Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Removal of Chlorine Detection Requirements & Changes to Control Room Ventilation Sys Requirements
	ML113210288
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	11/30/1993
From:	; Northern States Power Co
To:	;
Shared Package
ML113210287	List: ML113210286; ML113210288; ML113210289; ML20058G431;
References
	NUDOCS 9312090228
	Download: ML113210288 (20)
	v • d • e

Exhibit B Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant License Amendment Request dated November 18, 1993 Proposed Changes Marked Up on Existing Technical Specification Pages Exhibit B consists of the existing Technical Specification pages with the proposed changes marked up on those pages. Existing pages affected by this change are listed below:

Page 48 60e 63 69a 229u 229v 229 y

9312090228 931130 PDR ADOCK 05000263 F

P PDR

Pr 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS F. Recirculation Pump Trip and Alternate Rod Injection Initiation Whenever the reactor is in the RUN mode, the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.5 shall be met.

G. Safeguards Bus Voltage Protection Whenever the safeguards auxiliary electrical power system is required to be operable by Specification 3.9, the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the Instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.6 shall be met.:

H. Instrumentation for Safety/Relief Valve Low-Low Set Logic Whenever the safety/relief valves are required to be operable by Specification 3.6.E, the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the Instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.7 shall be met.

I. Instrumentation for Control Room Habitability Protection

41. 4Akenze:cr tho e9*ntrol Raw *erktilitiz,.

65Xytefo &i VaUbe b k SP881ifizatien g.17.At, .. l hi:L A Czn6444614 a ~

f$r rtz JoN C-ehiorino intu.-tefteierA li-ead ftL Tftft

-a-: Whenever the emergency filtration system is required to be operable by Specification 3.17.B, the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the radiation instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.9 shall be met.

3 .2/4.2 48 REV

TABLE 3.2.9 Instrumentation for Control Room Habitability Protection Total No. of Minimum No. of Operable Trip Instrument or Operating Minimum No. Required Function Settings Channels per Instrument Channels of Conditions*

Trip System per Trip System (1) Trip Systems 1rm 2(a) 2. 2au D Radiation CANo~e~ <2 mR/hr 1 1 2 A or/Is

'5 Notes:

(1) An instrument channel may be bypassed for testing or preventative maintenance for up to eight hours.

42) All inr.tuznt ehattelsa re ~V.

b1~.

beth r4I J ~ r j

Required conditions when minimum conditions for operation are not satisfied.

A) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months initiate and maintain operation of - leest one eseel roem veneeileee sysem oeueyt m in the- Leelatee mede-84 operation fr-an- epe*eble- ce irke- datestz - the control room emergency filtration system subsystem in the pressurization mode of operation Fa . Lkee.11

-razlistiz mniz nj witnin ;414 noura rotluoc ro6ter ioater tempcraturz t: beleffl 02-0-P O-dJ 94,uzsgrkd eere elteratizn Heo 461C tu.j8 *aa~n f 4jg #-4 havinag the potent-al3 fo daiin thA VAR*;A~ r 7 l

) W Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months reduce reactor water temperature to below 212 0 F.

3.2/4.2 60e_

REV

Table 4.2.1 - Continued Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Core Cooling, Rod Block and Isolation Instrumentation Instrument Channel Test (3) Calibration (3) Sensor Check (3)

SAFEGUARDS BUS VOLTAGE

1. Degraded Voltage Once/month Quarterly Not applicable Protection

2. Loss of Voltage Once/month Once/Operating Cycle Not applicable Protection SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE LOW-LOW SET LOGIC

1. Reactor Scram Sensing Once/Shutdown (Note 8)

2. Reactor Pressure - Opening Once/3 months (Note 5) Once/Operating Cycle Once/day

3. Reactor Pressure - Closing Once/3 months (Note 5) Once/Operating Cycle Once/day

4. Discharge Pipe Pressure Once/3 months (Note 5) See Table 4.14.1 See Table 4.14.1

5. Inhibit Timer Once/3 months (Note 5) Once/Operating Cycle CONTROT. ROOM MARTTARTTTTV VDATrrTTnA7 2.

1.t1.-

Radiation "L1ee l limathl 5 CkA0e-C Monthly (Note 5) 18 months Daily 3.2/4.2 63 REV

Bases Continued:

open and instrumentation drift has caused the nominal 80-psi blowdown range to be reduced to 60 psi. Maximum water leg clearing time has been calculated to be less than 6 seconds for the Monticello design. Inhibit timers are provided for each valve to prevent the valve from being manually opened less than 10 seconds following valve closure.

