ML113330805
ML113330805 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Salem |
Issue date: | 08/03/2011 |
From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
To: | Operations Branch I |
JACKSON D RGN-I/DRS/OB/610-337-5306 | |
Shared Package | |
ML110030673 | List: |
References | |
TAC U1830 | |
Download: ML113330805 (320) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel TASK NUMBER: N1150410501 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC RO Admin A1-1 ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: EPE10 EA1.1
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IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD RO[ZJ STAD SRO[ZJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
2-FRCI-3 Rev. 25 Response to Void in Reactor Vessel TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 min . TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07*20*11 Instructor Validated By: J Pierce, Jr Date: 07*28*11 SME or Instructor J~~
~_L- 7{
Approved By: Date: Approved By: ~ Date: 16/. /1' Operation Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT ! REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel TASK NUMBER: N1150410501 SIMULATOR SETUP INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is performing 2-EOP-FRCI-3, Response to Void in Reactor Vessel, due to an unexpected void formation in the Rx Vessel following a LOCA.
- Containment temperature is 220 degrees F. - Containment hydrogen concentration is 1.0%. - RCS pressure is 800 psig.
INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to calculate the maximum Rx Vessel Head venting time using Attachment 1 of FRCI-3. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Calculate maximum head vent time to be 20-24 minutes.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL {Required for
- NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT Once operator has read Initial Condition and Initiating Cue, provide them with FRCI-3 Attachment 1 and Figure 1.
Att. 1 Record the following data: Operator records the following data given Step 1 in Initial Conditions: 1.1 Containment temperature: 220 1.2 Containment hydrogen concentration (H): 1.0 1.3 RCS pressure: 800
- AU. 1 Determine containment air volume at Step 2 standard temperature and pressure I I Operator caicuiates containment 2.1 Calculate containment absolute absolute temperature. 220 + 460= 680 temperature. Tabs Tabs =Containment temperature (OF)
+460=
Operator calculates containment air 2.2 Calculate containment air volume volume at STP. 1.28E09/680=1.88E6 (V) at STP: (actual value of 1.882353E6 will be used V=1.28E09/Tabs= for bounding number, and can be used by operator) Page 3 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD StU UNSAT
- AU. 1 Determine maximum hydrogen vent Step 3 volume 3.1 Record containment hydrogen Operator records 1.0 concentration (from Step 1.2) 3.2 Record containment air volume at Operator records 1.88E6 (or STP (from Step 2.2) 1.882353E6) 3.3 Calculate maximum vent volume (M) Operator calculates maximum vent volume M= (3.0%-H) x V I I 100% M= (3.0%-1.0%) x 1.88E6(or I I I I I I i I
1.882353E6} 100% M= 37600 (or 37647) Page 4 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: Respond to a Void in the Reactor Vessel STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT
- AU. 1 Determine maximum vent time Step 4 4.1 Record RCS pressure (from Step Operator records 800 1.3)
Operator records 37600 (or 37647) 4.2 Record calculated maximum vent volume (from Step 3.3) Operator records 1600-1800 (allowed extrapolation) 4.3 Record hydrogen vent flow rate (from Figure 1) Operator calculates maximum vent time Tv= 37600/1600 4.4 Calculate maximum vent time (Tv) Tv= 23.5 minutes I Tv=M/F I Note: Using the 37647 (M) value and the 1600-1800 allowed extrapolation from Figure 1, the bounding correct answers for Tv are 20.89 minutes and 23.53 minutes. The allowable answer for this JPM is 20-24 minutes. Once operator has provided maximum head vent time, state JPM is complete. Page 5 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGIRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
jZ:-- 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
o 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
? 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant. control room, or simulator)
J 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. r 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. _...:,11/"~ __ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
/ ~
- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
_--J(J/,--_ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by tbis JPM m~h-?S the most current revision of r that procedure: Procedure Rev. ).~ Date 'i z..'i,-#/!._o-c-f_ _ _ -;Y _ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
/ a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_-p.V__ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. I _-,JI<-V__ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date "IPM cover page. SMEllnstructor: ~ Ib..::s= Date: _7+0_2_ F
-t,0,--1t_ __
7 SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/lnstructor: Date: - - - - - PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 2 is performing 2-EOP-FRCI-3, Response to Void in Reactor Vessel, due to an unexpected void formation in the Rx Vessel following a LOCA.
- Containment temperature is 220 degrees F. - Containment hydrogen concentration is 1.0%. - RCS pressure is 800 psig.
INITIATING CUE: The CRS directs you to calculate the maximum Rx Vessel Head venting time using Attachment 1 of FRCI-3. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Admin TASK: TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases) TASK NUMBER: N1140900401 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC RO Admin A 1-2 ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 2.4.47
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IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 3.6 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD ROW STAD SRO [X ] EVALUATION SEn"ING/METHOD: Classroom S1 ,OP-AB.SF-0001, Rev. 7 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling S1"OP-AR.ZZ-0003, Rev. 17, Overhead Annunciator Window C
REFERENCES:
Salem UFSAR Section 9.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (pg 9.1-13) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-20-11 Instructor Validated By: J Pierce, Jr Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor
/~~nt Date: ~ I I Approved By:
Approved By: ope~~ Date:
~;, !I ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:
ACTUAL TIIVIE CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK: TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases) TASK NUMBER: N1140900401 SIMULATOR SETUP INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 1 is defueled during a regular refueling outage. Spent Fuel Pool temperature is stable at 121 "F. On November 30th at 0100, the operating Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump trips, and cannot be re-started. The standby Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump cannot be started. At 0115, OHA C-19, SFP TEMP HI alarms. INITIATING CUE: At 0200, the CRS directs you to calculate the time of day at which the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool will reach its Design Temperature, lAW S1.0P-AB.SF-0001, if no operator actions are taken. Assume the heat-up rate has been linear from 0100 to 0200. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if sa'u::;fcHjLury progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Calculates that SFP temp will exceed Design Temp (180) @ 0436-0442. See bases for range on page 5.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SYSTEM Admin TASK: TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the at which SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases) STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- STANDARD S/U UNSAT Provide candidate with blank copy of IF asked, provide a copy of S2.0P S1.0P-AB.SF-0001, Loss of Spent Fuel AR.ZZ-0003, Overhead Annunciator Pool Cooling. WindowC.
Cue: IF asked by candidate if the OHA C-19 has been adjusted to a temporary setpoint, THEN state" OHA C-19 has not been adjusted to a temporary setpoint. r--~~~~~~ AB.SF-1 INITIATE Attachment 5, Spent Fuel Refers to S1.0P-AB.SF-0001, Loss of Step 3.3 Pool Heatup Trending, for Unit 1 Spent Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Attachment 5, I I fuel Pool, as directed by the CRS. Spent Fuel Pool Heatup Trending.
- AB.SF-1 Enters 121 as Initial SFP TEMP (A) on Att.5 Attachment 5.
ARSF-1 Refers to S1.0P-AR.ZZ-0003, Overhead Att.5 Annunciator Window C, and determines the alarm setpoint is 125°F. Page 3 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which SFP temperature will exceed Design Bases) STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- STANDARD S/U UNSAT
- AB.SF-1 Determines the SFP TEMP (A) at "+1 Att. 5 HR" is 137 based on the temperature rise from 0100 (121°) to the alarm at0115 (125°) over 15 minutes, and multiplies by 4 to get heatup for the hour of 16°.
- AB.SF-1 Determines the IlTEMP/HR (B) at +1 HR AU. 5 is 16.
AB.SF-1 Performs calculation to determine the Att. 5 time to 180"'F: I (180-A)/B I = (180-137)/16 2.6875 HRS
. Note: 2.6875 hrs= 2 hours, 41.25 min.
Page 4 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM TASK: TCAF a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Calculate the time at which SFP temperature exceed Design Bases) STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- STANDARD S/U UNSAT Calculates the time of day at which SFP temp will reach Design Temp:
Time of calculation: 0200 Time to reach 180: 2 hours, 41.25 min 04:41:15 Determination to the second is not required. The Task Standard states the band is 0436 (if rounded down to 2.6 hours, and 0442 (if round up to 2.7 hours) Page 5 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to "IPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _-,.j~iL--_1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. JL 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. JL 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant control room, or simulator) _--1..7__ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. --r-,fL-- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. --C:,lf"""V- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. __~-I'-_7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). --4-'-*- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of
/" that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date 1!z,".,t-:0-,-,_ __
_=P__ g. Pilot test the JPIVI:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
~
- 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
____ 11. When "IPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/lnstructor: ~ I SMEllnstructor:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DatE!: _ _ _ _ __ SME/lnstructor: Date: - - - - - - PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 1 is defueled during a regular refueling outage. Spent Fuel Pool temperature is stable at 121°F. th On November 30 at 0100, the operating Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump trips, and cannot be re-started. The standby Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pump cannot be started. At 0115, OHA C-19, SFP TEMP HI alarms. INITIATING CUE: At 0200, the CRS directs you to calculate the time of day at which the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool will reach its Design Temperature. lAW S1.0P-AB.SF-0001. if no operator actions are taken. Assume the heat-up rate has been linear from 0100 to 0200. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout TASK NUMBER: N3130060301 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC RO Admin A2 ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 2.2.13
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IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.1 4.3 APPLICABI LlTY: RO SRO EOD ROCK] EVALUATION SErnNG/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
OP-M-109-115, Rev. 2, Safety Tagging Operations TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-20-11 Instructor Validated By: J. Pierce Date: 07 11 SME or Instructor
~~
Approved By: Date: g - I ( Approved By: 45~l,,---_- Operations Representative Date: 8/,d I ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: I GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific PE~rmission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout TASK NUIVIBER: N3130060301 SIMULATOR SETUP INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping. The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to perform the following:
- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 SI pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 SI pump.
- 5. Enter all the above information on the provided OP~AA~ 109~ 115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.
Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required. ! Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Identifies correct blocking points.
- 2. Sequence tagging in order by 1: Bezels, 2: Electrical, 3: MElchanical isolation, 4: Vents and drains.
- 3. Identifies correct tag types for components.
- 4. Identifies desired positions.
PSEG Restricted ~ Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD StU UNSAT Provide candidate with package Note: If requested. provide extra blank containing several blank Form 4's, copies of Form 4 Tagging/Untagging (Tagging/Untagging Worklist), a copy Work list of OP-AA-109-115, Safety Tagging Operations, drawings 205234 sheets 1-4, 203002,207910-207912, and 207931-207933. Several of these drawings are not required.
I
- Determines Blocking Points as per key.
i
- Sequences Blocking Points in following I I I
order: I I I
- 1. Bezels
- 2. Electrical Isolation
- 3. Mechanical Isolation
- 4. Vents and Drains
- Determines correct tag type for each Blocking Point as per key.
- Determines position required for each Blocking Point as per key.
Page 3 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM Admin TASK: Prepare a Manual Tagout STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for
- NO. STANDARD S/U UNSAT Notes for Evaluators:
Attachment 2, Component Tagging Rules, contains information which allows for the following:
- 1. A minimum of 1 vent or drain is required to be RBT opened, there is no limit to how many can be used inside boundaries.
- 2. MOV's are allowed to be used as Blocking Points. It would be acceptable procedurally if the 11SJ113 AND 12SJ113 were used as Blocking Points instead I
I I of the single manual valve I I I 1SJ114. IF used as blocking points, the 11/12SJ113 breakers (RBT-OFF), bezels (INFO), and valve handwheels (RBT SHUT)would also be required to
~--
be tagged. Note: Actual WeD 4278552 (CRTE) used as the bases for the blocking points _u l in JPM, with addition of vents and drains. Page 4 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _.,..1)/,--_1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
?
---'J..ye::... .:...- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. _---':j~<"_3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) -~J~'/- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. --'I"--J-/L-- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. _~r,--_6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. _"rr~ __ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). _"",,;/)/,#-_ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM miChes the most current revision of r that procedure: Procedure Rev. ~ Date " .I_D7+-/......;II:..-_ _
/J/ 9. Pilot test the JPM: ~ a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_....,.J~-_1 O. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _~L __ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/lnstructor:~_ _ _ _ .J_._t>_1"--_"rt.c.._-,-i..._ SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SMEllnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. While performing a surveillance on 11 Safety Injection Pump, a leak was observed on the pump outlet flange discharge piping. The Work Clearance Module is not available due to an emergent power outage. INITIATING CUE: You are directed to perform the following:
- 1. Determine the correct blocking points which will allow repair of the 11 SI pump.
- 2. Sequence those blocking points in the correct order.
- 3. Determine the correct tag type for each blocking point.
- 4. Determine the required positions necessary to allow repair on 11 SI pump.
- 5. Enter all the above information on the provided OP-AA-1 09-115, Safety Tagging Operations Form 4.
Specific WCM identifiers are NOT required. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 6
OP-J )9-115 Revision 2 Page 94 of97 FORM 4 TAGGING / UNTAGGING WORK LIST [] REQUEST [I RELEASE TYPE (circle one) FULL PARTIAL TEMPORARY DISCIPLINE REVIEWS: WORK CLEARANCE DOCUMENT NUMBER This Worksheet: Page of Tag Current Desired Apply/Release QO Verified QO Seq. WCM Identifier Tagging Point Description Tvpe Position Position DatelTime Initials DatelTime Initials , 1 S1SJ -11SIPP-BZL 11 SI Pump Bezel INFO 2 S1SJ -11SJ33-BZL 11SJ33 Bezel INFO 3 S1SJ -11SJ113-BZL 11SJ113 Bezel INFO 4 S1SJ -12SJ113-BZL 12SJ113 Bezel INFO 5 S14KV-1A01AX50 11 SI Pump 4KV breaker RBT 01 6 S1230-1AY2AX3E 11 SJ33 Valve Motor RBT OFF 7 S1230-1AY2AX31 11 SJ113 Valve Motor RBT OFF 8 S1230-1BY2AX8A 12SJ 113 Valve Motor RBT OFF 9 S1SJ*11SJ33 11 SI Pump Suction valve RBT X 10 S1 SJ -11 SJ35 11 SI Pump Discharge valve RBT X 11 S1SJ-11SJ65 11 SI Pump mini flow isolation RBT X 12 S1SJ -11SJ922 11 SI Pump mini flow isolation RBT X 13 S1SJ*1SJ114 SJ-CHG pump x-over isolation vlv RBT X 14 S1SJ -11SJ113 11SJ113 Cross over RBT X 15 S1SJ -12SJ113 12SJ113 Cross over RBT X 16 S1SJ -1SJ181 SJ-CHG pump x-over drain vlv RBT 0 17 S1SJ -1SJ326 SJ-CHG pump x-over vent vlv RBT 0 18 S1SJ -11SJ102 11 SI Pump drain RBT 0 19 S1SJ -11SJ106 11 SI Pump drain RBT 0 20 S1SJ *11SJ104 11 SI Pump drain RBT 0 21 S1SJ -11SJ103 11 SI Pump vent RBT 0 22 S1SJ -11SJ105 11 SI Pump vent RBT 0 TAGGED BY: DATE/TIME: VERIFIED BY: _ _ _ _ DATEITIME:
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert TASK NUMBER: N1240100501 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC RO Admin A4 ALTERNATE PATH: 0 K/A NUMBER: 2.4.39
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IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.9 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOD RO[KJ STAD SRO[~ EVALUATION SEn"ING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
Salem ECG, Attachment 8 Secondary Communicator Log, Rev. 24 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 7-19-11 Instructor Validated By: J Pierce, Jr Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: ~~7 Date: q- L - \ I
-&ifning Department Approved By: B~---
Operations Representative, Date: r--------------------------------------------------------------------~ ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert. TASK NUMBER: N1240100501 SIMULATOR OPERATOR CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER ON LAND LINE 1-301*951*0550 BEFORE STARTING JPMS TO INFORM THEM EROS WILL BE ACTIVATED DURING EXAM. PLACE FOLLOWUP CALL AFTER LAST RO HAS PERFORMED JPM. ENSURE modem in simulator computer room, by 3 monitors is turned ON. Reset simulator to MODE 3 HSB IC, and place simulator in RUN. INITIAL CONDITIONS: An ALERT was declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip handle was used. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3. INITIATING CUE: You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform Salem ECG Attachment 8, Secondary Communicator Log. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Activate EROS.
- 2. Does NOT provide plant information to outside caller.
- 3. Terminate EROS.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) Stu (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
Provide a copy of ECG Attachment 8. Fills out ECG Attachment 8 by:
- 1. Printing name
- 2. Circles ALERT and circles CM2.
A.1 OBTAIN a copy of Attachment 6 and ASSIST Primary Communicator with Cue: Primary Communicator does not 15-minute notifications, as necessary. require assistance. A.2 I DIRECT the Shift Rad Pro Tech I I (SRPT) (2644) to implement SC.EP- Cue: Shift Rad Pro (Matt EP.ZZ-0301(Q) Shift Radiation Hassler) has been notified to Protection Technician Response. implement SC.EP-EP.ZZ-0301(Q) (N/A for Common Site) Shift Radiation Protection Technician Response. A.3 For an ALERT or higher Emergency:;
- a. IF an on-shift SRO is not available to fill the OSC Operations Supervisor Cue: The WCC Supervisor is the OSC position, CALLOUT an Supervisor.
additional SRO and have ,~~~~~~~ him/her report to the OSC. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) StU (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
A.3
- b. ACTIVATE EROS within 60 Uses SPOS display to activate EROS
- minutes from the affected unit's by:
SPOS terminal:
- 1. CLICK <EROS> button 1. Clicking <EROS> button
- 2. CLlCK<lnitiate> button 2. Clicking<lnitiate> button
- 3. CHECK for the following 3. Checking for the following status: status:
EROS Active EROS Active LINK Dialing Modem -> Link LINK Dialing Modem -> Link Active Active ----------- A.3 c. !E EROS Activator is not Determines EROS Activator was successfui, CONTACT iT Support: successful. I Network Operations (D!D 7008), I I I EOF IT Supervisor (NETS 5009), or the IT Help Desk (Ext. 5555) for assistance. A.4 ENSURE FAXed or FAX the leMF to Cue: The ICMF has been FAXed to Group A. Group A. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:,____________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:,____________________ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) StU (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
Simulator Operator: After candidate has performed step A.4 above. call the desk phone and say the following:
- "This is Anderson Cooper calling Does NOT give plant information to from CNN headquarters in Atlanta. caller.
We have received a report that the Salem 2 reactor has experienced a Attachment 8, Section C, INCOMING Rx accident and the core is melting. CALLS, MEDIA, CAUTION, states, Can you give me an update on the "Communicators are NOT authorized current condition of Salem Unit 2?" to release any information to the News Media." I I I I May read either Attachment 8. section II II
- C, Incoming Calls, 38, OR tell them he cannot provide any information.
CUE: If asked, state the ENC is activated. CUE: Once EROS is activated AND Media call action is complete, then state, "The Station Event has been terminated. The NRC Operations Center directs you to terminate EROS transmission." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:____________ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task: Perform Duties of Secondary Communicator During an Alert
- STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS NO. (* Denotes a Critical Step) S/U (Required for UNSAT evaluation)
C.4 WHEN directed by the NRC to TERMINATE ERDS transmission, THEN GO TO any SPDS terminal of the affected unit AND PROCEED as Uses SPDS display to activate ERDS follows: by:
- a. CLICK <ERDS> button
- b. CLlCK<Terminate> button 1. Cricking <ERDS> button
- c. CHECK for the following 2. Clicking<TERMINATE> button status: 3. Checking for the following ERDS Inactive status:
LINK Not Connected ERDS Inactive
- d. WHEN completed, NOTIFY LINK Not Connected the 8M CUe: SM notified, JPM is complete.
I I Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear Page 6 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. 9= 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
/? 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. /' ~ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
J. 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ?- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
r 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). --P"-'--- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM m5ltches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date"1L!% f 7 -i-F-- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
1c 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. f)/ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/lns!ruc!or: f1-<= J.7/~ Date: I / SMEllnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: SMEllnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: ----- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: An ALERT has been declared at Salem due to the Unit 2 reactor failing to trip when a manual trip signal was initiated. The Rx tripped when the second trip handle was used. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3. INITIATING CUE: You are the Secondary Communicator. You are directed to perform Salem ECG , Secondary Communicator Log. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROC3RAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ------_. STATION: SALEM SYSTEIVI: Administrative TASK: Determine the required actions basE!d on abnormal Secondary Plant chemistry conditions . TASK NUMBER: .; VI} Ll6 S1o\{o 2 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO Admin A1-1 ALTERNATE PATH: KfA NUMBER: 2.1.34 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.5 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EO [:=J RO [:=J STA [:=J SRO [=:KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AB.CHEM-0001, Rev. 21 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIIVIE CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 7-21-11 Instructor Validated By: C Recchione Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor Approved By:
~<Z-ment Date: 'i - L - II Approved By: -:g ~A_ Date: g[, [l (
Opera~~Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Determine the required actions based on abnormal Secondary Plant chemistry conditions. TASK NUMBER: N1140530402 INITIAL CONDITIONS: While operating at 100% power, Salem Unit 2 has experienced a rise in Sodium levels in 22B main condenser hotwell. Chemistry samples have been reported at 0800 on September 11th: SIG Slowdown pH: 10.1 SIG Slowdown cr: 38 ppb SIG Slowdown Na: 40 ppb SIG blow down Cation Conductivity: 0.9 uS/cm. Feedwater DO: 0.25 ppb INITIATING CUE: Using the assumption that the Secondary Chemistry conditions do not change, develop a timeline that describes how these conditions will affect Unit 2 operation, starting at 0800 on September 11th. Assume that any plant power changes will only be the minimum required. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. "IPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made .
. Task Standard for Successful Completion: . 1. Calculates that Unit 2 must be :s 30% power by 1600 on September 18th *
- 2. Calculates that Unit 2 must be <5% power by 1600 on September 22 nd
- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 2 of6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Determine the required actions based on abnormal Secondary Plant chemistry conditions. STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
When asked, provide a clean copy of S2.0P-AB.CHEM-0001, Abnormal Secondary Chemistry. Note: Once entered, the AB would not be exited until the conditions cause were found and isolated. Note: Action Levels are found on Attachment 4. S/G blowdown CI- and S/G blowdown Cation Conductivity both meet Action Level 1 at 0800 on September 11th. Operation in Action Level 1 for 7 days is the I escalation to Action Level 2, which is I , entered at 0800 on September 18th , Action Level 2 actions are directed at Step 3.28, which requires initiation of actions and reduce power .::30 % in the next 8 hours, by 1600 on September 18th . 100 hours of operation at Action Level 2 is the escalation to Action Level 3, which is entered at 1200 on September 22 nd *
. I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Determine the required actions based on abnormal Secondary Plant chemistry conditions. STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
I Action Level 3 actions are directed at Step 3.18, which req uires initiation of actions and reduce power <5% in the next four hours, by 1600 on September 22 nd
- Terminate JPM when operator turns in paperwork.
i f i i I f I r! I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 6
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate J PM using steps 8 and 11 below. _&_(__ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. _~__ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. Ct 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _ _-=-_4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _-----_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. _ _~_6. Task standards identified and verified by SME rElView. _ _ _ _ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). _-'.--__ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matc~E!s the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. t Date 1)",/1 "llj - - - - 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
_~M
/ b. ensure performance time is accurate.
- 10. If the ...IPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
__LI.L._ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/lnstructor:_-" ,C", -,_J-,- -.~ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _7. :. . . J./~z~. :!. .L .I- !-I _ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 5 of6
INITIAL CONDITIONS: While operating at 100% power, Salem Unit 2 has experienced a rise in Sodium levels in 22S main condenser hotwelL Chemistry samples have been reported at 0800 on September 11th: SIG Slowdown pH: 10.1 S/G Slowdown cr: 38 ppb S/G Slowdown Na: 40 ppb S/G blow down Cation Conductivity: 0.9 uS/cm. Feedwater DO: 0.25 ppb INITIATING CUE: Using the assumption that the Secondary Chemistry conclitio,1s do not change, develop a timeline that describes how these conditions will affect Unit 2 operation, starting at 0800 on September 11 tho Assume that any plant power changes will only be the minimum ~equired. PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PRO(3RAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the appropriate log TASK NUMBER: 1120700302 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO A 1-2 ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 2.1.18
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 APPLICABILITY: -----=-R-=-O- SRO EoD ROD STAD SRO[X] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom Salem Tech Specs
REFERENCES:
OP-SA-1 08-115-1 001, Rev. 2 TOOLS AND EQUIPME.NT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-21-11 Instructor Validated By: C Recchione Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: 4/'~ Date: 'b-2--f/ cf'~~~artment
~/ (I I Approved By:
o~'o s Representative Date: I ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: __________________________ DATE: _________________________ SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log TASK NUMBER: 1120700302 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Unit 2 is at EOL in a 300 hundred day run at 100% power.
- 2. Control Rod 2SA4 dropped fully into the core at 1015, the reactor did not trip.
3, The crew has implemented S2.0P-AB,ROD-0002, DroppE!d Rod.
- 4. Control Rod 2SA4 has been declared inoperable, and Reactor Engineering reports it will be at least 2 hours before they determine how to recover the rod.
- 5. The 3fd NCO has just completed a QPTR at 1025. The highest reading quadrant is 1.031.
- 6. Computerized LCO tracking is not being used.
INITIATING CUE: As CRS, determine all TSAS(s) that apply and make the appropriate log entries on OP-SA-108-114 1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, Attachment 4-1, and Form 1. Creation or documentation of notifications is not required. Successful Completion Criteria: 1, All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made, Task Standard for Successful Completion:
1 Identifiy TSAS 3.1.3.4.b, 3.1.3.1.c, and 3.2.4.a are applicable with 3.1.3.1.c as the most Time Limiting TSAS.
- 2. Fill out Attachment 4-1 and Form 1 as per Standard in "IPM body.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Provide candidate with blank copy of OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program. Provide marked up copy of Attachment 4-1.
- Obtains a copy of Plant Technical Determines the following LCO's apply:
Specifications and reviews for LCO 3.1.3.4.b , 3.1.3.1.c, 3.2.4.a t applicability. i Refers to Section 5.2, Entry into an Active/Tracking Technical Specification (TIS) LCO Action Statements of OP-SA-1 08-114 1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program I
- I I 5.2.2 DETERMINE if the TIS LCO Action I Determines the LCOs are ACTIVE. I I Statement is ACTIVE or TRACKING based on the following criteria:
5.2.3 IE the cause of the SSC being Determines the cause of the SSC being INOPERABLE is a planned .... evolution ... INOPERABLE it is NOT a planned evolution. 5.2.4 I For activities that cause a TECH SPECS SSC to be INOPERABLE that do not meet the criteria of Section 5.2.3, DOCUMENT the condition as follows: I II PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD StU evaluation) 5.2.4.A For SAP LCO tracking, REFER TO Determines computerized SAP LCO tracking guidance provided in OP-SH-108-115- is not being used as per stem.
1001, LCO Entry/Exit & Operability Determination SAP Guidance. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Determine the TSAS( s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5.2.4.B For LCO tracking using Attachment 4 and CUE: Provide copy of Attachment 4-1 and Form 1, PERFORM the following: Form 1. On Att. 4-1, the first LCO Index No. should is filled in so the candidate can number sequentially.
- 1. ASSIGN the next consecutive LCO
- Makes entries on AU. 4-1:
Index Number obtained from the Action Statement Log Index (Attachment 4) and
- Next LCO Index No. is 11*234 LOG the TIS LCO ACTION Statement on the Index.
- TS No's. 3.1.3.4.b. 3.1.3.1.c, 3.2.4.a
- Active
- Summary Descriptions
- Planned? NO
- Entry DatelTime
- Expiration: 3.1 1.c- 1 hour, 3.2.4.a-I I I I 2 hrs. (or less) from QPTR I I completion, 3.1.3.4.b 1 hour
- 2. UPDATE Unit Status Board for the CUE: Another operator will update the Unit Technical Specification Action Statement. Status Board.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 50f9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Determine the TSAS{s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.2.4.B COMPLETE Sections 1 and 2 of Form Makes entries on Form 1:
1 by performing the following:
- RECORD the LCO Index Number
- LCO Index No: same as AU. 4 (from Attachment 4)
- RECORD the LCO Status (Active
- LCO Status: Active
/ Tracking)
- RECORD the applicable Technical
- TS No.: 3.1.3.1.c Specification LCO number. When an INOPERABLE TECH SPECS/SSC affects multiple LCO A,.,+i" .... ~t<>t"'rnC\nt'" Dl=rnRD the I LCO number with the most limitinn I I Action Time.
- RECORD the DatelTime entered.
- DatelTime entered: Same as Att. 4
- RECORD the Mode Applicability for
- Applicability: MODES 1 & 2 the LCO.
- RECORD the Daterrime Action Date/Time Action Required: Within one Required. When recording the date I
- hour from entry and time that Action is required for an LCO Action Statement that has multiple actions, use the most limiting Action time. For Tracking Action Statements, record 'N/A'.
PSEG Restricted - Possessio~ Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Determine the TSAS(s) for a dropped rod and complete the applicable log COMMENTS STEP STEP EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD Stu evaluation) 5.2.4.B
- RECORD Other Applicable TIS.
- Other .Applicable TS: 3.2.4, 3.1.3.4.b List only active LCO's. Applicable Tracking LCOs should be listed seperately in the Summary Description of the Log Sheet.
- RECORD the Equipment
- Equipment: Shutdown Rod 2SA4 description.
- Briefly STATE the reason for the
- Summary: Brief summary of TS and the SSC condition in the Summary power reduction required within 1 hour from entry.
Description section and include a brief summary of actions required, including submittal of any special reports to the NRC. NOTIFY the SOS of any reporting I I req uirements. I t n I _, __ When candidate returns all paperwork, terminate JPM. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of9
TQ-AA-106-0303 Revision 4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _-\-__ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. __ Y-\-,_ _ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. r-- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) __V'\-,",--_ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _-""tA,-~'---_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. __y+-_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. G1 ____ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). 1'. ~'~T <I _0. ze;o /) __ :1J,..,__ 8. Verify the procedure reference~y this JPM rnawtles the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev.~ Date ~~ (~ 1..,,- gh (0,",) -~--l.-- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
jt .f
~
- 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM .
- 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
SMEllnstructor:__ cL_"_z,-i SMEll nstructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ Date: _______ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 9
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. Unit 2 is at EOL in a 300 hundred day run at 100% power.
- 2. Control Rod 2SA4 dropped fully into the core at 1015, the mactor did not trip.
- 3. The crew has implemented S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod.
- 4. Control Rod 2SA4 has been declared inoperable, and Reactor Engineering reports it will be at least 2 hours before they determine how to recover the rod.
- 5. The 3rd NCO has just completed a QPTR at 1025. The highest reading quadrant is 1.031.
- 6. Computerized LCO tracking is not being used.
INITIATING CUE: As CRS, determine all TSAS(s) that apply and make the appropriate log entries on OP-SA-108-114-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, Attachml3nt 4-1, and Form 1. Creation or documentation of notifications is not required. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 9 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE ~--------------------------------------------------------------------, STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: ADMINISTRATIVE TASK: Review a completed surveillance to calculate Shutdown Margin TASK NUMBER: 1200030301 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO Admin A2 ALTERNATE PATH: 1'-----11 KIA NUMBER: 2.2.12
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.1 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROD STAD SRO~] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002, Rev. 19 Shutdown Mar~lin Calculation S1.RE-RA.ZZ-0016, Rev. 3 Figures (Cycle 21) Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications TSAS 3.1.3.1 Movable Control Assemblies TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Calculator VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 20 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 25 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-21-11 Instructor Validated: C Recchione Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: .It:.-::I-~ df . 'ning D~rtment Approved By: -:r;; \'--_ _- - Date: OperatTdn~ Representative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIIVlE CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAr REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Administrative TASK: Review a completed surveillance to calculate Shutdown Margin TASK 1200030301 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: Control Rod 105 was declared INOPERABLE at 2210 today due to not moving during a rod exercise test. A NCO has completed a SOM as required by Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 lAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002, Shutdown Margin Calculation, and reports that SOM is SAT. Unit 1 Reactor Power is 70%. Control Bank 0 is at 174 steps. Current boron concentration is 300 ppm. Current core burnup is 10,000 EFPH. INITIATING CUE: Review the attached SOM calculation procedure SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 for completeness and accuracy. Note any discrepancies found by the review on Attachment 7', The current time is 2245. This is a time critical JPM. Time will start when procedures are given to you. Time will stop when procedures are given to proctor. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrEince is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Operator identifies incorrect Total Control Bank Worth at Stlsp 4.2.1 of Att. 3.
