ML101160436

G20090374/EDATS: OEDO-2009-0411 - Idaho State University Kevan Crawford 2.206 Director Decision Cover Letter

ML101160436
Person / Time
Site:	Idaho State University
Issue date:	07/30/2010
From:	Leeds E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Crawford K - No Known Affiliation
Schoenebeck G, NRR/DPR, 415-6345
References
G20090374, OEDO-2009-0411, TAC ME1648
Download: ML101160436 (11)

Text

July 30, 2010 Kevan Crawford, Ph.D.

3781 S. 3145 E.

Salt Lake City, UT 84109-3744

Dear Dr. Crawford:

This letter responds to the petition you filed with the Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.206, Requests for action under this subpart, on June 26, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML092440721), as supplemented during a transcribed conference call with the Petition Review Board (PRB) on September 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092650381). In your petition, you requested that the NRC take the following enforcement action:

(1) The reactor operating license at Idaho State University should be suspended immediately. All continuing violations must be reconciled with the regulatory requirements immediately, including items that you alleged were unresolved from Notice of Violation (NOV) 93-1 (Inspection Report 50-284/93-01, ADAMS Accession No. ML092600304) and 20 violations that you alleged to be concealed. The alleged violations correspond to regulatory, criminal, and ethical misconduct that you contend had affected public health and safety and the environment of Pocatello, Idaho.

(2) The licensee, Idaho State University, should be fined for all damages related to the violations and cover-up of violations.

(3) The licensee should be required to carry a 50-year, $50,000,000 bond to cover latent radiation injuries instead of covering these injuries with unreliable State budget allocations for contingency funds.

(4) You alleged that, students using the reactor lab facilities were handling irradiated samples without permission during the fall semester of 1993. You also allege that the samples were handled without anti-contamination clothing and that no radiological surveys were conducted, although you state that neither were required. You contend that said students proceeded to the local hospital to visit friends in the neo-natal unit.

Upon this basis, you requested that every potential exposure and contamination victim be identified through facility records, located, and informed of the potential risk to them and their families. The Medical Center in Pocatello, Idaho, should also be informed so that they may do the same. Those who were exposed should be informed of the entire range of expected symptoms and of their right to seek compensation from the licensee.

(5) The operating license for the Idaho State University should immediately be revoked because of the licensees inability to account for, with documentation, controlled byproduct nuclear materials that were treated in the following ways:

a. released in clandestine, undocumented shipments before August 4, 1993;

K. Crawford b. possessed by individuals not licensed to control the materials and not certified to handle them;

c. without proper U.S. Department of Transportation-certified containers under Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR), Transportation;

d. without proper labeling for transport on public roads;

e. concealed by fraudulent annual operating reports in which the licensee failed to address uncontrolled by-product material distribution and facility modifications and that were never amended after NOV 93-1.

(6) The licensee must permanently revoke the broad form license.

(7) The licensee must publicly acknowledge that there was a loss of control of special nuclear material.

(8) The licensee must publicly acknowledge persons who served as an accessory to concealing unlawful distribution of controlled substances, fraud (annual operating reports and the National Whistleblower Center), loss of control of special nuclear material, and child endangerment.

On November 19, 2009, the NRC staff acknowledged receiving your petition and stated that under 10 CFR 2.206 it had referred your petition to me for action and that it would be acted upon within a reasonable time.

You gave additional information to the petition review board on September 1, 2009, to clarify the bases for your petition. The transcript of this meeting was treated as a supplement to the petition and is available in ADAMS (Accession No. ML092650381) for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and from the ADAMS Public Library component of the NRCs Public Electronic Reading Room (http://www.nrc.gov).

In your petition, you state that during your tenure as the reactor supervisor at the Idaho State University research reactor from December 19, 1991, to March 12, 1993, you witnessed regulatory, criminal, and ethical violations in the operation of the NRC-licensed facility. You further contend that the NRC was grossly negligent in concealing violations in NOV 93-1 (Inspection Report 50-284/93-01), and that the licensee continues to operate its reactor in violation of regulatory requirements. You provided a detailed historical chronology of events through observed activity and alleged acts of Idaho State University (ISU) staff misconduct during the period of your tenure.

