ML101520093

301 Draft Simulator Scenarios (Section 4)

ML101520093
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/28/2010
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:
References
Download: ML101520093 (126)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outflne Form ES-D-1 Draft Facility: Vogue Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant at 100% with a reactor startup to 100% in progress.

Pre toad the following: MDAFW A shaft shear (AFO3A), PNL MAP 40007A to NEUTRAL (Rx. Trip HS),

TDAFW pump Auto Start Failure (AFO5C), Failure of Auto Rx. Trip (ESOI), NSCW Pump #5 auto start failure (NSO7E)

Place SIP B in PTL and place a red hold tag on the hand switch. Place SIP Train B SSMP hand switch to Bypass.

Turnover: Storms are approaching from the Southwest and high winds are possible within the hour.

SIP B was tagged out yesterday at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> and is scheduled to be returned to service in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. (TS 3.5.2).

Condition A Heater Drain Pump # 1 is experiencing high vibration. The system engineer, maintenance, and operations management are in the field evaluating the pump at this time.

Event MaIf. No. / Event Event Description No. Position Type*

NSO2B C Train A NSCW pump # 3 Locked Rotor (standby fails to auto start) 1 BOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water SRO (TS) TS 3.7.8 (NSCW), TS 3.8.1 (Offsite Sources)

SGO3A1 I Failure of SG # I Pressure transmitter downscale low.

@ 0% AOP-1 8001, section F for Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrument BOP TS 3.3.2 (ESFAS), TS 3.3.3 (PAMS), TS 3.3.4 (Remote Shutdown)

SRO (TS)

NI1OC I PR N43 Lower Detector Fails High 3 RD 18002-C, section B for Failure of Power Range Drawer Malfunction SRO (TS) TS 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip)

CV24@ I Letdown Pressure transmitter P1-0131 Fails low resulting in letdown isolation.

4 0%

18007-C, section A for Total Loss of Letdown Flow RD Restore N Restoration of normal letdown to service.

Letdown 13006-1, CVCS procedure section 4.4.2 Restoring Normal Charging and RD Letdown to Service FW01B C MFPT B trips with shaft shear of MFPT A 6 FWI5A 18016-C, section A for Trip of MFPT at Power RD / BOP 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft AFO2A M TDAFW pump over speed trips following manual start with trip of MDAFW AFO2C B on start signal. Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

ALL Perform Actions of Red Path FRP-1 9231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink and establish RCS feed and bleed. Restoration of AFW flow from TDAFW pump, terminate RCS feed and bleed, transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Voqtle 2007-301 Scenario # I (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

Event 1 NSCW Pump # 3 will trip with NSCW Pump # 5 failing to auto start requiring entry into the Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water AOP.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs a manual start of NSCW pump # 5 and verifies NSCW Train A system proper operation.

Technical Specifications: LCD 3.7.8 and LCO 3.8.1 Event 2 Steam Generator # 1 Pressure transmitter PT-514 will fail downscale low affecting MFPT control system and MFRV # 1. This requires entry in AOP-1 8001 section F for Loss of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs IDA to take manual control of MFPT speed and MFRV # 1 to control SG levels and select out failed channel, returns controls to auto.

Technical Specifications: LCD 3.3.2, LCD 3.3.3, and LCD 3.3.4 Event 3 Power Range channel N43 lower detector will fail high resulting in inward rod motion on the rod control system.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs IDA to take Rod Control system to manual.

(BDP) At the NIS drawers, selects out the failed channel.

Technical Specifications: LCD 3.3.1 Event 4 PT-01 31 Letdown Pressure Transmitter will fail low causing PV-01 31 to throttle shut effectively isolating letdown flow. The crew should enter AOP-1 8007-C for Total Loss of Letdown Flow to restore letdown using PV-01 31 in manual.

Verifiable Action: (RD) Isolates letdown using the Letdown Orifices and the Letdown Isolations.

Event 5 RD places Letdown system back into service using SDP-13006-1, CVCS System.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Places the Letdown system back in service, using SOP-i 3006 and controlling letdown flow using PV-0131.

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Event 6 MFPT B will trip requiring entry into AOP-18016 section A for MFPT Trip at Power.

During power reduction, MFPT A shaft will shear resulting in a total loss of main feed water. This will require a manual reactor trip and entry into E-O and ES-O.1 to stabilize the plant.

Verifiable Action: (BOP). Performs IDA and initiate a Setback of the Main Turbine and starts the 3 rd Condensate Pump.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs IOA to ensure a rapid insertion of control rods for rapid power reduction.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs manual reactor trips as SG Lo-Lo Levels imminent or upon exceeding the auto set point and reactor fails to trip.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs manual start of TDAFW pump after auto start failure.

Critical Step: Manual reactor trip due to imminent loss of secondary heat sink.

Event 7 A trip of the TDAFW pump will occur on over speed after the manual start performed by the BOP. MD AFW pump B will also trip on the pump start signal. This will cause a RED PATH CSFST for Heat Sink and entry into 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

The crew will be required to initiate a feed and bleed of the RCS using PRZR PORV-455 and PORV-456. During the event, operators in the field will report a tappet seating problem with the TDAFW pump Trip and Throttle valve has been fixed. This will allow reset of the T & T valve to allow AFW restoration.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Trips Reactor Coolant Pumps.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Initiates Safety Injection.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Arms COPS and opens PORV-455 and PORV-456.

Critical Step: Open PORV-455 and PORV-456 to establish RCS bleed path.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Hold HV-51 06 shut during reset of T & T valve, then opens the T & T valve to restore TDAFW pump to service.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Closes PRZR PORV-455 and PORV-456.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Isolates the BIT flow path and establishes normal charging.

Critical Step: Restoration of AFW flow to recover SG levels to allow restoration of secondary heat sink and termination of RCS feed and bleed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: I Page 1 of I Event

Description:

Train A NSCW pump # 3 locked rotor with failure of standby NSCW pump # 5 to auto start. This requires entry into AOP-18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses trip I malfunction of NSCW pumps:

Symptoms / alarms:

. Trip of running NSCW pump & failure of standby pump to start.

. NSCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS

. NSCW TRAIN A CNMT CLR 1 & 2 LO FLOW

. NSCW TRAIN A CNMT CLR 5 & 6 LO FLOW

. NSCW TRAIN A RX CVTY CLG COIL LOW FLOW

. NSCW TRAIN A DC CLR LO FLOW

. NSCW TRAIN A RHR PMP & MTO CLR LO FLOW

. 4160 1 E BUS AAO2 TROUBLE Indications:

. NSCW pump # 3 green and ambler lights lit on hand switch.

. NSCW pump # 5 failure to start in auto.

. NSCW system flow and pressure low.

SS Enters AOP 18021-C section A for Loss of NSCW BOP Checks if catastrophic leakage exists.

BOP Starts NSCW pump #5 BOP Performs check of NSCW Train A operating parameters.

. Supply header pressure> 70 psig.

. Supply header temperature < 90 degrees F.

. Supply header flow approximately 17,000 gpm.

. Cooling tower basin level > 73%.

. Checks NSCW return temperature < 95 degrees F.

SS Returns to procedure and step in effect.

Contacts maintenance and notifies Operations duty of the AOP entry.

References Tech Spec LCO 3.7.8 (NSCW) and 3. 8. 1 (Offsite Sources)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 2 Page 1 of I Event

Description:

Failure of Steam Generator # 1 Pressure transmitter downscale low requiring entry into AOP- 18001-C, section F for failure of SG Pressure Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Identifies failure of SG # I Pressure Transmitter:

Alarms:

. STM GEN 1 HI STM PRESS RATE ALERT

. HI STM PRESS RATE (ANY LOOP)

. STM GEN 1 LO STEAMLINE PRESS ALERT Indications:

. Steam Pressure Indicator P1-514 down scale low.

. Steam Flow Channel Fl-51 2 reading low.

BOP Performs IOAs to check steam and feed flows MATCHED ON ALL SGs. (They wont be)

. Takes manual control of MFRV # I

. Takes manual control of MFPTs speed.

. Controls SG levels between 60 and 70%.

SS Enters AOP-1 8001 -C section F for Failure of Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation.

BOP Selects another steam flow channel for control I returns control to auto:

. Selects FI-513 for control using FS-512C selector switch.

. Returns both the MFRV # I and MFPT speed controls to auto.

. Checks SG level control maintains NR level at 65%.

SS Notifies I & C for repairs, notifies Operations Duty of the AOP entry.

References Tech Spec LCOs (3.3.2 ESFAS), (3.3.3 PAMS),

(3.3.4 Remote Shutdown).

NOTE: It is NOT expected the SS will bypass or trip the channel.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

PR N43 lower detector fails high resulting in inward automatic rod motion. The RO will have to take manual control of rod control.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Diagnoses the failure with the following indications:

Alarms:

. POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION

. PWR RANGE LWR DET HI FLX DEV

. POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX RATE ALERT

. POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX HI SETPOINT ALERT

. OVERPOWER ROD STOP Indications:

. PR N43 reads higher than other 3 channels.

. PR channel 3 trip status lights illuminated.

. Rapid inward motion of control rods in automatic.

RO Performs immediate operator actions of AOP 18002-C section B:

. Places control rods in MANUAL.

BOP Selects the affected channel on:

. ROD STOP BYPASS switch.

. COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch.

. POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch.

. UPPER SECTION switch.

. LOWER SECTION switch.

. Resets rate trip.

RO Performs the following:

. Restores Tavg to program.

. Places rods in AUTO when desired.

. Selects an operable Power Range channel on NR-45.

SS Notifies I & C for repairs and notifies Operation Duty of AOP entry.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

PR N43 lower detector fails high resulting in inward automatic rod motion. The RO will have to take manual control of rod control.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> checks the following interlocks in required condition per Tech Spec 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation).

. P-7

. P-8

. P-9

. P-1O and input to P-7 Initiates 14915, Special Condition Surveillance Surveillance Logs.

(Data sheet # 7 for QPTR with 1 PR NIS inoperable).

Initiates the applicable actions for the following Tech Specs.

. Table 3.3.1-1 Function 2

. Table 3.3.1-1 Function 3

. Table 3.3.1-1 Function 6

. Table 3.3.1-1 Function 16 NOTE: It is not expected the SS will bypass the affected NI at this time.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Letdown pressure transmitter P1-0131 fails low resulting in letdown isolation and relief lifting to the PRT.

This will require entry into AOP-1 8007 CVCS Malfunction section A for Loss of Letdown.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Diagnoses loss of letdown flow.

Alarms:

. LP LTDN RELIEF HI TEMP Indications:

. FI-Ol 32 Letdown flow reading 0 gpm on RO panels.

. TE-0125 reading in red zone (> 160 degrees F) on RO panel.

. P1-01 31 reading 0 psig on RO panel.

SS Enters AOP-1 8007-C, section A for Total Loss of Letdown Flow.

RO Isolates letdown relief flow path by performing the following.

. Closes letdown orifice isolation valves HV-8149A, B, and C.

. Closes letdown isolation valves LV-459 and LV-460.

RO Adjusts HC-0182 and FV-0121 as necessary to establish the following:

. Seal injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

. Charging flow approximately 10 gpm > total seal injection flow.

NOTE: The BOP may possibly help the RO with this evolution by throttling FV-0121 while the RO throttles HC-0182.

RO Checks pipe break protection valves OPEN.

. HV-15214

. HV-8160 RO I BOP Checks instrument air to containment ESTABLISHED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Letdown pressure transmitter P1-0131 fails low resulting in letdown isolation and relief lifting to the PRT.

This will require entry into AOP- 18007 CVCS Malfunction section A for Loss of Letdown.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks CVCS letdown to BTRS flow path:

. TV-0381 B BTRS Demin Inlet Temperature Control - OPEN (HS-10351 DILUTE or OFF lights lit)

. HV-81 15 Letdown Divert to BTRS OPEN.-

RO Identifies and correct cause for loss of letdown:

. Checks letdown flow path for valve failure or mispositions.

Checks letdown instrumentation:

. PI-0131A

. TI-0130

. PIC-0131

. Other causes Determines normal letdown is available by manual control of PIC-Ol 31.

SS Directs crew to place Normal Letdown in service by initiating SOP-i 3006, Chemical Volume Control System.

NOTE: The step mentions controlling Letdown pressure in a range, the crew may opt to place Excess Letdown in service versus restoring Normal Letdown to service. This would be acceptable.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2

Description:

Restores CVCS Normal Letdown to service using SOP-13006 following failure ofPIC-0131 Letdown Pressure Controller OR places Excess Letdown in service per SOP-13008.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs the following:

. Ensures letdown orifices and isolation SHUT (shut in 18007).

. Close Aux Spray valve HV-8145 (already shut).

. Open CVCS Pipe Break Isolation HV-1 5214.

. Open RCS Letdown Isolation HV-8160.

. Open RCS Letdown Isolation HV-8152.

. Place PlC-i 31 in manual and 50 75% demand output.

. Place Letdown Hx Temp Controller TIC-i 30 in manual and to recorded position from rounds.

. Checks PRZR level> 17%

. Verify OPEN either HV-8146 or HV-8i47 (normal or alt charging)

. Verify OPEN HV-81 05 and HV-8i 06 Charging to RCS valves.

. Adjusts HC-182 and FV-121 to raise charging to 80-90 gpm and seal injection between 8 to 13 gpm.

NOTE: The BOP may help the RO with this evolution by controlling FV-121 to adjust charging flow.

RO Open Letdown Isolation Valves Upstream and Downstream

. LV-459 (HS-459)

. LV-460 (HS-460)

RO Establishes letdown flow by performing the following.

. Opens orifice isolation HS-8149B or C (75 gpm orifice)

. Adjust PlC-i 31A to maintain letdown pressure. (NOTE: this indicator will not work so RO will adjust to maintain 75 gpm).

. Place letdown temperature controller TIC-i 30 in auto.

. Verifies letdown temperature < 380 degrees F on TI-i 27.

. Adjusts letdown and charging to maintain PRZR level.

. Places PRZR level control in auto.

OR

. Places Excess Letdown in service per SOP-i 3008.

NOTE: Actions for this on the following page.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Restores CVCS Normal Letdown to service using SOP-13006 following failure ofPIC-0131 Letdown Pressure Controller OR places Excess Letdown in service per SOP-13008.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Places Excess Letdown in service to the seal return header per 13008.

. Checks a charging pump is running.

. Checks closed HV-8098 Head Vent to Excess Letdown

. Verifies HIC-0123 flow controller is closed.

. Verifies RCP seal leakoffs open (HV-8100 and HV-81 12)

. Verifies HS-8143 Excess Ltdn to VCT in the VCT position.

. Verifies reactor power < 3562 MWt (may need to reduce power)

. Opens HV-8153 and HV-8154 Excess Ltdn Isolations.

. Records Pressure on P1-0124 Excess Ltdn Hx Outlet

. Records Temperature on TI-i 22 Excess Ltdn Hx Outlet

. Opens HV-123 to establish Excess Letdown flow.

. Monitors P1-124 to limit to 50 psig above recorded pressure.

. Monitors TI-i 22 to limit temperature < 165 degrees F.

RO Adjusts charging flow controller FIC-121 and seal injection flow controller HC-182 to maintain PRZR level at desired level.

SS Directs C & T to dispatch personnel to align the outlet of the Seal Water Hx to the VCT spray nozzle.

. Unlock and open i-i 208-U6-i 04 Seal Water Hx to VCT Outlet

. Close i-i 208-U6-i 06 Seal Water Hx Outlet to NCP Suction End of EVENT #5

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Trip of MFPT B requiring crew to enter AOP- 18016 Condensate and Feed water Malfunction section A for MFP Malfunction. During event MFPT A will shear shaft resulting in a total loss of Feed water. Crew will be required to manually trip reactor to mitigate the event. First Rx. Trip hand switch on RO panel will not work requiring use of the other reactor trip hand switch.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses trip of MFPT B.

Alarms:

. MFPTBTRIPPED

. MFPT DISCH HDR LO PRESS

. STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) FLOW MISMATCH

. STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) HI I LO LVL DEVIATION

. Unexpected change in MFP speed or delta-P.

Indications:

. MFPT B speed and discharge pressure lowering.

. All SC levels rapidly lowering.

. All SC feed flows lower than steam flows.

. MFPT A discharge pressure downscale low.

. Total loss of all FW flows.

RO / BOP Perform IOAs of AOP-1 8016 section A:

BOP IOAs:

. Check MFPT tripped or flow lost (BOP)

. Check at least one MFPT running and providing flow (BOP)

. Depress start setback button on Turbine Control Panel (BOP) rd 3

. Start condendate pump. (BOP)

. Raise MFPT A speed to match steam and feed flow. (BOP)

RO lOAs:

. Check reactor power > 75% (RO)

. Verifies rapid insertion of control rods (RO)

SS Enters AOP 18016-C Condensate and Feed water Malfunction section A for MFP Malfunction.

CREW Recognizes MFPT A malfunction or a SC level loss is imminent.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Trip of MFPT B requiring crew to enter AOP- 18016 Condensate and Feed water Malfunction section A for MFP Malfunction. During event MFPT A will shear shaft resulting in a total loss of Feed water. Crew will be required to manually trip reactor to mitigate the event. First Rx. Trip hand switch on RO panel will not work requiring use of the other reactor trip hand switch.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Manually trips the reactor by performing the following when loss of all FW flow recognized or loss of SG level is imminent:

CRITICAL STEP

• Attempts reactor trip using RO panel (C panel) hand switch.

• Trips reactor using RO panel (A panel) hand switch.

SS Enters 19000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RO Performs E-0 lOAs.

