Text

Initial Exam 2009-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML093280403
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	11/18/2009
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Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.:

1 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Examiners: Lea Operators:

NEW Initial Conditions: 100% Qower, CNMT Mini-Purge in service, HV-3009 shut tagged for rSQairs (emergent work}. SG ARV #3 tagged for reQairs, BA TP #2 tagged for reQairs, I&C recording lift coil currents in rod control for baseline PM data.

USE IC # 86 Turnover: New s~stem Qeak record eXQected due to extremel~ hot weather. S~stem loads at maximum due to unexQected unit triQ. LCO 3.7.5 Condition A (HV-3009}. INFO LCO 3.7.4 (ARV} INFO TR 13.1.3 (BATP}.

Event Malf.

No.

1 EL13A ALB34 E02-0N 2

N/A 3

SG03D2

@O%

4 PR05

@20%

PR12A 5

SG01B

@2%

6 SG01B

@45%

ORHV-9387 SHUT Event Type*

I-ALL TS-SS N-OATC N-SS I-SS I-UO TS-SS C-SS C-OATC TS-SS R-ALL TS-SS M-ALL Event Description Loss of 1AY1A AOP 18032-C loss of 120 Vital AC due to inverter failure - power restored from regulated transformer LCO 3.3.1 13.3.2 I 3.8.7 I 3.8.9 Restore CVCS letdown to service SG Pressure instrument PT-545 fails low (after power restored)

LCO 3.3.2 I 3.3.3 PORV-455 fails partially open and its block valves fails to AUTO close

@ 2185 psig. AOP 18000-C entry required. PORV block valve shut to stop leak. LCO 3.4.11 I 3.4.1 Remote Functions:

PR01 - to open 1 AD1 M-04 (PORV power per AOP)

PR03 - to open 1ABE;'13 (HV-8000A power)

SG # 2 develops 20 gpm tube leak. AOP 18009-C LCO 3.4.13 Rapid power reduction per AOP 18013-C SGTL degrades to SGTR - EOP 19000 to 19030. Air to CNMT isolation (HV-9378) valve sticks closed. Depressurize RCS with PORV.

{After the SI and the valves close on the CIA signal}

Scenario 1 Page 1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.:

1 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Examiners: Lea Operators:

NEW Initial Conditions: 100% Qower, CNMT Mini-Purge in service, HV-3009 shut tagged for reQairs (emergent work}. SG ARV #3 tagged for reQairs, BATP #2 tagged for reQairs, I&C recording lift coil currents in rod control for baseline PM data.

USE IC # 86 Turnover: New system Qeak record eXQected due to extremely hot weather. System loads at maximum due to unexQected unit triQ. LCO 3.7.5 Condition A (HV-3009}. INFO LCO 3.7.4 (ARV} INFO TR 13.1.3 (BATP}.

Event Malf.

No.

1 EL13A ALB34 E02-0N 2

N/A 3

SG03D2

@O%

4 PR05

@20%

PR12A 5

SG01B

@2%

6 SG01B

@45%

OR HV-9387 SHUT Event Type*

I-ALL TS-SS N-OATC N-SS I-SS I-UO TS-SS C-SS C-OATC TS-SS R-ALL TS-SS M-ALL Event Description Loss of 1AY1A AOP 18032-C loss of 120 Vital AC due to inverter failure - power restored from regulated transformer LCO 3.3.1 I 3.3.2 I 3.8.7/3.8.9 Restore CVCS letdown to service SG Pressure instrument PT -545 fails low (after power restored)

LCO 3.3.2 I 3.3.3 PO RV-455 fails partially open and its block valves fails to AUTO close

@ 2185 psig. AOP 18000-C entry required. PORV block valve shut to stop leak. LCO 3.4.11 13.4.1 Remote Functions:

PR01 - to open 1 AD1 M-04 (PORV power per AOP)

PR03 - to open 1ABE-13 (HV-8000A power)

SG # 2 develops 20 gpm tube leak. AOP 18009-C LCO 3.4.13 Rapid power reduction per AOP 18013-C SGTL degrades to SGTR - EOP 19000 to 19030. Air to CNMT isolation (HV-9378) valve sticks closed. Depressurize RCS with PORV.

{After the 51 and the valves close on the CIA signal}

Scenario 1 Page 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7

MS03B C-SS SG #2 ARV fully opens due to failed pressure transmitter. Occurs after

@100%

C-UO 19030-C transition.

B ES22A C-SS BIT isolation valves fail to auto open, and charging line isolation valves ES22B C-OATC fail to auto close.

ES23A ES23B 9

AF05C C-SS TDAFWP fails to auto start.

