ML101520142

Initial Exam 2010-301 Final SRO Written Exam

ML101520142
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Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/28/2010
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76. 005G2.2.38 003/NEW/SRO/M 3.6/4.5/005AG2.2.38/N/2/HBF/GTO/NRCI 0/N-SAT-V Which one of the following states the RHR flow requ irement to be considered OPERABLE in accordance with TS 3.9.5, Residual heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation Low Water Level?

RHR pump flow must be a minimum of gpm to be OPERABLE.

A. 3300 Bk 3000 C. 2750 D. 1750 Plausibility and Answer Analysis A. Incorrect, the flow rate stated is NOT the minimum; SR 3.9.4.1 requires >3000 gpm of RHR flow (re-iterated in SOP-7 P&L 3.21) and allowing this amount of flow would violate P&L 3.16 of SOP-7.0.

Plausible: <3300 gpm is a limit imposed on RHR flow by SOP-7.0 to reduce the potential for pipe thinning form possible cavitation downstream of the orifices. (SOP-7.0 P&L 3.17)

B. Correct. SR 3.9.4.1 requires 3000 gpm of RHR flow (also stated in P&L 3.21 of SOP-7.0). TS Basis states that this flow is required to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. (TS B2.9.4-4)

C. Incorrect. This flow rate limit is that listed in P&L 3.18 of SOP-7.0 and is to reduce the thrust loading on the RHR pump bearings.

D. Incorrect. This flow rate (<1750 gpm) is a limit on RHR imposed by SOP-7.0 when in MODE 4 < 325° F, Mode 5 and MODE 6 when the react or vess is on, when LTOP system is also required to be in operation to el head prevent possibly exceeding the design discharge pressure of the RHR pump.

K/A statement 005 Residual Heat Removal System G2.2.38-Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Importance Rating: 3.6 4.5 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.9.4, B3.9.4 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: Recall and apply the information from the LCO bases sections surveillence requirements for any TS or TRM requirements associated the RHR system components and attendant equipment.

Question origin: NEW Comments: k/a overlap possible: 005K4.03-- above RO level since P&L does not list this requirement as an operability requirement AND this requires knowledge of the Surveillance Requirement. (below the line)

K/A match: Knowledge of the minimum flow for operability of the RHR pumps is license limitation.

SRO justification: Operability determined by SRO, and requires knowledge of TS surveillance requirements. The information contained in SOP-7.0 P&Ls does not directly relate to operability requirements, therefore requiring knowledge which is below the line or within basis to make the operability determination.

77. 007 EA2.02 002/MODIFIED BAN KJSRO/M EM 4.3/4.6/007EA2.02/N

/2/HBF/GTO/NRC I 0/M-SAT-V Unit 1 is in Mode 3, and the following conditions exist At 10:00:

• The shutdown banks are withdrawn.

• A Cooldown per Technical Specification 3.4.10, Pres surizer Safety Valves, is in progress due to an inoperable PRZR code safety valv e.

• TcoId is 530°F.

At 10:10, A complete Loss of Off-Site Power occurs with the following conditions:

• All emergency equipment operates normally.

• ACC reports that off-site power will be restored in 18 hrs.

Which one of the following describes the required action, if any, to open the Rx Trip Breakers and the procedure transition from ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, after the plant is stabilized?

Manual action (1) required to open the Rx Trip Breakers.

After the plant is stabilized the crew will transition to (2) from ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

(1) (2)

A IS ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding B. IS ESP-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Allowance for Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding (with RVLIS)

C. IS NOT ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding D. IS NOT ESP-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Allowance for Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding (with RVLIS)

Replaced UOP-2.3 with ESP-0.3 for plausibility conc erns of Examiner.(deleted reference to the UOP from SRO discussion from Note s page.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Correct. (1) RX trip breakers will not open automati cally therefore manual action is required.

(2) RCPs are not available and Cooldown to TcoId <325°F in 12h 15m is required per TS. 3.4.10. which satisfies the condition al statement of ESP-0.1 step 20.1.2 RNO, therefore Transition to ESP-O.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding.

B Incorrect. 1) The RTB will need to be manually operated but, 2) the transition to ESP-0.3 is incorrect since it would not be entered exce pt from ESP-0.2.

Additionally, considering the transition to ESP-0.3 from ESP-0.2 (long term transition), it would not be warranted with the give n information. Step 10 transition would not be satisfied since CST level at only 18 ft would allow a 25F/hr (ESP-0.2 limit)-- CST level is not provided since the stem is directed at the transition FROM ESP-0.2 and is not needed to answer the question.

Transition to ESP-0.3 from step 13 is not likely to be required since IF a void in the vessel head DID develop, there is no cond ition demanding a rapid depressurization therefore, remaining in ESP

-0.2 would be correct at this transition as well.

Plausible: 2) The transition to ESP-0.3 could be mad e from ESP-0.2 if a Depressurization was urgent or there were inventory conc ern.

C Incorrect. RX trip breakers will not open automatically

, therefore manual action is required. However, the transition is correct See A.2.

Plausible: a LOSP would result in a loss of all RCPs and therefore would result in a RX trip if > P-7 D Incorrect. (1) RX trip breakers will not open automatically therefore manual action is required. (2) the stated transition is also incorrect See B.

Plausible: See C.1 and B.2.

K/A statement -007EA2.02 Reactor Trip- Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip. Proper actions to be taken if the automatic safety functions have not taken place Importance Rating: 4.3 4.6 Technical

Reference:

ESP-0.2, version 18.

ESP-0.1, version 29 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-52201 107: RECALL AND DESCRIBE the operation and function of the following reactor trip signals, permissives and control interlocks, and engineered safeguards actuation signals associated with the Reactor Protection system.

OPS-62531B01: ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the ESP-0.1 and based on that assessment: DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required.

Question origin: Modified FNP Bank: ESP-0.1-52531B08 004 Comments: K/A match:Rx Trip breaker operation/P-4 is a safety function that has not occured automatically and a manual action (manual rx trip) is required per E-0.

Although no automatic reactor trip signal has occurred, E-0 is entered directly based on the recognized condition or as directed by 4.4 of AOP-5.0, and/or AOP-1 9 step 3.

Step 1 of E-0 verifies the reactor trip, and if not tripped the trip breakers are manually opened. IF AOP-4.0 entered instead, then step 7.2 will open Rx trip breakers.

Requires interpreting plant conditions to determine if the Rx trip breakers are or are not automatically opened. In the given circumstance, the Rx is tripped (rods are dropped due to MG set de-energization) but the Rx Trip breakers will not be open and P-4 will not be satisfied automatically.

SRO justification: Requires detailed knowledge of the decision point within a procedure requiring transition to a contingency or NON-major EOP procedure entry.

78. 007G2.4.2 001 /NEW/SRO/C/A 4.5/4.6/00 7G2.4.2/N/4/H B F/GTO/NRC I 0/M-SAT-V Unit 1 is at 100% with the following con ditions:

• Pressurizer pressure control is in AUT O.

• PT-445, PRZR PRESS, pressure tran smitter fails HIGH.

Which one of the following describes:

1) the PRT pressure following a PT-445 failure with no operator actions for five (5) minutes, AND

2) the basis for the limit of T.S. 3.4.13

, RCS Operational Leakage, if leakage continues into the PRT past the PORV and its block valve after the valves are closed?

A. 1) The PRT pressure will remain belo w rupture disc setpoint.

2) The leakage limit is a reasonable mini mum detectable amount that the leak detection processes can detect within a reasonable period of time.

B 1) The PRT pressure will remain belo w rupture disc setpoint.

2) The leakage limit is well within the capability of the makeup system and doe interfere with the identification of other s not leakage.

C. 1) The PRT will pressurize until the rup ture disc ruptures.

2) The leakage limit is well within the cap ability of the makeup system and doe interfere with the identification of other leak s not age.

D. 1) The PRT will pressurize until the rupture disc ruptures.

2) The leakage limit is a reasonable mini mum detectable amount that the leak detection processes can detect within a reasonable period of time.

changes: reduced the time to5 mm and merely delayed the Immediate actions would occur to address examiners con that cerns on operational validity.

Added from the PORV and its block valv e after they are closed-- REQUIRE inclusion of the block valve leakage sinc S e the TS actions would require this closure too-- in an attempt to terminate this leak age.

PT-445 failing high results in PCV-44 5 opening fully (when in auto) until Pressu below P-Il. The operation of PK-444A re falls will return pressure to > 2000 psig, at whic time PCV-445 will reopen to reduce pre h ssure. The OTAT Setpoint will be penaliz but will remain at or above 100.5% (101 ed

.5% demonstrated by laptop simulator),

therefore no reactor trip will occur. The PRT pressure will remain below rupture disc setpoint for over an hour under thes e conditions.

Should a similar failure occur on PT-444, then the combined respons e of PRZR

Sprays, and PORV operation would result in both a RX Trip on OTAT (if starting at 100%) or Low RCS Pressure (if <100%), and an SI on Low RCS pressure following the Rx Trip. The result is that the SI flow will fill the PRZR solid and the resultant water fill of the PRT would exceed its capacity-- causing the PRT rupture disc to rupture.

The rupture of the PRT rupture disc occurs in 27 mins after the failure as demonstrated by the laptop simulator.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect. The stated basis is that of UNIDEN TIFIED LEAKAGE, PRT in-leakage is categorized as IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.

Plausible: The stated basis is that of UNIDEN TIFIED LEAKAGE.

B Correct. The tank is designed to accept a steam discharge from the pressurizer equal to 110 percent of the volume above the full power pressurizer water level setpoint. The Sparger and 70% water level in the PRT will dissipate the pressure for over 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with the stated failure as demonstrated by the simulator (final pressure 70.0 psig and level 82% per laptop simulator).

Furthermore, the operation of P-i I will prevent a continuous discharge into the PRT.

T.S. B3.4.13: Up to 10 gpm of IDENTIFIED LEA KAGE is considered allowable because LEAKAGE is from known sou rces that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEA KAGE and is well within the capability of the RCS Makeup System C Incorrect. P-il will prevent the PORV from remaining open and the PRT is designed to recieve this discharge without exce eding 205°F and 100 psig.

Plausible: This would be the correct response if a PORV had failed or stuck open (ie a continuous discharge from the pressurizer). The PRT is NOT designed for a continuous discharge from the pressurizer.

D Incorrect. See C & See B.

K/A statement: 007G2.4.2 Pressurizer Relief Tank / Quench Tank System Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automati c actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

Importance Rating: 4.5 4.6 Technical

Reference:

T.S. Basis 3.4.13-3 AOP-100, ver 9.0 FSAR 5.5.11.1 (rev 22)

EEP-0 ver 38 SOP-0.3, Appendix G ver 39.0 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-52101E07, SELECT AND ASSESS the pressurizer system instrument/equipment response expected when performing pressurizer system evolutions, including the normal condition, the failed condition, Associated alarms associated trip setpoints, to include components found on Figure 3.

Question origin: NEW Comments: Validated on laptop simulator.

K/A match: EOP entry conditions--- AOP-100 provides the specific guidance for this failure.

lnterlocks/setpoints ---- P-i 1 (2000 psig) will actuate to prevent a continuous discharge into the PRT preventing rupture of the rupture disc (design/automatic response of sparger/water level).

PRT system---Must demonstrate knowledge of design capability of the PRT/quench system (intermittent vs continuous discharge [P-i 1]) as a result of a failure of PRZR PORV control system.

SRO justification: Knowledge of tech spec bases that is required to analyze tech spec required actions and terminology.

79. 00AG2.4.41 002/BAN K/SRO/C/A 2.9/4.6/00AG24.4 I/Y/3/H BF/GTO/NRC 10/N-SAT-V An automatic SI from 100% has occurred on Unit 1 due to a pressurizer safety valve failed open and the following conditions exist:

• RCP5 have been secured.

• Phase B has actuated.

• The lB CS Spray Pump tripped.

• The 1C CTMT Cooler Fan will not start.

AT 1000, plant conditions are as follows:

• RCS pressure 1335 psig and dropping

• Pressurizer level 100%

• All CETCs indicate 550°F and stable

• Lowest TcoId 405°F and stable

• All three SG levels 48% narrow range and stable

• RVLIS 72% Upper Plenum and dropping

• R-2 0.8 R/hr and stable

• R-27A 1 R/hr and stable

• Containment Hydrogen 0%

• Containment Pressure 4.8 psig and dropping

• Containment Sump Level 2.7 ft and rising

• RCS Activity <Tech Spec limit AT 1050, the crew has since aligned instrument air to cont ainment and the following parameters are reported:

• All CETC5 indicate 743° F and rising t

• Containment Pressure 1 .9 psig and dropping Considering ONLY the Fission Product Barriers, whic h one of the following identifies the Emergency Classification at 1000 and later at 1050?