• Verifies Reactor Trip breakers open, flux lowering, all rods at bottom.

• Checks for SI actuation and determines SI is NOT required.

BOP Performs E-0 lOAs.

• Verifies Turbine Trip with all stop valves shut.

• Verifies power to all 4160 1 E and 480V 1 E buses.

SS Enters 19001-C, ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response BOP Determines there is no AFW flow to the SGs.

• MDAFW pump A running with no discharge pressure or flow (shaft shear)

• MDAFW pump B is tripped with green and amber HS lights.

• TDAFW pump HV-5106 has failed to open.

BOP Attempts start of TDAFW pump by opening HS-5106.

BOP Informs SS of TDAFW pump trip on over speed during start attempt.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Trip of MFPT B requiring crew to enter AOP- 18016 Condensate and Feed water Malfunction section A for MFP Malfunction. During event MFPT A will shear shaft resulting in a total loss of Feed water. Crew will be required to manually trip reactor to mitigate the event. First Rx. Trip hand switch on RO panel will not work requiring use of the other reactor trip hand switch.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Determines CSFST RED PATH on HEAT SINK is present.

SS Transitions to FRP-H.1, 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 5 Event

Description:

A total loss of all FW has required the crew to enter 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew will eventually be required to trip the RCPs and initates RCS Feed and Bleed by initiating SI flow and opening the PRZR PORVs. The TDAFW pump over speed will be reset after Feed and Bleed initation, allowing the crew to terminate RCS Feed and Bleed once a SG NR level is> 10%.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Checks total FW flow capability to SGs < 570 gpm and not due to operator actions.

CREW Initiates continuous actions pages.

SS Notify SM of EPIP entry requirement.

CREW Checks secondary heat sink is required.

. RCS pressure greater than non-faulted SG pressures.

. RCS WR temperature> 350 degrees F.

RO Checks CCP status at least one available.

BOP Checks if Bleed and Feed is required.

. WR level in any 3 SGs < 29% (44% Adverse) OR

. RCS pressure > 2335 psig due to loss of heat sink.

NOTE: SC levels will eventually drop to less than 29% WR requiring the crew to trip the RCPs and go to step # 34 for bleed and feed.

CREW Continues with procedure and attempts to establish feed water flow.

. Try to establish MDAFW flow.

. Try to establish TDAFW flow.

. Try to establish Condensate flow.

. Try to establish Main Feed water flow.

RO Trips all RCPs when bleed and feed criteria is met.

SS Proceeds to step # 34 when bleed and feed criteria met.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 5 Event

Description:

A total loss of all FW has required the crew to enter 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew will eventually be required to trip the RCPs and initates RCS Feed and Bleed by initiating SI flow and opening the PRZR PORVs. The TDAFW pump over speed will be reset after Feed and Bleed initation, allowing the crew to terminate RCS Feed and Bleed once a SG NR level is> 10%.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RD Manually actuates Safety Injection and verifies RCS feed path.

. At least one CCP running.

. At least one SIP running.

. ECCS valve alignment proper per the MLBs.

RD Establishes RCS bleed path.

CRITICAL

• Places all PRZR heaters in OFF I PTL.

STEP

• Checks power to PRZR PDRV block valves available.

• Arm COPS and check PRZR PORV Block Valves Both Open.

• Open both PRZR PORVs.

RD Verifies adequate RCS bleed path:

• COPS-ARMED.

• PRZR PDRV Block Valves BOTH OPEN.

• PRZR PORVS BOTH OPEN RO Resets SI RD Resets CIA BOP Establishes instrument air to containment.

• Checks instrument air pressure> 100 psig.

• Opens Intrument air isolation to containment HV-9378.

• Verifies PRZR spray valves operating as required.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 5 Event

Description:

A total loss of all FW has required the crew to enter 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew will eventually be required to trip the RCPs and initates RCS Feed and Bleed by initiating SI flow and opening the PRZR PORVs. The TDAFW pump over speed will be reset after Feed and Bleed initation, allowing the crew to terminate RCS Feed and Bleed once a SG NR level is> 10%.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW I Receives call that TDAFW pump has tripped on overspeed due to tappet BOP not properly seated.

BOP Directs reset of TDAFW Trip and Throttle valve per SOP-I 3610 for AFW.

. Holds HV-51 06 shut while reset of T & T valve is performed by local operators.

SS Directs BOP to establish AFW flow to all Non-dry SGs.

NOTE: It is expected all SG levels will be > 9% WR (Dry-SG)

BOP Verifies open throttle valves for the selected SG(s).

CRITICAL STEP BOP Checks for adequate secondary heat sink.

. NR level in at least one SG > 10% (32% Adverse).

NOTE: The crew will remain at this step until one SG level> 10%. This will take approximately 12 15 minutes if SG WR levels in the low 20%

range when AFW flow established. Possible FREEZE point for scenario is running too long. All CRITICAL steps have been performed at this point in the scenario.

RO Checks RCS temperatures:

. Core Exit TCs LOWERING.

. RCS WR hot leg temperatures LOWERING.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 5 Event

Description:

A total loss of all FW has required the crew to enter 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew will eventually be required to trip the RCPs and initates RCS Feed and Bleed by initiating SI flow and opening the PRZR PORVs. The TDAFW pump over speed will be reset after Feed and Bleed initation, allowing the crew to terminate RCS Feed and Bleed once a SG NR level is> 10%.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Verifies Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves CLOSED.

BOP Checks SG pressures > 585 psig.

RO Checks if ECCS flow can be terminated (criteria will NOT be met)

. RCS subcooling > 24 degrees F (38 degrees F Adverse)

. RVLIS Full Range indication > 62%.

RO Checks RCS bleed path status:

. Blocks one train of COPS

. Places the associated PORV in auto and verifies it closes.

RO Checks if ECCS flow can be terminated (criteria will NOT be met)

. RCS subcooling > 24 degrees F (38 degrees F Adverse)

. RVLIS Full Range indication > 62%.

RO Checks RCS bleed path status:

. Blocks the 2nd train of COPS

. Places the associated PORV in auto and verifies it closes.

RO Checks if ECCS flow can be terminated (criteria will be met after an approximate 3 minute wait a NOTE informs crew to wait)

. RCS subcooling > 24 degrees F (38 degrees F Adverse)

. RVLIS Full Range indication > 62%.

RO Stops ECCS pumps.

. SI Pumps

. All but one CCP

Appendix 0 Reciuired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

A total loss of all FW has required the crew to enter 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The crew will eventually be required to trip the RCPs and initates RCS Feed and Bleed by initiating SI flow and opening the PRZR PORVs. The TDAFW pump over speed will be reset after Feed and Bleed initation, allowing the crew to terminate RCS Feed and Bleed once a SG NR level is> 10%.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks RCS bleed path status again.

. PRZR PORVs and associate block valves any OPEN (no).

BOP Checks instrument air is available.

RO Establishes charging flow:

. Opens CCP normal mini-flows (HV-81 1 1A and B, HV-81 10)

. Closes CCP alternate mini-flows (HV-8508A and B)

. Verifies CCP alternate mini-flows White Pressure Control Mode lights are out.

. Sets seal flow control HC-182 to maximum seal flow.

. Closes BIT discharge isolation valves (HV-8801A and B)

. Opens Charging to RCS isolation valves (HV-8105 and 8106)

. Maintains seal injection flow 8 to 13 gpm.

RO Checks RCS Hot Leg temperatures stable or lowering.

RO Checks if RHR pumps should be stopped.

. RHR pumps running with suction aligned to RWST.

. RCS pressure 300 psig.

. RCS pressure stable or rising.

. Stops both RHR pumps.

RO Controls charging flow to maintain PRZR level at 25%.

SS Transitions to 19011-C, ES-1.1 SI TERMINATION step 14.

END THIS IS THE END OF THE SCENARIO!

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant has been at 100% Power for eighteen months.

Pre load the following: PNL Map (over ride HV-8000B OPEN), Train A Auto swap over failure (ES-18A), BIT discharge valves HV-88O1AJB fail to auto open (ES-22A, ES22B), DGIA & DG1B auto start failures (EL19A, EL19B), SIP A auto start failure (Sl0A). RF TKO2 (present value to 38% over 1500 seconds)

Place SIP B in PTL and place a red hold tag on the hand switch. Place SI Train B SSMP hand switch to Bypass.

Turnover: Storms are approaching from the Southwest and high winds are possible within the hour.

SI Pump B was tagged out yesterday at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> and is scheduled to be returned to service in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (TS 3.5.2).

Heater Drain Pump # 1 is experiencing high vibrations. The system engineer, maintenance, and operations management are in the field evaluating the pump at this time.

Maintain 100% power.

Event Maif. No. I Event Event Description No. Position Type*

PRO2B © I PRZR pressure channel PT-456 fails off scale high I block valve HV-8000B 100% does not shut.

1 RO 18001, section C, Failure of PRZR Pressure Instrumentation SRO (TS) TS 33.1 (Rx. Trip), 3.3.2 (ESFAS), 3.4.1 (DNB), 3.4.11 (RCS PORV I Block>

SGO2G © I SG # 3 controlling LT fails off scale high.

100%

AOP-18001, section E for Failure of Steam Generator Level Instrument.

2 BOP TS 3.31 (Rx. Trip), 3.3.2 (ESFAS), 3.3.3 (PAMS)

SRO (TS)

MSOIB @ C Light seismic event, light tremors felt.

100%

Steam Dump PV-507 fails open, resulting in power excursion I reduction.

ALL 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage CVO7 C Normal Charging Pump Trips RO 18007-C section B for Total Loss of Charging Flow.

SRO TRM 13.1.5 (INFO for Charging Pumps), TRM 13.1.3 (INFO for Borated Water (TRM) Sources Flow Paths)

RC04A @ R Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than Tech Spec limits I power ramp.

4% Management will request down power per 18013 to request RCS inspection 5 ALL due to the seismic event earlier.

18004-C, section A for RCS Leakage (Modes 1, 2, 3 with RCS> 1000 psig) 18013, Rapid Power Reduction ELO2 M SSE I OBE escalates to Loss of Offsite Power, DBA LOCA ELO3 ECA-0.0, E-0, E-1.0, ES-1.3 6

RCO3B ALL 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D.-1 Draft ES-18A Containment Sump Suction (HV-8811A) to RHR Pump Train A will fail to automatically open on RWST LO-LO Level during transfer to Cold Leg RO 7 Recirculation.

ES-I .3 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Voqtle 2007-301 Scenario #2 (Loss of All AC Power I DBA LOCA)

Event 1 PRZR pressure channel PT-456 fails high resulting in PORV 456 coming full open. HV 800DB block valve will fail to shut resulting in PORV-456 cycling around 2185 psig. This will require entry into 18001-C, section Cfor Failure of PRZR Pressure Instrumentation.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs IOA by placing closing PORV 456 and operates heaters and sprays as necessary. On the QMCB, selects out the failed channel.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.3.1, LCD 3.3.2, LCD 3.4.1, LCD 3.4.11 Event 2 Steam Generator # 3 Controlling Level Channel Fails high resulting in MFRV # 3 throttling shut. This will require entry into 18001-C, section E for Failure of Steam Generator Level Instrumentation.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs IOA to take manual control of MFRV # 3 to control SG level. On the QMCB, selects out the failed channel.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.3.1, LCO 3.3.2, LCD 3.3.3 Event 3 The crew will be informed they can feel a slight tremor on the floor (seismic event). A few minutes later, PV-507C will fail open resulting in a power excursion due to increased steam demand. This will require entry into 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage and a power reduction to remain less than 100%. The steam dump valve may be locally manually isolated if requested by the crew.

Verifiable Action: (ALL) Power reduction. BOP will operate the main turbine and RD will operate control rods and the CVCS boration controls to control reactor power < 100%.

Event 4 The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) will trip resulting in a total loss of charging flow. This will require entry into 18007-C, section B for Total Loss of Charging Flow.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs IOA to manually close the Letdown Orifice Isolation valves and Letdown Isolation valves. Start a CCP, restores charging and letdown.

Technical Specifications: TRM 13.1.3 INFO LCD, TRM 13.1.5 INFO LCO

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Event 5 NOTE: This event could be eliminated for time compression of scenario if the NRC chief examiner feels the reactivity manipulation during Event # 4 was adequate.

RCS leak within the capacity of the normal charging flow path. Crew will determine an approximate leak size by manipulation charging / seals. This will require entry into AOP 18004-C, section A for RCS Leakage in Modes 1, 2, and 3 (With RCS Pressure> 1000 psig)

The crew will be directed by operations management to perform a rapid down power due to management concerns over the SSE! OBE event with the apparent RCS leakage.

The shutdown is to allow RCS inspection.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Determines leak within capacity of normal charging flow path.

This will be achieved by manipulation of the charging system.

Verifiable Action: (ALL) Power reduction. BOP will operate the main turbine and RD will operate control rods and the CVCS boration controls to control reactor power.

Event 6 The crew is informed heavy seismic activity occurring (SSE I OBE). This will lead to a Loss of All AC Power! DBA LOCA event. Both Offsite Sources will trip open with failure of both Diesel Generators to automatically start. A DBA LOCA will follow shortly. The crew will enter 19100-C, Loss of All AC Power and start the Emergency Diesel Generators. Once the Emergency Diesel Generators are started the crew will enter E-0 and take the actions for reactor Trip and Safety Injection due to the DBA LOCA.

Verifiable Action: (RO). Perform a reactor trip in response to the Loss of All AC power.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Manual starts of at least one Diesel Generator to restore AC power to a 4160 1 E Emergency Buses.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Manual opening of HV-8801A or B BIT Outlet Isolation Valves to ensure High Head Injection flow.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Starts Safety Injection Pump A which will not automatically start to ensure adequate ECCS injection flow.

Critical task: Starting Diesel at least one (1) Diesel Generator to restore AC Power.

Critical task: Manual opening of HV-8801A or B to ensure High Head Injection flow.

Critical task: Manual start of SIP A to ensure adequate ECCS injection flow.

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Event 7 A failure of Containment Sump to RHR pump A suction HV-881 1A to automatically open on RWST Lo-Lo level of 39% will occur. This will require the crew to manually open the valve to provide suction to RHR pump A during Cold Leg Recirculation operations.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Opens HV-881 1A during 19013-C, Cold Leg Recirculation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: I Event

Description:

Crew will respond to the high failure of a PRZR pressure secondary controlling channel (P1-456) resulting in PORV-456 opening. Block valve HV-8000B will fail to shut and the PORV will close on 2 I 3 channels reading < 2185 psig. The PORV will cycle around 2185 psig to 2200 psig until manual action is taken to close the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of the PRZR pressure channel P1-456.

Symptoms I alarms:

. PRZR HI PRESS alarm.

. PRZR HI PRESS CHANNEL ALERT alarm.

. PV-456A OPEN SIGNAL alarm.

. PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON alarm.

. PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK alarm.

Indications:

. PORV-456 open on hand switch.

. Other 3 PRZR pressure channels pressure lowering.

. Block valve HV-8000A closing.

RO Performs IOAs of 18001-C, section C for Failure of PRZR Pressure Instrumentation.

. Close spray valves.

. Close affected PORV.

. Operates heaters as necessary.

RO Checks P1-455 controlling properly. Diagnosis failure of Block Valve HV 8000 B to close and places hand switch for PORV-456 to CLOSE.

SS Enters AOP-1 8001-C, section C.

Directs implementation of COA page.

RO Uses heaters and sprays to control PRZR pressure between 2220 and 2250 psig.

Checks PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller in AUTO with RO output signal at approximately 25%.

ADoendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page2of2 Event No.: I Event

Description:

Crew will respond to the high failure of a PRZR pressure secondary controlling channel (P1-456) resulting in PORV-456 opening. Block valve HV-8000B will fail to shut and the PORV will close on 2/3 channels reading < 2185 psig. The PORV will cycle around 2185 psig to 2200 psig until manual action is taken to close the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Checks affected channel selected on PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL RO SELECTOR switch.

Selects an unaffected channel on PS-455F.

RO

. Selects channel 455 I 458 for control.

Places heaters and sprays controllers in AUTO and checks RCS RO pressure stable at or trending to 2235 psig.

RO Places PORVs in AUTO and verifies proper operation.

RO Places PRZR pressure Master controller in AUTO.

RO Selects channel P1-455 on recorder selector switch PS-455G.

RO / SS Checks P-I I status light on BPLP correct for plant conditions.

SS Notifies I & C for repairs and contacts Operation Duty to inform of the AOP entry.

SS Identifies requirement to trip affected bistable listed in table Bi within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the channel failure to comply with the following Tech Specs:

. 3.4.1, DNB parameters

. 3.3.l,FU6

. 3.3.1, FU 8a and 8b

. 3.3.2, EU id

. 3.3.2, EU 8b

. 3.4.11, RCS PORV Block Valve

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of I Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

SG # 3 controlling level channel fails HIGH requires BOP to take manual control of MFRV # 3 to control SG levels and select out the failed channel.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Diagnose the failure of SG # 3 controlling level channel.

Symptoms I alarms:

. STM GEN 3 HI I LO LVL DEVIATION

. STM GEN 3 HI-HI LEVEL ALERT.

Indications:

. MFRV # 3 throttling shut

. Feed flow < steam flow on SG # 3 BOP Performs lOA and takes manual control of MFRV # 3 BOP Selects unaffected SG level channel for control and returns SG level control to AUTO.

SS / Enters AOP-1 8001-C, section E for Failure of SG Level Instrumentation CREW and initiates the Continuous Actions Page.

BOP Verifies level control maintains 65% NR level.