Valve opening is sensed by pressure switches in the valve discharge line. Each valve is provided with two trip, or actuation, systems. Each system is provided with two channels of instrumentation for each of the above described functions. A two-out-of two-once logic scheme ensures that no single failure will defeat the low-low set function and no single failure will cause spurious operation of a safety/relief valve.

Allowable deviations are provided for each specified instrument setpoint. Setpoints within the specified allowable deviations provide assurance that subsequent safety/relief valve actuations are sufficiently spaced to allow for discharge line water leg clearing.

Control room habitability protection assures that the control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of accidental releases eg -etie><bobasreeeand of radioactive leakage which may bypass secondary containment following a loss of coolant accident or D radioactive releases from a steam line break accident, thus assuring that the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant can be operated or shutdown safely. An t st-ehel P eer GOFrpFrstion sonolu-dod thats ofg tho onnite sad effeitz ptz.nLl ta1ii ehziizzl haerds, evt;:

ahlogrino reouired nuto-matia9 detzztion ad 4i0gelatken tie prz;vcnt irnzzpazitatien zf zontro! room Oporstsrc. All 6tbecr ehemioald wege determined to have at leant tWe mlfmteo between detezbtl~

and poriaible ineepeeleatien. Preteeelia for therz teil ehziizl1 i6 proided thretich operator Although the operator will set the setpoints within the trip settings specified in Tables 3.2.1 through 3.2.9, the actual values of the various set points can differ appreciably from the value the operator is attempting to set. The deviations could be caused by inherent instrument error, operator setting error, drift of the set point, etc. Therefore, these deviations have been accounted for in the various transient analyses and the actual trip settings may vary by the following amounts:

3.2 BASES 69a REV

1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.17 UUNTL jO Mv ftYlA "Iulll . 4.17 UUNIKUL KUM HI5YLILLI Applicability: Applicability:

Applies to the control room ventilation Applies to the periodic testing requirements system equipment necessary to maintain of systems required to maintain control room habitability. habitability.

Objectives: Objectives:

To assure the control room is habitable both To verify the operability of equipment under normal and accident conditions. related to control room habitability.

Specification: Specification:

A. Control Room Ventilation System A. Control Room Ventilation System

1. Except as specified in 3.l7.A.2 and -i. At least once per shift, check 3.17.A.3 below, both trains of the control room temperature.

control room ventilation system shall be operablerwhenever irradiated .. 5d. AL 18 ner. is.. nrths ;rf fuel is in the reactor vessel and :r~.: :r.z z~trzi. r3zm i~ciarcr~ cn reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212*F, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, core alterations or activities having the potential for draining the reactor vessel.

2.

t n inoperable, restore the n oper le train to operable atus q within ven days or be. hot rzzziDn ~r .i.i:or.zo am:2Zn13nz shutdown thin the n 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months following t seve ays and either CA4 initiate and m ain the operable control room v ation train in.

the recircu ion m e or be in cold' shutdown d suspend e.

3.17/4.17 altera ons, fuel handl and 229u act ties having the pote al for REV 115 d ning the reactor vessel w hin

CHANGE H:

2.a With one control room ventilation train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to operable status within 30 days.

2.b If 2.a is not met, then be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months following the 30 days and in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2.c If 2.a is not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, core alterations, or activities having the potential for draining the reactor vessel then immediately place the operable control room ventilation train in operation or immediately suspend these activities.

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS op le, restore at least one n to coperable us within 24 ho or be in hot shutdown w n the t 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months following the 24 and in cold s;4-'k shutdown and pend cor terations, C fuel ha ng and activities ng the po al for draining the reactor sel B. Control Room Emergency Filtration System B. Control Room Emergency Filtration System

1. Except as specified in 3.17.B.1.a or 1. At least once per month, initiate from the 3.17.B.1.b below, two control room control room 1000 cfm (+/-10%) flow-through emergency filtration system filter trains both trains of the emergency filtration shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel treatment system. The system shall operate is in the reactor vessel and reactor for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with the heaters coolant temperature is greater than 212*F.

operable.

a. When one control room emergency filtration system filter train is made or found to be inoperable, for any reason, restore the inoperable train to operable status within seven days or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months following the seven days and either reduce the reactor coolant temperature to below 212*F or initiate and maintain the operable emergency filtration system filter train in the pressurization mode within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.17/4.17 229v REV-

CHANGE I:

3.a With both control room ventilation trains inoperable, restore at least one train to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.b If 3.a is not met, then be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.c If 3.a is not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, core alterations, or activities having the potential for draining the reactor vessel then immediately suspend these activities.