(ED Judgement is NOT to be used as criteria for the decla ration)

REFERENCE PROVIDED 1000 1050 A Alert(FA1) Site Area Emergency (FS1)

B. Alert (FAI) General Emergency (FGI)

C. Site Area Emergency (FS1) Site Area Emergency (FS1)

D. Site Area Emergency (FSI) General Emergency (FG1)

Plausibility and Answer Analysis PROVIDE FPB evaluation Modes 1-4 (Figure 1) from EIP-9.2

(  ;. )-- ver 7.

INFORMATION NOT stated but can be INFE RRED from condiUons stated justifications contained in the Threshold value informati and knowledge on (memory level-SRO) or systems know

1. RCS Leak Rate; NOT provided since the ledge level (all):

above conditions are subsequent to actio systems and a Blowdown of the RX vessel ns of the ESF inventory, there is ample indications to reco that RCS makeup is NOT sufficient and subc gnize ooling is currently (1650 psia =609 therefore 609-572=37°F and degrading) and TSA T °F; in excess of charging capacity. Furtherm the LOSS is not identified the POTEN ore, if TIAL LOSS is easily identified because is lowering still with SI flow, therefore RCS RCS inventory leak rate is far above 120 gpm.

2. CNMTevaluation parameters are omitted since there is ample information to indic operation of Cnmt spray system and oth ate normal er indication rad monitors are omitted since is normally expected for this failure AND NO alarm in this exam students are briefed not to condition is other than normal for the cond assume a itions of the stem unless otherwise state d.

A. Correct. 1) The Classification for 1000 is correct based on RCS Barrier LOSS (R-21R-7-- inferred from R27 readings) and furthermore a POTENTIAL LOSS is indicated based on leak rate

>120 gpm (if one were to assume that subcooling had been maintained the full time before SI actuation for this event-- likely assumption since sub cooling is currently only 37°F but lowering). There is no POTENTIAL LO SS or LOSS of Fuel Clad at this time.

2) The classification for 1050 is correct since CORE COOLING CSF is now ORANGE the fuel clad is declared a POTENTIAL LOSS.

B. Incorrect. 1) correct see A.1

2) Incorrect but plausible if the conditions for Clad were recognized AND either the opening of CNMT isolations (air to containment) were deemed a LOSS, OR the depressurization of CNMT were deemed as UNEXPLAINED or if thought intersys tem LOCA were indicated, OR Containtment CSF were incorrectly asse ssed as having been RED at any time.

C. Incorrect. 1) This classification is incorrec t (See A.1), but plausible if CNMT status was also considered LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS as discussed in B.2. OR if Fuel clad somehow also incorrectly asse ssed.

2) This is the correct classification (See A.2) and does not escalate thereby not invalidating(revealing) an erro r in the examinees first determination. This option is necessary to permit an error carried forward response, and not inadvertently direct a re-a ssessment of the first classification.

D. Incorrect. 1)SeeC.1.

2) This is an incorrect classification (see B2);

but plausible in that provides an avenue to escalate the classification from an erroneous first classification similar to that discussed in C.2.

K/A statement 008A PRESSURIZER Vap or Space Accident G24.41-Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classificati ons.

Importance Rating: 3.6 4.5

Technical

Reference:

FNP-0-EIP-9.2, ver 7 References to be provided: FNP-0-EIP-9.2, ver 7, Fig 1, Fission Product Barrier Evaluation MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Learning Objective: OPS-63002001 --Using plant procedures/references, Analyze a set of plant conditions and determine the proper classification of the emergency conditions as being a NOUE, Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency.

Question origin: BANK--Sequoyah 2008 NRC; added information improving plausibility of Cnmt barrier being assessed as LOSS or Potential LOSS; altered to address operational validity-- as best as practical for this failure 1000 data altered after checking operational validity of data: The conditions stated are those demonstrated by the simulator Laptop computer with the following malf/faults and actions: Safety valve opens 100% from 100% power, TDAFW pump prevented from operating, MDAFW flow limited to 75gpm/SG until SG NR level is 33% at which time secured; All CNMT coolers stopped from initiation of event, all RCPs secured immediately following Phase B actuation. The conditions stated are a result of NO operator actions other than that stated above.

1050 data --Removed 1050 RVLIS indication since unable to generate a condition with CETCs >700F and RVLIS at 40%.

Comments: Challenges: Reference has been reviewed such that:

information on the provided reference does NOT reveal the answer to 072G2.1 .27 on the RO portion of this exam; that question asks about the ARMS functions/purpose and since R-2/R-7, R-27 are ARMS radiation monitors, this purpose might be inferred.

HOWEVER, the knowledge that these rad monitors are part of the ARMS system is also required, and are not directly implicated in this reference as an ARMS rad monitor instrument, nor does 072G2.1.27 question on the RO exam draw this relationship.

004G2.4.2 on the RO exam challenges information regarding CSF 0.1 transition (RED path) in this question ORANGE path transition is identified.

K/A match: Knowledge of the severity (size) of a stm space LOCA coupled with the longevity of the accident impacts classification determinations regarding the assessment of the RCS being intact or LOSS/Potential LOSS of that boundary.

SRO justification: 100FR55.43(b)(6): as defined with SRO-on!y guide:

Evaluating [...] emergency classifications based on core conditions.

80. 01 4A2.04 N 1 O EWSR O O/C/A 6 3.4,39/0) 4A2.04/N/4/HBF/GTONRC I 0/N-SAT-V The following plant conditions exist:

• Unit 1 is performing the first reactor startup following a refueling outage

• The reactor has been critical for <100 hrs.

• UOP-1 .2, Startup of Unit From Hot Standby to Minimum Load, is in progress.

• All Control Bank D (CB D) rod heights indicated by DRPI and group step counters are at 208 steps.

• Reactor power is 20%.

A Main Generator trip occurred with rod control in automatic. During that transient, a failure occured on CB D rod H-2 CRDM such that its lift coil will not energiz

e. After the plant is stabilized, the following conditions exist:

• Rod H-2 is 14 steps above CB D step counters.

• The cause for the lift coil malfunction has NOT been identified.

Which one of the following states if TS 3.1 .4, Rod Group Alignment Limits

, are met and the required actions per AOP-19.0, Malfunction of Rod Control System?

The Rod Group Alignment Limits of TS 3.1.4 (1) met.

AOP-19.0 will direct the operator to (2)

(1) (2)

A. are Perform rod realignment using AOP-19.0, Attachment 2, Misaligned Rod Recovery or Maintenance Testing.

B. are NOT Perform rod realignment using AOP-19.0, Attachment 2, Misaligned Rod Recovery or Maintenance Testing.

C. are Immediately commence a shutdown using UOP-2.1, Shutdown of Unit From Minimum Load to Hot Standby.

D are NOT Immediately commence a shutdown using UOP-2.1, Shutdown of Unit From Minimum Load to Hot Standby.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect. 1) incorrect assessment of TS 3.1.4 which allows up to 12 steps misaligned, 14 steps is above this limit

2) The action is not correct, since Attachment 4 of AOP-1 9 would require an IMMEDIATE shutdown since <150 MWD/MTU. Also, Attachment 1 would ONLY be utilized if the rod malfunction were corrected AND the rod was moveable. In this case, the rod can not be realigned with attachment 1 for both Attachment 4 limits AND since the malfunction is not corrected, step 19 RNO action would require driving CB D out to match rod H-8 position.

Plausible: This is the correct action should the rod be movable and repaired per step 19 AER of AOP-1 9. and IF attachment 4 permitted recovery.

B Incorrect. 1) Rod misalignment does exceed the limits of TS, however

2) incorrect action for a misaligned rod at this time in core life (SEE A.2),

and an immovable rod that has not been repaired.

C Incorrect. 1) See A.1

2) see D.2 D Correct. 1)TS 3.1.4 which allows up to 12 steps misaligned, 14 steps is above this limit

2) Correct procedure actions per step 17 of AOP-1 9, and Attachment 4 where Core Burnup is <150 MWD/MTU recovery of the misaligned rod is not permitted and the RNO actions (and attachment 4) would require shutdown.

K/A statement 014A2.04 Rod Position Indication System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Misaligned rod on the RPIS; and (b) based on those on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Misaligned rod.

Importance Rating: 3.4 3.9 Technical

Reference:

AOP-19.0, ver 26.0.

References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-52201 E03; Relate and Identify the operational characteristics including design features, capacities, and protective interlocks associated with the Rod Control System.

OPS-62520S02; Evaluate plant conditions and determine if transition to another section of AOP-1 9 is required.

Question origin: NEW Comments: Given a failure that will result in an immovable rod during a automatic rod insertion, and ADP-19 would be addressed after AOP-1 7 stabilizes the plant.

The examinee must exercise knowledge of TS 3.1.4 alignment limits (12 steps) as well as AOP-19 requirements to mitigate the condition.

Interplay between parts (plausibility concerns): since the TS evaluation has NO bearing on the actions prescribed by the AOP, there is not interrelationship that is drawn between the first and second parts of the answer choices. Each choice is independent of the other, particularly since depending on core life, every option is mutually INCLUSIVE. (limits can be exceed and allow for alignment after repairs, or limits NOT exceed but still direct alignment after repairs).

SRO justification: procedure transition Core Life <150 MWD/MTU prevents recovery therefore assessment of step 17 (attachment 4) and step 17 RNO actions direct UOP shutdown.

81. 01 5G24. II 002/NEW/SRO/CiA 40,4.2/0 I 5G2.4. I I/Y/3/HBF/GT O/NRC 10/SAT Unit 1 startup is in progress using UOP-1 .2, Startup of Unit from Hot Standby to Minimum Load. Reactor power is being maintained 2-4%, when the following occurs:

N-44, Power Range NI, fails high.

Which one of the following describes the procedure containing the required response to the failure, and the ability to enter Mode 1 upon completing the AOP actions, lAW Tech Spec 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Condit ions D and E and Tech Spec 3.0.4?

REFERENCE PROVIDED (1) contains all of the required actions; after completing the AOP actions.

Mode 1 entry (2) permitted by Tech Specs.

A 1) AOP-100, Instrumentation Malfunction.

2) IS B. 1) AOP-100, Instrumentation Malfunction.

2)IS NOT C. 1) AOP-19, Malfunction of Rod Control System.

2) IS D. 1) AOP-19, Malfunction of Rod Control System.

2) IS NOT

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Correct. 1) Section 1.11 of AOP-100 provides the necessary directions

2) AOP-100 establishes the conditions necessary to satisfy all timed actions of TS 3.3.1 conditions D & E and both have actions that allow for continued operation in MODE 1 for an unlimited period of time. Per T.S. 3.0.4.a, these conditions permit entry into MODE 1.

B Incorrect. 1) See A #1 for discussion

2) entry into MODE 1 is allowed. See A #2 for discussion.

Plausible: 1) See A #1

2) Generally TS 3.0.4 prevents mode change to a higher mode where an unsatisfied LCO would be applicable. Failing to apply TS 3.0.4 exceptions would lead to the belief that a mode change is not permitted.

C Incorrect. 1) This AOP does not provide the necessary direction for N-44 failure, nor is the entry conditions met for this procedure due to being below C-5, Rods will not be in automatic control and there will be no unexplained rod motion.

2) See A #2 Plausible: 1) AOP-19, would be applicable if rods were in Automatic (>C5) concurrent with the failure, and any failure in rod control EXCEPT for input signals.

2) See A#2 D Incorrect. 1)SeeC#1

2) See B#2 for Plausibility

K/A statement -

015 Nuclear Instrumentation System G2.4.1 1 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Importance Rating: 4.0 4.2 Technical

Reference:

AOP-100 rev 9 TS 3.0.4; 3.3.1 References to be provided: REFERENCES PROVIDED ARE FOR APPLICABLE CONDITIONS-- Other information on the same page has been deleted or covered over.

T.S. 3.3.1 pg 3.3.1-2 through 33.1-3 (Obscure condition C data and F data),

T.S. 3.3.1-14 (obscure function 1, 4);

Learning Objective: OPS-62302A02 Recall and Apply the information of the generic LCO requirements (LCO 3.0.1 thru 3.07; SR 4.0.1 thru 4.0.4).

Question origin: NEW Comments: K/A match: knowledge of the response for the N44 failure is contained within an AOP; SRO justification: Generic LCO Application of 3.0.4.a to allow mode change must be evaluated.

