Text

Initial Exam 2010-301 Final Administrative Documents
	ML101230131
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/03/2010
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	50-327/10-301, 50-328/10-301
	Download: ML101230131 (134)
	v • d • e

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lxamination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: ~ G£)uoYA1-1 Date of Examination: Rb ;;ZO/()

Developed by: Written - Facility ~RC D II Operating - Facility ~RC D Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) Examiner's Initials

-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) >#;L

-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) ~

-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) /'!:5}l

-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) <Zj;;ll/ Dct t5U--

[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)] 1C},/J4/D1 1frK

{-75} 6.

Eit01-3, Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1/2, Ei~401-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d) II 1J '"

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{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)} *~X

{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6, and any Form ES-201-3 updates), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)

-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC~~rm, ES-202)

(NRCl~rmr

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rS) 17 tV due (C.1.1; C.2.g;

-14 10. Final license applications due and FOrj~S-// -4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; ES-202) ,,;( ;). i 0

-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f) -04

~4 2~~~~

?~~~~ ; C.3.g)

-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2/a

~

-7 13. Writt~n examinations and operating tests approved by ~ sU'pervisor (C.2.1; C.3.h) tf liz; ~

-7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if >10) applications audited to confirm quali~cations / eligibility; and examination approval and f/lj)etters sent (C.2.1; Attachment 5; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204) CZ 'S: )'0

-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee (C.3.k) ~/LSj;V 1?aL

-7 16. qU~J7~/,

Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and qU~J)on'/t distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i) ) Ie> ID Jl?lA-

Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.

[Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.

ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 02/16/2010 Initials Item Task Description a b* C#

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a.

b.

Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.

Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with ~

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I Section 0.1 of ES-401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled.

c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.

d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate. £~

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2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number S

I of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients. £!W 111" 1JtL

£1f' M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule /

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L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested uSing L A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

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c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D. '~ 11:r t1J'-

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:

(1 ) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form i~

1 (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s) (w 'Vtt flU (4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:

(1 ) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations

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c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. ~~

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4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. L~ "tty 11JtL i~

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G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. 'v,r fI!U-N

c. Ensure that KIA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. t~ "111' ~

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E R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. t;

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A L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. L~ 111 ~

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f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). 1kL

a. Author Michael Buckner

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b. Facility Reviewer (*) Van Ford ' Va-,.., ~d- 1I/lOio"')

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c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) ll{I.utlO C/kMU£.P.D I ~

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d. NRC Supervisor AlJJfltlJlJ.-[ \VIO,Ji4IJA} ~

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Note:

Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.

Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines

ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility:

~E.QIA.O'<AH Date of Examination:

FEB 2010 Initials Item Task Description a b* C#

w W

1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401. pq,

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R T

I

b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all KiA categories are appropriately sampled. err CUp leap

.~

T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. I BIt, Blt-I(~

E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KiA statements are appropriate.

tIL

2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number S

of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients.

N-l

~A I

M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U

L A

and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated N-\ %'

T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

0 R

c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.

N-I ~/A

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:

(1 ) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks

~

W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form 1 (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form N-J T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.

i

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1: N (1 ) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations N-I

~

c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.

N-J ~

4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered G

in the appropriate exam sections. ~l !til IttA1ft IttA1ff ~

Bft.

E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.

N E

c. Ensure that KiA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ICilf lW f)H..

R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. (#(

tP1 19ft..

A L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. ~1 ,,r 1!fJt

f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). Ittl '/JIA ~I r!(I*tJIA 1/);(

15O,~tl.~d I5oI~ti:.nyd ~~ ~

Date

a. Author Ot...,~ ~

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b. Facility Reviewer (*) v _ -"- ",L

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)

d. NRC Supervisor 3Rl.lNO c..ABAI,..\"'E~O I ~.I UMIDIJJ.:r:W'lWAl~~

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':J!;fIjq1 I!;!jjq1 Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in COlu;;';:"C";

Colu;;';"c"; chief examiner concurrence required.

Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines

To: NRC Region II Chief Examiner Bruno Caballero

Subject:

Completed ES-201-3 Forms Mr. Caballero, please find enclosed the completed ES-201-3, Examination Security Agreement, forms that have been signed off following the completion of the 2010301, Written exam administered at Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 on March 3, 2010.

If there are any questions, please feel free to call me the Sequoyah Training Center (423-843-4208).

Respectfully, ~

Mike Buckn~1 ' ~c~

Exam Project Lead Sequoyah Nuclear Station

ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination Sequoyah Nuclear Plant IL T exam for 02/2010 I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 2/16 & 2/22 2010 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

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1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 2/16-22/10 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or andlor an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered i" t,b during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted ba:<'

below and authorized by the NRC. \>f ~I\

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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

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1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 2/16-22/10 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201, Page 26 of 27

f.a.3 'b ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 2/16-22/10 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or ~

I the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination ~

To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered l

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fd 3 'b ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 2/16-22/10 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations andlor an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing ex()minations administered during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 2/16-22/10 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations andlor an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201, Page 26 of 27

ES*301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 2/16/2010 Examination Level: RO X SRO D Operating Test Number: 2010301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

D,R 2.1 .25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as Conduct of Operations graphs, curves, tables, etc. (3.9/4.2)

Perform a Reactivity Balance Calculation per 0-SO 7, Appendix E (JPM 190 RO )

D,R 2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such Conduct of Operations as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen.

(3.4/3.6)

Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation (JPM 123)

M,S 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures (3.7/4.1)

Equipment Control Perform Reactor Coolant System water inventory (JPM 43-2)

Radiation Control N,R 2.4.13 Knowledge of crew roles and responsibilities Emergency during EOP usage. (4.0/4.6)

Procedures/Plan Calculating maximum reactor vessel vent time Per EA-0-7 (JPM-2.4)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (S 3 for ROs; s 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (S 1; randomly selected)

RO 2.1.a This JPM has the candidate determine a reactivity Balance Calculation needed to change power from 20% to 70%, at 3%/min, BOL conditions, on Unit 1. The JPM has been updated to current core load data and is designed to have the computer unavailable to make the calculation thus the candidate will use the guidance in 0-SO-62-7, Appendix E. This JPM can be performed in the simulator or classroom.

RO 2.1.b This JPM has the candidate determine the stay time in containment based on the formaldehyde concentration and determine the respiratory protection requirements. This is a Bank JPM that can be performed in the simulator or classroom.

RO 2.2 This JPM has the candidate determine the Reactor Coolant System Water inventory (leak rate). This is a Modified Bank JPM that will be performed in the classroom without the plant computer.

RO 2.4 This JPM has the candidate determine the allowable Reactor Vessel head venting time to prevent CNMT Hydrogen from exceeding 3% per EA-0-7. This is a New JPM that can be performed in the classroom.

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Seguoyah 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 2/16/2010 Examination Level: RO 0 SRO X Operating Test Number: 2010301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

M,R 2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

Conduct of Operations (3.8/4.2)

Determine Maintenance of License Active Status (JPM A.1.1)

D,R 2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such Conduct of Operations as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen.

(3.4/3.6)

Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation (JPM 123)

D,R 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures Equipment Control Review a Surveillance for approval (3.7/4.1)

(JPM 410-1)

M,R,P 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits Radiation Control Approval of a Waste Gas Decay tank Release (2.0/3.8)

(JPM A-3)

N,R 2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility Emergency emergency plan, including supporting or acting as Procedures/Plan emergency coordinator if required. (2.4/4.4)

Classify Rep: LOCA with Significant Fuel Failure (JPM 019 AP3 )

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (::; 3 for ROs; ::; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (::; 1; randomly selected)

SRO 2.1.a This JPM has the candidate review the work history for 4 SROs and determine which has performed the required activities necessary to maintain their license in an active status. This is a modified bank JPM that can be performed in the classroom.

SRO 2.1.b This JPM has the candidate determine the stay time in containment based on the formaldehyde concentration and determine the respiratory protection requirements. This is an updated Bank JPM that can be performed in the simulator or classroom.

SRO 2.2 This JPM has the candidate review a surveillance test for determining whether or not to adjust RCP seal injection supply controlled leakage. The data will be outside acceptable limits and require entry into Tech Specs as well as performing sect 6.3 of procedure to adjust the seal leak-off flows. This is a Bank JPM that can be performed on the simulator or in the classroom.

SRO 2.3 This JPM has the candidate review a radioactive gas decay tank release to determine if release permit is accurate and can take place as written. The candidate will determine who needs to approve the permit. This is a modified Bank JPM that can be performed in the simulator or in the classroom. This JPM is a Repeat from the 2009 NRC exam, which has been modified with a new critical task added and was randomly selected from a group of Radiation Control JPMs.

SRO 2.4 This JPM has the candidate determine the correct Emergency Classification based on the data provided and make the initial contacts. The JPM has the candidate determine that a SAE exists.

This is a time critical, New JPM that can be performed in the simulator or in the classroom.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: _ _Sequoyah Nuclear Station Date of Examination: _02/16/2010_

Exam Level: RO X SRO-I D SRO-U D Operating Test No.: 2010301 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. 005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod (AA2.03 3.5/4.4) D,S,A,L 1 001AP-1 Emergency Boration (Stuck Rods)

b. 011 Large Break LOCA (EA 1.11 4.2/4.2) D,S,A 3 013AP1 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc.

c. 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (A4.06 3.6/3.1) N,S 2 JPM-2 Remove Excess Letdown from service.

d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (A4.01 3.6/3.4) M,S,L 4P 152-1 Swap RHR pumps (B train to A train) with level in the PZR.

e. WE05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (EA2.1 3.4/4.4) N,S 4S 034-1 Establish MFW per EA-2-2

f. 103 Containment System (A 1.01 3.7/4.1) D, S 5 065-1 Re-establishment of CNMT pressure

g. 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A4.06 3.9/3.9) D,S,A 6 077-1AP Perform DG load test on 1B-B DG (with high crankcase pressure)

h. 015 Nuclear Instrumentation System (A2.02 3.1/3.5) M,S 7 021-1A Respond to a failure of N-41 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. 059 Accidental Liquid Radioactive Waste Release (AA1.01 D,R,A 9 3.5/3.5) 189AP Radiation Monitor 0-RE-90-122 Flushing After Hi Radiation Signal Isolation of Release

j. 025 Residual Heat Removal System (AA1.10 3.1/2.9) D,E,R 4P 044 Venting A-A RHR pump due to cavitation

k. 068 AC Electrical Distribution System (AA 1.21 3.9/4.1) D,E,A 8 091-1 Transfer Controls to Aux Mode per AOP-C.04, AU 3 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irectfrom bank ::;9/::;8/::;4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant ;::1/;::1/;::1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / ;::1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown ;::1/;::1/;::1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) ;::2/;::2/;::1 (P)revious 2 exams ::; 3 / ::; 3 / ::; 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA ;::1/;::1/;::1 (S)imulator JPM A. Candidate has to determine that emergency boration is required due to 2 stuck rods following a Rx trip, with the normal emergency boration valve failing to open, requiring the candidate to align alternate boration through the charging pump suction. This is a Bank, Low Power, Alternate path, JPM.

JPM B. Candidate is directed to make alignment change for Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation per ES-l.4 following a trip due to large break LOCA. The Hot Leg Recirculation valve will fail to open requiring RHR to be aligned to Cold Leg injection with High head pumps aligned to Hot Legs. This is a Bank, Low Power, Alternate path, JPM.

JPM C. Candidate will be required to remove Excess Letdown from service using normal operating procedures. The normal letdown system has been placed in service following a malfunction and excess letdown is required to be removed and placed in standby. This is a New JPM.

JPM D. Plant is in Mode 4, and Candidate is directed to transfer RHR pumps and heat exchangers from B train to A train.

This is a Modified Bank, Low Power JPM. Original JPM was to transfer from Train A to B.

JPM E. Candidate is directed to establish a Secondary Heat Sink using Main Feed Water System following a Rx Trip.

MFW will be required due to a failure of all AFW pumps. This is a New JPM.

JPM F. Candidate is directed to vent excess pressure from CNMT. This is a Bank JPM.

JPM G. Candidate is to perform a quick start ofEDG A-A and load the EDG. Prior to closing the EDG breaker, a high crankcase condition will develop requiring a manual emergency trip of the EDG. This is a Bank, Alternate Path JPM.

JPM H. Candidate will respond to failed Nuclear Instrument (N4l) High. Control Rods will be stepping in at maximum rate, Candidate will take Rod bank selector switch to Manual and proceed to remove failed channel from service.

This is a Modified Bank JPM. Original JPM (021) had N-4l failing low from ---45%, this JPM has N-4lfailing High, requiring immediate manual action to stop control rod movement prior to removing channel from service.

JPM I. Candidate is to locate and flush the radwaste effluent monitor to clear the high alarm condition. After the local flush, the JPM is complete. This a Bank, Alternate path, JPM performed in the RCA.

JPM J. Candidate is directed to vent the lA-A RHR pump due to pump cavitating during mid-loop operation. This venting is done locally and is required to be performed to return the RHR pump to service. This is a Bank JPM and is performed in the RCA.

JPM K. Candidate is directed to perform checklist 3 of AOP-C.04 Shutdown from Auxiliary Control Room, following an event which requires Control Room Abandonment. This a Bank JPM.

ES-301 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Seauovah Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: _02/16/2010 -

Exam Level: RO D SRO-I X SRO-U D Operating Test No.: 2010301 Control Room Systems@

Systems(g) (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. 005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod (AA2.03 3.5/4.4) D,S,A,L 1 001 AP-1 Emergency Boration (Stuck Rods)

b. 011 Large Break LOCA (EA 1.11 4.2/4.2) D,S,A 3 013AP1 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc.

c. 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (A4.06 3.6/3.1) N,S 2 JPM-2 Remove Excess Letdown from service.

d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (A4.01 3.6/3.4) M,S,L 4P 152 Swap RHR pumps (A train to B train) with level in the PZR.

e. WE05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (EA2.1 3.4/4.4) N,S 4S 034-1 Establish MFW per EA-2-2 f.

g. 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A4.06 3.9/3.9) D,S,A 6 077-1AP Perform DG load test on 1B-B DG (with high crankcase pressure)

h. 015 Nuclear Instrumentation System (A2.02 3.1/3.5) D,S 7 021 AP Respond to a failure of N-41 In-Plant Systems@

Systems(g) (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. 059 Accidental Liquid Radioactive Waste Release (AA 1.01 D,R,A 9 3.5/3.5 189AP Radiation Monitor 0-RE-90-122 Flushing After Hi Radiation Signal Isolation of Release.

j. 005 Residual Heat Removal System D,E,R 4P 044 Venting A-A RHR pump due to cavitation

k. 062 AC Electrical Distribution System D,E,A 8 091-1 Transfer Controls to Aux Mode per AOP-C.04, AU 3 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes I Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U

(A)lternate path 4-6 1 4-6 1 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank :59/:58/:54 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant ?:1/?:1/?:1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1 ?:1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power 1 Shutdown ?:1/?:1/?:1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) ?:2/?:2/?:1 (P)revious 2 exams :5 3 1 :5 3 1 :5 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA ?:1/?:1/?:1 (S)imulator JPM A. Candidate has to detennine that emergency boration is required due to 2 stuck rods following a Rx trip, with the nonnal emergency boration valve failing to open, requiring the candidate to align alternate boration through the charging pump suction. This is a Bank, Low Power, Alternate path, JPM.

JPM B. Candidate is directed to make alignment change for Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation per ES-1.4 following a trip due to large break LOCA. The Hot Leg Recirculation valve will fail to open requiring RHR to be aligned to Cold Leg injection with High head pumps aligned to Hot Legs. This is a Bank, Low Power, Alternate path, JPM.

JPM C. Candidate will be required to respond to failed PZR pressure instrument which causes the PZR spray valves to open with one valve sticking open. With a PZR spray valve failing to close, candidate will follow actions of AOP-1.4 and trip the RX and trip at least two RCPs to stop mitigate the depressurization to prevent SI actuation. This is a Modified Bank, Alternate Path JPM. Original JPM JPM D. Plant is in Mode 4, and Candidate is directed to transfer RHR pumps from B train to A train. This is a Bank, Low PowerJPM.

JPM E. Candidate is directed to establish a Secondary Heat Sink using Main Feed Water System following a Rx Trip.

MFW will be required due to a failure of all AFW pumps. This is a New JPM.

JPM G. Candidate is to perfonn a quick start ofEDG A-A and load the EDG. Prior to closing the EDG breaker, a high crankcase condition will develop requiring a manual emergency trip of the EDG. This is a Bank, Alternate Path JPM.

JPM H. Candidate will respond to failed Nuclear Instrument (N41) High. Control Rods will be stepping in at maximum rate, Candidate will take Rod bank selector switch to Manual and proceed to remove failed channel from service.

This is a Modified Bank JPM. Original JPM (021) had N-41 failing low from ~45%, this JPM has N-4lfailing High, requiring immediate manual action to stop control rod movement prior to removing channel from service.

JPM I. Candidate is to locate and flush the radwaste effluent monitor to clear the high alann condition. After the local flush, the JPM is complete. This is a Bank, Alternate Path, JPM perfonned in the RCA.

JPM J. Candidate is directed to vent the 1A-A RHR pump due to pump cavitating during mid-loop operation. This venting is done locally and is required to be perfonned to return the RHR pump to service. This is a Bank JPM and is perfonned in the RCA.

JPM K. Candidate is directed to perfonn checklist 3 of AOP-C.04 Shutdown from Auxiliary Control Room, following an event which requires Control Room Abandonment. This is a Bank JPM.

ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: Sequoyah Date of Examination: 02/16/2010 Operating Test Number:2010301 Initials

1. General Criteria a b* C#

a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes

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are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution). t

b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be .

administered during this examination. '~

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c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants' audit test(s).

(see Section D.1.a.) "-

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d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits. L~

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e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level. ~ 11*Y 1fJfL

2. Walk-Through Criteria -- -- --

a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:

initial conditions

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initiating cues

references and tools, including associated procedures

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reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee

operationally important specific performance criteria that include:

- detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature

- system response and other examiner cues

- statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant

- criteria for successful completion of the task

- identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards

- restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable

b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.

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3. Simulator Criteria -- -- --

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~1f1J; "lAY The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached. 1#-

Printed Naqk~/

Naqh~/~ Date 'J/,;

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a. Author Mike Buckner Vp - I 2-//0 ,;:leV 'l

b. Facility Reviewer(*) Van Ford p~ f-c-,d-- P .. "/uLOi'

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) Cf<?7kl1--C1I:D/ 1lJ . /b/~~

SRl1NO Cf<?7kUkftD/ 1b (O;l1l1f/u~ J/q/ro

""~"J..--r:WIOIJA.A".~ f ,/ ~ ~r""lUwJ----~z/d1 I {

d. NRC Supervisor JJ 11 h' i"N.lJ...."'(.W, .lAAlAl/ Y" ~i!d1/tD { /tD 1

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NOTE:

The facility signature is not applicable for NRC.:oeveloped NRC:Oeveloped tests.

Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.

\

Caballero. Bruno

>m: Caballero, Bruno

.dnt: Friday, February OS, 2010 10:15 AM To: 'svsmithO@tva.gov' Cc: Widmann, Malcolm; 'Picchiottino, Bradley 0'

Subject:

Draft Operating Test submittal

Steve, This email does NOT contain exam security information.

As we discussed earlier, the draft operating test submittal was outside the acceptable quality range expected by the NRC because the 15 JPMs required significant modification and/or replacement due to the following issues:

Incorrect simulator setup conditions

Incorrect valve/component numbers listed

Poorly defined standards (the "answer key") for procedure steps; Le., adequate pass/fail criteria not established for critical steps, including tolerance bands on parameters

Initial conditions were either missing important detail, poorly defined, or included cues. In some cases, the initiating cue statements included items that were actually initial conditions.

