Text

Memorandum from Timothy Ohara to Arthur Burritt, Inservice Inspection Activities Inspection Feeder for Salem Unit 1, Inspection Report 05000272/2010003
	ML102980401
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/15/2010
From:	O'Hara T; Engineering Region 1 Branch 1
To:	Arthur Burritt; Reactor Projects Branch 3
References
	FOIA/PA-2010-0334, IR-10-003
	Download: ML102980401 (25)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

475 ALLENDALE ROAD

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415

July 15, 2010

MEMORANDUM TO:

Arthur L. Burritt, Chief

Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

THRU:

Richard J. Conte, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

IRA by E. Burket for/

FROM:

Timothy L. OHara, Reactor Inspector

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

IRA/

SUBJECT:

INSERVICE INSPECTION ACTIVITIES INSPECTION FEEDER

FOR SALEM UNIT 1, INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2010003

The enclosed feeder contains input for the subject report resulting from inspection of Inservice

Inspection (ISI) activities during the period from April 5, 2010 to June 28, 2010, at Salem Unit 1.

The inspection was conducted using Inspection Procedure 71111.08, Inservice Inspection

Activities and Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/.172, Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal

Butt Welds. The results of this inspection were presented to Mr. Ed Eilola, Salem Plant

Manager, at an exit meeting on June 28, 2010.

Suggested Cover Letter Input

This feeder documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). This

finding was determined to be a violation of an NRC requirement. This feeder also documents a

licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, in

section 40A7 of this report. This licensee-identified violation is also being documented as an

issue of agency concern, in accordance with, IMC 0612-10 and IMC 0612-11. Because these

violations are of very low safety significance and because the issues were entered into your

corrective action process, these findings are being treated as non-cited violations (NCVs)

consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Enclosure:

Feeder for Salem Unit 1, Inspection Report No. 05000272/2010003,

05000311/2010003

A. Burritt

cc w/Enclosure: (VIA E-MAIL)

A. Burritt, DRP

L. Cline, DRP

D. Schroeder, DRP, SRI - Salem Unit 1

T. O'Hara, DRS

R. Hardies, NRR

DRS Files

2

SUNSI Review Complete:

TLO/RJC

(Reviewer's Initials)

Non-Public Designation Category: MD 3.4 Non-Public A.7

DOCUMENT NAME: g:\\DRS\\EBl\\ohara\\saleml -(2010003)(ohara)(isi-rpt)(ti-172)(04-10)(7-

12-201 0).doc

After declaring this document An Official Agency Record" it will not be released to the Public.

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure

"E" = Copy with

attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE

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NAME

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DATE

07/12/2010

07/15/2010

OFFICE

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NAME

DATE

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Reactor Safety

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

A.

NRC Findings

Green. The inspector identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety

significance (Green) for the PSEG failure to perform Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)

discharge piping pressure tests on buried piping components as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) and the referenced American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code

(ASME),Section XI, paragraph IWA-5244 for Salem Unit 1 and Salem Unit 2. The

required tests are intended to intended to provide evidence of the structural integrity of

the buried piping portions of the system. The affected piping is safety related, ASME

Class 3, Seismic Class 1 piping. This performance deficiency is more than minor

because the condition affected the Equipment Performance attribute (availability and

reliability) of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). No Cross Cutting Aspect is assigned to

this violation because this condition is not indicative of current performance.

B.

Licensee Identified Findings

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by PSEG, was reviewed

by the inspector. Corrective action taken or planned by PSEG were entered into the

corrective action program. The violation and corrective action (Notification) number is

described in Section 40A7 of this report.

ii

REPORT DETAILS

1R08. Inservice Inspection (ISI) (7111108 - 1 Sample)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspector observed a selected sample of nondestructive examination (NDE)

activities in process. Also, the inspector reviewed the records of selected additional

samples of completed NDE and repair/replacement activities. The sample selection was

based on the inspection procedure objectives and risk priority of those components and

systems where degradation would result in a significant increase in risk of core damage.

The observations and documentation reviews were performed to verify that the activities

inspected were performed in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's performance of a visual inspection (VT) of the Unit

1 Reactor Vessel Closure Head (RVCH) and the installed upper head penetrations. The

inspector reviewed the visual procedure, the qualifications of the personnel and

reviewed the inspection report documenting the inspection results. The inspector also

reviewed the data sheets for the penetrant tests completed on 3 of the penetration welds

of the RVCH.