During February 23-24, 2010, the NRC conducted a nonroutine inspection (Idaho State UniversityNRC Non-Routine Inspection Report No. 50-284/2010-201, dated March 9, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML100321367) at the ISU research reactor to review logs, records, and observe the performance of licensed activities, pertinent to the issues accepted for your 10 CFR 2.206 petition. For each of the petition issues, the following describes the background, observations and findings, and NRC staff conclusion from the nonroutine inspection:

K. Crawford (1) Petition issue: Failure to conduct safety review under 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, of the modification of the controlled access area by the addition of an undocumented roof access for a siphon breaker experiment implemented before 1991.

a. Background In your petition, you state that there was a failure to conduct a 10 CFR 50.59 safety review for the modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an undocumented roof access for the siphon breaker experiment implemented prior to August 1991, and not covered in the SAR. Random students accessed the roof of the reactor room daily to retrieve objects thrown there. That is how the roof seal was broken and will continually be broken, and proof the roof area does not have a natural barrier to access the unmonitored doors to the reactor room. You submitted additional justification for requiring the facility modification during the teleconference with the PRB, stating, Routine access to the facility roof by the general public must be physically prevented, requiring an architectural barrier. The roof must be replaced to comply with the physical security plan requirement for the licensee to check each access at random intervals during each 8-hour period. The roof egress must be removed to comply with the physical security plan and rid the facility of an OSHA violation, to be replaced by a ground-level egress.

b. Observations The inspectors reviewed many records available onsite, dating from 1975 through the present, and interviewed present and former licensee facility employees. From these records and interviews, the inspectors ascertained that the siphon breaker experiment (SBE) was an experiment that did not involve, and was not connected to, the licensees research and test reactor. Because of the height of the piping involved in the SBE, the experiment was conducted inside the reactor room. Some of the piping extended out of the roof of the reactor room (through a temporary penetration in the equipment hatch cover plate), while the bottom portion of the SBE rested in the gamma irradiation pit. This provided sufficient vertical space for the experiment to be conducted but also required people working on the experiment to access the reactor room.

No 10 CFR 50.59 review of the SBE was found among the records reviewed by the inspectors. However, evidence does not support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was required, because the facility safety analysis report (SAR) for the Idaho State AGN-201M reactor did not describe the equipment access hatch in detail, aside from dimensions and material composition. A 10 CFR 50.59 review by the licensee would have been necessary if the modification would have changed structures, systems, and components as they are described in the SAR.

During August 1989, there were concerns about the security of the reactor room (Room 20) because of various people needing access to the area. These concerns were brought to the attention of the reactor supervisor. After a review of the practices and security arrangements for operation of the SBE, a temporary procedure was implemented to restrict access to the reactor room and to ensure

K. Crawford that the experimenters activities were in compliance with the physical security plan.

The inspectors also reviewed many records available onsite, dating from 1975 to the present, and interviewed present and former licensee facility employees about the installation of the personnel roof access ladder and hatch. You identified this issue during the transcribed conference call with the PRB on September 1, 2009. The inspectors noted that the ladder and roof hatch were installed to provide a secondary means of escape from the reactor room in case of emergency.

Through records review, the inspectors noted that the 1989 meeting of the Reactor Safety Committee discussed the installation of the emergency escape ladder in either the reactor room or reactor laboratory, as well as the installation of a fire alarm and smoke detector. The personnel roof access hatch was also addressed in Revisions 3 and 4 of the physical security plan for the facility, dated February 23, 1990, and January 27, 2003, respectively. No 10 CFR 50.59 review of the roof access hatch was found among the records reviewed by the inspectors. Evidence does not support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was required for the SBE because it was not a modification to existing structures or equipment as described in the SAR.