Initiating cue statements were either cumbersome (because they contained initial conditions) or poorly defined to elicit the required knowledge being tested by the JPM

No difference between expected knowledge for an SRO applicant versus RO applicant for some SRO-only JPMs

JPM Steps either inappropriately designated as "critical" or should have been designated as "critical"

Proposed procedures which were provided to applicants were not marked up according to plant protocols for placekeeping, etc.

Excessive typographical errors (do not usually comment on this "administrivia"; but the level of errors was unacceptable and misleading to the examiners)

When suggestions for enhancements and/or replacements were addressed, the subsequent JPM packages were missing procedures and/or data If necessary, we can provide specifics; however, due to exam security reasons, this is all we can provide via email. Don't hesitate to call if you have questions or concerns.

We look forward to working with you and your staff during the exam.

Bruno Caballero Operations Engineer - Region 2 bruno.caballero@nrc.gov 404-562-4608 1

ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklis! Form ES-301-4 1""1.

Facilty: Sequoyah 1&2 Date of Exam: 2/16/2010 Scenario Numbers: 1/213/4 Operating Test No.: 2010301 Initials QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES a b* c#

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1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment andlor instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.

MJI 2 The scenarios consist mostly of related events. L ~ 'ht" Ift~ ft~

3 Each event description consists of

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the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event ~y $A~

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the symptomslcues that will be visible to the crew

the expected operator actions (by shift position)

the event termination point (if applicable)

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4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into I

the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. -:~

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6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain £i.

complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. VIY 11J/lv' 1!1'v'

7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.

Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time Nil N/f\ VIA I iliA constraints. Cues are given.

8. The simulator modeling is not altered. t:- ~

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9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. :~ 11Y 11t{'

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10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. C.

L All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301. 'hr 1W1A-ffiA.

11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). t~ 'kr- I~ ~

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12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). 1v

13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. G~~ l1Y IWv ~I Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.S.d) Actual Attributes -- -- --

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 61718/6 ~ .Y/} i,qK IlrK

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2/3/3/1 ~ 1'W l$t 1M.

3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4/4/3/4 ~

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4. Major transients (1-2) 2/1/2/1 ~ 'l1y Itftl itftl

5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2) 3/3/3/2 t~ '1vY ~{

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2/2/2/1 ~ 1-1-( I~t

7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2/2/3/7'1 ~

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ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: 02/16/2010 Operating Test No.: 2010301 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E CREW 0 I CREW CREW CREW T N L N POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I I T L M S A B S A B S A B S A B C R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 U A T 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P M(*)

N Y R I U T P E

RO RX 5 1 2 1 1 0 D

SRO-I NOR 4 1 1 1 1 I/C 1,2,3, 2,4 8 4 4 2 X 4,9,10 SRO-U 8 2 MAJ 5 2 2 1 D TS 1,7 2 0 2 2 RO RX 5 1 2 1 1 0 D

SRO-I NOR 4 1 1 1 1 I/C 1,3, 2,3,4, 9 4 4 2 X 10 7,8,9 SRO-U MAJ 8 5 2 2 2 1 D TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 X NOR 1,4 2 1 1 1 SRO-I IIC 1,3, 3,4,7, 8 4 4 2 D

SRO-U 10 8,9 MAJ 8 5 2 2 2 1 D TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 4 1 1 1 0 X NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,4, 2,4 5 4 4 2 D

SRO-U 9

MAJ 8 5 2 2 2 1 D TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)"

positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide inSight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Sequoyah yah Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: 02/16/2010 Operating Test No.: 2010301 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E CREW 0 I CREW CREW CREW T N L N POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I I T L M S A B S A B S A B S A B C R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 U A T 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P M(*)

N Y R I U T P E

RO RX 5 1 2 1 1 0 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,2,3, 2,5,9 9 4 4 2 X 4,9,10 SRO-U 8 6 2 MAJ 2 2 1 0 TS 1,7 2 0 2 2 RX 5 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 0 I/C 1,3, 2,3.4, 10 4 4 2 SRO-I 10 5,8,9, X

10 SRO-U MAJ 8 6 2 2 2 1 0 TS 2.4,5 3 0 2 2 RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 X NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I IIC 1,3, 3.4, 7 4 4 2 0 10 8,10 SRO-U 8 6 2 MAJ 2 2 1 0 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 X NOR 5 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2.4,9 2,5,9 6 4 4 2 0

SRO-U MAJ 8 6 2 2 2 1 0

10 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)"

positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (IIC) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one IIC malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: 02/16/2010 Operating Test No.: 2010301 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E CREW CREW CREW CREW 0 I L N T N POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I I T L M S A B S A B S A B S A B C R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 U A T 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P M(*)

N Y R I U T P E

RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 D

SRO-I NOR 4 1 2 1 1 1 IIC 2,4 2,3,4, 8 4 4 2 X 5,9, SRO-U 10 D MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 2,4,5 3 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 D

SRO-I NOR 4 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,3,4, 2,5,9 9 4 4 2 X 7,8,9 SRO-U MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 D TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 X NOR 1,4 2 1 1 1 SRO-I IIC 3,4,7, 2,5,9 8 4 4 2 D

SRO-U 8,9 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 D TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 X NOR 4 1 2 1 1 1 SRO-I IIC 2,4 3,4, 5 4 4 2 D

SRO-U 10 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 D TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)"

positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (IIC) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one IIC malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5

_. n Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear.~ Plant Date '~Exam:

of Exam: 02/16/2010 Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V SPARE 2 3 4 T M P E CREW CREW 0 I CREW CREW T N L N POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I I T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M C R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 u U

A T 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C p M(*)

N Y R I U T P E

RO RX 1 1 0 D

0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 2,3,4, I/C 5 4 4 2 X 5,8 SRO-U MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 D0 TS 4,6 2 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 X NOR 6 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,4,5 3 4 4 2 D

0SRO-U MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 D0 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 X NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C *3,5,8 3 4 4 2 D

0SRO-U MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 D

0 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 D

0SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 D

0SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 IOO-U TS 0 2 2 10 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)"

positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (IIC) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one IIC malfunction can be credited toward the two IIC malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 2/16/2010 Operating Test No.: 2010301 APPLICANTS RO X RO D RO D RO D SRO-I D SRO-I X SRO-I D SRO-I D SRO-U D SRO-U D SRO-U D SRO-U D Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 InterpretiDiag nose 1,2, 2,3, 2,3, 2,3, All All All All 3,4, 4,5, 4,5, 4,5, Events and Conditions 5,7, 6,8, 6,8, 6,8 9,10 9 9,10 Comply With and 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, All All All All 4,5, 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, Use Procedures (1) 6, 7,8, 5,6, 6,7, 9 8 8 Operate Control 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, Boards (2) 8,9, 5,7, 5,8, 6,8 10 8,9 9,10 Communicate All All All All All All All All and Interact Demonstrate All All All All Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and 1,7 2,3 2,4, 4,6 5

Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1 ) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants' license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.

ES-401 1 Rev. 9 PWR examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Sequoyah Date of Exam: 2010 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency &

2 1 2 1 2 2 1 9 2 2 4 Abnormal Plant N/A N/A Evolutions Tier Totals 4 5 4 5 5 4 27 5 5 10 1 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 28 3 2 5 2.

2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 3 Plant Systems Tier Totals 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 38 5 3 8 I

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 I Categories 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2

1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals' in each KIA category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified In the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/- 1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

I

3. Systems/evolutlons within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding the elimination of Inappropriate KIA statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KIAs having an Importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.

7. *The generic (G) KIAs In Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

8. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; If fuel handling equipment is sampled In other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note

1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topiCS from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. LimitSRO selections to KIAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

, I

ES-401 Form ES-401-2 II ES-401 PWR ExamInation Outline I~

j Emeraen lant ElIOlutions* Tier 1!Grou

I Name I Safety Function K K K A A G KIA Topic(s) fR 1 2 3 1 2 F Id. ()

07 (BWfE02&E10: CEfE02) Reactor if!, '7

- Stabilization* Recovery I 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space ----

Accident/ 3 000009 Small Break LOCA I 3 f? i?,"1 f:>K t. OI 4,,2 000011 LarQe Break LOCA I 3 f< OiIEKt2,'CL ,;U:,

000015/17 RCP Malfunctions 14 It< iOISAK Lot i4,4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 12 R 0;;;;"1 A A 1,07 :~{.g I 000025 Loss of RHR System J 4 R Oil 5 A K3,o;;L 3,::;

000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water I 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control R AA/.o3 3.&.

System Malfunction I 3 000029 ATWS t 1 K 0;)1 r:K;; b ,;;t:l, I 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture 13 R 032 f 11,;/,,01.,:, 13,8 000040 (BW/E05; CEIE05; W/E12)

R 1110 . 0 4 ,,"$ ,,;;

Steam Line Rupture* Excessive Heal Transfer! 4 000054 (CElEOe) Loss of Main R0 A6'J,J.j} 14.~

Feedwater I 4 000055 Station Blackout I 6 -

000056 Loss of Off-site Power f 6 R () 5 b A "3, () I 3,S

~

057 AA J '/{/Y

'7 000057 Loss of V1tal AC Insl. Bus f 6 v', ()

000058 Loss of DC Power I 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 p" of?;J AG;Q,4, '1 :'.S,l:

000065 Loss of Instrument Air I 8 R Ob'7/1 !< ?" !J4 13 0 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment 1 3 R Wf: I!Yf £/~ ;;:. ;l 3*b WfE11 Loss or Emergency Coolant Recire./4 BWlE04: W/EOS Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 14 A t:;.

./ . :; ,q 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric At; 4.d Grid Disturbances I 6 R

ES-401, REV 9 R0 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 007EA1.10 Reactor Trip* Stabilization* Recovery 3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0

~oooo S/G pressure 11 009EK1.01 Small Break LOCA/3 LOCA / 3 4.2 4.7 ~l 0 0 0 0 0 ODD 0 0 0 0 D0 Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling 011EK2.02 Large Break LOCA 1 3 2.6 2.7 0 ~ DOD 0 0 0 DODO 000 0 0 D 0 Pumps 015AK1.01 RCP Malfunctions / 4 4.4 4.6 ~ D0 DOD 0 0 0 DOD 0 0 0 DOD0 0 0 Natural circulation in a nuclear reactor power plant

_.-=:-::=-........-----==---=--=:-:=--==----=----:----........

022AA1.07 Loss of RxCoolant Makeup 1 2 2.8 2.7 DOD 0 0 0 0 D 0 D 0 ~ 0 ODD 0 0 0 Excess letdown containment isolation valve switches and indicators 025AK3.02 Loss of RHR System /4 3.3 3.7 0 D 0 ~ D 0 D 0 D 0 D 0 0 [] 0 DC] Isolation of RHR low-pressure piping prior to pressure increase above specified level 027AA1.03 027AA 1.03 Pressurizer Pressure Control System 3.6 3.5 0 ODD 0 0 0 D 0 D 0 ~ D 0 DOD 0 0 0 Pressure control when on a steam bubble Malfunction / 3 029EK2.06 ATWS/1 2.9 3.1 0 ~ DOD 0 0 0 ODD 0 0 0 ODD0 0 0 Breakers, relays, and disconnects.

038EA2.06 Steam Gen.

Gen_ Tube Rupture / 3 3.8 4.4 0 0 0 D 0 ODD 0 D 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 DOD Shutdown margins and required boron concentrations 040AK1.04 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 3.2 3.6 ~ 0 DOD0 0 0 D 0 DOD 0 0 0 0 0 Nil ductility temperature Transfer 1 4 054AG2.1.31 Loss of Main Feedwater 1 4 4.6 4.3 DOD 0 0 0 DOD 0 0 0 D 0 D0 D 0 0 ~ Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

Page 1 of 2 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401, REV 9 R0 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 056AK3.01 Loss of Off-site Power 1 6 3.5 3.9 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Order and time to initiation of power for the load sequencer 057AA2.16 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus 1 6 3 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Normal and abnormal PZR level for various modes of plant operation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0o

.-.-.---~~------.

062AG2.4.9 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water 1 4 3.8 4.2 ~

~ Knowledge of low power shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.

065AK3.04 Loss of Instrument Air 1 8 3 3.2 DD~DDDDDDDD Cross-over to backup air supplies

-~~~~~---

077 AG2.2.44 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the Disturbances 1 6 status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions

~---------.--.~----------------------------------:--:---------,--------------

WE04EA2.2 LOCA Outside Containment 1 3 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 0 0 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

WE05EK2.2 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of 3.9 4.2 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary Secondary Heat Sink 1 4 coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the faCility.

Page 2 of 2 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES*401 PWR Examination Outline RO"SRGi E/APE # I Name I Safety Function KKK A A G KIA Topic(s}

12312 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal I 1 000003 Oro ped Control Rod 11 000005 Ino erabletSluck Control Rod 11 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction I 2 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak I 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 14 000059 Accidental Li uld RadWasle ReJ. I 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. I 9 000061 ARM S stem Alarms 17 000067 Plant Fire On-s!le /8 000068 {BW/A06) Control Room Evac. 18 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ.14 BW/E 13&E 14 EO? Rules and Enclosures

ES-401, REV 9 {Zo T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 028AK2.02 Pressurizer Level Malfunction 12 I2 2.6 2.7 0 D ~

~ D D D D 0000 D D D 000 Sensors and detectors 032AK2.01 Loss of Source Range NI/7 2.7 3.1 0 D ~ 0 D D 0 D 00 D0D0D0D0D Power supplies, including proper switch positions 033AA2.12 Loss of Intermediate Range Nil Nil? 7 2.5 3.1 D 0 D0 D0 D0 D0 D 0 D0 ~ D 0 D 0 D 0 Maximum allowable channel disagreement

-:-::-:::---c=--:-:-:-----:::---------- -

036AG2.4.35 Fuel Handling Accident I B S 3.B 3.S 4.0 0 D D D D D D D D D ~

oooooooo~ Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during emergency and the resultant operational effects 037 AA 1.04 037AA1.04 Steam Generator Tube Leak I 3 3.6 3.9 D 0 D0 D0 D0 D0 D 0 ~ D 0 D 0 D 0 D 0 Condensate air ejector exhaust radiation monitor and failure indicator 068AK3.12 Control Room Evac. 18 I8 4.1 4.5 D 0 D0 ~ D 0 D0 D 0 D0 D 0 D 0 D 0 D 0 Required sequence of actions for emergency evacuation of control room

"'-.-~"

WE03EA2.1 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. I 4 3.4 4.2 D 0 D0 D0 D0 0 0DD~DDD 0 ~ 0 0 0 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

WEOSEK1.1 WEOBEK1.1 RCS Overcooling - PTS I 4 3.5 3.8 ~ D 0 D0 D0 D0 D 0 D0 D 0 D 0 D 0 D 0 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

WE1 OEA 1.3 Natural Circ. With Seam Void! 4 3.4 3.7 D 0 D0 D0 D0 D0 D 0 ~ D 0 D 0 D 0 D 0 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401 5QN F~,~ 2010 - 12.0 ExaM 4 Form ES-401-2 I ES*401 ~ PWR E~m;mlnatl0n PWR Examination Outllpe--,

OUtllpe-'-)$RG}

Form ES-401-2 I

1~

System # ! Name

__________________-+~1~2~3~

KK K

I KK 1 2 3 4 IK [ililIt:

K K K 5

K A A A 6 1 2 3 A A A 4

G G

__ +-______________________

KIA Topic(s)

~~+_--~,

IR #

IR

,,~

!)C3 """,-!

003 003 ReactorCoo!antPump Reactor Coolant Pump 1)(;3 t/ Ij 3;3 004 Chemical and Volume I I I I I p, fl{J 1,904 I ,904 jJ jJ I,;*~1 . ~1 f-'

Control l~oo~5~R~e~sl-du-a-IH-e-a-tR-e-m-o-w-I----+-

005 Residual Heat Removal

~

ttt1 If:

Ir-=-OO;::';:6'-'E~m:':;;e:':;;rg::':,e;;"';nCY:';'::'::Co;;"';r;":':e:':':Co':":o:':":!i:':"nQ---~+-+-+-+--+--lI~

006 Emergency Core Cooling f:f-I~+---I- Ie)

Dr;"l Dr;"1 A4; /3 I~K~~~'- +--~~~~~~~~~S~'D)~~-------------+I~~7~--~i IOt'.5 J< 5 ,()~

,ell)it;- /If. 14 f/ /If, 14

/.3 3.j 3,j

!,;J 7

-, b 5.

_~'.

I v

007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench :/,

Tank R '

008 Component Cooling 008 Component Cooling Water Water p

~ A [(JoriA!

1//(; g A ! [) <1. 4 A} ,f)'3

'If;, 3 1£ 11:£ 1r-=-01~0~p~re::.:s;;...;su:.:.:ri~ze:.:..r;;...;p~re~~~u~re~Co~n~~O~I-+-+IJ 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control . LKJr-r-r-r-r-+--r~r'_'i_'D

" ,~')i(!_~k'~_',~,D_;'~

k"~,D;: _____________~12~'~04- ,> 0 __~1 012 Reactor Protection IkTTI It< K {}{} f;( 11,1. /I f, Ol! /<';'7, /<';'7,0; 0; ';(1-:;

I'*i(l-:;

'0. z .. f r:

~ ~

013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation

~, ! tJd rt~ 01 L~,7

-- 022 Containment Cooling Coolinq t, tr/:;;' ;U,O/ 7

",-if~

r' 025 Ice Condenser !f:, ()))' '1. k~!, (;

026 Containment Spray K 0;" ~) " );( l.f*

039 Main and Reheat Steam P, (/-;:,q 6;;7 nf 14~4 059 Main Feedwater R 1)51' IC3,O;(1 3'k-~

061 Auxiliary/Emergency if 1\ ()

Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution

-l-p: OG1,;: I( 4. {);<

I, It:? ',,,'("

063 DC Electrical Distribution R. 0',_:. Ii;') ,Dr ~;? 5' 064 Emergency Diesel Generator g II( 1£1&;4- il1, ;;L K; )5 ~:~

I f7'~ /1 A ,~

073 073 Process Monitoring Process RadiationRadiation Ir:n 1

1/\ 10'73 A

I () I';~ Ill{: 7:' [);1 eX..