The inspector reviewed records of ultrasonic testing (UT), visual testing (VT), penetrant

testing (PT) and magnetic particle testing (MT) NDE processes. PSEG did not perform

any radiographic testing (RT) during this outage. The inspector reviewed inspection

data sheets and documentation for these activities to verify the effectiveness of the

examiner, process, and equipment in identifying degradation of risk significant systems,

structures and components and to evaluate the activities for compliance with the

requirements of ASME Code,Section XI.

Steam Generator Inspection Activities

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the Salem Unit 1 steam generator Eddy Current

Testing (ECT) tube examinations, and applicable procedures for monitoring degradation

of steam generator tubes to verify that the steam generator examination activities were

performed in accordance with the rules and regulations of the steam generator

examination program, Salem Unit 1 steam generator examination guidelines, NRC

Generic Letters, Code of Federal Regulations 1OCFR50, Technical Specifications for

Salem Unit 1, Nuclear Energy Institute 97-06, EPRI PWR steam generator examination

guidelines, and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Sections V and Xl. The

review also included the Salem Unit 1 steam generator degradation assessment and

steam generator Cycle 21 and 22 operational assessment. The inspector also reviewed

and verified the personnel certifications of the personnel participating in the SG ECT

inspections during the 1R20 refueling outage.

2

The inspector reviewed the PSEG efforts in identifying wear degradation to the tubing in

the four SGs at Salem U1. The majority of these wear indications was attributed to Anti

Vibration Bar (AVB) wear in the u bend regions of the four SGs. The inspector reviewed

the analyses and evaluations which determined that a total of 14 SG tubes would be

removed from service by plugging.

Boris Acid Corrosion Control Program Activities

The inspector reviewed the PSEG boric acid corrosion control program. The resident

inspectors observed PSEG personnel performing boric acid walkdown inspections,

inside containment, and in other affected areas outside of containment, at the beginning

of the Unit 1 refueling outage. The inspector reviewed the Notifications generated by the

walkdowns and the evaluations conducted by Engineering to disposition the

Notifications. Additionally, the inspector reviewed a sample of Notifications and

corrective actions carried out to repair the reported conditions.

Section XI Repair/Replacement Samples:

AFW System Piping, Control Air & Station Air: The inspector reviewed PSEG's

discovery, reporting, evaluation and the repair/replacement of Unit 1 AFW piping which

had been excavated for inspection during the April 2010 Unit 1 refueling outage (1R20).

PSEG conducted this inspection in accordance with PSEGs Buried Piping Inspection

Program.

The inspector reviewed the repair/replacement work orders and the 50.59 screening and

evaluation for the AFW, CA and SA piping. The inspector reviewed the fabrication of the

replacement piping, reviewed the documentation of the welding and NDE of the

replacement piping and reviewed the pressure tests used to certify the replacement

piping. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the specified replacement coating, the

application of the replacement coating and the backfill of the excavated area after the

piping had been tested.

The inspector reviewed the limited UT testing performed on the Unit 2 AFW piping and

no significant degradation was reported.

Rewectable Indication Accepted For Service After Analysis:

The inspector reviewed the Notification and the UT data report of a rejectable wall

thickness measurement on the #11 SG Feedwater elbow during 1 R20: The inspector

reviewed the additional wall thickness data taken to further define the condition and

reviewed the finite element analysis (FEA) which verified that sufficient wall thickness

remained to operate the component until the next refueling outage when it will be

replaced.

Issue of Agency Concern: Buried, Safety Related Piping:

Because of an ongoing issue of Agency Concern about the degradation of buried piping

this issue is being documented as a licensee-identified finding in Section 40A7 in

accordance with the guidance of IMC 0612-10.

3

During a planned excavation and inspection of the Unit 1 AFW buried piping to SG #12

and SG #14, PSEG identified severe corrosion (significantly below minimum wall

thickness) of the safety related, ASME Class 3, Seismic Class 1 piping. PSEG repaired

or replaced the affected Unit 1 buried AFW piping in May 2010. The inspector

subsequently identified that this condition was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion Ill, Design Control.

b.

Finding

The inspector identified the following violation related to ASME, Section Xl testing of

buried Unit 1 and Unit 2 buried AFW piping.