The review of recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 reviews demonstrated the licensee is aware of the 10 CFR 50.59 process and that various operating and safety aspects of modifications to existing structures and equipment need to be reviewed (and, if necessary, approved by the Reactor Safety Committee or by the NRC if applicable) before implementing the changes.

c. Conclusion Although the inspection found no 10 CFR 50.59 reviews covering the SBE or the personnel roof access ladder and hatch, evidence does not support that such reviews were needed because there were no modifications to the existing structures or equipment as described in the SAR. In addition, the inspectors became aware through record review that the licensee acknowledged and addressed the security aspects of the SBE. Further, the licensee developed a procedure to restrict access to the reactor room to comply with the physical security plan during the timeframe the SBE was in use.

(2) Petition issue: Release of controlled byproduct nuclear materials in containers not certified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, for transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the required labeling.

a. Background In your 10 CFR 2.206 petition, you contend that around 1992 the facility was involved in the unlawful distribution of byproduct material in undocumented, clandestine transactions, to unknown individuals of ethnic origins. You also

K. Crawford state that the individuals were not licensed by the NRC or certified by the ISU broad license to possess materials, and that the materials were not transported in accordance with 49 CFR (e.g., shipping containers, approved vehicles, shipping routes). You acknowledge that the NRC cited ISU for failing to document the transactions of controlled byproduct nuclear materials (Inspection Report 50-284/93-01), but contend that, if the material was transferred by public road, the certified container identification and surface contamination surveys should have been recorded.

b. Observations The inspectors reviewed various records dating from 1975 through the present and interviewed present and former licensee facility employees. From these records and interviews, the inspectors determined that radioactive materials produced in the reactor were (and are) typically used in the reactor room or the adjacent reactor laboratory and then left in or returned to the reactor room for decay. On occasion, radioactive material is transferred to other individuals or groups for use elsewhere. In the past, the NRC noted problems in this area, as documented in Inspection Report No. 50-284/93-01. As a result, the licensee took various actions to correct the problems and deficiencies. One action was to revise and improve the recordkeeping system for tracking byproduct material.

The record system and the forms used for tracking material were reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors found that the material had either been transferred to an authorized or licensed individual or company as required or was held in the reactor room until it had decayed to background or near-background activity levels. No violations were noted.

Another action the licensee took as a result of the problems in 1993 was to revise the procedures for shipping radioactive materials from the ISU campus. In reviewing the current shipping procedures used at ISU, the inspectors noted that ISU requires radioactive material to be shipped from the reactor facility to first be transferred to the campus Technical Safety Office (TSO). A person from that office, designated as the ISU Certified Shipper, is responsible for ensuring that the material is shipped in accordance with the rules specified by the U.S. Department of Transportation in 49 CFR Parts 171 through 180. If assistance is needed, a certified shipper from the Idaho National Laboratory is called in for advice and consultation to ensure that all aspects of the regulations are met, including (but not limited to): (1) completion of the appropriate shipping papers, (2) use and marking of properly certified containers, (3) attachment of the proper labeling, and (4) use of appropriate placards for the transport vehicle as needed.

The inspectors also conferred with NRC inspectors from the Region IV office about their review of the radioactive material shipping program at ISU. In 1993, inspectors from Region IV indicated that they had reviewed the ISU program for receiving, handling, and shipping by-product and source material. Recent reviews noted no violations during the last three inspections.

K. Crawford A review of the available records indicated that no shipments of radioactive material from the reactor had been made in the past several years.

c. Conclusion The NRC review did not find any inappropriate release of material in uncertified and not properly labeled containers. In present operations, radioactive material to be shipped from the reactor facility must be transferred to the TSO, and that office is responsible for completing the transfer or shipment. Shipments of radioactive material are verified to be in compliance with the regulations, with the help of a consultant if needed. No shipments of radioactive material from or produced in the reactor have been made in the past several years.

(3) Petition issue: Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup procedures to wear protective clothing during routine removal of the activated startup channel detector from the reactor core. Your June 26, 2009, letter states that this was cited as an apparent violation (50-284/9301-07), but that the NRC should not have dropped this item in the final NOV. (Inspection Report 50-284/93-01).

a. Background In NRC Inspection Report 50-284/93-01, the inspectors addressed apparent violation 50-284/9301-07 by noting that a radiation detector was used in association with Experiment 21, Auto Reactivity Control System Operation, and was placed in the thermal column of the reactor but not surveyed when removed.