The system is designed to main a nominal temperature of 78*F dry bulb and 5 inal relative humidity in the main control room in the summer and a nominal temperature of 72*F in the winter.

3.17 Bases A. Control Room Ventilation System The Control Room Ventilation System provides air conditioning and heating as required to maintain a

suitable environment in.the main control room and portions of the first and second floors of the Emergency Filtration Train (EFT) building. The main control room is normally slightly pressurized and it is possible to have 0 to 100% recirculation of conditioned air. IV- s -i-is ege-to-me n . -5%

reatv htt-idity- .ae .. temperatturze er ;92F dr7 butlb Ir. the awxmer and ;12= r tbi the 4wintzer. The Control Room Ventilation System may be isolated from external air .supply by manual acin fre the. earr v et e st mi ss e t~ t ma t ii ei on 6n . C_VA . e .

e t e ti e n-of ehl e ri n _! F B. Cpntrol Room Emergency Filtration System The Control Room Emergency Filtration System assures that the control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of radioactive leakage which may by-pass secondary containment following a loss of coolant accident or radioactive releases from a steam line break accident. The system is designed to isolate and slightly pressurize the control room on a radiation signal in the ventilation air. Two completely redundant trains are provided.

Each train has a filter unit consisting of a prefilter, HEPA filters, and charcoal adsorbers. The HEPA filters remove particulates from the Control Room pressurizing air and prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to remove any radioiodines form the pressurizing air.

The in-place test results should indicate a HEPA filter leakage of less than 1% through DOP testing and a charcoal adsorber leakage of less than 1% through halogenated hydrocarbon testing. The laboratory carbon sample results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of a least 98% under test conditions similar to expected accident conditions. System flows should be near their design values. The verification of these performance parameters combined with the qualification testing conducted on new filters and adsorbers provide a high level of assurance that the Emergency Filtration System will perform as predicted in reducing doses to plant personnel below those level stated in Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

Dose calculations have been performed for the Control Room Emergency Filtration System which show that, assuming 90% standby gas treatment system adsorption and filtration efficiency and 90% control room emergency filtration system adsorption and filtration efficiency and radioiodine plateout, whole body and organ doses remain within the NRC guidelines of 5 rem and 30 rem, respectively.

All toxic substances which are stored on site or stored/shipped within a 5 mile radius of the plant have been analyzed for their affect on the control room operators. It has been concluded that the operators will have at least two minutes to don protective breathing 229y_

apparatus before -incapacitation limits are exceeded. For toxic substance rItnt which are REV.

transgorted on

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highways w t.

hi..... 5.... il n M es o

.. f1 th e p 1,4 ltit an ,

has been dete proba ility of a release from the plant due to incapacitation of the operators caused by a spill is sufficiently low that this scenario may be excluded. Protection for toxic chemicals is Drovided through operator training.

Exhibit C Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant License Amendment Request dated November 18, 1993 Revised Technical Specification Pages Exhibit C consists of the Technical Specification pages with the proposed changes incorporated. Existing pages affected by this change are listed below:

Pag~e 48 60e 63 69a 229u 229v 229 y

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS F. Recirculation Pump Trip and Alternate Rod Injection Initiation Whenever the reactor is in the RUN mode, for Limiting Conditions for Operation for the instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.5 shall be met.

G. Safeguards Bus Voltage Protection Whenever the safeguards auxiliary electrical power system is required to be operable by Specification 3.9, the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the Instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.6 shall be met.

H. Instrumentation for Safety/Relief Valve Low-Low Set Logic Whenever the safety/relief valves are required to be operable by Specification 3.6.E, the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the Instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.7 shall be met.

I. Instrumentation for Control Room Habitability Protection

1. Whenever the emergency filtration system is required to be operable by Specification 3.17.B, the Limiting Conditions for Operation for the radiation instrumentation listed in Table 3.2.9 shall be met.