SS Notifies I & C to initiate repairs and notifies Operations Duty Management of the AOP entry.

SS Identifies requirement to trip affected channel bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and initiates actions of the following Tech Specs:

. 3.3.1,FU13

. 3.3.2, FU Sc

. 3.3.2, EU 6b

. 3.3.3, EU 5

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of I Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Steam Dump valve PV-507C will fail open resulting in an entry into 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage requiring action by the crew to reduce power and isolate the leak.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose the increase in reactor power / steam demand due to PV-507C failing open.

SS Enters AOP-1 8008-C for Secondary Coolant Leakage.

Reduces turbine load until < 100% on all indications:

CREW

. PRNIS

. U1118

. Core delta Ts.

Continuous Action Page initiated.

Monitors leakage to insure no significant hazard to plant personnel or equipment exists and leak rate stable and not rapidly worsening.

RO Checks the following:

. Tavg matched with Tref

. PRZR level in program band.

. PRZR pressure between 2220 and 2250 psig.

BOP Maintains SG levels in the program band.

RO Checks CNMT pressure, temperature, moisture, sump level normal.

CREW Identifies the power increase due to PV-507C failed open.

CREW Dispatches personnel to isolate steam dump PV-507C.

CREW Takes action to control power and temperature during isolation of the steam dump valve.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The NCP (Normal Charging Pump) will trip resulting in a total loss of charging flow and seal injection. The RO will be required to perform lOAs and isolate letdown.

The malfunction will require entry into AOP-1 8007 section B for Total Loss of Charging Flow and the crew will perform actions to re-establish charging and seal injection.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RP Diagnosis loss of the NCP:

Symptoms I alarms:

. CHARGING PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP

. RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW

. CHARGING LINE HI I LO FLOW

. REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP Indications:

. NCP green and amber lights lit on hand switch.

. Charging flow 0 gpm.

. Seal injection 0 gpm.

. Letdown flashing RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions to Isolate Letdown Closes Letdown Orifice Isolations

. HV-8149A, B, and C Closes Letdown Isolations

. LV-459 and LV-460 SS I Enters AOP-1 8007-C section B for Total Loss of Charging Flow and CREW implements the Continuous Actions Pages.

RO I

• Trends RCP seal parameters.

CREW

• Determines cause of charging pump trip.

• Checks if gas binding of charging pump had occurred.

• Checks for any charging system leakage.

• Checks ACCW in service.

• Checks normal charging valve alignment OPEN

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The NCP (Normal Charging Pump) will trip resulting in a total loss of charging flow and seal injection. The RO will be required to perform lOAs and isolate letdown.

The malfunction will require entry into AOP-i 8007 section B for Total Loss of Charging Flow and the crew will perform actions to re-establish charging and seal injection.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Starts a CCP in accordance with SOP-i 3006 CVCS System and establishes normal charging flow.

RO Establishes normal letdown in accordance with SOP-i 3006 CVCS system.

RO Establishes 8 to 13 gpm seal injection flow and controls PRZR level in the program band.

SS Initiates the following Technical Specifications and I or Technical Requirements as necessary.

. TR I 3.1 .3 Borated Water Source Flow Paths Operating (INFO)

. TR-1 3.1 .5 Charging Pumps Operating (INFO)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of I Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RCS leakage will develop that is within the capacity of the normal charging flow path to maintain PRZR level and pressure. The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8004 for RCS Leakage. Due to the previous seismic event, Operations Management will direct a rapid down power in accordance with AOP-l 813-C, Rapid Downpower for an RCS inspection.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior TEAM Diagnoses an RCS leak has developed:

Symptoms I alarms:

. INTERMEDIATE AND HIGH RADIATION ALARMS Indications:

. RE-2562 showing alarm condition on SRDC

. Charging letdown flow mismatch.

. PRZR level lowering.

SS I TEAM Enters AOP-1 8004-C section A for RCS Leakage in Mode 1.

SS directs initiation of Continuous Actions page.

TEAM

• Verifies PRZR PORVs are shut.

• Checks PRZR Safety Valves are closed.

• Stops any load changes.

• Maintains VCT level.

SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Down Power at Operations Management direction.

• Performs SHUTDOWN BRIEFING

• Initiates the Continuous Actions page.

• Reduce Turbine load at a rate up to 5% minute:

RO I BOP

• Maintains Tave within 3 degrees F of Tref using rods in manual or boration as necessary.

• Maintains reactor and turbine power matched.

• PRZR level and pressure maintained on program.

• SG levels maintained on program.

SS Notifies System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Control room is informed of a heavy seismic event shaking the floor to the point they are having trouble standing (SSE I OBE). This will be followed by a Loss of Offsite Power (Loss All AC) and DBA LOCA. The Loss of All AC will occur due to failure of both DGs to automatically start, the DGs will be started in the Loss of All AC power procedure and the crew will return to E-0 to address the DBA LOCA.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior TEAM Diagnose an SSE I OBE event has occurred:

Indications:

. Report of seismic activity to the crew to the point of having difficulty standing.

TEAM Diagnoses Loss of Offsite Power I Loss of All AC Power has occurred.

Indications:

. Apparent loss of RAT 1A with DG1A failing to tie.

. Apparent loss of RAT 1 B with DG1 B failing to tie.

SS

• May briefly enter AOP-1 8031 -C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical

• Directs crew to trip reactor and enters 191 00-C, Loss of All AC Power when both 4160 1 E buses are lost.

RO Manually trips the reactor and performs lOAs of 191 00-C, Loss of All AC Power.

• Verifies reactor trip breakers open and neutron flux lowering.

BOP Performs lOAs of 19100-C, Loss of AH AC Power.

• Verifies Turbine is tripped with all stop valves shut.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Control room is informed of a heavy seismic event shaking the floor to the point they are having trouble standing (SSE I OBE). This will be followed by a Loss of Offsite Power (Loss All AC) and DBA LOCA. The Loss of All AC will occur due to failure of both DGs to automatically start, the DGs will be started in the Loss of All AC power procedure and the crew will return to E-0 to address the DBA LOCA.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks if the RCS is isolated:

. Verifies PRZR PORVs CLOSED

. Closes Letdown Orifice Isolations HV-8149A, B, and C

. Closes Letdown Isolation Valves LV-459 and LV-460

. Verifies Excess Letdown Isolated HV-81 53 and HV-81 54

. Verifies all Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolations CLOSED.

BOP Verifies AFW flow> 570 gpm and starts TDAFW if necessary by placing HV-5106 to the OPEN position.

RD Trips all RCPs.

SS / TEAM Initiates the Continuous Actions Page and Ss implements EPIPs.

BOP Checks Main Generator Output Breakers OPEN.

BOP Restores AC power to any AC Emergency Bus CRITICAL

• Starts at least one DG (both will start if attempted)

TASK

• Checks AC bus energized from DG (output breaker closed and bus frequency at 60 Hz)

SS Checks at least one AC bus energized and returns to procedure and step in effect. (this should be E-0 step # 1) and implements FRPs as necessary.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 7 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

DBA LOCA response. The crew will be required to manually open / align ECCS components to properly align ECCS for the DBA LOCA after power restoration. SI will auto actuate, however, the BIT outlets will fail to auto open and SIP A will fail to auto start. Later, during Cold Leg recirculation, Containment Sump Suction to RHR HV-881 1A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Transitions to E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RO / BOP Performs lOAs of E-O

. Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

. Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

. Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

. Checks if SI actuated (RO)

SS I TEAM Initiates Foldout Page, Continuous Actions Page and RO and BOP Initial Actions Pages.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

. Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

. Checks CIA actuated per MLBs RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

CRITICAL STEP

• CCPs both running.

• SI Pumps running (SI B tagged out, SI A did not auto start)

• Starts SI pump A after notifying SS of failure to start.

• RHR pumps both running.

• NCPtripped.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

• CCW pumps two running per train.

• NSCW pumps two running per train.

• NSCW tower return bypass valves in auto.

• Containment coolers running in SLOW speed with cooler isolation valves open.

• Containment pressure remained < 21.5 psig (if not, verify containment spray has actuated)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 7 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

DBA LOCA response. The crew will be required to manually open I align ECCS components to properly align ECCS for the DBA LOCA after power restoration. SI will auto actuate, however, the BIT outlets will fail to auto open and SIP A will fail to auto start. Later, during Cold Leg recirculation, Containment Sump Suction to RHR HV-881 1A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

CRITICAL Checks ECCS flows:

STEP

. BIT Flow

. Opens HV-8801A and HV-8801B to establish BIT flow after notifying SS of failure to open.

. RCS pressure < 1625 psig.

. Slpumpflow.

. RCS pressure < 300 psig.

. RHRpumpflow.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. Checks ECCS valve alignment proper.

. Checks at least one ACCW pump running and starts one if necessary.

. Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

BOP Performs BOP Initial Operator Actions of E-0

. Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

. Checks NR SG levels> 10%, controls AFW flows.

. Checks if SLI is required and ensures MSIVs and Bypasses are closed.

. Verifies FWI (MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut)

. Verifies SGBD isolated and places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close.

. Verifies SGBD sample isolations closed.

. Verifies Diesel Generators running.

. Throttles AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR.

. Verifies both MFPT tripped.

. Checks Main Generator Output breakers open.

Appendix D Reciuired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 7 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

DBA LOCA response. The crew will be required to manually open / align ECCS components to properly align ECCS for the DBA LOCA after power restoration. SI will auto actuate, however, the BIT outlets will fail to auto open and SIP A will fail to auto start. Later, during Cold Leg recirculation, Containment Sump Suction to RHR HV-881 1A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS WR Cold Leg temperatures.

CREW Takes actions of RNO step 8 to control RCS temperature.

(Not a lot they can do with RCS DBA LOCA)

RO Checks PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves all Closed.

RO Checks RCPs stopped.

BOP / SS Checks for faulted SC and transition to E-2 (not met)

BOP I SS Checks for SGTR transition criteria to E-3 (not met)

SS I BOP Requests chemistry to sample SGs for activity one at a time. BOP will open selected SC sample valves.

RO /SS Transitions to 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant due to containment radiation, containment sump levels, containment pressure all being abnormal.

NOTE The crew will perform actions of 19010-C until RWST level < 39%

requiring transition to 1901 3-C, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc.

SS Initiates the Continuous Actions and Foldout Pages.

SS Initiates CSFST monitoring and implements EPIPs.

RO Maintains seal injection to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 7 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

DBA LOCA response. The crew will be required to manually open / align ECCS components to properly align ECCS for the DBA LOCA after power restoration. SI will auto actuate, however, the BIT outlets will fail to auto open and SIP A will fail to auto start. Later, during Cold Leg recirculation, Containment Sump Suction to RHR HV-8811A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks RCPs stopped and at least one ACCW pump is running.

SS Assigns personnel to place Containment hydrogen monitors in service.

BOP Checks SG secondary pressure boundaries intact.

BOP Checks intact SG levels 10 65% NR, controls AFW, and checks for any ruptured SG.

RO Checks PORV and Block valve status, check CL temperatures.

RO Checks ECCS termination criteria (not met)

RO Checks if containment spray should be stopped (not met)

TEAM Reviews step addressing LOSP after SI reset to restart equipment.

BOP Checks if DGs should be stopped. (only source of power no)

RO Checks Cold Leg recirculation capability.

. Power to both HV-881 1A and HV-881 lB

. Power to RHR pumps A and B

. Power to HV-8809A and HV-8809B

. RHR Hx A and B OPERABLE BOP Checks auxiliary building leak detection alarms and plant vent radiogas.

TEAM Directs Chemistry to obtain samples for boron, pH, radioactivity from the RCS and both Containment Emergency Sumps, etc.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 7 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

DBA LOCA response. The crew will be required to manually open I align ECCS components to properly align ECCS for the DBA LOCA after power restoration. SI will auto actuate, however, the BIT outlets will fail to auto open and SIP A will fail to auto start. Later, during Cold Leg recirculation, Containment Sump Suction to RHR HV-881 1A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior TEAM Evaluate plant status.

. Secure unnecessary equipment.

. Isolate NSCW corrosion monitor racks after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

. Consult TSC for additional actions and to repair additional equipment required to mitigate the event.

SS / TEAM Checks for transition criteria met for 19012-C, Post LOCA Cool down and Depressurization. (not met)

SS I TEAM Checks for transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation required. (NOTE: At some point this will be met and crew will transition to 1901 3-C)

SS Transitions to 1901 3-C, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation when RWST level lowers to < 39%.

SS

• Initiates Continuous Actions Pages.

. Notifies HP of Auxiliary Building radiation levels changing.

. Makes a page announcement to clear personnel from the Auxiliary Building.

• Review Step for LOSP after SI reset to restart equipment.

RO

• Resets SI

• Checks CCW cooling for RHR heat exchanges.

RO

• Monitors RHR pump amps stable.

• Monitors RHR pump discharge flow normal for RCS pressure.

• Monitors RHR pump discharge pressure stable.

• Checks CNMT emergency sump level> 13. 5 inches.

RO

• Checks RHR pump A running.

• Checks HV-8811A-NOT OPEN

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 7 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

DBA LOCA response. The crew will be required to manually open / align ECCS components to properly align ECCS for the DBA LOCA after power restoration. SI will auto actuate, however, the BIT outlets will fail to auto open and SIP A will fail to auto start. Later, during Cold Leg recirculation, Containment Sump Suction to RHR HV-881 1A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO

• Stops RHR pump A

. Shuts HV-8812A

. Opens HV-881 1A (valve will open)

. Starts RHR pump A RO

• Checks HV-8809A open -

• Checks RHR train A flow> 500 gpm RO

• Checks RHR pump B running

• Checks HV-881 lB open

• Shuts HV-8812B

• Checks HV-8809B open.

• Checks RHR train B flow> 500 gpm.

SS

• Dispatches operator to shutdown panels to co-ordinate alignment of LV-112D and LV-112E.

RO

• Checks RWST level > 10%

• Checks RCS pressure < 1625 psig.

RO

• Places lockouts for HV-8806 and HV881 3 to ON

• Shuts SIP miniflow HV-8813, HV-8814, and HV-8920 RO

• Shuts CCP alternate miniflows

• HV-8508A

• HV-8508B

• HV8509A

• HV-8509B

• Verifies White Pressure Control Mode lights out on:

• HV-8508A

• HV-8508B

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 7 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

DBA LOCA response. The crew will be required to manually open I align ECCS components to properly align ECCS for the DBA LOCA after power restoration. SI will auto actuate, however, the BIT outlets will fail to auto open and SIP A will fail to auto start. Later, during Cold Leg recirculation, Containment Sump Suction to RHR HV-881 1A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the crew.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RD

• Shuts RHR pump discharge cross connect valves.

. HV-8716A

. HV-8716B RD

• Opens CCP suction header to SIP suction header valves.

• HV-8924

. HV-8807A

. HV-8807A

. Opens RHR to CCP and SIP suction isolation valves.

• HV-8804A

• HV-8804B RD

• Restarts RHR, SI, and CCP (if necessary)

RO

• Isolates RWST to CCP suctions

• LV-ll2DandLV-112E

• Shuts RWST to SIP suction HV-8806

• Directs operator at shutdown panel to take local control of RWST to CCP suctions.

• HS-0112H/LV-112D

• HS-0112F/LV-112E.

RD I SS

• Checks for proper flow path from CNMT sumps to RCS Cold Legs.

• RHR supplying CCP suction header.

• One CCP injecting through the BIT

• RHR supplying SIP suction header.

• One SIP injecting into RCS Cold Legs RD

• Checks RWST level 10% (not)

SS

• Transitions back to procedure and step in effect (1901 0-C)

THE END

• THIS IS THE END OF THE SCENARIO!

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: I & 2 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

(Event 1) A loss of I 20V AC bus 1 CY1 A will occur requiring the crew to enter AOP-1 8032 section E for Loss of ICY1A. Once the plant has been stabilized, the RO will be required to place Excess Letdown in service per 13008, Excess Letdown (Event 2).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnosis loss of Vital Instrument Panel 1CYIA.

Symptoms I alarms:

. 12OVAC PNL 1CY1A TROUBLE

. INVERTER 1CD1 13 TROUBLE Indications:

. All channel Ill trip status lights (except CNMT HI-3 PRESS and RWST LO-LO LEVEL) lit.

SS Enters AOP-18032-1 section E for Loss of 1CY1A and directs crew to initiate the Continuous Actions Pages.

RO Checks HV-81 60 open (it will be shut)

. Shuts the letdown orifice isolations HV-8149A, B, and C

. Shuts the letdown isolation valves LV-459 and LV-460

. Controls charging and seal injection at 8 to 13 gpm.

. Maintains charging flow 10 gpm above seal injection.

. Places Excess Letdown in service per SOP-I 3008 (event 2)

RO Places Excess Letdown in service to the seal return header per 13008.

. Checks a charging pump is running.

. Checks closed HV-8098 Head Vent to Excess Letdown

. Verifies HIC-0123 flow controller is closed.

. Verifies RCP seal leakoffs open (HV-8100 and HV-81 12)

. Verifies HS-8143 Excess Ltdn to VCT in the VCT position.

. Verifies reactor power < 3562 MWt (may need to reduce power)

. Opens HV-8153 and HV-8154 Excess Ltdn Isolations.

. Records Pressure on P1-0124 Excess Ltdn Hx Outlet

. Records Temperature on Tl-122 Excess Ltdn Hx Outlet

. Opens HV-123 to establish Excess Letdown flow.

. Monitors P1-1 24 to limit to 50 psig above recorded pressure.