The purpose of the survey would have been to determine if activation products presented a radiological hazard to persons handling the detector. At that time, 10 CFR 20.201(b) (now 10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection against Radiation, Subpart F, Surveys and Monitoring) required that each licensee evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may be present.

NOV 93-1 contains Enclosure 4, Idaho State University Presentation, which was conducted by the ISU reactor facility staff during the NRC-ISU enforcement conference held on October 8, 1993. On the basis of the supplemental information provided during the enforcement conference, the NRC did not issue a citation for the apparent violation.

In your 10 CFR 2.206 petition, you contend that the NRC should not have dropped this item from NOV 93-1 because the Agency overlooked contamination concerns which would have contaminated control console logbooks, and violated 10 CFR 20 ALARA requirements.

b. Observations NRC Inspection Report 50-284/93-01 addressed apparent violation 50-284/9301-07 when the inspectors noted that a radiation detector was used in association with Experimental Procedure 21 (EP-21), Auto Reactivity Control System Operation, and was placed in the thermal column of the reactor but not surveyed when removed. The survey would have determined if activation

K. Crawford products presented a radiological hazard to persons handling the detector. At the time, 10 CFR 20.201(b) was cited as the basis for an apparent violation by the licensees failure to make reasonable surveys under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may have been present.

NOV 93-1 contains Enclosure 4, Idaho State University Presentation, which was conducted by the ISU reactor facility staff during the NRC-ISU enforcement conference held on October 8, 1993, which discussed the licensees process for EP-21. The supplemental information given during the conference showed that, upon EP-21s completion, the ion chamber was left in the thermal column until another experiment required the thermal column to be altered, at which time surveys would be taken to determine radiation levels that would be recorded in the operations log. On the basis of this supplemental information, the NRC did not issue a citation for the apparent violation because ISU conducted surveys of the ion chamber when the thermal column was altered.

The inspectors interviewed facility staff and determined that EP-21 has not been used since 1995, and its equipment is presently not in service at the facility. The inspectors followed up on the current protocol for handling the startup channel detector (Channel 1). By verification of the procedure and through interviews with facility staff, the inspectors determined that, when reactor power reached the target threshold (as stated in Operational Procedure (OP)-1), an operator would depress an automated raise switch that would move the detector from an area of high flux to an area of lower flux within the water tank. The Channel 1 detector is not removed from the water tank, where it would be reasonable to conduct radiological surveys. The Channel 1 detector is lowered back into its fixed position by extending a solenoid arm external to the water tank, without direct contact of potentially contaminated equipment.

The inspectors reviewed contamination and radiation survey records as required by TS Section 4.4c, Radiation Safety Manual Sections 6.3 and 7.2, and radiation safety procedures (e.g., Experimental Procedure 8). The inspectors reviewed logs of reactor operating and shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and did an independent radiation survey. They determined that readings were consistent and comparable to those with the licensee.

c. Conclusion Supporting information from the 1993 NRC-ISU enforcement conference is consistent with the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements for conducting reasonable surveys to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may be present.

Currently, the licensee does not employ EP-21 and the equipment is not in service at the facility. The present handling of the startup channel detector is performed in accordance with procedures that do not require the use of protective clothing. A review of contamination and radiation survey logs was performed without issue.

(4) Petition issue: Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source (reactor startup source) by licensed operators and uncontrolled access by untrained and

K. Crawford unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source, violating 10 CFR Part 20 requirements for exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

a. Discussion In your 10 CFR 2.206 petition, you stated that, during reactor operation, radiation records filed at the console should have been higher than those annotated on operational checklists. Additionally, you contend that mixed radiation (e.g., neutrons, alphas) streaming from the core access hole could strike visitors of average height between the throat and eyes if they were positioned behind the console operator. You stated that during reactor startups you witnessed the neutron source handled routinely without protective clothing and placed on the open floor, which you contend violated 10 CFR Part 20 ALARA requirements.