117" 13,7 I':),

076 Service Water

[

r::; 07& A,:;J);2* 1,';,7 018 Instrument Air IF () 1?; K :;;',l);) I:¥*]

103 Containment IA R 103/1;),0{ /L~.:./i !i'[~

! KIA 111.6,,; ;g;lo~ryP=o=in=t Ki;;";,,,;;AC;;;8,;;;tteg ;; U~

Totals: ==='=':=b.;13=!ITl1lli,,='=+/-**

Categ()ry Point =To;;;ta;;;ls;;,: ~~Gro;.;;;;;JUP=p.,;o;;in=t Grn" Po'"tTo,"" T,,;,;o;,;;ta;;,;;I:=========d.,,;2;;;;8;,;;;/5;d

ES-401, REV 9 <<.0 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 003K5.01 Reactor Coolant Pump 3.3 3.9 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 The relationship between the RCPS flow rate and the nuclear reactor core operating parameters (quadrant power tilt, imbalance, DNB rate, local power density, difference in loop T-hol pressure) 004A3.05 Chemical and Volume Control 3.9 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 0 RCS pressure and temperature

- - - - - - - - ..- - - . - - - - - - - - . - * - - - - - - - - * * - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . , . - - = : : - - - - : = - - - : - : - : : c = - : - - - - : * - - - c - . . . , - - - - - * - - . . . , - * - - - - - - - -

004A4.13 Chemical and Volume Control 3.3 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 ~O VCT level control and pressure control

---.--~-----~-~--.---.---

005K505 Residual Heat Removal 2.7 3.1 0DDDD~DDDDDD 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Plant response during 'solid plant': pressure change due 10 the relative incompressibility of water

--=~-~

006A 1.14 Emergency Core Cooling 3.6 3.9 0DDDDDD~DDDD 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 Reactor vessel level 007K1.03 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

~OOODDDDDDD RCS 00BA1.04 Component Cooling Water 3.1 3.1 3.2 0DDDDDD~DDDD 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 Surge tank level 00BA2.03 Component Cooling Water 3.0 3.2 0 0 DO~ODO High/low CCW temperature 010K4.02 Pressurizer Pressure Control 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.4 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Prevention of uncovering PZR heaters 012A1.01 Reactor Protection 2.9 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 Trip setpoint adjustment 012K2.01 Reactor Protection 3.3 3.7 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 RPS channels, components and interconnections Page 1 of 3 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401, REV 9 <<0 T2Gl PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 013K2.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3.6 3.8 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ESFAS/safeguards equipment control

._o_~

.-.-~----.-.-------- -,---==-==---=:-=:::--c=--=-=:::-

013K6.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 2.7 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 Sensors and detectors 022K1.01 Containment Cooling 3.5 3.7 ~ 0 0 0 0

~OooODDOooo rOl .~."."

nnn

.-.~--~~

r01 i-I SWS/cooling system 025K4.02 Ice Condenser 2.8 3.0 0ooo~OoOOoOo 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 System control 026K3.02 Containment Spray 4.2 4.3 0Oo~oooo 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 Recirculation spray system 039G2.1.7 Main and Reheat Steam 4.4 4.7 0oooooooooo~

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.

059K3.02 Main Feedwater 3.6 3.7 0oo~ooooooo 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AFW system 061 G2.1.20 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ Ability to execute procedure steps.

062K4.02 AC Electrical Distribution 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Circuit breaker automatic trips 063A2.01 DC Electrical Distribution 2.5 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 0 0 Grounds

---:::c---:-::c---.,-----...---....-----...

064A4.12 Emergency Diesel Generator 2.7 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 Synchroscope Page 2 of 3 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401, REV 9 Ro T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 064K6.08 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.2 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 Fuel oil storage tanks 073A4.02 Process Radiation Monitoring 3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0DD~D 0 ~ 0 Radiation monitoring system control panel 076A3.02 Service Water 3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 Emergency heat loads 078K2.02 Instrument Air 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.S ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

~DDDDDDDDD Emergency air compressor 103A2.04 Containment 3.5 3.S 3.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 0 0 Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)

-=~=-~~~~=-~~~~=--~~------~-------------

103A3.01 Containment 3.9 4.2 0 0 0 0 [J 0 ~ 0 0 Containment isolation Page 3 of 3 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2

~"""" 0",,,",, RaJ PWR Examination OUtl~ Form ES-40 ES-401-2 K~mRO)S~

System # I Name K K KKK A A G KIA Topic(s} IR 1#

1 22 334 4 55 6611233 4 001 Control Rod Drive p.~ [JotI j< ::U! r; I 00 I~/,

I'::' J J 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control lr~ 01<';A,4,1)1

/<'; kef,!)1 13 HI

'J 014 Rod Position Indication ---

~

015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation I Ii

", = !

