovery). This authority may not be delegated.

4.4 Initial and subsequent emergency classification shall be made within 15 minutes following the identification of a classifiable event to ensure that prompt notification, mobilization, protective and corrective actions are taken.

4.5 Upon becoming aware of any condition or event that they believe may warrant an upgrade in emergency classification, Emergency Response Organization members shall promptly inform the Emergency Director via their chain of command.

4.6 A broad spectrum of discretion in classifying events is provided under Category 9.0 "Other". In using the Category 9.0 "Other" and in classifying emergencies under circumstances which are not a straight-forward use of the EALs, ERO members should be mindful than an approach is needed which is conservative with respect to public, plant, and personnel safety and with respect to ensuring the adequacy of personnel and technical support. Conservative decisions must be made if the Emergency Director has any doubt regarding the health and safety of the public.

5.0 DETAILS ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 Page

~ of 30 5.1 Recognizing an Emergency

!'tV II::

All classifications are to be based upon VALID indications, reports or conditions.

Indications, reports or conditions are considered VALID when they are verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

5.1.1 When indications of abnormal conditions or events are received, personnel will verify the symptoms/indications and then compare with the Emergency Action Levels (Attachment 1) and Fission Product Barrier Thresholds (Attachment 2).

5.1.2 Identify the highest applicable emergency classification level (if multiple EALs are exceeded) for which an EAL has been met or exceeded considering the following:

(a)

The plant condition existing at the time the abnormal condition exists:

Hot (Average reactor coolant temperature> 200°F)

Cold (Average reactor coolant temperature:$ 200°F)

Defueled (no irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel)

(b)

IF conditions warrant the issuance of offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). THEN the classification of General Emergency is required.

(c)

IF plant conditions indicate a possible radiological release or a release is in progress or suspected, THEN evaluate the applicability of offsite dose-based EALs (IP-EP-310, Dose Assessment).

(d)

IF a classification level was met or exceeded but the classifiable condition no longer exists (a lesser classification level mayor may not still be appropriate), THEN refer to Section 5.4, Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications.

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5.2 Initial Emergency Declaration from the Control Room NOTE IF the condition or event requiring initial classification potentially affects both units (security, natural or man-made events), THEN the Unit Shift Managers shall contact each other and confer on the need to declare. Upon concurrence, the Unit 2 Shift Manager shall make the appropriate emergency classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

5.2.1 The Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapacitated) shall announce to the Control Room operating staff:

(a)

That an emergency has been declared.

(b)

The emergency classification level.

(c)

That the (Unit 2 or Unit 3) Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapacitated) has assumed the role of Emergency Director.

5.2.2 Implement procedure IP-EP-210 "Central Control Room" 5.3 While in a Classified Emergency 5.3.1 Emergency response personnel shall continuously review the Emergency Action Levels (Attachment 1) and Fission Product Barrier Thresholds (Attachment 2) to ensure appropriate event classification.

5.3.2 If an Emergency Action Level threshold is exceeded for an emergency classification higher than currently declared, the Emergency Director shall re-classify the event to the appropriate level and initiate all required notifications.

5.4 TranSitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications 5.4.1 Transitory events that result in exceeding the Emergency Action Level criteria for event declaration, but which are terminated before they are declared, should still be identified, documented and reported (10CFR50.72), but not declared to implement the Emergency Plan.

Entergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 Page Z of 30

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5.4.2 In the case of a "spike" in a plant indication or event which rapidly exceeds and then decreases below an Emergency Action Level threshold, entry into the Emergency Plan or escalation to a higher classification "in retrospect" is not appropriate unless the "spike" is indicative of continuing degrading conditions which will lead to an escalated emergency classification level.

Examples include momentary steam generator level shrink following reactor trip or brief wind gusts in excess of classifiable levels.

5.4.3 Spurious alarms or parameters, which are known to be invalid indicators of actual plant conditions or of the emergency classification. should not be used to declare emergency classifications.