- 2. Operator identifies incorrect Total Shutdown Bank Worth at Step 4.2.2 of Att. 3.
- 3. Operator identifies incorrect Integral Rod Worth inserted at Step 4.2.5 of AU. 3
- 4. Operator identifies incorrect value of Power Defect at Step 4.3.:3 of AU. 3.
- 5. Operator completes review within 25 minutes.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task R .
- -- _._-- _. -- leted '11 ----.~----.-. .-.:..: Iculate Shutd ----~.~:~. _:::.. :.:::... M STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. S/U Evaluation)
Note to Evaluator: The actions contained in this JPM do not require the SRO candidate to perform the Shutdown Margin, only to identify the portions that have been performed incorrectly. The time critical aspect refers to the time required when the Shutdown Margin requirement of TSAS 3.1.3.1.c must be met. 1 Provide the candidate with the marked Ensures Sections 3 and 4 are completed. up copy of SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 and copy of S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016, Curve Book I Time Start: 2 Review Section 5 to ensure the correct Reviews Section 5 and determines the Attachment was performed. correct Attachment (3) was performed. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:,____________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:,____________________ System: ADMINISTRATIVE
. hutdown M STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. Stu Evaluation) 3 Review the completed Shutdown Margin Calculation:
4.1.1 Power Level Verifies power is 70% from stem initial conditions. 4.1.2 Boron Concentration Verifies 300 ppm from initial conditions 4.1.3 Control Bank Position Verifies Bank D at 174 from initial conditions. 4.1.3 Burnup Verifies burnup 10,000 EFPH from initial conditions. Step 4.1.5 Verifies 1 from stem.
- Step 4.2.1 Determines Total Control Bank Worth is incorrect from Figure 15/Tab!e G I
I Step 4.2.2 (Should be -3018) Determines Total Shutdown Bank I I Worth is incorrect from from Figure 16/Table H (Should be -3743) Step 4.2.3 Verifies 722 from Figure 14/Table I Step 4.2.4 Verifies 722 for 1 control rod.
- Step 4.2.5 Determines Integral Rod Worth Inserted is incorrect from Figure 2C/Tabie 1 or Figure 2NTabie 1-8.
(Should be 221) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Nuclear Training Page 4 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE System: ADMINISTRATIVE Task. Review a completed surveillance to calculate Shutdown Margin STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) STANDARD EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. StU Evaluation)
'" Step 4.2.6 Determines errors carried forward.
f----I--------1f----------------tI(§I!<:>l!!d be -5096)
- Step 4.3.1 Determines errors carried forward.
(Should be -5096)
- Step 4.3.2 Determines errors carried forward.
(Should be 604)
- Step 4.3.3 Determines incorrect Power Defect is used. (Should be 1937)
- Step 4.3.4 Determines SDM is incorrect. (Should be -2555)
'" 4 Acceptance Criteria Determines Acceptance Criteria are met.
Turns in procedures 25 minutes Time Stop: _ __ of start time. Total time to complete JPM MUST be 25 minutes or less. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 7
OPERATOR TRAIl" lING PROGR.4l\l
.JOB PERFORL'VIANCE MEASURE TQ-AA-I06-0303 Revision 4 JOB PERFOR1V[A.,.1\lCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be perfonned upon initial validation. Prior to]PM usage, revalidate ]PM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
_-=__ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KJ A) references are included. _ _+_3. Perfonnance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _~. ~~_-,,-_4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _ _----'--_ 5. Initiating and tenninating Cues are properly identified. __&_,_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. _ _,--_7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). __l\_ _ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matc.h.. e~ the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. ~ Date ~ ~*tJ/::: . ._--'--- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of contlict, and
- b. ensure perfonnance time is accurate.
_tt . 10. If the ]PM cannot be perfonned as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ~ 11. When]PM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date ]PM cover page. Date: 1\b~~_ Date: _ _ _._ __ Date: _______ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORlWANCE MEASURE INITIAL Name: ___________________________ CONDITIONS: Control Rod 105 was declared INOPERABLE at 2210 today due to not moving during a rod exercise test. A NCO has completed a SOM as required by Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 lAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002, Shutdown Margin Calculation, and reports that SOM is SAT. Unit 1 Reactor Power is 70%. Control Bank 0 is at 174 steps. Current boron concentration is 300 ppm. Current core burnup is 10,000 EFPH. INITIATING CUE: Review the attached SOM calculation procedure SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 for completeness and accuracy. Note any discrepancies found, corrections needed, and any actions required by the review on Attachment 7. The current time is 2245. This is a time critical JPM. Time will start when procedures are given to you. Time will stop when procedures are given to proctor. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 7
ATTACHMENT 3 SHUTDO\VN MARGIN VERIHCATION FOR MODES 1 OR 2 Page 2 of3 SALEM UNIT _ _. 4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 CRITICAL CO"NTIITIONS 4.1.1 POWER LEVEL 70 %RTP 4.1.2 BORON CONCENTRATION 3(}O ppm 4.1.3 CONTROL BANK POSITION Bank JL at 174 Steps 4.1.4 Bl..JRJ.'WP 10/)00 EFPH I 4.1.5 # OF INOPERABLE RODS i rods 4.2 CALCULATION OF ROD WORTH 4.2.1 TOTAL CONTROL BANK WORTH (Figure I5/Table G)-pri? 4.2.2 4.2.3 MOST REACTIVE STUCK ROD WORTH __ ?d.~ _ _ pem (Figure 14/Table I) 4.2.4 INOPERABLE ROD(s) WORTH pem f x 7'Z"Z-Item 4.1.5 Item 4.2.3 (},!.,;j 4.2.5 INTEGRAL ROD WORTH INSERTED AT POSITION IN ITEM 4.1.3 (If ARO, use zero) l's8/f _ _ _ _ pem (HFP: Figure 2Crrab1e 1-7 or HZP: Figure 2AJTable 1-8) 4.2.6 TRIPPABLE ROD WORTH - 507(, - 3B35 pem (Item 4.2.1) + (Item 4.2.2) + (Item (Item 4.2.4) + (Item 4.2.5) = 4.3 CALCULATION OF SDM (Note: See Precaution 3.4) 4.3.1 TRIPP ABLE ROD WORTH (Item 4.2.6) 4.3.2 TEN PERCENT ROD WORTH PENALTY be; '-f (J53(~ + i "1;;';)... )xO,10= abs(Item 4.2.1) abs(Item 4.2.2) (Item 4.2.3)
?u;Z .,.,'1'-13 72;.L 4.3.3 POWER DEFECT (Figure 17A1Table 2-1) pem 4.3.4 SDM pem (Item 4.3.1) + (Item 4.3.2) (Item 4.3.3)
Salem Common Page 22 of31 Rev. 19
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Waste Liquid TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Release TASK NUMBER: N0680070302 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO Admin A3 ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER: 2.3.6
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IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.8 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO Ece=J STAD SRc(Z] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Classroom
REFERENCES:
S1.0P-SO.WL-0002, Rev.25, 205209 (CW), 205242 (SW)* TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 30 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-24-11 Instructor Validated By: A Crampton Date: 06-30-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: v:~ afning D~rtment Date: Approved By: P~ rl Date: Operations Department ACTUAL ..IPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Waste Liquid TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Release TASK NUMBER: N0680070302 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is on day 25 of a scheduled 45 day refueling outage. 21 CCHX is in service, 22 CCHX is removed from service and drained. All Unit 2 Circulators are O/S. Salem Unit 1 is operating at 75% power. 12A Circulator is OIS for waterbox cleaning. The Non-Rad Waste Treatment System is in service performing a release, and must remain in service. Unit 1 is NOT in any active Tech Specs. 12 CVCS Monitor Tank is in Recirc using 11 CVCS Monitor Tank Pump, and Chemistry has granted permission to release the tank with a minimum dilution flow rate of 100,000 gpm. INITIATING CUE: You are the Unit 1 CRS. Select the release path for 12 CVCS Monitor Tank lAW S1.0P-SO.WL-0002, Attachment 2, Section 2.2 Release Verification AND provide marked up drawings of the flow path from 12 CVCS Monitor tank to its ultimate release point. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Candidate determines the release path as 21 CCHX to 12AAND/OR 12B CW Pump 115 (Att. 2 Step 2.2.3)
- 2. Provides release flow path drawing of 12 CVCS MT to 21 CCHX, (via Unit x-conn) to discharge of 12A112B Circulators.
Page 2 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Waste Liquid TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Waste Release STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
Provide marked up copy of S1.0P- Note: Drawings 205229-2 SO.Wl-0002., and blank copies of 205242-4 drawings: 205342-5 205230 are not needed for flowpath but are 205239-1 included to ensure an incorrect 205229-2 alternate flowpath could be selected. 205242-4 205339-1 205342-3,4,5,6 205209-2 and a colored marker. t I i Uses S2.0P-SO.Wl-0002, Attachment f
- 2, Section 2.2, to select the release flow path based on CCHX's available and Circulators in service, as 12 CVCS Monitor Tank to 21 CCHX, to 12A and/or 12B CW pumps liS.
Page 3 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Waste Liquid TASK: Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Release STEP COMMENTS STEP NO. (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- STANDARD S/U _______ l:valu"tion)
- Candidates mark the appropriate drawings, from the 12 CVCS MT on drawing 205230 to 205239 Sheet 1, to 205339 Sheet 1 via x-connect line, to 205342 Sheet 4, to 205342 Sheet 3, through 21 SW222, to 205342 Sheet 6, to 205342 Sheet 3, to 205209 Sheet 2.
Terminate JPM when candidate has returned procedures and marked up I I I drawings. I I Page 4 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. b 1. Task description and number, ..IPM description and number are identified. hr-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
/J 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control mom, or simulator) /L 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. /1L 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. /L 6. Task standards identified and verified by SIVIE review.
L 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). A: 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this ..IPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. Z S' Date ___,H~ I t~
'-iL--=--_ 9. Pilot test the ..IPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_f'J....!.~_A__ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPIVI. N!,L 11. When ..IPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date ..IPM cover page. SME/lnstructor:_b-<~t&:i:~_~~~~~_ _ Da te: ----'c,==-"f-h::.......cd=--,.f-L/;-'-I__ SME/lnstructor:_ _ _._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SMEllnstructor: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Date: _ _ _ _ __ Page 5 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
INITIAL CONDITIONS: Salem Unit 2 is on day 25 of a scheduled 45 day refueling outage. 21 CCHX is in service, 22 CCHX is removed from service and drained. All Unit 2 Circulators are O/S. Salem Unit 1 is operating at 75% power. 12A Circulator is O/S for waterbox cleaning. The Non-Rad Waste Treatment System is in service performing a release, and must remain in service. Unit 1 is NOT in any active Tech Specs. 12 CVCS Monitor Tank is in Recirc using 11 CVCS Monitor Tank FJump, and Chemistry has granted permission to release the tank with a minimum dilution flow ratE:; of 100,000 gpm. INITIATING CUE: You are the Unit 1 CRS. Select the release path for 12 CVCS Monitor Tank lAW S1.0P-SO.WL-0002, , Section 2.2 Release Verification AND provide markE:;d up drawings of the flow path from 12 CVCS Monitor tank to its ultimate release point. Page 6 of 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession requires Specific Permission From Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-1 (ESG-1) ALTERNATE PATH: I I KIA NUMBER: 2.4.41
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IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.6 APPLICABILITY: --R-O- SRO EOD ROO STAD SROW EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)
REFERENCES:
Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07*05*11 Instructor Validated By: B Boos Date: 07*28-11 SME or Instructor cA *-V~ Approved By: Date:
. aming D~ment 13 k *I*~R 8/, /' I Approved By: Date:
FaCI Ity epresentatlve. ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAMI:: DATI:: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical JPM. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. ..IPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of ALERT under EAL 3.2.2.a (or 3.2.2.b if subcooling is O°F) is and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK- Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary - 5 minute limit prior to starting)
*START TIME: *Start time begins when candidate Cue: The regulatory commitment time reports he/she is ready to assume SM clock has started.
duties 1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event and refers to Attachment 2 (ALERT) I I I I I I I I 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2 EAL#(s):EALs 3.2.2.a (or 3.2.2.b if subcooling is OaF) Declared at: Current Time and Date Initials as EC 4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue: I am the Primary Communicator PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK' Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD StU evaluation) 5 ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.
Callout Activation (EP96-003) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (lCMF) (last page of
- Fills out Section II of ICMF:
this attachment). Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 3.2.2.a (or 3.2.2.b if subcooling is OaF) Description of Event: Potential Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier (or Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier) I I I I I I Note: Description of Event is found in Q"".." .... uG-vUVI I 1\ I " f fh" c::("'~ I V UI LIIQ 1.-V'-'. I I Fills out Section III: Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS I I Initials for ar;mroval to transmit PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-1) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD StU evaluation)
J_ 7 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator Communicator and DIRECT the within 15 minutes of START TIME Communicator to implement ECG COMPLETION TIME: Attachment 6.
~~~,~~~~~-~~ ------
PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
ECG ATT2 Pg 2 of2 mITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORlVl
- 1. THIS IS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, COMMUNICATOR IN THE 0 CONTROL ROOM (NAME) OTSC AT THE SAJ~EM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT(s) NO. _ _2._ __
IL o THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A ALERT WHICH WAS DECLARED AT TIME ON - - - - TODAYSDATE (Time-24 HR CLOCK) (DATE) EAL #(s) 3.2.2.a (or 3.2.2.b if subcooling is OaF) DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: Potential Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier (Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier III.
~---- NOTE: -~
Radiological Release is defmed as: Plant Effluent> Federal Limit of2.42E+05 uCilsec Noble Gas or 2.1E+Ol uCilsec 1-131. o NO RADIOLGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release D THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRJ~SS defmition IV. 0 33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED: _ __ (From MET Computer ISPDS) (DEGREES) (MPH) V. 0 NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME SMmITIALS EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF) SGS PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0303 Revision 4
.JOB PERFORlVlANCE MEASURE V ALIDAT]ON CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be perfonned upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. #-.1, Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
M- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. -/J4- 3, PerfOImance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) M- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. -M-- 5. Initiating and tenninating Cues are properly identified. 4tJ-- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. -M- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). _~_ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by..this JPM matche~/he most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. __B _ Date (P/:j~/liL__ -:!_ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure perfonnance time is accurate.
Nit. 10. If the JPM cannot be perfonned as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. f'l/.,.. __ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/lnstruc~""'S~"""'--I'---------/"'F="""~'--------j5P"'-'V SME/lnstructor: Date: SME/lnstructor: Date:
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.
You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical JPM. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an leMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 ..IPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-2 (ESG-:2) ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 2.4.41
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IMPORTANCE FACTOR: ----
4.6 APPLICABILITY
RO SRO EoD ROD STAD SRO[)) EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)
REFERENCES:
Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-05-11 Instructor Validated By: B Boos Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor
~nrn;~
Approved By: Date: '1- L.- - 'I Approved By: ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical JPM. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of SAE under EAL 5.1.3. and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK- Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) I Provide candidate with "Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary - 5 minute limit prior to starting)
*START TIME: *Start time begins when candidate Cue: The regulatory commitment time reports he/she is ready to assume SM clock has started.
duties 1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event and refers to Attachment 3 (SAE) I I II I 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 3 EAL#(s):EALs 5.1.3 Declared at: Current Time and Date Initials as EC 4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue: I am the Primary Communicator PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-2) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD Stu evaluation) 5 ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.
Callout Activation (EP96*003) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of
- Fills out Section II of ICMF:
this attachment). Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 5.1.3 Description of Event: Reactor Trip Failure with power above 5% Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG. I I I I Fills out Section III: I Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for aQQroval to transmit
- 7 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides leMF to Primary Communicator Communicator and DIRECT the within 15 minutes of START TIME Communicator to implement ECG COMPLETION TIME:
Attachment 6. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
ECG ATT3 Pg 2 of2 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGI~ FOAAI I. THIS IS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , COMMUr-HCA'TOR IN THE 0 CONTROL ROOM (NAME) :::J TSC o EOF AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT(s) NO. ___- ______' II. o THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY WHICH WAS DECLARED AT TIME ON - - - -TODAYSDATE- - (Time-24 HR CLOCK) (DATE) EAL #(s) 5.
1.3 DESCRIPTION
OF EVENT: Reactor Trip Failure with power above 5% IIl.,-_______________________,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---, of2.42E-05 uCi/sec Noble NO RADIOLGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release o THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS definition IV. 0 33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED: _ _ _ _ __ (From MET Computer ISPDS) (DEGREES) (MPH) V. 0 NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIlVIE SMINITIALS EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF) SGS Rev. 09 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-I06-0303 Revision 4
,JOB PERFORl"WANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate n)M using steps 8 and 11 below.
M- 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. M 2. Knowledge and Abilities (K/ A) references are included. ~ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) M 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. L 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. M 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). g AO
- 8. Verify the procedure referenced bYlfis JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. -+- Date ~*IO __
--&- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and d2.te JPM cover page. SME/lnstructor: Date: SME/Instructor: Date:
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.
You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical JPM. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PF~OGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an leMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-3 (ESG-3) ALTERNATE PATH: I I KIA NUMBER: 2.4.41
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IMPORTANCEFACTOR: __-=~__ 4.6 APPLICABI LlTY: RO SRO EOD ROO STAD SROW EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)
REFERENCES:
Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-05-11 Instructor Validated By: B Bonner Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor J~~nt Approved By: Date: Approved By: ~ tJ'-------- Date: Fa~epresentative ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are rE~ady to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical..lPM. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of ALERT under EAL 5.1.2.a and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK Classify an event and complete an leMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Provide candidate with 'Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary - 5 minute limit prior to starting)
*START TIME: *Start time begins when candidate Cue: The regulatory commitment time reports he/she is ready to assume SM clock has started.
duties 1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated tables in the simulator, rather than the 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event and refers to ECG Attachment 2 (ALERT) I I I I I I 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2 EAL#( s): EALs 5.1.2.a Declared Current Time and Date Initials as
----------- ----------- ~~~~~~-
4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue: I am the Primary Communicator
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ------------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK' Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-3) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 5 ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM.
Callout Activation (EP96-003) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of
- Fills out Section II of ICMF:
this attachment). Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 5.1.2.a Description of Event: Reactor Trip Failure Note: Description of Event is found in Section IV of the ECG. Fills out Section III: I Checks No Radiological Release is in progress Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS Initials for a[;1[;1roval to transmit
- 7 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides ICMF to Primary Communicator Communicator and DIRECT the within 15 minutes of START TIME Communicator to implement ECG COMPLETION TIME:
Attachment 6.
ECG ATT2 Pg 2 of2 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM
- 1. THIS IS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--' COMMUNICATOR IN THE 0' CONTROL ROOM (NAME) eTSC AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT(s) NO. ___- ____..__.
II. o THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A ALERT \\1iICH WAS DECLARED AT TIME ON - - -TODAYSDATE- - (Time-24 HR CLOCK) (DATE) EAL #(s) 5.1.2.a DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: Reactor Trip Failure III.,-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----, Radiological Release is defIned as: Plant ,-"Ll.!,""JlH > Federal Limit Gasor2.lE+Ol uCi/secI-131. o NO RADIOLGICA.l RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release o THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS defInition IV. 0 33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From): WIND SPEED: _ _ _._ __ (From MET Computer ISPDS) (DEGREES) (:tvfPH) V. 0' NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME SMINITIALS EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF) SGS Rev. 08
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (8M). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume 8M duties.
You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty 8M. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical JPM.
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC SRO Admin A4-4 (ESG-4) ALTERNATE PATH: IL...-----II ~ANUMBER: ______-=2.~4~.4~1______~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.6 APPLICABILITY: --=R-=O- SRO EOO ROO STA 0 SRO [TI EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulate (Simulator or Classroom)
REFERENCES:
Salem ECG TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: Inform Simulator Operators - DO NOT ERASE ANY PROCEDURES UNTIL THE SRO EVALUATOR APPROVES VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: 15 minutes Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-22-11 Instructor Validated By: B Bonner Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor
~~ent Approved By: Date: Y-L 1/
Approved By: F~~ Date: 6/' /Il ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAMI:: DAn:: SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK: Classify an event and complete an leMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) TASK NUMBER: 1240020502 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties. You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." If there are multiple ECG calls, classify the most severe.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical JPM. [ Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. ...IPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Complete the ICMF with the classification of ALERT under EAL 3.2.2.b and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time.
OR
- 2. Complete the ICMF with the classification of SAE under EAL 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b and provide it to the Primary Communicator within 15 minutes of Start Time. This is the classification if the cavitating charging pump is not recognized and it fails.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK' Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Note: This ECG call can either be an ALERT or a SAE based on whether or not the crew tripped the cavitating charging pump. Provide candidate with 'Tear-off sheet" Reviews initial conditions and EOP's (as necessary - 5 minute limit prior to starting)
*START TI ME: *Start time begins when candidate Cue: The regulatory commitment time reports he/she is ready to assume SM clock has started.
duties c______ 1 Reviews ECG to classify event Note: It is acceptable to use the laminated I I I tables in the simulator, rather than the ECG I I 2 Classifies the event Determines the classification of the event i and refers to ECG Attachment 2 (Alert) OR refers to Att. 3 (SAE) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 3 Fills out Section A of Emergency Unit: 2 Coordinator Log Sheet, Attachment 2 EAL#(s):EAL 3.2.2.b (OR 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b)
Declared at: Current Time and Date I Initials as EC r-- -- 4 CALL communicators to the Control Pages communicators and initials as SM Room Cue: I am the Primary Communicator 5 ACTIVATE "ERO Emergency Callout" per Cue: Activation of ERO Emergency posted instructions titled: "Emergency Callout is not required for this JPM. Callout Activation (EP96-003) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Plan TASK- Classify an event and complete an ICMF within the regulatory committed time limit (ESG-4) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 6 COMPLETE the INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM (ICMF) (last page of
- Fills out Section II of ICMF:
this attachment). Time/Date: Time/date filled in on Attachment 2 EAL#(s): 3.2.2.b (or 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b) Description of Event: Loss of the Reactor Coolant System I Barrier OR Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier, Loss of the Containment Barrier. Note: Description of Event is found in I I I Section iV of the ECG. I I Fills out Section ill: I Verifies No Radiological Release is in progress is checked. Fills out Section IV: Retrieves wind speed and direction data from SPDS I Initials for approval to transmit I
------ ~~~~ ~ ~----~~
- 7 PROVIDE the ICMF to the Primary Provides leMF to Primary Communicator Communicator and DIRECT the within 15 minutes of START TIME Communicator to implement ECG COMPLETION TIME:
Attachment 6. '--- ~ --- '--------~ ~ ------ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 50f9
ECG ATT2 Pg 2 of2 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGlE FORM
- 1. THIS IS _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, COMMUN1CATOR IN THE 0" CONTROL ROOM (NAME) o TSC AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT(s) NO. _ _2_ _ __
II. 0" THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF AN ALERT WHICH WAS DECLARED AT TIME ON _ _ _TODAYS DATE (Time-24 HR CLOCK) (DATE) EAL #(s) 3.2.2.h DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier III.
,---------------------N-O-T-E--:----------
Radiological Release is defmed as: Plant Effluent> Federal Limit of2.42E+05 uCiisec Noble Gas or 2.1E+Ol uCiisec I-l31. _ .
=
0" NO RADIOLGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release o THERE IS A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS defmition IV. 0" 33 FT. LEVEL WIND DIRECTION (From):, WIND SPEED: ___."..--:---,--:-_ _ (From MET Computer ISPDS) (DEGREES) (MPH) V. 0" NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME SM INITIALS EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF) SGS Rev. OS PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific P,ermission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 9
ECG ATT3 Pg 2 of2 INITIAL CONTACT MESSAGE FORM
- 1. THIS IS ---------------------, COM.vIUNlCATOR IN THE 0 CONTROL ROOM (NAl\1E) 0 TSC o EOF AT THE SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, VNIT(s) NO. ___- _ _ _ _.
II. o THIS IS NOTIFICATION OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY WHICH WAS DECLARED AT ON _ _ _TODAYS DATE_ _. (Time-24 HR CLOCK) (DATE) LAL #(s) 3.2.2.b MD 3.3.3.b DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier, Loss of the Containment III. r----------------------------------------------------------------~ of RADIOLGICAL RELEASE IS IN PROGRESS. see NOTE for release o THERE A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS defInition IV. 33 FT. LEVEL \v1ND DIRECTION (From): \"\1ND SPEED: _ _ _ _ _ __ (From MET Computer ISPDS) (DEGREES) (MPH)
- v. 0 NO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME SMINITIALS EC Initials (Approval to Transmit ICMF)
SGS Rev. 09 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of9
TQ-AA-106-0303 Revision 4 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ 1, Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified, __(1'---_ 2, Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. i- ____ 3, Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
____ 5, Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified, ~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. (fl 7, Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*), ---<iI!fIL-_ _ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev, ~ Date~lo
/~ t1 1/1:1/ ).)'-"-----
.JJJ.-- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate, L 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM,
---'-0;:'4-_ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page, SME/lnstructor:~~ a~ /1 Date~ Date: _ _ _ _ __ Date: _______ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. You have a maximum of 5 minutes to review the Emergency Operating Procedures used during this scenario to refresh your memory of all events/paths. At the end of your review you will become the Shift Manager (SM). Inform the Evaluator when you are ready to assume SM duties.
You may continue to reference the procedures or to look at the control board but "the clock will be running." INITIATING CUE: You are the Duty SM. Classify the event, complete the correct ECG Attachment and provide an ICMF to the Primary Communicator. This is a Time Critical JPM. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Plarmission from Nuclear Training Page 9 of 9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Rod Control TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s) TASK NUMBER: 1140330401 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 I\JRC Sim a ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 003 AA2.03 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.6 3.8 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EO c=J RO [RJ STA SRO LX] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-ABROO-0002 Rev. 10 (checked 6/30/11) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED ..IPM COMPLETION TIME: 5 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: I\I/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-17-11 Instructor Validated By: K Riedmuller Date: 06-30-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: () ~/-;;;;--
%a<<n;D~ment Approved By: .<~~ . Date: 7/12*J, I Opera ions Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOSPERFORMANCEMEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Rod Control TASK: Take corrective actions for 2 dropped control rods TASK NUMBER: 1140330401 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-251 Insert RT-1, RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, Final Severity 5 after candidate has assumed the watch. Modify RD0267 ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, to Final Severity 53 when candidate has completed step 3.~0 of S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002 OR if candidate attempts to change Main Turbine load due to Tavg being >1.5 degrees lower than Tref. INITIAL CONDITIONS: 40% power, SOL. Control Sank 0 is at 108 steps. A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Candidate places Rod Control in Manual following 1st dropped rod.
- 2. Candidate trips the reactor upon discovery of 2 nd dropped rod.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD StU evaluation)
SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Insert RT~1 RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS Candidate announces cluster of rod related INTO RX, Final Severity 5, when "E" Window OHAs as unexpected alarms. candidate assumes the watch. Announces indications of rod 2SA 1 dropped into the core. Enters S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod. 2.1 IE more than one rod is verified to be Verifies only 1 rod has dropped into core. tripped, THEN Manually TRIP Reactor AND GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip OR Safety Injection.
- 3.1 PLACE Rod Bank Selector Switch in Places Rod Bank Seleclor Switch in MAN.
I I MAN. 3.2 IF a Turbine load change is in progress ... Verifies no turbine load change in progress. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s} STEP COMMENTS I STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD StU evaluation) I 3.3 ADJUST Tave to within 1.50 of program as Verifies Tave is within 1.50 of program.
follows:
- IF Main Turbine is operating, Simulator Operator: IF operator THEN adjust Turbine load.
attempts to lower turbine load, then
- IF Main Turbine is NOT operating, change RT~1 as described on next page THEN ADJUST Steam Dumps now.
OR 21-24MS10 valves. 3.4 Is Reactor subcritical as a result of the Answers NO, GOES TO step 3.9 dropped rod? 3.9 IF AT ANY TIME a power reduction Determines no power reduction is becomes necessary, THEN BORATE necessary. AND ADJUST Turbine load or Steam Dump Sy~tem flowrate to maintain Tave within 1.5v F of program. I .....- ~--. I I 3.10 Is power above 50% of RATED Answers NO, and GOES TO Step 3.12 THERMAL POWER? SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Modify malfunction RD0267, ANY ROD DROPS INTO RX, to Final Severity 53, when candidate has completed step 3.10 of S2.0P-AB.ROD-0002. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD Stu evaluation)
- 2.1 IF more than one rod is verified to be Candidate should observe a second rod tripped, THEN Manually TRIP Reactor bottom light by direct observation, or by AND GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip depressed power in the region of the 2 OR Safety Injection. dropped rods, Terr or Tavg lowering, or OHA 0-32 TAVE LO, and MANUALLY TRIP the Reactor lAW Step 2.1.
Evaluator: See next step if candidate does not recognize the second dropped rod and continues in the procedure. (This will allow the candidate to continue in the JPM until the 2 times validation time has been reached and the JPM is terminated.) 3.12 REQUEST Maintenance to determine if Candidate contacts Maintenance or an Individual Rod Position Indicator requests CRS to contact Maintenance to (IRPI) malfunction has occurred. determine if an iRPi maifunction has
- - - - rmcl Or.r.ll - - --
Cue: Maintenance has been contacted. 3.13 Has an IRPI malfunction occurred? Candidate answers NO based on rod bottom, OHAs, and primary plant parameter changes, and GOES TO Step 3.15. 3.15 INITIATE a power reduction to <75% Candidate recognizes power is 40%. Rated Thermal Power. .. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: ROD CONTROL TASK: Take corrective actions for a dropped control rod(s) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 3.16 REQUEST Reactor Engineering Candidate contacts Reactor Engineering or assistance to recover rod. requests CRS to contact Reactor Engineering for assistance in recovering dropped rod.
Cue: Reactor Engineering has been contacted. 3.17 Is dropped rod to be recovered, per Cue: Reactor Engineering will be Reactor Engineering? performing a flux map to aid in determination of whether a recovery will be made of the dropped rod. Terminate the JPM once the candidate has inserted a manual Reactor Trip or reaches two times the validation time. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 8
JOB PERFORl\tIANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps ofthis checklist should be perfonned upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
\lCr-: 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
\l(,t-.. 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
\~ 3. Perfonnance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
\l{y-" 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
\~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. \l.J.r 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. \llt 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
V..f.r- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date t,.") o* I J \lCr 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure perfonnance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be perfonned as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. vVhen JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SMElInstructor:_t-i ~=_*~n--,-,\,-+-a!.L~=::"':*-':":':::-=-_ Date: -{.*Jo*/I Date: Date: PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 40% power, BOL. Control Bank 0 is at 108 steps. A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: Salem Generating Station SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump TASK NUMBER: 0065010101 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC Sim b ALTERNATE PATH: D ~ANUMBER: ______0_06_ _ A4_._07_ ___~ IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.4 4.4
--R-O- SRO APPLICABILITY:
EOD ROm STAD SRO[X] EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator t Perform
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SO.SJ-0002. Accumulator Operations. Rev. 22 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: l\ltA Developed By: G Gauding Date: 07-09-11 Instructor Validated By: S Harris Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: ~~~ Date:
'i.- 2.- ~/, /rZn g DepS)Pl:fi1ent .