A 015 Ii .",!J(

,,)/t:, N5,(

,",!J(

1:)!/;'k5,l)r L~l ic/

1,;,(7

,;,(7

~~~ !

L 017 In-core Temperature Monitor !? 0;(/ /\;~ 0; 01 I3 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge f:: {);;; <t It!, 0;;: ~Jt

[1Jl 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling CoolinQ 12, (;~;;3 G ;; ;) 14::1 i4::1 034 Fuel HandlinQ Handling Equipment r;;,

r:f:,O().

o(). (/,b 1,;;(,[;,

035 Steam Generator !kk bY:; 1<4,01 0.:/5 13~

3/6' 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate {<' C5~.; gi,:;

g/, ,3 i;/,,,,,

,j, ""

068 Uquid UQuid Radwaste .

I

-+ JJ I

I 071 Waste Gas Disposal I I rn=

072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection int Totals:

~ I I~trrrr G,,", Po'"' Tota' 1013

ES-401, REV 9 R0 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 001K2.05 Control Rod Drive 3.1 3.5 rJ ~ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ MIG sets 014A4.01 Rod Position Indication 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.1 rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJrJrJrJrJ rJ ~ rJ Rod selection control

,---==--=::--------:---.

015A3.05 Nuclear Instrumentation 2.6 2.7 rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ rJ ~

~ rJ Recognition of audio output expected for a given plant condition 016K5.01 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 2.7 2.8 0 rJ rJ rJ ~ rJ rJ 0 0 0 rJ Separation of control and protection circuits 017A2.01 In-core Temperature Monitor 3.1 3.1 3.5 3.5 rJ 0 rJ rJ rJ 0 ~

rJOrJrJrJO~OrJrJ rJrJ Thermocouple open and short circuits 029A1.02 Containment Purge 3.4 3.4 rJOO~rJOrJrJ Radiation levels "033(32.4.21 033G2.4.21 Spe"nt Fuel Pool Cooling Spent 4.0 4.6 0 rJ 0 0 rJ 0 0 0 0 rJ ~

~ Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions 034K6.02 Fuel Handling Equipment 2.6 3.3 rJ rJ 0 rJ rJ ~ 0 rJ 0 rJ 0 Radiation monitoring systems 035K4.01 Steam Generator 3.6 3.8 0 rJ 0 ~ rJ rJ 0 rJ 0 rJ O~rJrJOOOrJ S/G level control 056K1.03 Condensate 2.6 2.6 ~ rJ 0 0 rJ0 rJ rJ 0 rJ 0 0 rJ MFW Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401, REV 9 gD T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO G2.1.19 Conduct of operations 3.9 3.8 DOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to use plant computer to evaluate system or component status.

G2.1.32 Conduct of operations 3.8 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

..------=::--c--- ._----

G2.1.40 Conduct of operations 2.8 3.9 0 0 0 [J 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements G2.2.40 Equipment Control 3.4 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.

G2.2.6 Equipment Control 3.0 3.0 3.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

DDDDDDDDDD~ Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures G2.3.12 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.5 Radiation Control 2.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to use radiation monitoring systems

- - - - - - - - - - - - -3.5

--- - -0. _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Ability

- to comply with radiation work permit ._------

G2.3.7 Radiation Control 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

DDDDDDDDDD~ requirements during normal or abnormal conditions G2.4.28 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.2 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 00000 DDDD~ Knowledge of procedures relating to emergency response to sabotage.

G2.4.46 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

2 Form ES-401-2 I ES*401 PWR Examination Outline ~sBQ})

/::~ Form E Em Emernencl' bnormal ~OIUtiOnS and Abnormal Plant Evolutions** Tier 1!Group11 1 E/APE #!# ! Name I Safety Function KKK K K A G KIA Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BWlE02&E10:

(BWIE02&E10: CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization* Recovery 11 p fA k:,<

000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accldentf3 000009 Small Break LOCA J 3 rt Is t' .'1

( (:;

(.:; ,:.!,:.1 ,x

, >/0 I,{,{~

000011 Large Break LOCA f 3 1$

IS vI) (1- ;;, o'j

(,- /,,1 1<,,1 oo0015f17 RCP Malfunctions I 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 1 2 000025 Loss of RHR System 14 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 p

ip ,?,l:,l:c 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction I 3 000029 ATWS /1 000038 Steam Gen, Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (BWlE05; (BWIE05; CE/E05; WlE12)

W1E12)

Steam Une Rupture* Excessive Heat Transfer 14 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 000055 Station Blackout f 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power 16 VitalI AC Ins!. Bus 16 000057 Loss of Vila ill S [,C~,~:,

':.' ~:, 1<,

/'.Ci "'I "I " \/

,/

000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 tttt1 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air 18 WlE04 LOCA Outside Containment f 3 t+/-+/-=b WfE11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recire, /4 BWIE04; W/EOS inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink I 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances J 6 I \'" ,

[{

If7/:

ory Totals:

,:;, Group Point Total:

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: lR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 007EA2.04 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 4.6 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 If reactor should have tripped but has not done so, 11 manually trip the reactor and carry out actions in ATWS EOP 009EG2.4.20 Small Break Loc.A:Ts--------*--=3-=.8-LOCA 1 3 3.8 4.34c-:.3 0 0 00 00 00 00 0 0DDDD~0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes notes..

.. __::-c-,__-- ------

011 EA2.07 Large Break LOCA 13 3.2 3.4 0 0DDDD~DOD 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 That equipment necessary for functioning of critical pump water seals is operable

- -~--------~

-~--~---~.

026AA2.02 Loss of Component Cooling Water 1 /8 2.9 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 fl(] 0 0 0 The cause of possible CCW loss 056AG2.1.19 Loss of Off-site Power 1/66 3.9 3.8 DO DOD 0 DOD 0 ~ Ability to use plant computer to evaluate system or component status.

077 AG2.2.44 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the Disturbances I/ 6 status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401 501l! reb loW - <5 fU) fYd /41.. 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form E

~

Emergency and Abno E/APE # f Name I Safety Function K K K A G KIA Topic(s) IR 1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal! 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod 11 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod f 1 U " 1)(; ,) ,:) :;": ,~ 0 000024 Emergency Boration { 1 !) ;;,' 1 A, /';, ".' () i 4f 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction I 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI/7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range Nt f 7 :;: , .f, "~

000036 (BWfA08) Fuel Handling Acddenl f 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak 13 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 14 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste ReI. J 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. 19 000061 ARM System Alarms I 7 I 000067 Plant Fire On-site I B 000068 (BW/A06} Control Room Evae. f B 000069 {WIE14) Loss of CTMT Integrity 15 000074 (WfE06&E07) rnad. Core Cooling 14 ,fi. (/ 7 "':/. l~, "". ~/: 4.<,'

000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity I 9 WIE01 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination I 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure! 4 WIE15 Containment Flooding! 5 WlE16 High Containment Radiation 19 BW/A01 Plant Runbaek / 1 BW/A02&AQ3 Loss of NNI-XlY I 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip I 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation I 6 BW/A07 Flooding I 8 BWIE03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin I 4 BWfE08: WlE03 LOCA Cootdown

Depress. 14 8W/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&EiO Natura! Clre,! 4 8W/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A 11; WIEOS RCS Overcoolinq

PTS I 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage 12 CE/E09 Functional Recovery KIA Category Point Totals: la 'J Gr GiJ

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 005AG2.4.35 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 3.8 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [] 0 ~ Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during emergency and the resultant operational effects 024AA2.01 Emergency Boration 1 1 3.8 4.1 o0 0 LJ 0DOD 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

~OOO Whether boron flow and/or MOVs are malfunctioning from plant conditions 033AA2.03 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 2.8 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Indication of blown fuse

--:-=--~= ---------.-.--.-

074EG2.2.44 Inad. Core Cooling 1 4 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 0 0OOOOOOOOO~

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

4 Form ES-401-2 r:::: PWR Examination Outline RO Form ES-401*2 System # f Name K K K K K A A A A G KIA Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 I 003 Reactor Coolan! Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal Is' "

'" ,1,/

006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation

."?,, t}}£ ;'f ,.

~

022 Containment Cooling 025 fce Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam ~S (J :+ 1):/,:) I" '/

059 Main Feedwater 061 AuxiliarylEmergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution LULL j j 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring

)5'

?

Ii

/L FR .:?

076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment

2815

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 005G2.2.40 Residual Heat Removal 3.4 3.4 4.7 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.

c--=:--= --::-c:--:=-==--

012G2.4.11 Reactor Protection 4.0 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

DDDDDDDD~ Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

~

039A2.02 Main and Reheat Steam 2.4 2.7 0 0 0 DOD 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 DDD~DDD Decrease in turbine load as it relates to steam escaping from relief valves 064A2.16 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.3 3.7 DO 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Loss of offsite power during full-load testing of ED/G 073A2.02 Process Radiation Monitoring 2.7 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Detector failure Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401 5QAI rt6 ;;)Of tJ- 5(20 f'x.vw- 5 Form ES-401-2 i cO-"V PWR Examination Outline F iSRoV System # I Name 001 Control Rod Drive K K 1ft'K K A A 1 245 6 1 2 G KIA Toplc(s) t- #

002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation I 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control

/; f 14 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool CoolinQ 034 Fuel Handling EqUipment 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam DumplTurbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator iiS' {} t;~; I , ;;J :.*,2 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 liquid Radwaste 1=

071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water I..>' ~!::( /: ';i , 3) 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: lR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 028A2.03 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.4 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 The hydrogen air concentration in excess of limit flame Control propagation or detonation with resulting eqUipment damage in containment 055G2.1.20 Condenser Air Removal 4.6 4.6 0 0 0 [J 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to execute procedure steps.

075Az:o:l-6irCulating 075A2.01 Circulating Water 3.0 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 0 0 Loss of intake structure Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: ">,,/., /:9) 9"ii ,4/ , Date of Exam: ;" . '"" ;:';:if ,,)

Category KJA# Topic RO SRO-Onfy IR # IR #

( .* ,r*.'

2.1.;: '" r;, l'{ ,,~ ,I, ., ,$.*A / ! ~//,,/ ;~V:" j A~/~ 1)1+ :~ !?

1.

2.1./;/1 '>;;! 'IA' l. "!,f~v£?/;

I l ;,.: v\ ill S,. ,',. ~ J., \ 4D Conduct of Operations 2.1.

2.1.

.l 2.1.

2.1.

Subtotal

i ,.:1:

2.2. ',;,' ;> * .'r'i;>' 'C'; I; i .. ,)'"i< 4,/

2.2. ;'7 fi. ':/.;;;.

i

/1 . :"1' * ,:); ; >,;

ttlU

2. 2.2.

Equipment Control 2.2.

2.2.

1= !

2.2. I I

Subtotal i 1 ' ;J;.

2.3. := "

';';,.; f' '; ,,'; "",I.. i :;:1 i

2.3.

3. 2.3.

Radiation Control 2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal I I

2.4. b ',0;, Vi, l;.",' ~'t\>/ [.~:.;')r /, J,,;# .' /;:It;;,~tA.~ I /. 'if 4.

2.4 .. {ft' ;'U','

{

f',~J' ' ! "'#'7 /. . "

C' *~'t*: 'd . 1, :;

Emergency 2.4.

Procedures I Plan 2.4. \

2.4. "v i

2.4. .;fJ;J1 'ii' Subtotal P,/A ller 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Ai A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO G2.1.26 Conduct of operations 3.4 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

G2.1.29 Conduct of operations Ccnduct 4.1 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc.

G2.2.12 Equipment Control 3.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

-""- ----~---------~

G2.2.17 Equipment Control 2.6 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations.

G2.3.5 Radiation Control 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 0 0DODDDDDD~

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to use radiation monitoring systems G2.4.12 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.0 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities during emergency operations.

~- -------"--"-------------------~

G2.4.6 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.7 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

~ Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.

Page 1 of 1 6/25/2009 12:27 PM

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3

" j It ~I "

",;,!,-C.' j Date of Exam: 1 /' ,; ,;:: (.'! ()

Category KlA# Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1. i;1 i . . '? ,I . ". ; "/< /.;. y:,.; ,',:, : '1(' . ,,1 Al!A /A

2. L ~:,:j .,,-;,:. j'! :;

1.

Conduct 2.1. (r)

. 'f;>: ii.

,..

, hi.**. " "'I

.'; I';~'

j /" j, ' "

/.

.'. 'i

,/ k of Operations 2.1.

2.1. I 2.1.

Subtotal :3 I 2.2. (, " pi (,' , . : i

" I :,

I ,,'.

.' /:

'",: il*.,

2.2. .. i i , '

2. 2.2.

Equipment Control 2.2. j 2,2.

2.2.

Subtotal ~

2.3. J j,d,' //:,IA p} . /;: ','. !.~? :**1>*':****...:* .j 2.3. / ,: *r*~i <l.' i." /. r f./;; / ,'. f:;, , /~/.;;, A,"

i z !

~

3. 2.3. i"./ * ' : ",,'!. ';' I: .*': * " i "/,,,,

I " ,

Radiation Control ~3.

.3. :

2.3.

Subtotal :3 1 i

2.4.jJ( /.; ,(, ",".,;.: f I .. ']_:- r". .*"'l: ,,',2 \

4. 2.4.1{ ;/ . .:.,' ;) '",,".; "f f'j" " (,j :" ;: :

Emergency Procedures I 2A. I ! I Plan 2.4. I \ I 2.4. 'Lli ~

2.4.

Subtotal ;Z "A V

'~?4 Tier 3 Point T ota! j{) 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA 1/1 (RO) 077 AG2.2.22 Chief Examiner: For an RO applicant, the Grid Instability topic does not lend itself to generic KIA for LCOs and safety limits. Randomly re-selected 077 AG2.2.44 [Interpret CR indications]

2/1 (RO) 010 K6.04 Chief Examiner: KIA required impact of PRT malfunction on Pzr Pressure Control ... which excessively overlaps with another Tier 2 Group 1 KIA 007K1.03 [physical connections/cause-effect relationship of PRT and RCS.

Randomly re-selected K4.02 [Prevent Uncovering Pzr Heaters]

2/1 (RO) 022 K1.04 Chief Examiner: SON does not use chilled water for containment cooling. Randomly re-selected K1.01

[SWSiCooling System].

2/2 (RO) 079 K4.01 Chief Examiner: KIA required knowledge of cross-connect between Service Air and Instrument air ... which excessively overlaps with Tier 1 Group 1 KIA [loss of instrument air and cross-over to backup air supplies] at SON. Randomly re-selected 035 K4.01 [S/G Level Control]

3 (RO) G2.1.9 Chief Examiner: Pure generic KIA required test item related to directing personnel activities inside the control room. This KIA is not conducive to a discriminating question at the RO level. Randomly re-selected G2.1.32 [Explain/apply System P&Ls]

1/2(SRO) 074 EG2.2.36 Chief Examiner: The Inadequate Core Cooling topic does not lend itself to generic KIA topic of maintenance activities and LCO status. Randomly re-selected G2.2.44 [Interpret CR indications]

2/1(SRO) 064 A2.09 Chief Examiner: KIA required test item related to synchronization of the EDG w/ other electric power supplies ... which excessively overlaps w/ RO T2G1 064A4.12

[synchronization of EDG]. Randomly re-selected A2.16

[LOOP during full EDG load testing]

1/2(SRO) 005AG2.4.35 Licensee: Could not write a discriminating question at the SRO level (due to generic knowledge associated with local AO tasks); Chief Examiner randomly selected G2.4.46 [10-13-09]

1/1 056 AG2.1.19 Licensee: Could not write a question to test SRO applicant's (SRO) ability to use the plant computer as it relates to LOOP, e.g.,

off site power sources not a "live" screen, no actions in ECA-0.0 requiring plant computer displays, etc. Chief Examiner randomly selected 056 2.1.23

ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6 Il:!cilit y:

Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 3/03/2010 Exam Level: RO X SROX Item Description Initial a b* c#

1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility. ~

~ ~1Il:}- l)X t~

2. a. NRC KlAs are referenced for all questions.

b. objectives are referenced as available.

Facility learning objectives i1k ~

3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401 (W (VIJP 1t1Y Btl-

4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).

X-

5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:

(~ ~

_ the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or

_ the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or t..

_ the examinations were developed independently; or ~

_X_ the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain) tr\Y

~1M

6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, Bank Modified New at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter 21f-Jjfk.. I-l?

)?

the actual RO / SRO-only Question question distributiot}(s) distribution(s) at right. 35/2 11 /6 29/17

7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are Memory CIA written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected KlAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) 35/9 40/16 ~ VJ-Y

~

at right.

8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors. ~ 'VIr- flX...

9.

10.

Question content conforms with specific KIA statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assiQned; assigned; deviations are justified.

Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.

n

~

'lilY $PI 11.(' ~

11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet. ~ 11t 25J.c Printed Nap:1~gnature Date

a. Author Mike Buckner jtJft Ijfc~/- 2/;1.'1&",>"

b. Facility Reviewer (*) Van Ford tla.-v.. -:;..,-.

t/a.-v.. -:;..,-. d- 2-(:2-4 {to c.

d.

NRC Chief Examiner (#)

NRC Regional Supervisor

£.12lA.NO U&A~/

"g,12lA.NO ~~/ ~ (}bA

/.MJ.WUJ. 17\AfIDIJ MlN/~

"An"....,~

(lkPf~ ~

II if1(jlto i///jlto {)

I ~ -

Note:

The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.

Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.

)

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 1 of 80 ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only New Avoid using the words "should" or "could occur" The question must be tightly worded as to what is "required" and "will occur."

New RO items preliminarily determined unacceptable: 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 22, 23,45,49,51,54,72 (total of twelve)>> 16% unacceptable New SRO items preliminarily determined unacceptable: 83, 87, 92 (total of three) >> 12% unacceptable New Overall unacceptable items (preliminary, RO+SRO) is 15%

New Appears to be more higher cognitive level questions on the RO test; need to verify enough lower cognitive questions to meet NUREG criteria New Very little coverage of Tech Specs on the SRO exam; appears to mostly be procedure selection being tested.

New The annunciators listed in the stem of the question seem to use a longer than necessary numerical descriptor, i.e., "1-XA-55-3B" versus "M3-B, E-1." This should be listed after the alarm window in parenthesis.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 2 of 80 Instructions

[Refer to Section 0 of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F}undamental or (H}igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOO) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy- difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are deSignated SRO-on/y (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Enter question source: (B}ank, (M}odified, or (N}ew. Check that (M}odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section O.2.f.

7. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U}nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E}ditorial enhancement, or (S}atisfactory?

8. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 3 of 80 ES-401 2 Form ES-401 -9

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 1 H 2 x N E 007 EA1.10

1. Cred Dist: "A" and "0" are not plausible because the Tavg mode cannot be operated manually. (borderline)

2. Q=KlA: This question is supposed to target the emergency abnormal Tier 1 category. The choices seem to test the applicants' knowledge of the Tier 2 aspect (normal system operation) of the Steam Dumps. (borderline)

Suggest the following:

Unit 2 is starting up at 2% power with the Steam Dump Control System operating as follows:

Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch (HS-1-103D): STEAM PRESS Steam Dump Pressure Controller (PIC-1-33): AUTO A spurious reactor trip occurs; however, the "B" reactor trip breaker fails to open.

WOOTF identifies the steam generator pressure setpoint BEFORE the crew transitions to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, and the required actions to manually control steam generator pressure AFTER ES-0.1 has been entered?

A. SG pressure corresponding to Tavg of 547"F (-1005 psig)

Use the lever at the bottom ofthe PIC-1-33 controller B. SG pressure corresponding to Tavg of 552°F (-1047 psig)

Use the lever at the bottom ofthe PIC-1-33 controller C. SG pressure corresponding to Tavg of 547°F (-1005 psig) Use the setpoint up/down push buttons D. SG pressure corresponding to Tavg of 552°F (- 1047 psig)

Use the setpoint up/down pushbuttons

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 4 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 2 H 2 x x B E 009 EK1.01

1. Cred Dis!: "c is not plausible because the applicants know that n

SAMG criteria is not being tested.

th

2. Stem Focus: The 6 bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.

st th

3. Stem Focus: The 1 and 5 bullets can be combined to streamline the question.

Suggest the following:

A small break LOCA has occurred and the RCPs have been tripped in accordance with the EOPs. The following conditions currently exist:

- SI pumps failed to start RCS Pressure is 1200 psig

RCS Hot Legs and the Reactor Vessel Head have voided WOOTF identifies one current method of core COOling and a note provided in ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization?

A. Natural Circulation During RCS depressurization, pressurizer level indication may rapidly rise B. Reflux boiling During ReS depressurization, pressurizer level indication may rapidly rise C. Natural Circulation During RCS depressurization, pressurizer level indication may rapidly lower D. Reflux boiling During RCS depressurization, pressurizer level indication may rapidly lower

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 5 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EtS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 3 H 2 x x B E 011 EK2.02

1. Cred Dis!: "A" is not plausible because it states to "do nothing different that you were planning on doing." In other words, the stem already states that 63-5 is ready to be closed and "A" states to go ahead and close 63-5 with no other required actions even though an RHR Pump has just tripped.

2. Stem Focus: The 4th bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.

3. Stem Focus: The word "correct" in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response

4. Stem Focus: Whenever applicable, ensure the phrase "in accordance with .... " Is pasted after the stem question. This ensures that there is only one correct answer. In all procedure related questions, ensure that the stem question includes "in accordance with ...[procedure name)"

See suggestion on the following row:

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 6 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 3 H 2 x x B E Suggest the following:

A large break LOCA occurred on Unit 1 and the crew is currently implementing ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump. The following conditions currently exist:

Both RHR Pumps are running aligned to the Containment Sump and RWST

The charging pump suction from the RWST has been manually isolated

The crew is ready to close 1-FCV-63-5, SI Pump Suction from RWST

RHR Pump 1A-A subsequently trips WOOTF identifies the expected Charging Injection Header Flow Indication (CCPIT) and the required "response not obtained (RNO)"

actions for the following continuous monitoring step in accordance with ES-1.3?

"14. Monitor Both RHR Pumps Running" A. Greater than zero; Ensure 1B-B CCP and 1B-B SI Pumps are running and then place the 1A-A CCP and 1A-A SI Pumps control switches to the pull-to-/ock (P- T-L) position B. Greater than zero:

Close 1-FCV-63-72, Train A Containment Sump Valve C. Zero; Ensure 1B-B CCP and 1B-B SI Pumps are running and then place the 1A-A CCP and 1A-A SI Pumps control switches to the pull-to-Iock (P- T-L) position D. Zero; Close 1-FCV-63-72, Train A Containment Sump Valve

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 7 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LaD (F/H)

(FtH) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Focus TtF Dis!. Link Iu~{ts I~ack-Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back-units ward Q=

KIA Only B/M/N utEtS SRO BtMtN utE/S Explanation 4 H 2 x x B E 015AK1.01

1. Cred Dis!: Because the choices aren't parallel; i.e., "B" is the only choice which states that forced circulation is the heat removal mechanism, this makes "B" not plausible.

th

2. Stem Focus: The 3'd and 5 sUb-bullet has two different fonts Suggest writing a 2-part question to test the applicants' knowledge of

1) one natural eirc indication [T cold at saturation temperature for SG pressure (vs. Thot at saturation temperature for SG pressure)] AND

2) one implication of a natural circ cool down [emergency boration is required (vs not required)] Both of these items are fundamental knowledge items; therefore, the question can be classified as fundamental knowledge.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 8 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 5 H 2 x x x N U 022 AA1.07