3.2/4.2 48 REV

Table 3.2.9 Instrumentation for Control Room Habitability Protection Total No. of Minimum No. of Operable Instrument or Operating Minimum No. Required Trip Channels per Instrument Channels of Conditions*

Function Settings Trip System per Trip System (1) Trip Systems Radiation <2 mR/hr 1 1 2 A or B Notes:

(1) An instrument channel may be bypassed for testing or preventative maintenance for up to eight hours.

I

Required conditions when minimum conditions for operation are not satisfied.

A) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency filtration system subsystem in the pressurization mode of operation.

B) Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months reduce reactor water temperature to below 2120 F.

3.2/4.2 60e REV

Table.4.2.1 - Continued Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Core Cooling, Rod Block and Isolation Instrumentation Instrument Channel Test (3) Calibration (3) Sensor Check (3)

SAFEGUARDS BUS VOLTAGE

1. Degraded Voltage Once/month Quarterly Not applicable Protection

2. Loss of Voltage Once/month Once/Operating Cycle Not applicable Protection SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE LOW-LOW SET LOGIC

1. Reactor Scram Sensing Once/Shutdown (Note 8)

2. Reactor Pressure - Opening Once/3 months (Note 5) Once/Operating Cycle Once/day

3. Reactor Pressure - Closing Once/3 months (Note 5) Once/Operating Cycle Once/day

4. Discharge Pipe Pressure Once/3 months (Note 5) See Table 4.14.1 See Table 4.14.1

5. Inhibit Timer Once/3 months (Note 5) Once/Operating Cycle CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY PROTECTION I 1. Radiation Monthly (Note 5) 18 months Daily 3.2/4.2 63 REV

Bases Continued:

3.2 open and instrumentation drift has caused the nominal 80-psi blowdown range to be reduced to 60 psi.

Maximum water leg clearing time has been calculated to be less than 6 seconds for the Monticello design. Inhibit timers are provided for each valve to prevent the valve from being manually opened less than 10 seconds following valve closure. Valve opening is sensed by pressure switches in the valve discharge line. Each valve is provided with two trip, or actuation, systems. Each system is provided with two channels of instrumentation for each of the above described functions. A two-out-of-two-once logic scheme ensures that no single failure will defeat the low-low set function and no single failure will cause spurious operation of a safety/relief valve. Allowable deviations are provided for each specified instrument setpoint. Setpoints within the specified allowable deviations provide assurance that subsequent safety/relief valve actuations are sufficiently spaced to allow for discharge line water leg clearing.

Control room habitability protection instrumentation assures that the control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of accidental releases of radioactive leakage which may bypass secondary containment following a loss of coolant accident or radioactive releases from a steam line break accident, thus assuring that the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant can be operated or shutdown safely.

Although the operator will set the setpoints within the trip settings specified in Tables 3.2.1 through 3.2.9, the actual values of the various set points can differ appreciably from the value the operator is attempting to set. The deviations could be caused by inherent instrument error, operator setting error, drift of the set point, etc. Therefore, these deviations have been accounted for in the various transient analyses and the actual trip settings may vary by the following amounts:

3.2 BASES 69a REV

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.17 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY 4.17 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY Applicability: Applicability:

Applies to the control room ventilation Applies to the periodic testing requirements system equipment necessary to maintain of systems required to maintain control room habitability. habitability.

Objectives: Objectives:

To assure the control room is habitable both To verify the operability of equipment under normal and accident conditions. related to control room habitability.

Specification: Specification:

A. Control Room Ventilation System A. Control Room Ventilation System

1. Except as specified in 3.17.A.2 and 1. At least once per shift, check 3.17.A.3 below, both trains of the control room temperature.

control room ventilation system shall be operable, whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212*F, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, core alterations or activities having the potential for draining the reactor vessel.

2.a With one control room ventilation train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to operable status within 30 days.

2.b If 2.a is not met, then be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months following the 30 days and in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2.c If 2.a is not met durin movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, core alterations or activies having the potential for draining the reactor vessel then immediately place the operable control room ventilation train in operation or immediately I

suspend these activities.

3.17/4.17 229u REV 115

3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.a With both control room ventilation trains inoperable, restore at least one train to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.b If 3.a is not met, then be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3.c If 3.a is not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, core alterations, or activities having the potential for draining the reactor vessel then immediately suspend these activities.