82. 022A2.0 002/N EW/SRO/C/A 2.5/2.7/022A2.0i/Y/3/HBF/GTO/NRCIO

/M-SAT-V UNIT 1 is in Mode 1, when the following conditions and sequence of events occur:

CTMT CLR FANS SEL switches are positioned as follows:

• A Train selected to 1A

• B Train selected tolD 1300 Aug 06: Containment Spray Pump 1A declared INOPERABL E.

1900 Aug 08: While performing STP-17.0, Containment Coolin g System Train A(B),

Operability Test, the following deficiencies were discovered or occurred:

- 1A and lB CTMT CLRs were determined to be clogged with maximum attainable SW flow through either cooler being 500 gpm.

BA3, 1C CTMT CLR FAN FAULT, came into alarm due to 1C CTMT CLR Fan Slow Speed breaker tripping open when started.

0327 Aug 09: 1A Containment Spray Pump was returned to OPER ABLE status.

Which one of the following states the latest time and date that Mode 3 must be (have been) entered without violating Tech Spec 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems?

Mode 3 must be (have been) achieved no later than (date) at (time)

REFERENCE PROVIDED DATE TIME A. Aug 09 0200 B. Aug12 0100 C Aug16 0100 D. Aug16 1900 Altered distractor to eiminate the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and replace with 10 day require ment.

Changed sequence of answer choices to fit psychometrics.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis

Time of entry/required exit DATE (+6hrs) 3.6.6(lodays) 13 13 16 19 Spray pump (72hr) 13 13 9 19 A coolers (7 day) 19 19 16 1 Aclr&spray(72hr) 12 1 3.0.3 19 9 2 A Incorrect. This time is associated with Condition F which is NOT applica ble. 1A, lB and 1 C CTMT fan coolers and the CTMT Spray pump are all inoper able, however since only I slow speed fan is required per train, and since B

Train fan coolers AND B train CTMT Spray remain operable, ONLY 2

trains are inoperable, NOT 3 trains. Furthermore, if TS 3.0.3 were entered, then Condition F (TS 3.0.3) could be exited at 0327 Aug 9th when the 1A CTMT spray pump were made operable and mode 3 would no longer be required. Plausible if the examinee evaluates this as condition F and does not properly exit the condition when satisfied.

(If 3.03 then 8/08 1900+7 hrs = 8/09 0200)

B Incorrect. This time is associated with Condition D. Plausible if the candid ate incorrectly assesses operability of the CNMT coolers, and implements condition D, a 72 hr Restoration allowance.

(8/8 1900 +72 hrs + 6 hrs = 8/12 0100)

C Correct. This is the time associated with the 7 day requirement of condit ion C and more limiting than the 10 day from failure to meet the LCO. Condition C

is entered and then Condition E will add 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to the 7 day LCO.

The concurrent failure extension rules which would, if applied, require a

more restrictive limit of 24 hrs from original entry (limiting to Aug 10 1900) discussed in TS 1.3; the application of this limit does NOT apply since the completion times have a modified time zero.( reference TS 1.3-2 last paragraph).

(8/8 1900 +7 days + 6 hrs = 8116 0100)

D Incorrect. This is the time associated with the 10 days form entry into TS 3.6.6 which is the limiting completion time for Conditon C, but not the most restrictive for the given condition.

(816 1300 +10 days + 6 hrs = 8/16 1900)

K/A statement 022A2.O1-Contianment Cooling System (CCS) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Fan motor over-current on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Fan motor over-current.

Importance Rating: 2.5 2.7 Technical

Reference:

TS. 3.6.6 and section 1 .0 and 3.0 References to be provided: T.S. 3.6.6-1 through 3.6.6-2 Learning Objective: OPS-62102C01; Recall and apply the information from the LCO bases sections [...j associated with the containment spray and cooling system components and attendant equipment.

Question origin: NEW Comments: K/A match Requires CTMT cooler breaker failure a) prediction of impact on system operability and then based on those predictions/assessments b) implement the 1 .0 & 3.0 section of TS to determine the appropriate mitigating/control actions required.

The part a) prediction portion of this K/A is an implied aspect of the decision/selection of the correct TS response.

500 gpm was provided to demonstrate an inoperable cooler. SR 3.6.6.3 requires >1600 gpm but basis document requires only> 600 gpm. 500 gpm value was selected because NMP-AD-012 would declare this component OPERABLE but Degraded if flow were 600 gpm or greater; if it were still capable of performing its safety function just with less margin.

SRO justification: Application an LCD requirement in accordance with the rules of application requirements (section 1) to determine the response required to mitigate the consequences of the failures.

83. 022AG2.4.50 001/MODIFIED BANK/SRO/C/A 4.2/4.0/022AG2.4.50/N/3/HBF/GTO/NRC l0/M-SAT-V The following plant conditions exist on Unit 2:

AT 1000:

• 100% power.

• A Train is on service.

• 2A CCW pump is tagged out to investigate a pump trip which occurred 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> earlier.

• 2A Charging pump is in service.

AT 1010, the following event occurs:

• EA3, CHG PUMP LUBE OIL TEMP HI, comes into alarm.

• The Radside systems operator reports the 2A charging pump local temperature is 156°F and rising.

Which one of the following states the required actions per EA3, CHG PUMP LUBE OIL TEMP HI, and describes IF T.S. 3.0.3 entry is required per Tech Spec 3.5.2, E CCS-O pe rating?

A.

• Immediately stop the 2A charging pump, then start 2B charging pump.

• Entry into T.S. 3.0.3 IS required.

B. Immediately stop the 2A charging pump, then start 28 charging pump.

• Entry into T.S. 3.0.3 is NOT required.

C. . Start 2B charging pump, then stop the 2A charging pump.

• Entry into T.S. 3.0.3 IS required.

D Start 2B charging pump, then stop the 2A charging pump.

• Entry into T.S. 3.0.3 is NOT required.

Changes: changed answer choices as suggested by examiner-- thus changing the feedback and SRO match justification.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis Initial condition provides the conditions that explain why the plant is not in the NORMAL split train alignment. AOP-9.0 would shift the Chg pump to A train, then work to restore the off-service train; however since the plant is online, swapping the ON-Service train without both the 2A and 2C CCW pumps available will not be procedurally allowed. Since the ON-service train is in service and capable of continued plant operation, then AOP-9.0 would be exited at step 13 go to procedure step in effect.

A Incorrect. 1) this ARP action is correct only if temp were >160°F.

2) The T.S. action is not correct, although both trains of ECCS are

inoperable, 100% ECCS flow equivalent is available with B Chg pump aligned to A train (A train On-service). T.S. 3.5.2 cond ition A is applicable and the B Charging pump can be made operable within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allotted time by racking out the 1A charging pump brea ker or installing jumpers to allow the 1 B charging pump to auto-star t on ESF actuation signal and performing the requirements of SR 3.5.2

.1.

TRM 13.1.5 is also satisfied by one pump (Conditio n A) since the operability of the charging pump addresses the abili ty to borate from the RWST and/or BAT with a charging pump. In this TRM

, operability does not require ECCS auto start capability, it only requ ires the capability of delivering flow from the Borated water sources to the RCS and powered from an operable DG. B Chg pump support conditions are available, and it is aligned to the A train DG, therefore B is an Operable charging pump for the purpose of this TRM and 13.0.3 would !Q be applicable either.

Plausible: This would be the correct--

1) ARP response if temp were 160°F

2) T.S. action if unable to maintain 100% ECCS flow equi valent avail.

ALSO, if TRM 13.1.5 is inappropriately applied; --- 13.0.3 (3.0.3 equivalent) might be applied since there are NO actio ns for loss of both required charging pumps.

B Incorrect. 1) See A.1.

2) See D.2 C Incorrect. 1) ARP response is correct See D. 1.

2) See A.2.

Plausible: For T.S. plausibility see A.2 D Correct. 1) Waiting to stop the 2A charging pump is correct per ARP when temps are less than 160°F. There is no imminent danger of pum p damage at this temperature and sufficient time should be available to swap Charging pumps per section 4.7 of SOP-2.1.

2) Although both trains of ECCS are inoperable, 100% ECC S flow equivalent is available with B Chg pump aligned to A train (A train On-service). T.S. 3.5.2 Condition A applies, therefore appl ication of TS 3.0.3 is not required.

K/A statement 022AG2.4.50-Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup- Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

Importance Rating: 4.2 4.0 Technical

Reference:

FNP-2-ARP-1 .5, ver 45.0 T.S. 3.5.2 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: CVCS-52101F02; State the symptoms and predict the impact a loss or malfunction of chemical and volume control system components will have on the operation of CvCS OPS-62520K01: Determine and apply the information form the LCO bases sections for any TS or TRM requirements associated with AOP-1 6.

Question origin: Significantly Modified from CVCS-52101F02 18 Comments: K/A match: System alarm and setpoint which requires action immediate action if> 1 60F otherwise utilize procedure to reduce impact of rising temps; the ARP directs manipulation of controls.

SRO justification: IOCFR5&43(b)(2): application of generic LCO requirements (LCO 3.0.1 thru 3.0.7).

NOTE TO EXAMINER: a portion of this test item is similar to that of the simulator JPM

g. It was determined as not a double jeopardy issue for the following reasons:

1) Although the same annuciator actuates, the cause and the circumstance of the alarm are different. JPM g, the cause is a loss of the support system, whereas the failure in the above question is a failure of the chg pump itself--- with the opposite stby support system inoperable.

2) The MODE and plant impact is different, and the above question challenges a different TS evaluation/action. this aspect is no longer entirely true.

3) Although the decision point is common, the pertinent parameters and required actions for each of the two are different.

84. 026A2.04 001/MODIFIED BANK/SRO/C/A 3.9/4.2/026A204/N/3/HBF/GTO/NRCI 0/M-SAT-V Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

AT 1000:

• RCS subcooling is -3 °F.

• RVLIS lights are ALL red.

• Containment pressure reached 29 psig and is decreasing.

• ESP-1 .3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, is in progress.

• Both A and B ECCS Trains have just been aligned for cold leg recirculation.

• RWST level is 4.3 feet.

• 1A Containment Spray pump discharge flow drops to 900 gpm, jumps to 1300 gpm, and then begins falling again.

AT 1005 annunciator CAl, 1A CS PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP, comes into alarm.

Which one of the following describes the potential impact, if any, on the Contai nment Spray design function; and the action required by procedure for this failure?

A. . Containment Iodine may exceed design limits.

• Go to ECP-1 .3, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Caused by Sump Blockage.

B.

• Containment Iodine will NOT exceed design limits.

• Go to ECP-l .3, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Caused by Sump Blockage.

C.

• Containment Iodine may exceed design limits.

• Continue in ESP-1 .3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

D* Containment Iodine will NOT exceed design limits.

• Continue in ESP-1 .3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Change: omitted information regarding B Cnmt Spray pump stable parameters, omitte d

the action description of all answer choices to improve plausibility Added LBLOCA indications to stem (RVLIS and subcooling); changed CNMT pressure reached 29 psig and is decreasing ; omitted 1A Cnmt cooler tagged out (extraneous);

and added times to show a sequence of events.

PRESUMED: Operational situation, pump bearing overheat and seizure-- results in slowing of motor, break free then seizure until overcurrent/overload --- may be evaluated as cavitation from MCB.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect, 1) Iodine will not exceed limits; ONLY one Containment Spray train is required to remove iodine from containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. A loss of

1ACS pump does not impact this requirement since the lB CS pump is still running. Furthermore, based on procedure completion through alignment of both ECCS trains, it is unlikely that the lB CS pump would be secured, since alignment is imminent.

2) The 1 A Containment spray pump is not cavitating but is showing similar signs of cavitation, and even IF ESP-1 .3 step 8 were implemented with the assumption that 1A CS pump was cavitating, then the RNO action would be evaluated; however, the RNO actions are not appropriate since both LHSI and HHSI are still operating properly, as is the lB CS pump.

Plausible: 1) Both one CS pump and 1 Ctmt Fan cooler is required for operability per T.S. 3.6.6; required to keep cnmt pressures within safety analysis fimits.

2) This would be correct if either the Charging pump or RHR pump were cavitating (Continuous Action step 8 RNO and step 3 of ECP-1 .3 with RWST level <4.5 if). Securing lB CS pump is also within alignment of the Continuous Action step 1 of ESP-1 .3 with a delay in alignment of the lB CS pump (not imminent).

B. Incorrect 1) Correct. See A for discussion

2) Incorrect. See A for discussion and plausibility.

C. Incorrect, 1) See A for why condition is incorrect.

2) Correct: Procedure and actions are correct step 10 of ESP-1.3.

Plausible: See A for discussion and plausibility.