Introduction The inspector identified a GREEN non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) and the referenced American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Code, Section Xl, paragraph IWA-5244 for PSEG's failure to perform required pressure

tests of buried components. This piping is safety related, 4.0" ID, ASME Class 3,

Seismic Class 1 piping.

Description Portions of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System piping

is buried piping and has not been visually inspected since the plant began operation in

1977 for Unit 1 and since 1979 for Salem Unit 2. In April 2010, approximately 680 ft.

(340 ft. of the #12 SG AFW supply and 340 ft. of the #14 SG AFW supply) of piping

between the pump discharge manifold and the connection to the Main Feedwater piping

to the affected SGs was discovered to be corroded to below minimum wall thickness

(0.278") for the 1950 psi design pressure of the AFW System. The lowest wall thickness

measured in the affected piping was 0.077". PSEG plans on excavating the Unit 2

buried piping to inspect the condition during the next Unit 2 outage scheduled for the

spring of 2011.

10 CFR 50.55(a)(g)(4)(ii) requires licensees to follow the in-service requirements of the

ASME Code,Section XI. Paragraph IWA-5244 requires licensees to perform pressure

tests on buried components to demonstrate structural integrity of the tested piping. The

pressure test required by IWA-5244 is considered to be an inservice inspection and is

part of Section XI.Section XI and IWA-5244 do not specify any other non-destructive

examinations (NDE) on buried components to ensure structural integrity. Thus, PSEG

neglected to perform the only inservice inspection, intended to provide evidence of the

structural integrity of this safety related buried piping. PSEG did not perform the required

tests for Unit 1 during the 1st period (5/19/01 to 6/3/04) and 2 nd period (6/24/04 to

5/20/08) periods of the 3rd In Service Inspection Interval, and for Unit 2 for the 1st period

(5/19/01 to 6/3/04) and 2 nd period (6/24/04 to 5/20/08) of the 3 rd In Service Inspection

Interval.

PSEG sought relief, from the NRC, from the previous Code required pressure testing in

1988 for Unit 1 only. Relief was granted to PSEG, by the NRC, to perform an alternate

flow test in 1991 for Unit 1. However, PSEG did not perform the proposed alternate

tests during the 2 nd inservice interval and during the 1st (5/19/01 to 6/3/04) and 2 nd

(6/24/04 to 5/20/08) periods of the 3 rV In Service Inspection Interval for Unit 1. Also,

PSEG did not request relief from the required tests or perform perform the proposed

alternate tests on the Unit 2 buried piping during the 1st period (5/19/01 to 6/3/04) and

2 nd period (6/24/04 to 5/20/08) of the 3rd In Service Inspection Intervals. Thus, PSEG

4

missed an opportunity to identify and correct this performance deficiency which affects

Unit 1 and Unit 2.

A second opportunity to identify and correct this performance deficiency was missed in

2002 when a similar condition (failure to perform buried piping pressure tests) was

reported by Indian Point Unit 3. PSEG's review of operating experience reports did not

identify that the same condition potentially existed at Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2.

PSEG replaced the affected buried Unit 1 piping during the refueling outage in April/May

2010. The required pressure tests were successfully completed after the replacement of

the Unit 1 buried piping. Because the AFW system functioned as required during the

plant shutdown prior to the start of 1 R20 (April 2010), the system did not loose

operability.

For Unit 2, PSEG completed an Operability Determination and a Risk Assessment for

continued operation until the next scheduled refueling outage scheduled for spring 2011

for this issue. These evaluations determined that the condition was acceptable for

continued operation until spring 2011.

Analysis The inspector determined that the licensee's failure to perform the required

pressure test on this safety related buried piping was a performance deficiency for each

Salem Unit. This condition was the result of the licensee's failure to meet the regulatory

requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) and the ASME Code,Section XI, paragraph IWA-

5244. This performance deficiency was reasonably within the licensee's ability to forsee

and correct and should have been prevented.

The inspector determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because

this condition affected the Equipment Performance attribute (availability and reliability) of

the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and

capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences (i.e., core damage).

This finding affects the mitigating systems cornerstone by affecting the secondary, short

term decay heat removal capability. Because the finding did not result in loss of

operability or functionality the inspector determined that the finding was of very low

safety significance, Green.

The inspector determined that a Cross Cutting Aspect did not exist because the issue

was not indicative of current performance because the condition existed since 1991,

more than 3 years ago.