C-UO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

Loss of 120 VAC vital instrumentation bus 1AY1A due to inverter failure. This requires entry into AOP 1B032-1 Section A.

Verifiable action:

OATC - Immediate actions: checks power> 10% and places rods to manual.

Reduces charging flow to 10 gpm > RCP seal injection flow, maintains seal injection flow B-13 gpm, controls PZR pressure with manual sprays / heaters, defeats loop 1 Tave & delta T inputs into control circuits, restores rods to ARO UO - places all MFRVs and MFPTs speed control in manual, matches steam and feed flows to maintain SG levels at 65%. Bypasses PRNI 41 rod stop, transfer steam dumps to steam pressure mode.

OATC & UO select unaffected channels and place control systems back to automatic.

Technical specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 - Functions 16a through f (P-6, P-7, P-B, P-9, P-10, and P-13) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months LCO 3.3.2 - Function Bb (P-11) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months LCO 3.B.7 Condition A (1 inverter inoperable) - restore inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and enter LCO 3.B.9 with any vital bus de-energized.

LCO 3.B.9 condition B (vital AC bus) - restore vital bus from regulated transformer within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Event 2:

Restore CVCS Letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Align letdown flowpath, establish BO-90 gpm charging flow and B-13 gpm RCP seal injection flow, establish 75 gpm letdown flow, raise letdown flow 120 gpm, place letdown controls in automatic.

Scenario 1 Page 2 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7

MS03B C-SS SG #2 ARV fully opens due to failed pressure transmitter. Occurs after

@100%

C-UO 19030-C transition.

8 ES22A C-SS BIT isolation valves fail to auto open, and charging line isolation valves ES22B C-OATC fail to auto close.

ES23A ES23B 9

AF05C C-SS TDAFWP fails to auto start.

C-UO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

Loss of 120 VAC vital instrumentation bus 1 AY1 A due to inverter failure. This requires entry into AOP 18032-1 Section A.

Verifiable action:

OATC -Immediate actions: checks power> 10% and places rods to manual.

Reduces charging flow to 10 gpm > RCP seal injection flow, maintains seal injection flow 8-13 gpm, controls PZR pressure with manual sprays / heaters, defeats loop 1 Tave & delta T inputs into control circuits, restores rods to ARO UO - places all MFRVs and MFPTs speed control in manual, matches steam and feed flows to maintain SG levels at 65%. Bypasses PRNI 41 rod stop, transfer steam dumps to steam pressure mode.

OATC & UO select unaffected channels and place control systems back to automatic.

Technical specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 - Functions 16a through f (P-6, P-7, P-8, P-9, P-1 0, and P-13) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months LCO 3.3.2 - Function 8b (P-11) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months LCO 3.8.7 Condition A (1 inverter inoperable) - restore inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and enter LCO 3.8.9 with any vital bus de-energized.

LCO 3.8.9 condition B (vital AC bus) - restore vital bus from regulated transformer within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Event 2:

Restore CVCS Letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Align letdown flowpath, establish 80-90 gpm charging flow and 8-13 gpm RCP seal injection flow, establish 75 gpm letdown flow, raise letdown flow 120 gpm, place letdown controls in automatic.

Scenario 1 Page 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:

Controlling SG pressure instrument fails low requiring entry into AOP 18001-C section F.

Verifiable action:

UO - Immediately takes manual control of affected SG MFRV and MFPs speed to restore levels to 65%

with steam & feed flows matched. Unaffected channel selected, controls returned to automatic.

Technical specifications:

LCO 3.3.2 ESFAS - Functions 1 e (SI), 4d(1) and 4d(2) (SLI)- action 0 - trip channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO 3.3.3 PAMS - Function 8 (SL pressure) - Action B - restore in 30 days Event 4:

PORV-455 fails partially open and the PORV block valve will fail to automatically close at 2185 psig. The crew will enter AOP 18000-C. The PORV block valve is shut to stop the RCS leakage.

Verifiable action:

OATC - Immediately verifies PRZR spray valves closed. Closes the affected PORV block valve. Checks PRZR safety valves closed. Verifies PRZR pressure control instrumentation operating properly.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.11 PORVs - Condition B - Close associated block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and remove power from associated block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Restore PORV within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and mode 4 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

LCO 3.4.1 DNB parameters - Condition A - Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Event 5:

A 20 gpm SGTL develops on SG # 2. AOP entrY is required for the SGTL into AOP 18009-C. The AOP will require a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C in conjunction with the SGTL AOP (18009-C).

Verifiable actions:

OATC - Maintain PRZR level with charging & letdown, maintain Tave matched with Tref during SID.