5.5 Compensatory Measures for Out-ot-Service EAL Instruments.

5.5.1 IP-EP-AD40 provides guidance when planning to take an instrument OOS (Out of Service) that is used to determine an EAL condition or following an unplanned loss of the instrument.

6.0 INTERFACES 6.1 IP-EP-210, Central Control Room 6.2 IP-EP-220, Technical Support Center 6.3 IP-EP-310. Dose Assessment 6.4 IP-EP-410. Protective Action Recommendations 6.5 IP-EP-510. Meteorological, Radiological & Plant Data Acquisition System 6.6 IP-EP-340. Meteorological Information & Data Acquisition System (MIDAS) 6.7 IP-EP-520, Modular Emergency Assessment & Notification System (MEANS) 6.8 IP-EP-AD40, Equipment Important to Emergency Response 7.0 RECORDS Any logs or torms completed by members of the ERO during an actual declared emergency are permanent quality records.

8.0 REQUIREMENTS AND COMMITMENTS NONE 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 Emergency Action Levels 9.2 Fission Product Barrier Thresholds

Entergy

"'" Category,,',.'.,',

1.1 Subcriticality 1.2 Core Cooling 1.3 Heat Sink 1.4 Integrity 1.5 Containment NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels

-._-_...... -.

  • _ow-.. _

",';"',",':'; "... ',, ~r.I Site ArM

' ' :;',~ ',;D'

~,':.',..

Alert

" i, 1.1.3 {> 200°F}

1.1.2 {> 200°F}

1.1.1 {> 200°F}

RED path in F-Q. 1, Subcriticality RED path in F*O,1 Subcriticality Any Failure of an automatic AND AND trip signal to reduce power range < 5%

Actual or imminent entry into either:

ALL manual attempts at tripping the ANQ reactor from the Control Room have RED Path in F-O.2, Core Cooling failed to reduce power range < 5%

Manual trip is successful OR Red Path in F-O.3, Heat Sink 1.2.2 {> 200°F}

1.2.1 {> 200°F}

RED path in F-O.2,Core Cooling ORANGE or RED path in F-O.2, AHD Core Cooling Functional restoration actions taken and procedures not effective within 15 min.

1.3.1 {> 200°F}

RED path in F-Q,3, HEAT SINK AHD Feed & Bleed is required 1.4.1 {> 200°F}

RED Path on F-OA, Integrity 1.5.1 {> 200°F}

RED Path F-Q.5, Containment resulting from loss of coolant.

Revision 6 of 30

Unu.;.1 Event

.,;j

Entergy

.* *** ** C.tegory *...

2.1 Coolant Activity 2.2 Containment Radiation ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

'. General. :

2.2.3 {> 200°F}

Containment Radiation monitor R-25 or R-26

> 68 RlHR NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels I

I CATEGORY 2.0 REACTOR FUEL i

'--.-'"-~

-- - ----.~

SbArN Alert ' ___

Una"'l Event

/'-j; 2.1.3 {> 200°F}

2.1.2 {> 200"F}

2.1.1 {All}

Coolant activity> 300 ~Cilcc 1-131 equivalent Coolant Activity> 300 I1Cilcc 1-131 equivalent Coolant sample activity and any of the following:

in excess of Technical RED path on F-O.4, INTEGRITY Specification limits Primary system leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a single charging pump RCS subcooling < SI initiation setpoint due to RCS leakage

[Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 ~Ci/cc or R-42 off-scale due to RCS leakage

[Unit 3] R-11 > 1.2E-5 ~Cilcc or R-12> 0.05 ~Ucc 2.2.2 {> 200°F}

2.2.1 {> 200°F}

Containment Radiation monitor

[Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 pCilcc or R-25 or R-26 > 17 RlHR R-42 off-scale due to RCS leakage

[Unit 3] R-11 > 1.2E-5 pCl/cc or R-12> 0.05 pCilcc

ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6

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9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGQRY 2.0 REACTOR FUEL

. Gen... ** *;**'L

.., Alert ~~-

  • "C **. :.:., :.,., i:V

~pategory x:

.\\,: : < Y' Site Area

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Unuaua' Event 2.3 2.3.2 {All}

2.3.1 {All}

Refueling Confirmed sustained alarm on any of the

[Unit 2) or [Unit 3]

Accidents or following radiation monitors resulting Spent fuel pool Other Radiation from fuel damage caused by an (reactor cavity during Monitors uncontrolled fuel handling process:

refueling) water level cannot be restored R-2/R-7 Vapor Containment Area and maintained:

Monitors

  • above the Technical R-5 Fuel Storage Building Area Specification Monitor minimum water R-25/26 Vapor Containment High level [Unit 2]

Radiation Area Monitors

  • above the spent R-12 Containment Gas Activity fuel pool low water

[Unit 3]

level alarm setpoint

[Unit 3]

2.3.3 {All}

Report of visual observation of (Unit 2 or Unit 3) irradiated fuel uncovered

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I PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 11 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

    • , Category,
General, SIte Am, Alert -, -, -., -~

.'. Uriua.,aIE-;;rit---:

3.1

-~

3.1.3 {>200°F. s 200°F}

3.1.2 {>200°F}

3.1.1 {>2oo°F}

RCS Leakage RVLlS cannot be maintained [Unit 2}

3.2 Primary to Secondary Leakage 3.3 RCS Subcooling

> 41% [Unit 3} > 33% with no RCPs running OR With the reactor vessel head removed, it is reported that water level in the Reactor Vessel is dropping in an uncontrolled manner and core uncovery is likely 3.2.2 {>200°F}

Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a single charging pump 3.2.3 {>200°F}

Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage > Technical Specification limit in any steam generator ANO Coolant activity> 300 ~Cilcc of 1-131 equivalent Primary system leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of single charging pump 3.3.1 {>200°F}

RCS subcooling < SI initiation set point due to RCS leakage Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage

> 10gpm Q.B Identified leakage

> 25gpm 3.2.1 {>200°F}

Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage>

Technical Specifications limit in any steam generator

ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE de EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6

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9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMENT Genera' sae:ArN

~

u~u.uai Event Category

-<.;}.

. ~': ): :.;

,\\.,;"

Alert c'.

4.1 4.1.4 {>200°F}

4.1.2 {>200°F) 4.1.1 {>200°F}

Containment Confirmed Phase "S" isolation signal following confirmed Rapid uncontrolled decrease in Both doors open on a VC Integrity Status LOCA with less than minimum containment cooling safeguards containment pressure following initial airlock for> 4 hrs.

equipment operating, Table 4.3 increase due to RCS failure OR AND OR Inability to close Any indicators of fuel clad loss, Table 4.1 Loss of primary coolant inside containment pressure relief containment with containment or purge valves which pressure or sump level response not results in a radiological 4.1.5 {>200°F}

consistent with LOCA conditions release pathway to the EITHER:

environment for> 4 hrs.

Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure QB following initial increase due to RCS failure Any Phase "A" or Phase QB "S" or containment Loss of primary coolant inside containment with containment ventilation isolation valve(s) not closed when required pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA which results in a conditions radiological release AND pathway to the environment Any indications of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2

ENN IPEC NON-QUAUTY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6

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~

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Alert U~uau.IEv.nt.

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4.1 4.1.6 {>200°F}

4.1.3 {>200°F}

Containment EITHER:

EITHER:

Integrity Status Any Phase "An or Phase "8" or Containment Any Phase "A" or Phase "8" (cont)

Ventilation Isolation valve(s) not closed when required or Containment Ventilation following confirmed LOCA Isolation valve(s) not closed OR when required following confirmed LOCA Inability to isolate any primary system discharging OR outside containment AND Inability to isolate any primary system discharging outside Radiological release to the environment exists as a result containment AND AND Any indicators of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2 Radiological release to the environment exists as a result 4.2 4.2.2 {>200°F}

4.2.1 (>200°F)