Enforcement 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) states, in part: "Throughout the service life of a

boiling or pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facility, components ... which are

classified as ASME Code Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 must meet the requirements, ...

set forth in Section XI of editions of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code".

Paragraph IWA-5244, Buried Components, of Section XI says, in part,

"(b) For buried components where a VT-2 visual examination cannot be

performed, the examination requirement is satisfied by the following: (1) The

system pressure test for buried components that are isolable by means of valves

5

shall consist of a test that determines the rate of pressure loss. Alternatively, the-

test may determine the change in flow between the ends of the buried

components.

Contrary to these requirements, PSEG did not perform the required pressure tests of the

buried AFW piping to the #12 SG and #14 SG at Salem Unit 1 during the 2nd In Service

Inspection Interval (2/27/88 to 5/19/01) and during the 1st (5/19/01 to 6/3/04) and 2 nd

(6/24/04 to 5/20/08) periods of the 3 rd In Service Inspection Interval (5/19/01 to 5/19/11).

Also, contrary to these requirements, PSEG did not perform the required pressure tests

of the buried piping to the #22 SG and #24 SG for Unit 2 for the 1st period (5/19/01 to

6/3/04) and 2 nd period (6/24/04 to 5/20/08) of the 3 rd In Service Inspection Interval.

Consequently, from 2/27/88 to 4/20/07) the required pressure tests were not performed

to demonstrate structural integrity on the affected buried Unit 1 AFW piping.

Because PSEG entered this condition into the corrective action process (Notification

20459686) and because it is is of very low safety significance (Green), it is being treated

as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

NCV 50-272/2010-?? and NCV 50-311/2010-??

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action reports (Notifications), listed in

Attachment 2 which involved in-service inspection related issues, to ensure that issues

are being promptly identified, reported and resolved. The sample of Notifications

selected did demonstrate that non-conformances are being identified, evaluated and

appropriately addressed.

b.

Findincqs

No findings of significance were identified.

40A5 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/172

a.

Inspection Scope

The Temporary Instruction (TI), 2515/172 provides for confirmation that owners of

pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) have implemented the industry guidelines of the

Materials Reliability Program (MRP) -139 regarding nondestructive examination and

evaluation of certain dissimilar metal welds in the RCS containing nickel based Alloys

600/82/182.

During 1 R20 PSEG inspected the dissimilar metal weld on the 1'" reactor vessel drain

piping with no detected indications. Salem Unit 1 has dissimilar metal welds in the eight

reactor coolant system piping to reactor vessel nozzle safe end welds. No additional

inspections or MSIP applications were performed during 1 R20.

6

This TI requires documentation of specific questions in an inspection report. The

questions and responses for the IR 05000272/2010003 section 40A5 are included in

this report as Attachment "B-I".

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

40A6 Meetings, including Exit

The inspectors presented the ISI inspection and TI 2515/172 inspection results to Mr. Ed

Eilola, Salem Plant Manager, and other members of the PSEG staff at the conclusion of

the inspection at an exit meeting on June 28, 2010 for Salem Unit 1. The licensee

acknowledged the conclusions and observations presented. Some proprietary

information was reviewed during this inspection and was properly destroyed. No

proprietary information is contained in this report.

40A7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following finding of very low safety significance was identified by PSEG and is a

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, Design Control, an NRC requirement.

PSEG did not provide an effective protective coating for the buried AFW piping. This

issue has been evaluated via IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and

Characterization of Findings and IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening.

During a planned excavation and inspection of the Unit 1 AFW buried piping to SG #12

and SG #14, PSEG identified severe corrosion (significantly below minimum wall

thickness) of the safety related, ASME Class 3, Seismic Class 1 piping. The area of the

worst corrosion resulted in a wall thickness of 0.077". PSEG repaired or replaced the

affected Unit 1 buried AFW piping before returning the plant to operation.

This finding affects the mitigating systems cornerstone by affecting the secondary, short

term decay heat removal capability. Because the finding did not result in loss of

operability or functionality the inspector determined that the finding was of very low

safety significance, Green. The inspector determined that a Cross Cutting Aspect did

not exist because the issue was not indicative of current performance because the

condition existed since 1977.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, Design Control, states, in part "Measures shall be

established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis,

for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are

correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These

measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are

specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are

controlled. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability

of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the

safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components."