D. Correct, 1) one CS pump and one fan is sufficient to prevent any of the parameters exceed their design limits. One Containment Spray train is required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. A loss of 1A CS pump does not impact this requirement since the lB CS pump is still running.

2) Procedure and actions are correct step 10 of ESP-l .3.

TS Bases 3.6.6 During a DBA, a minimum of one containment cooling train with a

single OPERABLE fan unit and one containment spray train are required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 3). Additionally, one containment spray train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis.

K/A statement 026 Containment Spray System--Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the Failure of spray pump on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Failure of spray pump:

Importance Rating: 3.9 4.2 Technical

Reference:

TS Bases 3.6.6 ESP-1.3, ver 19.

References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-62102C01; Assess the facility condition associated with the Containment spray and cooling system components, and based on that assessment, Select the appropriate procedures for normal and abnormal situations.

Question origin: FNP Bank CS&COOL-62102C01 002 (2006 NRC exam)--Modified to fit part (b) of K/A.

Comments: K/A match: Requires analysis of the failed pumps impact on the design capability of the CSS; Requires procedural actions for the given failure.

SRO justification: Evaluation of satisfying facility license requirements utilizing Knowledge of Tech spec bases, also detailed knowledge of procedure not HIGH level.

85. 027AA2. 15 003BANKSRO/C/A 37/40/027AA2. 15/N/2/HBF/GTO/NRC 10/N-SAT-V Unit 1 is at 100% power with all control systems in automatic and the following conditions exist:

A pressurizer pressure transmitter fails resulting in:

• RCS pressure is 2150 psig and lowering i.

• Both Spray valves are CLOSED.

• PCV-444B, PRZR PORV is CLOSED.

• PCV-445A, PRZR PORV is OPEN.

• All heaters are energized.

The crew successfully completes the Immediate Operator Actions required for the instrument failure and plant conditions are stabilized with the unit remaining at power.

Which one of the following states which pressure transmitter that has failed and the OPERABILITY status of PCV-445A per T.S. 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV5)?

(1) has failed high. PCV-445A (2) OPERABLE.

(1) (2)

A. PT-444 IS B. PT-444 IS NOT C PT-445 IS D. PT-445 IS NOT

SEE comments in NOTES Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect. 1) The response of PCV-445 is indicative of PT-445 Failing high, all others are indicative of PT-444 failing low or responding to and actual low pressure condition caused by PCV-445 opening.

2) See 0.2 B Incorrect. 1)seeA.1

2) See C.2, plausible if taking the PORV control switch out of AUTO to Close would mop the PORV.

Additionally; if candidate misses the INSTRUMENT failure, the indications are indicative of PCV-445A valve malfunction which May or may not be capable of MOB operation (also actions handled by the AOPs IOA) one might believe that the block valve must have been closed because PCV-445A would not close from the MCB to isolate the PORV; under this assumption then the PORV could be determined inoperable.

C Correct. 1) PCV-445A failing OPEN is indicative of PT-445A failing high. The response of the remaining pressure control circuit is that of an actual low pressure condition.

2) AOP-100 IOA for PRZR Press Malfunction would require manually shutting the PCV-445A. Because of the stated INSTRUMENT failure, and successful completion of IDAs, the PORV would be closed, and capable of being operated from the MOB. Therefore ,the PORV is operable per TS. 3.4.11, Pressurizer PORVS D Incorrect. 1) See C.1

2) See B.2

K/A statement - 027AA2.15 PZR PCS Malfunction- Actions to be taken if PZR pressu re instrument fails high.

Importance Rating: 3.7 4.0 Technical

Reference:

AOP-100, ver 9.0 TS B3.4.11 References to be provided: none Learning Objective: OPS-621 01 E01; Recall and Apply the information from the LCO Bases sections [...] [for] TS 3.4.11.

Question origin: Bank; Surry 09 NRC Comments: challenges: overlap needs to be considered by NRC CE on question 007G2.4.2 also on SRO exam; technically this question is challenging different knowledge requirements but has some knowledge overlaps (ie PORV response to the failure). Question 007G2.4.2, addresses the condition before operator action is taken and the interlock system response and the POST operator actions TS evaluation to a leak (TS 3.4.13).

Wheras this question evaluates the evaluation of the instrument failure and the operability of PORV (TS 3.4.11).

SRO justification: Using information from TS basis to determine operability.

86. 027G2.2.42 001 NEW/SRO/C,A 3.9/4.6/027G2.2.42/N/4/HBF!GTONRCI 0/ED -SAT Unit 1 is in Mode 5, preparing to enter Mode 4 with the following plant conditions:

STP-1 6.14, ECCS Recirculation Fluid pH Control System Verification, has just been completed with the following results:

- IA Basket is reported to have broken mesh, the trisodium phosphate is spilling out, and level is between the MIN and MAX level mark.

- I B Basket is reported to have level equal to the MAX level mark.

- IC Basket level is equal to the MIN level mark and the TSP is lumped/caked up.

Which one of the following states the operability status of the ECCS Recirculation Fluid pH Control System per TS 3.5.6, ECCS Recirculation Fluid pH Control System, and the reason?

The ECCS Recirculation Fluid pH Control System is (1) , because the (2)

(1) (2)

A. Operable volume is sufficient in all three baskets.

B. Operable volume and integrity is sufficient in 2 of 3 baskets.

C. Inoperable integrity of 1A basket is unacceptable and the lumped/caked TSP in the 1C basket is unacceptable.

Dv Inoperable integrity of ONLY 1A basket is unacceptable.

NOTE: TS 3.5.6 is not applicable in MODE 5, however, the STP-16.14 is performed while in MODE 5 prior to entry into MODE 4, therefore although the TS is not applicable while in MODE 5, the system would still be INOPERABLE and required to be restored to OPERABLE prior to Mode 4 entry.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect. Although levels in all baskets are adequate, the basket s integrity is also required for the system to be considered operable.

Plausible: The contents of the basket> mm is adequate to adjust pH to required levels post accident. TSP dissolves into the Recirculation sump and it would be plausible to believe that adequate volume is all required to satisfy operab ility (REQUIRES knowledge of SR 3.5.6.1); STP-16.14 contains a note that states, broken, crimped or oxidized screen mesh is acceptable assuming the contents are contained.

incorrect CONDITION: 3/3 level onlyoperable B Incorrect. All three baskets are required for the system to be considered operable.

Plausible: 2 of 3 is the standard redundancy of ECCS system and could be assumed to be applied to the TSP baskets.

incorrect CONDITION: 2/3 = operable C Incorrect. The reason is incorrect, the 1 B ECCS sump TSP basket meets the operability requirements of SR 3.5.6.1 (STP-16.14); the lumps in the 10 TSP basket is, per T.S. basis, an analyzed condition, and acceptable.

Plausible: Because since the lumps/caking of the TSP may be considered outside of allowance.

incorrect Condition: 2/3 inoperable D Correct. The clumps in 10 are within design. Also, the lB integrity is satisfie d since the contents of the basket are contained. ONLY the IA basket is not satisfy ing the operability requirements, and since all 3 baskets are required, the system is inoperable.

Correct Condition: 1/3 inoperable.

K/A statement 027 Containment Iodine Removal System 2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

Importance Rating: 3.9 4.6 Technical

Reference:

STP-16.14, ver 5.0 TS Basis B3.5.6-5 rev 0.

References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-621 02001; Recall and apply the information form the LCD bases sections for any TS or TRM requirements associated with the containment spray and cooling system and attendant equipment alignment to include:

TS 3.5.6 Question origin: NEW Comments: K/A match Requires recognition of TSP basket conditions regarding SR 3.5.6 requirements to determine operability of ECCS pH system.

SRO justification: Knowledge of TS bases (and Surveillance requirements) to analyze satisfaction of LCD.

87. 065AG2.4.47 014/NEW/SRO/C/A 4.2/4.2/065AG2.4.47/Y/3/HBF/GTO/NRC 10/SAT Unit 1 is at 100% power when an air line break results in a High Penetration Room Pressure Isolation signal actuation and the following conditions:

• KD2, INSTRUMENT AIR PRESSURE LO, is in alarm.

• RCP Seal injection flow to RCPs are as follows:

FI-130A, 1A RCP = 13.6 gpm Fl-127A, lB RCP = 13.5 gpm FI-124A, 10 RCP = 11.3 gpm

• Avg. PZR pressure is 2235 psig and rising.

• P1-121, CHG HDR PRESS = 2420 psig.

After repairs, the seal injection parameters are stabilized as follows:

• HIK-186, Seal WTR Injection, is set to 25%.

• RCP Seal injection flow to RCPs are as follows:

FI-130A, 1A RCP = 8.5 gpm FI-127A, lB RCP = 8.5 gpm FI-124A, 10 RCP = 8.3 gpm

• Avg. PZR pressure is 2235 psig and stable.

• P1-121, CHG HDR PRESS 2420 psig.

Given the above conditions, which one of the following states the require ment to adjust seal injection flow, if any, AND the basis for maintaining Seal Injection flow within the limits T.S. 3.5.5, Seal Injection Flow Limits?

Adjustment of the individual RCP seal injection throttle valves (1) required; The seal injection flow HIGH limit of T.S. 3.5.5 is to ensure (2)

REFERENCE PROVIDED (1) (2)

A1 IS adequate ECCS flow is available following a LOCA.

B. IS RCP seal integrity is maintained.

C. IS NOT RCP seal integrity is maintained.

D. IS NOT adequate ECCS flow is available following a LOCA.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis This TS ensures that seal injection [...] will be sufficient for RCP seal integrity but limited so that the ECCS trains will be capable of delivering sufficient water to match boil-off rates soon enough to minimize uncovering of the core following a large LOCA. (TS B3.5.5-1).

LOW limit = LIGHT vertical line at 18 gpm {F(y)= 18} for seal integrity requirements (STP-8.0 fig. 1; clarifies demonstration of limit).

HIGH LIMIT DARK line shown { f(x)= 7*(x+18) +50}

I rs evaluation must be performed witn MIPS-lbb tuii open per I St-< 3.b.b.1. re 110w conditions during the loss of air [with HIK-186 full open] (required by TSR 3.5.1) with the differential pressure of 180 psid demonstrates that the throttle valves require adjustment.

250 C)

(I)

U)

C)

I 0

I-200 C)

N U)

U)

C) a- 150 (N

U 100 a

(V a) 50 GPM A Correct. 1) Lowering seal injection flow IS required. The operating point {38.4 gpm, 180 psid} revealed due to the loss of air is below and to of the right of curve. Reduction of SI flow is required to return to acceptable region for same DP conditions with HCV-186 full open.

2) high limit for ECCS flow; see excerpt from above.

B Incorrect. 1) Lowering seal injection flow IS required. See A.

2) Incorrect but plausible since the LOW limit shown on the curve >18 gpm is for seal integrity; the HIGH Limits shown by line f(x)= 7*(x+1

{

+50} is to ensure ECCS flow is sufficient during certain Large LOCA 8) conditions.

C Incorrect. 1) See A #1 Plausible : The operating point {25.3 gpm, 185 psid} is in the acceptable region, however this is the inappropriate evaluation of Seal injection flow since HIK-186 is throttled. (SR 3.5.5.1).

Normally, TS compliance is NOT evaluated during a transient, or using the transient parameters. HOWEVER, in this case, SR 3.5.5.1 compliance is confirmed by establishing the same parameters created by the given failure (STP-8.0)--- also P&L STP-8.0 State immediate evaluation of seal injection flow is required when changes are made to the letdown conditions (2 to 1 orifice). The condition of Letdown is not required to be stated since the evaluation of the TS is directed, and the recognition of the need for the evaluation is not required.

2) See B#2 D Incorrect. 1) Incorrect See C #1

2) Correct See A#2.

K/A statement Loss of Instrument Air- Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference materi al.

Importance Rating: 4.2 4.2 Technical

Reference:

D-175034 sheets 2 and 3 T.S. 3.5.5 T.S B3.5.5-1 through 3 STP-8.0, ver 20.0 References to be provided: TS 3.5.5-1 through 3.5.5-3, Seal injection Flow Learning Objective: OPS-62101F01; Recall and apply the information from the LCO bases sections for any TS or TRM requirement associated with the CVCS and attendant equipment alignment to include: TS 3.5.5 Question origin: NEW Comments: The initial conditions demonstrate system trends and alarms expected for an air leak, with mal-adjusted seal injection throttle valves. The loss of air condition creates the system trends necessary to properly identify this mal-adjustment.

The Chg pump has a degraded condition initially to establish the necessary conditions to challenge the limits of this Spec. However the pump remains operable per the pressure requirements of the TRM. Also, the system pressures are provided within the requirements of SR 3.5.5.1 to allow proper evaluation of the parameters both before and after the failure.