. Monitors TI-122 to limit temperature < 165 degrees F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: I & 2 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

(Event 1) A loss of 1 20V AC bus 1 CYIA will occur requiring the crew to enter AOP-1 8032 section E for Loss of ICYIA. Once the plant has been stabilized, the RO will be required to place Excess Letdown in service per 13008, Excess Letdown (Event 2).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Adjusts charging flow controller FIC-121 and seal injection flow controller HC-182 to maintain PRZR level at desired level.

SS Directs C & T to dispatch personnel to align the outlet of the Seal Water Hx to the VCT spray nozzle.

. Unlock and open 1-1 208-U6-1 04 Seal Water Hx to VCT Outlet

. Close 1-1 208-U6-1 06 Seal Water Hx Outlet to NCP Suction End of EVENT #2 RO The following actions are back in the AOP Loss of CY1A (event 1)

Restores PRZR level control

. Check LT-461 selected for control (its not)

RO Checks if PRZR Pressure Control selected to Channel 457 (its not).

RO Selects Defeat 432 on 1TS-412T T-AVG DEFEAT SEL.

RO Selects Defeat 431 on ITS-41 1 F DELTA T DEFEAT SEL.

RO I BOP Restores Tavg to Program value.

. Place ROD STOP BYPASS to BYPASS N43 position (BOP)

. Adjust rod position to restore Tavg to Tref (RO)

BOP Verifies SGBD isolation hand switches in CLOSE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: I & 2 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

(Event 1) A loss of 120V AC bus 1CY1A will occur requiring the crew to enter AOP-18032 section E for Loss of 1CYIA. Once the plant has been stabilized, the RD will be required to place Excess Letdown in service per 13008, Excess Letdown (Event 2).

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS I RD Verifies the following interlocks are in the required state for existing Unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in accordance with Technical Specifications:

. P-6, 3.3.1 EU 16a

. P-7, 3.3.1 EU 16b

. P-8, 3.3.1 FU 16c

. P-9, 3.3.1 FU 16d

. P-10 and input to P-7, 3.3.1 EU 16e

. P-13 3.3.1 FU 16f

. P-i 1 3.3.2 FU 8b SS / Performs other actions of AOP-1 8032-1 CREW

. Dispatches personnel to transfer 1CY1A to regulated transformer.

. Refers to Attachment E Table 1 for I & C loads for affected instrumentation

. Refers to Attachment E Table 2 for additional affected equipment.

SS Initiates AOP-1 8002 NIS for failed channel Ill NIS.

SS Refers to Technical Specifications

. 3.8.7 for Inverters

. 3.8.9 for Electrical Distribution END of AOP 18032 actions until inverter is repaired.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant at 83% with a reactor startup to 100% in progress. (1C20)

Pre load the following: PNL DWGS, Condensate Pump # 3 to STOP, PNL DWGS, COPS arming hand switch HV-8000H to BLOCK.

Place SIP B in PTL and place a red hold tag on the hand switch. Place SI Train B SSMP hand switch to Bypass.

Turnover: Storms are approaching from the Southwest and high winds are possible within the hour.

SI Pump B was tagged out yesterday at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> and is scheduled to be returned to service in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (TS 3.5.2). Condition A.

Heater Drain Pump # 1 is experiencing high vibrations. The system engineer, maintenance, and operations management are in the field evaluating the pump at this time.

Continue power ascent to 100% at no greater than 8% per hour.

Event MaIf. No. / Event Event Description No. Position Type*

ELI3C C Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Bus ICYIA 1 RO I BOP 18032-1 section E for Loss of 120V AC Vital Bus 1CV1A SRO (TS) TS 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip), 3.3.2, (ESFAS), 3.8.7 (Inverters), 3.8.9 (Distribution)

Excess N Places Excess Letdown In service per SOP-I 3008 2 Letdown RO CVI 3 I LT-1 12 VCT Level transmitter fails low.

3 RO AOP-1 8007-C, Section C for Loss of VCT Makeup Over ride C Boric Acid Transfer Pump # I trip during auto makeup.

3 RO AOP-18007-C, Section C for Loss of VCT Makeup SRO (TS) TRM 13.1.3 (Borated Water Source Flow Paths) INFO LCO MSOI1A I PT-507 Steam Header Pressure Instrument Fails Low

@ 0% 18001-C, section I for Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation (a new section)

BOP SGOI B @ C Steam Generator Tube Leak within normal charging capacity but> 5 gpm.

4%

18009-C section A for Steam Generator Tube Leakage RO Power R Power ramp from 85-90% to 80% using 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

6 Ramp Power reduction directed per 18009-C, SGTL due to leakage > 5 gallons per minute. Shut down within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

ALL C05B C Condensate Pump Trips with standby wont start requires manual Rx. Trip.

7 RO I BOP Crew will enter E-0 after manually tripping the reactor and transition to ES-0.1 to stabilize the plant 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft SGOI B @ M Steam Generator Tube Rupture on SG # 2 with loss of air to containment.

° Crew will manually actuate SI, eventually transition to 19030-C to isolate the Over ride SGTR. Due to loss of air to containment and a COPS ARM hand switch fail to 8 actuate, a PORV will be used to depressurize RCS to refill the PRZR.

9378A shut RD / BOP (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description VogDe-2007-301 Draft Voqtle 2007-301 Scenario # 3 (SGTR I Depressurize to Refill RCS with PORV)

Event 1 Loss of Inverter 1CDII3 resulting in loss of 12OVAC IE Vital Bus 1CY1A. This will result in a total loss of letdown flow due to the auto closure of HV-8160 (pipe break instrument) and require the RD to reduce charging flow I seal injection and place Excess Letdown into service. Letdown will be relieving to the PRT until isolated. CY1A wHl later be transferred from inverter supply to the regulated transformer at the crew direction.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Isolates letdown which is currently relieving to the PRT by closing the letdown orifices and letdown isolation valves.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Selects out Channel Ill on the Tave and Delta T defeat switches.

Technical Specifications: LCD 3.3.1, LCD 3.3.2, LCD 3.8.7, LCD 3.8.9 Event 2 Places excess letdown in service per SDP-1 3008.

Verifiable Action: (RD) Places the Excess Letdown system in service, using charging, seals, and Excess Letdown to control PRZR level.

Event 3 VCT level transmitter LT-112 will fail low resulting in CVCS auto makeup initiation.

Shortly after makeup initiation, Boric Acid Transfer Pump # 1 will trip resulting in a dilution requiring the operator to manually stop the makeup. Further makeup from the blender system will require manual operations by the RD.

Verifiable Action: (RD) Places HS 40001 B (VCT Makeup Control) to STOP.

Technical Specifications: TRM INFO LCD 13.1.3 (Borated Water Source Flow Paths)

Event 4 PT-507 Steam Header Pressure transmitter will fail low. The MFPT control system will see delta P as too high and start reducing speed of both MFPTs. The BOP will have to take manual control of the MFPTs speed master controller to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG levels. This will require an entry into ADP-18001-C, section I for Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation. NOTE: This is a relatively new AOP section for Vogtle.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Perform IDA and take manually control SG levels using the MFP Master Speed Controller. The BOP will have to manually control SC levels for the duration of the scenario.

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Event 5 A Steam Generator Tube Leak on SG # 2 within the capacity of the normal charging flow path but> 5 gpm will occur. This will require an entry into 18009-C, SG Tube Leakage.

The crew will determine the leak is> 5 gpm. AOP-1 8009-C will require a plant shutdown within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per AOP-18013-C, Rapid Down power.

Verifiable Action: (RO). Performs rough RCS inventory balance using charging to maintain PRZR level and determines leak is> 5 gpm.

Event 6 Perform rapid down power in accordance with AOP-1 8013-C.

Verifiable Action: (ALL) Power reduction. BOP will operate the main turbine and RD will operate control rods and the CVCS boration controls to control reactor power.

Event 7 Shortly after initiation of the rapid down power, Condensate Pump # 2 will trip with Condensate # 3 failing to start in either auto or manual. The crew will recognize the inability to maintain SG levels and perform a manual reactor trip. This will require entry into AOP-1 8016-C section B for Trip of a Condensate or Heater Drain Pump Verifiable Action: (BOP) Attempts manual start of Condensate Pump # 3 and attempts to maintain MFP suction pressure.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Perform a manual reactor trip.

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Event 8 The crew will transition directly from E-O to E-3 to mitigate the SGTR and identify and isolate the ruptured SG # 3. Instrument air valve to containment HV-9378A will fail shut on the SI and one PORV COPS arm switch will fail to work. This will require depressurization of the RCS to refill PRZR using a PORV.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs actions to isolate the ruptured steam generator.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Utilizes steam dumps to perform a rapid cool down of the RCS to ensure subcooling prior to RCS depressurization.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Use PRZR PORV-455 to depressurize the RCS to refill pressurizer.

Critical Task: Identifies SG # 2 as ruptured and performs isolation of SC # 2 to include:

• MSIVs and Bypasses

• MFIVs and Bypasses

• TDAFW and MDAFW isolations

• TDAFW Steam Supply HV-3019

• ARV Loop #2 set point at 7.73 (control at 1160 psig)

Critical Task; Selects proper CET temperature for cool down to ensure RCS subcooling (518 degrees F or 506 degrees depending on SG pressure at time of selection) and controlling RCS temperature less than the selected temperature.

Critical Task: Depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR using a PORV until termination criteria is met.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

LT-1 12 for VCT level will fail low iniating an auto makeup. Shortly after the makeup initiates, BA Transfer pump # 1 will trip resulting in a dilution to the VCT. The RO will stop the auto makeup and the SS will address Tech Specs (TRM) for the loss of BA Tranfer pump.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Diagnoses failure of LT-1 12 low:

Alarms:

. VCT HI I LO LEVEL alarm Indications:

. BA transfer pump # I auto starts.

. BA acid and makeup flow registering on blender.

RO Diagnosis trip of BA Transfer Pump # 1 Indications:

. BA transfer pump # 1 green and amber light on hand switch.

. BA acid flow not registering on blender meters.

RO Stops AUTO makeup by placing blender control switch to STOP on Makeup Control Switch 40001 B.

SS Enters AOP-1 8007 section C for Loss of VCT Makeup.

RO Stabilizes plant conditions:

. Reactor Power

. RCS Temperature

. PRZR Pressure RO Checks I performs the following:

. At least one Boric Acid Transfer Pump running

. Starts a Boric Acid Transfer Pump

. At least one Reactor Makeup Water Pump running

. VCT makeup valve alignment correct for selected mode.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

LT- 112 for VCT level will fail low iniating an auto makeup. Shortly after the makeup initiates, BA Transfer pump # I will trip resulting in a dilution to the VCT. The RO will stop the auto makeup and the SS will address Tech Specs (TRM) for the loss of BA Tranfer pump.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS/CREW Initiates the Continuous Actions Page.

CREW Checks VCT makeup restored.

SS Returns to procedure and step in effect. (UOP-1 2004 or AOP-1 8032)

SS Refers to TRM 13.1.3 for Borated Water Source Flow Paths - Operating (INFO LCO)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of I Event

Description:

PT-507 Steam Header Pressure Transmitter fails downscale low. This will result in MFPT controls seeing a high delta P and causes MFPT controls to start reducing the speed of both MFPTs. The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8001-C section I (new section) for Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation to mitigate the event.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnoses failure of PT-507 Steam Header Pressure transmitter PT-507:

Symptoms I alarms:

BOP /

• STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) FLOW MISMATCH CREW

• STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) HI I LO LVL DEVIATION Indications:

• PT-507 indicating low

• Unexplained steam/feed flow mismatch indication on all SGs.

BOP Performs IOAs of 18001 section I

• Checks steam and feed flows matched on all SGs.

• Takes manual control of MFPT speed controllers.

• Takes manual control of MFRVs as necessary.

SS Enters AOP-1 8001 section I for Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation BOP Maintains SG levels > 40% NR. (trip Rx and go to E-0 if cant maintain)

BOP Checks SIC-509A, B, and C operating properly (they are)

BOP Checks PT-507 operating properly (it is not)

• Places Steam Dumps in Steam Pressure Mode per 13601, Steam Generator and Main Steam System Operation.

SS Notifies I & C for repairs, notifies Operations Duty of AOP entry.

BOP Will have to control MFPT speed in manual for rest of scenario.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

A steam generator tube leak will occur requiring the crew to enter AOP-1 8009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leakage. The RO will use charging and letdown to determine a leak rate of> 5 gpm. This will require entry into AOP-180 13-C Rapid Down Power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses SG tube leak.

Symptoms I alarms:

. INTERMEDIATE AND HIGH RAD ALARMS Indications:

. RAD flashing red on IPC computer.

. RE-0019 and RE-0021 rad alarms

. RE-0724, RE-0810 rad alarms

. RE-i 2839 rad alarms SS I Enters AOP 18009-C Steam Generator Tube Leak and initiates the CREW Continuous Actions Pages.

RD Maintains PRZR level:

. Adjust charging flow as necessary.

. Checks PRZR level stable or rising.

CREW Attempts to identify the affected SG.

. Directs chemistry to identify the SG using 31 1 20-C, Chemistry SG Tube Leak Actions procedure.

. Check SG level indications stable or rising with relatively lower feed flow rate (cant tell at this time)

RD Maintains VCT level using manual makeup control (due to earlier LT-i i 2 failure)

RD Checks that leak rate is < 5 gpm as determined by charging (letdown +

Seal leak off) mismatch.

NDTE: Leak will be > 5 gpm.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

A steam generator tube leak will occur requiring the crew to enter AOP-1 8009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leakage. The RO will use charging and letdown to determine a leak rate of> 5 gpm. This will require entry into AOP-180 13-C Rapid Down Power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction to be in Mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of I Event

Description:

Crew initiates rapid down power per direction of AOP-1 8009 Steam Generator Tube leak due to leakage greater than 5 gpm. Crew will use AOP-180 13-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Down Power at Operations Management direction.

. Performs SHUTDOWN BRIEFING

. Initiates the Continuous Actions page.

RO I BOP

• Reduce Turbine load at a rate up to 5% minute:

• Maintains Tave within 3 degrees F of Tref using rods in manual or boration as necessary.

• Maintains reactor and turbine power matched.

• PRZR level and pressure maintained on program.

• SG levels maintained on program.

SS Notifies System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

NOTE Event will continue until adequate power maneuver completed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Condensate Pump # 2 trips during Rapid Power Reduction resulting in a Loss of SG levels. The AOP for Condensate Feed Water Malfunction may be briefly entered. The crew will be required to perform a manual reactor trip. The crew will transition to E-0 to stabilize the plant.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW I Diagnose trip of Condensate Pump # 2:

BOP Symptoms I alarms:

. STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) FLOW MISMATCH

. STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) HI I LO LVL DEVIATION

. 13.8 kV SWGR NM TROUBLE Indications:

. Condensate Pump # 2 green and amber light lit on hand switch.

BOP Attempts start of Condensate Pump # 3 using QMCB hand switch (it wont start)

SS May enter AOP-18016-C Condensate Feed Water Malfunction section B for Trip of Condensate or Heater Drain Pumps RD Performs a manual reactor trip due to imminent loss of SG NR levels.

SS Enters E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RD I BOP Performs lOAs of E-0

. Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

. Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

. Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

. Checks if SI actuated (RO)

SS Enters ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response CREW Performs actions of 19001-C to stabilize the plant.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Condensate Pump # 2 trips during Rapid Power Reduction resulting in a Loss of SG levels. The AOP for Condensate Feed Water Malfunction may be briefly entered. The crew will be required to perform a manual reactor trip. The crew will transition to E-O to stabilize the plant.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Manually actuates SI when unable to maintain PRZR level or pressure.

SS Transitions back to E-O to perform actions for Safety Injection.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO I BOP Performs lOAs of E-0

. Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

. Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

. Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

. Checks if SI actuated (RO)

SS I TEAM Initiates Foldout Page, Continuous Actions Page and RO and BOP Initial Actions Pages.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

. Checks CIA actuated per MLBs RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

. CCPs both running.

. SI Pumps running (SI B tagged out)

. RHR pumps both running.

. NCP tripped.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. CCW pumps two running per train.

. NSCW pumps two running per train.

. NSCW tower return bypass valves in auto.

. Containment coolers running in SLOW speed with cooler isolation valves open.

. Containment pressure remained < 21 .5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS flows:

. BIT Flow

. RCS pressure> 1625 psig.

RD Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. Checks ECCS valve alignment proper.

. Checks at least one ACCW pump running and starts one if necessary.

. Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

BOP Performs BOP Initial Operator Actions of E-0

. Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

. Checks NR SG levels> 10%, controls AFW flows.

. Checks if SLI is required and ensures MSIVs and Bypasses are closed.

. Verifies FWI (MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut)

. Verifies SGBD isolated and places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close.

. Verifies SGBD sample isolations closed.

. Verifies Diesel Generators running.

. Throttles AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR.

. Verifies both MFPT tripped.

. Checks Main Generator Output breakers open.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 3 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RD Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

CREW Takes actions of RNO step 8 to control RCS temperature.

RD Checks PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves all Closed.

RD Checks if RCPs should be stopped (not expected to)

BOP / SS Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 (not met)

SS / BOP Checks for SG Tubes intact.

. Directs chemistry to sample all SG one at a time for activity.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

. Main Steam Line Rad Monitors

. Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors

. Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors

. Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner.

SS Transitions to 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

SS / Initiates the following actions:

CREW

. Continuous Actions and Foldout Page

. CSFST Monitoring

. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

RD Maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 4 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks if RCPs should be stopped: (not expected to)

. CCP or SIP at least one running.

. RCS pressure < 1375 psig.

• Stop RCPs.

BOP Identifies Ruptured SG # 2

. Unexpected rise in SG # 2 level

. High radiation from any SG sample

. High radiation from any SG steam line.