B. Control Room Emergency Filtration System B. Control Room Emergency Filtration System

1. Except as specified in 3.17.B.l.a or 1. At least once per month, initiate from 3.17.B.l.b below, two control room the control room 1000 cfm (+/-10%) flow emergency filtration system filter trains through both trains of the emergency shall be operable whenever irradiated filtration treatment system. he system fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor shall operate for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months with, coolant temperature is greater than the heaters operable.

212 0F.

a. When one control room emergency filtration system filter train is made or found to be inoperable, for any reason, restore the inoperable train to operable status within seven days or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months following the seven days and either reduce the reactor coolant temperature to below 2120F or initiate and maintain the operable emergency filtration system filter train in the pressurization mode within the fo1lowing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.17/4.17 229v REV 115

3.17 Bases A. Control Room Ventilation System The Control Room Ventilation System provides air conditioning and heating as required to maintain a suitable environment in the main control room and portions of the first and second floors of the Emergency Filtration Train (EFT) buildin&. The main control room is normally slightly pressurized and it is possible to have 0 to 100% recirculation of conditioned air. The system is designed to maintain a nominal temperature of 78*F dry bulb and 50% nominal relative humidity in the main control room in the summer and a nominal temperature or 72*F in the winter. The Control Room Ventilation System may be isolated from unfiltered external air supply by manual action.

All toxic substances which are stored on site or stored/shipped within a 5 mile radius-of the plant have been analyzed for their affect on the control room operators. It has been concluded that the operators will have at least two minutes to don protective breathing apparatus before incapacitation limits are exceeded. For toxic substance which are transported on highways within 5 miles of the plant, it has been determined that the probability of a release from the plant due to incapacitation of the operators caused by a spill is sufficiently low that this scenario may be excluded. Protection for toxic chemicals is provided through operator training.

B. Control Room Emergency Filtration System The Control Room Emergency Filtration System assures that the control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of radioactive leakage which may by-pass secondary containment following a loss of coolant accident or radioactive releases from a steam line break accident. The system is designed to isolate and slightly pressurize the control room on a radiation signal in the ventilation air. Two completely redundant trains are provided.

Each train has a filter unit consisting of a prefilter, HEPA filters, and charcoal adsorbers. The HEPA filters remove particulates from the Control Room pressurizing air and prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to remove any radioiodines form the pressurizin& air.

The in-place test results should indicate a HEPA filter leakage of less than 1% through DOP testing and a charcoal adsorber leakage of less than 1% through halogenated hydrocarbon testing. The laboratory carbon sample results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of a least 98% under test conditions similar to expected accident conditions. System flows should be near their design values. The verification of these performance parameters combined with the qualification testing conducted on new filters and adsorbers provide a high level of assurance that the Emergency Filtration System will perform as predicted in reducing doses to plant personnel below those level stated in Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

Dose calculations have been performed for the Control Room Emergency Filtration System which show that, assuming 90% standby gas treatment system adsorption and filtration efficiency and 90% control room emergency filtration system adsorption and filtration efficiency and radioiodine plateout, whole body and organ doses remain within the NRC guidelines of 5 rem and 30 rem, respectively.

3.17 BASES 229y REV

Exhibit D Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant License Amendment Request dated November 18, 1993 Control Room Habitability Toxic Chemical Study, Revision 0, Dated June 11, 1993, 61 pages

.1 COVER SHEET ECP-2.1 IECP-212 DESIGN CALCULATION

[X ] ECP-23 ENG. EVALUATION

[ OTHER, S JECT: Control Room Habitability - Toxic Chemical Study Final Report CONT. I.D. NO. 1961-23-001 I

PROJECT: Monticello Toxic Chemical Study 60 (plus cover sheet)

NO. OF SHTS.

C LINLT: NorthernSaes Power C o y PURPOSE/DESCRIPTION The purpose of this report is to document the methodology employed and the results obtained for the updated Monticello Toxic Chemical Study. This report describes the local area survey methodology and results; it describes the approach used and results obtained for calculations which deterministically and probabilistically model toxic chemical releases at or near the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

The report summarizes these findings to support elimination of the control room HVAC chemical detectors.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT VERIFICATION F

At- t o-6, m, eI-.l "ll" h'O-V af -416ellld 4, r wer Feci'zq ' r ey'f f&s' ~*,a,.,ef f~

0. 7'aj ORIGINATOR VERIFIED BY APPROVED BY REV. NO. (Signature) DATE (Signature) DATE (Signature) DATE Sm/RA

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ML113210288

Text

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