P&L STP-8.0 State immediate evaluation of seal injection flow is required when changes are made to the letdown conditions (2 to 1 orifice). This condition of Letdown is not required to be stated since the evaluation of the TS is directed in the stem, and the recognition of the need for the evaluation is not required.

K/A match: trend evaluation is necessary to properly evaluate TS 3.5.5.

MCR reference material is satisfied by providing TS 3.5.5 for evaluation of required action.

SRO justification: SRO level achieved based on implementation of TS Surveillance and Below the line figure of TS.

88. 076G2.4. I I 002/N EW/SRO/C/A 4.1 /4.4!076G2.4. I 1 /N/3/HBF/GTO/NRC 10/SAT Given the following:

• Unit I is at 100% power with B Train on service.

• 1 E Service Water pump tripped.

• AE4, SW PUMP TRIPPED, is in alarm.

Which one of the following procedures, upon completion, is the earliest that B Train Service Water can be declared OPERABLE?

A. ARP-1.1, AE4, SW Pump Tripped B. AOP-10.0, Loss of Service Water C SOP-24.0, Service Water System D. SOP-36.6, Circuit Breaker Racking Procedure

A. Incorrect. Step 2 of ARP-1 .1, AE4 will restore functionality of the B train SW system by starting a stby pump in that train. HOWEVER, the 1C SW pump is required to Auto start to be considered operable and ARP-1 .1 does not provide this guidance (directly). Since ARP AE4 response is to refer to SOP-24 AT STEP 4, completion of AE4 MAY OR MAY NOT be completed before operability is restored and operability is determined at the end of the SOP-24 alignment.

Plausible: This ARP provides will start the 10 SW pump which regains functionality. Completion of this procedure after SOP-24D would allow for a procedural reminder to declare SW inoperable/operable after actions completed.

B. Incorrect. EXIT from AOP-10 is made after establishing 60 psig in the both SW headers, but provides no guidance to restore operability of the SW system. It does however restore functionality of the SW system by verifying the start of the 1C SW pump.

Plausible: EXIT from AOP-1 0 is accomplished only after restoring Pressure >60 psig. This is not the requirement of operability per TS 3.8.9.

C. Correct. SOP-24 section 4.6, and Appendix 24D will be used to ensure that the IC SW pump is mechanically and electrically aligned to the B train and selected to auto-start in place of the 1 E SW pump as well as electrically bump the pump to confirm it is OPERABLE.

D. Incorrect. This procedure is used to align the 10 SW pump electrically to the B train (if needed), but does not contain sufficient guidance to restore operability due to the train selector switch manipulation must also be completed to restore operability. Additionally, this procedure is used to disable the 1 E SW pump, and allow for troubleshooting or corrective actions after a trip.

Plausible: Swing train components are often made operable by racking out the designated train component. For example: B charging pump, for it to become OPERABLE for the A Charging pump, the A charging pump breaker must first be racked out using SOP-36.6, otherwise it will not auto-start following a SI.

FSD 181001 3.1.5.1 The Service Water pumps shall be automatically started by a signal from the LOSP or ESS sequencer. The Service Water swing pump shall be automatically started by a signal from the LOSP or ESS sequencer when in service replacing one of the train oriented pumps.

(References 6.7.039 and 6.1.009)

K/A statement Service Water System-.

G2.4.1 1 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Importance Rating: 4.0 4.2 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.7.8 TS 3.8.1 AOP-10, ver 15 SOP-24, ver 71 ARP-1.1 ver50 References to be provided: none Learning Objective: OPS-62102F01; Recall and Apply the information from the LCO bases sections [...] for any TS or TRM requirements associated with the Service water System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include [...} 3.7.8 Service Water System.

Question origin: NEW Comments: KA match- SW pump trip is the abnormal condition, knowledge of the required mitigating procedures for that abnormal condition is required to identify when/which procedure restores operability of the SW system.

SRO justification: Knowledge of Tech Spec bases that is required to analyze operability of the SW system; two pumps AND controls required to perform the safety related function.

89. 078G2.2.42 001 !NEW;SRO/C/A 3.9/4.6/078G2242/N4!HBF/GTO:NRC 10/SAT The following plant conditions exist on Unit 1:

• The Reactor was manually tripped from 100% power due to a complete Loss of Instrument Air.

• ESP-0.1 Reactor Trip Response, is in progress.

• The crew has identified an unisolable rupture downstream of the Instrument Air Dryers.

• PZR Level is 64% and increasing.

Which one of the following describes the appropriate procedural strategy of controlling PZR level for the given conditions, and the operability per Tech Spec 3.4.9, Pressurizer?

Isolate charging flow and (1)  ; The Pressurizer is (2)

A. 1) maintain Tavg stable as directed by AOP-6, Loss of Instrument Air, until repairs are made.

2) inoperable.

B 1) cool down as required to restore pressurizer level as directed by AOP-16, CVCS Malfunction.

2) inoperable.

C. 1) maintain Tavg stable as directed by AOP-6, Loss of Instrument Air, until repairs are made.

2) operable.

D. 1) cool down as required to restore pressurizer level as directed by AOP-1 6, CVCS Malfunction.

2) operable.

NOTE: MEl Vs close, Stm dumps and ARVs do not operate automatically, and Letdown isolates at <85 psig at LCV-459/460 actuators which would lead to plausibility as to why PZR level is so high.

T.S. 3.4.9 exception provided by NOTE: >10% Step change in RTP, does not apply in this case since the >10% step change is NOT the cause for the high level, and is NOT a Short term operational transient.

Furthermore, ESP-0.1 and AOP-6.0 and AOP-16.0 are all applicable ESP-0.1 and AOP-6.0 direct-- STABILIZE Tavg AOP-16.0 directs Cooldown with UOP-2.2.

Due to the given failure (unisolable air leak) AOP-16.0 provides the long term mitigation strategy to maintain a bubble in the PZR to remain within the accident

analyses assumptions.

This is appropriate per SOP-0.8 para. 3.14 which states:

There are some instances where actions directed by non-ERP proced ures would be in conflict with recovery strategy directed by the ERPs. In these cases, the operator should use the guidance contained in the ERPs as well as his knowledge of the overall recover strategy to determine the correct course of action.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect. 1) Remaining in this condition UNTIL REPAIRS ARE MADE is not correct since there is an indefinite time before repairs can be made.

Once AOP-6.0 step 11 is encountered (stabilize Tavg) the operato r is in a DO-LOOP that attempts to recover instrument air, with the assumption that recovery is possible, and PZR level rise is contro llable between 20-50%. Maintaining a Stable Tavg, with NO letdown flow available, would result in eventually filling the PZR solid with seal injection flow (>92% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 24 mins).

2) LCO 3.4.9 is not satisfied and the Pressurizer is NOT operable, this condition must be addressed upon exit from ESP-0.1.

Plausible: 1) this is the correct strategy per ESP-0.1 & AOP-6.0 step 7 for conditions when level <50% and operation of 8107/8108 is availab le for przr level control.

B Correct. 1) AOP-6 step 7 says: Maintain PRZR level between 20-50%

When that can not be accomplished which is where the stem of the question puts the user, the RNO column says to go to AOP-16.0. Step 5 RNO will direct performing attachment 1 which will establish manual charging contro l and step 12 and 13 will direct a cooldown per UOP-3.1. This note in AOP-16 explain s the intent:

NOTE:

• The intent of the following steps is to borate throug h the RCP seals and reduce reactor power. The power reduction and cooldown will lower TAVG and will either reduce the rate of pressurizer level increase or stop the pressurizer level increase through RCS shrinkage, and afford time to restore a letdown path.

Maximum ramp rates specified in FNP-1-UOP-3.1, POWER OPER ATION are not applicable. Pressurizer level, response to boration through the RCP seals, and time required to restore a letdown path will dictate the maximum ramp rate. Depending on pressurizer level a reactor trip may be required.

Step 15 will have the unit cooled down per UOP-2.2.

AOP-1 6 provides the long term mitigation strategy for this condition by cooling down to recover Przr level AND if necessary initiating drainin g via RCS sample paths if required.

Maintaining a Stable Tavg (as directed by AOP-6 and ESP-0. 1) with NO letdown flow available, the PZR will eventually fill solid with seal injection flow

(>92% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 24 mins).

2) TS 3.4.9 is modified with a NOTE, but the exception provid ed: >10% Step change in RTP, does not apply in this case since the >10%

step change is NOT

the cause for the high level, and is NOT a Short term operational transient.

o Incorrect. 1) strategy is incorrect---SEE A #1;

2) Pressurizer is not operable---See B #2; but plausible: T.S. 3.4.9 is modified by the NOTE: stating that PZR level limit does not apply when thermal power steps

>10%.

D Incorrect. 1) Action is correct --See B#1

2) Pressurizer is not operable-- SEE B#2

K/A statement 078 Instrument Air System 2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

Importance Rating: 3.9 4.6 Technical

Reference:

AOP-6.0, ver 35 AOP-16, ver 14 TS 3.4.9-1 TS B3.4.9-0 rev 0 SOP-0.8, ver 18.0 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-62520F01; Evaluate plant conditions and Determine if transition to another section fo AOP-6 or another procedure is required.

OPS-52101E01: Recall and apply the LCO and applicability for [...j TS 3.4.9 [...}

Question origin: NEW Comments: Requires identification of Pressurizer LCO entry conditions and applicability of the NOTE which modifies the applicability of this TS- requires understanding of intent/bases of note for LCO 3.4.9.

K/A match: a loss of Instrument air has resulted in PZR level to exceed LCO 3.4.9.

SRO justification: Requires SRO familiarity with procedural strategy between AOP-6.0 and AOP-16;

• Conflicting procedural recovery/stabilization guidance between the two applicable procedures (AOP-6 and AOP-16).

• Although the knowledge of the NOTE of 3.4.9 is RO knowledge, knowledge of the bases is required to recognize its non-applicability for this instance.

90. G2. 1.3 I 001/NE W/SRO/CiA 4.6/4.3/G2. 1.3 1/N/2/HBF/GTO/NRC1 0/SAT The following plant conditions exist:

• The Motor Driven Fire pump (MDFP) was started remotely per SOP-61 .0, Fire Protection- Pump House and Yard Main, for annual valve cycle testing in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building.

• MH3, FIRE PROT SYS TRBL, is in alarm due to the MDFP supply breaker tripping open.

Which one of the following states the status of the amber light on the MDFP, N1P43P003, MCB handswitch, AND the minimum Fire Pump requirements for operability of the Fire Suppression Water System?

The MDFP control switch amber light will be (1)

The Fire Suppression Water System is considered operable when a minimum of (2) Fire Pumps are operable.

A 1) LIT.

2) Two B. 1) LIT.

2) Three C. 1) NOTLIt

2) Two D. 1) NOT Lit.

2) Three

Plant conditions: MDFP started from MOB per SOP-61 .0 which would also require the Jockey fire pump to be secured. Upon trip of the MDFP, the #2 DDFP is expected to start at 70 psig header pressure, and maintain 120 psig header pressure-- inferred since Jockey not capable of running (turned off) and pressure being maintained.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Correct. 1) indication correct: since the MDFP was started from the MOB the amber light is capable of indicating the breaker is opened by a method other than the MOB control switch (Remotely or automatically).

2) FSAR Section 9B.O.2.1(unit 1) and 9B.O.9.1.2.1 (unit 2) state that [...j two high pressure pumps [...] are required to maintain the suppression header operable.

B Incorrect 1) Correct see A.

2) Incorrect. TWO pumps are required per FSAR 9B.O.2.1.

Plausible: SOP-0.4 states partial loss of fire main system that results in at least one fire pump and one fire protection storage tank operable, initiate a Fire Protection Administrative LOO and take action per FSAR Sections.

This statement mis-read would lead one to believe that all three pumps were required.

Additionally, because the Fire protection system is similar to the AFW system; such that there are 3 pumps, two with same prime mover and the third with a different type. The AFW system requires all 3 trains to be operable.

O Incorrect. 1) Wrong indication; because the MDFP was started from the MOB, the amber light will be lit if the pump is not running with switch in Auto until switch is repositioned to stop.

2) Correct See A Plausible: This is the correct indication if the pump were started locally.

D Incorrect. 1) Incorrect indications and incorrect requirements.

2) Incorrect number-- See B Plausible : See C --- indications & See B for # of pumps.