- Approved By:
~~
Operations Representative
. Date: ~ [lid ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME:
ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASLIRE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump TASK 006501 01 01 NUMBER: INITIAL IC-254 CONDITIONS:
- 1. The plant is at 100% power with all systems in their normal alignment with control systems in automatic.
- 2. 24 Accumulator is at 57.9% level.
- 3. The Safety Injection System is available.
- 4. RWST Boron Concentration is 2400 ppm.
INITIATING CUE: Raise 24 ECCS Accumulator to 60% using 21 SI pump lAW S2.0P-SO.SJ-0002, Accumulator Operations, Section 5.2. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurr~nce is obtained) .
- Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Raise 24 Accumulator to 60% using 21 SI pump, and return system to normal lineup.
II PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific P.pproval from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD stu Evaluation)
Provide copy of S2.0P-SO.SJ-0002(Q), Reviews procedure, and initials all Accumulator Operations, with Prerequisites Precautions and Limitations. signed off. 5.2.1 ENSURE either of the following conditions exist:
- ALL RCS Cold Leg Temperatures Determines ALL RCS Cold Leg
>312°F Temperatures >312°F.
OR
- The Reactor Vessel Head is I I Removed, I I 5.2.2 RCS Pressure <2000 psig, THEN Determines RCS pressure is >2000 ENSURE CLOSED 21SJ134, COLD LEG psig and marks step N/A..
DISCHARGE.
- 5.2.3 START 21 Safety Injection Pump, Operator depresses 21 Safety Injection Pump START PB.
Cue if required: IE operator asks for a Field Operator to do pre-start checks on 21 SI pump, THEN report as NEO that 21 SI Pump is ready for start. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
- 5.2.4 OPEN 2SJ53, 21 SI PUMP DISCHARGE Depresses 2SJ53 21 SI PUMP TEST LINE VALVE. DISCHARGE TEST LINE VALVE OPEN PB and notes change in light status .
- 5.2.5 OPEN 2SJ123, TEST LINE TO CVCS HUT. Depresses 2SJ123 TEST LINE TO CVCS HUT OPEN PB and notes change in light status.
- 5.2.6 OPEN associated Accumulator fill valve: Depresses 24SJ20 24 I I,
- 21SJ20. 21 ACCUMULATOR FILL ACCUMULATOR FiLL OPEN PB; notes change in light status, and I monitors level on the applicable level
- 22SJ20, 22 ACCUMULATOR FILL channels.
- 23SJ20, 23 ACCUMULATOR FILL
- 24SJ20, 24 ACCUMULATOR FILL PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level with a Safety Injection Pump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD stu Evaluation)
- 5.2.7 When desired level is reached, CLOSE the Cue: After level starts to rise in 24 associated Accumulator fill valve: Accumulator, state: "24 Accumulator level has risen to 60%."
- 21SJ20, 21 ACCUMULATOR FILL
- 22SJ20, 22 ACCUMULATOR FILL After acknowledging cue, depresses
- 23SJ20, 23 ACCUMULATOR FILL 24SJ20 24 ACCUMULATOR FILL CLOSE PB.
- 24SJ20, 24 ACCUMULATOR FILL 5.2.8 If required, REPEAT Steps 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 Determines no other Accumulators will to fill additional Accumulators. be filled.
,
- 5.2.9 CLOSE 2SJ53. Depresses 2SJ53 CLOSE PB. I
- 5.2.10 CLOSE 2SJ123. Operator depresses 2SJ123 CLOSE PB.
- 5.2.11 STOP 21 Safety Injection Pump. Depresses 21 SI Pump STOP PB.
5.2.12 IF in modes 1,2, or 3, AND 21 SJ134 was Determines 21 SJ134 was not CLOSED in Step 5.2.2, THEN OPEN previously shut. 21SJ134. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling Systems TASK: Raise ECCS Accumulator Level a Safety Pump STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 13 IF required, BLEED off the SI Pump Determines SI pump discharge discharge pressure by performing the pressure is lowering.
following: Cue if required: candidate states intention to bleed off SI pump discharge pressure, THEN 8tate:"SI pump discharge pressure is lowering steadily." 5.2.14 Direct a second Operator to PERFORM Cue: Independent Verification is Independent Verification lAW Attachment 1, complete. Section 2.0 1-5.2.15 TSAS 3.5.2 was entered.-THEN- - REVIEW Determines TSAS 3.5.2 was NOT I I continued applicability of ths Action I entered. I I Statement. 5.2.16 IE the Unit is in Mode 1 or 2, or Mode 3 with Identifies the need to perform S2.0P Pressurizer pressure> 1000 psig, THEN ST.SJ-0008(Q) Emergency Core PERFORM S2.0P-ST.SJ-0008(Q), Cooling - Accumulators. Emergency Core Cooling - Accumulators. I PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFOR'\1ANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. __h__ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. __b~_2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. -,Lf-.pL-C"\-4--- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) __\...,,/\--::.._ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
il,,-:.C\~<::::<:"'" 5. Initiating and terminating Cues 'are properly identified.
~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
___~_7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). h- 8. Verify the procedure referenced b"y this JPM matches:~ ~ost current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. d), Date 12-/:~ - 4 9 . Pilot test the JPM: '
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
- 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
- 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/nstructor:_ _..........d4:};,=::.!:.:l..-..,L-/L:::.!:==----.:::.._ _ __ Date: _~~-=--I--.J<..J... SM Ell nstructor: Date: _______ SME/lnstructor: Date: ------ PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Appronal from NuclearTraining Page 7 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFOR1VIANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. The plant is at 100% power with all systems in their normal alignment with control systems in automatic.
- 2. 24 Accumulator is at 57.9% level.
- 3. The Safety Injection System is available.
- 4. RWST Boron Concentration is 2400 ppm.
INITIATING CUE: Raise 24 ECCS Accumulator to 60% using 21 SI pump lAW S2.0P-SO.SJ-0002, Accumulator Operations, Section 5.2. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level TASK: TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve) TASK NUIVIBER: 1140240401 ...IPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC Sim c ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NlUMBER: 010 A4.01
------------------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.7 3.5 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOO ROW STAO SRO[ X ] EVALUATION SErriNGIIVlETHOD: Simulator
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Rev. 18 (Rev. checked 6-30-11) TOOLS AND EQUIPIVIENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 4 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 6-17-11 Instructor Validated By: w. Neiheiser Date: 6-30-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: .;Jc;?-C~- Date: 7- L( - 1/
~ning De~ment Approved By: ~~--
Operations Department Date: 7/S{' I ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COIVIPLETION TIIVIE: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D LlNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific P,ermission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: __________________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level TASK: TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve) TASK 1140240401 NUMBER: SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-253 4% power, BOL. 110 8304 OVLO Pressurizer Relief Valve Outlet Temperature- Value: 98.6 MALF: PR018A PZR PORV 2PR1 d!velops leak - Value:40000 Tied to ET-1 RT-1 PR0019A PZR Spray Valve 2PS1 fails open ET-1 kal06tph 23 Rep Stop INITIAL CONDITIONS: Reactor power is stable at 4.0% power. The power ascension is on hold temporarily. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Trip Rx.
- 2. Stops 21 and 23 RCP.
- 3. Stop 22 OR 24 RCP.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific PE!rmlSsion from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level TASK: TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) . Simulator Operator: Note: The time between the 2PS1 failing open and RCS pressure Insert RT-1 on direction of evaluator. reaching 2,000 psig is - 4 minutes and 15 seconds. MALF: PR0019A, 2PS1 fails open Recognizes lowering PZR Pressure and/or alarm and/or change in 2PS1 position. Acknowledges OHA E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS La. Recognizes PZR I I B/U heaters energized. If candidate I refers to ARP for OHA E-28, it directs entry into S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. I Enters S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001 directly or via OHA E-28 ARP. Note: It is acceptable for the candidate to attempt closing 2PS1 prior to entering S2.0P-AB.PZR-001.
~ ~ ~
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 30f9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level TASK: TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 3.1 INITIATE Attachment 1 Continuous Initiates Attachment 1 Continuous Action Summary. Action Summary. Note: There is a CAS action to trip the Rx if RCS pressure lowers to 2,000 psig and continues to drop. IF the candidate were to trip the Rx during this JPM based on that CAS action and not at step 3.24.A on page 6 as expected, THEN AFTER the candidate has tripped the Rx, verified the Main Turbine is tripped, verified SI not actuated or required and all 4KV I I vital buses energized, the following I I cue must be given: Cue: The immediate actions of TRIP-1 have been verified by the eRS and RO. The CRS directs you to continue actions of S2.0P* AB.PZR-0001, while the remaining crew members will continue to perform TRIP-1. 3.2 Is POPS in service? Determines POPS is not in service by initial conditions or console indications. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level TASK: TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 3.3 Is the controlling Pressurizer Pressure Determines Pressurizer Pressure Contro! Channel (lor III) failed? Control Channel (lor III) is not failed and GOES TO Step 3.11 3.11 Is the Master Pressure Controller Determines Master Pressure failed? (Refer to Attachment 2 for Controller is not failed and GOES TO guidance) Step 3.17 (may not refer to Attachment 2 if 2PS1 has been noted open with pressure below closing setpoint.) 3.17 Is a Spray Valve(s) failed? (Refer to Determines 2PS1 is failed open. Attachment 2 for guidance) I I --------------------------------- .. - -------------I I 3.18 PLACE the Spray Valve(s) in MANUAL Depresses MANUAL PB for 2PS1 and verifies AUTO light extinguished and MANUAL light illuminates. 3.19 OPERATE the Spray Valves to control Depresses the CLOSE PB for 2PS1 pressure consistent with Attachment and recognizes that 2PS1 remains open. 3.20 PLACE all Pressurizer heaters in Determines all PZR heaters are in MANUAL and ON MANUAL and ON. PSEG Restricted w Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 50f9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level TASK: TCAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 3.21 Has pressure control been regained? Determines pressure control has not been regained since 2PS1 remains open. 3.22 Is RCS pressure dropping rapidly? Determines RCS pressure is dropping rapidly from console indication. 3.23 Are Reactor Trip Breakers CLOSED? Determines Reactor Trip Breakers are closed by initial conditions or console indication. 3.24 PERFORM the following: A
- A. TRIP the Reactor. Initiates a Reactor Trip using either I I I I MANUAL TRIP handle.
3.24 B. Is Reactor Trip Confirmed? Determines Reactor Trip is confirmed B after identifying PRNI reading < 5% and IR NI indication dropping.
- 3.24 STOP 21 AND 23 RCPs: Depresses STOP PBs for 21 and 23 C RCP and verifies start lights extinguish and stop lights illuminates.
Simulator Operator: Ensure ET-1 is TRUE when 23 RCP stop PB is
-- ----- ----~ -----
de(;lressed. ---- PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Pressurizer Pressure and Level TASK: TeAF Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction (Failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT NO. STANDARD S/U Evaluation)
- 3.24 I F Pressurizer Pressure continues to Determines Pressurizer Pressure D drop, THEN STOP all but one Rep. continues to drop, and depresses STOP PB on 22 OR 24 Rep and verifies start light extinguishes and stop light illuminates.
3.24 E GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, AND CONTINUE with this procedure.
- '-'-~I ! = ~!l ..... : J : , ...... ' t - ! V \ V l f!!P "-"" ..... 'lo..'l'~~j Injection, state JPM is complete.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. W 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified .
.J 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
W 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) _ - > L ._ _ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. _-.:;GJ=-_ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. __UJ __ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. _-.::.tt1 __ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). _-=__ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matc:hes the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. (9 Date (b t ( _--'-_0_ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. @§/lnstructor: 0~ ~ Date: _lP_-3_D_-_\\_ Date,: _ _ _ _ __ DatE;: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted* Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 9
OPERATIONS TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: Reactor power is stable at 4.0% power. The power ascension is on hold temporarily. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms. PSEG Restricted* Possession Requires Specific pj~rmission from Nuclear Training Page 9 of9
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM 1 & 2 SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents) TASK NUMBER: N1150290501 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC Sim d ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: EPE E05 EA1.1
------~----~--~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.1 4.0 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROm STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator - Perforrn
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev. 24 (checked 6/20/11) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 5 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-17-11 Instructor Validated By: J Klein Date: 06-30-11 SME or Instructor
.J,/?~ Date: "7 -2. (~ 1/
ttr~ng~ent Approved By: Approved By:
~~
Operati ns Department Date: S 1./' I ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Emerqency Operatinq Procedures TASK: TCAF a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents) TASK NUMBER: N1150290501 SIIVIULATOR SETUP: IC-252 developed by : MSL rupture downstream of MSIVs. Fail auto MT trip. Fail all MSIVs open. All AFW pumps failed. Fail 2PR2 shut. 21 CVCS pp CIT. Performed TRIP-1 through Step 20. 22 CVCS pp tripped during TRIP-1. INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in reSpOnSE! to a Main Steamline break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is CIT.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1.
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Stop ALL RCPs.
- 2. Open 2PR1.
- 3. Open Rx Head Vent Valves 2RC40-2RC43.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Operator states he has the watch. 1 IS TOTAL AFW FLOW LESS THAN Determines it was not operator action which 22E04 LB/HR DUE TO OPERATOR caused total AFW flow to be less than 22E04 ACTIONS Ib/hr. 2 IF LEAST ONE INTACT OR Recognizes ALL SGs are faulted. RUPTURED SG IS AVAILABLE. THEN DO NOT FEED A FAULTED SG 3 IS ReS PRESSURE GREATER THAN Checks RCS pressure on control console ANY INTACT OR RUPTURED SG and determines it is greater than all SG PRESSURE pressures checked on controi consoie. I I I I I 3.1 ARE RCS T-HOTS GREATER THAN Checks RCS That indication on control 350°F console and determines that RCS Thots are greater than 350°F. 4 IS 21 OR 22 CHARGING PUMP Determines neither 21 nor 22 charging pump AVAILABLE is available based on initial conditions and/or control console indications. GO TO STEP 23 Goes to Step 23. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ---------------- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with 51 pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD Stu evaluation) 23 CAUTION TO ESTABLISH RCS HEAT REMOVAL Reads Step.
BY RCS BLEED AND FEED, STEPS 24 THRU 29 MUST BE PERFORMED QUICKL Y AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION
- 23 STOP ALL RCPS Depresses STOP PB for 21-24 RCPs and verifies green stop light illuminates and red start light extinguishes.
24 INITIATE SI Uses Safeguards key and initiates SI on at least one train of Safeguards initiation. 25 ARE SI VALVES IN SAFEGUARDS Checks 2RP4 and/or console indication to POSITION' determine that all valves listed in Table Bare in Safeguards position. Table B valves are: 2SJ4 OPEN BIT INLET 2SJ5 OPEN BIT INLET 2SJ12 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2SJ13 OPEN BIT OUTLET 2CV68 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE 2CV69 CLOSED CHARGING DISCHARGE (continued next page) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Page 4 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: _________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Table B Valves (con't}: 21-24SJ54 OPEN ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 2SJ1 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING 2SJ2 OPEN RWST TO CHARGING 2CV40 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP 2CV41 CLOSED DISCHARGE STOP 1--- ----------- ------ 25.1 IS 21 OR 22 CHARGING PUMP Checks control console and determines RUNNING neither 21 nor charging pump is running.
----------~ ---
25.2 IS ANY SI PUMP RUNNING Checks control console and determines both 21 and 22 SI pumps are running. H 25.2 ARE V/\LVES IN TABLE C OPEN FOR Checks control console indication for valves I AT LEAST ONE RUNNING SI PUMP listed in Table C and determines the valves are open for at least one running SI pump. Table C valves are: 21/22 SI PUMPS 2SJ30 (FROM RWST) 21/22SJ33 (SI PUMP SUCTION) 2SJ135 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE) 21J22SJ134 (COLD LEG DISCHARGE) 26 OPEN BOTH PZR PORV STOP VALVES Checks control console and determines BOTH 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ----------------- SYSTEM: Emergency Operating Procedures TASK: Respond to a Loss of Heat Sink (Initiate Bleed and Feed with SI pumps and Rx Head Vents) STEP COMMENTS STEP (* Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 26 OPEN BOTH PZR PORVS Depresses 2PR1 PZR PORVopen PB and verifies green closed light extinguishes and red open tight illuminates.
Depresses 2PR2 PZR PORV open PB and reports that 2PR2 will not open.
------- f---- ----
26.1 ARE BOTH PZR PORV STOP VALVES Checks control console and determines BOTH OPEN 2PR6 and 2PR7 PORV STOP VALVES are open. 1------ ARE BOTH PZR PORVS OPEN Determines 2PR2 PZR PORV is not open.
- 26.1 OPEN 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 (REACTOR Inserts key into each 2RC40 THRU 2RC43 HEAD VENTS) (REACTOR HEAD VENTS) switch on 2RP3, I I I turns to open, and verifies each valve opens.
I I Terminate JPM when operator has opened 2RC40 thru 2RC43 Reactor Head Vents. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 8
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ 1. Task description and number, ..IPM description and number are identified. Q1b t : :~t~~r:::~~::~~i:::::c::::ti~::,lant. control room, or simulator)
- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
OiL 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. Q\L 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. Ot=<<' 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this ..IPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. J."f Date Cp .'>0 ' l \.
~ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. _ _ _ _ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SMEJlnstructor: ~ .I Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/lnstructor: Date: _________ PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 8
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Unit 2 initiated a Rx trip from 100% power in response to a Main Steam line break at the mixing bottle.
- An automatic Safety Injection initiated.
- The Main Turbine failed to trip automatically, and was manually tripped from the control console.
- MSLI failed, and all MSIV's remain open.
- All AFW flow has been lost.
- 21 charging pump is err.
- 22 charging pump tripped 3 minutes ago.
- EOP-TRIP-1 was performed and a transition to FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was made at Step 20.
INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Perform FRHS-1 starting at Step 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training Page 8 of 8
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Main Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) TASK NUMBER: N1140420401 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC Sim e ALTERNATE PATH: I X KJANUMBER: 2.4.31 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.2 4.1 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EO c:=J RO [KJ STA SF~O [KJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: Simulator - Per1'orrn S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0007, Rev. 46, Overhead Window G
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AB.TRB-0001 Rev. 14, Turbine Trip <P-9 (Both rev checked 6-21-11) J TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 5 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: NJA Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-17-11 Instructor Validated By: J. Klein Date: 06-30-11 SME or Instructor Approved By:
/.~~ent Date: 9. ~ L - II Approved By:
o~ment Date: -,) e} J , ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific: Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: SYSTEM: Main Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) TASK NUMBER: N1140420401 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-255 RT-1 MALF AN0105 SER 105, Fails-: G8 Turbine Auxiliary Cooling MALF TU0118A 21 MS2a Turb Stop Valve Fails Open Override CK23 Turbine Trip-Trip INITIAL CONDITIONS: 40% power, BOL. Control Bank D is at 108 steps. A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-line is on hold. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion timH may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Trip the Main Turbine.
- 2. Trip the Rx.
Page 2 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Main Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Insert RT-1 after candidate assumes the Announces unexpected OHA G-8 TAC watch. EXP TK LVL HI OR LO. Refers to S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0007, Overhead WindowG. ARP Reviews causes and determines there are 1.0/2.0 no automatic actions associated with this alarm. I I ARP I DETERMINE if level alarm is high or low I Determines CRT point 105 Turbine I 3.1 from the Annunciator CRT: AuxiliaiY Cooling Expansion Tank Level CRT Point Description Low is in alarm. 104 Turbine Auxiliary Cooling Expansion Tank Level High 105 Turbine Auxiliary Cooling Expansion Tank Level Low Page 3 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Main Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) STEP COMMENTS STEP (Required for UNSAT (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) 3.2 IF level is high, THEN: Determines level is not high, and continues to next step.
3.3 lE level is low, THEN: A. Send an operator to MAKEUP to Dispatches an operator to makeup to tank, tank. and identify and isolate any leaks. B. Send an operator to IDENTIFY AND ISOLATE any leaks. Simulator Operator: 2 minutes after being dispatched, call control room and report:
"This is the SecondaiY Operator. The Unit 2 TAC expansion tank level is T' and I I I lowering one inch per minute. The auto makeup valve is stuck shut, and I can't get the bypass valve open."
Page 4 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Main Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD StU evaluation) 3.4 IF unable to maintain tank level above 6 inches, THEN:
A. IE >P-9 (49% power), THEN TRIP the Reactor, AND GO TO 2-EOP Determines tank level cannot be TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety maintained above 6 inches, and attempts
- Injection. to trip the Main Turbine with the Turbine Trip handle, and reports the Main Turbine
- B. IF <P-9 (49% power) THEN TRIP did not trip.
the Turbine, AND GO TO S2.0P Depresses the Turbine Trip PB and AB.TRB-0001(Q), Turbine Trip determines the Turbine has tripped. Below P-9. Goes to S2.0P-AB.TRB-0001. Note: IF the candidate observes the 21 MS28 remaining open at this point, THEN they may determine the turbine is I not tripped, and perform a MSLI by I I I I depressing aU 4 MSLI PBs on either I I Safeguards bezel. Initiating a MSLI before the Rx is tripped is an incorrect action which may challenge SG safeties if they lift. Initiating a MSLI renders the Main Steam Dumps inoperable and prematurely isolates the SGFPs. With Rx power >P-10 (10%) and steam dumps not available, a Rx trip is required lAW CAS actions 1.0 and 2.0. See page 8 for complete discussion. Go to page 7 for required actions IF a Rx trip is performed here. Page 5 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Main Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
AB.TRB INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action 3.1 Action Summary. Summary. I--- ---------- ~- 3.2 i---VERIFY the Turbine is tripped. Note: IF the candidate observes the 21 MS28 remaining open at this point, THEN they may determine the turbine is not tripped, and perform a MSLI by depressing all 4 MSLI PBs on either Safeguards bezel. Initiating a MSLI before the Rx is tripped is an incorrect action which may challenge SG safeties if they lift. Initiating a MSLI renders the Main Steam Dumps inoperable and prematurely isolates the SGFPs. With Rx power >P-10 (10%) and steam dumps not available, a Rx trip is required lAW CAS actions 1.0 and 2.0. page 8 for compieie discussion. I I I I See next DaGe for required actions IF a Rx I I I trip is performed here. Page 6 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
IF candidate initiates a Rx trip prior to EOP- initiating a MSLI based on CAS actions 1.0 TRIP-1 and 2.0 which would occur if they initiated a MSLI, then successful performance of TRIP-1 immediate actions must be performed as follows:
- 1 TRIP REACTOR Trips the Rx using either Trip handle.
2 IS REACTOR TRIP CONFIRMED Confirms Rx trip
- 3 TRIP TURBINE Attempts to trip the Main Turbine using the Trip handle.
Determines the Trip handle did not close all Main Turbine Stop Valves. Depresses Turbine Trip bezel. Determines the Trip handle did not close all Main Turbine Stop Valves. Initiates a MSLI. I I I I Terminate JPM after MSLI has been I performed. 3.3 Are all Turbine Stop Valves closed? Determines all Turbine Stop Valves are NOT closed from 2RP4. Goes to Step 3.7. 3.7 TRIP the Reactor, GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP- Trips the Reactor using either of the 1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Reactor Trip handles. I Page 7 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Main Turbine TASK: TCAF Main Turbine Trip < P-9 (Loss of Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling Expansion Tank Level) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Begins performing immediate actions of 2 EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Terminate JPM when Reactor has been tripped.
' - - - - ,~~ ~~-----~~ ~--- ~-----~~
Turbine Trip requirements- During performance of this JPM, the candidate will receive direction from the Alarm Response Procedure S2.0P-ARZZ 0007, Overhead Window G, OHA G-8, page 18-19, which states "TRIP the Turbine and GO TO S2.0P-AB.TRB-0001, Turbine Trip <P-9." When outside the EOP network, initiating a MSLI to perform a Turbine Trip is NOT an appropriate action, since in TRIP-1 the steps for tripping the Rx precede the steps for tripping the Turbine, and the MSLI would only be performed AFTER all attempts to trip the Rx from the control room have already been performed. IF the Rx trip were NOT confirmed, then the Turbine trip steps would include the MSLI since the overriding concern at that point would be reduction of Rx power by removing the Main Turbine from service. After enteiing the EOP Network, actions for tripping the Reactor and tripping the Turbine have special definitions as described in OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures, which ONLY apply while in the EOP network. When defining turbine trip while in EOP-TRIP-1, it states on page 13, " Steps 2.2 and 3, TRIP TURBINE, are defined as, "Operate the turbine trip switch" IF turbine trip NOT confirmed, THEN trip the turbine using the Turbine Trip bezel. IF turbine trip NOT confirmed, THEN initiate main steam isolation."" For these reasons, initiating a MSLI during this JPM prior to initiating a Rx trip will be considered as failure criteria due to the possible challenge to SG safeties which may occur due to this action, and which otherwise would not occur in the JPM. Page 8 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ~ ..-"p..=_ _ 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. -I.4t...~""".-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KiA) references are included. -L}J....p.l,... .---- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) . .L)q.If\\I.---
. 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~~!!:p-:lo..-- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. -,~=p:.>".----_ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME:: review. _(}A---<=..;,,--_7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
~ 8. Verify the procedure referenced R¥ try~ JPM m,atcR~s the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. ~ Date (0 .. iJ.J "'\.l
'Cl\:::..!.....+._ _ 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
~ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ~ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SMEflnstructoc ~ Date: SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ _ _ __ Page 9 of 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 40% power, BOL Control Bank 0 is at 108 steps. A power reduction to bring the Main Turbine off-linE~ is on hold. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. Page 10 of 1Qi PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: AC Electrical Distribution TASK: Transfer A 4 KV Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT) TASK NUMBER: N0620110101 JPM NUMBER: 09-0*1 NRC Sim f ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: 062 A4.01 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.3 3.1 APPLICABI L1TY: RO SRO EO RO STA c:::=J SRO [ ] ] EVALUATION SETIING/METHOD: Simulator - Perform S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0003, Rev. 35, Hot Standby to Minimum Load
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-SOAKV-0008, Rev. 12, 4KV Group Buses Power Supply Transfer TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 12 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-17-11 Instructor Validated By: J Klein Date: 06-30-11 SME or Instructor Approved By: Date: 7 II Approved By: Operations Department Date: 7 Is! I I ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: AC Electrical Distribution TASK: Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT) TASK NUMBER: N0620110101 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-256 19.2% power BOl. MAlFS: AN0637 SER 637 Fails-: J14 21 ESD Breaker Failure tied to ET-1 RP0058 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip - Overrides: C308 OVOI 2AEGD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER -CLOSE OFF All tied C308 OVOI 2AEGD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER-OPEN ON to ET-1 C312 OVOl21ESD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER-OPEN ON C312 OVDI 21 ESD 2E GROUP BUS FEEDER-CLOSED OFF C307 OVOI 21 HSD 2H GROUP BUS FEEDER-OPEN ON C307 OVOI 21 HSD 2H GROUP BUS FEEDER-CLOSED OFF C601 OVOI 13 KV SECTION 1-6-0PEN ON C601 OVOI 13 KV SECTION 1-6-ClOSED OFF Check APT voltage the same as the Group bus voltage pre-req 2.3.3 Note to Evaluator: The bus transfer sequence - H, F,G corresponds to RCPs 21, 22, 23, AND 24. INITIAL CONDITIONS: 19.2% power, BOL. The Main Turbine was synchronized 10 minutes ago. Steam Dumps are in Tavg Mode-Auto. Rod Control is in Auto. Group buses are powered from the Station Power Transformers. INITIATING CUE: You are the NCO assigned to transfer the 4KV Group Buses. The CRS directs you to transfer all 4KV Group buses from their respective Station Power Transformers to the Aux Power Transformers, starting with H Group Bus, lAW S2.0P-S0.4KV-0008, 4KV Group Buses Power Supply Transfer. All pre-requisites are complete SAT. The CRS directs you to transfer the buses in this order: H, E, F, G Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
. 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Transfer 2H 4KV Group bus from SPT to APT.
- 2. Trip Rx upon ATWT while transferring 2E 4KV Group bus from SPT to APT Page 2 of7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Electrical TASK: Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD StU evaluation)
Reviews Precautions and Limitations. 5.4.1 ENSURE all Overhead Annunciators for Checks OHA Windows and determines all 2 APT are clear. Overhead Annunciators for 2 APT are clear. r----- -- I 5.4.2 ENSURE 2B APT voltage is 4.22 - Checks 2B APT reading on 2CC3 and 4.36KV. determines 2B APT voltage is 4.22 4.36KV. I 5.4.3 IF Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer Determines Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation is tripped, Transfer is not tripped from control console THEN RESET Auxiliary Power Unit indication. Isolation Transfer (UIT). 11- 5.4.4 PRESS the Mimic Bus 2H GROUP BUS INFEED 2AHGD BREAKER pushbutton, I Depresses Mimic Bus 2H GROUP BUS INFEED 2AHGD BREAKER pushbutton AND ENSURE console bezel 2AHGD and checks console bezel 2AHGD MIMIC MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION illuminates. Illuminates. Page 3 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: ___________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Electrical TASK: Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.4.5 PRESS control console 2AHGD CLOSE Depresses control console 2AHGD CLOSE pushbutton, pushbutton, and checks the following:
AND ENSURE the following: A. 21 HSD is OPEN. A. 21 HSD is OPEN. B. 2AHGD is CLOSED. B. 2AHGD is CLOSED. C. 2H 4KV Group Bus voltage is C. 2H 4KV Group Bus voltage is from from 4.22 - 4.36KV. 4.22 - 4.36KV. D. Console bezel 2AHGD MIMIC D. Console bezel 2AHGD MIMIC BUS BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is is extinguished. extinguished. i------ -- 5.1.1 ENSURE all Overhead Annunciators for Checks OHA Windows and determines all 2 APT are clear. Overhead Annunciators for 2 APT are clear. 5.1.2 ENSURE 2B APT voltage is 4.22 - Checks 2B APT reading on 2CC3 and 4.36KV. determines 2B APT voltage is 4.22 I I 4.36KV. I 5.1.3 IF Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation Transfer Determines Auxiliary Power Unit Isolation is tripped, Transfer is not tripped from control console THEN RESET Auxiliary Power Unit indication. Isolation Transfer (UIT). 5.1.4 PRESS Mimic Bus 2E GROUP BUS Depresses Mimic Bus2EGROUP BUS INFEED 2AEGD BREAKER pushbutton, INFEED 2AEGD BREAKER pushbutton, AND ENSURE console bezel 2AEGD AND checks console bezel 2AEGD MIMIC MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION illuminates. illuminates. ~ Page 4 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Electrical TASK: Transfer A 4 Kv Group Bus To The Alternate Power Supply (SPT to APT) STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
- 5.1.5 PRESS control console 2AEGD CLOSE pushbutton, AND ENSURE the following: Determines 2E Group bus did not transfer and recognizes a Rx trip demand signal is I
A. 21 ESD is OPEN. B. 2AEGD is CLOSED. present. C. 2E 4KV Group Bus voltage is 4.22
- 4.36KV.