. High radiation from any SG blow down line.

BOP Isolates flow from ruptured SG # 2 CRITICAL

• Adjusts ARV PV-3010 controller set point to 7.73 (for control STEP at 1160 psig)

• Checks at least one MDAFW capable of feeding SGs.

• Close TDAFW steam supply from SG # 2 (HV-3019)

• Verify SGBD isolation valves closed with HS in close position.

• Close loop # 2 MSIV and Bypass valves.

• Checks SG #2 level greater than 10% NR.

• Stops feed flow to SG # 2 (shut TDAFW & MDAFW throttle valves)

BOP Checks ruptured SG isolated from intact SGs.

• Checks ruptured SG # 2 steam line isolated.

• Check TDAFW steam supply to SG # 2 closed.

• Maintains ruptured SG isolated unless needed for cool down.

• Checks ruptured SG pressure > 290 psig.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 5 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO I BOP Checks if low steam line pressure SI / SLI should be blocked.

. Steam dumps AVAILABLE

. PRZR pressure < 2000 psig.

. High steam pressure rate alarms CLEAR Block low steam line pressure SI I SLI using the following:

. HS-40068

. HS-40069 RD I BOP Check if auto steam dump isolation should be BYPASSED.

. RCS temperature > 550 F.

IF, bypass is needed.

. Place steam dump controller PIC-507 to 0% demand.

. Transfer Steam Dumps to Steam Pressure Mode.

. Place HS-500A and 500B to BYPASS INTERLOCK position.

. Open Steam Dumps using PIC-507 as necessary.

BOP Raises intact SG levels prior to RCS cool down.

RD Checks at least 1 RCP is running.

SS Determines required core exit TC for cool down based on ruptured SG pressure. One of the following:

CRITIAL STEP

• SG #2 pressure between 1000 1099 = 506 F

• SG#2pressurebetweenlloo1199=518F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 6 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Initiates RCS cool down to selected CET temperature.

Part of

• Opens all available steam dumps by slowly raising demand on CRITICAL PIC-507.

STEP

• Maintains RCS cool down until < selected CET.

• Stops RCS cool down and maintains CETs < selected temperature.

• NOTE: crew may continue with other EOP actions during the RCS cool down.

BOP Checks intact SG levels.

• At least 1 SG > 10% NR.

• MaintainsSG levels 1065% NR.

• Checks intact SG levels, none rising uncontrolled.

RO Checks PRZR PORV and Block Valves

• Power available to PORV block valves.

• PRZRPORVs-CLOSED.

• PRZR PORV Block Valves At least I OPEN

• When RCS pressure > 2185 psig, ensure I block valve open.

CREW Reviews CAUTION for LOSP after SI reset and repositioning Phase A valves causing possible radiation problems in the plant.

RO Checks at least I RCP is running.

BOP Attempts to establish Instrument Air to Containment.

(NOTE: HV-9378A is failed shut after SI occurred)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 7 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks if RHR pumps should be stopped.

. RHR pumps running with suctions aligned to RWST (they are)

. RCS pressure > 300 psig (it is)

. Stops both RHR pumps RO Monitors RCS pressure to restart RHR pumps if < 300 psig.

BOP Checks if RCS cool down should be stopped (if not done previously)

BOP Checks ruptured SG # 2 pressure stable or rising (it should be)

RO Checks if RCS subcooling > 44 degrees F (it should be)

RO / SS Checks if RCS depressurization termination criteria is met (Should not be)

. RCS pressure> ruptured SG pressure (should not be)

. PRZR level > 9% (should be off scale low)

. RCS subcooling < 24 F ( should be more than this)

. PRZR level > 75% (should not be)

RO Checks Normal PRZR spray available (NO, due to loss of air)

RO Checks at least one PRZR PORV available (yes)

Checks at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve available (yes)

RO Depressurizes RCS using a PRZR PORV to refill the PRZR.

CRITICAL

• Arms at least one train of COPS and verifies block valve STEP opens.

• Opens one PRZR PORV.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 8 of 8 Event

Description:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring the crew to perform the actions of E-0 for SI and to transition to 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture to mitigate the event. During performance of E-3, Instrument Air valve HV-9378 will fail shut requiring the crew to use PRZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks if ANY of the following conditions are satisfied. BOTH of the following:

CRITICAL STEP

• RCS pressure < ruptured SG pressure

• PRZR level > 9%

OR

• RCS subcooling < 24 F OR

• PRZR level > 75%.

RO Terminates RCS depressurization.

• Closes PRZR PORV used for depressurization.

• Checks RCS pressure RISING RO Checks if ECCS flow should be terminated: (expected to be met)

• RCS subcooling > 24 F

• Secondary heat sink >570 gpm AFW OR

• At least one intact SG level > 10% NR

• RCS pressure stable or rising

• PRZR level > 9%

RO Stops both SIPs and all but one CCP.

THE END End of the scenario!

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant has been at 100% Power for three months following a refueling outage.

Pre load the following: Auto reactor trip failure (ESO1,) Trains A & B SI Auto failures (ESO8, ES16), CIA fails to actuate in auto or manual (ESI9A, ES19B), CVI fails to actuate in auto or manual (ES2OA, ES2OB).

NSCW Train B pumps fail to auto start (NSO7B, NSO7D, NSO7F). 3 control rods fail to fully insert or stuck out (RD1OK, RDI7II @18, RD17L @ 12)

Place SIP B in PTL and place a red hold tag on the hand switch. Place SI Train B SSMP hand switch to Bypass.

Turnover: Storms are approaching from the Southwest and high winds are possible within the hour.

SI Pump B was tagged out yesterday at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> and is scheduled to be returned to service in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (TS 3.5.2).

Heater Drain Pump # 1 is experiencing high vibrations, the system engineer, maintenance, and operations management are in the field evaluating the pump at this time.

Event Malf. No. / Event Event Description No. Position Type*

CVI8A C Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump Discharge line leak.

RD / BOP 17061-1, window F06 for Level C Leak Detected 1

SRO (TS) LCO 3.5.2 (ECCS), TRM 13.1.3 INFO (BA Flow Paths), TRM 13.1.5 (Charging Pumps)

RCO8C@ I NR Temperature Instrument Fails High (Thot) 100%

AOP-1 8001, section B for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature lnstr.

2 RD LCO 3.3.1, LCO 3.3.2 SRO (TS)

SGO5B @ I Steam Generator # 2 Steam Flow Instrument Fail Low.

0%

18001-C section G for Failure of Steam Generator Flow Instrument BOP RPO6B # C RCP # I seal on RCP # 2 fails to> 5.5 gpm (immediate shutdown per SOP) 4 16/0 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pumps section 4.2.1 Operation with seal abnormal.

RD RPO3B R Reactor Coolant Pump # 2 trips with failure of Reactor to auto trip requiring manual trip. 3 control rods will stick out requiring an emergency boration.

RD Crew will enter E-0 after manually tripping the reactor and transition to ES-0.1 to stabilize the plant.

RCO5B Medium size RCS LOCA requiring manual SI actuation, manual CIA and CVI ramp valve alignment.

M 6 Crew will enter E-0 after SI actuation, transition to E-1 RCS LOCA, and

° 0 0 eventually to ES-i .2 Post LOCA Cool Down and Depressurization.

ALL 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft ELO3 LOSP after SI reset on IBAO3, train B NSCW fails to auto start.

7 BOP C Crew should manually start NSCW train B after recognizing failure to start.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Voqtle 2007-301 Scenario #4 (RCS LOCA I Post LOCA CD & Depressurization)

Event 1 CCP A discharge line leak, this will be found by leak detection annunciators for Auxiliary Building Level C. The Emergency Boration flow path through HV-8104 will not be available.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Informs crew of COP A leak detection ZLBs illuminated.

Verifiable Action: (RO) The RD will manually isolate COP A to stop the leakage and place CCP A in PTL.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.5.2, TRM INFO LCO 13.1.3, TRM INFO LCD 13.1.5 Event 2 RCS Narrow Range Thot instrument fails high resulting in inward rod motion. The RD will place control rods in manual.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs IDA and places control rods in manual.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Selects out the failed channel on the Tavg I Delta T defeat switches.

Technical Specifications: LCD 3.3.1, LCD 3.3.2 Event 3 Steam Generator # 2 Steam Flow will fail low requiring the BOP to take manual control of the MFRV# 2 and MFPT Master Speed Controller. An entry into 18001-C, section G for Steam Generator Flow Instrument Failure will be required.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs IDA to take MFRV # 2 to manual and MFPT Master Speed Controller to manual and control SG levels.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Defeats the failed channel and selects an operable channel using the Steam Flow Selector switch.

Event 4 Reactor Coolant Pump # 2 seal leak off increases to abnormal range. The crew will enter SOP-i 3003 section 4.2.1 for Operation with a Seal Abnormality and evaluate continued RCP operation via a decision tree. The decision tree will require an immediate shutdown of the RCP.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Utilizes 13003-i decision tree to determine immediate shutdown of RCP.

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-301 Draft Event 5 Reactor Coolant Pump # 2 trips with failure of the reactor to trip ATWT. The RO will have to manually trip the reactor due to power> 48%. Three (3) control rods will fail to fully insert on the reactor trip requiring an emergency boration of the RCS.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs manual reactor from the A panel reactor trip hand switch.

2 n d Verifiable Action: (RO) Uses hand switch to attempt reactor trip when 3 rods not fully inserted is discovered.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Initiate an emergency boration of the RCS in response to the three (3) stuck rods.

Critical task: Manual reactor trip.

Critical Task: Initiation of Emergency Boration flow at a rate of> 30 gpm with charging flow > 42 gpm.

NOTE: If RWST flow path is used, alternate flow requirements must comply with those stated in SOP-i 3009, CVCS Makeup Control System to satisfy the task.

Event 6 While in ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, a medium size LOCA (1000 gpm) will ramp in over 120 seconds. The crew will manually actuate SI and return to E-0. While in E-0, it will be discovered CIA and CVI have failed to manually actuate. The QMCB hand switches will also fail to actuate CIA / CVI and require manual alignment of valves and dampers by the RO! BOP.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Manual actuation of SI in response to lowering PRZR level and RCS / PRZR pressure.

Verifiable Action: (RO I BOP) Manual alignment of CIA! CVI valves and dampers which fail to align automatically or with hand switch actuation.

Event 7 While in 19012-C, Post LOCA Cool down and Depressurization, Otfsite Power will be lost to 4160 1E bus BAO3 with the DG1B re-energizing the bus. However, NSCW cooling water pumps will fail to auto start requiring a manual start by the crew.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Manual start of Train B NSCW pumps which failed to auto start.

Critical Task: Manual start of Train B NSCW pumps to maintain cooling water supply to the Train B DG and to the Train B ECCS cooling water pumps.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of I Event No.: I Event

Description:

Train A CCP discharge line break. This will require the crew to isolate the suction and discharge to CCP A to stop the leak. The QPCP leak detection annunciators will alert the crew to the leak and direct isolation of the leak. This will render CCP A inoperable for ECCS (opposite train from SIP B) requiring Tech Spec entry into 3.5.2 for ECCS and TRM for Borated Water Source Flow Paths and Charging Pumps.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnoses leak in CCP A pump room:

BOP Symptoms I alarms:

. LEVEL C LEAK DETECTION alarm on QPCP Indications:

. CCP A leak detection status light lit.

. Report back from field that CCP A has leak in the pump room between the pump and the discharge isolation valve.

RO / SS Isolates leak on CCP A.

. Place CCP A in Pull-to-lock

. Closes CCP A suction isolation valve.

. Closes CCP A discharge isolation valve.

. Observe leak stops (VCT level best indication)

SS Initiates Technical Specifications for inoperable CCP.

. LCO 3.5.2 condition A for ECCS

. TRM 13.1 .3 Borated Water Source Flow Paths Operating (INFO LCO)

. TRM 13.1 .5 Charging Pumps Operating (INFO LCO)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument Fails High (Thot) on loop # 3. This will require the RO to perform IOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8001 section B for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnose NR Temperature Instrument Failure:

Symptoms / alarms:

. RC LOOP DELTA T I AUCT DELTA T HI-LO DEV RO

• RCLOOPTAVGIAUCTTAVGHI-LODEV

• TAVG TREE DEVIATION

• AUCTTAVG HIGH Indications:

• Rapid inward control rod motion.

• Loop 3 Tavg I Delta T indication deviating from other loops.

RO IOA Takes manual control of control rods to stop rapid insertion.

SS Initiates AOP 18002-C, Section B to direct crew actions.

RO Restores Tavg to program, if required.

RO Selects out the failed channel:

• Selects affected loop on TS-41 2T Tavg Defeat switch.

• Selects affected loop on TS-41 1 F Delta T Defeat switch.

RO Places control rod bank selector back in AUTO if desired.

SS Notifies I & C to initiate repairs, notifies Operations Duty of AOP entry.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument Fails High (Thot) on ioop # 3. This will require the RO to perform IQAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8001 section B for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Tern perature Instrumentation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Identifies Tech Spec requirements to trip the affected bistable listed in table Bi within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the channel failure.

. TS 3.3.1, EU 6, Condition E

. TS 3.3.1, EU 7, Condition E

. TS 3.3.2, FU 5b, Condition I SS Initiates the Continuous Actions Pages.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of I Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Steam Generator # 2 Controlling Steam Flow instrument fails LOW. This will require entry into AOP-1 8001 section G for Failure of SG Flow Instrument and selection of an unaffected SG flow channel. The BOP will have IOAs to take manual control of MFRV # 2 and MFPT speed control.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Diagnose failure of SG Steam Flow instrument:

Symptoms I alarms I indications:

. STM GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) FLOW MISMATCH

. Any unexplained steam I feed flow mismatch indication BOP Performs IOA of 18001 section G for Steam Flow Instrument Failure:

. Checks steam and feed flows matched on all SGs (they arent)

. Take manual control of MFRV # 2

. Take manual control of MFPT(s) speed control.

SS Enters AOP-1 8001 section G for Steam Flow Instrument Failure.

BOP Selects an unaffected channel for control.

BOP Returns feed flow and MFP(s) speed controls to AUTO.

SS I Initiates the Continuous Actions Page.

CREW BOP Checks SG level control maintains NR level at 65% in AUTO.

SS Notifies I & C to initiate repairs, notifies Operation Duty of AOP entry.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of I Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Failure of RCP # 1 seal on RCP # 2 to > 5.5 gpm requiring an immediate shutdown of the RCP in accordance with SOP-i 3003 RCP Operations Seal Abnormality Decision Tree. The crew will be required to perform a reactor trip since power> 15%.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnosis failure of RCP # 2 (seal # 1):

Symptoms / alarms:

. RCP 2 CONTROLLED LKG HI/LO FLOW

. RCP 2 NO. 2 SEAL LKOF HI FLOW Indications:

. RCP 2 seal leak off high range reading > 5.5 gpm

. Excess letdown temperature rising (possibly)

. Changes in VCT level or pressure

. RCP 2 operating parameters changing (temperatures)

CREW Trends RCP computer data points listed in Table 2 on the IPC computer.

RO / SS Evaluates monitored indications on Figure 1, RCP Seal Abnormalities Tree. Below is projected flow path through the tree.

. Seal injection > 8 gpm (yes)

. Seal injection < 135 degrees F (yes)

. NO. 1 seal leak off within figure 2 Normal delta P range (no)

. NO. 1 seal leak off> 5.5 gpm (yes)

. Immediately stop RCP per step 4.2.1 .4 SS Directs trip of reactor and shutdown of RCP # 2

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2005-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant pump # 2 trips prior to action by the crew with failure of the reactor to auto trip. The RO will be required to manually trip the reactor. Once the reactor is tripped the crew will transition to E-O and to E-O.1 Reactor Trip Response to stablilize the plant.

Three (3) control rods will be stuck out requiring an emergency boration of the RCS by 462 ppm.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnosis RCP # 2 trip I ATWT:

Symptoms I alarms:

. RCP SHAFT VIBRATION ALERT alarm

. RCP FRAME VIBRATION ALERT alarm CREW

• RCP SHAFT HI VIBRATION alarm

. RCP FRAME HI VIBRATION alarm

. RCP TRIP alarm

. RCP LOOP 2 LO FLOW ALERT alarm st 1

(

• LOW FLOW I RCP I P8 PERMISSIVE REACTOR TRIP out)

Indications:

• RCP # 2 green and amber hand switch lights lit.

• RCP loop 2 flow indicators lowering

• Reactor trip breakers closed.

RO CRITICAL Performs a manual reactor trip due to failure of auto Rx. Trip.

STEP SS Enters E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO I BOP Performs IOAs of E-O

• Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

• Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

• Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

• Checks if SI actuated (RO)

SS Transitions to 19001, ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2005-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant pump # 2 trips prior to action by the crew with failure of the reactor to auto trip. The RO wifl be required to manually trip the reactor. Once the reactor is tripped the crew will transition to E-0 and to E-0.1 Reactor Trip Response to stablilize the plant.

Three (3) control rods will be stuck out requiring an emergency boration of the RCS by 462 ppm.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates the following:

. Continuous Actions and Foldout Page

. CSFST monitoring

. Reviews step for SI actuation to transition back to E-0 BOP Performs actions to limit RCS cool down:

. Verifies AFW flow to the SGs.

. Trips both MFP5.

. Checks SC NR levels at least one> 10%.

. Throttles AFW flow as necessary.

. Verifies SGBD isolation valves closed with hand switches in closed position.

RO Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 using Tavg with RCPs running.