K/A statement 2.1.31 Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they corre ctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

Importance Rating: 4.6 4.3 Technical

Reference:

SOP-61 .0, ver 40.0 FSAR 9B.C.2.1 & 9B.C.9.1 SOP-0.4, ver 74.0 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-62 I 08K01; Recall and Apply the information from the T.S.-Fire Protection Program: Renewed License No.[...j NPF-2-Amendment No.175- Fire Protection Program as describe in FSAR which implements fire prote ction requirements of 100FR5O.48, 10CFR5O, and Appendix R.

Question origin: NEW Comments: K/A match or other comments: identifies indication s

expected following a remote manual start and subsequent trip; Location (1st part of K/A) of switch is omit ted from stem due to the complication of 3 part questions

--Switch operation chosen as the higher cognitive level portion of the question since the indication will vary depe nding on station from which the pump was started.

Remotely= from MCB; SRO justification: Requires knowledge of limitations within the Faci lity License (FSAR 9B) required to analyze OPERA BILITY of this particular system.

Task of determining FP system operability is perfo rmed solely by an SRO. (SRO only objective)

91. G2.2.36 005/MODIFIED BANK/SRO/MEM 3.1 /4.2/G2.3.36/N/2/HBF/GTO/NRC I 0/M-SAT-V Unit 1 is in Mode 4.

At 0500 LCV-1 1 5B, RWST TO CHG PUMP, was manually checked closed using the local handwheel to isolate the 1A Chg Pump on an outage tagout.

At 1900 the work is complete and the following conditions exist:

• The 1A Chg Pump has been filled, vented, and tagged in.

• The tagout has restored power to LCV-1 1 5B and the GREEN valve position light is lit.

Which one of the following correctly states the OPERABILITY of LCV-1 1 5B, and the requirements, if any, for returning LCV-1 15B to service as stated in SOP-O.O, General Instructions to Operations Personnel?

A

• LCV-1 1 5B is NOT OPERABLE.

• The valve should be electrically stroked one full cycle to demonstrate operability prior to return to service.

B.

• LCV-1 1 5B is NOT OPERABLE.

• The valve should be time stroked in the open direction to demonstrate operability prior to return to service.

C.

• LCV-1 1 5B is OPERABLE.

• No additional testing is required.

D. LCV-115B is OPERABLE.

• The valve should be electrically stroked one full cycle to clear the Administrative LCO on the MOV.

A. Correct. The valve is inoperable until electrically cycling the valve one full cycle, and that will allow clearing the LCO per FNP-O-SOP-O.O, Step 15.5.4 and 15.5.6 B. Incorrect. The valve is only required to be stroked electrically in order to ensure that it is closed to the conditions for which the Motor is capable of unseating it without overload. This is plausible since this is the required action if any maintenance had occurred on the valve (packing adjust, valve or actuator work).

C. Incorrect. The valve was declutched and turned in order to check its position; Plausible, because this would be true if the valve were merely de-energized and later re-energized and no manual stroking(de-clutching) was performed.

D. Incorrect, but plausible, because this would be true for any MOV that was manually operated but is in the required position for its ESF function (in this case if LVC1 15B were left OPEN, it would be OPERABLE while in the open position.

K/A statement G2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting condit ions for operations.

Importance Rating: 3.1 4.2 Technical

Reference:

SOP-0.0 v 127 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-52302A06; Assess plant conditions to determine the ability of plant equipment and structures to meet their intended, designated function.

Question origin: MINOR modifications from FNP Bank PLT OPER-40502H12 005 (2008 NRC Exam)

Comments: K/A match--This question presents a maintenance activity which affects the operability of an MDV. Proper evaluation of the operability of the MDV after it has power restored and proper indication is verified is required to answer this question. Also Knowledge of the post-maintenance testing required to return the valve to operable is required to answer this question. The words such as [...] are used in this k/a to allow other types of maintenance affecting LCOs to meet this k/a SRO justification: Information regarding T.S. operability is not contained Above-the-Line and although this information is contained in generic instructions to operations personnel, An operability declaration is a decision by a senior reactor operator (SRO) on the operating shift crew that [...] that an SSC can perform its specified safety function. (NMP-AD-012, ver 6.0, 4.12) detailed knowledge of any administrative procedures which directs when to implement procedures (when procedures are applicable [...J) --- in this case SOP-0.0 is an administrative procedure that is providing the necessary information to directs the implementation or interpretation of TS... AND includes the Retest requirements of PMT-0.0.

92. G2.2.37 OONEW/SRO/C/A 3.6/4.6/G2.2.37/N/3/HBF!GTO/NRCIO/SAT Unit 1 is at 100% power, and the following conditions exist:

Chemistry discovers and reports that Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.4, the safety injection accumulator boron concentration verification, which is required at a frequency of 31 days, has been missed for the 1 C SI ACCUM.

• The last 1 C SI ACCUM boron sample result was 2260 ppm 45 days ago.

• The 1 C Accumulator level has risen 3% since the last sample but no fill evolution has occurred.

Which one of the following states whether or not the 1 C Accumulator is OPERABLE and the reason?

The lCAccumulatoris (1) because (2)

(1) (2)

A OPERABLE the delay period of SR 3.0.3 may be applied for up to 31 days.

B. OPERABLE the delay period of SR 3.0.3 may be applied for only the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

C. INOPERABLE the surveillance frequency has been missed.

D. INOPERABLE the boron concentration is unknown.

SR 3.0.3 If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. [...J Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Correct. Although the surveillance has not been completed, there is reasonable expectation that the Accumulator boron concentration remains above the minimum required value (NMP-AD-012), and the delay period allowance of SR 3.0.3 can be applied thereby allowing an additional 31 days to complete the surveillance. Reasonable expectation can be derived from the 12% rise requirement: A rise in level with no Fill evolution would ensure that <1 % of tank volume change due to potential leakage from the RCS (since no fill evolutions occurred); due to relatively small volume, it is unlikely that even with EOL boron concentrations that a 3% (indicated) volume change would result in Boron concentrations falling outside of the allowable limits.

B Incorrect. The accumulator remains operable but 3.0.3 allows the extension of up to 31 days.

Plausible if missed the OR GREATER aspect of 3.0.3, which is

coincidently also counter-intuitive.

C Incorrect. Missing the surveillance alone does not render the accumulator inoperable. See A.

Plausible: Satisfying the requirements of the surveillances is required to be operable, and if extensions requirements of 3.0.2, or delay period of 3.0.3 is not satisfied or there is reasonable expectation that the safety function was lost then this would be a correct answer.

D Incorrect See C; a 3% rise without filling, may imply that a leak is occurring from the RCS into the accumulator. In the event of an RCS leak into the Accumulator, a 1% tank volume change is permitted (12% indicated) before this dilution would be a concern. With a known volume change, known RCS boron concentration, and previous sample results, the Accumulator concentration could be calculated very accurately further gaining reasonable assurance that the function was not lost.

Plausible: since a level rise has occurred since the last sample, then it can be assumed that a dilution of the Accumulator has occurred.

Without knowledge of the basis of SR 3.5.1.4 or system knowledge that the indicated level of 12% is only 1% of volume of the accumulator, one might assume that there has been a significant dilution resulting in a loss of that reasonable assurance that the safety function has been maintained.

K/A statement 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

Importance Rating: 3.6 4.6 Technical

Reference:

SR 3.0.2 / Basis SR 3.0.3 / Basis References to be provided: none Learning Objective: INTRO TS-52302A05; Recall and describe the application of bases of LCD [...}

section SR 3.0 of TS.

Question origin: NEW Comments: Requires evaluation of T.S. equipment for operability with regard to missing a Surveillance frequency requirement.

Although this is a system specific evaluation, it exercises the generic principles of SR 3.0.1 through 3.0.3 thereby satisfying the generic intent of the K/A.

SRO justification: Application of generic LCD requirements (LCD SR 3.0.3)

93. G2.3.1 I 002/BANK!SRO/MEM 3.8/4.3!G2.3.1 I/N/2/HBF/GTO/NRCIO/SAT The following plant conditions exist on Unit 1:

• A gaseous waste release is in progress lAW a gas waste permit and SOP-51 .1, Waste Gas System Gas Decay Tank Release.

• The power supply to R-14, Plant Vent Gas Monitor, fails.

• The following alarms have come in:

- FH1, RMS HI-RAD.

- FH2, RMS CH FAILURE.

Which one of the following is the required action, and is a complete list of personnel required to be notified per FH1, FH2, and SOP-51.1?

HCV-14, Waste Gas Release Valve, will be verified closed (1)

Notify the Shift Supervisor, (2)

A. 1) immediately from the MOB.

2) Chemistry, Health Physics, and l&C personnel.

B 1) by the Radside SO at the Waste Gas Panel.

2) Chemistry, Health Physics, and l&C personnel.

C. 1) immediately from the MOB.

2) and the shift radiochemist ONLY.

D. 1) by the Radside SO at the Waste Gas Panel.

2) and the shift radiochemist ONLY.

A Incorrect; 1- The discharge in progress is automatically secured by the auto shutting of HCV-14 and can not be closed nor checked from the MCB.

2- The second part is correct. See B.

B Correct; 1- The discharge in progress should automatically secure by auto shutting HCV-14.

The rad side SO must be sent to the verify the release is secured, per ARP-1.6, FH1, step 2 and 3.1 since this valve status is only available from the WG control panel. SOP-51.1 is referenced from FH1, in which the P&L 3.2 states that the release stopped and SS notified.

2 Additionally, the action for FH2 includes:

2. Notify chemistry and health physics personnel.

3. Notify Instrument Service Personnel C Incorrect; 1-see A above 2-The notifications are incomplete and does not include health physics or IC personnel.

plausible: stated actions are that required per the ODCM to allow for a release without HCV-14 availability. The release being secured also satisfies the ODCM requirements.

D Incorrect; 1-correct see B above 2- second part is not complete. See C.

K/A statement - Radiation Control--2.3.1 1 Ability to control radiation releases.

Importance Rating: 3.8 4.3 Technical

Reference:

ARP-1 .6, FH1 & FH2, Ver 64 SOP-51.1, ver27 ODCM ver 23 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-62106B02; Assess the facility conditions associated with the WG system components and select the appropriate procedure for normal or abnormal situations.

Question origin: FNP Bank WAST GAS-62106B02 002 2003 NRC SRO Comments: The radiation monitors fail to a High Radiation condition on loss of instrument and/or control power that will result in actuation of associated automatic functions.

SRO justification: notifications of other organizations is the responsibility of the SRO.

94. G2.3. 12 002/MODIFIED BANK/SRO/MEM 3.2/3.7/G2.3. 127N/3/HBF/GTO/NRCIO/SAT Unit 1 is at 25% power. A Unit 1 containment entry is planned for maintenance on the Moveable Incore Detector System (MIDS). Containment entry will be through the Emergency Air Lock.

lAW AP-42, Access Control, which one of the following states the positions that must approve:

(1) removal of the locking device from the MIDS power switch, AND (2) entry using the emergency personnel airlock?

(1) (2)

A. Shift Supervisor Shift Manager B. Shift Supervisor Operations Manager C Health Physics Supervisor Shift Manager D. Health Physics Supervisor Operations Manager

AP-42, version 44.0 states:

10.2 Normal entry when the reactor is at power shall be throug h the personnel air lock.

The emergency personnel air lock is for emergency use only, and any other use of the emergency personnel air lock must be approved by the Shift Manager. Also, management may allow personnel/groups to enter containment via the equipment hatch when the plant is shutdown and it is deeme d prudent to allow access via this point.

10.3 Before any Containment entry, Incore Detectors will be placed in a safe condition [...j Removal of the locking device or safety tag will require approval by Health Physics Supervision.

per Health Physics procedure(s) [RCP-12].

[...] The [MIDS] will be controlled RCP-12, ver 17.0, provides more definitive clarification that supervision = Supervisor 6.0 Contact an HP Supervisor for their approval and to authorize the Incore Drive Panel to be energized.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A. Incorrect. 1) incorrect per AP-42 para 10.3; but plausible since the Shift Supervisor would be normally direct the Plant Operators to perform this action or would be informed of each change in configuration control per RCP-12 step 3.6.1.

2) per AP-42 para 10.2 this is correct.

B. Incorrect. 1) See A#1

2) incorrect per AP-42 step 10.2; but plausible since managemen t may allow personnel/groups to enter containment via the equipment hatch when shutdown.

C. Correct. 1) HP Supervisor is correct per AP-42 para 10.3 & RCP-1 2.

2) Shift Manager is correct per AP-42 para 10.2 D. Incorrect. 1) See C#1

2) See B#2 K/A statement G2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety princ iples pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requ irements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, align ing filters, etc.