D. Console bezel 2AEGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is extinguished. Recognizes the Rx did not trip. Announces ATWT. Trips the Rx using either trip handle. II I Terminate the JPM when a Rx trip has been initiated. ( i III I, f f t Page 5 of 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training i
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. ?Yl! 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. C(lL.. 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ~ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) ~ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. ~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. ~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. Clik 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). Au 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of ~ that procedure: Procedure Rev.$$/1"L Date ~-"SO . . \ \ ~ g. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the ~IPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/lnstructor:_----'cw:~..J..T!l"dJ.IfI,oj'J..:l.oO~~rL------- Date: 19"3O 1\\ SME/lnstructor: Date: - - - - - - Date: _ _ _ _ __ Page 6of7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Spe!cific Permission from Nuclear Training
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 19.2% power, BOl. The Main Turbine was synchronized 10 minutes a~lo. Steam Dumps are in Tavg Mode-Auto. Rod Control is in Auto. Group buses are powered from the Station Power Transformers. INITIATING CUE: You are the NCO assigned to transfer the 4KV Group Buses. The CRS directs you to transfer all 4KV Group buses from their respective Station Power Transformers to the Aux Power Transformers, starting with H Group Bus, lAW S2.0P-SOAKV-0008, 4KV Group Buses Power Supply Transfer. All pre-requisites are complete SAT. The CRS directs you to transfer the buses in this order: H, E, F, G Page 7 ()f 7 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires SpE~cifiic Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Emergency Procedures TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction (Energize Source Range NIS lAW TRIP-2 w/one under compensated IR channel) TASK NUMBER: N1140230401 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC Sim g ALTERNATE PATH: CD KlA NUMBER: _ _ _ EP_E_00_7_E_A_1_.0_5_----l IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.0 4.1 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROW STAD SROW EVALUATION SETIING/METHOD: Simulator I Perform
REFERENCES:
2-EOP-TRIP-2, Rev. 27 Reactor Trip Response (rev checked 6-17-11) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 Minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 05-04*2011 Instructor Validated By: K Reidmuller Date: 06*30*11 SME or Instructor Approved By:
~~ent Date: 7~2~ I - 1/
Approved By:
~~nl I
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: __________________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Procedures TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction (Energize Source Range NIS lAW THlp**2 One under compensated IR channel) TASK NUMBER: 1150030501 SIMULATOR SETUP: IC-2S7 on 2011 Flash Drive MALF: NI019SD IR CH N36 Compensating Volts Lo - TRUE IC setup by tripping both SGFP's and initiating a MANUAL Rx trip Perform EOP's through Step 15 of TRIP-2 Ensure audio count rate monitor selected to 10K scale INITIAL CONDITIONS: A MANUAL reactor trip was initiated 15 minutes ago when both SGFP's tripped automatically. Operators performed the immediate actions of EOP-THIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. Operators have performed TRIP-2 up to Step 19, Steam Dump Mode Shift. INITIATING CUE: You are the board operator. Starting at Step 19, perform 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response Successful Completion Criteria: I. 1. All critical steps completed. I 2. All sequential steps completed in order. I 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Performance for Successful Completion:
- 1. Transfers Main Steam Dumps to MS Pressure Control - Auto
- 2. Energizes BOTH SRNI Channels
- 3. Adjusts audio count rate monitor to 1K scale PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 2 of j7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Procedures TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction COMMENTS STEP STEP (Required for (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL
- NO. STANDARD UNSAT
(#Denotes a Sequential Step) StU evaluation) 19 Are Condenser Steam Dumps Available? Checks Condenser Steam Dumps are reports they are available based on circulators in service and condenser vacuum established.
- Place Steam Dumps in "Manual" Depresses Steam Dumps Manual PB on control console and verifies Manual light illuminates and Auto light extinguishes.
- Align Steam Dump Valve demand "Press Uses Increase Demand (Open Vlv) PB on
%" and 'Tavg %" to align Steam Dump Valve demand "Press %" and 'Tavg %".
- I Place Steam Dumps in "MS Pressure Depresses "MS Pressure Control" PB on i I Contro!" I control console and verifies light illuminates I and Tavg Control light extinguishes.
I
- Place Steam Dumps in "Auto" Depresses Steam Dumps Auto PB on control console and verifies Auto light illuminates and Manual light extinguishes.
I Adjust Steam Pressure Valve Demand to Adjusts Steam Pressure Valve Demand to maintain SG Pressure at 1005 psig. maintain SG Pressure at 1005 psig. Note: Steam dumps may be placed in Manual for adjustment then returned to auto. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Procedures TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction COMMENTS STEP STEP (Required for (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL
- NO. STANDARD UNSAT
(#Denotes a Sequential Step) S/U evaluation) 20 Is any RCP running Checks RCP status and determines all RCP's are running. 22 Are both IR Channels less than 7E-11 Checks IRNI Channel 1 and Channel II Amps indication and determines 2N36 reads
>7E-11 Amps.
Is undercompensation preventing proper Determines undercompensation of channel IR operation? 2N36 is preventing proper IR operation by:
- Elapsed time since trip - SUR 0 on affected channel with power above minirnum display I I I I
- 22.1 Energize Source Range Channels Energizes Source Range Channel I by depressing RESET SOURC RANGE A
- Energizes Source Range Channel II by depressing RESET SOURC RANGE B PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Emergency Procedures TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction COMMENTS STEP STEP (Required for (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL
- NO. STANDARD UNSAT
(#Denotes a Sequential Step) S/U evaluation) 22.2 Transfer NR-45 (Nuclear Power Transfers NR-45 (Nuclear Power Recorder) to Source Range Channels Recorder) to Source Range Channels by selecting Source Range Channel I on Pen 1 or 2, and selecting Source Range Channel lion the other Pen.
--- --------- --- 1---
Terminate JPM after audio count rate scale I adjustment has been verified in the control room. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 7
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. _~ _ _ _ 1. Task description and number, .JPM description and number are identified. _\L_t- _ _ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
\l~
- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
_~,-ur ___ 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
\L~_ _ 5. Initiating and terminating C ues are properly identified.
--!...\_ _\l_tr' _ _ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. --l\{)-'--_ _ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). _\_lV- ___ 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. ~ Date , <1_<>_,1_1_ __
- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
____ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SME/lnstructor:---11_Cufr.~_*_n__, ...:..~ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _b_'_3_o_._11 _ _ SME/lnstructor: Date: __________ SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DatEl: _________ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 7
INITIAL CONDITIONS: A MANUAL reactor trip was initiated 15 minutes ago when both SGFP's tripped automatically. Operators performed the immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. Operators have performed TRIP-2 up to Step 19, Steam Dump Mode Shift. INITIATING CUE: You are the board operator. Starting at Step 19, perform 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Reactor Trip Response. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 7 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality TASK NUMBER: N1140080401 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC Sim h ALTERNATE PATH: I X I KIA NUMBER: 008 A4.01 IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 3.3 3.1 APPLICABI LlTY: RO SRO EO RO [RJ STA SRO EVALUATION SEn"ING/METHOD: Simulator - Perform S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Rev. 14 Component Cooling Abnormality S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Rev. 21 Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0004, Rev. 26, OVerhE!ad Window 0 (all rev checked 6-22-11) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 minutes TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: NtA Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06*17*11 Instructor Validated By: K Reidmuller Date: 06-30-11 SME or Instructor
.:z -
I~~ Approved By: Date: tI I> Approved By: ~~ Date:~ Operations Department ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: SAT UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: DATE: __________________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality TASK NUMBER: N1140080401 SIMULATOR SETUP IC-258 100% power EOl. Remote: CC29D 23 CCW pump control power OFF. RT-1 MALF CC0172B 22 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip RT-2 MALF CC0172A 21 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100% power, EOL. 23 CCW pump is CIT for oil leak repair. TSAS 3.7.3 was entered 6 hours ago. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion timE) may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Trip the Reactor.
- 2. Trip 21-24 RCPs.
- 3. Isolate Letdown and swap Charging Pump suction to the RWST.
II Page 2 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Note for Simulator Operator: The Note to Evaluator: The end result of this remaining CCW pump must be tripped JPM will be the same whether the PRIOR to the determination that the Rx Component Cooling or Reactor Coolant must be tripped and RCPs stopped in Pump Abnormal Procedure is used. The either the Reactor Coolant Pump or Attachment in each procedure for Stopping Component Cooling System Abnormal RCPs is the same. Procedures. S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001 steps start on page 8 S2.0P-AB.CC-0001 steps start on page 13 -~~ ~-~ Page 3 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: ___________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD Stu evaluation)
Simulator Operator: Insert RT-1 after candidate assumes the watch. MALF CC0172B 22 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip VL.OP-AB.CC-UUU1, t.,;ompont::i ii vUUiii iY Abnormality. Either of the Abnormal Procedures may be entered directly, or through the Alarm Response Procedure to get to ABs. ARP Refers to S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0004, Overhead 020-23 Window D. ARP Determines there are no automatic actions 020-23 associated with these alarms. 2.0 I Page 4 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: DATE: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
ARP CHECK OPEN the following Component Determines the following Component 020-23 Cooling Water valves: Cooling Water valves are open on CC1: 3.1 A. 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP A. 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP INLET INLETV. V. B. 2CC118, RCP CC MOT OP B. 2CC118, RCP CC MOT OP INLET INLET VALVE VALVE C. 2CC136, RCP BRG MOT OP C. 2CC136, RCP BRG MOT OP OUTLET VALVE OUTLET VALVE D. 2CC187, RCP MOTOR CC D. 2CC187, RCP MOTOR CC MOTOR OPERATED OUTLET MOTOR OPERATED OUTLET VALVE. VALVE. ,- ------ I ARP MONITOR 21 RCP Motor Bearing Monitors 21 RCP Motor Bearing 020-23 temperatures. (T0413A, T0414A T0415A, temperatures. (T0413A, T0414A T0415A, 3.2 and T0416A) and T0416A) using P-250 computer on the Reactor Coolant Pumps screen, 'v'v'hich has I I 21-24 RCP bearing temperatures. I I Note: OHA 020-23 are identical except for bearing temperature instrument numbers. Only OHA 0-20 for 21 RCP is listed here, but all RCP bearing temperatures should be monitored. Page 5 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAl (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD SJU evaluation)
ARP IF either of the following conditions exist, 020-23 GO TO S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001(Q) Reactor 3.3 Coolant Pump Abnormality:
- 21 RCP Motor Bearing Determines 21 RCP Motor Bearing Temperature reaches 175°F, or Temperature has not reached 175 0 (will reach maximum of - 157 OF)
- CCW flow can NOT be Determines that RCP Motor Bearing established within 5 minutes AND temperatures are not trending up. (The 21 RCP Motor Bearing temps will rise from -141 to 157 quickly, temperatures are trending up. within 3 minutes. and the curve of the line flattens out quickly. There IS still CCW flow going to the RCPs, and it WILL keep them from reaching required pump trip temperatures. IF pace of JPM performance results in it being determined that temperatures are trending up, THEN will go to S2.0P-AB.RCP-001 here.
I I I I J ARP MONITOR CC Surge Tank and Determines CC Surge Tank and 020-23 Containment Sump Pump runs for Containment Sump Pump runs do not 3.4 leakage indication. indicate leakage. ARP IF CC Console alarms header pressure Initiates S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Component 020-23 low, OR Surge Tank Level High Low, Cooling Abnormality based on CC header 3.5 THEN INITIATE S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Pressure low console alarms. Component Cooling Abnormality. ARP 21 (22) CC HDR PRESSURE LO Determines there are no automatic actions CC1 associated with these alarms. 2.0 ______ .** L_ Page 6 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: __________________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
ARP ENSURE Seal Injection Flow to each Checks seal injection to each RCP CC1 RCP is between 6-12 gpm NOT to between 6-12 gpm, and total seal injection 3.1 exceed 40 gpm total seal injection. flow less than 40 gpm. ARP IF 2CC131 closed due to momentary Determines 2CC131 did not close on high CC1 high flow while balancing CC flow or flow while balancing CC flow or pump 3.2 pump shifting ... shifting. - ~~~~~~ ARP IF the High flow alarm also occurs ... Determines the High flow alarm is not CC1 alarmed. 3.3 ARP ENSURE OPEN: Determines the following valves are open CC1
- 2CC190, RCP THERM BAR CC on 2CC1:
3.4 OUTLETV.
- 2CC190, RCP THERM BAR CC
- 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP OUTLETV.
INLETV.
- 2CC117, RCP CC MOT OP INLET
- 2CC'j 'j 8, RCP CC MOT OP v.
INLET VALVE. I
- 2CC118, RCP CC MOT OP INLET I I J
2CC131, RCP THERM BAR CC VALVE. CONTVALVE.
- 2CC131, RCP THERM BAR CC CO NT VALVE. -----------
Page 7 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
ARP IF the low flow alarm does NOT clear, CC1 THEN: 3.5 A. SEND an operator to:
- 1. MONITOR CC flow from each RCP seal locally.
- 2. ENSURE CC valve positions to/from each RCP.
B. GO TO S2.0P-AB.RCP-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality. ABRCP INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action 3.1 Action Summary. Summary. I I I Note: The first 2 bulleted CAS actions for
- 1) losing CCW flow to ALL RCPs I I
- 2) not restoring CCW flow within 5 minutes of initial loss are based on a loss of ALL CCW flow.
However, if a conservative decision is made that the actions of Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps are applicable, then Simulator Operator action will be required to insert RT-2 so that the intiating condition for stopping RCPs is total loss of CCW flow when that decision is made. Page 8 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD stu evaluation)
ABRCP MONITOR AND COMPARE RCP Monitors and compares RCP parameters in 3.2 parameters in Attachment 3 to determine Attachment 3 on the Plant Computer, affected RCP(s) until malfunction is Control Console, and RP Panels, and corrected or as directed by SM/CRS. determines that all RCPs are affected. AB RCP IF Corr 3.3 causin~ THEN: A. ;
- 2CC131 AND 2CC190, RCP Rep THERMAL BARRIER VALVE, and THERM.A.L BARR!ER VALVE 2CC136 AND 2CC187, RCP BEAR!NG OUTLET valves are all open on control
- 2CC136 AND 2CC187, RCP console.
BEARING OUTLET Determines that CCW system operation B. ENSURE CCW Heat prior to the event was normal, and CCW exchanger(s) in service lAW HX( s) are in service. S2.0P-SO.CC-0002(Q), 21 & 22 Component Cooling Heat Cue if required: lE verification of CCW HX Exchanger Operation. operation is begun using S2.0P-SO.CC 0002, THEN cue: "21 & 22 CCW HX's are in service." Page 9 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
C. ENSURE RCP Seal Injection Checks RCP Seal Injection flows are 6-12 flows are 6-12 gpm per pump, gpm per pump, total RCP Seal Injection NOT to exceed 40 gpm total RCP Flow adds up to ~ 40 gpm. Seal Injection Flow. AB RCP IE any RCP Motor winding temperature, Determines all RCP Motor winding 3.4 indicated on 2RP4 recoder, is >235°F for temperatures, indicated on 2RP4 recoder, Hot Loop Conditions (Modes 1-4), OR are <235° for Hot Loop Conditions (Modes
>248°F for Cold Loop Conditions (Mode 1-4).
- 5) THEN: Note: 2RP4 Motor winding temperature recorder is broken, so the following cue is required.
Cue: All RCP Motor winding temperatures, indicated on 2RP4 recoder, are <235° AB RCP IE Loss of Seal Injection is causing Determines Loss of Seal Injection flow is
') c: Df"'n(~\ ~h~~~~~1 ~~~rI;f;~~ 1\ "In Df"'D 1'"\"+ ""'IIC'inri Dr'CIr-\ ,...hn.,.. .u ... r"V"I,.."i ,...."n~i+i"t""\
v.v r'v.~;:,) a U l l U l l l l a l vUIIUllIUII, nl'llLJ I " v l Seal Leakoff is <2.5 gpm on any RCP, THEN: AB RCP IF affected RCP Seal Water Leakoff is Determines affected RCP Seal Water 3.6 <0.8 gpm or is slowly appraoching 6 Leakoff is >0.8 gpm and is not slowly gpm, AND affected Pump bearing/sea approaching 6 gpm from console inlet temperatures are stable or indications. lowqering, THEN: Page 10 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
Simulator Operator: Insert RT ~2 Determines last remaining Component Cooling water has tripped. MALF CC0172A 21 Component Cooling Water Pump Trip r-- ------- ----- ---- ------- AB RCP IF AT ANY TIME, any of the validated Determines Component Cooling Water flow RCP conditions exist, THEN GO TO has been lost to all RCPs and goes to CAS 1.0 Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps: pumps. Page 11 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
AB.RCP IF Reactor Trip Breakers are CLOSED, AU. 2 THEN:
- 1.0 1.1 TRIP the Reactor. Trips the Reactor using either trip handle.
- 1.2 STOP affected RCP(s). Depresses stop PBs for 21-24 RCPs.
1.3 RCP shutdown was due to RCP Determines RCP shutdown was not due to seal Leakoff flow> 6gpm, THEN RCP seal Leakoff flow> 6gpm. simultaneously PERFORM the following: Determines RCP shutdown was due to a 1.4 !E RCP shutdown was due to a TOTAL LOSS of Component Cooling TOTAL LOSS of Component Cooling Water and simultaneously performs the Water (including loss of CCW to the following: CVCS Letdown Heat Exchanger), THEN simultaneously PERFORM the following:
- ISOLATE RCS letdown AND SWAP charging pump suction to the RWST by performing the I I following: I I
- a) CLOSE 2CV2 AND Depresses the close PB for 2CV2 AND 2CV277 to isolate letdown. 2CV277 to isolate letdown.
- b) OPEN 2SJ1 AND 2SJ2 to Depresses the open PB for 2SJ1 AND swap charging pump 2SJ2 to swap charging pump suction to the suction to the RWST. RWST.
- c) CLOSE 2CV40 AND Depresses the close PB for 2CV40 AND 2CV41 to isolate the VCT. 2CV41 to isolate the VCT.
- GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Goes to 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Trip or Safety Injection AND Safety Injection.
RETURN to this attachment, at Terminate JPM when immediate actions the SM/CRS discretion. begin to be performed. Page 12 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
AB.CC INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action 3.1 Action Summary. Summary. Is CCW Surge Tank level >58% and Determines CCW Surge tank level is AB.CC rising? < 58% and stable from console indication, 3.2 goes to Step 3.13. I-- ---------- Is CCW Surge Tank level <42% and Determines CCW Surge tank level is AB.CC dropping? >42% and stable from console indication, 313 goes to Step 3.40. AB.CC Is either of the following annunciators in 3.40 alarm?
- 21CCHDRPRESSURELO Determines both 21 and 22 CC HDR I
- CC HDR PRESSURE LO I PRESSURE LO annunciators are in alarm . I AB.CC START available CC Pumps as Determines no CCW pumps are available 3.41 necessary to clear CC HDR PRESSURE to be started to clear CC HDR PRESSURE LO alarms(s). LO alarms(s).
Simulator Operator: Insert RT-2 MALF CC0172A 21 Component CoolinQ Water Pumt> Trip Determines last remaining Component Cooling water has tripped. Page 13 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation)
AB.CC IF AT ANY TIME, any of the validated Determines Component Cooling Water flow CAS conditions exist, THEN STOP RCP's has been lost to all RCPs and goes to lAW Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant 1.0 Coolant Pumps: pumps. Page 14 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: __________________ SYSTEM: Component Cooling System TASK: Take Corrective Action For A Component Cooling Water System Abnormality STEP COMMENTS . STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. STANDARD S/U evaluation) i IF Reactor Trip Breakers are CLOSED, THEN:
- A. TRIP the Reactor. Trips the Reactor using either trip handle.
- B. STOP affected RCP(s). Depresses stop PBs for 21-24 RCPs.
C. Simultaneously PERFORM the following:
- IF a total loss of Component Cooling Water was the initiating event (including loss of CCW to the CVCS Letdown Heat Exchanger), THEN ISOLATE RCS letdown AND SWAP Charging Pump suction to the RWST as follows:
- a. CLOSE 2CV2 AND 2CV277 to Depresses the close PB for 2CV2 AND isolate letdown. 2CV277 to isolate letdown.
- b. OPEN 2SJ 1 AND 2SJ2 to swap Depresses the open PB for 2SJ1 AND I I charging pump suction to the I 2SJ2 to swap charging pump suction to the I I RWST. RWST.
- c.CLOSE 2CV40 AND 2CV41 to Depresses the close PB for 2CV40 AND isolate the VCT. 2CV41 to isolate the VCT.
- a Component Cooling Water Detemines CCW leak in containment was LEAK in Containment with not the initiating event.
2CC113 AND 2CC215 closed was the initiating event, THEN CLOSE the following valves:
- GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Goes to 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Trip or Safety Injection. Safety Injection.
Terminate JPM when immediate actions
~!gin t()l:>e performed.
Page 15 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
\l.{/v- 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
v..rJL 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. ____ 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) V.O - 4. Initial setup conditions are identified. I.J..{/l- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified. -'-___ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
- 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
- 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date l). )
\Lv 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
_ _ _ _ 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the ~IPM. ____ 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page. SMEllnstructor:_1j-:~:'=:"::"-"';'"...;..n--"--l-~~*=-=:"::";"" _ _ __ Date: _b_'_30_.._11_ __ SMEllnstructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/lnstructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ Page 16 of H PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
INITIAL CONDITIONS: 100% power, EOl. 23 CCW pump is CfT for oil leak repair. TSAS 3.7.3 was entered 6 hours ago. INITIATING CUE: You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all alarms and indications. Page 17 of 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Control Room Evacuation TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation. TASK NUMBER: 1130070501 JPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC IP-i ALTERNATE PATH: KIA NUMBER: APE 068 AA1.22
------~--------~
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.0 4.3 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROm STAD SROm EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In PiantlSimulatl3
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Rev. 22 Att. 5 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: JAM Key VALIDATED ..'PM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-30-11 Instructor Validated By: J Pierce, Jr Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor
/.~nt Approved By: Date: q - L.. - I I Approved By:
o~D.partmen~ Date: g /' /11 ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME:: DATE:: SYSTEM: CVCS TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation. TASK NUMBER: 1130070501 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. The Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- 2. A reactor trip from 100% was initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room.
INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to take local control of charging flow per S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation Att. 5, starting at Step 8.0. Steps 1.0-7.0 have been completed. Successful Completion Criteria: 1 . All critical steps completed. . 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.
I Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Take local control of 2CV55.
- 2. Adjust air operator to change charging flow from current reading to 70 gpm.
Page 2 of 7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _________ SYSTEM: CVCS TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation. COMMENTS STEP STEP (Required for
* (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL NO. STANDARD UNSAT S/U evaluation)
Operator reviews a copy of Evaluator provides copy of Attachment 5, S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, AU. 5, and proceeds to and a JAM Key. Charging Pump Alley, EI. 84. Note: If operator inquires why steps 1.0 7.0 are not signed off, state that another operator performed those steps and still has the procedure with him in the field. Proceeds to Panel 216-2, Chg Pmps FL
& PR Inst Pnl.
Note: Panel 216-2 will alarm in the Control Room. The Control Room must be notified prior to opening this panel, and when it is secured. I 8.0 TAKE local control of 2CV55, Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cant Valve, by performing the following: 8.1 RECORD the charging flow as indicated on Records charging flow from 2FI-128A, 2FI-128A. Charging Pump Flow Indication. Locates local E/P Bypass Line Selector
- 8.2 PLACE local EJP Bypass Line Selector Valve Valve and discusses turning valve to in Manual.
Manual. Page 3 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: - - - - - - - JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: CVCS TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation. COMMENTS STEP STEP (Required for
* (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL NO. STANDARD UNSAT S/U evaluation) 8.3 Using the MANUAL hand air operator, Reads flowrate from 2FI-128A, Charging ENSURE that the flow rate as noted in Step Pump Flow Indication to ensure the flow 8.1 is being maintained with 2CV55. rate is maintained with 2CV55.
Cue: Flow rate is the same as that recorded in Step 8.1. Points out local air pressure indicator. 8.4 OBSERVE local air pressure indicator to verify local control. Cue: Air pressure on local air pressure indicator is 8 psig. Page 4 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: - - - - - - - JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: CVCS TASK: Control charging flow after Control Room evacuation. COMMENTS STEP STEP (Required for
* (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL NO. STANDARD UNSAT S/U evaluation) 9.0 NOTIFY the CRS and STA that Steps 1.0-8.0 Locates page or states that they would of Att. 5 are completed. walk to HSD Panel, to inform CRS and STA that steps 1-8 of Attachment 5 are completed.
Note: May inform CRS and STA that Step 8 is completed, since they didn't perform Steps 1-7. Cue: The CRS directs you to adjust charging flow to 70 gpm (Evaluator: or a value not currently read on FI-128A). Discusses adjusting flow using MANUAL hand air operator. Raises air pressure to
- lower flow or lowers air pressure to raise flow. (2CV55, Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Vaive is faii open vaive)
Cue: If candidate states they would LOWER air pressure, then provide feedback that charging flow indicated on FI-128A has risen to 5 gpm above that recorded in Step 8.1. When candidate RAISES air pressure, then provide feedback that charging flow indicated on FI-128A has lowered to 70 gpm. Terminating Cue: Adjusts air pressure to match new requested flow rate. State "this JPM is terminated". Page 5 of 7
JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE V ALIDAT][ON CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be perfonned upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
j:-- 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified.
1-- 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KiA) references are included.
/J/ 3. Perfonnance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) /
JL- 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
+. 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ~ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). + 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM matches the most current revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. "l.""" Date ~ _ _ + 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conmct, and
- j':
- b. ensure perfonnance time is accurate.
- 10. If the JPM cannot be perfonned as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM.
- 11. When JPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
SME/Instructor: ff/t ~ ~ . '?I ~' t/~ Date_ 7~9/u SME/Instructor:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Date: SME/Instructor: Date: Page 6 of 7
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- 1. The Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- 2. A reactor trip from 100% was initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room.
INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to take local control of charging flow per S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation Att. 5 starting at Step 8.0. Steps 1.0-7.0 have been completed. j Page 7 of7
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater TASK: Reset Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Trip Valve MS52 TASK NUMBER: 1130040501
..'PM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC IP-j ALTERNATE PATH: K/A NUMBER: _ _ _ A_P_E_0_68_AA_1_.0_2_--I IMPORTANCE FACTOR: 4.3 4.5 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EoD ROm STAD SROITJ EVALUATION SETTING/METHOD: In Plant
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Rev. 22 Att. 13 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: I\lone VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 8 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: NJA Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-24-11 Instructor . Validated By: J Pierce, Jr. Date: 07-28-11 SME or Instructor 2-- \
¥~
I Approved By: Date: Approved By: U. Department Date: ACTUAL JPIVI COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: D SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: I EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: Page 1 of 7 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME_____________ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE: DATE______________ SYSTEM: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM TASK: Reset an Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Trip Valve (MS52) TASK NUMBER: 1130040501 INITIAL CONDITIONS: The reactor has been tripped and the control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat. 23 AFW Pump has tripped on over speed. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to reset 2:3 AFW Pump Turbine Trip Valve (2MS52) lAW S2.0P-AB.CR-000*1, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 13, Turbine - Driven AFW Pump R.estoration. Maintenance has corrected the cause of the overspeed trip, and there are no AUTO start signals present for 23 AFW pump. I SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION CRITERIA:
- 1. ALL critical steps completed
- 2. ALL sequential steps completed in order i 3. ALL time-critical steps completed within the allotted time JPM completed within validated time.
Completion may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained). Task Standard for Successful Completion: 1.. Perform Attachment 13 in correct sequence. Page 2 of 7 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERA1,- ... TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater TASK: Reset MS52
# STEP STEP -STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
- No. (*Denotes Critical Step) StU
(#Denotes Sequential Step) Provide operator with the correct procedure, Operator obtains procedure. S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Rev. 22, Att.13. Contacts Control Room and reports that they will be entering 23 AFP Room. Note: 23 AFP Room is a High Energy Line Break (HELB) area, and the Control Room must be contacted prior to opening door or access panel to room. 1.0 RESETTING 2MS52 1* 1.1 I SEAT tappet n~t by slightly pulling Head Lever I Verifies tappe~ nut seated. ~nd EMERGENCY 1
, away from trip linkage AND CHECK that the TRIP LEVER in reset position.
Emergency Trip Lever is in its RESET position (horizontal). Cue: Tappet nut seated and EMERGENCY TRIP LEVER is reset. 1.2 ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel in the closed Simulates rotating 2MS52 23 AFW Pp Turbine
- Trip Valve handwheel clockwise and verifies direction (clockwise). This will cause the Latch-Up Lever to move up toward the Trip Hook. Latch-Up Lever moving toward Trip Hook.
Cue: Lever is moving towards trip hook. Page 3 of 7 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERA1,- ... TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater TASK: Reset MS52
...... ~ --------- # STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
- No. (*Denotes Critical Step) Stu
------- ~......
(#Denotes Sequential Step) 1.3 CHECK that the Latch-Up Lever moves up into position, that it moves to and engages the Trip
- Hook. Verifies Trip Hook engages.
Cue: Trip Hook is engaged. 1.4 PULL UP on the Hand Trip Lever to ensure full Points out Hand Trip Lever to ensure full engagement of the Trip Hook and Latch-up engagement of the Trip Hook and Latch-up Lever. Lever. Cue: Trip Hook and Latch-up Lever are fully engaged. CAUTION: Leaving 2iviS52 backseated may impose Inore I I reaction loading on the Trip hook than the Trip I Linkage can overcome, thus rendering the 2MS52 trip function INOPERABLE. When resetting 2MS52, trapped steam pressure could spin turbine for short period of time (-2 seconds) 1,--- ------
- 1.5 Slowly ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel in the Simulates rotating Handwheel counter-OPEN direction (counter-clockwise) until the clockwise and verifies Split Coupling makes Split Coupling raises and makes contact with contact with Sliding Nut OR the valve comes to the bottom of the Sliding Nut OR the valve rest on the backseat.
comes to rest on the backseat. Cue: Split Coupling makes contact with Sliding Nut. Page 4 of 7 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERAl ..... i TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater TASK: Reset MS52
# STEP STEP STANDARD EVAL COMMENTS
- No. (*Denotes Critical Step) S/U
(#Denotes Sequential Step)
- 1.6 ROTATE 2MS52 handwheel clockwise Simulates rotating Handwheel clockwise one approximately one turn until handwheel moves turn and verifies Handwheel moves freely.
freely AND Latch-up lever is in full contact with Trip Hook. Cue: Handwheel moves freely and Latch-up lever is in full contact with Trip Hook. 1.7 ENSURE turbine stops spinning (indicates Determines shaft is not spinning. 2MS132 is seated) 1.8 ENSURE proper engagement of tappet nut and Ensures proper engagement of tappet nut and head lever lAW Att. 13, page 2, 23 AF Pump head lever lAW AU. 13, page 2. TripIThrottie Valve & Overspeed Trip Mechanism, Overspeed Trip Mechanism Reset. TERMiNATiNG CUE: When report is made that 2MS52 is reset, state JPM is complete. Ensure Control Room is contacted after 23 AFW pump room access door/panel is shut. Page 5 of 7 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE IVIEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate ..IPM using steps 8 and 11 below.
/ 1. Task description and number, ..IPM description and number are identified.
_-->~/C--_ 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included.
/
--7-7'~"--- 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator) t" 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
~ 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
-_:yL-.- 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review.
/
t' 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*).