SG Tube Rupture Unisolable faulted (outside VC) ruptured steam generator Unisolable faulted (outside VC) w/Secondary At:f.Q ruptured steam generator Release Any indicators of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 {>200°F}

Combustible Gas

~4% Hydrogen concentration in containment Concentrations

Entergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMENT Table 4.1 Fuel Clad Loss Indicators Coolant activity> 300 J.lCi/cc of 1-131 equivalent Containment radiation monitor R-25/R-26 reading> 17 Rlhr RED path in F-O.2, CORE COOLING Table 4.2 Fuel Clad Damage Indicators ORANGE or RED path in F-O.2, CORE COOLING RED path in F-0.3, HEAT SINK At!Q Heat sink is required Coolant activity> 300 J.lClicc of 1-131 equivalent Containment radiation monitor R-25/R-26 reading> 17 Rlhr IP-EP-120 Page Table 4.3 Minimum Containment Cooling Safeguards Equipment Fan Cooler Units Operating Spray Pumps Required

<3 2

3 5

1 o

Revision 6 of 30

Entergy Category \\

5.1 Effluent Monitors 5.2 Dose Projections/

Environmental Measurementsl Release Rates ENN IPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 REFERENCE USE Page 9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 5.0 RA!210ACTIVITY REbEASE

~-::::-

Site ArM Alert General :>

5.1.4 {All}

5;1.3 {All}

5.1.2 {All}

A valid reading on any A valid reading on any A valid reading on any monitors Table monitors Table 5.1 column monitors Table 5.1 column 5.1 column "Alert for> 15 min. unless "GE" for> 15 min. unless "SAE" for> 15 min. unless dose assessment can confirm dose assessment can dose assessment can confirm releases are below Table 5.2 column confirm releases are below releases are below Table 5.2 "Alert" within this time period.

Table 5.2 column "GE" column "SAE" within this time within this time period.

period.

5.2.5 {All}

5.2.4 {All}

5.2.2{AII}

Dose projections or field Dose projections or field Confirmed sample analysis for surveys resulting from an surveys resulting from an gaseous or liquid release rates actual imminent release actual imminent release which

>Table 5.1 column "Alert" limits for>

which indicate doses/dose indicate doses/dose rates>

15 min.

rates> Table 5.2 column Table 5.2 column "SAE" at the 5.2.3 {All}

"GE" at the site boundary or site boundary or beyond.

beyond.

Dose projections or field surveys resulting from an actual imminent release which indicate doses/dose rates> Table 5.2 column "Alert" at the site boundary or beyond.

Revision 6 of 30

{;;"

  • -*~ *UnuS~E;;~t-\\

5.1.1 {All}

A valid reading on any monitors Table 5.1 column "NUE" for> 60 min. unless sample analysis can confirm release rates

< Table 5.1 column "NUE" within this time period.

5.2.1 {All}

Confirmed sample analysis for gaseous or liquid release rates

> Table 5.1 column "NUE" limits for> 60 min.

ENNIPEC NON-QUAUTY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6

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Erzlergy IMPLEMENTING 1

16 1 PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30

--~--

9.1 - Emergency Action levels CAIEGQRY ~.O BADIQACTIVITY B~lEA~E C

' G4t <.

Alert * {',_._->'.... -_. ** UnusuaIE".nf.',.

....... ategory '.........*

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n.r. *.'i.'

8118 Area

~.-.--

5.3 5.3.2 {All}

5.3.1 {AU}

Area Radiation Sustained area radiation levels Any sustained direct ARM Levels

> 15 mRem/hr in EITHER:

readings> 100 x alarm or Control Room offscale high resulting from an OR uncontrolled process Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station 5.3.3 {All}

Sustained abnormal area radiation levels> 8 Rlhr within any areas, Table 5.3 AND Access is required for safe operation or shutdown

-E

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nlergy ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Monitor R,27 N

R-44

'2 R-54

)

R-49 R-27 C'")