Importance Rating: 3.2 3.7 Technical

Reference:

AP-42 ver 44.0 RCP-12 ver 17.0 RCP-11 ver 24.0, References to be provided: None Learning Objective: AP-42-40502M04; Describe the requirements that must be met for containment entry[.. .1.

Question origin: modified BANK-- combined 2; AP-42-40502M04 001 AP-42-40502M04 002 (NRC 2000;2003;2006)

Comments: K/A Match: 1-- radiological safety principles: safety principle is control of the MIDS to prevent overexposure 2-- pertaining to licensed operator duties:

authorization for containment NON-emergency entry via the Emergency Personnel Air lock while at power.

combined two bank questions to better match KA since the SRO duty (decision) is not for radiological safety and since this aspect of Radiological safety is not directly a licensed operator duty; although knowledge of the limitations of the SS/SMs authority is as important as knowledge of the positions authority itself.

SRO justification: This question requires recalling what strategy or action is written into a plant procedure, including when the strategy or action is required. It also requires the SRO to know his unique responsibilities for radiological safety principles pertaining to his duties while at power.

Bank Selection (different than randomly chosen):

AOP-30.0-62521H02 001--- first randomly selected K/A (used 2008 NRC)--- used on Audit exam CCW-40204A1 1 014--- due to RO knowledge level no feasible method to upgrade

<Spec 10>

AOP-3OXi-2D1EO2 I CC V-.U2O3AI1

95. G2.4.2 003/BANK/SRO/C/A 4.5J4.6/G2.4.2/N*2/HBF/GTO/NRCiON-SAT-\

Which one of the following is correct with respect to Tech Spec 3.3.1 Bases and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the following RPS Reactor Trips:

• Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip.

• Turbine Trip.

The Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip (1) designed to protect against a boron dilution event.

The Turbine Trip / Rx Trip (>P-9) (2) relied upon in the FSAR for RCS integrity protection.

(1) (2)

A. IS IS B. IS IS NOT C. IS NOT IS D IS NOT IS NOT A. Incorrect. 1) See D.1; plausible this is true for SR HIGH flux Rx trip while in modes 3,4, or 5.

2) TS 3.3.1 states the function of this trip is to minimize the pressure/temperature transient on the reactor adn rhe RCS pressure boundary components; Plausible since these instruments are required to be operable per TS 3.3.1.

B. Incorrect. 1) See D.1; plausible this is true for SR HIGH flux Rx trip while in modes 3,4, or 5.

2) See D.2.

C. Incorrect. 1) See D.1.

2) See A.2 D. Correct. 1) TS B3.3. 1 states that the PR high flux trip ensures protection against FAST positive Reactivity excursions leading to DNB and fuel overpower during power operations. FSAR 15.2.4.3 describes that a dilution event at power is slow.

2) FSAR 15.2.7.3 states that plant design is such that [complete loss of electrical load and/or a turbine trip] without a direct reactor trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS or Main steam system.

K/A statement 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

Importance Rating: 4.5 4.6 Technical

Reference:

FSAR chapter 15 TS B3.3.1 Learning Objective: (OPS-62201 101) RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections [...] with regards to TS 3.3.1 References to be provided: None Source: Bank (provided by NRC)

Comments:

SRO level 10 CFR 55.43(b) (2)The SRO knowledge of the TS BASIS for the LCO 3.3.1 RTS and FSAR license limits.

96. G2.4.20 001/N EW/SRO/C/A 3.8/4.3/G2.4.20/N/4/H BF/GTO/N RC 10/SAT The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

• A Main Steam header rupture occurred in the Turbine Building 35 minutes ago while at 100% power.

• The MSIVs could not be closed from the MOB.

• SI termination using ECP-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, is in progress.

Concurrently with securing the first charging pump, air is bled from 1A MSIV accumulator using SOP-i 7, Main and Reheat Steam, and the 1A SG pressure begins to rise.

• Pressurizer Level is 15%.

• RCS Pressure is 1880 psig.

• Subcooling Margin Monitor indicates 186°F and increasing.

• TcQLD are 418°F and decreasing.

• THOT is 423°F and decreasing.

• SG water levels, pressures and, AFW flows are as follows:

AFW FLOW WR LEVEL PRESS (throttled)

- 1A SG 23% 305 psig 20 gpm

- lB SG i1% 295 psig i 20 gpm

- 10 SG 12%÷ 290 psig i 20 gpm Which one of the following describes the required procedure transition from ECP-2.i?

A. Immediately transition to EEP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

B. Immediately transition to FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

C Remain in ECP-2.1 until SI is terminated, then transition to EEP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

D. Remain in ECP-2.1 until SI is terminated, then transition to FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect. Step 1 NOTE-2 denotes that the transition to EEP-2 is not made during the SI termination steps of ECP-2.i.

Plausible: The transition to EEP-2 is correct per step 1 [CA] of ECP-2.i, except for during the SI termination steps.

B Incorrect. Although CSFST are applicable, and FRP-H.i (RED) is indicated, ECP-2.1 NOTE-5 and FRP-H.i NOTE-i both state that FRP-H.i is expected and should not be implemented.

Plausible : FRP-H.i is RED and 2 SG WR levels are <31% NR, without knowledge of notes of ECP-2.i or H.i step 1 note: entry into FRP-H.i is not appropriate if flow is less then 395 gpm due to intentional operator action.

C Correct. Due to step 1 NOTE- 2, The transition to EEP-2 is delayed until SI termination is complete (step 26).

The transition to EEP-2 is correct per step 1 [CA] of ECP-2.1.

and based on ECP-2.1 NOTE-S and FRP-H.1 NOTE-i both state that FRP-H.1 is expected and should not be implemented.

D Incorrect. ECP-2.i NOTE-5 and FRP-H.i NOTE-i both state that FRP-H.1 is expected and should not be implemented.

Plausible:

FRP-H.i is RED and 2 SG WR levels are <12%. this would require initiation of Bleed and Feed without delay, should FRP-H.i be implemented-- without knowledge of notes of ECP-2.1 or H.i step i note.

K/A statement Emergency Procedures/plans 2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Importance Rating: 3.8 4.3 Technical

Reference:

ECB-2.1, ver 1.0 EEP-2, ver 14 ECP-2.l, ver23 FRP-H.l, ver26 References to be provided: None Learning Objective:

OPS-62532F01; Assess the facility conditions associated with ECP-2.1,

[...], and based on that assessment:

• Select the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations,

• Determine if transition to another section fo the procedure or to another procedure is required and

• Determine if the CSF are satisfied.

Question origin: NEW Comments: K/A match or other comments:

Requires understanding and application of ECP-2.l Step 1 NOTE 2 regarding the transition applicability while performing SI termination.

Also, tests knowledge of ECP-2.1 NOTE-5 and FRP-H.1 NOTE-I for the impact on FRP-H.l implementation.

SRO justification: Requires in depth understanding of procedural strategy/transitions/decision points out of Emergency Contingency Procedures; Particularly exceptions to the entry conditions for various procedures/Continuing actions/Foldout page criteria.

97. WEO3EG2 4.6 OOI/NEV./SRO/C/A 3.7/4.7/WEO3EG2.4.6/N/2/HBF,GTO/NRC I O/M-SAT-V Unit 1 is at 18,000 MWD/MTU and has experienced a small break LOCA.

At 11:00, the following conditions exist:

• ESP-1 .2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, is in progress.

• A cooldown using the SG Atmospheric Relief Valves has been started.

• The RCS temperature has been as follows:

1TvIE 10:00 10:30 1 1:00 TEMP CF) 45 440

• The current RCS boron concentration is 600 ppm.

• The Cold Shutdown boron concentration is 800 ppm.

• The required boron concentration for the current temperature is 578 ppm.

Which one of the following describes the status of the cooldown rate AND whether or not the Shutdown Margin requirements are met to continue the cooldown lAW ESP-1 .2?

The allowable cooldown rate (1) been exceeded.

The cooldown (2) continue.

(1) (2)

A. has may B. has may NOT has NOT may D. has NOT may NOT Plausibility and Answer Analysis PZR level will not require termination of cooldown this is depressurization criteria 73% [66%] and charging flow control parameter >25% [50%].

Cooldown RATE:

The maximum cooldown rate of 100°F in any 60 mm period will preclude violation of the Integrity Status Tree Thermal shock limits. (ESB-0.1 pg 20)

NOTE: RCS coo1dowr cri prc:d prior to srabiishirig fna1 cold shutdown boron con.:entrationi if adccuatQ shutdown margin is maintained for existing trnpcrature.

REQUIRED SDM is required for given temp to continue cooldown, and from curve 61:

I 4INF F liD F i =

4i iii + ,;-

4 CI c 5 ii Ci:

i:pm required A Incorrect. (1) The limit of <100°F for any 60 mm period has NOT been exceeded.

However, the excessive momentary rate could result in a challenge maintaining the <100°F for the next 60 mm and cooldown rate would need to be closely monitored to prevent violating this limit.

(2) Per curve 61 the current required SDM concentration is 578 ppm (see above calculation). RCS concentration is adequate to continue cooldown.

Plausible: 1) 000ldown RATE between 10:00 and 10:30 is =100°F/hr therefore not

<100°F/hr. Also, many other FRP, ESP5 for similar conditions limit cooldown to 50°F per 60 mm period (FRP-P.1 post soak is one such example).

B Incorrect. (1) See A #1 for discussion and plausibility.

(2) This is not correct due to the boron concentration being sufficient for given temp. Plausible since the current boron concentration is not sufficient to allow Cooldown to 200F (cold shutdown). In various procedures, particularly UOP5, but also in ESP-0.2, cooldown is not permitted if cold shutdown concentration has not been achieved.

C Correct. (1) This is correct. Cooldown is <100°F in past 60 mmns.

(2) ESP-1 .2 requires a cooldown and cooldown is permitted to be commenced provided that there is sufficient shutdown margin for the given plant conditions (see NOTE-23).

D Incorrect. (1) This is correct. Cooldown is <100°F in past 60 mins. See A#1 for discussion.

(2) This is NOT correct See B.2.

K/A statement WEO3 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Importance Rating: 3.7 4.7 Technical

Reference:

ESP-1 .2 ver 23 ESB-1 .2 ver 1.0 PCB-VOL1 -CRV1 PCB-VOL1 -CRV61 References to be provided: NONE Learning Objective: OPS-52531 F03: State and explain the basis for all Cautions, Notes and Actions associated with ESP-1 .2.

OPS-52531 F06: Evaluate plant conditions and Determine if any system components need to be operated while performing ESP-1 .2.

Question origin: NEW Comments: K/A match or other comments:

RO knowledge= Major actions: Cooldown establish subcooling; 100 F in 60 mm period is generic cooldown required by many of the ERPs.

KA match: ESP-1 .2 mitigation strategy includes a cooldown to long term cooling (RHR) while preventing further challenge to the RCS integrity (cooldown rate) and Preventing cold restart accident (SDM)

SRO justification: Recalling what action/strategy is written into a plant procedure, including when the strategy or action is required (which are not HIGH level actions)

SRO knowledge= Major actions of ESP-1 .2 strategy when conflict with other accident mitigating strategies (loss of SDM) and the knowledge of proceduralized strategy of priority.

98. WE I OEA2.2 004/MODIFIED BAN K/SRO/C/A 3.2/3.97W/El OEA2.2/Y/3/HBF/GTO/NRC I 0/M-SAT-V Unit 1 is performing a natural circulation cooldown in accordance with ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding. The following conditions exist:

• RCS cold leg is 525°F.

• RCS pressure is 1900 psig.

• 1A and lB CRDM fans are running.

• RCPs 1A, 1B, and 10 are tripped and cannot be restarted.

• CST level is 10.0 ft.

• AFW flow is 350 gpm

• RCS cooldown rate is 5°F/hr.

• PZR level is stable at 25%.

• RVLIS is not available.

Which one of the following is the correct response lAW ESP-0.2 and the maximum permitted cooldown rate to lower TcOLD to 500° F?

REFERENCE PROVIDED Procedure names are as follows:

ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding ESP-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Allowance For Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding (Without RVLIS)

A.

• Continue with ESP-0.2.

• The maximum cooldown rate is <50°F/hr.

B. Continue with ESP-0.2.

• The maximum cooldown rate is 100°F in any 60 minute period.

C

• Transition to ESP-0.4.

• The maximum cooldown rate is <50°F/hr.

D. Transition to ESP-0.4.

• The maximum cooldown rate is 100°F in any 60 minute period.

PROVIDE: Attachment 3 of ESP-O.2 NRC questioned need to state max attainable AFW flow RESPONSE: The only plausible way for one to achieve a value of <10 ft in this calculation is to a) reduce AFW flow b) assume Cooldown can be raised to a value

> 25F or c) reduce AFW flow while increasing C/D rate.