/ / 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this ..IPM ma;Ch,s thf~r;;t cur~nt revision of that procedure: Procedure Rev. 2- 'l-- Date 'I 1.( 9'2.- l/l)( )
L} 9. Pilot test the ..IPM:
r-- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
2- 10. If the JPIV1 cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPIV1. ~ 11. When ..IPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date ..IPM cover page. SMEllnstructor: tJ:~ Date: SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DatEl: SME/lnstructor:- - - - - - - - - - - - - Date: Page 5 of 6 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: The reactor has been tripped and the control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat. 23 AFW Pump has tripped on over speed. INITIATING CUE: You have been directed to reset 23 AFW Pump Turbine Trip Valve (2MS52) lAW S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 13, Turbine - Driven AFW Pump Restoration. Maintenance has sorrected the cause of the overspeed trip, and there are no AUTO start signals present for 23 AFW pump. Page 7 of 7 PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE STATION: SALEM SYSTEM: Control Room Evacuation TASK: TCAF Control Room Evacuation (Trip Turbine, Open Exciter Field Breaker, Trip SGFP's) TASK NUMBER: 1140130401
..IPM NUMBER: 09-01 NRC IP-k ALTERNATE PATH: D KIA NUMBER:
IMPORTANCE FACTOR: APE 068 AA 1.04, AA 1.23, All >2.5 AA1.27 All >2.5 APPLICABILITY: RO SRO EOO ROW STAO SROW EVALUATION SEnl NG/METHOD: In Plant! Simulate
REFERENCES:
S2.0P-AB.CR-0001, Rev. 22 AU. 8 (checked 6-24-11) TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT: None VALIDATED JPM COMPLETION TIME: 10 min TIME PERIOD IDENTIFIED FOR TIME CRITICAL STEPS: N/A Developed By: G Gauding Date: 06-24-11 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Validated By: (j. -P.cy..:L Date: ,.z.8*/ 1 SME or Instructor
?-:L- \, ~ment Approved By: Date:
S/,/,I Approved By:
~~ Date:
ACTUAL JPM COMPLETION TIME: ACTUAL TIME CRITICAL COMPLETION TIME: PERFORMED BY: GRADE: 0 SAT D UNSAT REASON, IF UNSATISFACTORY: i EVALUATOR'S SIGNATURE: DATE: PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 1 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE NAME: __________________________ DATE: SYSTEM: Control Room Evacuation TASK: TCAF Control Room Evacuation (Trip Turbine, Open Exciter Field Breaker, Trip SGFP's) TASK 1140130401 NUMBER: INITIAL CONDITIONS: The control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat. INITIATING CUE: You are assigned to carry out the actions of S2.0P-AB.CR*001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 8, Steps 2.0-4.0: Trip the Main Turbine, open HIe Exciter Field Breaker, Trip both SGFP's. Assume you have the equipment required by the procedure. Successful Completion Criteria:
- 1. All critical steps completed.
- 2. All sequential steps completed in order.
- 3. All time-critical steps completed within allotted time.
- 4. JPM completed within validated time. Completion time 'llay exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made (and NRC concurrence is obtained).
Task Standard for Successful Completion:
- 1. Locate and describe TRIP operation of Reset-Normal-Trip Lever at Turbine Front standard.
- 2. Locate and describe opening of Exciter Field BreakElr.
- 3. At SGFP area, locate and describe at least one method of locally tripping SGFPs.
PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 2 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _______________________ SYSTEM ABNORMAL PROCEDURES TASK: TCAF Control Room Evacuation: Trip MT, Open Exciter Field Breaker, SGFP's STEP COMMENTS
# STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (#Denotes a Seauential Step) STANDARD S/U Evaluation) 1 Evaluator provides copy of S2.0P Operator reviews procedure. AB.CR-1, Control Room Evacuation Att. 8.
- 2 Proceed to Turbine Front Standard, and place the Reset-Normal-Trip Lever in the Proceeds to turbine front standard, TRIP position. locates Reset-Normal-Trip lever and points out TRIP position.
- 3 Proceed to Excitation System Control Cubicle and open Generator Exciter Field Proceeds to Turb. Bldg .. EL 120, I I Breaker. I (North End) locates Generator Exciter Field Breaker and discusses opening.
I I I I I PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 3 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM NAME: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DATE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SYSTEM ABNORMAL PROCEDURES TASK: TCAF Control Room Evacuation: Trip MT, Open Exciter Field Breaker, Trip SGFP's STEP COMMENTS
# STEP (*Denotes a Critical Step) EVAL (Required for UNSAT
- NO. (#Denotes a Seauential Step) STANDARD StU Evaluation)
- 4 Locally, trip the following:
- 21 SGFP Proceeds to Turb. Bldg., EI. 100, and
- 22 SGFP discusses operation of at least one of the ways to locally trip the SGFPs.
- 1. Pulling out the OS trip plunger
- 2. Depressing the "Local Emergency TRIP" button under glass on side of SGFP.
- 3. Depressing the Emergency Stop PB on the Woodward 505 Digital Control panel.
- 4. Opening Thrust Oil drain valves 21 PL73 or 22PL73.
I I I (21 SGFP Trip Test Loading Oil ISLN VLV behind panel; same for I
- 22) (!ithey select a different method such as de-energizing COPU, evaluate after JPM complete)
CUE: JPM is complete PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 4 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE VALIDATION CHECKLIST NOTE: All steps of this checklist should be performed upon initial validation. Prior to JPM usage, revalidate JPM using steps 8 and 11 below. jL 1. Task description and number, JPM description and number are identified. --J:--: 2. Knowledge and Abilities (KIA) references are included. V 3. Performance location specified. (in-plant, control room, or simulator)
}I 4. Initial setup conditions are identified.
--7"Y'-- 5. Initiating and terminating Cues are properly identified.
~ 6. Task standards identified and verified by SME review. ~ 7. Critical steps meet the criteria for critical steps and are identified with an asterisk (*). !JL 8. Verify the procedure referenced by this JPM mp!cfes t e os~current revision of 7 that procedure: Procedure Rev. Date ~~l- d (f)
_--=...y.:......- 9. Pilot test the JPM:
- a. verify Cues both verbal and visual are free of conflict, and
- b. ensure performance time is accurate.
? 10. If the JPM cannot be performed as written with proper responses, then revise the JPM. ) / 11. When ~IPM is revalidated, SME or Instructor sign and date JPM cover page.
SMEllnstructor: /~.:. . "'\~ [late: __ -r~jI(--~--~~~~II-I I SMElinstructor: Date: _ _ _ _ __ SME/lnstructor:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.___ Date: _ _ _ _ __ PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 5 of 6
OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM JOB PERFORMANCE ME,ASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS: The control room has been evacuated due to a bomb threat. INITIATING CUE: You are assigned to carry out the actions of S2.0P-AB.CR-001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 8, Steps 2.0-4.0: Trip tile Main Turbine, open the Exciter Field Breaker, Trip both SGFP's. Assume you have the equipment required by the procedure. PSEG Restricted- Possession Requires Specific Approval from Nuclear Training Page 6 of 6
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No,: ESG-1 Op-Test No,: 09-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOL 21 AFW pp CIT for oillisak repair. 21 CFCU is CIT, PZR Pressure channel II is O/S for calibration. Turnover: Maintain 100% power, Event Malf. No, Event Event Type* Description No. I I 1 PR0017A Controlling PZR level ch failure (TS) CRS/RO C 2 RCOO02 RCS leak (TS) ALL N 3 Power Reduction (directed based on RCS leak) ALL M 4 RCOO02 SBLOCA (-100 gpm) ALL RP0342 C 5 Failure of automatic High Head injection RP0343 CRS/RO AF0182A C 6 RP318E2 AFW fails to automatically actuate CRS/PO O/R B606 C 7 O/R C206 SEC fails to reset CRS/PO C 8 RCOO02 SBLOCA escalation (ECCS flow re-initiation in TRIP-3) CRS/RO CT's 1, Establish hi head ECCS. 2, Initiate AFW flow. 3.Re-start ECCS pps
- (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor O/R = Override Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 1 of 30 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: RCS Leak, Escalatin~l SBLOCA SCENARIO NUMBER: 09-01 NRC ESG-1 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Date EXPECTED DURATION: 77 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '---_----'I L.O. REQUAL X 1 INITIAL LICENSE L..--_ _ ---l STA OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 09-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 07-04-11 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: ~e:-:2- -6'-2-- 1/ O~ ionsMaining Manager Date APPROVED BY: ~ 6~ /11 ate PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 3 of 30 A. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action{s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, lAW approved station procedures. B. Given the unit with multiple OHAs in alarm, the crE~W will prioritize, validate and then determine a course of action when provided with additional information, lAW approved station procedures. C. Given the order or indications of a charging system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the charging system in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of the Charging system DIRECT corrective action for a Charging System malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. F. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with thi;:l approved station procedures. G. Given the unit at power with an ReS leak greater than the Tech. Spec. limit, take corrective action lAW AB.RC-0001. H. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given the order or indications of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given indication of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), DIRECT the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures. N. During performance of emergency operating procE;dures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Page 4 of 30 A. Controlling PZR level channel fails low B. 17 gpm RCS leak C. 100 gpm SBLOCA D. 1800 gpm SBLOCA A. The crew takes the watch with the unit at 100% power, BOL. 21 AFW pump is CIT for oil bubbler repair. 21 CFCU is CIT after it tripped 1 hour ago. I&C is performing a channel calibration of PZR Pressure Channel II. 2PR7 is shut with power removed to comply with TSAS 3.4.5.b. All bistables associated with PZR Pressure Channel II are tripped lAW S2.IC. CC.RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II. Orders for the shift are to maintain 100% power. B. Shortly after taking the watch the controlling PZR level channel will fail low, and a 17 gpm RCS leak will commence ramping in over 12 minutes. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging. The crew will respond and take manual control of the Master Flow Controller, swap to an operable level channel, restore letdown and PZR level, and return the system to auto. The CRS will enter the appropriate Tech Spec. C. The crew will diagnose the RCS leak based on inclications and alarms. The CRS will enter S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak. The crew will swap to a centrifugal charging pump and quantify the leak. The CRS Will identify that the Unidentified RCS leak rate exceeds Tech Spec limits, and a unit shutdown is required. D. During the power reduction, the RCS leak will worsen to a 100 gpm SBLOCA. The crew will identify that the RCS leak rate exceeds the capacity of the CVCS makeup system. The CRS will direct a Rx trip and Safety Injection be initiatec. The High Head ECCS injection valves 2SJ12 and 2SJ13 fail to open on the Safety Injection signal. The crew opens the valves from the control room to establish High Head ECCS injection. F. AFW fails to initiate based on: 21 AFW pump CIT, 22 AFW pump fails to start on the SEC initiation signal, and 23 AFW pump governor fails to rr:inimum speed. The crew establishes AFW flow by blocking and resetting 2B SEC and starting 22 AFW pump. 23 AFW pump remains unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. G. The crew performs diagnostics in EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip Response, and transitions to EOP TRIP-3, Safety Injection Termination based on the size of the RCS LOCA. The 2C SEC cannot be reset, and will be deenergized to establish control over C bus equipment. H. Once ECCS equipment has been removed from service, the SBLOCA will increase in size. The crew will diagnose the inability to maintain PZR level, and start ECCS pumps to maintain PZR and RCS subcooling. I. The scenario will be terminated when the crew has started sufficient ECCS pumps to maintain PZR level and RCS subcooling . PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 5 of 30 IC-241 100% power, BOL 1 RH1 and RH2 CIT 2 RH18s CIT 3 VC1 and VC4 CIT 4 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 5 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 6 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) _ 10 21 AFW pump CIT. 11 21 CFCU CIT. _ 12 2PR7 shut and deenergized. 13 S2.1C-CC-RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II, Exhibit 1 signed and on NCO desk or provided to crew for turnover. _ 14 SGBD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3. 15 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 6 of 30 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not chanl~e column name without consulting Simulator Support group
,c'~~;~:r "~~8:~' ;; " <. i' <riilj'tm¢:~';'/ii
--[-1:--- Initial ET # Description
-E-V-EN-T-I MaN P254 <1 0 1/ CaNT ROD BANK C< 10 ( RX TRI P )
ACTION: 1 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: ---~~- --~ - - ------ ------ ------ - -~-- ----_ .. _._._--------
,.,,\~\;:, ," ,
SELF- Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK Timl~ Value Time 01 N!A N!A N/A RT-1 o RC0002 RCS LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT ( equiv to O 02 N/A 0 00:15:00 RT-1 17 4 inches
~l; i\
03 RP0342 2SJ12 FAILS TO AUTO OPEN ON SEC hl!i:' ti:t-\ N!A Nil" 04 RP0343 2SJ13 FAILS TO AUTO OPEN ON SEC j'.JI/'J.,. N!A N!A 05 RP318E2 Aux Feed Pum 22 Fails to Start on SEC NiA N/A N!A N/A SER POINT AN0302 SER 302 FAILS - :E35 2PR2 PROTECTION 06 CH II LOOP UNSAFEIIN TEST NiA N!A N/P~ N!A FAILS/OVRD TO ON SER POINT AN0328 SER 328 FAILS - :A12 REACTOR PROT SYS 07 N/A N/,'; NfA NiA FAILS/OVRD CHANNEL II INSTRUMENT LOOP IN TEST TO ON
,;. f .,,;.aq~t~.".:':"<; ;'L: ,i: il'~ i': .,....... . ,' . ' l' ,~, " ... i.* ,::C'.:;;! ."";}:';fit .'\ .
SELF Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Condition CHECK Timl~ Value Time 01 AF20D 21 AFW PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER N/J\ Nfl; N!A N",,, OFF I 02 PR02D PZR HI PR RX TRP CH 2 PC456A BS N!A Nt/\. f',J!A N!A TRIP 03 PR13D PZR LO PR BLK SI CH 2 PC456B BS N!A N/A N!A ~JiA TRIP 04 PR06D PZR LO PR RX TRP CH 2 PC456C BS N!A Nfl\, NiA NI.,'; TRIP 05 PR10D PZR LOW PRESS SI CH 2 PC456D BS N!A N!.A NiA N/A TRIP 06 RC02D OT DELTA T TRIP CH II BS (421 C) NfA N!A NiA N!A TRIP 07 RC06D OT DELTA T RlBCK CH II BS (421 D) f'lfA N!A N!A N/A TRIP 08 PR35D PORV STOP VALVE 2PR7 TAGGED Nfl\ N/A N!A N/A TAGGED 09 CT191-1D 21 CFCU BKR #1 Hi>Jh Speed 125VDC N/A Nfl\ N!A ~\!A OFF 10 CT191-2D 21 CFCU BKR #2 High Speed 125VDC NJA -- N!l\ N!A N!A OFF 11 CT191-3D 21 CFCU BKR #3 Low Speed 125VDC I Nfl\ N/,fI,\ N!A N!A OFF 12 DG03D DE ENERGIZE "C" SEC CABINET N!A Nill i'1iA RT-3 YES PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 7 of 30 SELF CHECK 01 B606 F 01 23 AUX FEED PUMP-SPEED DECREASE NfA. NiA N!A ET-1 ON 02 8606 E 01 23 AUX FEED PUMP-SPEED INCREASE N!A NiA N'A ET-1 C206 A 01 2C SFGD EMER OPR-EMERG LOADING N!A 03 N!A NlA N!A OFF
- 1. None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Page 8 of 30 A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 9 of 30
- 1. PZR Level Controlling Channel (LT459) Fails Lo
,'Si~UJat()~;operator:lnSElrtRTl1' .....* "
Qn.9irectiqp.rr9T*.L,~~sl".§vaJuqtQ~~*;i;ii!: C+\'/'","<< "
' __ in. -','" " ,"<', _~~~~-~;,;~/t;~ .;.:,: , ';'~'
M.ALF~RCOOO A "."'."it*"'*i.."*. '.i' . . '.* ''''t'. CoO ammen . *. '.,. ""Final Valu'e:*t7i.*.*.*. ,';!:~'.i.:' LRam'p:,i15~nlinutes;i';::;:* RO announces OHA E-36, PZR HTR OFF LVL LO, and console alarm PZR LO LVL as unexpected, and diagnoses failure of PZR controlling level channel. RO may place Master Flow Controller in manual and reduce flow to minimize level rise in PZR prior to Abnormal Procedure entry. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging. CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. RO reports letdown is isolated. RO reports 23 charging pump is running. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Paae 10 of 30 RO reports there is no indication of cavitation. RO reports PZR level channel I has failed low. Note: RCP seal injection flow will RO takes manual control of charging flow if not lower as charging flow is lowered, previously done, and lowers charging flow to and CV71 may have to be adjusted minimize level rise in PZR. to maintain at least 6 gpm seal injection flow to each RCP. RO selects channel III for control, and reports expected clearing of OHA E-36, PZR HTR OFF LVL LO, and console alarm PZR LO LVL. RO reports OHA E20, PZR HTR ON LVL HI as expected due to no letdown flow. RO places control heaters and one group of backup heaters in ON. Note: An auto makeup to the VCT PO restores letdown by: may occur depending on how Ensuring open 2CV7 quickly crew restores letdown flow, - Placing 2CV18 in Manual closed and is an expected condition. - Opening 2CV18 until close PB extinguishes.
- Opening 2CV2 and 2CV277 and placing in auto. - Ensure charging flow 85-90 gpm. - Open a 75 gpm orifice while adjusting 2CV18 to maintain letdown pressure -300 psig. - When selected orifice is open, place 2CV18 in auto.
CRS directs RO to restore charging flow PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 11 of 30 nf ., controller to auto when PZR level is restored to program. Note: Charging flow should not be RO manually lowers charging flow to restore lowered lower than -65 gpm to PZR level is restored to program. ensure adequate cooling of letdown flow through the Regen HX and prevent flashing in the Letdown CRS directs PO to remove PZR level channel I service lAW S2.0P-SO.RPS-0003. CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 action 6. PO verifies PZR Level channel III selected for control, Channel II selected for alarm, and selects PZR level recorder to channel II or PO informs CRS that Ie support is required to perform remainder of procedure. Note: Crew may identify rising 2R11A prior to RMS alarm. CRS should enter S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak, or S2.0P-AB.RAD-0001, Abnormal Radiation upon indication that containment radiation level is rising. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 12 of 30
- 2. Res leak Note: The 2R11A monitor, RO announces unexpected OHA A-6, RMS Containment Particulate, will go Trouble.
into warning at -8 minutes from leak onset. Warning does not provide annunciation. 2R11A will go into Alarm - 11 minutes after leak onset, and will cause OHA A-6 RO reports 2R11A is in alarm. Note: Master Flow Controller may be in auto or manual at this point. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak, or S2.0P-AB.RAD 0001, Abnormal Radiation. Note: OHA C-2 will annunciate RO reports unexpected OHA C-2, CNTMT -13 minutes after RT-1 insertion. SUMP PMP START. CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. RO reports RCS temperature is >350 F, and Q the unit is in MODE 1. RO raises charging flow to determine if PZR level can be maintained stable or rising, and reports that with maximum charging flow, PZR level is dropping slowly. RO reports a centrifugal charging pump is not running. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 13 of 30 PO places 2 CFCUs in slow speed and 2 CFCUs in fast speed lAW CAS Step 4.0. RO transfers to a centrifugal charging pump as follows: Ensures Master Flow Controller in auto. Shuts 2CV55. Starts a centrifugal charging pump Place 23 charging pump speed controller in manual and lowers charging speed to 2CV55. Stops 23 charging pump when at minimum flow. Adjusts 2CV55 to stabilize PZR level. Maintains RCP seal injection flow 6-12 gpm per pump not to exceed 40 gpm total seal injection flow. RO swaps to 45 gpm letdown orifice if required to stabilize PZR level. Note: Alarm is due to the letdown RO reports 2CC131 Discharge Flow Lo HX CCW TCV 2CC71 opening due console alarm when second letdown orifice is to the increased letdown flow, and placed in service, and reports its clearing will clear when 2nd orifice is shut. when 2nd orifice is removed from service. Note: With RCS leak fully ramped RO stabilizes PZR level and estimates RCS in the leakrate is 20 gpm. leak rate. RO reports PZR level can be maintained stable or rising. RO ensures CVCS makeup system in service. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 14 of 30 Eyaluatorll nS'fruC:f6i A6ii'v Expectea' PlantlStlfdent ResPQl1s'e':':::: SBl!""!!:*
~~;~~ "::::'\1. ,~,:., ~ :~: ,: ". _, '0~,~:~t~';:~f,: "".'.J~1~,*:i:';:;,'~'.,'~: ;'~(~t: ~':"J ~¥f~~~';:~'~"::i'i:ii'i~;,,~;:,)~:!;!!;:('j11~~)?}; :';:~:; .<:!;- :::<::i /;H:'::~!J ; ~', W;',~: {:; ~.: f' ,~:~;~fif ':::~' "';
j; '; .. .*:, 7f~~OG CRS directs initiation of S2.0P-ST.RC-OOOB, RCS Water Inventory Balance. CRS identifies Tech Spec 3.4.7.2.b for RCS unidentified leakage. Role Play: When directed by Lead Evaluator, call the CRS as the Operations Director. State" This is John Garecht. The Shift Manager has just updated me on the status of the Unit 2 RCS leak rate. I want you to have Unit 2 Rx shutdown within the next 2 hours. Commence the Unit 2 shutdown expeditiously."
- 3. Power Reduction CRS briefs crew on load reduction.
CRS enters S2.0P-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction. CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. CRS directs RO and PO to coordinate and initiate a Turbine Load Reduction (at least 1 per minute.) RO calculates boration required for load reduction. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 15 of 30
'*{:Comment*
RO initiates boration. Note: Digital EHC is set up for a PO initiates load reduction at rate directed by SGFP trip to 66% turbine power at CRS, and ensures load reduction starts. 15% per minute. PO must change rate to the rate directed by CRS. RO maintains Tavg on program during load reduction by ensuring control rods automatically insert when Tavg-Tref deviation reaches +1.5°F. RO energizes all PZR heaters. Proceed to next event after sufficient power reduction has been performed at direction of Lead Evaluator.
- 4. SBLOCA S,,,,~I~tor. (jp.rat~":MpdifY;"
§;~~I~yqndireCtl?ri; *1 IVIALF,RC0002ftorri17 to1 00. ... ,.....
':l.ithr1i5 ramp ,. Lead Evaluatof., ..' ......*** ,.
.../._J RO reports OHAs E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS LO and C-38 CFCU LK DET PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 16 of 30
.Evaluator/ln~f(Uqto*dActivitY)::. Expected'Plaht/Sfudenf" Res'pohse .' - ,
- A '" -' h.,~'"- .~ ; ,
.":ssr' 'Comment<ii....* "LOG RO reports PZR pressure lowering.
RO reports PZR level dropping faster than expected for the down power. RO reports PZR level cannot be maintained on program.
- 5. Rx Trip, failure of High Head CRS directs RO to trip the Rx, confirm the trip, ECCS injection. initiate Safety Injection, then perform immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1.
RO trips the Rx using either Trip handle. RO confirms the Rx trip and initiates Safety Injection with either key switch. Simulator Operator: Ensure ET*1 isTrue upontheRxtrip. This inserts the 23 AFW.pump*governor failure. . Iif i Ii RO performs Immediate Actions for TRIP-1: l
- Trip reactor t - Confirms reactor trip - Trips turbine l~ - Verifies at least one 4KV vital bus J ti energized ~ ~
I Reports SI initiated ~
§ CRS and RO verify performance of immediate ~
actions. I i I PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training f
TQ-AA-106-0204 Paae 17 of 30 PO reports AFW status:
- 21 AFW pump not available. - 22 AFW pump not running. - 23 AFW pump coasting down with speed demand at zero.
RO announces Unit 2 Rx trip, Safety Injection on plant page. PO reports SEC loading is not complete for energized vital buses, and determines 22 AFW pump did not start. Note: When the 28 SEC is reset, PO blocks and resets 2B SEC. 22 AFW pump will start due to the 10-10 SG NR signal which is present. r CT#1'***.****.(E~9:-F).**i',!.,.>::i*;*;:i(~'."i:.!! I PO reports 22 AFW pump is running.
;;.~bJI~~&~i~~~I~ult~i!ri!{6~ '1 tQ~iSG$ before transition outof .
EOP~TRIP~1r.....;:'..". e.i.... ii,. PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 Ibmlhr. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 18 of 30 RO reports 2SJ12 and 2SJ13 have not opened as expected. CT ~2.:i * * (E~O--I)~:i;~;~"x RO opens 2SJ12 and 2SJ13 to establish high
~s~a~IJ~~Jlo.wJro"'!~~iil~~st?qe head ECCS injection flow.
HighHeadiECCS.*pompbefore transitionout'ofEOP- TRIP';1. RO reports 21/22CA330's are shut. RO reports containment pressure has remained less than 15 psig, and will report to CRS if it exceeds 15 psig. RO reports no indication of high steam flow coincident with low steam pressure or 10-10 Tavg. PO reports all 4KV vital busses are energized. RO reports control room ventilation is in Accident Pressurized mode. RO runs 2 switchgear SUDDlv and one exhaust fans. RO reports 2 CCW in operation. RO reports cold leg recirc has not been established. RO reports greater than 100 gpm charging flow SI systems charging flowmeter. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Paae 19 of 30 RO reports Res pressure is >1540 psig. PO reports AFW flow is > 22E4 Ibm/hr. PO receives permission to throttle AFW flow < 22E4 Ibm hr when at least one SG NR level is
> 9%, and maintains intact SG NR levels between 9-33%.
RO reports all Reps are running. RO reports Res Tavg is stable at or trending to 54rF. RO reports reactor trip breakers are open. RO reports both PZR PORVs are shut and both PORV block valves are open. RO reports all Reps running and spray valves shut. RO reports ReS pressure is > 1350 psig. RO maintains seal injection flow to all Reps. PO reports no SGs are depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized. RO reports no indications of any SGTR. RO reports no radiation monitors in Table F are in warning. alarm, or rising. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 20 of 30 RO reports containment pressure remains < 4 psig. RO reports containment sump is <46%. RO reports RCS subcooling is >O°F. PO reports AFW flow is either >22E4 Ibm/hr or at least one SG NR level is >9%. RO reports RCS pressure is stable or rising. Note: If PZR level is <11 % at this RO reports PZR level is > 11 %. point, it should be rising due to ECCS injection flow. CRS will loop back to step 29 until PZR level is > 11%. CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-3, Safety Injection Termination. RO resets SI and Phase A isolation. RO opens 21/22CA330s. RO reports neither spray valve is failed open. PO resets A SEC, and reports C SEC will not reset. Note: 2C SEC will not block PO attempts to block 2C SEC, or reports that because there is no SI present to the block function is unavailable due to SI block. reset actions already performed. PO reports 2C SEC will not reset. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 21 of 30 valuator/Instructor A~tivity "'~Comrrl'(H"it .. CRS dispatches an operator to deenergize 2C SEC. S.i01,ulato(O~erator;2 minutes'\;. RO reports OHAs A-29 SEC 2A-2C TEST OR after being dispatched; insert RT*3~ TRBL and A-41 AUX ALM SYS PRINTER as .to deeriergizE;l,2C,SEC: . expected due to deenergizing 2C SEC. PO reports all 230V centers are reset. RO stops one centrifugal charging RO reports RCS pressure is rising slowly. RO reports charging pump suction is aligned to the RWST. RO reports 2CV139 and 2CV140 are open. RO closes BIT isolation valves 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13. RO closes Charging Flow Control Valve 2CV55. RO opens Charging Discharge Valves 2CV68 and 2CV69. RO maintains PZR level >25% by adjusting 2CV55, while maintainina RCP seal flow to RCPs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 22 of 30
.'. Eval uatorJlnstructorActl"itY~i]~;~:~S> antIStudent Respohse""~* ***0"\1*.*.* *.>,..... "Ci'**C"ommen .:r:.?: .. t**,****,***"* "\:\'-:i:;:-.~~.ti~~_~;,'-';: ,. <, ,~, .>,,,~_.\
f
,.~/~", ,.- ,'" .;,:>: ~- ./~/".;:~.::::~; ~:!1 ;.~lj:j::iiZ~:~*';~}~":' -'c " , ..* -:X~*:-:_:;~~:: ~~.~~~:~~~< _~~'l;A;'~~~;' .
RO reports PZR level is stable or rising. RO reports RCS pressure> 1540 psig and stable or rising. RO stops 21 and 22 SI pumps, and 21 and 22 RHR pumps. RO reports RCS >O°F. RO reports PZR level >11 % .
.SimUjatq":6pe..atol'~;Modify; ... '.
. l3qOOQ~Ur91!l1 00J01800 with n'o "raq1pord~laY"afte'rStep'10'is completei;!., .. RO reports RCS pressure and PZR level are lowering rapidly. RO raises charging flow to maintain PZR level
>11%.
RO reports that PZR level will not be able to be maintained> 11 %. CRS should start the idle CRS directs starting of ECCS pumps. centrifugal charging pump and both SI pumps. RHR pumps may be started since the RCS leak rate will not have been determined. SI pumps may not be started until it is determined that RCS pressure PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 23 of 30 lower below the shutoff head of the pumps (-1560 psig). RO starts the idle centrifugal charging pump and both SI pumps. GT"#3: {F,SJ).:~)St~~,ES,C:Si"i'i: .,Ypump5to;restorelmarht~tiri "
.RCSsODcooling'and PZR Jevel:~\t)';i! "
Terminate scenario when the idle centrifugal charging pump and both SI pumps have been started. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Page 24 of 30 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. Salem FSAR E. OP-AA-1 01-111-1 003, Use of Proced ures F. S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging G. S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak H. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection I. 2-EOP-TRIP-3, Safety Injection Termination PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Revision 2 Page 25 of 30 ATIACHMENT1 UNIT TWO PLANT STATUS TODAY MODE: 1 POWER: 100% RCS BORON: 1150 MWe 1230 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUE:LED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATEfTlME OF EXPIRATION: 3.7.1 .2.a action a for 21 AFW pump. 69 hours remain in LCO action time. EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES iN PROGRESS: S2.IC-CC-RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: 2PR7 shut and power removed to comply with TSAS 3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II being out of service for channel calibration. PZR Pressure Channel IV selected for Alarm. CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: 21 CFCU CfT after its high speed breakers tripped 1 hour ago. TSAS 3.6.2.3 action a. 3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II calibration. i'O hours left in action time. 3.3.1.1 action 6 and 3.3.2.1 action 19 for PZR Pressure Channel II PT-456. SECONDARY: 21 AFW pump CfT. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Revision 2 26 of 30 ATTACHMENT 2
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All aHA lamps operating (aHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 ATTACHMENT 3 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY
--~---~~------.----~--~
In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions includl3 those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Soration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Revision 2 Page 28 of 30 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 09-01 NRC ESG-1 REVIEWER: Initials Qualitative Attributes r
- 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.
- 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation r
may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.
- 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events.
- 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiatled
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position) r 5.
- the event termination point No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into tf.'_~:
the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
- 8. The simulator modeling is not altered.
!(~r ~o.