BOP Checks FW status:

. RCS average temperature < 564 degrees F

. Verifies MFIVs, BFIVs, MFRVs, BFRVs all shut.

BOP Checks total feed flow capability to SGs greater than 570 gpm available.

RO Checks all Rods Fully inserted (theyre not, 3 stuck out)

CRITICAL

• Initiates an emergency boration to borate the RCS by 462 STEP ppm for 3 rods not fully inserted per 13009, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System.

• Initiates actions to have a Shutdown Margin performed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RD will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 19010-C, E-1 .0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1 .2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Recognizes degrading plant conditions:

. High radiation alarms in Containment

. Lowering Pressurizer level and pressure indications and alarms

. High Containment moisture and temperature alarms RD Raises charging flow to attempt to maintain PRZR level and pressure.

RD Manually actuates safety injection.

SS Transitions back to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RD I BOP Performs IDAs of E-0

. Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

. Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

. Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

. Checks if SI actuated (RD)

SS I TEAM Initiates Foldout Page, Continuous Actions Page and RD and BOP Initial Actions Pages.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 2 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RO will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 19010-C, E-1 .0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. Checks both trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs. If not performed previously actuates SI.

. Checks CIA actuated per MLBs (it wont be).

. Informs SS and manually actuates CIA.

. Informs SS of CIA failure and initiates manual alignment.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

. CCPs both running.

. SI Pumps running (SI B tagged out)

. RHR pumps both running.

. NCPtripped.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. CCW pumps two running per train.

. NSCW pumps two running per train.

. NSCW tower return bypass valves in auto.

. Containment coolers running in SLOW speed with cooler isolation valves open.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. Observes CVI valves and dampers NOT closed per MLBs.

. Informs SS and initiates manual closure of valves and dampers.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. Checks containment pressure has remained < 21 .5 psig.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 3 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RO will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 19010-C, E-1 .0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS flows:

. BIT Flow

. RCS pressure < 1625 psig.

. Slpumpflow

. RCS pressure > 300 psig RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS valve alignment proper per MLBs.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ACCW pumps at least one running.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Adjusts RCP seal injection to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 4 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RO will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 19010-C, E-1 .0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1 .2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Performs BOP Initial Operator Actions of E-0

. Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

. Checks NR SC levels> 10%, controls AFW flows.

. Checks if SLI is required and ensures MSIVs and Bypasses are closed.

. Verifies FWI (MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut)

. Verifies SGBD isolated and places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close.

. Verifies SGBD sample isolations closed.

. Verifies Diesel Generators running.

. Throttles AFW flow to control SC levels 10 65% NR.

. Verifies both MFPT tripped.

. Checks Main Generator Output breakers open.

BOP Performs BOP Initial Operator Actions of E-0

. Assists RO with alignment of CIA and CVI valves and dampers located on the back panels.

RO Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

CREW Takes actions of RNO step 8 to control RCS temperature.

RO Checks PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves all Closed.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 5 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RO will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 19010-C, E-1 .0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1 .2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks if RCPs should be stopped.

. Checks at least one CCP or SIP running.

. RCS pressure < 1375 psig.

. Stops RCPs BOP I SS Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 (not met)

SS I BOP Checks for SG Tubes intact.

. Directs chemistry to sample all SG one at a time for activity.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

. Main Steam Line Rad Monitors

. Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors

. Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors

. Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner.

SS I RO Checks for RCS intact inside containment.

. Containment radiation normal (it is not)

. Containment pressure normal (it is not)

. Containment Emergency Sump level normal (it is not)

SS Transitions to 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 6 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RO will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 19010-C, E-1.0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates the Continuous Actions and Foldout Pages.

SS Initiates CSFST monitoring and implements EPIPs.

RO Maintains seal injection to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

RO Checks RCPs stopped and at least one ACCW pump is running.

BOP Places Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service per SOP-i 31 30.

BOP Checks SG secondary pressure boundaries intact.

BOP Checks intact SG levels 10 65% NR, controls AFW, and checks for any ruptured SG.

RO Checks PORV and Block valve status, check CL temperatures.

RO Checks ECCS termination criteria (not met)

RO Checks if containment spray should be stopped (not met)

TEAM Reviews step addressing LOSP after SI reset to restart equipment.

BOP Checks if DGs should be stopped, directs OSA operator to shutdown the DGs per 131 45-1, Diesel Generators.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 7 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RO will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 1901 0-C, E-1 .0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1 .2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks Cold Leg recirculation capability.

. Power to both HV-881 1A and HV-881 1 B

. Power to RHR pumps A and B

. Power to HV-8809A and HV-8809B

. RHR Hx A and B OPERABLE BOP Checks auxiliary building leak detection alarms and plant vent radiogas.

TEAM Directs Chemistry to obtain samples for boron, pH, radioactivity from the RCS and both Containment Emergency Sum ps, etc.

TEAM Evaluate plant status.

. Secure unnecessary equipment.

. Isolate NSCW corrosion monitor racks after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

. Consult TSC for additional actions and to repair additional equipment required to mitigate the event.

SS I TEAM Checks for transition criteria met for 1901 2-C, Post LOCA Cool down and Depressurization. (met)

SS Transitions to 19012-C, Post LOCA Cool down and Depressurization.

TEAM Reviews CAUTION addressing LOSP after SI reset to restart equipment.

Reviews CAUTION addressing realignment of CIA valves may cause radiation problems throughout the plant.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 8 of 8 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A medium LOCA develops inside Containment. PRZR level and pressure will begin to lower faster than the capacity of the normal charging system. The RO will be required to manually actuate SI as auto SI will not work. In addition, CIA and CVI will fail to auto or manual actuate.

This will require manual closure of CIA and CVI valves and dampers. The crew will return to E-0, transition eventually to 19010-C, E-1 .0 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. Once 19010-C is completed, the crew will transition to 19012-C, E-1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Resets SI RO Resets CIA BOP Establishes instrument air to containment.

. Checks air pressure> 100 psig.

. Open HV-9378.

. Verifies PRZR spray valves operating as required.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of I Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

A Loss of RAT lB will occur resulting in an LOSP to 4160 1E bus 1BAO3. The DG output breaker will close resulting in re-energization of the bus. On the sequencing, the Train B NSCW pumps will fail to auto start requiring a manual start by the crew to prevent losing cooling water to the DG and Train B safety related ECCS pumps required for the LOCA. Once the crew has re-started the NSCW pumps manually, the scenrario will end.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses loss of RAT 1 B feed to I BAO3:

Indications I alarms / symptoms:

. Various electrical distribution alarms.

. Control room lights go dim and then re-energize.

. DG1B output breaker closing and LOSP sequence running.

RO Restarts RHR pump B (not critical as RCS pressure is higher)

BOP I Diagnoses failure of NSCW pumps to auto start:

CREW Indications / alarms I symptoms:

. NSCW pump green lights illuminated on Train B

. ZLBs for NSCW Train B discharge valves indicate closed (pump start interlock met)

. NSCW flows and discharge pressure reading 0 (zero)

. DG high temperature alarms if NSCW not started promptly.

BOP Starts two Train B NSCW pumps and verifies proper operation.

CRITICAL

• NSCW discharge pressure, supply and return flows normal.

STEP END This is the end of the scenario!

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-301 Draft Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant has been at 100% Power for three months following a refueling outage.

Pre load the following: Failure of automatic SLI (ESIO, ESI I), failure of automatic and manual SI (ES1 6, ES1 7)

MD AFW pump B shaft shear AFO2B.

Place SIP B in PTL, place a red hold tag on the hand switch. Place SI Train B SSMP hand switch to Bypass.

Turnover: Storms are approaching from the Southwest and high winds are possible within the hour.

SI Pump B was tagged out yesterday at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> and is scheduled to be returned to service in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (TS 3.5.2).

Heater Drain Pump # 1 is experiencing high vibrations. The system engineer, maintenance, and operations management are in the field evaluating the pump at this time.

Event MaIf. No. / Event Event Description No. Position Type*

Fill SI N Fill Safety Injection Accumulator # 3, level low due to sample valve left open.

Accum SOP-i 31 50-1, Safety Injection System section 4.2.1 for Filling Accumulator at 1

BOP Normal RCS Pressure.

SRO (TS) TS 3.5.1 (ECCS Accumulators) is cleared during this evolution.

PRO3A @ I Controlling PRZR level instrument LT-459 fails high.

i00/o 18001-C, Section D Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation 2

RO TS 3.3.1 (Rx. Trip)

SRO (TS)

ELO2 C Loss of RAT IA (Offsite Power) with DGIA tripping on over speed.

ELOIA AOP-18031, section Afor Loss of 4160 IE Bus with DG Failing to Tie RO / BOP TS 3.8.1 (AC Sources)

SRO (TS)

FWO2D @ I Controlling FW Flow Channel on Loop # 4 SG fails high 100%

18001-C section G for Failure of Steam Generator Flow Instrumentation BOP Power R Power ramp from 100% to 90% to remove HOP # 1 from service.

Ramp AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

ALL FWO6A @ M Feed water Line Break on SG # I ORC outside FWI valves.

0-25%

Crew will enter E-0 after manually tripping the reactor and SI will actuate on 6 over 50 Low PRZR pressure. The crew will transition to E-2 to isolate the faulted SO.

seconds ALL

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft ACO2B C ACCW Pump # 2 trips resulting in a loss of RCP cooling.

RO Crew trips RCP before 10 minutes elapse or after exceeding RCP trip limits.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario #5 (Feed Water Line Break IRC I Loss of ACCW)

Event 1 Crew assumes shift with SI Accumulator # 3 pressure of < 617 psig (Tech Spec limit).

Pressure low due to Chemistry inadvertently left sample valve open causing level to lower along with pressure. This happened just prior to turnover, direct crew to restore accumulator # 3s pressure to normal. Crew will restore using SOP-i 3105-1 SI system.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Manual start of SIP A and manipulate appropriate SI system valves to restore Accumulator # 3 pressure to greater than the Tech Spec limit.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.5.1 to be cleared.

Event 2 Controlling PRZR level channel LT-459 will fail high resulting in an automatic reduction of charging flow via FV-0121. This will require entry into AOP-i800i-C, section D for Failure of PRZR level instrumentation.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Takes manual control of charging flow control valve FV-Oi2i to restore charging flow to normal.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Selects out the failed channel.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.3.1 Event 3 Loss of RAT A the offsite source to 1E 4160 bus AAO2. DG1A will briefly start and trip on over speed resulting in a complete loss of power to the bus. This will require entry into AOP-i 8031-1 section A for Loss of 4160 1 E Emergency Bus will DG Failing to Tie.

Verifiable Action: (ALL) Restore reactor power to < 100%.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Throttle TDAFW pump to control SG levels and reactor power.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.8.1 and list in Attachment A of 18031.

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-301 Draft Event 4 Controlling feed water flow channel fails high. This will result in underfeed of affected SG and also affects MFPT Master Speed Controller. This will require entry into AOP-18001 section G for Failure of Steam Generator Flow Instrumentation.

Verifiable Action: (BOP). Takes manual control of MFPT Master Speed Controller and SG # 4 MFRV to control SG levels. Select out the failed channel.

Event 5 Management request rapid power descent to 90% to remove HDP # 1 from service as a safety concern.

Verifiable Action: (ALL) Power reduction. BOP will operate the main turbine and RO will operate control rods and the CVCS boration controls.

Event 6 Feed water line break IRC on SG # 1. This will result in either a manual reactor trip by the crew or an automatic reactor trip on SG # 1 Lo-Lo level. On the reactor trip, an SI actuation signal will soon be received on Hi-i containment pressure of 3.8 psig.

However, automatic SI and manual SI will not actuate. This will require the crew to manual start ECCS pumps and align ECCS valves. CIA! CVI will actuate if the crew uses the actuation hand switches. Automatic isolation of the main steam lines will also fail to actuate requiring manual actions by the crew.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs a manual reactor trip as SG levels lower Verifiable Action: (RO) Manual start of Train B ECCS pumps and aligns valves.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Manual start of two (2) Train B CCW pumps.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Manual actuation of CIA I CVI.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Manual steam line isolation actuation.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Raises TDAFW speed or opens isolation valves to establish auxiliary feed water flow.

Critical Task: Manual start of CCP B and opening of BIT outlet isolation HV 8801B.

Critical Task: Manual SLI to limit blow down to one SG to prevent challenge to Containment Barrier.

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-301 Draft Event 7 ACCW pump # 2 will trip just after entry into E-2 resulting in a loss of cooling to the RCPs. The crew should trip the RCPs prior to 10 minutes or immediately (within 1 minute) of receipt of any RCP immediate trip criteria parameter. This will be a chance for the SRO to prioritize crew actions between faulted SG and ACCW pump trip.

Verifiable Action: (RO). Manually trips RCP on loss of ACCW.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Manual isolation of faulted SG # 1.

Critical task: Manual isolation of faulted SG #1. This includes direction to plant personnel to locally isolate the de-energized AFW valve to SG # 1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event NoV: I Event

Description:

Fill Safety Injection accumulator # 3. Pressure is low due to chemistry sample valve inadvertently left open just prior to turnover. The crew will restore pressure by filling the accumulator using SOP-I 3105-1 for Safety Injection.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO / BOP Verifies containment and RWST parameters appropriate for filling the accumulators.

. Containment temperature > 72 degrees F on QMCB TI-2563 or IPC point UT2501.

. RWST temperature > or = to 44 degrees F as indicated on QPCP TIS-1 0980.

BOP Verifies open HV-8813 SIP COMMON MINIFLOW.

BOP Relieves Safety Injection header pressure by performing the following:

. Opens HV-8871 SIS CHECK VALVE TEST CNMT ISO VALVE.

. Opens HV-8964 SIS CHECK VALVE TEST CNMT ISO VALVE.

BOP Verifies SIP A MINIFLOW HV-8814 is open.

BOP Starts SIP A using HS-0998A BOP Closes HV-8964, SIS CHECK VALVE TEST CNMT ISO VALVE.

BOP Opens HV-8888 ACCUM FILL ISO VALVE.

BOP Opens HV-9978C ACCUM 3 WTR FILL VLV.

BOP Closes HV-9978C ACCUM 3 WTR FILL VLV when desired level and pressure is reached.

BOP

• Closes HV-8871 (IV required)

• Closes HV-8888 (IV required)

• Stops SIP A using HS-0998A (IV required)

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: I Event

Description:

Fill Safety Injection accumulator # 3. Pressure is low due to chemistry sample valve inadvertently left open just prior to turnover. The crew will restore pressure by filling the accumulator using SOP-i 31 05-1 for Safety Injection.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Notifies chemistry to sample the accumulator as required.

BOP Initiates relief of Safety Injection Header pressure by performing the following:

. Opens HV-8871 SIS CHECK VALVE TEST CNMT ISO valve.

. Opens HV-8823 SIS CL INJ TEST LINE VLV

. Cycles HV-8964 SIS CHECK VALVE TEST CNMT ISO VALVE.

. Closes HV-8871 (IV required)

. Closes HV-8823 (IV required)

NOTE: This header pressure takes a long time to relieve, the scenario should move on at this point.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Pressurizer level controlling channel LT-459 will fail high resulting in an automatic reduction of charging flow. The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8001 section D to address the event. Flow can quickly be restored by taking manual control of FV-121 to adjust output to return flow to normal.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Diagnoses PR Level channel failure:

Symptoms I alarms:

. PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON.

. PRZR HI LEVEL ALARM

. PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT

. RCP SEAL INJ LO FLOW Indications:

• Charging flow lowering as read on Fl-i 21.

. RCP seal injection flows lowering.

. Letdown flashing (possibly)

SS Enters AOP-1800i section D for Failure of PRZR Level Instrumentation.

RO Checks PRZR level trending to program level (it wont be) and performs actions of RNO.

. Adjust charging flow to prevent letdown from flashing OR

. Isolates letdown.

RO Maintains seal injection flow to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

RO Selects an unaffected channel on LS-459D PRZR LVL CNTL SELECT.

. 461 I 460 position should be selected.

RO Selects same channel on LS-459E PRZR LVL REC SEL as selected on LS-459D. (this should be channel 461)

RO Restores letdown flow if required per SOP-i 3006, CVCS.

Form ES-D-2 Actions Required Operator Appendix D Page 2 of 2 1 Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 2007-30 Event No.: 2 ulting in an el co ntr oll ing ch an ne l LT-459 will fail high res section D to Pressurizer lev 1 Event

Description:

ed to enter AOP-1800 n of ch arg ing flo w. Th e crew will be requir contr ol of FV -1 21 to adjust automatic reductio ick ly be res tor ed by taking manual ow can qu address the event. Fl flo w to normal.

output to return Behavior Applicants Action or Time Position vice. (not required) if PR ZR he ate rs sh ould be returned to ser RO Checks ntrol to AUTO.

RO Returns PRZR level co by auto control.

maintained at program RO Checks PRZR level is ty of AOP entry.

C to ini tia te rep air s, notifies Operations Du SS Notifies I &

within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the t to trip the affected bistables Identi fie s req uir em en ts of the following TS:

SS an ne l fai lur e to co mp ly with the requiremen ch

. Tech Spec 3.3.1, FU 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RAT IA (offsite source) will trip with DG1A tripping on overspeed during start. This will result in 4160 1 E bus AAO2 being de-energized. The crew will be required to enter AOP-l 8031 section A to address the loss of the 1 E bus. Prompt action will have to be taken to address TDAFW pump start and reactor power rise due to cold FW from AFW.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnoses loss of IE electrical bus 1AAO2:

CREW Symptoms I alarms I indications:

. Various plant alarms associated with Train A

. DG1A start and subsequent trip.