SINCE:

a) is always an option, one must evaluate the consequence of this action--

reducing AFW flow would allow for lower CST required levels, but then there would be no capability to maintain a sustained C/D rate. this is contrary to the basis of this

decision.

b) exceeding OlD rate of 25F/hr would violate the limits of ESP-0.2.

c) combing a reduction in AFW flow while increasing OlD up to 25FIhr would not be sustainable at given conditions (350gpm AFW stated in stem with 5F/hr); with these conditions, one must assume that MORE AFW flow would be required to sustain a

>5 F/hr cooldown rate.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A. Incorrect. 1) ESP-0.2 maximum allowed O/D rate is 25°F/hr and with an RCS temp of 525°F, a minimum of 17ft of CST inventory is required to remain in ESP0.2. An accelerated cooldown is required therefore ESP-0.3 or ESP-0.4 must be used.

2) Since there is insufficient CST inventory, and RVLIS is unavailable ESP-0.4 must be used. While RCS temperature is being reduced to 500°F the maximum allowed cooldown rate is 50F/hr.

Plausible: 1) the reference provided demonstrates that an increased cooldown is required due to CST inventory concerns, without knowledge of the C/D limit of ESP-0.2, remaining in ESP-0.2 might be thought the preferred procedure, when no indication of a void is present (STABLE PZR level).

2) RVLIS not being available would be irrelevant IF CST inventory were available to permit 25F/hr cooldown.

B. Incorrect; 1) See A.1.

2) See 0.2, but plausible since 100 °F in any 60 minute period is the limit on RCS cooldown and would be correct if ESP-0.4 were implemented at any TcoId <500°F, OR if ESP-0.3 were the procedure implemented (RVLIS available).

C. Incorrect; 1) The 25°F/hr cooldown is required by ESP-0.2 but in this case the reduced CST volume requires a cooldown rate of greater than 25°F/hr (in this case 75°F/hr) would be required per Attachment 3 of ESP-0.2, however ESP-0.2 limits cooldown to 25°F/hr therefore step 10 RNO must be implemented; RVLIS is not available therefore ESP-0.4 is required.

2) This is the correct C/D limit until RCS temp is reduced to 500°F in ESP-0.4.

D. Incorrect; 1)SeeC.1

2) See 0.2. Plausible: A faster cooldown rate of <100°F in any 60 minute period is permitted by ESP-0.4 when RCS temp is <500°F and RCS pressure is 1850 psig.

K/A statement El 0 Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the fadiity*s license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE 3.4 3.9 Technical

Reference:

ESP-0.4, version 20 ESB-0.4, version 1.

References to be provided: Attachment 3 of ESP-0.2 Learning Objective: OPS-62531 001; Assess the facility conditions associated with (1)

ESP-0.2 [...] (2) ESP-0.3 [...}, and (3) ESP-.0.4 [...] and based on that assessment:

• Select the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations.

• Determine if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required.

• Determine if the CSF are satisfied.

Question origin: MODIFIED FROM ESP-0.2.3.4-62531 COl 001 ;2008 HLT 32 NRC Exam Comments: K/A match or other comments:

1) ESP-0.4 and the mitigation strategy is chosen to address WE1O portion of the K/A; this procedure is only applicable in Natural Circ cooldown without RVLIS.

2) Procedural adherence: is satisfied by challenging the knowledge of actions low CST inventory and cooldown rate limitations.

3) Facility license is complied if actions taken per procedure for accident within bounds of FSAR chapter 15.

A discriminatory question would be difficult to write for choosing between ESP-0.2 (without voiding), ESP-0.3, Nat Circ cooldown w/ allowance for voiding with RVLIS &

ESP-0.4, Nat Circ cooldown WI allowance for voiding without RVLIS, since the names of the procedures are given with the procedure numbers and would potentially make the choice of procedure obvious to an incompetent applicant. The question was instead written to require diagnosing the need to speed up the cooldown and depressurization which would cause voiding, and to know what procedure flowpath and cooldown rate limits (procedure strategies) are required for the situation of the natural circ cooldown with voiding.

SRO justification: Meets 10 CFR 55.43 (b) 5 requirements for SRO level question: Assessment of facility condition [CST inventory vs. Cooldown rate] and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal, or emergency situations. [ESP-O.2 or ESP-O.4 selection]

99. WEll EG2. 1.28 005/N EW/SRO/C/A 4.1/4.1 /WE I I EG2. 1.28/N 2/HBF/GTO/NRC 10/SAT The following sequence of events occur on Unit 1:

At 10:00:

• EEP-1 .0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.

• MOV-8706B, 1 B RHR HX to CHG Pump Suct, is discovered with no indicating lights lit.

• SI RESET pushbuttons for both A and B trains were depressed with the following results:

• MLB-1 1-1 is LIT.

• MLB-1 11-1 is NOT LIT.

At 10:15:

• 1 F 41 60V Bus is de-energized and the I -2A DG starts but fails to load.

• RWST level is 13 ft.

AT 10:45:

• The crew has begun cooldown using ECP-1 .1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

• The TSC has restored power to MOV-8706B.

• RWST level is 4.5 ft.

Which one of the following describes:

1) the actions required to RESET SI at 10:00 AND

2) the actions required for the RWST level at 10:45?

A. 1) S821 RESET switch must be placed in the RESET position.

2) Align for normal charging from the RWST, using ECP-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

B 1) S821 RESET switch must be placed in the RESET position.

2) Align for cold leg recirculation using ESP-1 .3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

C. 1) ESS STOP RESET pushbutton on the Sequencer panel must be depressed.

2) Align for normal charging from the RWST, using ECP-1 .1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

D. 1) ESS STOP RESET pushbutton on the Sequencer panel must be depressed.

2) Align for cold leg recirculation using ESP-1 .3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect 1) Operating the S821 RESET will reset all the latched slave relays in the SSPS AND is the directed action per step 4 RNO of ECP-1.i, as well as in EEP-1 step 9.4, if encountered prior to transition (step 14 or foldout criteria).

2) Step 2 of ECP-1 .1 is a continuing action step that requires return to procedure step in effect upon restoration or recirculation capability.

-This would require transition back to EEP-1, and immediate (foldout) transition to ESP-1 .3. which would then align for Recirculation.

Step 9 of ECP-1 .1 is ALSO a continuing action step that requires advancement within ECP-1 .1 to align for normal charging to maintain core cooling with the minimum flow required.

- The actions of step 34 and the remainder of ECP-1 .1 are ONLY applicable if BOTH RWST level <4.5 ft AND cold leg recirc is NOT available. (step 34-CAUTION-i).

Plausible: 2) ECP-i .1 is the procedure currently in use and step 9, also a continuing action directs advancement to step 34. IF power was not restored to M0V8706B, then this would be a correct response.

B Correct. 1) SEE A #1.

2) Because power is restored to MOV87O6B Recirc capability has been restored, and return to procedure step in effect (EEP-1) would result in foldout criteria mandating transition to ESP-1 .3 (<12.5 ft RWST) this is the correct action. IF step 9 [CA] were implemented, the Caution preceding step 34 would remind the operator not to proceed with ECP-i .1. SEE A #1 for further discussion.

C Incorrect 1) Depressing the ESS Emerg Stop Reset pushbutton on the B1F sequencer will not Reset the SI signal; nor will it reset the sequencer since the SI signal is still present.

plausible: the ESS Emerg Stop Reset Pushbutton is often reset following reset of the SI signal, and would be encountered in EEP-i attachment 4 step 1.11 RNO, and again in AOP-5.O after the loss of A train power. This action is required to reset the sequencers memory retentive circuit.

2) See A#i for discussion and plausibility.

D Incorrect 1) See C #1 for discussion and plausibility

2) See B#2.

K/A statement Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

Importance Rating: 4.1 4.1 Technical

Reference:

ECP-1 .1, rev 27 References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-62532D01; Assess the facility conditions associated with ECP-1 .1

[...] and based on that assessment:

• Select the appropriate procedures [...}

• Determine if transition to another section fo the procedure or to another procedure is required.

• Determine if the CSFs are satisfied.

Question origin: NEW Comments: Requires knowledge of purpose/function of the S821 switch; SRO justification: Requires detailed knowledge of strategy within procedure that is not a high level action/ERP, also a decision point within the procedure.

100. WEI 5EA2.2 001/MODIFIED BANKJSRO/C/A 2.9/3 .3/WEI 5EA2.2/N/2/HBF/GTO/NRC 10/ED -SAT The following plant conditions exist on Unit 1 following a Large Break LOCA:

• All automatic functions operated per design.

• Containment pressure peaked at 33 psig and is now 18 psig.

• RWST level indicates 12 feet 5 inches.

• ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, has been implemented; the crew has NOT yet begun to align ECCS for Cold Leg Recirculation.

• The indications for containment sump level are as follows:

- Ll-3594A, CTMT SUMP LVL, is reading 8.2 feet.

- LR-3594B, POST ACCIDENT CTMT WTR LVL, is reading 8.2 feet.

Which one of the following is the correct procedural flow path for the event in progress AND the concern with this containment sump level?

A. Stop ESP-1 .3 actions, implement FRP-Z.2, Response to CTMT Flooding, and then continue in ESP-1.3.

• Damage to vital systems or components due to submersion.

B Continue in ESP-1 .3 until step 7, Align ECCS for cold leg recirculation, is complete, then implement FRP-Z.2, Response to Containment Flooding.

• Damage to vital systems or components due to submersion.

C. Continue in ESP-1 .3 until step 7, Align ECCS for cold leg recirculation, is complete, then implement FRP-Z.2, Response to Containment Flooding.

• Damage to containment structure due to lateral forces on walls.

D. Stop ESP-1.3 actions, implement FRP-Z.2, Response to CTMT Flooding, and then continue in ESP-1 .3.

• Damage to containment structure due to lateral forces on walls.

Plausibility and Answer Analysis A Incorrect. 1- Since the RWST level is <12.5 ft, the realignment of the SI system to cold leg recirculation must be done as quickly as possible, and as stated in step 1 Caution-2, NO FRP should be implemented until step 7 is completed. Step 7 is the step which aligns for recirculation.

Plausible: Per SOP-0.8 (version 16.0, step 4.4) since E-0 has been exited, FRPs have a higher priority over the ERPs and shall be implemented immediately upon satisfying a RED or ORANGE CSF condition, except when specifically stated otherwise.

2 - correct see B B Correct. 1- Due to RWST water level <12.5 ft, and the time required to swap to Recirculation lineup, protecting the ESF components is a higher priorit y

than any other CSF, as stated in the step 1 -Caution-2 of ESP-1

.3.

2- Containment flooding is a concern since critical plant components necessary for plant recovery may be damaged and rendered inoper able.

A water level greater than the design basis flood level (7.6 ft) provid es an indication that water volumes other than those represente d by the emergency stored water sources.

C Incorrect. 1- Continuing in ESP-1 .3 is the correct response. see B

2 Incorrect The concern for filling Containment >7.6 ft is that of threatening the availability of equipment required for long term coolin g

of the core and/or containment.

Plausible: This is a concern for external flooding water level of 144.2 ft.

(which is >38 ft from bottom of containment). The lateral stress impose d

on the containment structure from a high interior water level is a concern in the design loading of containment. However, this loadin g is much greater than the 7.6 ft identified in the CSF for loss of vital equipment.

D Incorrect. See A & C

K/A statement -

WEI5 Containment Flooding EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE 2.9 3.3 Technical

Reference:

ESP-1.3, rev 19 ESB-1 .3, ver 2.0 FRB-Z.2, ver 1.0 SOP-0.8, ver 18.0 PES Evaluations HP/LP Rev 2 FSAR 3.8.1.3.j.

References to be provided: None Learning Objective: OPS-62531G01; Assess the facility conditions associate with ESP-1 .3 and based on that assessment:

[...J,

• Select the appropriate procedures [...J.

• Determine if transitions to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required.

• Determine if the CSFs are satisfied.

Question origin: Modified Bank; FRP-Z-52533M01 002 (improved plausibility of distractors) & ESP-1 .3/.4-62531 GOl (modified second part to match K/A more closely).

Comments: K/A match or other comments. This question requires candidate to evaluate conditions and comply with ESP-1 .3 guidance as well as understanding of the intention of FRP-Z.2 in maintaining the operability/functionality of components vital to preventing Core damage.

SRO justification: Generic procedure transition is not appropriate in the situation presented above due to higher priority strategy implementation. This decision is an SRO level decision, also covered within the body of a recovery strategy that is NOT a high level step.