7

Contrary to these requirements, PSEG did not provide engineering evaluations, vendor

certification, or testing data to demonstrate that the specified coating would protect the

buried AFW piping for the design lifetime of the plant. Also, PSEG did not assure

appropriate quality standards which assure that deviations from such standards were

controlled. Additionally, PSEG did not provide measures for the selection and review for

suitability of the coating materials for the buried AFW piping application, for periodic

inspections to ensure that the applied coating was protecting the buried AFW piping, and

did not provide engineering details demonstrating the ability of the coating to protect the

buried AFW piping for the design life of the plant.

Because PSEG entered this condition into the corrective action process (Notification

20456999) and because the issue is of very low safety significance (Green), this issue is

being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A. 1 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy. NCV 50-272/2010003-??

A-1

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY CONTACTS

Licensee Personnel:

Howard Berrick, PSEG

Pat Fabian, PSEG

Mohammad Ahmed, PSEG

Tony Oliveri, PSEG

Tom Roberts, PSEG

Ali Fakhar, PSEG

Len Rajkowski, PSEG

Dave Mora, PSEG

Edley Giles, PSEG

Walter Sheets, PSEG

Bob Montgomery, PSEG

Jim Mellchiona, PSEG

Bill Mattingly, PSEG

Pat Van Horn, PSEG

Jim Barnes, PSEG

Justin Werne, PSEG

Rick Villar, PSEG

Matthew Murray, PSEG

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Notifications:

20457869, Control Air Piping Leak*

20462034, Basis AFW Discharge Line Design Pressure*

20461785, Untimely retrieval of Design Documents*

20461255, U2 Containment Liner Blisters*

20459259, U2 Containment Liner Blisters*

20459689, failure to do IWA-5244 pressure tests*

20456999, Guided Wave (GW) pipe wall loss 20% to 44%*, in Equipment Apparent Cause

Evaluation (EQ;ACE) Charter

20457854, see Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EQ: ACE) Charter

20457869, Air Line Leak, in Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation EQ: ACE Charter

20458147, see Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EQ: ACE) Charter

20458148, see Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EQ: ACE) Charter

20458568, see Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation (EQ: ACE) Charter

20458554, 11 CA HDR Line In Fuel Xfer Area Degraded*

20458761, 1 R20 CA Buried Pipe Coating Repair*

20458925, 1 R20 SA Buried Pipe Coating Repair*

20457262, (88) 1 R20 AF Buried Pipe Inspection Results*

20460624, Need Heat Trace on AF lines in FFT Area

20457877, Ul Containment Liner Corrosion at 78' El.*

A-2

20459259, Ul Corrosion on Containment Liner*

20459303, #14 AF pipe damaged penetration seal*

20459304, #12 AF pipe damaged penetration seal*

20459454, Request for Additional UT Data, 4/18/10 (due to 0.077" reading)*

20344017, Inspect steel liner in 1 R19

20235636, NRC noted water running down containment wall

20459189, Question on location of RFO-14 location of a PZR shell weld

20290560, Replace section of 15B FWH shell-S1-R18

20457879, (184) 1R20 FAC(N18) 14# elbow below Tmin

20456828, (66) valve has visible boron buildup 1 R20

20459232, Heavy Dry White Boron Vlv Packing (1 R20)

20456834, Heavy Dry White Boron VIv Packing (1 R20)

20456840, Medium Dry White Boron VIv Packing (1R20)

20456839, Medium Dry White Boron VIv Packing (1R20)