. DGIA OVERSPEED TRIP alarm.

. TDAFW pump auto start.

SS Enters AOP-1 8031 and eventually transitions to section A for Loss of Power With DC Failing To Tie To Bus.

RO Checks reactor power less than 100% on the following indications:

. UA-1 1 18 less than or equal to 3565 MWT.

. PR NIS less than or equal to 100%

. Delta T less than or equal to 100%.

BOP Performs the following actions to lower power.

. Reduces TDAFW speed to not less than 1535 rpm.

. Throttles TDAFW pump discharge valves.

. Reduces turbine load as necessary.

SS Transitions to 18031 section A due to DGIA has tripped on overspeed.

BOP Verifies two NSCW pumps running on Train B.

RO Verifies either an NCP or CCP is running. Performs RNO to isolate letdown since NCP will be de-energized.

Initiates actions per 13006, CVCS to place a CCP in service and to restore letdown.

RO I BOP Verifies two CCW pumps running on Train B.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RAT 1A (offsite source) will trip with DGIA tripping on overspeed during start. This will result in 4160 1 E bus AAO2 being de-energized. The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8031 section A to address the loss of the I E bus. Prompt action will have to be taken to address TDAFW pump start and reactor power rise due to cold FW from AFW.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks RHR pump status (not required)

SS I Initiates the Continuous Actions Page.

CREW BOP Checks AFW status needed to maintain SG levels. (not required).

RO Verifies ACCW pump B running.

BOP Verifies four containment coolers Train B running in high speed per 13120-C, Containment Building Cooling System.

BOP Verifies two Train B CRDM fans running.

BOP Verifies reactor cavity cooling unit Train B is running.

CREW Verifies SFP cooling pump on Train B running.

BOP Verifies Train B class 1 E 480V load centers energized.

. BBO6

. BBO7

. BB16

. NBIO BOP Verifies Train B MCCs no trouble alarms present.

SS Directs propping open of Unit I Train A Control Building doors.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RAT 1A (offsite source) will trip with DG1A tripping on overspeed during start. This will result in 4160 1 E bus AAO2 being de-energized. The crew will be required to enter AOP-1 8031 section A to address the loss of the 1 E bus. Prompt action will have to be taken to address TDAFW pump start and reactor power rise due to cold FW from AFW.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates the following actions:

. 14230, AC Source Verification

. Verify SAT energized per 1341 8-C, Standby Auxiliary Transformer RO Verify DRPI energized.

BOP Checks DC bus loads, battery amps less than the following limits.

. AD1B300amps

. BD1B300amps

. CD1Biooamps

. DD1B - 80 amps Monitors all 1 E battery bus voltages remain > 1 05V DC.

RO Checks reactor makeup water system status.

. Train B Boric Acid Transfer Pump running or in auto.

. Unaffected Reactor Makeup Water Pump running or in auto.

BOP Verifies battery charger in service for non-i E batteries.

. ND1

. ND2

. ND3A

. ND3B BOP Transfers any de-energized NYS, NYRS, and NYR buses to the alternate sources per 13432-1, 1 20V AC NON-I E Instrumentation Electrical Distribution System CREW Directs transfer of control room emergency lighting for Train A to Unit 2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RAT 1A (offsite source) will trip with DG1A tripping on overspeed during start. This will result in 4160 1E bus AAO2 being de-energized. The crew will be required to enter AOP-18031 section Ato address the loss of the 1E bus. Prompt action will have to be taken to address TDAFW pump start and reactor power rise due to cold FW from AFW.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates applicable Technical Specification requirements listed in Attachment A.

. LCO 3.8.1, Condition A and B (AC Sources)

. LCO 3.7.5 Conditions B and C (Auxiliary Feed water)

SS Initiates an investigation and repair for the loss of power.

Notifies Operations Duty of the AOP entry.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2005-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of I Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Controlling feed water flow channel for SG #4 will fail high resulting in MFRV throttling shut and underfeed ing SG # 4. MFPT speed control will also be affected. The crew will be required to perform lOAs of 18001-C section G for SG Flow Instrumentation Failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Diagnoses failure of SG # 4 controlling feed flow instrument:

Symptoms / alarms / indications:

. STM GEN 4 FLOW MISMATCH

. Any unexplained steam / feed flow mismatch indication.

BOP Performs IOA of AOP-1 8001 section B.

. Checks steam and feed flows matched on all SGs (not)

Performs RNO of IOA.

. Takes manual control of MFRV # 4

. Takes manual control of MFP speed.

BOP Selects an unaffected channel for control.

BOP Returns feed flow and MFP(s) speed controls to auto.

SS / Initiates the Continuous Actions Pages.

CREW SS Notifies I & C to initiate repairs, notifies Operations Duty of AOP entry.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2005-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of I Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Power ramp to 90% to remove HDP # 1 from service. The Operations Manager will direct the crew to reduce power to 90% within 15 minutes due to HDP # 1 vibration increasing and a possible personnel safety hazard. The crew will enter AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Power Reduction to lower power to 90%.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Down Power at Operations Management direction.

. Performs SHUTDOWN BRIEFING

. Initiates the Continuous Actions page.

RO I BOP

• Reduce Turbine load at a rate up to 5% minute:

• Maintains Tave within 3 degrees F of Tref using rods in manual or boration as necessary.

• Maintains reactor and turbine power matched.

• PRZR level and pressure maintained on program.

• SG levels maintained on program.

SS Notifies System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

NOTE Event will continue until adequate power maneuver completed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A feed water line break on SG # I ORC will occur outside the FWI valves. The crew will enter E-O after tripping the reactor and SI will not actuate automatically or from the manual hand switches. This will require the crew to manually start ECCS pumps and align ECCS valves. CIA and CVI actuation will not occur due to auto SI failure but can be actuated using the QMCB hand switches. SLI will not occur in auto requiring the crew to intiated a manual SLI. The crew will eventually transition to E-2 to isolate SG # 1.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Recognizes degrading plant conditions:

. FW flow higher than steam flow with SG # 1 level lowering rapidly.

. Various SG # I feed flow, steam flow and level alarms.

RO Manually trips the reactor using the QMCB hand switches.

SS Enters E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO I BOP Performs lOAs of E-O

. Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

. Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

. Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

. Checks if SI actuated (RO)

SS I TEAM Initiates Foldout Page, Continuous Actions Page and RO and BOP Initial Actions Pages.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

. Checks both trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs. If not performed previously attempts manual SI actuation.

. Checks CIA actuated per MLBs (it wont be).

. Informs SS and manually actuates CIA.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A feed water line break on SG # 1 ORC will occur outside the FWI valves. The crew will enter E-O after tripping the reactor and SI will not actuate automatically or from the manual hand switches. This will require the crew to manually start ECCS pumps and align ECCS valves. CIA and CVI actuation will not occur due to auto SI failure but can be actuated using the QMCB hand switches. SLI will not occur in auto requiring the crew to intiated a manual SLI. The crew will eventually transition to E-2 to isolate SG # 1.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

Part of CRITCAL

• CCPs NOT running, informs SS.

STEP

• Places alternate mini flow valve for CCP B to Enable PTL.

st 1

(

part)

• Starts CCP B to achieve high head ECCS flow.

• SI Pumps NOT running (SI B tagged out)

• RHR pumps NOT running

• Informs SS and starts RHR pumps B

• NCP NOT tripped.

• Informs SS and stops the NCP.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

• CCW pumps informs SS and starts two train B CCW pumps.

• NSCW pumps two running per train.

• NSCW tower return bypass valves in auto.

• Containment coolers running in SLOW speed with cooler isolation valves open.

• Informs SS Train B containment coolers need to be shifted to SLOW speed (BOP will perform this action)

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

• CVI valves and dampers closed per MLB5. Should have aligned properly after manual CIA actuation.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

• Checks containment pressure has remained < 21 .5 psig.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A feed water line break on SG # 1 ORC will occur outside the FWI valves. The crew will enter E-O after tripping the reactor and SI will not actuate automatically or from the manual hand switches. This will require the crew to manually start ECCS pumps and align ECCS valves. CIA and CVI actuation will not occur due to auto SI failure but can be actuated using the QMCB hand switches. SLI will not occur in auto requiring the crew to intiated a manual SLI. The crew will eventually transition to E-2 to isolate SG # 1.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Part of Checks ECCS flows:

CRITICAL STEP

• BIT Flow (none as valves have not aligned)

(2 nd part)

• Aligns valves per Attachment B

• Opens HV-8801 B to achieve BIT flow.

• RCS pressure < 1625 psig.

• SI pump flow (none available)

• RCS pressure > 300 psig RD Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS valve alignment proper per MLB5.

Manually aligns train B ECCS valves per Attachments B, C, D as necessary.

RD Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ACCW pumps Train B running.

RD Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Adjusts RCP seal injection to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 4 of 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A feed water line break on SG # 1 ORC will occur outside the FWI valves. The crew will enter E-O after tripping the reactor and SI will not actuate automatically or from the manual hand switches. This will require the crew to manually start ECCS pumps and align ECCS valves. CIA and CVI actuation will not occur due to auto SI failure but can be actuated using the QMCB hand switches. SLI will not occur in auto requiring the crew to intiated a manual SLI. The crew will eventually transition to E-2 to isolate SG # 1.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Performs BOP Initial Operator Actions of E-0 CRITICAL

• Checks MDAFW pump B and TDAFW pump is running.

STEP

• Checks NR SG levels> 10%, controls AFW flows.

• Checks if SLI is required and ensures MSIVs and Bypasses are closed.

• Informs SS and performs manual SLI using QMCB hand switches to limit blow down to 1 SG.

• Verifies FWI (MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut)

• Verifies SGBD isolated and places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close.

• Verifies SGBD sample isolations closed.

• Verifies Diesel Generator Train B running.

• Informs SS and manually starts DG B

• Throttles AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR.

• Verifies both MFPT tripped.

• Checks Main generator output breakers are open.

RO Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

CREW Takes actions of RNO step 8 to control RCS temperature.

RO Checks PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves all Closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 5 of 5 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

A feed water line break on SG # I ORC will occur outside the FWI valves. The crew will enter E-O after tripping the reactor and SI will not actuate automatically or from the manual hand switches. This will require the crew to manually start ECCS pumps and align ECCS valves. CIA and CVI actuation will not occur due to auto SI failure but can be actuated using the QMCB hand switches. SLI will not occur in auto requiring the crew to intiated a manual SLL The crew will eventually transition to E-2 to isolate SG # 1.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks if RCPs should be stopped (not expected)

. Checks at least one CCP or SIP running.

. RCS pressure < 1375 psig.

. Stops RCPs if criteria met.

BOP / SS Checks for faulted SG and transitions to E-2, Faulted SG Isolation.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

During isolation of the FW Line break on SG # 1, ACCW pump # 2 will trip resulting in a loss of ACCW flow. The crew will be required to trip the RCPs due to the loss of ACCW. The crew will continue with the faulted SG # 1 isolation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiates CSFST monitoring and initiates EPIP implementation.

BOP Verifies MSIVs and Bypasses SHUT.

BOP Checks SG secondary pressure boundaries.

. Any intact SG pressure ANY stable or rising.

. Identifies faulted SG # 1 pressure lowering uncontrolled or completely depressurized.

CREW Diagnoses loss of ACCW pump # 2 Symptoms I alarms / indications:

. Multiple ACCW flow, pressure, and component high temperature alarms are received.

. ACCW pump # 2 green and amber hand switch lights lit.

. ACCW system flows and discharge pressures at 0.

SS Directs the RO to trip all RCPs.

RO Trips all RCPs.

SS Continues with actions of 1 9020-C, E-2 to isolate SG # 1.

BOP Isolates Main Feed water to SC # 1.

. Shuts affected MFIV, HV-5227.

. Shuts affected BFIV, HV-1 51 96.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

During isolation of the FW Line break on SG # 1, ACCW pump # 2 will trip resulting in a loss of ACCW flow. The crew will be required to trip the RCPs due to the loss of ACCW. The crew will continue with the faulted SG # 1 isolation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Isolates Auxiliary Feed Water to SG # 1

. Shuts MDAFW pump A valve to SG # 1, HV-5139. This valve is de-energized due to loss of 1AAO2 and the crew must direct manual actions to close the valve. The valve room may be inaccessible due to the faulted SG # 1.

NOTE: If asked for, local actions will be allowed to close the valve.

OR The crew may discuss locally isolating the valve WHEN conditions allow this to occur safely.

CRITICAL

• Shuts TDAFW pump throttle valve to SG #1, HV-5122.

STEP BOP Checks at least one MDAFW pump running and available for cool down.

BOP CRITICAL Shuts TDAFW steam supply from SG # 1, HV-3009.

STEP BOP Verifies SG # 1 ARV is shut, PV-3000.

BOP Aligns SGBD valves for the affected SG.

• Places SGBD isolation valve hand switches to CLOSE.

• Shut SG Sample valve, HV-9451.

CREW Verifies faulted SG # 1 remains isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cool down.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

During isolation of the FW Line break on SG # 1, ACCW pump # 2 will trip resulting in a loss of ACCW flow. The crew will be required to trip the RCPs due to the loss of ACCW. The crew will continue with the faulted SG # 1 isolation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Checks CST levels> 15%.

SS I BOP Checks for SG tubes intact.

. Directs chemistry to sample all SG(s) one at a time for activity.

Checks secondary radiation normal.

. Main Steam Line Rad Monitors

. Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors

. Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors

. SG Tube leak monitors WITH

. Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner

. SG sample radiation CREW Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced.

. RCS subcooling > 24 F (38 F Adverse)

. Total feed flow to intact SG(s)> 570 gpm OR

. NR level in at least one intact SG> 10% (32% Adverse)

. RCS pressure stable or rising

. PRZR level > 9% (37% Adverse)

Transitions to 19011-C SI Termination SS OR Transitions to 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant The End THIS IS THE END OF THE SCENARIO!

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.: 6 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant is at 3.5% power with power ascension in progress at BOL. Ready to swap to BFRV.

Pre load the following: auto reactor trip failure (ESO1), SI train A auto actuation failure (ESOB), CCW pump

1. 5 auto start failure (CCO4E)

Turnover: Storms are approaching from the Southwest and high winds are possible within the hour.

BOL power ascent in progress after an outage with reactor power approximately 3.5%. MFPT A has been placed in service, AFW flow currently about 250 gpm per SG. Step 4.1.8 of UOP 12004-C is the next step to be performed.

Swap from AFW to the Bypass Feed Regulation Valves (BFRV) and continue the power ascent.

Event MaIf. No. / Event Event Description No. Position Type*

AFW N BOP will perform a swap from AFW to the BFRV on all 4 SG one at a time.

swap to The RO will control reactor power stable (or as SS directs) during the swaps.

1 BFRV BOP / RO RC1 1 C @ I Loop # 3 RCS Flow Instrument Fails Low 0%

2 18001-C, section A for Failure of RCS Loop Flow Instrumentation SRO (TS)

TS 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip)

SGO2G @ I Controlling SC Level Transmitter for Loop # 3 fails low 0%

18002-C section E for Failure of Steam Generator Level Instrumentation BOP TS 3,3.1 (Reactor Trip), 3.3.2 (ESFAS), 3.3.3 (PAMS)

SRO (TS)

Power R Power ramp from 3.5% until plant is in Mode 1.

4 Ramp RO CCOIA C CCW pump # I trip with CCW pump # 5 fails to start.

5 BOP 18020-C Loss of Component Cooling Water SRO (TS) TS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water ELI3B C Loss of I2OVAC IE Vital Bus IBYIB (results in ATWT with manual Rx. trip) 6 RO Crew will enter E-0 after the RO performs a manual reactor trip and transition to ES-0.1 to stabilize the plant.

PROIB J M PRZR Code Safety fails open resulting in LOCA to the PRT.

7 50%

Crew will re-enter E-0 after manually actuating safety injection. Train B ALL components will have to be manually aligned due to loss of BY1B.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-30 1 Draft Vogtle 2007-301 Scenario # 6 (low power-backup) (Low Power Ops I 3.5% on AFW)

Event 1 Perform swap of AFW to Main Feed water. AFW flow will be swapped to the BFRV in accordance with UOP-1 2004 step 4.1.8.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Swaps from AFW to BFRV one at a time while controlling SG levels.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Maintains reactor power stable during BFRV swaps by manipulation of control rods or boration.

Event 2 RCS loop flow transmitter fails low on loop # 3. This will require entry into AOP-1 8001 section A for Failure of RCS Loop Flow Instrumentation.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.3.1 Event 3 Controlling Steam Generator # 3 Level Transmitter will fail low causing the BFRV to fully open requiring the BOP to take manual control. This will require entry into AOP-1 8001, section E for failure of Steam Generator Level Instrumentation.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs IOA to take manual control of MFRV # 3 to control SG # 3 level.

Technical Specifications: LCO 3.3.1, LCO 3.3.2, and LCO 3.3.3 Event 4 Perform power ramp from 3.5% to greater than 5% (Mode 1 entry). Crew will perform steps of UOP-12004 section for Power Ascent.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Power increase. RO will operate control rods and the CVCS boration controls while the BOP initiates actions to prepare for Turbine startup.

Event 5 Once Mode 1 is entered, COW pump # 1 will trip with failure of COW pump # 5 to automatically start. This will require a manual start of COW pump # 5 and entry into AOP-1 8020 for Loss of COW.

Verifiable Action: (BOP). BOP will manually start COW pump # 5.