R-14

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R,18 R-19 TEDE CDE Thyroid External Exposure Rate REFERENCE USE Page 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Table 5.1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds GE SAE Alert 44IJCi/cc 4.4 IJCi/cc 4.4E-1 IJCi/cc (1200 Cilsec)

(120 Ci/sec)

(12 Cifsec)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Off Scale

(>4E-2 uCilcc)

N/A N/A 2.7E-2 IJCi/ce 44IJCilee 4.4 IJCi/cc 4.4E-1 IJCilee (1200 Cilsec)

(120 Cilsec)

(12 Cilsee)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Off Scale

(>4E-2 uCi/cc)

N/A N/A 2.7E-2 uCi/ee Table 5.2 Dose Projeetion/Env. Measurement Classification Thresholds GE SAE 1000 mRem 100 mRem 5000mRem 500mRem 1000 mRem/hr 100 mRemlhr Thyroid exposure rate (for 1 5000 mRem/hr 500mRemlhr hr. of inhalation)

IP-EP-120 Revision 6 I 171 of 30 UE 4.4E-3 IJCi/cc (1.2E-1 Cifsee) 4.4E-3 IJCi/cc 2.5E-3 IJCi/cc 2.7E'4 IJCi/ec 4.4E-3 IJCilee (1.2E-1 Cifsec) 4.4E-3,..Cifcc 2.5E-3 uCi/cc 2.7E-4 uCifcc Alert 10 mRem N/A 10 mRem/hr N/A

e

~~ Enlergy ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Table 5.3 Plant Areas UNIT 2 UNIT 3

  • Condensate Storage Tank
  • Auxiliary Feedpump Building
  • P.A.B.
  • Fuel Storage Building
  • Control Building
  • Fuel Storage Building
  • Primary Auxiliary Building/Fan House
  • Refueling Water Tank
  • 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Control
  • Diesel Fuel Tank Building)
  • Vital Area Access to Containment
  • Cable Spreading Room/Electrical
  • Appendix R Diesel Generator Tunnel
  • Diesel Generator Building/Fuel Tank Area
  • Battery Room (Control Building 33' 0" ele.)

Revision 6 18 of 30

ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6

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~

9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 6.0 ELECIRICAL FAILURES

---:-"':-. -'-'--'-"'--~-~" --

. '.Category.,.'.*....... ': ': ',,' G."',.I *'

SbArN Alert UnuaualEvent 6.1 6.1.5 {>200°F) 6.1.4 {>200°F}

6.1.2 {s200°F. Defuel}

6.1.1 {All}

Loss of AC Power Loss of all 480 volt Loss of AC power to all 480 Loss of AC power to all 480 volt busses Unplanned loss of offsite power Sources safeguards bus (5A, volt safeguard busses (5A, (5A, 2AJ3A, 6A) for> 15 min.

capability to all 480V safeguard 2AJ3A, 6A) AC power 2AJ3A, 6A) for> 15 min.

6.1.3 {Hot) busses (SA, 2AJ3A, 6A) for> 15 AND EITHER:

AND min.

AC power capability to 480 volt Power restoration to Inability to power required safeguard busses (5A, 2N3A, 6A) required core cooling core cooling systems with reduced to only one Table 6.1 source for systems is not likely in alternate power sources for

> 15 min.

s 4 hrs.

> 15min.

OR Actual or imminent entry into ORANGE or RED path on F-0.2. "CORE COOLING" r-----.------.

6.2 6.2.2 {> 200°F) 6.2.1 {S200°F)

Loss of DC Power loss of bus voltage << 105 (Unit 2] Unplanned loss of bus Sources vdc) for> 15 min. on all of voltage << 105 vdc) for> 15 the DC Busses.

min. on any DC Bus resulting in the loss of decay heat removal capability

[Unit 3] Unplanned loss of bus voltage << 105 vdc) for> 15 min. on all of the DC Busses

Entergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 6.0 ELECTRICAL FAILURES Table 6.1 Safeguard Bus AC Power Sources UNIT 2 UNIT 3 480 V EDG 21

  • 480V EDG 33 IP-EP-120
  • Unit Auxiliary transformer*
  • Unit Auxiliary transformer
  • Station Auxiliary transformer*
  • Station Auxiliary transformer
  • 13.8 KV gas turbine auto
  • 13W92 feeder transformer*
  • 13W93 feeder
  • With 86P or 86BU tripped, all offsite
  • Appendix R Diesel power supplies must be considered as one power supply.