20389147, Recordable ISI Indications on CVC Tank

20344017, Inspect Steel Liner in 1R19 @ Containment Sump

20235636, NRC Noted Water Running Down Containment Wall

20392631, ARMA From ISI Program Audit 2008

20460624, Need Heat Trace on AF lines in FTT Area

20333050, Response to NRC NOV EA-07-149

20322039, 2nd Interval ISI NRC Violation

20397518, A1 CVC-1 CV1 80 Chk VIv Stuck Open - PI&R review

20444514, Boric Acid Leak from Drain Line - PI&R review

20445314, boron leak - PI&R review

20448241, Minor Packing Leak - BAC - PI&R review

20435861, 21SJ313 Has Boric Acid Leakage - PI&R review

20417331, Boric Acid Leak at 11 CV1 56 - PI&R review

20411151, Tubing leak on 1 SS653 - PI&R, review

20414343, 12 Charging Pump seal inj. Line - PI&R review

20395346, 12 Bat PP Seal Leak - PI&R review

20450330, Containment Liner Corrosion - PI&R review

20385733, Severe Corrosion on FP Valve - PI&R review

20438320, (217) Op Eval. Of Containment Corrosion - PI&R review

20387897, Significant outlet pipe corrosion - PI&R review

20397225, MIC Corrosion Causing Through Wall Leak - PI&R review

20436836, Repair Cracks in Battery Cells - PI&R review

20392145, Update Ul ISI Relief Request Book - PI&R review

20449447, Update Salem Unit 1 ISI 10 Yr Plan - PI&R review

20449744, Update Salem Unit 1 Containment ISI 10 Yr Plan - PI&R review

20449442, Update Salem Unit 2 Containment ISI 10 Yr Plan - PI&R review

20449554, Salem U2 RFO18 ISI Scope - PI&R review

20416605, INPO PSIRV Alloy 600 Program - PI&R review

20404057, Unit 2 ISI (MSIP) - PI&R review

20392631, ARMA FROM ISI PROGRAM AUDIT 2008 - PI&R review

20388065, Water leaking in decon room - PI&R review

20439023, 23 CFCU Head Leakage - PI&R review

20439022, SW Header Leakage 23 CFCU - PI&R review

20389148, 1 R19 ISI Weld Exam Limitations - PI&R review

20416605, INPO PSIRV Alloy 600 Program - PI&R review

20449442, Update Salem 2 Containment ISI 10 yr. Plan - PI&R review

20449554, Salem Unit 2 RFO18 ISI Scope - PI&R review

A-3

20449747, Update Salem 2 ISI 10 Yr. Plan - PI&R review

20401542, Perform ISI BMV Exam on RPV Upper Head - PI&R review

20449063, SA Ul Service Inspec- ISI & Ul TI 2515 - PI&R review

20389147, Recordable ISI Indications on CVC Tank - PI&R review

20392145, Update U1 ISI Relief Request Book - PI&R review

20449744; Update Salem UI Containment ISI 10 Yr. Plan - PI&R review

20409943, NRC RIS 2009-04 SG Tube Insp Rqmts - PI&R review

20459851,Section XI Exams Limited to 90% or Less - PI&R review

20450520, Recoat Affected Areas of Liner 2R1 8 - PI&R review

20457388, Excavation Issues - PI&R review

Denotes this Notification was generated as a result of this inspection

Section XI Repair/Replacement Samples:

W.O. 60079414, 14" Carbon Steel Elbow FAC indication below minimum wall

W.O. 60084266, Salem Ul AF Buried Piping Inspection

W.O. 60089561, 80101381: Replace Aux FW U/G. Piping

W.O. 60064104, Repair 15B FWH Area

W.O. 60084375, BACC Program repair to 1 PS1

W.O. 60089612, BACC Program repair to S1CVC-14CV392

W.O. 60089615, BACC Program repair to S1SJ-13SJ25

W.O. 60089848, 80101382 Advanced Work Authorization #2 FTTA Replace Aux. Feedwater

Pipe

W.O. 60089561, 80101381 Advanced Work Authorization - Replace Aux. FW U/G Piping,

4/9/10

Non-Code Repair

W.O. 60089848, Repair Non-nuclear, safety related CA Pipe, Unit 1 FTTA

W.O. 60089757, Test Non-nuclear, safety related CA Pipe Repair, Unit 1 FTTA

Miscellaneous Work Orders:

W.O. 60089917, Penetrations for CA & SA Lines, 4/23/10

W.O. 941017262, Activity 04, Excavate and Examine Auxiliary Feedwater Piping, Unit 2, 12/94

W.O. 941017262, Activity 03, Excavate and Examine Auxiliary Feedwater Piping, Unit 2, 12/94

W.O. 941017262, Activity 02, Excavate and Examine Auxiliary Feedwater Piping, Unit 2, 12/94

W.O. 941017262, Activity 01, Excavate and Examine Auxiliary Feedwater Piping, Unit 2, 12/94

W.O. 60089561, Flush New AFW piping 12 and 14

Drawings & Sketches:

205236A8761-54, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1, Auxiliary Feedwater

Salem Unit 1 Aux Feed Piping, Allan Johnson, 4/10/10

80101381RO, Buried Pipe, Replaced AFW Piping Arrangement

207483A8923-1 1, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1 - Reactor Containment

Auxiliary Feedwater, Plans & Sections - Elev. 78' 10" & 100' 0", Mechanical