1. Q=KlA: This is a tough KIA to hit because it requires a loss of reactor coolant makeup. The question (as proposed) does not involve a loss of reactor coolant makeup. It involves a loss of letdown, requiring excess letdown to be placed in service.

Discuss altematives with the licensee; Chief Examiner may need to replace the KIA.

2. Cues: Choices "A", "B", and "0" include the cue of a containment isolation signal. Suggest the following choices:

A. 62-59 will automatically divert to the RCDT. 62-61 and 62-63 will NOT auto-close.

B. 62-61 and 62-63 will auto-close; Seal Return Relief Valve will open to the PRT C. No automatic actions occur at this time. At 1.5 psig, 62-61 and 62-63 will auto-close; Seal Return Relief Valve will open to the PRT D. No automatic actions occur at this time. At 2.81 psig, 62-61 and 62-63 will auto-close; Seal Return Relief Valve will open to the PRT st

3. Stem Focus: The 1 four bullets should all be past tense. The only bullet with present tense should be the last bullet.

4. Stem Focus: The stem question should be targeted to elicit the response from the choices provided, i.e., the stem question as proposed asks the applicants to describe how flow will be affected whereas each choice presents an automatic actuation sequence.

The stem question can be more appropriately worded as "WOOTF predicts the status of the Excess Letdown Valves?"

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 9 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Crecl. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 6 F 2 x x N E 025AK3.02

1. Job Link: Presumably the reason that the 1A-A RHR Pump trips is to meet the KIA [Loss of RHR]; however, tripping of the pump is directed by AOP-R.03 when RCS pressure continues to rise. The ARP for the high pressure condition requires to the operator to first attempt to adjust charging/letdown to remedy the high pressure condition. An applicant can potentially argue that this question is not operationally relevant because the stem doesn't follow the required actions listed in the ARP and AOP; therefore, the question may be deleted from the exam.

51

2. Q=KlA: Because the 1 portions of each choice are unique, the applicants are not being tested on the "reason" (2 nd ) portion of the KIA statement.

Suggest the following:

Unit 1 is in Mode 5 with the pressurizer solid. Train ':4" is operating in Shutdown Cooling. The following alarm is received:

FCV-74-112 TROUBLE OR RHR PRESS HI (M6-6, E-7)

The operator attempted to adjust letdown and charging; however, the alarm condition did not clear and RCS pressure continued to slowly rise. The operator subsequently manually tripped the 1A-A RHR Pump and noted that RCS Pressure was still slowly rising.

WOOTF identifies the RCS Pressure at which the operator is directed to manually close FCV-1 and -2 in accordance with AOP-R.03, RHR System Malfunction, including the reason for this required action?

A. 380 psig; prevent inventory loss B. 380 psig; prevent over pressurization of the PRT C. 450 psig; prevent inventory loss D. 450 psig; prevent over pressurization of the PRT

3. Verify no overlap wI RO Q#31

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 10 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EtS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 7 H 2 x x B U 027 AA1.03

1. Use the EXACT wording engraved on Pressurizer Pressure HI (LO) Alarm Window (also specified in ARP) followed by parentheses containing the shortest possible abbreviated window location designation that the applicants are familiar with. This ensures no misunderstanding as to the alarm being referenced.

2. Cred Dis!: "A" is not plausible because IF the 68-340A "sees" nd actual pressure rising, (HI alarm) THEN the 2 part (pressure will rise) is not plausible.

3. Cred Dis!: "0" is not plausible because IF the 68-340A "sees" actual pressure lowering, (LO alarm) THEN the 2 nd part (pressure will lower) is not plausible.

2. #/units: Include the controller numbers, i.e., PIC-68-340A, etc. in the stem.

Suggest the following:

The unit is operating at 85% power and both Pressurizer Spray Valve Controllers (#ID ) are in MANUAL with their output set to "0."

WOOTF predicts the plant response if the Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller (#10 ) output signalfails to 100%?

A. PS-68-340F/G PRESSURIZER PRESS ABOVE REF SET POINT (M5-A, B-3) will alarm; Actual pressure will remain the same.

B. PS-68-340F/G PRESSURIZER PRESS ABOVE REF SET POINT (MS-A, B-3) will alarm; Actual pressure will lower.

C. PS-68-340G/F PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOW BACKUP HTRS ON (M5-A, 0-4) will alarm; Actual pressure will rise D. PS-68-340G/F PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOW BACKUP HTRS ON (M5-A, 0-4) will alarm; Actual pressure will remain the same.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 11 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LaD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 8 H 2 x x M U 029 EK2.06

1. Q=KlA: The question does not meet the Tier 1 aspects, i.e.,

doesn't test applicants' knowledge of the abnormal control room indications or emergency procedures for an ATWS as it relates to the trip breakers. The proposed question is testing the applicants' knowledge of the reactor trip breakers from a systems perspective, i.e., Tier 2. See 012, RPS, K6.03, Trip logic circuits and A2.06, rd Failure of RPS signal to trip the reactor. The 3 bullet is provided to the applicants even though the KIA requires Suggest testing the applicants' knowledge of FR-S.1 required actions and the local manipulations that must be taken at the breaker cubicle(s).

2. Backwards: The question (as written) asks the applicants to decide which malfunction "would have contributed" to the past failure. Typically, the NRC exam questions ask the applicant to predict the impact of a failure on the plant, i.e., how an event affects the plant. The question (as written) asks the applicants to look back at an event and then predict what could have caused it.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 12 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 5. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 9 H 2 x x x N E 038 EA2.05

1. Cred Dis!: "B" is not plausible because it is the only choice that does not provide an action to take.

2. Stem Focus: "B" and "C" also include "reasons" even though the stem question does not ask for a reason; therefore these two choices may not be plausible.

3. Job-link: Step 4.d in ES-3.1 requires the operator to perform O-SI-NUC-OOO-038 to determine the required RCS boron concentration required for cold shutdown. The KIA requires testing the applicants' ability to determine the boron concentration OR to interpret the required boron concentration. Ask the licensee when ROs perform this SI.

4. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question as follows:

"WOOTF identifies an action that is required to be performed BEFORE a cooldown can be commenced and the reason why the cooldown should be promptly initiated at a rate near 100°Flhr in accordance with ES-3.1?"

A. Borate the RCS > 35 gpm from the BA T; Inadvertent criticality could occur during for a slower cooldown rate B. Inject Boric Acid into the Secondary side of #2 SG using AFW; longer operation of the RCPs is permitted C. Borate the RCS > 35 gpm from the BAT; longer operation of the RCPs is permitted D. Inject Boric Acid into the Secondary side of #2 SG using AFW; Inadvertent criticality could occur during for a slower cooldown rate

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 13 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 10 F 1 x x x B E 040 AK1.04

1. Q=KlA: The choices are testing Generic Fundamentals Knowledge; i.e., the plant specific portion of the question (Left of Limit A on Curve 2) is not necessary to choose the correct answer because all the answers have a "bad" thing occurring. The question should test a plant specific knowledge.

2. Partial: An applicant can also argue "C" as correct. Whenever applicable, ensure the phrase "in accordance with .... " Is pasted after the stem question. This ensures that there is only one correct answer. In all procedure related questions, ensure that the stem question includes "in accordance with ...[procedure name]"

3. Cred Dist: "A" is not plausible because of the word "fatigue" (i.e.,

"cyclic" ) since this does not occur during a rapid cool down. (GFES knowledge).

4. Cred Dist: "D" is not plausible because it is the only choice that contains a "reason." This choice is not psychometrically balanced with the other choices.

Suggest the following:

A steam line rupture has occurred on Unit 2.

WOOTF points indicates a Pressurized Thermal Shock condition and identifies how this condition affects the reactor vessel in accordance with FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, and EPM-3-FR-P1, Basis Document for FR-P. 1?

A. To the LEFT of Limit A on Curve 2; an existing flaw could propagate B. To the RIGHT of Limit A on Curve 2; new flaw can develop C. To the LEFT of Limit B on Curve 2; an existing flaw could propagate D. To the RIGHT of Limit B on Curve 2; new flaw can develop Alternatively, test the applicants' knowledge of mitigation activities associated with a faulted SG in FR-P.1

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 14 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 11 H 2 x x x x M U 054 AG2.1.31

1. Job-Link: This question will be targeted to ONLY Unit 1 because DCS Modification D22239A replaces the SGWLC System Main Control Room components on Unit 2. The NRC Operator Licenses will be issued on both units, contingent on the applicants' successful completion of their training and evaluation for this modification.

2. Q=KlA: The generic KIA requires testing the applicants' knowledge of the control room switches, controls, and indications.

The question (as proposed) tests the applicants' knowledge of the required position (closed) following a FWI signal. This generic K/A as applied to the stem question would require testing the applicants' knowledge for the eXQ.ected indications on the 1-L/C-3-35, -48, -90, -

103 controllers following a loss of main feed water. In other words, the question should test the applicants' knowledge of what the controller looks like following a FWI signal.

Suggest providing a picture of the controller and test the applicants knowledge of the expected indications such as AUTO/MAN lamps, bar graph indication, and/or set point line indicator.

th

3. Cue: The 5 bullet in the stem cues the applicant that an isolation signal has occurred. Suggest providing an actual FWI signal in the stem, i.e., Hi-Hi SG level, SI, or Rx Trip/Lo Tavg.

4. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question and eliminate the words "would be" in each choice. "WOOTF predicts the position of the MFW 8yp Valves and the expected SG level trend?"

A. closed; rising B. open; lowering .... etc.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page Page 15 15 of of 80 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q#

Q# LOK LOK LOD (F/H)

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 12 12 H H 3 x x x B U 056 AK3.01 nd

1. Cue: The 2 nd portion of the stem is a cue because of the words

".. .following the SI signaL?" This phrase cues the applicants that choices "A" and "B" are incorrect because they occur after the shutdown board voltage is restored. This phrase is not needed to elicit the correct response.

2. Q=KlA: The KIA requires testing the applicants' knowledge of the reasons for the order/time sequencing. The question (as proposed) does not test the applicants' knowledge of the reasons.

2. Stem Focus: The words "due to blackout" are redundant to all four choices and are not needed to elicit the correct response.

3. Stem Focus: The words "... Assuming all equipment operates as designed .. " is not needed to elicit the correct response.

4. Stem Focus: The LOCA event can be concisely worded (at time 13.5 seconds) as 'Valid Safety Injection (SI) Signal"

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 16 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 13 H 2 x x B E 057 AA2.16

1. #/units: The choices should reflect the controller numbers in the main control room (instead of the flow control valve (FCV) designations): i.e., HIC-62-93A and HIC-62-89A.

2. Stem Focus: Whenever applicable, ensure the phrase "in accordance with .... " Is pasted after the stem question. This ensures that there is only one correct answer. In all procedure related questions, ensure that the stem question includes "in accordance with ...[procedure name]"

Suggest the following:

WOOTF controllers is required to be placed in MANUAL (will no longer function in AUTOMA TIC), including the required action in accordance with AOP-P-0.3, Loss of Unit 1 Vital Instrument Power Board?

HIC-62-93A, Charging Flow Control HIC-62-89A, Charging Seal Water Flow Control A. HIC-62-93A; control pressurizer level at or trending to 25%.

B. HIC-62-93A; control pressurizer level at or trending to 60%

C. HIC-62-89A; control seal injection between 6 - 11 gpm D. HIC-62-89A; control seal injection between 3 - 4 gpm Note: The power loss involves essentially the same board as Q#20 and Q#38.

14

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 17 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EtS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 15 F 2 x x N E 065AK3.04 nd

1. Q=KlA: The 2 part of the question (reason for the actuation) is st not being tested because each of the 1 parts is unique. In other words, an applicant only needs to know the actuation set point and he/she can get the correct answer without knowing the reason.

2. Partial: An applicant can potentially argue that there is no correct answer because the "reason" listed in Choice "A" does not exactly match the lesson plan. Whenever applicable, ensure the phrase "in accordance with .... " Is pasted after the stem question. This ensures that there is only one correct answer. In all procedure related questions, ensure that the stem question includes "in accordance with .. .[procedure name]" .

The reason listed in OPT200.CSA for why the 0-FCV-32-85 isolates was .. " to isolate the non-essential portion from essential air portion during a degraded non-essential air pressure below 69 psig." The lesson plan is normally not referenced in NRC test questions. Is there an FSAR section that identifies the reason for the isolation? If not, then the exact wording from the lesson plan must be used.

16 F 2 x x N E 077 AG2.2.44

1. Cues: The proposed question does not test the applicants ability to interpret control room indications because the stem provides cues such as "the generator voltage regulator is taken to manual .. " and

'WOOTF identifies the max generator voltage allowed .. " These items cue the applicant as to what the alarm [GEN EXCITER FIELD OVERCURRENTj means.

Suggest keeping the alarm .. but providing the applicant with pictures of control board meter indications for VARS and MW and then testing the applicants' ability to determine whether these indications exceed GOI-6 limits and the required operator actions, including any new limits when regulator is in Manual.

2. Cred Dis!: "C" and "0" are not plausible because it is never wrong to notify the SELD.

Ensure no overlap wI SRO Q#81

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 18 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E1S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 17 F 2 x B E WE04 EA2.2 1.Stem Focus: The first 3 bullets can be steamlined or eliminated as follows:

Following a reactor trip, abnormal radiation was noted in the Aux Building due to a loss of RCS inventory outside containment.

WOOTF identifies a required action and the subsequent check used to determine whether or not the leak is isolated in accordance with ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment?

18 F 2 x M E WE05 EK2.2

1. Stem Focus: The word "Intact" is provided in all 4 choices; therefore it is not necessary to elicit the correct response.

2. Stem Focus: The order of the two parts of the stem question is confusing because they don't flow logically, i.e.,

one would first determine which SG to use and THEN determine what feed water source was available.

Suggest the following:

WOOTF identifies the preference for restoring a SG as a heat sink and the order in which the feed water sources are attempted in accordance with FR-H. 1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink?

A. Feed a ruptured SG before feeding a faulted SG TDAFW, MFW, Condensate, MDAFW using ERCW B. Feed a ruptured SG before feeding a faulted SG MDAFW; TDAFW, MFW, Condensate C. Feed a faulted SG before feeding a ruptured SG TDAFW, MFW, Condensate, MDAFW using ERCW D. Feed a faulted SG before feeding a ruptured SG MDAFW, TDAFW, MFW, Condensate

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 19 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 19 H 3 x B S 028AK2.02

1. Job-Link: Discuss the simulator validation times (i.e., the times until a reactor trip occurs for each of the four transmitter failures) with the licensee. Consider listing these times in the distractor analysis for each level transmitter failure.

20 F 2 x x x B E 032AK2.01

1. Cred Dis!: "B" is not plausible because the stem states that N-32 has failed; therefore, placing the audio CR selector switch to a broken channel does not make sense.

2. Job-Link: Did M-4B, A-2 also alarm? [SOURCE/INTERMED RANGE CH II TROUBLE]. If so, then provide this alarm (and all associated alarms) in the stem. This is needed in order for the applicant to diagnose the problem.

3. Q=KlA: How is the proposed question testing the applicants' knowledge of power supplies? Suggest failing a vital instrument board and provide ALL associated alarms in the stem and then test applicants' knowledge of required switch positions to recover a SRM feature.

Note: The power loss involves essentially the same board as Q#13 and Q#38.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 20 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 21 H 2 x x x N E 033 AA2.12

1. #/units: The readings provided in the stem do not match the units provided on the M-4 indicators for the N-35 and N-36 meters [1-XI-92-5003A and -5004A]. The meters read out in powers of 10; therefore, the stem should provide the same units as the applicants' would encounter on panel M-4. For example, at 0800, the reading 1

would be 10 (instead of 10%). Also, the meter numbers should also be provided in the stem so that the applicant knows these readings were obtained at panel M-4.

2. Job Link: Discuss required actions if the indicators at Panel M-4 exceed the max allowable deviation at the same time that the IR drawer indications are correct. Is there an LCO? TRM? (just for the M-4 indicators?) Note 27 (in 1-SI-OPS-000-002.0) states that "readings on both channels will provide evidence that the instruments are operable." Is this all that's required for operability? Are both indicators inoperable or just one?

2. Stem Focus: The words "control board readings" in the stem question should exactly match the words in 1-SI-OPS-000-002.0, Note 27, i.e., "control board indicators"

3. Reference Provided: Ask the licensee how much of 1-SI-OPS-000-002.0 is being provided to the applicants. All pages? Only one page?

4. Stem Focus:

WOOTF identifies the correct status ofthe M-4 meter indications for N-35 and N-36, in accordance with 1-SI-OPS-OOO-002.0, Shift Log?

A. 5003A and 5004A are both operable B. 5003A and 5004A are BOTH inoperable C. ONLY 5003A is inoperable; 5004A remains operable D. ONLY 5004A is inoperable; 5003A remains operable 22 H 2 x N U 036 AG2.4.35

1. Cred Dis!: "A" and "B" are not plausible because with any "leak" in progress, one always closes or isolates components instead of opening them. Suggest testing the RO applicants' knowledge of the hand wheel location for the 78-610 wafer valve and how this will affect the lowering cavity level (in the event of a reactor cavity seal leak.)

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 21 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 23 H 1 x N U 037 AA1.04

1. Q=KlA: In the context of a SGTL, the KIA should be testing the applicants' ability to monitor the alarm limits for CVE radiation monitors, including after chemistry has calculated 90-119 or 90-99 alarm limits for primary to secondary leakage. The question (as proposed) renders "B" and "0" as not plausible because the stem states that 90-99 went "offscale high" with no change in PZR level or Charging flow. The KIA statement (failure indicator) may be referring to a warning light on the 90-99 -119 drawer; however, in the context of a SGTL, this phrase is most likely referring to a tube failure indicator based on alarm limits for CVE radiation monitors.

2. Cred Oist: "C" is not plausible because IF the CVP discharge filter was plugged, the rad monitor would not rapidly rise and go offscale high.

3. LOO=1: This question will not provide any discriminatory value on the exam because of Items #1 and #2 above.

4. May be able to use Q#51 to meet this KIA; ensure no overlap 24 F 2 x N E 068 AK3.12 The sequence being tested must be an actual sequence specified in the AOP-C.04. Also, testing the applicants' knowledge of which step is listed before another may result in appeals from the applicants because the sequence on the printed page may not have a basis.

1. Job-Link: "A" is not operationally valid because the procedure doesn't specify (require) that the reactor vessel head vent fuses are pulled before the MSIV bypass valve fuses, even though these steps are listed in this order. This sequence requirement does not exist.

2. Job-Link: "0" is not operationally valid because the procedure does not require normal letdown in service (only excess letdown).

This AOP action does not exist.

Some alternative items to test include: 1) There is a requirement to place only one CCP in P-T-L before leaving the control room. 2)

There is a requirement to trip 0-HS-13-204 and -205 before leaving the control room. 3) There is a time requirement to pull fuses within 30 minutes. Any of these items are valid "sequences" specified in the AOP, and lend themselves to testing applicants' knowledge of the reasons for the actions.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 22 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 25 H 2 x x N E WE03 EA2.1

1. Q=KlA: This question (as proposed) tests the applicants' knowledge of the same prerequisites for shutdown cooling as 0-SO-74-1, i.e., RCS pressure < 380 psig and RCS temperature <

350 deg F AND the max (allowed) cooldown rate (100 deg/hr).

Because this is a Tier 1 KIA (emergency/abnormal), then the item should not only test normal prerequisites required for shutdown cooling.

2. Partial: "C" can also be argued as correct because the containment pressure (following the LOCA) is not specified in the stem. Therefore, an applicant can reasonably assume that adverse containment values are required in ES-1.2, which do not meet the req'ts of less than 300 psig RCS Pressure in Step 37.

Suggest including containment pressure in the stem, which requires applicants' to know the difference between normal shutdown cooling prerequisites and LOCA shutdown cooling prerequisites. (which are different based on adverse containment conditions). The selection of adverse containment conditions can meet the intent of the KIA for assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures.

Altematively, test another knowledge item in ES-1.2.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 23 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (FtH) (1-5) Stem Cues TtF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #t Back- Q= SRO BtMtN utEtS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 26 H 2 x x x N E WED8 EK1.D1 st

1. Stem Focus: The 1 sub-bullet should be Tcold (vs RCS temperature)

2. Cred Dis!: "A" is not plausible because the flowpath is not provided like "C" and "D."

3. Backward Logic: All of the plant conditions should normally be provided in the stem and then the applicant should be tested based on those initial conditions. The question (as proposed) relies on providing an "additional" condition in each of the four choices. This may be acceptable depending on the final outcome of the question.

Suggest the following:

WOOTF identifies an additional condition that is the largest contributor to the pressurized thermal shock, including the required action to mitigate in accordance with FR-P.1? (Consider each condition separately)

A. Total AFW flow to the intact SGs is 300 gpm; Raise AFW flow to greater than 440 gpm B. Total AFW flow to the intact SGs is 300 gpm; Minimize AFW flow to no greater than 50 gpm per SG C. One CCP is injecting via the CCPIT; Reset SI and stop the CCP D. One CCP is injecting via the CCPIT: Reset SI and isolate the CCPIT

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 24 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EtS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 27 H 2 x B S WE10 EA1.3 Note to Examiner: The operator should be aware that the pressurizer will not respond in the normal manner if a void is present.

If letdown is greater than charging, the pressurizer pressure will decrease, the vessel void will grow and the pressurizer level will increase. In the same way when charging is greater than letdown, the pressurizer pressure will increase, the vessel void will shrink, and the level will decrease.

rd

1. Stem Focus: Modify the 3 bullet to state "A depressurization is being performed and PZR pressure is 785 psig and being lowered by auxiliary spray."

2. Stem Focus: Modify the stem question as follows: "Assuming NO additional operator action, WOOTF predicts the expected RVLlS and PZR Level trends as the depressurization continues?

nd

3. Stem Focus: Modify the title of the 2 column to "PZR Level"

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 25 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 28 F 2 x B E 003 K5.01

1. Licensee provided Farley 2009 exam question

2. Job-Link: The operational implication (limit is exceeded) may be a result of the low flow; however, the effect on plant operations is that, if not already tripped, the unit must exit Mode 1 as a result of the DNB parameter.

Suggest the following:

WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.1, Reactor Coolant Loops and Coolant Recirculation?

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation, which maintains above the safety analysis limit during all normal operations and antiCipated transients.

With one reactor coolant loop not in operation, the plant is required to be within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

A. QPTR; less than or equal to 5%

B. QPTR: in Hot Standby C. DNB; less than or equal to 5%

D. DNB; in Hot Standby

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 26 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 29 H 2 x x x B E 004 A3.05