Revision 6 20 of 30

ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN

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CATEGORY 7.0 EQUIPMENT FAILURES IP-EP-120 Revision 6 I I 21 I l

of 30

  • ":Catagory. \\~I Gene... I *' I Y;;;-- "Slbilue.',

. Alert

-.~."'......

-"-'-~

....,. UnuSual Event,"

7.1 Technical Specificationsl Requirements 7.2 System Failures or Control Room Evacuation 7.2.5 {All}

Control Room evacuation AND Plant control cannot be established per AOP-SSD-1 in [Unit 2] ~ 15

min,

[Unit 3] ~ 30 min.

7.2.2 {>200°F}

Turbine failure generated missiles which causes or potentially causes any required safety related system or structure to become inoperable.

7.2.3 {All}

Entry into AOP-SSD-1 7.2.4 {s200°F}

Reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained S 200°F 7.1.1 {>200°F}

Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

7.2.1 {>200°F}

Report of main turbine failure requiring turbine trip resulting in:

Damage to turbine generator seals causing a release of lubricating oil or hydrogen OR Turbine casing penetration

ENN IPEC fa EMERGENCY PLAN

-:::::--Entergy IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 7.0 EQUIPMENT FAILURES IP-EP-120 RevisIon 6 I 22 I of 30

.'-.._.r-- -..... - --- --

............ 1 L : category

,::\\ ~enerar

' ' " "<:;5118 Ar.a

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Alert

. Unusual event.i 'J'"

7.3 7.3.4 {>200°F}

7.3.3 {>200°F}

7.3.1 {>200°F}

Loss of Indicationsl Alarmsl Communicatio n Capability Loss of most (approx.

75%) safety system annunciators or indications on Control Room Panels AND Loss of ability to monitor critical safety function status AND A significant plant transient in progress Unplanned loss of most (approx. 75%)

Unplanned loss of most (approx.

safety system annunciators or 75%) safety system annunciators indications on Control Room Panels or indications on Control Room for> 15 min.

Panels for> 15 min.

AND AND Increased surveillance is required for Increased surveillance is required safe plant operation for safe plant operation AND EITHER:

A significant plant transient in progress OR

[Unit 2] PICS [Unit 3] CFMS and QSPDS are unavailable 7.3.2 {All}

Loss of all communications capability affecting the ability to EITHER:

Perform routine operations OR Notify offsite agencies or personnel

ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN

~ Enlergy IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page 9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS IP-EP-120 Revision 6 I 23 I of 30

.* Category,,----r oe.,.,.f

i.

I

.-.-.~

,. SHeArN Alert Un"".1 E~.nt-*--- -----

8.1 I 8.1.10 {All}

Security Threats A Hostile Force has taken control of plant equipment such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions.

8.1.7 {All}

Intrusion into a plant Vital Area by a Hostile Force 8.1.8 {All}

Any security event which represents actual or likely failures of plant systems needed to protect the public.

8.1.9 {All}

Notification from the site security force that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact or other Hostile Action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area 8.1.4 {All}

Any security event which represents an actual substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant 8.1.5 {AU}

A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat < 30 minutes away 8.1.6 {AU}

Notification from the site security force that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact or other Hostile Action is occurring or has occurred within the OCA 8.1.1 {All}

Notification of any credible site specific security threat by the Security Shift Supervisor or outside agency.