Technical Specifications: 3.7.7 for Component Cooling Water (COW)

Scenario Event Description Vogtle-2007-301 Draft Event 6 Loss of 120V AC 1 E Vital Bus 1 BY1 B will occur. This will result in an ATWT condition due to N135 loss and 2/4 coincidence made up on SG Lo-Lo Level bistables. The RO will manually trip the reactor and the crew will enter E-O and transition to ES-O.1 to stabilize the plant.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs manual reactor trip when ATWT condition recognized.

Critical Task: Manual reactor trip.

Event 7 Shortly after the reactor trip, PRZR code safety valve will slowly fail open over several minutes resulting in a LOCA to the PRT. The crew will have to manually actuate SI Train A and manually align SI Train B components due to the loss of 1 BY1 B.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Manual SI actuation due to RCS pressure lowering uncontrolled.

Verifiable Action: (RO) Performs manual alignment of Train B ECCS / SI components.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs manual start of DG B.

Verifiable Action: (BOP) Performs manual alignment of Train B CIA / CVI valves and dampers.

Critical task: Manual Safety Injection actuation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 1 of I (low powerSPARE)

Event No.: I Event

Description:

The scenario will start with the crew at 3.5% power while performing the steps of UOP-1 2004 for Power Ascent. MFPT A has been placed into service. The crew will initiate a swap from AFW to the BFRVs and continue the power ascent.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Transfers from Auxiliary Feed Water to Main Feed Water, one Steam Generator at a time, by performing the following:

. Verifies MFPT Delta P maintained between 100 150 psid.

. Stabilizes SG NR level between 60% and 70% and note total feed flow.

. Slowly open the BFRV and verify slight increase in feed water flow.

. Close the Auxiliary Feed Water Supply valve.

. Adjust the BFRV to re-establish total feed flow as noted in previous step b.

. Stabilize SG level and place the BFRV in automatic.

. Repeats the steps for the other 3 SGs.

NOTE Event #2 will occur just after placement of the first BFRV in automatic.

Go to the sheets for Event # 2. Once completed, return to this sheet for completion of the AFW to BFRV swap over actions.

BOP Continues transfers from Auxiliary Feed Water to Main Feed Water, one Steam Generator at a time, by performing the following:

. Verifies MFPT Delta P maintained between 100 150 psid.

. Stabilizes SG NR level between 60% and 70% and note total feed flow.

. Slowly open the BFRV and verify slight increase in feed water flow.

. Close the Auxiliary Feed Water Supply valve.

. Adjust the BFRV to re-establish total feed flow as noted in previous step b.

. Stabilize SG level and place the BFRV in automatic.

. Repeats the steps for the other 3 SGs.

SS I CREW Continues with power ascent into Mode 1 upon completion of AFW to Main Feed Water swap over.

BOP Stops MD AFW pumps and places in standby per 1361 0-1, AFW.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 1 of I (low powerSPARE)

Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

RCS loop # 3 flow instrument will fail downscale low. This will require an entry into AOP-1 8001-C, section A to address the failed flow instrument.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnose RCS loop # 3 flow channel low failure:

RO Symptoms / alarms I indications:

. RCP LOOP 1 LOW FLOW ALERT

. RCS Loop 1 FLOW TRIP 90% bistable status light lit.

. RCS Loop 1 flow indicates down scale low (< 90%)

SS Enters AOP-1 8001-C, section A for Failure of RCS Loop Flow Instrumentation.

RO Checks actual RCS flow> 90% in all RCS loops.

RD Identifies the affected flow instrument for loop # 3.

SS Notifies I & C to initiate repairs, notifies Operations Duty of AOP entry.

RD Checks power level > P-7. (It is not)

SS Bypasses the affected instrument channel using 1 3509-C if desired.

SS Returns to procedure and step in effect (UOP-1 2004)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Controlling SG Level transmitter for Loop # 3 fails LOW. This will require the crew to enter AOP-1 8001 section E for Failure of SG NR Level Instrumentation. The BFRV for loop # 3 will open requiring the BOP to perform lOAs and take manual control of the valve to prevent FWI on Hi-Hi SG level.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Diagnoses the low failure of SG # 3 NR level instrument:

Symptoms I alarms / indications:

. STM GEN 3 HI I LO LVL DEVIATION

. STMGEN3LOLEVEL

. STM GEN 3 LO/LO LVLALERT

. Steam generator # 3 controlling level channel reading down scale low.

. BFRV for loop # 3 SG throttling open.

. MFW flow to SG # 3 increasing.

. Other 3 level channels on SG # 3 rising.

BOP Performs lOAs of AOP-1 8001 section E

. Checks steam and feed flows matched on all SGs (not loop # 3)

. Takes manual control of SG # 3 BFRV to restore SG # 3 level between 60% and 70%.

SS Enters AOP-1 8001-C, section E for Failure of SG NR Level Instrumentation.

BOP Selects an unaffected control channel.

BOP Returns feed flow control to automatic.

SS/ CREW Initiates the Continuous Actions Page.

BOP Checks SG level control maintains NR level at 65%.

SS Notifies I & C to initiate repairs, informs Operation Duty of the AOP entry.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 2 of 2 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Controlling SG Level transmitter for Loop # 3 fails LOW. This will require the crew to enter AOP-1 8001 section E for Failure of SG NR Level Instrumentation. The BFRV for loop # 3 will open requiring the BOP to perform lOAs and take manual control of the valve to prevent FWI on Hi-Hi SG level.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Identifies requirement to trip the affected bistables listed in Table Bi of 18001-C within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the channel failure to comply with the following requirements Tech Specs.

. T.S. 3.3.1, FU 13

. T.S. 3.3.2, FU 5c

. T.S. 3.3.2, FU 6b

. T.S. 3.3.3, FU 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 1 of I (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

The crew will initiate a power ramp from 3.5% power to> 5% for Mode 1 entry. All entry requirements for Mode 1 will have been met according to shift turnover.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Co-ordinates the following with chemistry if not already performed during the swap over from AFW to MEW.

. Notifies chemistry that feeding via MEW has commenced.

. Verifies that PRZR Steam space sample is in service.

. Initiates actions to place N-16 radiation monitor RE-0724 in service.

. Ensures SGBD is in service.

. Directs ABO to adjust SGBD condensate return temperatures.

RO Energizes at least on bank of PRZR heaters until power> 30%.

SS All admin requirements of step 4.1.12, step 4.1.13 will have been performed according to the shift turnover.

SS Verifies AFW in standby readiness prior to exceeding 5% power.

RO Initiates raising reactor power to between 16% and 20%.

RO I BOP Maintains plant conditions during power increase as follows:

. Tave within 2 F of program Tave using steam dumps in the Steam Pressure Mode.

. Steam Generator levels between 60% and 70% NR.

. PRZR Pressure 2235 + plus or 15 psig.

. PRZR level within 5% of program with normal charging and letdown in service.

. Monitors Tave/Tref Deviation Alarm during remainder of startup.

SS When power reaches 5% as determined by higher of Average PR NIS or Average Loop Delta T.

. Logs Mode 1 entry into the Unit Control Logbook.

. Notifies Chemistry of the Mode Change.

NOTE: After adequate power change, proceed to Event # 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

A trip of running CCW pump # 1 will occur with failure of standby CCW pump #5 to auto start. The crew will enter AOP-1 8020-C for Loss of CCW. The procedure will direct the start of the standby pump. Once system operating parameters have been verified, the crew will return to the procedure and step in effect.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose loss of CCW Train A by any of the following indications:

. CCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS alarm

. CCW TRAIN A LO FLOW alarm

. CCW TRAIN A RHR PMP SEAL LO FLOW alarm

. NSCW CCW ACCW TRAIN A TEMP ALARM

. CCW TRAIN A RHR HX LO FLOW

. CCW pump # I green and amber lights lit on hand swith.

. CCW pump # 5 green light lit on hand switch (didnt start)

. CCW system flows and pressures low.

SS Enters AOP-1 8020-C for Loss of CCW BOP Checks CCW pumps in affected train Two Running (no)

BOP Manually starts CCW pump # 5 BOP Checks CCW train A operating parameters.

. Flow approximately 9000 gpm

. Pressure approximately 90 psig.

BOP Verifies NSCW supply header flow on Fli 640B approximately 17000 gpm.

SS Checks RHR not required for Shutdown Cooling.

SS Checks RHR train A not injecting in Cold Leg Injection Mode.

BOP Checks CCW surge tank level indications and alarms:

. CCW TRAIN A SURGE TK LO-LO LEVEL extinguished.

. CCW TRAIN A SURGE TK HI/LO LEVEL extinguished.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 2 of 2 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

A trip of running CCW pump # 1 will occur with failure of standby CCW pump #5 to auto start. The crew will enter AOP-1 8020-C for Loss of CCW. The procedure will direct the start of the standby pump. Once system operating parameters have been verified, the crew will return to the procedure and step in effect.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Checks CCW Train A - no abnormal leakage.

CREW Checks CCW Train A still in service.

CREW Dispatches personnel to verify SEP temperature < 130 degrees F.

BOP Verifies Fuel Handling Building Normal HVAC in service.

SS Returns to procedure and step in effect. (UOP-1 2004)

SS Enters Tech Spec LCO 3.7.7 for CCW.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 (IowpowerSPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus 1BYIB will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and JR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0.1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW Recognizes Loss of BY1 B ATWT event has occurred by the following symptoms I alarms I indications:

. 12OVAC PANEL 1BY1B 1BY2B TROUBLE alarm.

. INVERTERS 1BD1I2 1BD1I12 TROUBLE alarm.

. All channel II trip status lights (except IR P-6, CNMT Hl-3 PRESS, and RWST LO-LO LEVEL) lit.

. Simultaneous loss of SR N-32, IR N-36, and PR N-42.

. First out annunciator for SC LOOP 3 LO-LO LVL RX TRIP

. First out annunciator for NIS HI FLUX IR REACTOR TRIP RO CRITCAL Performs lOAs of 18032 and performs a manual reactor trip.

STEP SS Enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO / BOP Performs lOAs of E-O

. Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

. Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

. Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

. Checks if SI actuated (RO)

SS Transitions to 19001, ES-O.1 Reactor Trip Response SS Initiates the following:

. Continuous Actions and Foldout Page

. CSFST monitoring

. Reviews step for SI actuation to transition back to E-0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 2 of 9 (low powerSPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus 1BY1B will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and IR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0.1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Performs actions to limit RCS cool down:

. Verifies AFW flow to the SGs.

. Trips both MFPs.

. Checks SG NR levels at least one> 10%.

. Throttles AFW flow as necessary.

. Verifies SGBD isolation valves hand switches in closed position.

RD Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 using Tavg with RCPs running.

BOP Checks FW status:

. RCS average temperature < 564 degrees F

. Verifies MFIVs, BFIVs, MFRVs, BFRVs all shut.

BOP Checks total feed flow capability to SGs greater than 570 gpm available.

CREW Recognizes degrading plant conditions:

START OF

• Lowering Pressurizer level and pressure indications and alarms EVENT #7

• PRZR SAFETY RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP alarm

• Open Safety Valve indication on IPC or Plasma screens.

RD Raises charging flow to attempt to maintain PRZR level and pressure.

RD CRITICAL Manually actuates safety injection.

STEP

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 3 of 9 (low powerSPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus 1BY1B will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and IR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0. 1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BYI B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Transitions back to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO / BOP Performs lOAs of E-O

. Verifies Reactor Trip (RO)

. Verifies Turbine Trip (BOP)

. Verifies AC Power to the Emergency Buses (BOP)

. Checks if SI actuated (RO)

SS I TEAM Initiates Foldout Page, Continuous Actions Page and RO and BOP Initial Actions Pages.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

. Checks both trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs. If not performed previously actuates SI.

. Checks CIA actuated per MLBs (it wont be for Train B).

. Informs SS and manually actuates CIA.

. Informs SS of CIA failure for Train B and initiates manual alignment.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

. CCPs both running

. Informs SS and starts CCP B

. SI Pumps running (SI B tagged out)

. RHR pumps both running.

. Informs SS and starts RHR pump B

. NCPtripped.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 4 of 9 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus IBY1B will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and JR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0.1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. CCW pumps two running per train.

. Informs SS and starts two Train B CCW pumps

. NSCW pumps two running per train.

. NSCW tower return bypass valves in auto.

. Containment coolers running in SLOW speed with cooler isolation valves open.

. Informs SS that CTNT coolers for Train B need to be started in SLOW speed (SS will direct BOP to align)

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

. CVI valves and dampers closed per MLBs.

. Informs SS and initiates manual closure of valves and dampers.

(SS will direct BOP to align back panel dampers and valves)

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

. Checks containment pressure has remained < 21 .5 psig.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS flows:

. BIT Flow

. RCS pressure < 1625 psig.

. Slpumpflow

. RCS pressure> 300 psig

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 5 of 9 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus 1BY1B will occur resuLting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and IR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0. 1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ECCS valve alignment proper per MLBs.

Informs SS and aligns Train B valves per attachments A, B, C as necessary.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Checks ACCW pumps at least one running.

RO Performs Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

Adjusts RCP seal injection to all RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

BOP Performs BOP Initial Operator Actions of E-0

. Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

. Informs SS and starts MDAFW pump B

. Checks NR SG levels> 10%, controls AFW flows.

. Checks if SLI is required and ensures MSIVs and Bypasses are closed.

. Verifies FWI (MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut)

. Verifies SGBD isolated and places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close.

. Verifies SGBD sample isolations closed.

. Verifies Diesel Generators running.

. Informs SS and starts DGI B

. Throttles AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR.

. Verifies both MFPT tripped.

. Checks Main Generator Output breakers open.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 6 of 9 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus 1BY1B will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and JR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0. 1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Performs BOP Initial Operator Actions of E-O

. Assists RO with alignment of CIA and CVI valves and dampers located on the back panels, starts CTMT coolers SLOW speed.

RO Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

CREW Takes actions of RNO step 8 to control RCS temperature.

RO Checks PORVs, Block Valves, and Spray Valves all Closed.

RO Checks if RCPs should be stopped.

. Checks at least one CCP or SIP running.

. RCS pressure < 1375 psig.

. Stops RCPs BOP I SS Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 (not met)

SS / BOP Checks for SG Tubes intact.

. Directs chemistry to sample all SC one at a time for activity.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

. Main Steam Line Rad Monitors

. Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors

. Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors

. Any SC level rising in an uncontrolled manner.

E-3 SGTR transition criteria (not met)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 7 of 9 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus IBYIB will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and JR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0.1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS I RO Checks for RCS intact inside containment.

. Containment radiation normal (it is)

. Containment pressure normal (it is)

. Containment Emergency Sump level normal (it is)

NOTE: If slow during scenario to this point, PRT may rupture and a transition to 1901 0-C would be appropriate at this point. If not, continue with E-0 will eventually transition you to 1901 0-C later in the procedure.

RO Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced.

. RCS subcooling > 24 degrees F (not met)

SS Initiates CSFST monitoring and implements EPIP procedures.

BOP Checks intact SG levels.

. NR level in at least one SG > 10% (32% Adverse)

. Maintains NR levels between 10% (32% Adverse) and 65%.

. No NR level rising in an uncontrolled manner.

BOP Checks Auxiliary Building Leak Detection Normal

. Plant vent radiation monitors normal.

. Auxiliary Building Leak Detection status lights NOT LIT.

RO Checks if PRT conditions NORMAL.

. PRZR PORV and Safety tailpipe temperatures < 190 F

. PRT temperature < 115 F

. PRT level between 57% and 88%

. PRT pressure between 3 PSIG and 8 PSIG

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 8 of 9 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus 1BYIB will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and JR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0.1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Transitions to 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

SS Initiates the Continuous Actions and Foldout Pages.

SS Initiates CSFST monitoring and implements EPIPs.

RO Maintains seal injection to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

RO Checks RCPs stopped and at least one ACCW pump is running.

BOP Places Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service per SOP-i 3130.

BOP Checks SG secondary pressure boundaries intact.

BOP Checks intact SG levels 10 65% NR, controls AFW, and checks for any ruptured SG.

RO Checks PORV and Block valve status, checks CL temperatures.

RO Checks ECCS termination criteria (not met)

RO Checks if containment spray should be stopped (not met)

TEAM Reviews step addressing LOSP after SI reset to restart equipment.

BOP Checks if DGs should be stopped, directs OSA operator to shutdown the DGs per 13145-1, Diesel Generators.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 6 Page 9 of 9 (low power SPARE)

Event No.: 6 and 7 Event

Description:

A loss of 120V AC Vital Bus IBYIB will occur resulting in an ATWT condition. Two first outs will alert the crew to the ATWT. SG Lo-Lo level due to earlier instrument failure and JR NIS Hi Flux Reactor Trip.

The crew will trip the reactor manually and perform the actions of E-0 and transition to 19001-C, Reactor Trip Response to stabilize the plant. Shortly after the trip while in ES-0. 1, A PRZR Safety will fail open requiring a manual SI. Train B equipment will have to be aligned due to the BY1B failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RO Checks Cold Leg recirculation capability.

. Power to both HV-881 1A and HV-881 1 B

. Power to RHR pumps A and B

. Power to HV-8809A and HV-8809B

. RHR Hx A and B OPERABLE BOP Checks auxiliary building leak detection alarms and plant vent radiogas.

TEAM Directs Chemistry to obtain samples for boron, pH, radioactivity from the RCS and both Containment Emergency Sumps, etc.

TEAM Evaluate plant status.

. Secure unnecessary equipment.

. Isolate NSCW corrosion monitor racks after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

. Consult TSC for additional actions and to repair additional equipment required to mitigate the event.

SS I TEAM Checks for transition criteria met for 19012-C, Post LOCA Cool down and Depressurization. (met)

SS Transitions to 19012-C, Post LOCA Cool down and Depressurization.

The End This is the end point of the scenario!