1. Cred Dis!: "C" is not plausible because of the word AUTO; i.e.,

the crew normally never receives an AUTO makeup. IF an AUTO makeup occurred, then there is most likely a leak, and this is not something intended to be introduced to the question.

2. Stem Focus: The stem does not include the status of the RCS pressure control parameters, i.e., spray valve position, control heaters, etc. This can contribute to an applicant arguing no correct answer or the another answer is correct. Provide RCS pressure value and status of the spray valves and controlling heaters.

3. Stem Focus: The word "could" in the stem question is vague and can lead to partially correct answers. (Depends on the meaning of the word "could"). Re-word the stem question as:

'WOOTF conditions will result in these conditions?"

4. Q=KlA: What automatic function of the CVCS system is being monitored? Discuss KIA match wI licensee. May be acceptable.

30 H 2 x x B E 004 A4.13

1. Cue: The ONLY choice with an operator manual answer is also the correct choice, i.e., "C". Consider including what would happen if the operator did not intervene, i.e., VCT level would continue to lower until charging pumps lose suction.

2. Stem Focus: WOOTF predicts the plant response assuming no operator action?

3. Stem Focus: Follow the alarm window with parentheses containing the shortest possible abbreviated window location designation that the applicants are familiar with; i.e., M-6C, A-3.

31 H 2 x B E 005 K5.05

1. Verify no overlap with RO Q#6

2. Stem Focus: Combine the 4th bullet with the stem question as follows:

"WOOTF choices completes the following choices IF the 1A-A RHR Pump subsequently trips?"

The RCS pressure will initially _ _ because 1-PCV-62-81 will automatically throttle ___ when the pump trips ..

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 27 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F CrecL Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 32 H 2 x B S 006 A1.14

1. Partial: Ask the licensee why an applicant couldn't successfully n

argue that "C is also correct in the strictest sense of the wording, i.e.,

uncovery will eventually happen and raising ECCS flow is always a good thing.

33 H 2 x B E 007 K1.03

1. Partial: "0" can be argued as correct since the normal flowpath is "isolated."

34 F 2 x N E 008 A1.04

1. Stem Focus: add "in accordance with 0-SO-70-1, Component Cooling Water System "8" Train?"to the stem question.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 28 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 35 F 2 x x N E 008 A2.03

1. Job-Link: The alarm procedure states device 1-TS-70-157 triggers the RHR HX A OUTLET TEMP HI alarm at 115 def F and rising. Is this temperature switch monitoring CCS temperature or RHR (primary) temperature?

Discuss wi the licensee, because the wording of the fill-in-the-blank statement must align with the wording in the alarm response procedure. In other words, the guidance listed in the alarm response procedure tries to adjust temperature of RHR water (not CCS water).

nd

2. Stem Focus: Re-word the 2 bullet as follows: RHR HX A OUTLET TEMPERATURE HIGH (M27-B-A, E-6) in alarm rd

3. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet has two different fonts

4. Stem Focus: Split the fill-in-the-blank statement into two sentences as follows:

WOOTF choices completes both statement in accordance with the annunciator procedure?

"It is to exceed the alarm setpoint when Shutdown Cooling is in service. "

"In order to maintain the RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature less than 145 deg F, "

A. aI/owed; Throttle open 1-FCV-70-156 and/or Lower RHR Flow through the heat exchanger by throttling open 1-FCV-74-32.

Throttling closed 1-FCV-74-16 is NOT permitted.

B. aI/owed; Throttle open 1-FCV-70-156 OR Lower RHR Flow through the heat exchanger by throttling open 1-FCV-74-32 and/or throttling open 1-FCV-74-16.

C. NOT aI/owed; Throttle open 1-FCV-70-156 and/or Lower RHR Flow through the heat exchanger by throttling open 1-FCV 32. Throttling closed 1-FCV-74-16 is NOT permitted.

D. NOTal/owed; Throttle open 1-FCV-70-156 OR Lower RHR Flow through the heat exchanger by throttling open 1-FCV-74-32 and/or throttling open 1-FCV-74-16.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 29 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Focus Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Dis!. Link i u~1 units Back-its ward Q=

KIA SRO B/M/N U/E/S Only Explanation 36 H 2 x x B E 010 K4.02 st

1. Stem Focus: The 1 bullet provides a value of reactor pressure rd (2235 psig) , which conflicts with the 3 bullet which states st st "currently." The 1 bullet should become the 1 sentence (no need for Given the following phrase); i.e.,

Unit 1 was in Mode 3, Tavg 547 deg F, PZR pressure 2235 psig.

A malfunction subsequently occurred which caused PZR pressure to drop to 2050 psig and PZR level to drop to 15%. Currently, PZR pressure is 2100 psig and PZR level is 30%.

Assuming no operator action, WOOTF predicts the current status of the PZR heaters?

2. Cred Dist: "D" is not plausible because it does not mention Backup Heater Bank "C." What is the proposed status of "C" Backup Heater Bank? On or off?

37 H 2 x B E 012 A 1.01

1. Stem Focus: To be more precise (and avoid confusion) use the words "trip setpoint value" (instead of "setpoint").

2. Stem Focus: Modify the stem question to ask:

"WOOTF identifies how the actual RPS trip setpoint value will change if Tavg decreases by 1 deg F? Assume AFD remains constant.

A. Both OTIJ T and OPIJTtrip setpoint values will decrease.

B. OTIJ T trip setpoint value will increase and OPIJ T trip setpoint value will decrease.

C. OTilT trip setpoint value will increase and OPil T trip setpoint value will remain the same.

D. OTIJ T trip setpoint value will remain the same and OPIJ T trip setpoint value will decrease.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 30 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EtS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 38 H 2 x x B E 012 K2.01

1. This question overlaps with Q#13 (U1) and Q# 20 (U2)T because this question also involves essentially the same Vital Instrument Board. Discuss wI licensee.

2. This question overlaps with Q#84 because it involves essentially the same knowledge associated with how the high flux reactor trip output feature is affected by a loss of control power. Discuss wI licensee.

3. Backwards Logic: The question presents a startup condition with a loss of VIPB 1-11 and then requires the applicants' to go back in time and predict how different switch positions would have affected a reactor trip.

3. Stem Focus: Suggest the following A reactor startup is in progress on Unit 1 with reactor power at 8

5 x10* % on the Intermediate Range.

WOOTF predicts whether a reactor trip will occur for the following Source Range Monitor N-32 Trip Bypass Switch positions if 120VAC Instrument Power Board 1-1/ subsequently de-energizes?

IF Switch was in "NORMAL" If Switch was in "B:iJ2ass" 39 H 2 x x B E 013 K2.01 51

1. Cue: The 1 bullet provides a cue to the applicants that a reactor trip will occur following a loss of VIPB 1-1. IF this is the case (Main Feedwater Pumps go to minimum??), THEN the applicant should be able to deduce a reactor trip occurred without the information in this bullet. How does the loss of VIPB 1-1 cause a reactor trip?

2. Stem Focus: WOOTF predicts how SSPS and ECCS will respond?

3. Stem Focus: Re-word the choices to eliminate the word "would" and replace with "will."

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 31 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 40 H 2 x x N E 013 K6.01

1. Cred Dist: The first part of choice "B" should be the same as "A" to make the question psychometrically balanced. Pick whichever Train A(B) is most plausible and change both choices so that the 1st portion matches.

2. Stem Focus: 'WOOTF identifies the availability of the swap over logic and the required actions in accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.2.1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation?

Swapover Loqic Status Required Action nd

3. Stem Focus: Make the 2 part of each choice mirror the words in Action 18 as closely as possible, i.e., "Place the 1-L/-63-S0 channel in the BYPASSED condition" or "Place the 1-L/-63-S0 channel in the TRIPPED condition"

4. Verify wI the licensee's Operations Management that the 2nd part of the question is fair for an RO applicant.

41 H 1 x x B E 022 K1.01

1. LOD= 1: This question will not discriminate on the exam because without cooling water, any cooler won't work.

2. Q=KlA: The KIA match is interesting; however, it is not the normal way to hit the KIA. For example, the applicants' could be tested on their knowledge of how the loss of one train of ERCW would affect the containment cooling system, etc. Testing the applicants' knowledge of whether or not a Tech Spec LCO is met is a different knowledge than a K1 systems knowledge.

3. Stem Focus: For choices "C" and "0", identify which valves are isolated by name and #.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 32 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 42 F 2 x B E 025 K4.02

1. Stem Focus: Suggest the following:

WOOTF describes how the Ice Condenser Glycol Containment Isolation Valves prevent over pressurization ofthe piping that penetrates containment when glycol trapped between the valves expands?

A. The penetration's INSIDE containment isolation valve disks are modified with a drilled hole.

B. The penetrations's OUTSIDE containment isolation valve disks are modified with a drilled hole.

c. The penetration's INSIDE containment isolation valve has a bypass line and check valve arrangement D. The penetration's OUTSIDE containment isolation valve has a bypass line and check valve arrangement.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 33 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. B.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlEtS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 43 H 2 x x x M E 026 K3.02

1. Stem Focus: Why is the unit only at 10% power initially?

2. Stem Focus: The 2nd bullet indicates that 1A-A started, does this mean automatically started?

3. #/units: The exact noun name for 72-39 should be used.

4. Q=KlA: The question (as proposed) tests the applicants knowledge of when RHR Recirc Spray is removed from service; the KIA requires testing the effects of a loss of CS on RHR Recirc Spray.

Suggest the following:

WOOTF identifies the minimum required Containment Spray flow rate (per train) and one of the required prerequisite conditions for establishing RHR Recirculation Spray Operation in accordance with FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure?

A. At least 5000 gpm; At least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months has elapsed since the beginning of the accident B. At least 4750 gpm; Containment pressure at least 10 psig C. At least 5000 gpm; Containment pressure at least 10 psig D. At least 4750 gpm; At least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months has elapsed since the beginning of the accident.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 34 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. B.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 44 H 2 x M E 039 G2.1.7 st

1. Stem Focus: In the 1 part of the stem question, re-define "largest reactivity excursion" [to better match the KIA] by providing the plant specific indication that indicates a large reactivity excursion is occurring; i.e., "most rod movement" (if in AUTO) or "Tavg/Tref deviation."

nd

2. Stem Focus: In the 2 part of the stem question, re-word to eliminate the word "would", i.e., WOOTF identifies both 2) ... a condition which requires a manual reactor trip in accordance with AOP-S.05?

3. Stem Focus: For choices "A" and "C", re-define "steam leak in excess of 3% power [to better match the KIA] by providing the statement "Final Reactor power is 65%"

4. Does current Core Operating Limits Report reflect moderator temperature coefficient much more negative at EOL? (Reference material not provided.) Verify current core on both units.

45 H 2 N U 059 K3.02

1. Q=KlA: The correct choice can be determined solely by knowing the MDAFW pump power supply and the AFW flow paths. Because each choice already involves AFW feeding, the applicant is NOT being tested on how AFW is affected by a loss of MFW. Discuss wI licensee.

46 H 2 x B E 061 G2.1.20 st

1. Stem Focus: The 1 and 2nd bullets can be combined. "Unit 1 was initially operating at 100% power and a reactor trip occurred."

(not necessary to specify E-O in this bullet)

2. Stem Focus: " WOOTF identifies the EARLIEST time that AFW can be reset and throttled to less than 440 gpm in accordance with E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection?"

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 35 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 47 F 2 x M E 062 K4.02

1. Stem Focus: Is it 300 seconds from the time that voltage dipped below 6456v or 300 seconds from the time that the alarms were received? The reference material (OPT200.DG, page 44 of 83) implies that the breaker will trip 300 seconds from the time that the 2/3 relays "see" 6456v. If this is the case, then the choices are not defined well enough. Suggest modifying the question to test applicants knowledge of when the clock starts for the 300 seconds, including the setpoint for sustained degraded voltage.

rd

2. Stem Focus: The 2nd and 3 bullets are somewhat redundant, except for the 30 second delay. Is it necessary to include both bullets?

3. IF alarms provided, then put (M26-B, C-7) after the name of the alarm window.

4. Stem Focus: Eliminate the word "would" in the stem question and replace with "will."

5. Higher or Lower Cog question? Seems lower cog. Discuss wI licensee.

Unit 1 & 2 are operating at 100% power.

WOOTF identifies the degraded voltage set point that will automatically trip open the 1B-B 6.9KV Shutdown Board Normal Feeder Breaker?

A. Voltage remains at 93.5% of nominal voltage for at least 30 seconds B. Voltage remains at 80% of nominal voltage for at least 30 seconds C. Voltage remains at 93.5% of nominal voltage for at least 5 minutes D. Voltage remains at 80% of nominal voltage for at least 5 minutes

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 36 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EfS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 48 H 3 x B E 063 A2.01

1. Stem Focus: Choices "A" and "C" are not psychometrically balanced with "B" and "D"; i.e., A and C should have the same 1st portion instead of undervoltage and overvoltage, respectively.

2. Stem Focus: The word "correct" (in the stem question) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.

nd

3. The 2 bullet should have parenthesis after the words with (M1-C, A-5)

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power and the following alarm is received:

125V DC VITAL BA T BD 1 ABNORMAL (M1-C, A-S)

WOOTF identifies the reason for this alarm and an expected indication OR required operator action in accordance with the annunciator procedure?

A. Charger has tripped; EI-S7-92 indicates steady current flow below zero B. Charger has tripped; EI-S7-92 indicates steady current flow above zero C. Ground exists; Locally adjust red flag set point to clear the control room alarm D. Ground exists; Sequentially open breakers (one at a time) on the battery board to locate the ground.

49 H 1 B U 064 A4.12

1. LOD=1: The proposed question can be answered solely using GFES knowledge without having plant specific knowledge. This portion of the exam is the plant specific portion; therefore, the test item should require the applicants' to know some plant specific knowledge.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 37 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 50 F 2 x B E 064 K6.08

1. Q=KlA: The KIA requires the applicant to have knowledge of how a loss of the fuel oil tanks will affect the EDG. The proposed question tells the applicants how the EDG is affected; Le., it will be declared inoperable.

WOOTF identifies the MINIMUM required 7-Day Fuel Oil Tank Level on O-L/-16-38 and the required actions if actual level is less than the minimum required level in accordance with Tech Specs?

[Reference Provided]

A. 4.8 feet; Perform Breaker Surveillance within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months B. 4.3 feet; Restore level to greater than minimum within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months C. 4.8 feet; Restore level to greater than minimum within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D. 4.3 feet; Perform Breaker Surveillance within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 51 H 2 x x N U 1. Ensure no overlap with Q#23

2. Cred Dist: "A" and "C" are not plausible because of the 2nd portion (isolation valves must be closed to allow chemistry to take a sample). Common sense dictates that a valve must be opened to obtain a sample.

st Suggest keeping the 1 portion of the question and revising the nd 2 portion to test the applicants' knowledge of how to open the SGBD isolation valves (Le., what switch position or prerequisite

's required to open these valves). If it's simply a switch going to the OPEN position, then test the applicants' knowledge of a rad monitor decision step in E3.

3. Stem Focus: The valve numbers are missing from the 2nd portion of the stem question (FCV-1-181?)

4. Stem Focus: Replace the word "would" (in the 2nd part of the stem question) with "are required to"

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 38 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F CreeL Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 52 F 2 x B E 076 A3.02

1. Stem Focus: The choices are cumbersome to read and are not psychometrically balanced. Verify wI licensee that FCV-151 does not ever receive an auto-open SI signal and that Unit 2 SI signal is the same as Unit 1. Suggest the following:

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power and a valid SI signal is received.

WOOTF predicts the automatic response of the following ERCW System Valves?

.. O-FCV-151, CCS 081 Heat Exchanger Discharge to Header A 0-FCV-152, CCS 082 Heat Exchanger Discharge to Header 8 A. FCV-151 automatically closes FCV-152 automatically throttles to 35% open

8. FCV-151 remains as is FCV-152 automatically travels to 100% open C. FCV-151 remains as is FCV-152 automatically throttles D. FCV-151 automatically opens FCV-152 automatically throttles to 35% open

2. Verify wI licensee that IF OPEN, FCV-151 does not ever receive auto closure signal from SI.

53 F 2 M S 078 K2.02

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 39 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Focus Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Oist. Link Minutia Iu~~s Back-units ward Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S KIA Only Explanation 54 F 2 x x U 103A2.04

1. Cred Oist: "A" and "C" are not plausible because they imply that it's okay to leave people in containment after an irradiated bundle was dropped wI rad levels rising.

2. Partial: An applicant can argue "0" as correct during an appeal because the "immediate area" is not defined well enough to preclude nd it meaning containment. The 2 portion can be argued as correct because it's missing the word "automatically", i.e., applicant could argue that the word "verify" means manual actuation.

Suggest the following:

An irradiated fuel assembly has been dropped in containment during a refueling outage.

WOOTF identifies the MINIMUM required areas to be evacuated and a MINIMUM required actions in accordance with AOP-M.04, Refueling Malfunctions?

A. All personnel inside containment must be evacuated; however, personnel on elevation 734' in the Aux Building are NOT required to be evacuated.

At least ONE door must be closed in both upper and lower containment air locks.

B. All personnel inside containment AND on elevation 734 in the Aux Building are required to be evacuated.

BOTH doors must be closed in both upper and lower containment air locks.

C. All personnel inside containment must be evacuated; however, personnel on elevation 734' in the Aux Building are NOT required to be evacuated BOTH doors must be closed in both upper and lower containment air locks.

D. All personnel inside containment AND on elevation 734 in the Aux Building are required to be evacuated.

At least ONE door must be closed in both upper and lower containment air locks.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 40 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Crecl. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 55 H 2 x B E 103 A3.01

1. Backwards Logic: The proposed question presents a series of events and requires the applicants' to look back to determine whether the events were correct. Ideally, the question should present the applicants with a set of plant conditions and then test the applicants' ability to predict (forward thinking) what will happen (versus what should have happened.)

A manual Safety Injection (SI) signal was initiated on Unit 2. The following plant conditions currently exist:

Containment Purge Rad Monitors:

2-RM-90-130: HI alarm

2-RM-90-131: not in alarm Phase A signal: RESET SI Signal: NOT RESET WOOTF predicts how the Containment Ventilation Isolation (eVI)

System will respond and how the eVI signal must be reset?

A. ONLY an "A" Train isolation will occur; The eVI signal can be reset with the SI signal present B. ONLY an "A" Train isolation will occur; The SI signal MUST be reset FIRST before the eVI signal can be reset C. Both "A" and "B" Trains will isolate; The CVI signal can be reset with the SI Signal present D. Both "A" and "B" Trains will isolate: The SI signal MUST be reset FIRST before the eVI signal can be reset 56 H 2 B S 001 K2.05

1. Ask the licensee whether the phrase "by relay operation" has a significant meaning to this question.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 41 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Crect. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N u/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 57 F 2 x B E 014 A4.01

1. Q=KlA: The proposed questions tests the applicants' knowledge of the reason for adjusting the Control Bank D group 2 step counter to zero steps before withdrawing a dropped rod. The question should test the applicants' ability to operate or monitor the rod selection controls.

For example, Suggest a 2-part question which tests the applicants 1) knowledge of what was required prior to withdrawing the rod (adjust group step counter for all control bank 0 group 2 rods to zero {versus adjusting all except H-8} AND 2) ability to withdraw the rod place the bank control selector switch to Bank 0 {versus some other plausible distractor}. )

2. Ensure no overlap with scenarios or JPMs 58 F 2 x E 015A3.05

1. Cred Dis!: "C" and "0" are not plausible because these actions are manually performed. Suggest keeping "A" and "B" and converting to a 2-part question. Alternatively, suggest the following; WOOTF identifies how the Control Room Audio Count Rate sound occurs following a reactor trip?

A. Sound is AUTOMA TlCALL Y triggered only after both N-35

& N-36 are less than 10 -4 % power.

B. Sound is AUTOMA TlCALL Y triggered only after 3 out of 4 of the Power Range detectors are less than 10%

C. Sound is MANUALL Y initiated only after the Level Trip Bypass Switches are placed in the NORMAL position.

O. Sound is MANUALL Y initiated only after SRM Trip Reset Block Switches are placed to the RESET position.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 42 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 59 F 2 x x B E 016 K5.01

1. Partial: "C" can also be argued as correct; especially since none of the training reference materials describe the purpose of the isolation amplifier. Is this description provided in an I&C lesson plan?

Ask licensee to provide reference that describes purpose and function of isolation amplifier to ensure "C" is incorrect. If reference not available, then re-work question.

2. Cred Dist: "B" is not plausible because the word Isolation Amplifier cannot mean that containment pressures are protected.

Suggest testing the logic diagram associated with Y. pressurizer pressure channels used for SI versus all 4 pressurizer channels used for control and work into the question the separation of control and protection circuits.

3. IF the isolation amplifier is inoperable, does tech specs require declaring the channel inoperable?

60 F 2 x N S 017 A2.01

1. Stem Focus: The 2nd part of each choice is confusing because it focuses the applicants on the "Train" instead of the "Quadrant."

Since Tech Specs focuses on the requirements for each Quadrant, nd re-work the 2 part of each choice to begin with Each Quadrant must have a minimum of .....

2. Stem Focus: Provide the annunciator this way:

INCORE TEMP MONITORING SYSTEM TROUBLE (M4-B, A-3)

3. Licensee designated as higher order. Discuss whether this may qualify as lower cog since both parts of the question are fundamental knowledge items. (Seems like exam has many higher cog questions)

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 43 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KJA Only 61 H 2 x x B E 029 A1.02

1. Cred Dis!: "C" and "0" are not plausible because the 90-106 is not a purge rad monitor.

2. Stem Focus: The 2 column format is confusing with the 90-106 heading. Suggest the following:

3. Stem Focus: Provide a procedure section which is in effect for the purge activity.

Una 1 is operating at 100% power and a lower containment purge in in progress in accordance with 1-S0-??

WOOTF identifies:

1) the minimum required logic to initiate an automatic containment ventilation isolation signal and

2) whether the 1-RM-106, Lower Containment Radiation Monitor control board indication remains valid after the isolation signal?

Note: 1-RM-90-130 & 131, Containment Purge Rad Monitors A. BOTH rad monitors (90-130 & -131) must reach the high setpoint for an automatic CVI; 1-RM-106 indication is still VALID after the CVI occurs B. BOTH rad monitors (90-130 & -131) must reach the high setpoint for an automatic CVI; 1-RM-106 indication is NOT valid after the CVI occurs C. ONLY one rad monitor (90-130 OR -131) reaching its high setpoint will result in an automatic CVI; 1-RM-106 indication is still VALID after the CVI occurs D. ONLY one rad monitor (90-130 OR -131) reaching its high setpoint will result in an automatic CVI; 1-RM-106 is NOT valid after the CVI occurs

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 44 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 62 F 2 x B E 033 G2.4.21

1. Tough KIA to hit, but achievable.

2. Cred Dis!: "C" and "0" are not plausible because there is no such thing as a minimum temperature for refueling.

Suggest a 2-part question which tests the applicants' knowledge of 1) the temperature value associated with cavitation (Le. the safety function status) and 2) the reason for the temperature limitation (cavitation)