8.1.2 {All}

Indication of attempted sabotage within the plant Protected Area 8.1.3 {AU}

A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

Entergy ENN IPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

  • .... Category. :/;!:/y-:,Genttral I;'

8.2 Fire or Explosion NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Page of 30

  • ----r--** ** ; -.-

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Site ArM I

AI8rt Unusual Event

",};

8.2.3 {All}

Fire or explosion in any plant area, Table 8.1, which causes or potentially causes any required safety related system or structure to become inoperable 8.2.1 {All}

Confirmed fire in or contiguous to any plant area, Table 8.1 not extinguished in

s 15 min. of Control Room notification.

8.2.2 {All}

Report by plant personnel of an explosion within Protected Area boundary resulting in visible damage to non-vital permanent structures or equipment.

Efltergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page IP-EP-120 Revision 6 25 of 30

~---- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS

.., Category "

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Alert

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8.3 8.3.4{AII}

8.3.1 {All}

Man-Made Vehicle crash or projectile impact Vehicle crash into or projectile Events which causes or potentially causes which impacts plant safety related any required safety related system or structures or systems within structure to become inoperable, Protected Area boundary Table 8.1 8.3.2 {All}

8.3.5 {All}

Report or detection of toxic or Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter flammable gases within a plant area, or have entered within the Table 8.1, in concentrations that will Protected Area boundary in be life threatening to plant personnel amounts that could affect the or preclude access to equipment health of plant personnel or safe (even when using personal protective plant operation equipment) needed for safe plant OR operation Report by local, county or state officials, for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event 8.3.3 {All}

Accident Conditions affecting a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDRY Cask Tip-Over OR Dropped Cask Resulting in Cask Tip-Over

Entetgy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY ReLATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page IP-EP-120 Revision 6 26 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS r

,:categO? :,"l'<:>Generi';:i, 'L*l, S"Af.a.~ I

,~_~rt ~'="-~~T:- " '<"-' Unu.u~IEy.~t,.

8.4 Natural Events 8.4.4 {All}

Earthquake felt inplant based upon a consensus of Control Room Operators on duty AND Kinemetrics Strong Motion Accelographs in the Unit 3 VC produce an alarm in the Control Room At!Q Amber and red Peak Shock Annunciators indicate seismic activity 8.4.5 {All}

Sustained winds> 90 mph onsite OR Tornado strikes a plant vital area, Table 8.1 8.4.6 {All}

Assessment by the Control Room personnel that a natural event has occurred which causes or potentially causes any required safety system or structure to become inoperable, Table 8.1 8.4.7 {All}

River level ~ 15' (0 MSL)

OR Low service water bay (intake structure) level resulting in a loss of 8.4.1 {All}

Earthquake felt in plant based upon a consensus of Control Room Operators on duty AND EITHER Kinemetrics Strong Motion Accelographs in the Unit 3 VC produce an alarm in the Control Room OR At least one amber Peak Shock Annunciator is lit 8.4.2 {All}

Report by plant personnel of tornado within plant Protected Area boundary 8.4.3 {All}

River level ~ 14.5' (0 MSL)

OR Service water bay (intake structure) level < -4'5" (0 MSL)

Entergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Table 8.1 Plant Areas Unit2 IP-EP-120 Page I

Unit 3 I

  • Condensate Storage Tank
  • Auxiliary Feedpump Building I
  • P.A.B.
  • CAS/SAS
  • Fuel Storage Building
  • Fuel Storage Building
  • Control Building
  • Primary Auxiliary Building/Fan
  • Control Room House
  • Vapor Containment Building
  • Refueling Water Tank
  • 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Control
  • EDG Rooms Bldg.)
  • Diesel Fuel Tanks
  • Cable Spreading Room/Electrical
  • Vital Area Access to Tunnel Containment
  • Central Control Room
  • Appendix R Diesel Generator
  • Diesel Generator Building/Fuel Tank Area
  • Battery Room (Control Bldg. 33'0" ele.)
  • Central Alarm Station Revision 6 27 of 30

ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6

-=-Enlergy IMPLEMENTING I 28 I PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.1

  • Emergency Action Levels I

CATEGORY 9.0

---'=h--"-'--'~-""-""-~---'-

~. Category

........... Gerieral" Site Ana.