11. All crew competencies can be evaluated. The scenario has been validated. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate thl9 need to modify or replace the scenario. (12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific PElrmission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Revision 2 Page 29 of 30 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) 6 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 2 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 1 Major Transients: 1-2 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 o EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 3 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific P,srmission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 30 of 30 09-01 NRC ESG-1 CT #1: (E-O--F) Establish the minimum required AFW flow rate (22E4 Ibm/hr) to the SGs before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1. BASIS: Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions, results in "adverse consequence(s) or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant." CT #2: (E-O--I) Establish flow from at least one High Head ECCS pump before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1 BASIS: Failure to manually start at least one high head ECCS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS capacity. CT #3: (FSAR) Start ECCS pumps to restore/maintain RCS subcooling and PZR level. BASIS: Salem FSAR assumes a minimum of one train of ECCS pumps available for a SBLOCA. When ECCS pumps are secured in EOP-TRIP-3 and a subsequent SBLOCA causes a loss of PZR level (and eventually subcooling), operator action to start ECCS pumps is required to restore the minimum complement of ECCS pumps assumed in the Accident Analysis. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA*106*0204 Pa 31 of 30 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out Y LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONEI\JT. SYSTEM. OR TRAII\J YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAil\! N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SSO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger* N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cool down the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube ruptu"e(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed this evaluation form for each ESG. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-2 Op-Test No.: 09-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 70% power, MOl. 25 Service Water pump is CIT for strainer work. Turnover: Raise power to 75% at 10% per hour, place 3rd Condensate pump liS, continue power ascension to 90%power. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description N 1 Raise Power ALL C 2 O/RAG04 In sHrvice ABV Exhaust fan trip (TS) CRS/PO I 3 NI0193A PR NI Channel fails (TS) ALL 4 BF0105A C 21 SGFP oil leak EH0327 R 21 SGFP trip, MT fails to auto runback (PO manually 5 O/R B433 ALL initiates turbine runback, RO uses manual rod control) M 6 SGOO78B 22 SG Tube leak / tube rupture ALL RPOO58 RPOOS9A 7 RP0059B C O/R B440 ATWT/FRSM ALL O/R B441 O/R C310 O/R C510 CN0086 C 8 Loss of condenser vacuum during SGTR cooldown MS0093 CRS/PO 3 CT, insert neg reactivity, isolate rupt SG, cooldown to target temp
- (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix 0, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 1 of 36 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: SGFP trip, ATWT/FRSM, SGTR SCENARIO NUMBER: 09-01 NRC ESG-2 (Modified ESG-905) EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Date EXPECTED DURATION: 75 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 01 PROGRAM: '---_--'I L.O. REQUA.L X 1 INITIAL LICENSE
'---_-->1 STA '---_--'I OTHER Revision Summary Modified ESG-0905 as follows:
Initial power level is now 69.5% vs. 90%. Changed initial conditions so that only 22 Condensate pump is O/S. Added additional Tech Spec component failure. Added Main turbine runback failure. Added 25 SW CIT. PREPARED BY: G Gauding 07-04-11 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: ~_l--/' Date APPROVED BY: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific PE~rmission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 3 of 36 A. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, lAW approved station procedures. B. Given the unit with multiple OHAs in alarm, the crew will prioritize, validate and then determine a course of action when provided with additional information, lAW approved station procedures. C. Given the unit at power with the generator synchronized to the grid, the crew will perform a power increase to 100% at 10%/hr, lAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ*0004(Q}. D. Given a failure of a power range detector, take corrective action for a power range instrument failure lAW AB.NIS-0001. E. Given the unit at power and a trip of an operating main feedwater pump, take corrective action lAW AB.CN-0001. F. Given the order or indications of a feedwater or condensate system malfunction, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given indication of a feedwater or condensate system malfunction, DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given a steam generator tube leak, take corrective action, lAW S2.0P-AB.SG-0001. !. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube leak in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube leak (SGTL), DIRECT the response to the tube leak, in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of an anticipated transient without trip (ATWT), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the ATWT in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given indication of an anticipated transient without trip (ATWT), DIRECT the immediate response to the ATWT in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given the order or indications of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the tube rupture in accordance with the approved station procedures. Given indication of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), DIRECT the response to the SGTR in accordance with the approved station procedures. N. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. O. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. P. During performance of emergency operating procedures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific F'errnission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 4 of 36 A. Raise power B. PRNI fails high C. 21 SGFP oilleakl trip D. MT fails to auto runback 22 SG Tube leak I rupture F. ATWT/FRSM G. Loss of Condenser vacuum during cool down A. The crew takes the watch with the unit at 70% power, MOL. 25 SW pump is CIT for strainer work. A Tech Spec 3.0.3 required power reduction was in progress due to declaring both ECCS trains inoperable based on discovery of non 1E rated bearings installed on both Safety Injection pumps during the last refueling outage. The correct documentation paperwork showing that the bearings were actually qualified was "found, and the load reduction stopped at 70%. B. Shortly after the crew assumes the watch, 22 Auxiliary Building Exhaust fan will trip. The crew will start the standby exhaust fan, and the CRS will identify the appropriate Tech Spec. C. Power Range Nuclear Instrument 2N42 fails high. The crew Will determine a load rejection has not occurred and place rod control in manual. The crew will perform actions to remove the failed channel from service. The eRS will identify the appropriate Tech Specs. D. After the PRNI failure has been addressed, 21 SGI=P will develop an oil leak which will lead to its tripping. The Main Turbine will fail to automatically runback, and the crew will manually lower Main Turbine load. A large SGTR will ramp in over 10 minutes following a six minute delay from 21 SGFP trip. The crew will diagnose the tube rupture, and the CRS will order a Rx trip and Safety Injection. F. The Rx will not trip from the control room, and the crew will enter and perform 2-EOPFRSM-1, response to Nuclear Power Generation. The crew will establish rapid boration and the Rx will be tripped locally. G. The crew will transition to 2-EOP-TRIP-1, and initiate a Safety Injection if an automatic SI has not yet occurred. The crew will transition to 2-EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. H. The crew will identify and isolate the 22 SG. The crew will perform a cooldown to target temperature. During the cooldown, Main Condenser vacuum will be lost, and steam dumping will be shifted from the Main Steam Dumps to the intact SG MS10's. I. The scenario will be terminated when the crew has demonstrated the ability to maintain RCS temperature below the target temperature. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 5 of 36 __ IC-242 69.5% power, MOL PREP FOR TRAINING (i.e. computer setpoints, procedures, bezel covers .tagged equipment) Initial I Description 1 RH1 and RH2 CIT 2 RH18s CIT 3 VC1 and VC4 CIT 4 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 5 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 6 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) _10 25 SW pump CIT _ 11 SGBD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3. 12 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 6 of 36 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not chanf)e column name without consulting Simulator Support group Description EVENT monp187 < 540 INCORE TIC TEMP.O ACTION: 4 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: EVENT kb433wad /I ROD BANK SELECTOR SW-MAN ACTION: 5 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: EVENT monp187 < 518/1 HOTTEST INCORE TIC TEMP.O ACTION: 6 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: EVENT monp299 < 25001121 ACTION: 7 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: Aux Bldg Exhaust Fan Fails to Start on 01 NiA N!A N/A N!A CONTROL OIL 02 STM GEN FEED PUMP TRIP NfA NfA N/A RT-5 PRESSURE LOW 03 04 05 NfA NiA N/A RT-10 06 AAS 736 FAILS :22 TGA SUMP LEVE:L HIGH 00:00:10 N'A 1M N!A RT-10 07 AAS 737 FAILS - :23 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:00:17 NiA NfA RTclO AAS POINT FAILS/OVRD I TO ON PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 7 of 36 ....- I AAS POINT. 08 i AN3738 AAS 738 FAILS - :24 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00;00:27 N/A RT-10 FAILS/OVRD I
-~ ~... TOON !
I AAS POINT lV'~ 09 AN3739 AAS 739 FAILS :25 TGA SUMP LEVEL HIGH 00:00:35 , ~/r\ N/A RT-10 FAILS/OVRO TO ON 10 MS0093 LOSS OF STM DMP VAC PERMISSIVE NfA NiA NjA ET-6 11 . CN0086 LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM NJA N!A WA. ET-4 100 12 RP0058 FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC RX TRIP NiA. N/A Nt;" NiA 13 RP0059A FAILURE OF MANUAL RX TRIP Ni/\ N/A NfA NiA 14
- RP0059B FAILURE OF MANUAL SJ/RX TRIP N/A N!A Ni/\ NJA
- NjA i 15 L_N10193B PR CH N42 FAILS HIILO N!A NiA RT-3 200 SELF CHECK 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 C310 F 01 2E6D PRESSURE HEATER BUS 480V 04 N
N!A NiA C510 F 01 2G60 PRESSURE HEATER BUS 4E.OV 05 NfA NiA OFF OPEN 06 . B433 5 01 ROD BANK SELECTOR SW-AUTO ET-5 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 8 of 36 1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 9 of 36 A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift", D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Page 10 of 36
- 1. Raise Power Note: RCS Tavg-Tref when simulator is taken out of freeze is
-+0.2 degrees. The rate at which Tavg is lowering is .0rF/min. Note: - 60 pcm will be added per CRS briefs crew on power ascension. 700 gallons of dilution. Xenon is building in at 60 pcm/hr. An additional 1,185 gallons is required for 10% per hour load ascension, assuming 'V2 from dilution and 'V2 from control rods. RO initiates a 900 RO reports console alarm VCT Pressure Hi-Lo it alarms. RO operates 2CV243 DEGAS as necessary to lower VCT pressure < 50 psig and maintain < 50 psig. PO sets up Digital EHC for 10% per hour load change. PO initiates turbine load ascension and verifies turbine load rises. RO monitors Tavg and announces expected control rod movement when it occurs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 11 of 36
- 2. 22 ABV Exhaust Fan stops l\t;;Srm~lali{ti9p~ ..~tC)r:.*lnser:t~RT;;1tt;;:;:
,;ori}directionJrom*lead.*Evaloator:;;~~i;i;; ;(fl.ltf6*g~p6werchange*::*i22J;;: . . .." Z,~&j~.;:' \
J ," :m~:t~rv; ',~ ,:.~/;~F:;f '~~'.;,~,;/:c<:;<, c<):';':"":'~ .~.~;<<, ~;QVERRIDE:;AG04E;OI)22*AUX,*\ .;SLDG:EXHAUST:F:AN.SToprj:!!,;i ':~~D" . :/',~;~~~~~~' ;. / ;'"/;,...... ,,,"i C RO reports AI R FLOW LO for 22 ABV Exhaust fan. RO reports 22 ABV Exhaust fan was running. but is now stopped. CRS dispatches an operator to check status of ABV Exhaust Fan breaker 2BX1AX1 Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched. report as the NEO breaker 2BX1AX12X is open, and there is nothing abnormal with the breaker, and there is no indication that the breaker tripped. Note: CRS may direct PO to CRS directs PO to start 23 ABV Exhaust Fan attempt to restart 22 ABV Exhaust lAW S2.0P-SO.ABV-0001. Auxiliary Building Fan since no apparent reason for it Ventilation System Operation. to stop running is present, but it will not start. Note: P&L 3.6 identifies that TSAS 3.7.7 is applicable. RO starts 23 ABV Exhaust fan and ensures PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106*0204 Page 12 of 36 AIR FLOW LO alarm clears. CRS enters TSAS 3.7.7 action a for not having all three ABV exhaust fans operable. Proceed to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 3. PRNI channel fails
.Si.ro(Jlat()r.5per~t()r;q~sertRT~ .
oH"directioniJrom" Lead Evaluator!'
- MAtE~NI0193BP
'ft.,ITO';)'"}'!,,':::* . ,Final.Value:200*'*"
RO announces control rods inserting at 72 steps per minute with no load rejection in progress, requests permission and places Rod Control in manual, and reports rod motion stopped.
~.in~lIlat~.r:*,Rp~.ra sure.ET.. S" is** *true."'fhe.nT~d ;; 'ceslr'in:;: *. man~. ~I\,'~hisi~sertst d;:'
':. contra I fail ure!"':"
~~~~~~~~
CRS directs PO to place the load ascension on hold. PO depresses Hold PB on digital EHC and ensures the load ascension stops. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 13 of 36 RO announces OHA E-28 PZR HTRS ON PRESS LO (if it alarms depending on how much rod insertion) as expected due to rod insertion and acknowledges bezel indication of 22 B/U htr group energizing in auto. Direct entry into S2.0P-AB.NIS CRS enters S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous 0001 may be performed. Steps are Rod Motion or S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear below. Instrumentation System Malfunction. CRS verifies with RO that placing rod control in manual stopped rod movement. RO reports PRNI channell has failed Note: There is no direction in RO reports outward rod motion is blocked by S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003 to lower the Overpower Rod Stop. turbine load to restore Tavg. RO reports rod motion was in the inward direction. RO reports PRNI channel I has failed high. S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001 steps CRS enters S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction. CRS ensures rod control is in manual. If not performed earlier, CRS directs PO to piace the turbine load change on hold. RO reports indications of 2N42 PRNI failed PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 14 of 36 Comment . . . . . ""' CRS directs PO to remove failed channel from service lAW S2.0P-SO.RPS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Trip/Restoration. S2.0P-SO.RPS-0001 Steps PO verifies tripping of associated bistables not result in an ESF or RPS actuation. PO ensures 2N42 is not selected on 2N45 recorder. CRS enters 3.3.1.1, Action 2 and 6 if not entered previously. PO informs crew prior to taking any action that will cause alarm status change. PO places Detector Current Comparator, Upper Section, switch in PRN42 and ensures Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-38 is clear. PO places Detector Current Comparator, Lower Section, s"'Jitch in PRN42 position and verifies Channel Defeat light illuminates and OHA E-46 is clear. PO places Power Mismatch Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42. PO places Rod Stop Bypass switch in Bypass PRN42 and ensures the overpower rod stop for channel I on 2RP4 is illuminated and OHA E-31 is clear. PO places Comparator Channel Defeat switch in N42 and ensures the Comparator Defeat PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA-106-0204 Paae 15 of 36 lamp illuminates and OHA E-39 is clear. PO reports to CRS that S2.0P-SO.RPS-001 is complete with the exception of actions required to be taken by I&C technician to trip the associated bistables. Note: CRS may elect to leave rods CRS directs RO to withdraw control rods to in manual due to step 3.6 of restore Tavg to within +/- 1.5 degrees of Tref. S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001 not being complete untill&C trips bistables. Continue to next event if this is the case. RO withdraws control bank D rods in a slow and deliberate manner, and places rod control in Auto when Tavg is within +/- 1 degrees of Tref. Proceed to next event after rods Crew updates AFD penalty minutes acquired if are restored to auto or at direction AFD went out of target band. of Lead Evaluator. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 16 of 36
- 4. 21 SGFP Trip on Low Control Oil Pressure
~imu~~~()r.ppe~~t~r: .lose~*RT-5 ... PO announces unexpected 21 SGFP Turb Oil
- 6n"cueftomJne*1l:~ad Evaluator,.) Res Lvi HI-LO alarm and refers to ARP.
Y'~ijl!!:i;~, ....... ,,~*U . .;,:k\:;;'
~5i;*iBli0105At21;;,$GFPtrjp
- . 'Fj~ari'Val;f~4~~$i'r~'.2,::t;Jil~,j' * .* :.,'.:'3;{'
- (J9~lill . ta1<e -90;,se onds,.fOr.[X.>; c
. reserVoirlo{levelalarm to come in be CRS dispatches an NEO to investigate the SGFP low oil pressure. CRS briefs crew on required actions for a SGFP trip with Rods in manual. Note: This alarm will occur approx PO reports OHA G-23, 21/22 SGFP Deviation 5 min after RT-5 insertion. and 21 SGFP speed decreasing CRS directs trip of 21 SGFP to initiate auto run back.
>SjmlJjatQrop~~at§r:'En~ure:ET:7;'; PO trips 21 SGFP. '. is>true when2:1 ..E)*~~PspEi~df;S;(2~1,i>\ ,I0'rl.ers to ';:250olrmTI~~ "hisinserts'~
..theS53TR'ona*j b.~rnuterar:oP**
.afiEita6minutedeJay,.,Y!~: J,,,:i;<
- '/" t{ ~;, ~ - , :'<t ::,; '/':'~:i:: ,; : ": : :~; ';~;: : :;:i:~(: !'i:!': :,~;:i'~'>: ':':~"":'::~{~~~?i
--.--~~ ~ ;{
Note: If Crew trips Reactor proceed to Event 7. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 17 of 36
""1\.'n.;;:~'A,~.'i"~:'fr, ;,:, "",~\"+;~~~~:;~
CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality. PO reports the automatic Main Turbine runback has not occurred. PO performs immediate actions by initiating Main Turbine run back by: Adjusting ramp rate to ,:::15%/MIN Adjusting SETTER-SETTER: .s,66% Selecting SETTER GO Note: Auto rod control is failed. RO performs immediate actions by manually inserting rods to maintain Tavg on program lAW Attachment 2, Section 3.0. CRS initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary for S2.0P-AB.CN-0001. PO reports 21 SGFP tripped. RO reports power is > P-10. RO initiates boration as required to maintain control rods above the RIL and restore AFD. PO verifies 22 SGFP speed has risen and is maintaining SG levels. PO reports the Polisher Bypass valves, 21 23CN 108s, are open. PO opens the CN47, Heater String Bypass Valve, opens, and shuts 21-24GB4 SG Blowdown Isolation Valves, and 21-24GB185 Blowdown Throttle Valves. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Paae 18 of 36 PO presses 21 SGFP trip PB if not performed previously and ensures AFP AUTO ARMED bezel lit for 21 SGFP. RO energizes PZR heaters. Note: Proceed to next event on RMS alarm for 22 Steam Generator Tube Leak.
- 6. 22 Steam Generator Tube Leak RO reports 2R53B for 22 SG in warning, followed shortly by 2R15 alarm.
Note: CRS will order Rx trip and SI CRS enters S2.0P-AB.SG-0001, Stearn when it is apparent that the tube Generator Tube Leak. leak is larger than the capacity of the RCS makeup system. CRS initiates Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. RO reports 2R19B when it alarms.
;<?iI11UI~torTOp~rat<:?r:;3lmin.~tes~'ii; CRS directs NEO to deenergize the Turbine
.. after.bei~g;?iSpatched,i9se(t~Rt~.~o{ . . Generator Area and Condensate Polishing
*10 todeenergizeJGA;sumps:',> Sumps.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 19 of 36 CRS directs swapping to a centrifugal charging pump, but orders Manual Rx Trip and SI when PZR level cannot be maintained lAW CAS. Note: Proceed to next event when CRS direct RO to trip the Rx, confirm the Rx CRS orders a reactor trip. trip, then initiate SIIAW CAS of S2.0P AB.SG-0001.
- 7. ATWT I FRSM RO attempts to trip the Rx and reports the Rx did not irip.
Crew identifies A TWT. RO attempts to trip the Rx with the other trip handle and reports the Rx did not trip. RO attempts to trip the Rx by opening both Rx trip breaker PBs and reports the Rx did not RO attempts to trip the Rx by opening PZR heater bus infeed breakers and reports the Rx did not PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 20 of 36 4HJYtJ'~~A:~' ,~ RO trips RO attempts to attain a RO initiates rod insertion in manual. faster rod speed by placing rods in auto, rod motion will stop and rods must be returned to manual and inserted. CRS/RO verify immediate actions of EOP TRIP-1 are complete. CT#1 (FR-S.1;C) Inserthegative CRS enters EOP-FRSM-1, Response to reactivityi pta to the core, by at Nuclear Power Generation. one ofthefoUowing .\> rnOTnnNc. prior td~ol'l1pletin9 . PO starts/ensures 21 and 22 AFW Pumps running. Note: The earliest AFW should be PO reports AFW flow <44E04 Ib/hr. isolated to 22 SG is at Step 10 of FRSM-1, and then only if at least 1 SG NR level is >9%. PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 21 of 36 PO starts 23 AFW pump. RO starts 21 and 22 charging pumps. RO reports no SI has occurred. RO initiates Rapid Boration by :
- Starting both Boric Acid Pumps in Fast Speed; - Opening 2CV175 Rapid borate Stop Valve; - Closing 21/22CV160 BAT Recire Valves; - Verifies Rapid Boration flow indicated on Rapid Borate flowmeter; - Maintaining charging flow >87 gpm.
RO reports PORVs operating as expected for current RCS pressure, and that both PORV block valves are open. RO reports containment isolation valves 2VC5 and 2VC6 are shut. PO performs APPX-3 Si verification when SI occurs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 22 of 36 Simulator6perat()rs"?OP~ll.the'7 CRS sends NEO to open RTBs, Rod Drive MG ~'react9~itrip . brf$Clker~~~minute~< Motor and Generator breakers. after theord~r;iS"glYenJ:Ultn .' PO reports all Turbine Stop Valves closed. RO reports when the Reactor is tnpped. PO maintains AFW flow >44E4 Ibm/hr until at least one SG NR level is > 9%, then throttle AFW flow to maintain SG NR levels 9-33%. CRS sends NEO to isolate dilution paths and PO checks no primary water flow on FI111 A. PO reports no faulted SG or uncontrolled cooldown. RO reports no CETs are >1200°F. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Paae 23 of 36 RO confirms reactor trip by 3 PRNls <5% and IRNls SUR negative. CRS directs Chemistry to sample RCS for boron. CRS directs performance of Shutdown Margin. CRS transitions back to TRIP-1 after completing FRSM-1. Note: Proceed to next event after transition back to TRIP-1
- 5. Steam Generator Tube Rupture Evaluators: Log reentry time RO verifies reactor and turbine trip.
into TRIP-1 to start clock fo r critical tasks: TIME:_:_ _ RO reports all4kV Vital Buses energized. RO reports either:
- SI has actuated OR - SI has not actuated, and SI is required by plant conditions.
RO initiates SI if auto SI has not occurred. RO announces 2 Reactor Trip. Safety PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 24 of 36 Injection (twice) on PA.
*. . *. *.c.. . F.* *. *..#. .* . .2. . . **.*. (..*.~.*. . . -...3. *. *.-.*. . .A .::rupturedSGwithin.~Omii1utes(ofM . .*. . J; . *.'. *.*.S. . . .*.O. .*'*. . I.a. . **. t. . e.".'. A . .**. . . . ;.t.*.. 9. J. . .h. . . . e. . *.**.**.*,j .*. . F..* ,.'.*W PO closes flow into 2222AF11 SG. and 22AF21 to isolate AFW ,,.~ent~.::!~'OT~~R*~ag~;*** ,,' . }s.ub.~~qu~htly.910~~* .*~~.M "22MS1a;:;'22MS1"ANi:f22 """,':':<',' <:-;",.;>! ,,':!;<:<J,n',,' ~::~.'(',' ," .,,--,--,' '-, "'"
- J~*~r~te(tb~~~i.I ~~ur~:~~<3{R~ic
- ~ transitiorito SGTR~3;~?0";": 'Yil"i/i'.;:,.
'" y>i~~"':' '-- ,-d' />;;~;~,'\,,; ';;t:;~:::~~~i/'NFJ'- ;;;~~:)""":'::"::'::' ":-~~~il1X SAT' PO identifies all SG NR levels >9% and throttles AFW to SGs.
PO verifies SEC loading complete for all available equipment on energized 4kV Vital Buses. PO reports proper safeguards valve alignments. PO reports MSLI not required. PO reports all 4KV vital buses are energized. RO reports Control Room Ventilation in Accident Pressurized Mode. RO runs 2 Switchgear Room Supply fans and one exhaust fan. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 25 of 36
;bl';'l<\f'Q'~wHa"'+: Respo'i1se h~~;f~~ d),': ~~'~ ~:
RO reports 2 CCW pumps running. RO reports leg recirc has been established. RO reports greater than 100 gpm charging flow SI systems charging flowmeter. RO reports RCS pressure is >1540 psig. RO/PO verifies AFW flow >22E04 Ib/hr or SG level> 9%. RO reports all RCPs are running. RO reports RCS Tavg is stable at or trending to 54rF. RO reports both reactor trip breakers are open. RO reports both PZR PORVs are shut and PORV block valves status. RO reports all RCPs and spray valves shut. IF RCS pressure is < 1350 psig and ECCS flow is established, then RO stops all RCPs. RO maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs. RO reports no faulted SGs. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 26 of 36 Evalu'ii!()rlln~l~uctorActivity,;r"i;>> .' "Exp~ae(fPlatiVStufjentRe'Sp'Onse%"'5/'SB:t';:~;;:i; .*.Coinrften't~3;£~t?;r< ..;;;..... ft;*
.. "",' .......;:';;:.; i <: ,<:i:::il:'~' ...* *:~:'t~:.; .' .. . Q *. . ' ***" * * * *: } : , . ; : . >. ,.... .Ji~Ji:*~¥i~~~;~\?; ';.~.;r* LQG."
PO reports 22 SG NR level is rising in an uncontrolled manner. CRS transitions to EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. PO reports 22 SG NR level is rising in an uncontrolled manner. PO sets 22MS10 to 1045 psig, and reports 22MS10 is shut. SEE CT#2 PREVIOUS PAGE PO shuts 22MS167, and reports 22MS18, 22MS7, and 22GB4 are shut PO reports 21 or 23 is not the ruptured SG. Role Play: 5 minutes after CRS dispatches an operator to close 2SS327. requested, report 2SS327 closed. PO reports 22 SG is isolated from intact SGs. PO reports 22 SG NR level >9% and that all feedwater flm.,v is isolated to 22 SG. RO reports power is available to 2PR6, and power is deenergized to 2PR7. CRS leaves power deenergized to 2PR7. RO verifies PORV status is correct for current RCS pressure. RO reports 2PR6 is open and 2PR7 is shut. PO reports no SGs are faulted. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 27 of 36 PO adjusts AFW flow to maintain at least 1 SG NR level> 9%, and all SG NR levels 9-33%. RO/PO reset Safeguards Actuations:
- Resets SI
- Resets Phase A
- Opens 21 & 22CA330
- Resets each SEC
- Resets each 230V Control Center.
RO stops 21 & 22 RHR pumps. PO reports 22 SG is isolated and >375 psig. CRS dispatches NEO to shift Gland Sealing Steam to Unit 1. PO notifies CRS 22MS10 starts to open .
. Simulator*ODerator~,cEnsure. el'..4 CREW commences RCS cooldown with the
. ,fnsert~wheri'hig hest,.r!1c;ore~'~>*~~ >', ** Steam Dumps using intact SGs to value thermocouple is l.essttl?n,§~OQ '." determined from Table D (503 deg) .. ~AL~~i~N~08~0Ld,SS;:Qf.Cond.,,:;:(.f: .VaCuum . '>"'?,~"~: .'i~*:*'
/><:"
PO places Steam Dumps in manual. PO adjusts steam pressure valve demand to zero. PO places steam to Pressure Control. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 28 of 36
'Ev(lIuatorllnstructoF~Activify~/:;', '.:;. / '.' ., ExpettCid:Ph:rotlS(u(fenlRespol1se:::i!j::t 0q; S8T, *'Cofnirient:;*;;*~Z '><~':' .<.:::..~\~ " . .c\*,' ,\.,,,: " ~'/Y!'l':w"': ," ..J,~r~?'*>'*";/'*'
- ~ .' :~~., :;~:::~: ,isb£;<" ..";:,i;tlf: "':" ':~. :'., .;:::.;'::2~ e'G' . . L()~t PO adjusts steam pressure valve demand to 25%.
Proceed to next event when When Tavg low-low is reached, PO bypasses highest incore thermocouple is less Tavg and verifies steam dumps reopen. than 540°.
- 8. Loss of Condenser Vacuum!
Steam Dumps RO reports "DO HI" in alarm as not expected. Note: Crew should monitor steam PO reports OHA G-5 Condenser Vac Lo. dumps but not swap to MS10s early as this is an increased release to the public. Note: CRS may implement S2.0P CRS briefs crew on potentia! loss of steam AB-COND-1 for loss of vacuum. dumps with degrading vacuum. CRS dispatches an NEO to look for vacuum leaks. SimulatorOp~rator:lnsure ET-6 PO reports Steam Dump valves have closed. inserts when CETis<518. . MAlF:MS()093 Lossot 8tm Dump VacPermissive . PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 29 of 36 ~;'l'~r1'Evaluatorllnstruct(),. .Activity ~XI?~*~tf'tPlan*tlSt~CfefWResp()n~ei\ ;;;;._ '. '.i' Comment: .. uU *.'
'%~fuFt~tfi;0Y ~:': :\kt\w t>~~ ~::<,,;S;:i<'" ,< ~L<{:'L';':-\:.<'*~> ,',' ' , .,' ",<..',:; &P;" ,~~. , /';L\'7~:':;H:t;~XO. ~;~~;:"IJ,t:i',~, j1~k:~i~1~~ll~,: ~r;~:~QG~'<1'1'~\n,,<>>r~J/ ,:;::il~~t>>;::,<:i:"i~A ,<;'~;.~ <
CRS returns to step 1S.2 and answers "Steam Dumps not available" PO re-commences cooldown by fully opening 21,23, and 24MS10. CT#3{E~3,:B}: EstC!!blishl RO reports hottest CET is < S03°F. i' maintain .R<;~.;JeITlRfuature*to,'~~'s
'maintain minimum required/0 / .*: ; . ; , PO stops the cooldown and dumps steam as ';~~~~:I&9,:~'~!J~~~"
required to maintain temperature < target temperature. Terminate scenario when crew has demonstrated the ability to maintain temperature at target temperature. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 30 of 36 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. S2.0P-AB.ROD-0001, Continuous Rod Motion F. S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction G. S2.0P-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality H. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection I. 2-EOP-FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation J. 2-EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific l::lermission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Revision 2 Page 31 of 36 AITACHMENT1 UNITTWO PLANT STATUS TODAY MODE: POWER: 69.5% RCS BORON: 937 MWe 840 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5,6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Power reduction from 100% to 70% at 1% per minute was completed 30 minutes ago. Power ascension to 100% power will be performe,d at 10% per hour. Xenon is building in at 60 pcm per hour. Reactivity plan for the power ascension is to perform 900 gallon batch dilutions every 30 minutes, while using rod control to maintain AFD and Tavg on program. Rx fuel is conditioned to 100% power. MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATErrlME OF EXPIRATION: EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: IOP-4, Power Operation Step 5.1.19 is complete. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: Main Turbine power is 71% (PT-505/506 -537 psig) RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: 25 SW pump crr for strainer work. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific F)ermission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 ATTACHMENT 2
. SIMULATOR REA[)Y FOR TRAINING CHECKLIST
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ~AA~ 106-0204 Revision 2 Page 33 of 36 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY*** ~~~~~--~--.------~~ In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by thEl scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challen!~e to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106-0204 Revision 2 Page 34 of 36 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 09-01 NRC ESG-2 REVIEWER: ~~. ~ ~ Initials Qualitative Attributes rrr
.\
- 1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.
- 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events.
t 3. 4. The scenario consists mostly of related events. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point
~ 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into t"~ 8.
the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. f The simulator modeling is not altered.
; 9 All crew competencies can be evaluated.
y 10. The scenario has been validated.