b. Observations During the inspection period, the reactor was inoperable due to maintenance of control systems. The inspectors reviewed contamination and radiation survey records as required by Technical Specification Section 4.4c, Radiation Safety Manual Sections 6.3 and 7.2, and Radiation Safety Procedures. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed logs of reactor operating and shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and performed an independent radiation survey. The inspectors determined that readings were consistent and comparable to those of the licensee. By reviewing records, the inspectors determined that during the last reactor full power survey, conducted on July 21, 2009, by ISU TSO staff, the radiation level at the reactor console during 4-watt reactor power was 0.4 mr/hour. Streaming radiation from the 1-inch diameter access hole is shielded by 12-inch thick, high density baryte concrete blocks that reduce the radiation levels. The level of radiation on the unshielded side of the access hole, streaming away from the reactor console, was 70 mr/hour at a distance of 1 meter.

The inspectors reviewed records for leak checks of the 10 m curie radium-beryllium (Ra-Be) source that is used during reactor startup. The records indicated that recorded levels during analyses were below the threshold for minimum detectable activity of the liquid scintillation counter.

The inspectors interviewed facility staff and reviewed the reactor startup procedure, OP-1. The procedure provides guidance for the operator to insert the Ra-Be startup source into the access hole, thermal column, or a beam port as needed for startup; however, the procedure does not explicitly give a step for startup source removal and storage. Reactor operators are trained to remove the startup source at the point where the nominal rod height has been established and power has stabilized. The startup source is removed by hand and is stored in a lead-shielded storage receptacle (known as a pig) for subsequent use.

The procedure does not explicitly state a requirement for protective clothing because the startup source does not come into direct contact with the operator

K. Crawford during handling; it is currently threaded onto the end of a 6-foot aluminum rod that facilitates placement into the reactor.

c. Conclusion The NRC review did not find unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source or uncontrolled access to the source. No violations of 10 CFR Part 20 were identified. Radiation surveys performed by TSO staff during reactor operations indicate consistent dose rates on the order of 0.4 mr/hr at the reactor console. Contamination surveys, involving the leak check for the Ra-Be startup source, indicate levels below the threshold for minimum detectable activity of the liquid scintillation counter. Handling of the Ra-Be startup source is conducted in accordance with the approved procedure.

The NRC staff sent a copy of the proposed Directors Decision to you and to ISU, the licensee, for comment on March 19, 2010 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML100600816 and ML100491750).

Neither you nor the licensee provided comment.

A copy of the Director's Decision (DD-10-03) will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission to review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As provided for by this regulation, the decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision within that time. The documents cited in the enclosed decision are available in ADAMS for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and from the ADAMS Public Library component on the NRC's Web site, http://www.nrc.gov.

I have also enclosed a copy of the notice of Issuance of the Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206" that has been filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication. I would like to thank you for bringing potential issues to the attention of the NRC staff through the 10 CFR 2.206 process; it enhances the NRCs mission by protecting people and the environment.

K. Crawford Please feel free to contact Gregory M. Schoenebeck at 301-415-6345 to discuss any questions related to this petition.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-284

Enclosures:

1. Directors Decision

2. Federal Register Notice

K. Crawford Please feel free to contact Gregory M. Schoenebeck at 301-415-6345 to discuss any questions related to this petition.

Sincerely, Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-284

Enclosures:

1. Directors Decision

2. Federal Register Notice DISTRIBUTION: G20090374/EDATS: OEDO-2009-0411 PUBLIC RidsRgn4MailCenter RidsNrrMailCenter RidsOgcMailCenter HCruz RidsAdmMailCenter RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter GSchoenebeck RidsNsirDpr RidsOeMailCenter RidsNrrDorl CMarco, OGC RidsNrrDorlLpl1-1 RidsNrrOd GLappert RidsNrrLASLittle RidsOiMailCenter TMensah RidsNrrPMDPickett RidsEdoMailCenter ADAMS Accession Nos.:

Package: ML101160492 Directors Decision: ML101160483 Letter to Petitioner: ML101160436 Federal Register Notice: ML101110133

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