I Alert Unusual Event I

9.1 9.1.7 {All}

9.1.5 {All}

9.1.3 {All}

9.1.1 {All}

Other As determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, events are in progress which indicate actual, or imminent core damage and the potential for a large release of radioactive material in excess of EPA PAGs outside the site boundary.

9.1.8 {>200°F}

Any event. as determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, that could lead or has led to a loss of any two fission product barriers and loss or potential loss of the third, Attachment 2.

As determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, events are in progress which indicate actual or likely failures of plant systems needed to protect the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposures which exceed EPA PAGs.

9.1.6 {>200°F}

Any event, as determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, that could lead or has led to EITHER:

Loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS barrier, Attachment A.

QB Loss or potential loss of either fuel clad or RCS barrier in conjunction with a loss of containment,.

Any event. as determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, that could cause or has caused actual substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

9.1.4 {>200°F}

Any event, as determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, that could lead or has led to a loss or potential loss of either fuel clad or ReS barrier, Attachment 2.

Any event, as determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, that could lead to or has led to a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

9.1.2 {>200°F}

Any event, as determined by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director, that could lead to or has led to a loss or potential loss of containment,.

ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6

-E l IMPLEMENTING I 29 I Tl,ergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.2 - Fission Product Barrier Thresholds FUEL CLADDING BARRIER Potential Loss Loss ORANGE path in F*0,2, CORE COOLING RED path in F-02, CORE COOLING RED path in F-0.3, HEAT SINK AND Heat sink is required Coolant activity> 300..,Ci/cc 1-131 equivalent Core Exit Thermocouple Readings [Unit 2] > 700°F Core Exit Thermocouple Readings> 1200 OF

[Unit 3] > 715 of RVLlS [Unit 2] :s; 41% [Unit 3J:S; 33% wi no RCPs running

~ ~

Containment radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 > 17 Rlhr Emergency Director Judgment II II Emergency Director Judgment Res BARRIER Potential Loss Loss RED path on F*OA, INTEGRITY RCS subcooling < SI initiation setpoint due to RCS leakage RED path on F-O.3, HEAT SINK AND Feed & Bleed is required Unisolable faulted (outside VC) ruptured steam generator Primary system leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a

[Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 j.lCi/cc or single charging pump R-42 off-scale due to ReS leakage

[Unit 3] R-11 > 1.2E-5 j.lCi/cc or R-12 > O.05j.1Ci/cc Emergency Director Judgment Emergency Director Judgment

NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 Efltergy ENN IPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.2 - Fission Product Barrier Thresholds CONTAINMENT BARRIER Potential Loss RED path F-0.5, CONTAINMENT EITHER:

Core exit thermocouples >1200° F OR Core exit thermocouples [Unit 2] >700 of [Unit 3] > 715 OF with RVLlS [Unit 2] <41% [Unit 3] <33% wi no RCPs AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

Confirmed phase "6" isolation signal following confirmed LOCA with less than minimum containment cooling safeguards equipment operating Fan Cooler Units Oper Spray Pumps Req'd

<3 2

3 5

1 o

Containment pressure 47 psig and increasing

~4 % hydrogen concentration in containment Containment radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 reading

>68 Rlhr Emergency Director Judgment Loss Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure following initial increase due to RCS failure EITHER:

Any Phase "An or Phase "6" or containment ventilation isolation valve(s) not closed when required following confirmed LOCA OR Inability to isolate any primary system discharging outside containment AND Radiological release to the environment exists as a result 60th doors open on a VC airlock for> 4 hrs.

OR Inability to close containment pressure relief or purge valves which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment for> 4 hrs.

OR Any Phase "A" or Phase "6" or containment ventilation isolation valve(s) not closed when required which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage> Technical Specifications limit in any steam generator Loss of primary coolant inside containment with containment pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA conditions Emergency Director Judgment

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