WOOTF completes the following statement in accordance with the caution listed in AOP-M. 06, Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling?

IF the spent fuel pit temperature is greater than , THEN could occur.

A. 192°F; excessive gassing from the SFP B. 192°F; SFP pump cavitation C. [another plausible temperature] of; excessive gassing from the SFP D. [another plausible temperature] of; SFP pump cavitation

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 45 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 63 H 3 x x M E 034 K6.02

1. Q=KlA: Because there are no rad monitoring systems whose loss or malfunction directly affects one of the fuel handling systems (grapple, polar crane, etc.), THEN this KIA is match is borderline, but is acceptable since the fuel handling activity depends on the operability of the control room rad monitors.

2. Stem Focus: Because LCO typically means limiting condition of operation, technically the correct phrase should be "require entry to an action statement. "

rd

3. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet can be more precise by simply stating that the monitor had failed, i.e., "due to an instrument malfunction" may imply more that was intended.

4. Stem Focus: Convert to 2 fill-in-the-blank statements.

Given these conditions, WOOTF choices completes both statements?

Unit 1 Tech Spec 3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, contains an action statement that to be entered.

With the O-RM-90-125 failed, irradiated fuel shuffles in the spent fuel pool A. is required; may still continue B. is required; are not allowed C. is NOT required; may still continue D. is NOT required; are not allowed

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 46 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LaD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 64 F 2 x x M E 035 K4.01 st

1. Stem Focus: The 1 portion of each choice inappropriately mixes the reason for the 33% setpoint value and the 44% setpoint value.

st The 1 part of the stem question asks the applicant for the design bases criteria for the entire level control program whereas the 1st part of each choice presents the applicants with the basis for both setpoints intermingled. This may cause confusion. Suggest testing either the basis for the 33% or 44% setpoint (not both); i.e., 33% is steam line break, 44% is shrink and swell accommodations.

2. Stem Focus: The 2nd part of the stem question seems like it would st be better as the 1 part, i.e., test applicants' knowledge of where the level control program setpoint is derived FIRST .. and then test the basis for the set point.

3. Stem Focus: The basis portion of the question is in accordance with what document?

4. Q=KlA: Since the program level setpoint is a design feature, then this question hits the KIA. (No interlock is being tested>>okay)

5. Job-Link: Will the Unit 2 modification still have the same basis for the SG program setpoint values? Discuss wI licensee.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 47 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. B.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 65 F 2 x x N E 056 K1.03

1. Q=KlA & Stem Focus: The proposed question does not "directly" test the cause effect relationship of the condensate system to the MFW system even though seal injection taps off of the condensate 5

system. Suggest the following to hit the 1 part of the KIA and also to streamline the question:

WOOTF choices completes both statements?

The Main Feedwater Pump Seal Water Injection System taps off of the condensate system A sustained condition with low seal water will cause a MFW Pump to automatically trip.

A. between the condensate and condensate booster pumps injection pressure at 220 psig B. between the condensate and condensate booster pumps differential pressure at 10 psid C. downstream of the condensate booster pumps injection pressure at 220 psig D. downstream of the condensate booster pumps differential pressure at 10 psid

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 48 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 66 H 3 x x E G2.1.19

1. Q=KlA: Because the last part of the 3rd bullet tells the meaning of the alarm, the KIA is not being tested, Le., the applicants must be tested on their ability to use the plant computer. IF the computer alarm is presented differently on the screen, THEN the question, as proposed, tests the applicants' knowledge of the AFD Tech Specs but doesn't test their ability to use the plant computer. Ask the licensee to show the computer screen being tested during prep week. Discuss whether or not all of the words in the 3'd bullet are provided in the computer alarm screen.

Suggest either taking out the last part of the 3rd bullet OR providing them with a copy of the plant computer screen that provides the AFD alarm.

2. Cred Dis!: The plausibility analysis for "A" [no action required]

states that the basis for this choice is if the applicant doesn't recognize that the ICS alarm indicates that at least 2 NIS AFD channels indicate> 50% RTP and outside the acceptable region even though the 3'd bullet already provides this information.

67 F 2 x x M E G2.1.32

1. nd Cue: The last part of the 2 bullet cues the applicant that the shorter time frames (Le., choice "C", is not correct.) The reason for rolling the diesel is not required to elicit the correct response.

nd Suggest modifying the 2 bullet as:

"2A-A Diesel Generator is being rolled locally in accordance with 0-SO-82-3, Diesel Generator 2A-A prior to the performance of a monthly surveillance. "

2. nd Job-Link: The last part of the 2 bullet states that the reason for rolling the DG is to "check for water in the cylinders ....

Precaution & Limitation 0.4 states that rolling the diesel provides assurance that the cylinders are not cracked or do not have a gasket leak for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . These reasons appear to conflict. Discuss wI licensee.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 49 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus I Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 68 F 2 x x N E G2.1.40

1. Stem Focus: Ensure that a question is presented in the stem.

Suggest the following:

WOOTF identifies the reason for this requirement in accordance with 0-GO-9, Refueling Procedure?

2. Cred Dist: Modify one of the incorrect choices to include the words "adequate vent exists .. "

69 H 3 x B S G2.2.40

1. Stem Focus:

WOOTF identifies the required actions in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.9.1, RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits or Tech Requirements Manual TRM 3.4.9.2, Pressurizer Temperature Limits?

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 50 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 70 F 2 x x B E G2.2.6 st

1. Stem Focus/Cred Dist: The 1 part of the proposed question is testing the applicants' knowledge of whether the procedure can be performed out of sequence; however, the 2nd part of the question is not solicited in the stem. Consequently, choices "A"

, "6", and "C" are not plausible because "D" is ALWAYS the right thing to do.

Discuss w/ the licensee>> Is there ever a time at Sequoyah when performing procedure steps out-of-sequence is allowed?

(other than startup/shutdown procedures) If so, then this situation/procedure needs to be incorporated. If not, then none of the incorrect choices are plausible. Discuss w/licensee. For example:

WOOTF identifies whether the procedure steps are allowed to be performed out-of-sequence, including the reason or other required actions?

A. The procedure steps are allowed to be performed out-of-sequence in this case because this is classified as a "Operator Burden" in accordance with OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations.

B. The procedure steps are allowed to be performed out-of-sequence in this case because this is classified as a "Operator Challenge" in accordance with OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations.

C. The procedure steps are NOT allowed to be performed out-of-sequence in this case. A temporary procedure change is required in accordance with SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical Procedures.

D. The procedure steps are NOT allowed to be performed out-of-sequence in this case. A permanent procedure revision is required in accordance with SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical Procedures.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 51 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 71 F 2 x N E G2.3.12

1. Stem Focus: Reword the stem as follows:

WOOTF identifies the incore flux detector requirements listed in O-SI-OPS-OOO-011.0, Containment Access Control During Modes 1 - 4, for an entry into lower containment or the annulus?

Required Incore Flux Detector Placement Tagged with a ...

72 F 2 x x B U G2.3.5

1. Cred Dist: "A", "B", and "C" are not plausible because the stem asks for the specific leaking SG and these choices each only have one rad monitor listed.

2. Partial: An applicant can argue that "A", "B", and "C" are each partially correct because by the operator could use these rad monitors in conjunction with other available indications to determine the specific SG wI the rupture.

Suggest developing a question that tests the applicants knowledge of how a procedure uses a specific rad monitor, i.e.,

some question related to a threshold value and required action.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 52 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 73 F 2 x x B E G2.3.7

1. Stem Focus: The question can be simplified as follows:

WOOTF completes the following statement in accordance with the General Requirements in RCI-tO, ALARA Program?

The shall approve all Containment Building Entries during periods which are outside the pre-determined Containment Building entry schedule. Approvals shall be documented on an Attachment 06, Containment Building Entry Request/Authorization.

A. Plant Manager B. Radiation Operations Shift Supervisor C. Radiation Protection Manager D. Shift Manager

[Question deals with the RWP Request Process for KIA match

2. Job-Link: Verify wI Sequoyah Operations Management that this is RO knowledge.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 53 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 74 F 2 x x x N E G2.4.28

1. Partial and/or Stem Focus: An applicant could argue choices "A" and "0" as potentially correct because these situations (hostile force and lack of security guards) could warrant a conservative implementation of the "2-Person-Line-of-Sight Rule." Since the stem of the question does not specify in accordance with any procedure and this opens up choices "A" and "0" to interpretation.

2. Job-Link: Based on EPIP-8 (Personnel Accountability and Evacuation), Appendix 0 (Nuclear Security - Assembly and Accountability Actions), it appears that Security makes the call on whether the "2-Person-Line-of-Sight Rule" is required.

Discuss wI licensee. WHO makes the determination whether to implement the rule? IF Security makes the determination, then test the applicants' knowledge of what the "2-Person-Line-of-Sight Rule" means.

3. The SPP-1.3 document was not provided on the reference disk.

The one-page excerpt provided with the Draft Written submittal package provides additional guidance listed in the document; however, unable to research w/o the reference.

4. Suggest writing a fill-in-the-blank question format:

WOOTF completes both ofthe following statements in accordance with EPIP-8, Personnel Accountability &

Evacuation?

During a ___ , the "2-Person-Line-of-Sight Rule" is required.

The "2-Person-Line-of-Sight Rule" requires that _ _ _ .

A. Radiological Emergency; all persons in vital areas must remain in visual contact with another person and the two persons also must possess similar skills or knowledge B. Radiological Emergency; all persons in vital areas must remain in visual contact with another person but the two persons do NOT have to possess similar skills or knowledge.

c. Credible Insider Threat; ditto '}!\"

D. Credible Insider Threat; ditto "8"

[Verify wI licensee that 2-Person-Line-of-Sight Rule is never applicable during only a radiological emergency.]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 54 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 75 H 2 x x x M E G2.4.46075

1. Cred Dist: "C" and "0" are not plausible because stem asks for nd the correct operator response and the 2 parts of these choices don't provide any response ("monitor" is not a response).

th

2. Cue: The word "remain" in the 6 bullet is a cue that something has failed to re-position.

3. Stem Focus: The word "correct" in the stem question should be "required."

Suggest developing a 2 part question that tests 1) the applicants knowledge of the M6-E, E-4 alarm setpoint and 2) a CNTMT Sump alarm which is consistent with the required conditions for the auto-swapover logic to occur.

4. Verify no overlap exists with SRO Q#78.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 55 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LaD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 76 H 2 x M E 007 EA2.04

1. Stem Focus: The choices ("A", "B", "C" & "0") seem unbalanced.

"A" and "B" have an action. The correct answer ("C") includes a contingent portion ["if conditions remain the same,] which is confusing. See suggestion below.

2. Stem Focus: The stem question does not ask the applicant to determine the "reason" for the response even though choices "A" and "B" include a reason. Either provide a reason for all choices or eliminate the reasons provided in "A" and "B."

st

2. Stem Focus: 1 bullet should say Unit 2 WAS operating at 100% power with the TDAFW Pump tagged out of service.

3. Stem Focus: 2nd bullet is missing an "s" after the word "attempt" n

and the word unsuccessful is misspelled. Additionally, the 2 bullet is missing the word "trip" after the word manually.

4. Stem Focus: Add the words "and stable" to the RCS pressure Unit 2 was operating at 100% with the TDAFW Pump tagged out when a valid trip signal occurred; however, the reactor did not trip.

All attempts to manually trip the reactor from the MCR were unsuccessful. The crew entered E-O and the Immediate operator actions of FR-S. 1, Nuclear Power GenerationlA TWS, have been completed. The following plant conditions currently exist:

Maximum available AFW flows: 195, 220, 0, 0 NR SG Levels: 0%, 0%, 0%, 0%

RCS Pressure: 2285 psig and stable

- Emergency Boration Flow: 45 gpm from the BA T Reactor Power: 19%

"Given the above conditions, WOOTF identifies the required actions, in accordance with FR-S.1, Nuclear Power GenerationlA TWS?

A. Do NOT perform the actions of FR-H.1; RCPs are allowed to be tripped B. Perform the actions of FR-H.1; Reps are NOT allowed to be tripped C. Do NOT perform the actions of FR-H.1; RCPs are NOT allowed to be tripped D. Perform the actions of FR-H.1; RCPs are allowed to be tripped

[SRO-only: Procedure Selection]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 56 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 77 H 2 x x x M E 009 EG2.4.20

1. Job-Link/Minutia: The premise of the question is for the applicants' to infer that pressurizer level and subcooling wililower

[during the RCP startup] based on the wording of the NOTE preceding another step that commences depressurization. [NOTE:

Upper head voiding may occur during RCS depressurization if no Reps are running. This may result in rapidly rising pressurizer level.]

This note doesn't state that pressurizer level will decrease when the RCP is started. Verify exact conditions in the stem on the simulator yield lowering level during a RCP startup. What pressure ranges [on the simulator] show a lowering level when the RCP is started after a depressurization? Is this documented? Need to discuss w/licensee to ensure that this question has a correct answer.

st

2. Stem Focus: The 1 phrase {'Given the foJ/owing:'] and 1st buliet can be streamlined, i.e., suggest combining into "A small break LOeA has occurred on Unit 1 and the foJ/owing conditions currently exist:" Also, the stem question is cumbersome because it is a lengthy 2 part question.

3. Stem Focus: Also, the wording of the P&L listed in the normal system operating procedure should align with the [incorrect] choices "B" and "D."

Suggest the following:

WOOTF identifies the next required procedure and the operational implication of a NOTE in this procedure prior to starting an Rep?

A. ES-1.1; A steam bubble is required in the Pressurizer to minimize the pressure transient when cold water injected by the charging pump is circulated in the ReS during the Rep startup B. ES-1.1; A steam bubble may exist in the Reactor Vessel Upper' Head which could result in lowering Pressurizer level indication and lowering subcooling margin during the Rep startup

e. ES-1.2; A steam bubble is required in the Pressurizer to minimize the pressure transient when cold water injected by the charging pump is circulated in the ReS during the Rep startup D. ES-1.2; A steam bubble may exist in the Reactor Vessel Upper Head which could result in lowering Pressurizer level indication and lowering subcooling margin during the Rep startup

[SRO-only: Procedure Selection]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 57 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 78 F 2 x N E 011 EA2.07

1. Stem Focus: The annunciator should be for the "B-B" Pump, this may be a typo.

2. Stem Focus: The first five bullets can be combined as follows:

3. Stem Focus: The 2nd part of each choice is confusing because of the implied sequence of procedures. Suggest the following:

Unit 2 was operating at 100% power with the 2A-A RHR Pump out of service when a LOCA occurred. The reactor was tripped and a safety injection was actuated.

WOOTF identifies how a loss of CCS cooling to the 28-8 RHR Pump seal water heat exchanger will affect continued pump operation and the required procedure for these plant conditions when RWST level lowers to 27%?

Note:

ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation A. 28-8 RHR Pump can run indefinitely; ES-1.3

8. 28-8 RHR Pump must be immediately removed from service; ES-1.3 C. 28-8 RHR Pump can run indefinitely; ECA-1.1 D. 28-8 RHR Pump must be immediately removed from service; ECA-1. 1

[SRO-only: Procedure Selection]

Note: Ensure that placing 27% in the stem does not provide a cue to another test item on the RO or SRO exam. Verify no overlap wI RO Q#75.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 58 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 5. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EtS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 79 H 2 x x N E 025AA2.02 nd

1. SRO-only: The 2 portion of the choices doesn't meet the "procedure selection" requirement of 10CFR55.43(b) for SRO applicants because all choices say "appropriate section of 0-SO nd 1, CCWS "B" Train". The 2 portion of the choices should ideally require the applicants' to pick a procedure section. 0-SO-70-1, Precaution & Limitation "M" states that the CoS Pump throw over switch alignment to the Train A power supply eliminates the load shedding features thus rendering the DG inoperable; therefore, an RO applicant can deduce that "A" and "c" are not correct. [RO's are responsible for P&Ls] Furthermore, the "B" choice can be eliminated solely by knowing the powersupplytotheC-S pump. "A", "B" and "c" can all be eliminated using RO knowledge. See Suggestion below.

2. The Stem question is cumbersome because it is a lengthy 2 part question.

Suggest the following:

Both units are operating at 100% power with all equipment normally aligned.

WOOTF identifies 1) the cause of a loss of CCS Train "B" on both units and 2) the required procedure to restore the Train B cooling in accordance with AOP M.03, A. 480 V SO Board 1A2-A; 0-SO-70-1, Section 8.6, Swapping CoS Pump Power Supplies B. 480 V SO Board 1A2-A; 0-SO-70-1, Section 8.7.1, Swapping 1B-B CCS Pump From '~" Train Service to "B" Train Service and Re-aligning 2B-B CCS Pump to Unit 2,

'~" Train Service C. 480 V SO Board 2B2-B; 0-SO-70-1, Section 8.6, Swapping CoS Pump Power Supplies D. 0-SO-70-1, Section 8.7.1, Swapping 18-8 CCS Pump From "A" Train Service to "8" Train Service and Re-aligning 28-8 CCS Pump to Unit 2, "A" Train Service

[SRO-only: Procedure Selection]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 59 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 80 F 2 x x N E 056 AG2.1.19

1. Q=KlA: This KIA was discussed per telecom on 11/2/09 because it seemed to be a difficult one to hit. Licensee explained that although a switchyard diagram on the plant computer existed, it wasn't "active" and couldn't be used to determine offsite power breaker position. Chief Examiner suggested to write question testing the SRO applicants' ability to use the process computer to determine SillY. equipment's status following a LOOP.

Licensee subsequently provided 2-part question to test SRO applicants' knowledge of 1) the Unit 1 & 2 plant computers availability following a dual unit trip (LOOP) and 2) the preferred source of offsite power lAW AOP-P.01.

Neither of these items test the applicants' ability to use the plant computer to evaluate a system status; therefore, the KIA match is "soft."

Suggest writing the question that involves a LOOP (similar to what is already proposed) and then require the applicants to use a Qrovided screen gicture of a s'l.stem comgonent, or garameter to determine an E-plan or EOP procedure selection.

Alternatively, test the applicants' knowledge of NRC reportability requirements following a LOOP, when the SRO applicant must use a provided screen picture of a system, component, or parameter.

2. Stem Focus: The fifth bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.

3. Stern Focus; The stem question is lengthy, consider the use of a fill-in-the-blank statement.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 60 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 81 H 2 x x x N E 077 AG2.2.44

1. SRO-only: The question provides a normal 161 KV voltage and then tests the applicants' ability to determine operability of the 161 KV System. The question should provide at least one ABNORMAL condition and then test the SRO applicants' ability to determine operability of the 161 KV. This question does not seem operationally valid since the voltage is normal, i.e., why is the dispatcher calling to say a RED condition exists when everything is normal? Would he be normally providing the parameter of concern? Discuss wI the licensee.

Suggest providing switchyard voltage/VAR information and require the applicant to apply this information SECTION F of GOI-6 to determine operability and/or reportability per SPP-3.5.

st

3. Stem Focus: For the 1 portion of the stem question, re-word as follows: "WOOTF identifies the required procedure for the crew to implement and the immediate operability status of the offsite power source?'

4. Partial: Is it wrong for an applicant to pull out AOP-P.01 and refer to the procedure? IF the procedure was implemented, would any actions be taken based on the current plant conditions? An applicant may be able to argue "C" as correct.

Ensure no overlap wI RO Q#16

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 61 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 82 H 2 x N E 005 AG2.4.46

1. SRO-only: The proposed test item is borderline with respect to linkage to 10CFR55.43(b) (5) [procedure selection]. The basis for the SRO-only tie is presumably the level of recall associated with when power is> or < 75% [step 10 in AOP-C.01]. Since ROs are normally responsible for all plant conditions that require an immediate reactor trip, then this question is borderline with respect to SRO-only.

Additionally, the action to restore the rod is a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months action statement in accordance with TS 3.1.3.1, which is RO knowledge.

Suggest the following:

Consider the following annunciator:

COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEV & SEQ N/S PWR RANGE TIL TS (M4-B,D-4)

WOOTF identifies the 1) rod misalignment setpoint for the alarm and

2) the corresponding Tech Spec (TS) surveillance requirement(s) that require(s) this annunciator to be operable?

Note: TS 3.2.1 Power Distribution Limits - Axial Flux Difference TS 3.2.4 Power Distribution Limits- Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio A. A MINIMUM of at least a 12 step difference between the actual rod position and the bank demand counter; Alarm function fulfills surveillance requirement ONL Y for TS 3.2.1 B. A MINIMUM of at least a 12 step difference between the actual rod position and the bank demand counter; Alarm function fulfills surveillance requirement for BOTH TS 3.2. 1 and TS 3.2.4 C. GREA TER than a 12 step difference between the actual rod position and the bank demand counter; Alarm function fulfills surveillance requirement for BOTH TS 3.2.1 and TS 3.2.4 D. GREATER than a 12 step difference between the actual rod position and the bank demand counter; Alarm function fulfills surveillance requirement ONL Y for TS 3.2.1

[SRO-only: Tech Specs]

Note: Verify that this one alarm is linked to SR for both TS wI licensee.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 62 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Sack- Q= SRO S/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 83 H 2 x x x x x M U 024AA2.01

1. This test question overlaps with the Simulator JPM [005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod [001 Emergency Soration (a It path)].

Either modify the test question or replace the JPM (safety function 1)

2. SRO-only: The basis for the SRO-only tie is presumably the procedure selection associated with either Section 4.2 (SAT) or Section 4 .. 3 (RWST); however, because these choices are linked to an RO knowledge associated with the required minimum injection rate for emergency boration, the SRO procedure selection aspect is actually not being tested, i.e., if he knows the minimum required injection rate for emergency boration, then he doesn't need to know what section of the procedure is required. [Knowing that switch has no seal-in feature is RO systems knowledge.]

3. Partial: "A" and "S" are technically identical distracters.

4. Cred Dis!: IF the 1FCV-62-138 MOV breaker compartment does not have a thermal overload reset feature, THEN "A" and "S" are not plausible because a magnetic trip of the circuit breaker would remove the RED/GREEN indication.

rd

5. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet should be more precisely worded (to ensure applicants' know that the switch wasn't held long enough) as follows: "After the OA TC placed 1-HS-62-138A, Emergency Soration FCV, to the OPEN position, he immediately released the hand switch as soon as he observed flow on 1-FI-62-137A, Emergency Soration Flow Indicator."