\....... 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
( 12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Revision 2 Page 35 of 36 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellE~nt evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.S.d) Initial Quantitative AttributE3s (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.S.d) 7 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 1 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 1 Major Transients: 1-2 2 EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions: 1-2 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 3 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*-AA-106-0204 Page 36 of 36 09-01 NRC ESG-2 CT #1: (FR-S.1-C) Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods prior to completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (FRSM) BASIS: Failure to insert negative reactivity under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of this critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Since Salem employs flow charts vice the standard Westinghouse two-column format, there are no immediate actions associated with FRSM. The immediate actions of FRSM are contained in step 2 of EOP TRIP-1 and steps 1-4 of FRSM. Thus the time limit of this critical task is extended to step 4 of FRSM to maintain alignment. CT #2: (E-3-A) Isolate AFW to the ruptured SG within 10 minutes of entry into TRIP-1 and subsequently close 22MS167, 22MS18, 22MS7 and 22G84 in SGTR-1. BASIS: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that " ... necessitates the crew taking compensating actions which complicates the event mitigation strategy ... " CT #3: (E-3-B) Establish/Maintain RCS temperature so a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur because Tave is too high to maintain minimum subcooling, OR below the RCS temperature that causes an extreme challenge (Red) or severe (Purple) challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF. BASIS: Failure to establish and maintain the correct ReS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that" ... necessitates the crew taking compensating actions which complicates the event mitigation strategy ... " PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 P 37 of 36 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN Event YIN Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water Y Steam Generator Tube Rupture N Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out N LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN YIN COMPOI\jENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Y Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Y Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-3 Op-Test No.: 09-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 100%, EOL. 21 CFCU is CIT. Turnover: Maintain current power. Event Malf. No. Event Event Type* No. Description C 1 CC0172B CCW pump trip (TS) (standby pp falls to auto start) CRS/RO O/R C80S C 2 Loss of 28 4KV bus (TS) O/R C80S ALL R 3 Power reduction to <'100%. ALL 4 MS0088Cr M Steam Leak in containment. C 5 RPOO58 ATWT, (auto demand-no trip-manual trip works) RO I MSOO90Cr M 6 VL0420- MSLI fails, Multiple SG depressurization, ALL 423 !
~
RP0276A,B C 7 Auto CS & Phase 8 isolation fails. RP0277A,B CRSRO Recovery of single SG in LOSC-2. II I .. I I CTs man init trip, man inti phase B, lower AFW 1E41bm/hr fiO::J
* (N)ormaJ, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D. Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 1 of 34 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIIO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: Loss of 2B 4KV/460V, Steam leak in containment SCENARIO NUMBER: 09-01 NRC ESG-3 EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Date EXPECTED DURATION: 80 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 00 PROGRAM: '--_--' LO. REQUAL L.--_X_J INITIAL LICENSE L--_---IJ STA OTHER Revision Summary New Issue for 09-01 NRC Exam PREPARED BY: G Gauding 07-10-11 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: '~-'L - If ojii"aons Trarning Manager Date g/,I,,_
~
APPROVED BY: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 3 of 34 A. Given a situation with an OHA alarm, the crew will perform action(s) to investigate and correct the cause of the alarm, lAW approved station procedures. B. Given the unit with multiple OHAs in alarm, the crew will prioritize, validate and then determine a course of action when provided with additional information, lAW approved station procedures. C. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with the approved station procedures. D. Given indication of a loss or malfunction of a safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. E. Given a loss of a 4 Kv vital bus, take corrective action, lAW S2.0P-AB.4KV-0002. Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedure:s. G. Given indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given the unit at 100% power with a steam leak, the crew will take corrective action for a steam leak, lAW S2.0P-AB.STM-0001 I. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with trle a:)proved station procedures. J. Given the indication of excessive steam flow, DIRECT the response to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. N. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the n3sponse to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. O. Given the order or indications of a loss of secondary coolant, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the coolant loss in accordance with the approved station procedures. P. Given indication of a loss of secondary coolant, DIRECT the response to the loss of secondary coolant, in accordance with the approved station procedures. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 4 of 34 Q. Given the order or indications of a multiple steam generator depressurization, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the generator depressurization in accordance with the approved station procedures. R. Given indication of a multiple steam generator depressurization, DIRECT the response to the generator depressurization in accordance with the approved station procedures. S. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. T. Given indication of excessive containment pressure, DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. U. During performance of emergency operating procedures, monitor the critical safety function status trees in accordance the EOP in effect. A. 22 CCW pump trip B. Loss of 2B 4KV/460V bus (EDG energizes) C. Steam leak in containment D. Steam rupture in containment with failure of MSLI. E. Recovery of single SG in LOSC-2 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 5 of 34 A. The crew takes the watch with the unit at 100% power, EOl. 21 CFCU is CIT after it tripped 1 hour ago. Orders for the shift are to maintain 100% power. B. Shortly after assuming the watch, 22 CCW pump will trip, with no auto start of the standby pump. Operators will take manual control and stali 23 CCW pump. The CRS will enter TSAS 3.7.3 for less than 2 operable CCW loops. C. Once the CCW pump Tech Spec has been identified, 2B 4KV vital bus infeed breakers will open, along with the 4KV-460V tie breaker. 2B EDG will start and load 2B Vital bus in SEC MODE 11*, Single Vital Bus Undervoltage. The crew will respond to stabilze the plant lAW S2.0P-ABAKV-0002, loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus. 22 AFW pump will start, and Rx power will rise above 100% power. 22 AFW pump will not be able to be stopped from the control room, nor will the 21 or 22 AF21 valves respond if AFW flow from 22 AFW pump is attempted to be lowered. The crew will perform a power reduction to less than 100% power. The CRS will identify the appropriate Tech Spec. D. Once power has been reduced to <: 100% power, a small steam leak in containment will ramp in over 5 minutes. The crew will identify changing containment conditions, and respond lAW S2.0P-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow. Once the need for a unit shutdown is made, the steam line will rupture in containment. E. The Rx will not automatically trip, and will be tripped by the crew. Auto and manual MSLI fails to shut the MSIV's. Containment Spray and Phase B isolation fail to actuate and will be manually initiated. F. The crew will transition to 2-EOP-lOSC-1, Steam Generator Depressurization, then 2-EOP lOSC-2 for Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization. G. The crew will perform 2-EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure to ensure containment cooling systems are in correct lineup. H. While in 2-EOP-lOSC-2, a single SG MS167 will be locally shut, and the crew will take the CAS action to transition to EOP-lOSC-1. I. The scenario will be terminated when the crew has transitioned back to 2-EOP-lOSC-1. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 6 of 34 __ IC-243 100% power, EOL 1 RH 1 and RH2 crr 2 RH18s err 3 VC1 and VC4 crr 4 RCPs (SELF CHECK) _ 5 RTBs (SELF CHECK) _ 6 MS167s (SELF CHECK) _ 7 500 KV SWYO (SELF CHECK) _ 8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) _ 9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 10 21 CFCU CIT. _ 11 SGSD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3. 12 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 7 of 34 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group Description EVENT ka604dmm 1123 CC PUMP-MANUAL ACTION: DOR KA604PBM 3 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE:
t-----~- -l----~--------~--_--IL ~------------------ ____------------------------------------------------------ ------.. -.-..--.------...-
EVENT ka604dmm II 23 CC PUMP-MANUAL ACTION: DOR QA604AWM 5 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: EVENT ka604dmm 1123 CC PUMP-MANUAL ACTION: DOR QA604DBM 7 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE:
*-----c***----c-----------=----=-*=+c---::-_c-c----:--:---:-=---,----.. ....
---.---~-- --~-~------------.-----------------------
EVENT MONP254 <101/ CONT ROD BANK C < 10 (RX TRIP) ACTION: DOR KB515LCP -1 0 9 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: EVENT ACTION: 11 COMMAND: <update as needed> PURPOSE: 01 02 03 NfA 0 00:05:00 RT-5 1.5 04 NfA NiA N!A RT-7 05 06 07 08 09 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Pa Je 8 0 f34 10 _J~P0276A AUTO PHASE B FAI LS TO ACT, TRN WA 1>1U', N1A NfA 11 ....RP0276B AUTO PHASE B FAILS TO ACT, TRN NiA N/A NiA N/A 12 iI RP0277A AUTO CNT SPRY FAILS TO ACT,TRN mmmm~ NiA N!A N/A N!A 13 i RP0277B AUTO CNT SPRY FAILS TO ACT,Ti~N NiA N/A NIA N!A 14 AF0181B 22 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP Ni,i~ N/A NfA ET-9 SELF CHECK 01 N/A N/A RT*3 ON 02 N;A ON 03 NlA 04 NfA 05 NfA N;A N/A 06 N'"
~ :K NjA N!A 07 N!A NfA I'lfA OFF 08 8515 F DI 22AF21 CLOSE N'A NiA
- 1. None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 9 of 34 A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives. S, Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 10 of 34
- 1. 22 CCW pump Trip Simulator Operator: \Ih~ert RT~1t~[
on directionifrom LeadE;.valuator('
- frY<; ,,\~.:;
. ' ' ,~:,:' ~<,,::,''':' "",,~:11/~~/'~~:;>:':h':::.
- .*.MALF:'CC0172Bc 22Ccimpbnent.*.
'.C()()~J~g *.**R~e,.r~i~'i\lii.':1rji:i~~:J' ~ii; *. i *....*.
RO announces unexpected alarms:
- 22 CCW pump trip Barrier Discharge Flow Low 21/22CC header pressures - OHA's 020-23 RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO PO reports standby CCW pump did not auto start.
CRS directs PO to manually start 23 CCW pump. Sirrlula,to~.qperator:',., PO places 23 CCW pump in manual, and En~ure.ET's3! 5i &7*areTRUE./, starts 23 CCW pump. wh~n 23CCW'R~rnp'fT1~nual Ps,*.!s. depreSs~?JbiS~dEllete§the .. ,./i~;: PO reports all alarms associated with 22 CC i:>verrides,Whicbmade;'2~~. CCW{//. pump trip have cleared. p.'~.' m 0.
.*p.. . . !o. klike.*.*.*..i.t..:.*. *.'.*,.a.s.*. *.*.,.i. .n.*.*. .
Itwaslntv1E1l1uaL'" . ' ...*......._._ w.**...
. .* ~~!Owhen:.;.. 0<
l* PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 11 of 34 CRS dispatches personnel to investigate CCW pump trip. Note: An entry condition for CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CC-001, Component S2.0P-AB.CC-001 is CC header Cooling Abnormality, and directs initiation of low pressure. Starting the standby Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary. pump will restore CCW header pressure, and entry into AB.CC is PO reports Surge Tank level is neither rising not required. The steps for AB.CC nor lowering. are listed here if the CRS enters the procedure. Step 3.44 is a PO reports CCW header pressure alarm procedural loop that directs CRS to status. return to step 3.2 for rediagnosis after CCW header pressure is restored or confirmed. IF dispatched to remove control If CCW pump not started previously, then PO power from 22 CCW pump, call will start 23 CCW pump. control room 2 minutes after being dispatched for a first check, use REMOTE CC25D to OFF to deenergize 22 CCW pump controi power. PO reports CC HDR PRESSURE LO alarms are clear PO reports CCW HX temps not high or rising. Role Play: 2 minutes after being dispatched to breaker, report overcurrent flags are tripped for 22 CCW pump 4KV breaker. Role Play: 3 minutes after being CRS enters TSAS 3.7.3 for only one operable dispatched to 22 CCW pump, CCW loop. report that there is nothing obviously wrong with 22 CCW pp. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 12 of 34 Continue to next event on direction from Lead Evaluator.
- 2. UV on 28 4KV vital bus with loss of 28 460/230V vital bus.
*.**OIRi;(:i()~::bvDk~;~~b.:2*** ';" ."";.;...*"'., **,;.,** ,;,;...,,. .'. ".*'1'*
1]:~i~~:=~:~e:;g~2?******';~~i;:c\' . I RO/PO announce multiple OHA and Console alarms. Note: The Full Core Display Rod Bottom lights will all illuminate and IRPI indication will go to zero. Crew diagnoses the loss of 2B 4KV vital bus, and 2B EDG is loading in MODE 11* (Single Vital Bus UV). Note: The 2B4D 460V breaker open bezel and 22 CCW pump stop bezel will flash continuously, PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 13 of 34 and are unable to be silenced control power is removed from the breakers. Note: The 2B40 460V breaker should have remained shut during the SEC loading sequence, but has tripped open. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.4KV-0002, Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus. Note: Rx power rises above 100% with the addition of cold AFW. When the crew determines a power reduction must be performed, go to steps on page 16 of this guide. CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1, Action Summary. CRS dispatches an operator to monitor 2B EOG. RO reports 2SW26 is open based on having no power to close it, and Main Turbine and TGA parameters related to SW cooling water are stable, and dispatches an operator to locally check position. IF dispatched to remove control power from 22 CCW pump, call control room 2 minutes after being dispatched for a first check, then use REMOTE CC25D to OFF to deenergize 22 CCW pump control power. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ~AA*1 06-0204 Paae 14 of 34 I F dispatched to remove control power from breaker 284D. call control room 2 minutes after being dispatched for a first check, then use REMOTE ED53D to OFF to deenergize breaker 284D control power. RO reports 21 charging pump was not supplying seal injection and charging flow. RO reports 22 RHR pump was not providing core cooling. PO reports 28 vital bus is energized from 28 EDG. RO reports OHA E-20 PZR HTR ON LVL HI when it annunciates due to 21 charging pump running. PO resets emergency loading for 28 EDG. PO resets 28 230V control center. PO reports 2SW26 is open based on having no power to close it, and Main Turbine and TGA parameters related to SW cooling water are stable. CRS directs stopping of loads being powered from 28 EDG: PO stops 24 SW pump based on 4 SW pumps in service. RO stops 21 charging pump based on 23 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 15 of 34 charging pump in service. Note: Charging flow will lower to RO adjusts charging flow as required to - 65 gpm when 21 charging pump maintain 6-12 gpm seal injection flow to each is secured. RCP, and not exceed 40 gpm total seal injection flow. RO reports letdown did not isolate. PO reports stable SG levels. PO depresses 22 AFW pump start PB. RO opens 21-24SS94s. CRS determines if SGBD is to be restored. PO restores SGBD to service if required. RO/PO depresses 22 AFW pump stop PB and reports 22 AFW pump remains in service. If CRS directs PO to close 21AF21 and 22AF22, PO reports 21AF21 and 22AF22 remain open. IF directed to locally open 22 AFW CRS dispatches personnel to 22 AFW pump pump breaker, do NOT open it breaker. unless the power reduction has been performed. IF power reduction to < 100% power has been performed, AND direction to locally open breaker has been given, then:
- 1. Delete 110 B512 for 22 AFW pump Stop PB.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Paae 16 of 34
- 2. Open 22 AFW pump breaker with REMOTE AF28D to TRIP.
- 3. Power Reduction to less than CRS directs PO to initiate a power reduction.
100% power. RO calculates boration required for power reduction, and initiates boration. PO initiate turbine load reduction to power specified by CRS at directed rate, and ensures load reduction starts. PO ensures load reduction stops at the specified level, and sets digital EHC up for the SGFP runback (66% @15%/minute). Note: Time considerations may CRS enters TSAS 3.6.2.3 action b for 3 preclude identification of all Tech CFCUs inoperable (21 CIT, 22 and 24 have no Specs associated with the B Bus power.) probable. Post scenario query may CRS enters TSAS 3.6.1.1 for Containment be necessai)' for all Tech Spec Integrity based on 2S'vV26 being inoperable. identifications. CRS enters TSAS 3.8.1.1 for off-site power to 4KV vital bus. CRS enters TSAS 3.8.2.1 for loss of power to 4KV/460V vital buses. CRS enters TSAS 3.9.12 for less than full complement of FHV fans operable. CRS enters TSAS 3.4.5 for loss of power to PORV Block valve 2PR7. CRS enters 3.8.2.3 and 3.8.2.5 for 125V and 28VDC battery chargers. Continue to next event at lead Evaluators direction. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nucfear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204
.~~g~.~ Tot 34
- 4. Steam Leak in Containment
,~Sim.~.j~i~~rOB~rato en dirsCtlgn.fror ij~~Li~~:s;.? R~~P:,\5(;~,:v. i Final.Value::t'l; RO reports CFCU leak detection HI. as unexpected. RO reports rising level on 23 and CFCU leak detection. RO reports rising containment pressure, and Containment Pressure High console alarm. PO determines no rise in CNTMT radiation and that a steam leak is inside containment based on rising containment pressure. CRS enters S2.0P.AB.STM-0001. Excessive Steam Flow.
,iii ~if!1Ulatpr2per~ton CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1 rate.ofcontainment{' Continuous Action summary.
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TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 18 of 34 PO verifies EHC system operating correctly, and MS10s and Steam Dumps are closed. CRS determines a shutdown is required and plans rate and reactivity management. RO calculates boration required. Note: It takes - 8 seconds from the insertion of RT-7 for the automatic Rx trip signal to be generated. "<C;Itt1(E-:O~A)Manuallytripl~~"...... RO reports demand for RX trip F Window reactorfrom lhe<controEroom.<:; annunciates, and initiates a manual reactor prior. tcfSGdryout .'J,., . ";;;
>.1: , ". ~ " "/: / c trip and informs CRS of ATWT.
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- F"<>',:';', ;""C' CRS directs MSLI and verification of Safety Injection when RX trip is confirmed.
RO reports MSLI failed and reports SI has auto initiated, and backs uo SI PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 19 of 34 RO continues with Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection:
- Trips Turbine - Reports all Vital AC buses energized - Reports SI actuated After Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1 are completed, CRS may order PO to attempt MSLI isolation at 2CC3 and 2CC2 controls (fast and slow close).
CRS/RO verify immediate actions of EOP TRIP-1 are complete by performing verification of immediate action steps. Note: STA will arrive in the control RO announces Rx trip and Safety injection. room 10 minutes after being called to initiate monitoring of CFSTs. Note: With all SGs faulted, AFW PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 flow should not be isolated to any Ibm/hr with eRS concurrence. SG. PO reports SEC loading is not complete for A and B vital buses. Reports A bus is 21 AFW pump and 21 CFCU which are both CIT. Reports B bus is 2B40 breaker and 22 ABV Supply fan. PO reports all available equipment started. PO reports 21 and 23 AFW pumps are operating. RO reports numerous safeguards valves have failed to realign due to no power available from PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 u6-0204 Page 20 of 34
~~M'~h'h1f1C;i 2B 460/230V buses, but reports that all valves have a redundant valve in the flowpath that has shut.
CRS dispatches personnel to realign safeguards valves which have not aligned to their safeguards positions. RO reports 21 and 22CA330s are RO reports containment pressure is > 15 psig. RO reports Phase B and Containment Spray have not automatically initiated. RO manually initiates CS and Phase B, stops RCPs, and verifies Phase B valve L--...:......-_--"-_ _~_ _'_'___'_~_----"____'___J alig nments. RO reports High Steam Flow SI status and failure of MSLI to shut MS167s. Role Play: Respond when CRS contacts WCC to assist in closing contacted that you will assemble a MS167s locatly. team of operators and mechanics and attempt to shut the valves you were directed to shut.
!f CRS dispatches an NEO directly to attempt closure of any MS167, state that you will report to the WCC to pick up a Safety Man.
PO reports all 4KV vital busses are energized. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-1 U6-0204 Page 21 of 34 RO reports CAV is in Accident Pressurized mode. Note: The 2C SEC must be RO runs 2 switchgear room supply fans and blocked and reset to allow start 1 exhaust fan. of 23 switchgear supply fan. RO reports 2 CCW pumps are running. RO reports correct ECCS pump alignment and expected flows for RCS Note: PO should have lowered PO reports AFW flow is >22E4 Ibm/hr, and AFW flow to as close to 22E4 maintains total AFW flow >22E4 Ibm/hr. Ibm/hr as possible. RO reports all Reps are stopped. PO reports RCS temperature is not being controlled, and MSLI has failed to close any MS167. RO reports both reactor trip breakers are open. RO reports both PZR PORVs are shut and both Block valves are open. PO reports all SG pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized. CRS transitions to EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant. Timing of scenario will determine STA reports Red or Purple path on when FRCE Red or Purple path is Containment environment. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 22 of 34
- Expectect~lant/StuaenfResponse ...' Comment ....
Evaluatcir/lnstructofActivity .....*.,
/;~;"", ":: c "<y:," " ', '> ,:;<~t.,~'~~:;i:~::~~.~:~t/<:< ,~, , ,"'\,~,~'>:. *'\*:::/~~:*;r:.,\ ,c~!.:.,,\),~,~{ "-;' , ". "" ,.v; " .;;)~~g~3*;.** . ~.:: ',-.,c,'"
reported by the STA. When FRCE transition is made, go to FRCE steps on page 24. CRS transitions to EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure. LOSC-1 steps begin here. PO reports all MS167s are open. Role Play if not previously CRS dispatches personnel to shut 21 performed: Respond when 24MS167s if not previously performed. contacted that you will assemble a team of operators and mechanics and attempt to shut the valves you were directed to shut. If CRS dispatches an NEO directly to attempt closure of any MS167, state that you will report to the WCC to pick up a Safety Man. PO reports all SG pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized. CRS transitions to EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization. LOSC-2 steps begin here PO ensures all BF19s, BF40s, BF13s, MS10's, MS7s, MS18s, and GB4s are shut, and reports all MS167s remain open. CRS dispatches operators to close MS167s one loop at a time if not previously dispatched. Note: When SGs are completely CRS determines 23 AFW pump is needed to depressurized, 23 AFW pump will maintain SG levels. slow down due to inadequate PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 23 of 34 steam supply. If 23AF21 and 24AF21 were shut earlier in scenario, they will have to be opened to establish AFW flow. CRS directs performance of Shutdown Margin monitoring. RO reports RCS cooldown rate is > 100°F/hr.
- JCT¥3"~~RC~~;a!
- tes1~'~.~educ~(*\:':~ PO minimizes AFW flow to all SGs while (V;to~~~less!th~~"1'E4Ibn1l1ir:::\;;; maintaining a minimum of 1E4 Ibm/hr to each
.pe{iS.G,pdot,to.e~itingERGE~1r~*;i>* , , -'".' , -' ,-. ',,'.':.",,-,' -----f:':~::~~:~
SG. SC~f~~: RO reports RCS Thot status. Note: Once the SGs have RO reports all RCPs stopped. completely depressurized, RCS pressure will rapidly rise to the PZR PORV setpoint. RO reports when RCS pressure is being contro!led by automatic PZR PORV cycling. Sih'dl<ltor;gp~ratc)t:'.Moaify,jhe:: ~fv1~LF\'~~~geiatijdwith~;~he':M§1
- the<C~§;b~,sid,irect~~.pe~clo,~~dj'*'
- ~*firstfr6rrii*~5
- ;1td10;;6~*it.l1ospeclfi~1~;j
- lb6ph~stfeeli~selg~~~~;ijeJefe"~he'0 .
.,~.MACF:<;lss9Ciafed,wltW;the,loop)~ h'
- wnlcf;thas:tnei})igHEisf"SG.**press
"~"M ALJ:s:. ~:i~'#JtI;fj2L';:"{:~ :;-~';,~~1:;\;*lPi~~~~~:l\~'~:::i}~~\(~~~:;;",~;~::~':" <"*:<~i~,~:'> PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 24 of 34 PO reports selected MS167 valve is shut. Note: IF step 8 is reached prior to PO reports selected SG pressure is rising. identification of MS 167 shut and SG pressure rising, the crew wilt perform SI reduction steps 8-20 before transitioning to LOSC-1. CRS transitions to LOSC-1 based on a single SG pressure rise. FRCE-1 Steps begin here. PO verifies Phase A isolation valve shut and 2VC5 and 2VC6 shut. RO reports:
- Containment pressure> 15 psig - LOCA-5 not in effect - Containment Spray in service - Phase B isolation valves - RCPs stopped.
RO reports CFCU status:
- 21 CFCU CIT. - 22 and 24 CFCU have no power to fans, but SEC shut the respective 460V Low Speed breakers, and SW is being supplied to CFCUs. - 23 and 25 CFCU running normally in Low Speed.
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TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 25 of 34
.;f:5?V;(~:
RO reports MSIVs remain open. PO minimizes AFW to all SGs while maintaining at least 1E4 Ibm/hr per SG. PO verifies all BF19s, BF40s, and BF13s are shut or dispatches operators to locally shut them. PO reports selected MS167 valve is shut. PO reports selected SG pressure is rising. PO maintains at least 1E4 Ibm/hr to each SG. CRS transitions to procedure in effect (LOSC-1 or 2) STA reports RED path on Heat Sink CSF after PO reduces AFW flow. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 26 of 34 CRS transitions to EOP-FRHS-1. Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and verifies it was operator action that lowered AFW flow less than 22E4 Ibm/hr, and returns to procedure in effect (LOSC-1 or LOSC-2). Terminate scenario after the transition to LOSC-1 on rising SG pressure has been made. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 27 of 34 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. Salem FSAR E. OP-AA-101-111-1003. Use of Procedures F. S2.0P-AB.CC-0001. Component Cooling Abnormality G. S2,OP-ABAKV-0002. Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus H. S2.0P-AB.STM-0001. Excessive Steam Flow I. 2-EOP-TRIP-1. Rx Trip or Safety Injection J. 2-EOP-LOSC-1. Loss of Secondary Coolant K. 2-EOP-LOSC-2. Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization L. 2-EOP-FRCE-1. Response to Excessive Containment Pressure M. 2-EOP-FRHS-1. Loss of Secondary Heat Sink PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106*0204 Revision 2 Page 28 of 34 ATIACHMENT.1 MODE: 1 POWER: 100% RCS BORON: 19 MWe 1230 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5, 6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATEITIME OF EXPIRATION: 21 CFCU CIT after its high speed breakers tripped 1 hour ago. TSAS 3.6.2.3 action a. EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PHOGRESS: ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: SECONDARY: RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: None PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING
- 1. Verify simulator is in 'TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Hams ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in operation
- 5. Simulator clacks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test) and burned aut lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple calor procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorde,rs are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 CRITICAL TASK METHODOL()GY_-,--~-,---,-,,--,-_~ \il In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination te,am, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert cont~ol rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions includE~ those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challen!Je to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Revision 2 Page 31 of 34 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 09-01 NRC ESG-3 REVIEWER: ~~r 4/01/\ Initials Qualitative Attributes
~1. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario.
17 2 The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumei1tation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. W The scenario consists mostly of related events. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction( s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. Sequencing/timing of events is neasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. The simulator modeling is not altered. All crew competencies can be evaluated. The scenario has been validated. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training durin!~ the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Revision 2 Page 32 of 34 Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Quantitative Attributes (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) 6 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 1 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 3 Abnormal Events: 2-4 2 Major Transients: 1-2 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: 1-2 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 3 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQnAA-106-0204 Page 33 of 34 09-01 NRC ESG-3 CT#1 (E-O-A) Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to SG dryout Basis: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS." For a specific scenario, select a parameter that is related to the initial trip initiation signal and that is supported by analysis as being safety significant. .. a candidate for a safety significant parameter that can be developed into a performance standard is SG wide range water level. (Footnote 3.d) CT#2 (E-O-E) Manually initiate Phase B and Spray Actuation before transition from Step 11 of 2-EOP*TRIP-1. Basis Failure to actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions constitutes a "demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an EFS system or component." In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to violation of the facility license condition." CT#3 (FRCE Basis) Reduce AFW to no less than 1 E4 Ibmthr per SG prior to exiting FRCE-1. Basis Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge to the integrity CSF. Also failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality and the containment CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety" (con't next page) PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Page 34 of 34 The standard which has been applied to this CT in this scenario encompasses the reason for minimizing AFW flow to 1E4 Ibm/hr in FReE with multiple faulted SGs. The reason this is done is to prevent thermal shock conditions to SG components if the SG was allowed to dry out, and then subsequently have AFVV flow reinitiated. This meets the definition given on of Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release.
Not maintaining verifiable minimum AFW flow (1 E4th) when it is possible to do so could result in a SGTR when cold feedwater is subsequently reinitiated. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Pa 35 of 34 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN Event YIN Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture Y Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Slack Out N LOCA COMPONENTITRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM. OR TRAIN Y/I\! COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SSO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SSO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system N Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cool down the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS N Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG. PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: ESG-4i.§Q~ Op-Test No.: 09-01 NRC Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 100% power, EOl. 21 AFW pp CIT for oil leak repair. 21 CFCU is CIT. PZR Pressure channel II is O/S for calibration. Turnover: Maintain current power. Event Malf. No, Event Event Type* No. Description I 1 SGOO95A SG NR Ch failure (T5) CRS/PO R 2 TA0314 Stator Water runback (AFD TS) ALL i C I 3 RCOOO2 RCS leak CRS/RO I M 4 RCOOO1 lBLOCA CRS/RO 5 C RP0277A,B CS fails to actuate I CRSRO 6 C RP318A1,2 lo Head ECCS fails to actuate ALL i C i 7 CV62B Charging pump cavitation RO I CTs: Init Cont Spray, initiate Lo head ECCS, xfer to ClR, trip cavitating chargin!~ pp.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
TQ-AA-106-0204 SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENAR.IO GUIDE SCENARIO TITLE: LOCA SCENARIO NUMBER: 09-01 NRC ESG-4 (~)09) EFFECTIVE DATE: See Approval Dates below EXPECTED DURATION: 70 minutes REVISION NUMBER: 01 PROGRAM: -_.--> LO. REQUAL
'---_X_,J INITIAL LlCIENSE ,-_--,I STA '-_--'I OTHER Revision Summary Rev. 1- Removed the steady state rod stepping Added OHA G-20 to IC.
PREPARED BY: G Gauding 07-22-11 Lead Regulatory Exam Author Date APPROVED BY: O#afOnsTrai~er Date APPROVED BY:
- Dhle PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 A. Given the unit with a condition requiring a stator water run back, the crew will take action to verify or perform the actions nlseded for the runback, lAW approved station procedures. B. Given a situation requiring rapid boration, the crew will initiate a rapid boration and terminate when required lAW approved station procedures. C. Given the unit at power with an RCS leak greater than the Tech. Spec. limit, take corrective action lAW AB.RC-0001. D. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak DIRECT the response to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. E. Given the indications of a reactor coolant system (RCS) malfunction or leak perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures. Given indication of a reactor trip, DIRECT the response to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. G. Given the order or indications of a reactor trip perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures. H. Given indication of a safety injection DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. I. Given the order or indications of a safety injection perform actions as thH nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures. J. Given a safety injection has occurred and equipment has failed to START equipment that has failed to automatically start in accordance with the approved station procedures. K. Given indication of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) DIRECT the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures. L. Given the order or indications of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures. M. Given a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and plant conditions to support cold leg recirculation DIRECT actions to transfer to cold leg recirculation DIRECT actions to transfer to cold leg recirculation. N. Given the order or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and plant conditions to support cold leg recirculation perform actions as the nuclear control operator to TRANSFER to cold leg recirculation in accordance with the approved station procedures. O. Given indication of excessive containment pressure DIRECT the response to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. R. Given the order or indications of excessive containment pressure perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the excessive pressure in accordance with the approved station procedures. S. Given the unit in the EOPs and an excessive containment pressure the crew will reduce containment pressure lAW approve station procedures. 2 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106*0204 A. 21 SG Ch II NR level fails high, B, Automatic Stator Water Runback C. RCS leaklSBLOCA D. LBLOCA A. The crew will take the turnover at 100% power, EOL. I&C is performing a channel calibration of PZR Pressure Channel II. 2F'R7 is shut with power removed to comply with TSAS 3A.5.b. All bistables associated with PZR Pressure Channell! are tripped lAW S2.IC, CC.RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II. Orders for the shift are to maintain 100% power. B. Shortly after assuming the watch, 21 SG NR level Ch, II fails high. The crew will verify no ADFCS malfunction and the CRS will enter the appropriate Tech Spec. C. A Stator Water Main Turbine runback will initiate due to Low Rectifier Flow, and the runback will terminate at -900 Mwe when the condition clears. Operators will ensure positive control of the Main Turbine and borate the RCS to restore control rods above the RIL. D. Due to the rod insertion AFD will go out of the target band, and the CRS will identify entry into the appropriate Tech Spec. E. Once control rods have been restored above the RIL a RCS leak will begin ramping in, and operators will enter S2.0P-AB.RC-0001. The crew will attempt swap to a centrifllgal charging pump and quantify the leak, but the crew will diagnose that the k:lak is larger than the capacity of the CVCS make up system. Operators will trip the Rx and initiate a Safety Injection. F. 2C 4KV Vital bus will deenergize upon the Rx trip, and the SEC will load 2C vital bus on its EDG. 21 CCW pump will trip, and 23 CCW pump control will transfer and remain in manual. 22 charging pump will not start on SEC initiation, and operators will block the SEC and start 22 charging pump. The RCS leak will turn into a LBLOCA. Automatic Phase Band Containment Spray will not occur, and operators will manually initiate Cont Spray and manually start Containment Spray pumps. Operators will perform diagnostics in TRIP-1 and transition to LOCA-1. G. The crew Will transition to LOCA-3 when RWST level reaches 15.2 ft. The crew will perform the transfer to CL Recirc with ali 4KV vital bUSSE:ls energized and 2C bus energized from its EDG. During the transfer, 22 charging pump will cavitate when 2SJ1 and 2SJ2 are shut, and operators will stop the pump. If the pump is not stopped, it will fail, and a LOCA outside containment will occur. H. The scenario will terminate when 22 charging pump is tripped, or after indications of CVCS system piping failure have oCCUlTed if the pump was not secured. 3 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106-0204 IC-244 1 RH1 and RH2 CIT 2 RH18s CIT 3 VC1 and VC4 CIT 4 RCPs (SELF CHECK) 5 RTBs (SELF CHECK) 6 MS167s (SELF CHECK) 7 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK) _ 8 SGFP Trip (SELF CHECK) 9 23 CV PP (SELF CHECK) 10 OHA G*20 in alarm. _ 11 2PR7 shut and deenergized. 12 S2.1C*CC*RCP*0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II, Exhibit 1 signed and on NCO desk or provided to crew for turnover. _ 13 SGBD directed to Condenser placard on 2CC3. 14 Complete Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist." 4 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 Note: Tables with blue headings may be populated by external program, do not change column name without consulting Simulator Support group Description EVENT ACTION: <10 II CONT ROD BAI'lK 1 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: gbc18axd < 0.851 11(205) ROD POSITION 3 COMMAND: DMF TA0314 PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: kb1171ck 112SJ2 TO CHG PUMP CLOSE 5 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> EVENT ACTION: MONP254 <10 II CONT ROD BANK C < 10 ( RX TRIP) 7 COMMAND: PURPOSE: <update as needed> 5 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 SELF Description Delay Initial Ramp Trigger Severity CHECK TimE~ Value Time AN0302 SER 302 FAILS - :E35 2PR2 PROTECTION SERPOINT I 01 N;A FAILS/OVRD CH II LOOP UNSAFEIIN TEST TO ON SER POINT AN0328 SER 328 FAILS - :A12 REACTOR PHOT SYS 02 N/A N1M
" NIA NiA FAILS/OVRD CHANNEL II INSTRUMENT LOOP IN TEST TO ON 03 TA0314 STATOR WATER FLOW SIGNAL FAIL NJA N!A NfA RT-3 04 ~S~G~00~9~5~A~2~1~S~G~L~V~L~X~M~T~R~(~~5~19~))~C~H~I~1~FA~I~L______~__~N~jA~ ___ ~~~~4!~A~~__~N~l!f~\___ + __~R~T-~1__~___1~2~0__~
RC0002 RCS LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT (equiv to 0 05 100 00:05:00 RT-5 1000 4 inches) 06 RC0001A RCS RUPTURE OF RC LOOP 21 00:05:()=-=0__ ~_f\~J!~A'--1-__~i';='!,A--'--__t-_--=ET~-~7__~______ ---1 I 07 ~R~P~31~8=S=2~2=2~C~H~R~G~P~M~P~FA~I~L=S~T~O~S~T~R~T_O=N~~S=EC=-__~__~~~'IA~ ___ ~_~~~i~'A~1-__~N~'!A_'c__-r__~N~ir~\__~______~ 08 CV0208A 21 CHARGING PUMP TRIP 00:15:()~0__ ~_~~~,_I.A'--1-___ N,,--1!A ____t-___ ET_-_7__~______~ 09 ~R~P=02=7~7~A~A=U~T~O_C=N~T~S=P~R~Y~FA~I=LS~T~O~A~C~T~,T~,R~N~__~__,--N~'!A~ ___ ~~N~!A,--~___~~l!,~A__ -+___~~~!,_A__1-________~ 10 ~R~P=02=7~7=B~A=U~T~O~C=N~T~S=P~R~Y~FA~I=LS~T~O~A~C~T~,T~,R~N~__~__,--~~liA~ ___ ~~N~!A,--~__~N~!A~'___-+__~N~!.~A__1-________~ 11 ~C~V=00~4=3.~C~H~A~R~G~IN~G==L~IN=E~L=E~A~K~I~N~A~U~X~B=L=D~1,3,--____~__~N~'fK~' ___ ~__N~I~'A'--1-__~Ni,A~ ___t-_~R~T-~9__~__~5~5~0__~ 12 CV0208B 22 CHARGING PUMP TRIP 00:02:()=-=0__ ~_i'~L"-'A'--1-__~~=Ji,,,~,*__-r__~R~T-~9__~______~ SERPOINT AN0289 SER 289 FAILS - :H45 GENERATOFl 13 RT-11 FAILS/OVRD STATOR COOLING SYSTEM TROUBLE TO OFF RM0210B1 AREA RAD MONITOR 2R4 FAILS 14 00:00::30 HiA RT-9 15 ANYWHERE SER POINT AN0737 SER 737 FAILS - :A6 RMS HI RAD OR TRBL Nip., 15 00:00::30 N!A RT-9 FAI LS/OVRD II CHG PUMPROOM CH 2R4 TO ON 16 CC0172A 21 COMPONENT COOLING PUMP TRIP 00:00::30 NII\ ET-1 17 RP318A1 RHR PUMP 21 Fails to Start on SEC NIP-. N!A _ _ 18 ~R~P~31~8,,--A=2~R~H~R~P_L~IM~P-=22~Fa=i~ls~to=S~t=a=rt~o~n~S=E(cc~_______ +-__,,--N~jA ___ r __~N,~IA__-r__~N.~!r_'I__-+___N~~_'__~______~ SER POINT AN0269 SER 269 FAILS - :G20 SEAL & CYLINDER 19 HEATING STEAM SYSTEM TROUBLE N!A N!A FAILS/OVRD I TOON~ 6 PSEG Restricted - Possession RE~quires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 SELF CHECK 01 N!A N!A TRIP 02 N!A TRIP 03 04 05 06 RC060 OT DELTA T RlBCK CH II BS N!A TRIP 07 PR35D PORV STOP VALVE 2PR7TAGGED NfA TAGGED 08 CV62B 22 CHG PUMP SUCTION VALVE 2CV49 ET-5 .000045 SELF CHECK 01 02 03 C812 F DI24CSD 2C VITAL BUS FEEDER-OPEN 04 C809 F 01 23CSD 2C VITAL BUS FEEDER-OPEN N"
- j_A.
05 A604 E 01 PUMP -START Ni.u,
- 1. PZR Pressure Channel IV selected for Alarm 7
PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106*0204 A. State shift job assignments and review scenario objectives. B. Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide crew members a copy of the shift turnover sheet). C. Inform the crew "The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkclowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift". D. Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel. 8 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 PO announces OHA G-15 ADFCS Trouble, and 21 SG Isolation Level Hi-Hi console alarms as unexpected. PO refers to ARP. PO identifies 21 SG NR level CH II has failed PO verifies all ADFCS parameters are normal and still being controlled in automatic. CRS contacts I&C or WCC and informs them of channel failure. Proceed to next event after Tech CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6, and Spec call at direction of Lead 3.3.2.1 action b 19. Evaluator. 9 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204
- 2. Stator Water Runback SimulatorOperat()r:;lnsert RT=3,:,:
'ondirecti'ory:from l.el:ld?t;valuator.;t";
~,' "{ /,"~ /:r;";;:0~':'>~i::' ';"
PO announces OHA's H-38 GEN STAT RUNBACK, and H-45 GEN STAT CLG SYS TRBL as unexpected . .. Simulator Oper"tor: EnsursETJj*;:;n is}".ills:>>,flen, cOntlb];bank'[)"lQW9rs .
,tQ*j92sfeps*'or'af:1~ad;evaluators~;;; "direction. This'deletes tHe l\11~:"" ,,; . nj~back.
PO reports the Main Turbine is running back. Note: The runback was initiated at RO monitors primary plant and ensures control 30% per minute, but the Main rods start stepping inward in auto when Turbine Governor valves respond demanded due to power mismatch and Tref slower than that. When the load Tavg deviation OR inserts rods if in Manual. reduction signal clears, the DEHC reference will stop changing, but the turbine governor valves be closing, and Mwe will lower another -100 before reference equals actual. PO starts standby Stator Cooling Water pump IAWARP. RO/PO initiates boration. Role Play: 5 minutes after being CRS dispatches an operator to the Stator 10 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear
TQ-AA-106-0204 > "tEvaluatorllnstructor:::Activity *i:iExpect~a PlarltlStudeijrRe'sp'(:i'iiie SBT
, ,:,~". '\:,:;~<~:~:~;~f~:,t;y';;:,;~,;,.ri~;.J'/{'*< ,> 'ct:'~~:J:r:~.:.* ",': i,t~.\o>.,>. ,~;>~:: }~~;., ~?:::*.L '-1 LOG '.
dispatched, insert RT-11 which will Water Panel 968 to investigate and determine clear OHA H-45. Then call control panel alarm status lAW ARP for OHA H-38. room as NEO and report: Panel 968 alarm A-1 L, Inlet Flow Low was flashing, but cleared when I acknowledged it. Inlet flow is reading 600 gpm. There are currently NO alarms on the panel. PO verifies that when OHA H-38 clears, the DEHC reference stops lowering. Note: Emergency Boration is to WHEN OHA E-16 ROD INSERT LMT LO-LO continue until control rods are at annunciates, THEN RO/PO initiates least 2 steps higher than the RIL, Emergency Boration lAW S2.0P-SO.CVC and OHA E-16 clears. 0008 as directed by ARP by: Determining that there is no set time duration for the boration per step 5.1.1. Starts at least one Boric Acid Transfer pump in FAST speed. Ensures charging flow is > 75 gpm. Opens 2CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve Closes 21 and 22CV160, Recirc Vlvs Ensures boric acid flow is >36 gpm on 2FI-113A. OR Ensures charging flow is >75 gpm on 2FI-128B Starts at least one Boric Acid Transfer pump in FAST speed. Ensures the 2CV179 and 2CV181 are shut. Manually open 2CV172. Open 2CV185. 11 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 'Eva) uat()rllnstriJa()rActivity~;.T ExpecteCiPlantlStudenf Response{" :';:58T1('
",'.:'r~:~;~~~~~E ,~~E:::::,,' ,'~!~~' '( '" \~;:.;~~~ L:.;:~z *.'.:':i~~:' '~f , , - . . " ' , , ,,;, ,,/',;
i' [ ~.,
';£[:OG' ~ - Close 2CV160 and 2CV161. - Ensure Boric Acid flow >36gpm on 2FI-110A.
PO ensures generator MVARs within band. CRS enters S2.0P-AB.LOAO-0001, Rapid Load Reduction. IF emergency boration was initiated, THEN VVHEN OHA E-16 clears, RO stops the emergency boration by:
- Stopping the Boric Acid Transfer pump started above - Closing the 2CV175 - Throttling open 21 and 22CV160 as ron I Ii ro.f"'I 1'--1 U I I ...... U
- OR
- Place the running Boric Acid pump in Slow Speed.
Close the 2CV172 and 2CV185. Return the CVCS Makeup system to AUTO. Throttle open 2CV160 and 2CV161. CRS enters TSAS 3.2.1 Action a.2 for AFO 12 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 RO announces OHA CNTMT SUMP PUMP START as unexpected. CREW identifies 2R11A indication rising, and PZR pressure and level slowly lowering. RO announces OHA C-38 CFCU LK DET and OHA C-30 CFCU LK DET HI-HI when alarmed as unexpected. RO reports PZR level is NOT stable or rising. RO begins transfer to centrifugal charging pump by: Ensuring Master Flow Controller is in AUTO
- Closing 2CV55 Starting 21 or 22 charging pump Lower 23 charging pump speed to minimum in Manual while adjusting 2CV55 Stopping 23 charging pump when speed demand is at minimum.
13 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear
TQ*AA*106-0204 Ensuring RCP seal injection flow 6-10 gpm per pump not to exceed 40 gpm total RO adjusts 2CV55 to stabilize PZR level. RO estimates RCS leakrate. RO reports that PZR level can NOT be maintained stable or rising, and the leak rate is
> than the capability of the CVCS make-up system, and recommends tripping the Rx and initiating a Safety Injection.
CRS directs the RO to trip the Rx, confirm the trip, initiate Safety injection, then go to TRIP-1. RO trips the Rx using a Rx Trip handle, confirms the Rx trip, and uses key to manually initiate 14 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 luafoi'lnstruct6"1~ctiv*i* , ~;;:~~,ted Plant/Stud~rlt ResP9""'"
~'h 1H:11tN~rf~~;'~~,~~;
- 4. LBLOCA RO performs TRIP-1 immediate actions from memory:
- Verifies Rx tripped - Verifies Rx trip confirmed - Trips the Main Turbine - Verifies at least one 4KV vital bus energized. - Verifies Safety Injection actuated.
CRS reads immediate action steps to RO and RO verifies performance. RO/PO reports 2C 4KV vital bus is energized 2C EDG. 15 PSEG Restricted Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 RO reports 22 charging pump, 21 and 22 RHR m~umps failed to start. Crew blocks ALL SECs on 2RP1. RO starts 22 Charging pump, 21 RHR pump, and 22 RHR DumD. CT#1(E';O-H) Manually start at least one RHRP~mppriorto
;transition out of.eOP..TRIP..1*.. '.
~~;;. ~~rt~; :;;:~:. ~fi;;1::;~~~:;." .. ~.' ".'" ,:,r<~'~>"::'~~~,~~i~Y:,:~{~tJ; , ' ;~>"" ~~':,' SAT_~._ UNS'Af;" RO makes pager announcement Unit 2 Rx trip, Safety Injection. PO reports all AFW pumps running, and requests permission to throttle AFW flow while maintaining 22E4 Ibm/hr or 9% level in at least one SG NR level. CRS directs PO to throttle AFW flow. PO lowers 23 AFW pump speed to minimum, and throttles 21-24AF21's to maintain AFW flow - 22E4 Ibm/hr. RO/PO identifies that the RCS leak has turned into a LBLOCA by control board indications. RO reports control console indication of Containment Spray and Phase B actuation, but no Containment Spray system components have actuated. 16 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ*AA*106-0204 CT#2~'(E.O.~;E) Initiate' . . L.\.. . ) CRS refers/returns to Step 11 and directs RO
- 99r1t~inmenfSpray prior to initiate Containment Spray by:
exitingTRIP~1 ~'" Initiate phase B and Spray actuation. RO inserts BOTH keys into CS actuation and turns at same time.
- RO reports spray valve realignment.
Start 21 and 22 CS pumps
- RO inserts key and turns for 21 and 22 CS pumps and reports both CS pumps are running. - Initiate MSLI RO reports MSLI initiated. - Stop 21-24 RCPs RO depresses stop PB for all RCPs. - Ensure valve groups in Table D in safeguards position.
PO reports all Table D valves in safeguards position. RO reports MSLI has been initiated. QB§ direGt~§M implement the ECG. PO reports all 3 4KV vital busses are energized with 2C 4KV vital bus energized from 2C EDG. RO reports control room ventilation is in Accident Pressurized mode. RO reports 2 swgr supply and 1 swgr exhaust fans are running. 17 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Note: The PO should NOT attempt to start CCW pump here, since 2C vital 4kv bus is powered from the EDG and there is no direction in TRIP-1 to start the second CCW pump. IF the PO attempts to start 23 CCW pump, it will neither start nor backflash due to scenario setup override. CRS dispatches an operator to shut 2CC37 and 2CC48. CREW performs ECCS flow evaluation and determines all ECCS pumps are injecting to RCS as expected for LBLOCA and cont press. PO reports AFW status and is maintaining 22E41bm/hr or 15% (adverse cont numbers in effect) level in at least one SG NR level. then 15-33%. RO reports all Reps are stopped and MSLI actuated. RO reports both RTBs open. RO reports both PORVs shut with 2PR6 open and 2PR7 shut with power removed. RO reports all RCPs are stopped. RO ensures seal injection flow is maintained to all RCPs. 18 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear
TQ-AA-106-0204 1;\l*':.::m;,,',~~~~~:~~~~*.;~la~~~~~'~~~;'~~~P~'~~~j1'I.* i Note: All SG pressures will be PO reports there are no faulted or ruptured dropping due to the LBLOCA with SGs. 21 SG pressure lower than the remaining 3 SGs due to the RCS rupture being on that loop. CRS transitions to LOCA-1 on containment radiation levels. Note: 21 charging pump will trip 15 I RO reports 21 charging pump has tripped. minutes after the Rx trip. Note: Upon the transition out of TRIP-1, CFST monitoring becomes active. Crew identifies that a PURPLE path exists on both the Thermal Shock and Containment Environment Critical Function Status Trees. CRS transitions to FRTS-1 based on RCS cool down rate and Table A conditions. RO reports RCS pressure is less than 420 psig (adverse). CRS transitions back to LOCA-1.
--------~~------
Crew identifies a PURPLE path still exists for
-I Containment Environment (if containment pressure remains above 15 psig).
CRS transitions to FRCE*1 based on PURPLE_ 19 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 RO verifies actions previously performed: CFCUs running in low speed with proper SW flow. RCPs stopped Both CS pumps running. Containment isolations MSLI No faulted SGs. CRS transitions back to LOCA-1. PO reports no faulted SG's. PO reports AFW status and is maintaining 22E4 Ibm/hr or 15% (adverse cont numbers in effect) level in at least one SG NR level, then maintaining 15-33%. PO reports no indications of SGTR. RO resets SI, Phase A, and Phase B. RO opens both CA330s. PO resets all SECs. RO resets SGBD Sample Isolation Bypass and opens 21-24SS94s. CRS directs chemistry to sample SGs for boron and activity. RO reports both PORVs shut with 2PR6 open and 2PR7 shut with power removed. RO reports subcooling is less thanz:ero. n 20 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 RO reports both CS pumps are RO reports subcooling is less than zero. RO reports RHR is not aligned for CL recirc. RO reports RHR flow is > 300 gpm on both SJ49s. CRS requests assistance from TSC to restore off-site power to 2C 4KV vital bus. RO reports both RHR pumps and both SJ44s are available. RO/PO reports no rad monitors in Table Care in waming or alarm. CRS directs chemistry to sample the RCS and analyze for failed fuel and boron. CRS consults TSC about equipment availability to assist in long term recovery. CRS verifies operators were dispatched in TRIP-1 to shut 2CC37 and 2CC48. RO reports both RHR pumps are running. RO reports RHR flow is > 300 gpm on both SJ49s. I 21 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-t06-0204 If the crew arrives at Step 18.2 RO reports RWST level. prior to RWST level of 15.2', they will enter a "do loop" with return to step 16. When RWST 10 level alarm actuates, continue below. LOG TIME OF RWST LO-LO RO reports RWST 10 level alarm as expected LEVEL ALARM for CT#2 alarm. EVALUATION CRS transitions to LOCA-3. Simulator '.into.tocA~.3;PEI,;r;;;,,&;;~.'1 aVDI fartheST CCVV.pump and. ""'MYVI NOTstart Be p"rin~"~H rem()~erVSTOP~~,,",:Y
.(~quired.as: .itaffect$'t$P6na
,.dotcome; and RO reports both Cont Sump Level >62% are lit. RO depresses Sump Auto Armed PBs for 21 and 22SJ44. PO removes lockouts for 2SJ67, 2SJ68 and 2SJ69. 22 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ~AA~1 06~0204 RO reports 21 and 22SJ44 are open. CT#3:(ES.1,3.AlTnfn~fEirtO** ......' RO reports both RHR pumps are running and
,~OI.d * ~eg~~cirClilatiO.ri 'suchth~t;r shuts 2SJ69.
- at.]e:.tst°rt~train*o~5.<:;9SiS:.i .... AN o~~ra~ionlnthe.re&f~fulation *.' *
*l1)oCleWitllin*the folloWingJime~f(
fame LOG TIME 2SJ69 Close is initiated:
~to.~",
iating~~lIQse . -------- .--------.-------- n trt.i "'t~~'ii'i!ti1:;i/t*;~~0.,~.
- ~'i**. ftdm.BYY:~i!*I~I~ LOG TIME Containment Spray pump on~.cont~inm~6tt~Jl stopped:
s~()p. ~5.5 .miriute.s .,.*,.*.*'. ..*. ; /;i\,i.;*i:** -- . i3'*Ff~9~ . ~V\ls~.J~leve1ial~(rn,to *. . .*
- .sv.Ji.ts~*~yer;cb.Q1pl,etionO~.~Juae
- >:~
.restarting5C~S;pump~!f""'*' '" . st9Pped'on flVVST .10..10,1
.1 1.2 minutes c . '. .
RO reports SI is reset, and all SEes are PO reports 230V load centers are reset. RO reDorts 2SJ69 is closed. RO reports both CS pumps are operating and stoos 22 CS oumo. RO shuts 21 and 22RH 19s, and stops 23 charging pump if running. CRS selects step 11 as the correct flowpath transition. PO reoorts C bus is enerqized from its EDG. 23 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 RO reports 3 SW pumps are running. RO reports both CCHXs are in service. RO reports 23 CCW pump is NOT running. RO reports 22 CS pump is NOT running. RO starts 23 CCW pump. RO reports 21 and 22CC16s are open. RO shuts 2SJ67 and 2SJ68. RO reDorls RH 1 and RH2 are RO reports both RHR pumps are running and opens 21 and 22SJ45s. RO reports 21 and 22SJ113s are open. LOG TIME ECCS Pumps verified RO reports 22 charging pump and 21 and 22 running: SI pumps are running. PO removes lockout from 2SJ30. Simuiator:Operator: E{1sllreET~5 I RO shuts 2SJ30, 2SJ1, and 2SJ2. isTR~.~~~~d.*th~y~toseRE3;rf( h2~92i~**.d.~Rresse.~,.:)*mhlSiHs~rts~;
- the(qlgsure;:8f,22ch~fgjng'eomp sl.ictianps()l.atiod;valv~)22.cy49*,:a wnl~~H~e22,~t'larging .. pumttto "if)'!'
cavitate.D'Ufingyan<;latiQn~*"'.*i*;:*.**. os.cillations.* bet\tVeen~'8~9p.~mps.::t;, were observedr,,'and the. pump did>' .' NOTtrip 00'00; . 24 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Evaluator/l nstruct"'
- }J;:?~'/,' ~~;::"q~ L l::i'< "'i:iib!
RO/PO recognizes 22 charging pump is cavitating by amperage indication, discharge flow and BIT flow, and discharge pressure oscillations. CT#4 Trip~the~cavit~tingCchargil1g I RO trips 22 charging p~mp prioftopump/system,' piping damage;'" SAT', UNSAT,i . ' .
~~~~~~---------
- Slfllul~to~;Ope'it6r:**.*IF}r~crew':;}
"does"iN()T trip 22 chargifl~npumpi/~~ .withirF3.fninuteso~,tffe,inltiation;:Of *. ,.~ 'cavitatiqrr;THEN',ins~d RT-9i.:rhis;; . simulates, a fai1ure~ of the,c~aiging'~~ .
system piplO~r}.qmeJ\uxBuilding: resuJtif]£ti9~'E()9f\outside ..**. . ~>; .*....,.
':*9ontab3m'/ent~<then.*.tdR$~2;;chargiri "purlJP~af!~r .an.~Q~m!grJalzfrTi(1J delay{";: .. .
MALF~""'CV0043 Cl!fa~ ifrfAU'x;*sfdg*jiij*. /**** Final.;.,;\lalti*~:,!5P9<. . l . . ;,. MACF~CV0208B 22ChgPul)1p.trip** 2 "" . t******** " De Iay:;.JlllnU ,'i", .*.*****t~.* es.T",*,.:J,,*.{' *,.f Finat'{~ltle: .* Try~*,..'r/(~/i;Jl~,~;~,:~~,,;:;~'f MALF':.,RM021~~1,}'\r:ea;Bad,:,,?;',;..:r ..
- MonltQ~2R~'fa:ils'anYwh~r~~~'"',:.;~~i.~;~.: ....
ii.~jB~IY~!~!~~'!!.f!, .'****Y7::~, * !~::,:!:.,i,.::i::.]!)~,:,.~C M~~F:At;.J.b137sERt37f~HS. ., A6 RMSHLRad or Trouble . 25 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 TERMINATE the scenario when 22 charging pump has been secured, whether by operator action or when it trips 5 minutes after cavitating starts. Note: Some of the following steps RO places 21 and 22RH29 controllers in may be performed depending on Manual and ensures valves are shut. when, or if, the crew recognizes the 22 charging pump cavitation, and should be evaluated accordingly. CRS implements FRPs as necessary. CRS dispatches operator to tag SJ44 breakers open. RO verifies Phase A and Phase B are reset, and CA330s are open. PO stops 2A and 2B EDGs. Evaluator Note: The correct classification is an ALERT under EAL 3.2.2.b. (!f the 22 charging pump is NOT stopped by the operators and the charging system failure occurs as described on the previous page, then the correct ECG classification will be a SAE based on 3.2.2.b AND 3.3.3.b 26 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 A. Alarm Response Procedures (Various) B. Technical Specifications C. Emergency Plan (ECG) D. OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures E. 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection F. 2-EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Coolant Accident G. 2-EOP-LOCA-3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation H. S2.0P-AB.LOAD-0001 Rapid Load Reduction I. S2.0P-AB.RC-0001 Reactor Coolant System Leak 27 PSEG Restricted - Possession R3quires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 MODE: 1 POWER: 100 RCS BORON: 18 MWe 1230 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5,6 & DEFUELED): NA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burnup: 12,600 EFPH MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATEfTlME OF EXPIRATION: 3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II calibration. 70 hours left in action time. EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS: S2.1C-CC-RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II. ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS: 2PR7 shut and power removed to comply with TSAS 3.4.5.b for PZR Pressure Channel II being out of service for channel calibration. PZR Pressure Channel IV selected for Alarm. CONTROL ROOM: Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs. PRIMARY: 3.3.1.1 action 6 and 3.3.2.1 action 19 for PZR Pressure Channel II PT-456. SECONDARY: OHA G-20 SEAL CVL HTG STM SYS TRBL is in alarm due to Gland Sealing Steam high pressure. NEO is investigating. Heating steam is aligned to Unlit 1. RADWASTE: No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER: None 28 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 ATTACHMENT 2 .. 0 SIMULATOR READY FOR TRAINING CHECKLlST _ _ _ ~~
- 1. Verify simulator is in "TRAIN" Load
- 2. Simulator is in RUN
- 3. Overhead Annunciator Horns ON
- 4. All required computer terminals in opE3ration
- 5. Simulator clocks synchronized
- 6. All tagged equipment properly secured and documented
- 7. TSAS Status Board up-to-date
- 8. Shift manning sheet available
- 9. Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
- 10. All aHA lamps operating (aHA Test) and burned out lamps replaced
- 11. Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
- 12. All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon
- 13. Required procedures clean
- 14. Multiple color procedure pens available
- 15. Required keys available
- 16. Simulator cleared of unauthorized material/personnel
- 17. All charts advanced to clean traces and chart recorders are on.
- 18. Rod step counters correct (channel check) and reset as necessary
- 19. Exam security set for simulator
- 20. Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
- 21. Shift logs available if required
- 22. Recording Media available (if applicable)
- 23. Ensure ECG classification is correct
- 24. Reference verification performed with required documents available
- 25. Verify phones disconnected from plant after drill.
29 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant. I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents ...
- degradation of any barrier to fission product release
- degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity
- a violation of a safety limit
- a violation of the facility license condition
- incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods)
- a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that im:lparably introduced by the scenario II. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to ...
- effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
- recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
- take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
- prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 Note: This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios. (PRIOR TO SBT TESTING COMPLETEITRANSCRIBE THIS FORM ( Reviewer Name, Initials and Comments) ELECTRON/CALL Y HERE) (1.; lvt f1;) Oh SCENARIO IDENTIFIER: 09-01 NRC-ESG-4 REVIEWER: fo~ Initials Qualitative Attributes ~ ~. The scenario has clearly stated objectives in the scenario. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue crew into expected events. f1J 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events. ~ 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiatE~d
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
.t ; 5.
- the event term ination point No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incidert such as a seismic event
~~ The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
~tf/'t
- 8. The simulator modeling is not altered.
- 9. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
- 10. The scenario has been validated.
- 11. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training durin~l the requalification cycle, evaluate thH need to modify or replace the scenario.
~12. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
30 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Trc:dning
TQ-AA-106-0204 ATTACHMENT 4
';i ;;SiMUlAroRsc~rJ~~[~'~~~iE~f CH~~I<LIST~'*
Note: The quantitative attribute target ranges that are specified on the form are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool, but may not fit within the ranges. A scenario that does not fit into these ranges shall be evaluated to ensure that the level of difficulty is appropriate. (ES-301 Section D.5.d) Initial Quantitative AttributEls (as per ES-301-4, and ES-301 Section D.5.d) 8 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 4 Malfunctions that occur after E::OP entry: 1-2 2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 1 Major Transients: 1-2 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions: '1-2 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions: 0-2 3 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS: 31 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Pe,rmission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 09-01 NRC ESG-4 (Spare) CT#1 (E-G-H) Manually start at least one RHR pump prior to transition out of EOP-TRIP-1. 8asis- Failure to manually start at least on low-head EGGS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ... capacity." CT#2 (E-O--E) Manually actuate at least the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment before exiting TRIP-1. Basis- Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions constitutes a "demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component." Failure to manually actuate containment spray represents a "demonstrated inability of the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to a violation of the facility license condition." CT# 3: (ES-1.3-A) Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation such that at least one train of ECCS is in operation in the recirculation mode within the following time frames:
- 1. From RWST 10 level alarm to initiating closed on 2SJ69 - ,:::3.7 minutes.
- 2. From RWST 10 level alarm to one containment spray pump stop- .:::5.5 minutes.
- 3. From RWST 10 level alarm to switchover completion (includes restarting ECGS pumps if stopped on RVVST 10-10 level) -.::: 11.2 minutes.
Basis: Failure to establish cold leg recirculation within the time frame specified in the FSAR is a "demonstrated inability of the crew to effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls that would lead to a violation of the facility license condition." CT#4: Trip the cavitating Charging Pump prior to pump/system piping damage. Basis: Failure to trip a cavitating charging pump during the transfer to cold leg recirculation when indications of cavitation are present, leads to the possibility of system damage and the advent of a loss of coolant outside the containment building. (As is the case in this scenario.) 32 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training
TQ-AA-106-0204 EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN Event YIN Event N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N Loss of Service Water N Steam Generator Tube Rupture 1\1 Loss ofCCW N Loss of Offsite Power N Loss of Control Air N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N Station Black Out Y LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N Containment Sump Strainers N Gas Turbine N SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N Any Diesel Generator N RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N Auxiliary Feed Pump N CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation Valves N SBO Air Compressor OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE YIN OPERATOR ACTION N Restore AC power during SBO N Connect to gas turbine N Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system Y Re-align RHR system for re-circulation N Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger N Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST N Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system N Isolate the affected Steam Generator that has the tube rupture(s) N Early depressurize the RCS 1\1 Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG. 33 PSEG Restricted - Possession Requires Specific Permission from Nuclear Training}}