6. Sackward: The words "would be" in choices "C" and "0" are futuristic and the question is asking the applicant to predict what happened in the past (valve stopped moving) instead of predicting the expected response.

SEQUOYAH 2010*301 Page 63 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (FfH) (1-5) Stem Cues TfF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #f Back- Q= SRO BfMfN utEfS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 84 H 2 X x N E 033 AA2.03

1. This question overlaps with Q#38 because it involves essentially the same knowledge associated with how the high flux reactor trip output feature is affected by a loss of control power.

nd

2. Cue: The 2 part of the stem question cues the applicant that N35 is also required by TS 3.3.3.7. Plausibility of 7 day LCO (before plant shutdown required) s1

3. Stem Focus: The word "WOUld" [in the 1 portion of the stem question] is confusing. Also, the word MINIMUM should be incorporated to the stem question to add plausibility to "A" and "C" choices. Suggest the following:

Unit 1 is at 40% power and NI-35 fails due to one blown fuse.

WOOTF NI-35 drawer circuit indications prevents the high flux reactor trip output signal from being manually bypassed and identifies the MINIMUM required actions in accordance with Tech Specs?

A. Control Power light is dark; Power operation can continue indefinitely with NI-35 inoperable B. Control Power light is dark; NI-35 must be restored operable within 30 days or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

C. Instrument Power light is dark; Power operation can continue indefinitely with NI-35 inoperable D. Instrument Power light is dark; NI-35 must be restored operable within 30 days or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

[SRO-only: Tech Specs]

Note: Ask the licensee to explain the fuse circuitry to assure that the high flux reactor trip output signal cannot be manually bypassed even though only one fuse is blown.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 64 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 85 H 3 x N E 074 EG2.2.44

1. Stem Focus: To ensure that the applicants know that the SG levels dropped to < 10% during the depressurization, suggest the following changes:

A LOCA occurred on Unit 1 and core exit TIC temperatures exceeded 1200 deg F. The crew has performed the following actions:

RCPs #1 and #2 have been started

SG depressurization has been commenced During the depressurization, the following conditions were noted:

- All SG NR levels dropped to < 10%

Core exit TICs indicate 1210 deg F and lowering WOOTF choices completes both ofthe following statements in accordance with FR-C.1, Inadequate Core Cooling?

The depressurization of the SGs ___ and the required action is to A. is required to continue; enter SACRG-1, Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response B. is required to continue; remain in FR-C.1, Inadequate Core Cooling C. is NOT allowed to continue; enter SACRG-1, Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response D. is NO T allowed to continue; remain in FR-C.1, Inadequate Core Cooling

[SRO-only: Procedure Selection]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 65 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 86 H 2 x M E 005 AG2.4.40

1. Stem Focus: Ensure that the RCS temperature is Tavg to comply with the modes definitions.

s

2. Stem Focus: The 1 ', 5'h, and 6'h bullets can be combined to streamline the chronology of events.

3. Stem Focus: The 1st part of the stem question asks for the staus of the LCO but the choices only provide action statements ... suggest the following to also test applicants' knowledge of modes and LCO actions applicable to certain modes:

Unit 1 is shutdown with Tavg at 170 deg F with all RCS loops filled and all RCPs OFF.

The 1A RHR Pump was initially in service; however the pump tripped and the crew subsequently placed Train B RHR in service. Current SG levels are:

SG#1 at8% WR

- SG#2 at 15% WR SG#3at9% WR

SG#4at6% WR WOOTF identifies the MINIMUM required action (if any) in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4, Reactor Coolant System and also identifies the Tech Spec basis for the requirement that one RHR loop be in operation for this plant mode?

A. No required action; Provides sufficient core decay heat removal in the event of a bank withdrawal accident B. No required action; Ensures that any reactivity changes associated with boron reduction are within the capability of operator recognition and control C. Immediately raise one SG level> 10% WR; Provides sufficient core decay heat removal in the event of a bank withdrawal accident D. Immediately raise one SG level> 10% WR; Ensures that any reactivity changes associated with boron reduction are within the capability of operator recognition and control

[SRO-only: Tech Spec Bases]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 66 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 87 H 2 x x N U 012 G2.4.11

1. SRO-only: The basis for the SRO-only tie is presumably the procedure selection associated with either selecting an appendix in the procedure or notifying MIG to evaluate the Eagle 21 lockup.

However, the question can be answered solely using systems knowledge since there are no bistables lit (as stated in the stem);

consequently, this is NOT a loop control processor failure. Extra info is contained in the second part of each answer choice allowing the question to be answered using RO knowledge.

One area of SRO level knowledge is knowledge of the content of the procedure versus knowledge of the procedure's overall mitigative strategy or purpose. The proposed question does not provide for procedure selection and only tests the AOP-1.01's overall mitigative strategy (RO knowledge).

Suggest modifying this question to keep the 1st part (which section of the AOP-1.01 is required) but also incorporate an instrument failure and test the SRO applicants' knowledge of the required Tech Spec 3.3.1 actions, not to overlap with any scenario even!. Also ... possible suggestion is:

A. (1) same as origi nal question (2) Implement Appendix in the AOP B. (1) same as original question (2) Notify MIG

2. Stem Focus: If an annunciator(s) is referred to in any part of the question, use the EXACT wording engraved on Alarm Window (also specified in ARP) followed by parentheses containing the shortest possible abbreviated window location designation of which applicants are familiar. This ensures no misunderstanding as to the alarm being referenced. For example: (M-6A, C-3)

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 67 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 88 H 2 x x M E 039A2.02 2.Cue: The 2nd bullet provides a cue to the applicant regarding the required action per TS 3.7.1, i.e., "reduction in the PR high flux trip setpoint." This can be eliminated by stating that "all required actions in accordance with TS 3.7.1 have been taken."

3. Stem Focus: Re-word the 2-part stem question as follows:

"WOOTF predicts the turbine load response to the relief valve leakage (prior to maintenance gagging activities) and identifies any additional required actions in accordance with TS 3.7.1?

4.Stem Focus: The first part of each choice (A thru D) should state either "turbine load will remain constant' .. .. or "turbine load will lower" ,

i.e., no need for the governor valve response portion in each choice.

5. Stem Focus: The words "would be" in the 2nd part of each choice should be replaced with "no additional required actions for TS 3.7.1" or "the Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint must be adjusted."

rd

6. Stem Focus: The 3 bullet is vague with respect to the slang term "leaking through." Try to use the words from the AOP, e.g., abnormal leakage, etc.

7. Stem Focus: The fourth bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.

st

8. Stem Focus: The 1 bullet is grammatically loose, i.e., Unit 1 at.

9. Stem Focus: The 2nd bullet should be past tense, i.e., "setpoint was reduced"

[SRO-only: Tech Specs]

SEQUOYAH 2010*301 Page 68 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 89 H 2 x x N E 064 A2.16

1. References provided to applicant: Discuss providing the entire Section 1 of EPIP-1 to the applicants (instead of only providing page 21 of 47). By only providing one page, this may cue the applicant where to look for the answer to the E-plan classification. Discuss wI licensee. The loss of power lasting greater than 15 minutes may be sufficient (without a reference) to elicit applicants' recall that a NOUE is required. Discuss wI licensee.

2. Cred Dist: "C" and "0" do not appear plausible because why would the engine trip following a over current relay actuation? More logical to assume that the engine would continue to run unloaded.

st Suggest modifying the 1 portion of each choice as follows:

A. Bkr 1912 will trip open & re-c/ose; Alert B. Bkr 1912 will trip open & re-close; NOUE C. Bkr 1912 will trip open & remain open; ALERT D. Bkr 1912 will trip open & remain open; NOVE

3. Stem Focus: Include the name and number of the surveillance procedure being conducted in bullet #2.

4. Need a combined U1/U2 electrical diagram of Sequoyah electrical distribution in the reference material. Does one exist?

[SRO-only: Procedure selection E-Plan]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 69 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 90 H 4 x x N E 073 A2.02

1. Cred Dist: "c" and "D" are not plausible because the 2nd part of these choices involves the ODCM requirements even though there is no longer a release, i.e., SGBD flow was re-routed to the Condensate System. In other words, an applicant knows that the only time the rad monitors are required operable is when releases are underway via the pathway. IF the SGBD was re-routed to the demineralizers, then the release would be terminated and determining the grab sample frequency is a moot point; therefore an applicant could eliminate "C" and "D" without knowing the parameter that determines grab sampling frequency.

2. Stem Focus: The stem does not specify whether the 90-121 failed upscale or downscale. IF the rad monitor fails upscale, then is "D" correct?

3. Stem Focus: Verify wI the licensee that the releases may continue provided that grab samples are obtained either every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months dependent on the secondary coolant activity.

4. Stem Focus: If an annunciator(s) is referred to in any part of the question, use the EXACT wording engraved on Alarm Window (also specified in ARP) followed by parentheses containing the shortest possible abbreviated window location designation that the applicants are familiar with. This ensures no misunderstanding as to the alarm being referenced.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 70 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EtS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 91 H 3 x x N E 028A2.03 st

1. Job-Link: The 1 part of the stem question asks the applicants to determine whether the H2 RECOMBINER is allowed to be operated; however, FR-1.3, Step 19 targets the H2 IGNITERS. It appears that st the 1 column in the choices should also be labeled "IGNITERS."

nd

2. SRO-only: The 2 portion of the question only tests the applicants knowledge of when vessel venting is/is not allowed. [Not allowed when Containment hydrogen concentration is > 6%.] The question is not testing the SRO applicants' knowledge of procedure selection.

One area of SRO level knowledge is knowledge of the content of the procedure versus knowledge of the procedure's overall mitigative strategy or purpose. The proposed question does not provide for procedure selection and only tests the FR-1.3 overall mitigative strategy (RO knowledge).

Suggest the following:

An accident has occurred on Unit 1 and the crew has entered FR-I.3, Voids in The Reactor. The crew has placed the Hydrogen Analyzers in service and the following conditions currently exist:

RCS Subcooling > 90 deg F

Pzr Level> 90%

- PRT pressure is 5 psig Containment hydrogen concentration is 7%

Containment Ventilation is isolated and the upper and lower compartment coolers and CRDM fans are running WOOTF identifies the required actions in accordance with FR-I.3?

A. Do NOT place the Hydrogen Igniters in service and Do NOT vent the Reactor Vessel; Return to Procedure and Step in Effect B. Do NOT place the Hydrogen Igniters in service; Perform EA-0-7, Calculating Maximum Reactor Vessel Vent Time.

C. Place the Hydrogen Igniters in service and then perform EA-0-7, Calculating Maximum Reactor Vessel Vent Time.

D. Place the Hydrogen Igniters in service and then perform EA-268-1, Placing Hydrogen Recombiners in Service.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 71 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 92 F 2 x x x N U 055 G2.1.20

1. Q=KlA: The proposed test item does not meet the KIA because it targets the emergency/abnormal Tier 1 topic (i.e., SGTL event) instead of a Tier 2 aspect (normal condenser air removal operation).

The proposed test item tests the applicants' ability to perform required actions from AOP-R.01 (emergency/abnormal topic) but does not test the applicants' ability to perform or interpret steps associated with the Condenser Air Removal system.

2. SRO-only: Presumably the tie to the 55.43 is "procedure selection" based on the applicant having to recall steps of the procedure. SRO-Ievel knowledge (with respect to prescribing or selecting procedures) is knowledge of the content of the procedure (SRO knowledge) versus knowledge of the overall mitigative strategy of the procedure IRO knowledge). (this question may be borderline)

Suggest writing a question to target the Condenser Vacuum System Charcoal Absorber System, including the SRO aspect of either ODCM 1/2.2.2.4 (Tech Specs) or procedure selection.

Discuss how the Condenser Air Removal System topic can be tested at the SRO level with the licensee.

3. Stem Focus: The choices can be boiled down to 1) how long do you have to shutdown the unit and 2) do you have to obtain a confirmatory chemistry sample before commencing the shutdown. The choices (as proposed) all have the words "without waiting" or "leak rate confirmed." Suggest streamlining answers into a 2-part choice and re-wording the stem question to closely match.

4. Stem Focus: The 4th bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 72 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 93 H 2 x x x E 075A2.01

1. Per NUREG 1021, ES-401, Section 0.2 (pg 6 of 33), it is acceptable to limit the scope of an A2 KIA statement to the (b) portion (only) IF it is not possible to test both aspects of the KIA statement without expending an inordinate amount of resources. In this question (as proposed), only the (b) portion of the KIA is being targeted. This is acceptable.

2. Stem Focus: The stem question needs to be worded to eliminate the word "should." Consider incorporating the words "minimum required action" in the stem question.

3. Cred Dist: "B" and "0" refer to a cool down that was already in progress on Unit 1. Does the stem support this? In other words, the stem only states that Unit 1 is in Mode 4 w/ RCS at 340 deg F. Is Unit 1 cooling down? Because this information is missing from the stem, it makes "B" and 0" less plausible.

4. Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that "C" is also correct based on the imminent nature of lake level.

5. Stem Focus: Is the lake level stable? Suggest the following:

WOOTF completes both of the following statements in accordance with AOP-N.04, Break of Downstream Dam, and TS 3.7.5, Ultimate Heat Sink?

Loss of condenser circulating water supply occurs when lake level drops to ___ .

The MINIMUM required action (s) at this time for Unit 2 is/are A. 668' elevation; be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

B. 674 ' elevation; be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

C. 668

elevation; Initiate a plant shutdown to COLD Shutdown using AOP-C.03 D. 674' elevation; Initiate a plant shutdown to COLD Shutdown using AOP-C.03

[SRO-only: Procedure Selection and/or Tech Specs]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 73 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 94 F 2 x x N E G2.1.26 st

1. Cred Dist: Since the 1 part of each choice is unique, then the applicant doesn't need to know the answer to the 2nd part; i.e.,

the SRO portion. For example:

A. orange; SPP-10.2 B. blue; GO-5 C. green; SPP-10.2 D. red; GO-5

2. Partial: Some applicants can argue that "A" is also correct because the stem does not specify which procedure requirement.

Suggest copying an exact sentence from the SPP-1 0.2 appendix E and converting it into a fill-in-the-blank statement.

For example:

The procedure for clearing a 161 kV or 500 kV air blast power circuit breaker requires the breaker and its disconnects to be "opened" and then the breaker cycled at the direction of the transmission operator to discharge an\,: caQ.acitors that rna\,: be in Q.aral/el with the contacts of the breaker.

Plausible distracters can be "to local/\,: verif\,: the correct breaker."

To make SRO-only, include the TS required action for the 161 (or 500 KV) breaker being under clearance.

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 74 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 95 F 2 x x x N E G2.1.29 st

1. Q=KlA: In the 1 part of this question, the applicant is being tested on the required verification technique (RO knowledge).

The 2nd part of the question (knowledge of TS 3.0.4) is not the intended topic to be tested at the SRO level. This situation is similar to Q#80; however, this is the second item on the SRO test like this. The problem is that the sampling of SRO knowledge on the sample plan topic may become skewed with too many of these type questions.

2. Stem Focus: Include exact noun name for the manual valve nd (No.1 System Start Motor Air supply Isolation Valve) in the 2 bullet m

3. Backwards Logic: Reverse the situation such that the 3 bullet is deleted and first test the applicant's knowledge of whether entry to Mode 4 can be made with the out-of-position valve.

Secondly, test the applicants' knowledge of the required verification technique.

Consider the following two alternatives:

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 75 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 95 F 2 x x x N E G2.1.29 (cont'd)

WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with SPP-10.1, System Status Control?

The LOWEST level of authority required to relax the status control of a system within a clearance boundary is the An equipment alignment checklist be documented as "complete" with a valve tagged out-ot-position by another clearance.

A. Shift Manager; can NOT B. Shift Manager; can still C. Unit Supervisor; can NOT D. Unit Supervisor; can still OR - - -

Unit 2 is in Mode 5 preparing to enter Mode 4. An AUO performing a valve checklist discovers that the No. 1 System Start Motor Air Supply Isolation Valve (0-82-516-1A 1) on the 1A EDG is closed even though the checklist requires the valve to be in the open position.

WOOTF identifies whether Mode 4 can be entered with this valve in the closed position and the required verification method in accordance with 0-SO-82-5, Attachment 2, Diesel Generator 1A-A Support Systems Valve Checklist 0-82-5.02?

[SRO-only: Procedure selection based on knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal procedures.]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 76 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/EfS Explanation Focus Dis!. link units ward KIA Only 96 F 2 x N E G2.2.12

1. Stem Focus: This question (including the choices) are too cumbersome. Suggest the following revision:

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power and the 2A-A Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 08:00. According to Tech Spec 3.8.1.1, AC Sources, the AC Electrical Power Source Operability Verification (0-SI-082-007. W) is required to be performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

WOOTF choices completes both statements?

The LA TEST time that 0-SI-082-007. W is allowed to be completed is

_ _ _ in accordance with Tech Specs.

IF the 0-SI-082-007. W is NO T performed by this time, THEN this event required to be reported to the NRC in accordance with SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.

A. 09:00; IS B. 09:15; IS C. 09:00; IS NOT D. 09:15; IS NOT

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 77 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link I units ward KIA Only 97 F 2 x N E G2.2.17

1. Stem Focus: The clearance for this screen maintenance isn't well defined. Will the screen removal require the J-A and K-A pumps to be placed under clearance? If so, then include a statement in the stem stating that both of these pumps are tagged out.

2. Stem Focus: Streamline the stem question as follows:

WOOTF identifies the MINIMUM required risk level classification and operability status of the ':4" Train ERCW Header in accordance with SPP-7.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process AND Tech Specs, respectively?

3. Stem Focus: The column headings for the choices should be clarified as follows:

MINIMUM REQUIRED RISK LEVEL STATUS

[SRO-only: Procedure selection based on knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal procedures.]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 78 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (FfH) (1-5) Stem Cues TfF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #f 8ack- Q= SRO 8fMfN UfEfS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 98 F 2 x x 8 E G2.3.5

1. Cred Dist/Cues: "A" and "8" are not plausible because of the word "containment radiation monitors"; i.e., if an applicant was s1 guessing, he could rule out "A" and "8" because the 1 portion of these choices does not include the word containment.

2. Partial: "0" could be argued as correct since pressure is related to temperature.

3. Stem Focus: The 2-part question flows better in reverse order, i.e., first test the applicants' knowledge of where in the E-plan network the monitors used and then HOW they're used.

Suggest the following:

WOOTF completes the following statements as they pertain to the Upper Containment Radiation Monitors (1-RE-90-273 and 1-RE-90-274) in accordance with EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Matrix?

The Upper Containment Rad Monitors are required to assess the integrity of barriers in the Fission Product Barrier Matrix The Upper Containment Rad Monitors should only be used for trending until has been stable for approximately 5 minutes after a steam line break or LOCA.

A. 2; containment temperature B. all 3; excore nuclear instrumentation C. 2; containment temperature D. all 3; excore nuclear instrumentation

[SRO-only: E-plan]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 79 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 99 F 2 x x N E G2.4.12

1. Stem Focus: The question is targeting EPM-4, Shift Manager Responsibility (Item # 3.3.1.1) on the top of page 11 of 97.

Rather than providing the lightning strike scenario, copy the Item and provide a fill-in-the-blank statement to test the applicants' knowledge of where the incident commander function is required to be located.

2. Partial: The Item # 3.3.1.1 that this question is targeting in EPM-4 contains two words that can allow an applicant to argue that there is no correct answer. The words "may", "IF, "should' can imply there is no right or wrong way to complete the incident commander function locally.

Suggest the following:

WOOTF completes the following statement in accordance with EPM-4, Users Guide, Section 3.3, Duties of the Operations Team?

The local Incident Commander function be performed remotely from the control room during a A. may; fire when the Unit Supervisors are at the minimum crew staffing level B. may: medical emergency when the Auxiliary Unit Operators are at the minimum crew staffing level C. may NOT; fire even if the Unit SupeNisors are at the minimum crew staffing level D. may NOT; medical emergency even if the Auxiliary Unit Operators are at the minimum crew staffing level

[SRO-only: Knowledge of administrative procedures & SRO responsibilities]

SEQUOYAH 2010-301 Page 80 of 80

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 100 H 2 x x B E G2.4.6

1. Partial: "B" and "D" are very similar; therefore, an applicant can potentially argue that "D" is correct.

2. Backward: "B" and "D" are backwards logic because of the phrase "if the red path still exists." All of the required information should be in the stem of the question and then the applicants' should make their choice only based on the information in the stem.

Suggest the following:

A LOCA occurred on Unit 1 and FR-C.2, Degraded Core Cooling has been entered and a depressurization of the steam generators is being performed.

The STA subsequently reported a Red Path condition on FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock.

WOOTF identifies the required depressurization rate in FR-C.2 and the required action in accordance with the Functional Restoration Procedures?

A. Less than 100 deg/hr; Suspend implementation of FR-P.1 B. Maximum achievable rate; Immediately transition to FR-P.1; C. Less than 100 deg/hr; Immediately transition to FR-P. 1; D. Maximum achievable rate; Suspend implementation of FR-P.1

[SRO-only: Procedure selection]

ES-403 Written Examination Grading Quality Checklist Facilit : Date of Exam: Exam Level: RO I:2J S SRO Initials Item Description a b c

1. Clean answer sheets copied before gradin

2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented

3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations) AlIA

4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail

5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are 'ustified

6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions uestions missed by half or more of the applicants Printed Name/Signature Date

a. Grader ~M?,M?, "'-\( J BItJI<E.sfJr/.,J M IC,.g."j1rIC-J ~

I kL

b. Facility Reviewer(*) N)A 0

c. NRC Chief Examiner (*)

d. NRC Supervisor (*)

(*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.

ES-403 Written Examination Grading Quality Checklist Facility: Date of Exam: 3~~ Exam Level: RO D SRO ~

Initials Item Descri tion a b c

1. Clean answer sheets copied before

2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented

3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations)

4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-onl ) reviewed in detail

5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are 'ustified

6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions uestions missed b by half or more of the a applicants licants Printed Name/Signature Date

a. Grader ~K¥. 1. ~\C.\\£S

!'f'II.\ MW, /J!!~ ~

\\IC.I<£S /J1I Jc 1i JkL

b. Facility Reviewer(*) N/f\ 0

c. NRC Chief Examiner (*)

d. NRC Supervisor (*)

(*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two inde ind endent NRC reviews are re uired.

required.

ML101230131

Text

Subject:

Subject:

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