Maintain rods above RIL with borations.

UO - reduce turbine power for SID.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 - RCS Operational Leakage - Action B - mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Scenario 1 Page 3

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Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Event 3:

Controlling SG pressure instrument fails low requiring entry into AOP 18001-C section F.

Verifiable action:

UO - Immediately takes manual control of affected SG MFRV and MFPs speed to restore levels to 65%

with steam & feed flows matched. Unaffected channel selected, controls returned to automatic.

Technical specifications:

LCO 3.3.2 ESFAS - Functions 1 e (SI), 4d(1) and 4d(2) (SLJ)- action 0 - trip channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO 3.3.3 PAMS - Function 8 (SL pressure) - Action B - restore in 30 days Event 4:

PORV-455 fails partially open and the PORV block valve will fail to automatically close at 2185 psig. The crew will enter AOP 18000-C. The PORV block valve is shut to stop the RCS leakage.

Verifiable action:

OATC - Immediately verifies PRZR spray valves closed. Closes the affected PORV block valve. Checks PRZR safety valves closed. Verifies PRZR pressure control instrumentation operating properly.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.11 PORVs - Condition B - Close associated block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and remove power from associated block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Restore PORV within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and mode 4 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

LCO 3.4.1 ONB parameters - Condition A - Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Event 5:

A 20 gpm SGTL develops on SG # 2. AOP entry is required for the SGTL into AOP 18009-C. The AOP will require a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C in conjunction with the SGTL AOP (18009-C).

Verifiable actions:

OATC - Maintain PRZR level with charging & letdown, maintain Tave matched with Tref during SID.

Maintain rods above RIL with borations.

UO - reduce turbine power for SID.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 - RCS Operational Leakage - Action B - mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Scenario 1 Page 3

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events 6, 7, 8, and 9:

SGTL degrades to SGTR. OATC is unable to maintain PRZR level with normal charging. This requires tripping the reactor and actuating SI. A transition to 19030-C, E-3 for the SGTR is required to stop the primary to secondary leakage.

Verifiable actions:

OATC-recognize not able to maintain PRZR level with 2 charging pumps and no CVCSletdown.

Manually trips reactor and actuates Safety Injection. Manually open BIT isolations and close charging line isolations. RCS depressurization following rapid cooldown. Use PORV to depressurize RCS.

Terminate ECCS injection & establish normal charging.

UO - Identify & isolate ruptured SG. Rapid RCS cooldown to target temperature and maintain that temperature with SG ARVs. Manually close stuck open SG#2 ARV. Manually start TDAFW pump.

CRITICAL STEPS:

1. Manually restore ECCS HHSI flow paths to maintain RCS inventory

- Correctly restored at completion of Attachment B for 19000-C

2. Isolate the Ruptured SG

- Completed in time to prevent transition to 19131-C, SGTR with a Loss of Reactor Coolant

3. Stop offsite emergency release from SG #2 ARV.

- Completed in time to prevent transition to 19131-C, SGTR with a Loss of Reactor Coolant Scenario 1 Page 4 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events 6, 7, 8, and 9:

SGTL degrades to SGTR. OATC is unable to maintain PRZR level with normal charging. This requires tripping the reactor and actuating SI. A transition to 19030-C, E-3 for the SGTR is required to stop the primary to secondary leakage.

Verifiable actions:

OATC-recognize not able to maintain PRZR level with 2 charging pumps and no CVCSletdown.

Manually trips reactor and actuates Safety Injection. Manually open BIT isolations and close charging line isolations. RCS depressurization following rapid cooldown. Use PORV to depressurize RCS.

Terminate ECCS injection & establish normal charging.

UO - Identify & isolate ruptured SG. Rapid RCS cooldown to target temperature and maintain that temperature with SG ARVs. Manually close stuck open SG#2 ARV. Manually start TDAFW pump.

CRITICAL STEPS:

1. Manually restore ECCS HHSI flow paths to maintain RCS inventory

- Correctly restored at completion of Attachment B for 19000-C

2. Isolate the Ruptured SG

- Completed in time to prevent transition to 19131-C, SGTR with a Loss of Reactor Coolant

3. Stop offsite emergency release from SG #2 ARV.

- Completed in time to prevent transition to 19131-C, SGTR with a Loss of Reactor Coolant Scenario 1 Page 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1 AY1 A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses loss of power to vital bus 1 A Y1 A:

Indications:

Several channel I trip status lights are lit Simultaneous loss of SR, IR, and PR NIS channels N-31/35/41 Alarms:

120V AC PANELS 1AY1A 1 AY2A TROUBLE INVERTERS 1AD111 1AD1111 TROUBLE Several other alarms resulting from loss of channel I vital AC power OATC IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

A1 Check reactor power> P-10 setpoint A2 Verify control rods in manual UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

A3 Control SG NR levels 60%-70%:

Place MFRVs in manual MFPT SPEED CONTROL MASTER in manual SS Enters AOP 18032-C, Loss of 120V AC Instrument Power, section A and direct the following actions listed in the following steps for the OATC /

UO (Crew Update)

OATC/UO A4 Initiate Continuous Actions Pages 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses loss of power to vital bus 1 AY1A:

Indications:

Several channel I trip status lights are lit Simultaneous loss of SR, IR, and PR NIS channels N-31/35/41 Alarms:

120V AC PANELS 1AY1A 1 AY2A TROUBLE INVERTERS 1AD1111AD1111 TROUBLE Several other alarms resulting from loss of channel I vital AC power OATC IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

A1 Check reactor power> P-10 setpoint A2 Verify control rods in manual UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

A3 Control SG NR levels 60%-70%:

Place MFRVs in manual MFPT SPEED CONTROL MASTER in manual SS Enters AOP 18032-C, Loss of 120V AC Instrument Power, section A and direct the following actions listed in the following steps for the OATC /

UO (Crew Update)

OATC / UO A4 Initiate Continuous Actions Pages

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 1 B032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC A5 Control charging to:

Maintain seal injection flow to all RCP's B to 13 GPM If letdown isolated, then adjust charging flow to - 10 GPM greater than total seal injection flow OATC A6 Restore PRZR level control:

a.

Check 1 LS-459D PRZR LVL CNTL SELECT selected to CH459 for control

b.

Select CH461 /460 on 1 LS-459D

c.

Restore Control Heaters by plaCing 1 HS-1 0471 in ON

d.

Reset Back-up Heaters by placing control switches in OFF, then in AUTO:

1 HS-10469A 1 HS-10470A 1 HS-10472

e.

Operate heaters and sprays to maintain pressurizer pressure - BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG

f.

Select L-461 on 1 LS-459E PRZR LVL REC SEL.

OATC A7.

Check Letdown in service RNO.

Perform the following:

a. Restore letdown by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM. (Event 2)

b. IF letdown can NOT be placed in service, THEN place excess letdown in service by initiating 1300B, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EXCESS LETDOWN.

2

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC A5 Control charging to:

Maintain seal injection flow to all RCP's 8 to 13 GPM If letdown isolated, then adjust charging flow to - 10 G PM greater than total seal injection flow OATC A6 Restore PRZR level control:

a.

Check 1 LS-459D PRZR LVL CNTL SELECT selected to CH459 for control

b.

Select CH461/460 on 1 LS-459D

c.

Restore Control Heaters by placing 1 HS-1 0471 in ON

d.

Reset Back-up Heaters by placing control switches in OFF, then in AUTO:

1 HS-1 0469A 1 HS-1 0470A 1 HS-1 0472

e.

Operate heaters and sprays to maintain pressurizer pressure - BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG

f.

Select L-461 on 1 LS-459E PRZR LVL REC SEL.

OATC A7.

Check Letdown in service RNO.

Perform the following:

a. Restore letdown by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM. (Event 2)

b. IF letdown can NOT be placed in service, THEN place excess letdown in service by initiating 13008, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EXCESS LETDOWN.

2

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 1 B032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC AB.

Check 1 PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT selected to CH455.

A9.

Select alternate pressure channel:

a. Place 1 HS-0455A PRZR PORV 455A in close.

b. Place PRZR SPRAY controllers in manual:

1PIC-455B 1PIC-455C

c. Adjust PRZR Master Pressure Controller 1 PIC-455A output to approximately 25%.

d. Select CH457/456 on 1 PS-455F.

e. Select P-457 on 1 PS-455G PRZR PRESS REC SEL.

OATC A10.

Restore automatic PRZR pressure control:

Check pressure 2220-2250 psig Place 1 HS-0455A in auto 0

(should remain in manual close due to event 1 failure)

Check PORV 455 remains closed Place PRZR heaters in AUTO Place PRZR spray valve controllers in AUTO Verify RCS pressure - stable or rising Return PRZR master pressure controller 1 PIC-455A to AUTO UO A11.

Select channel II SG control instruments by placing selector switches to the right (May ask for peer check) 3 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC A8.

Check 1 PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT selected to CH455.

A9.

Select alternate pressure channel:

a. Place 1 HS-0455A PRZR PORV 455A in close.

b. Place PRZR SPRAY controllers in manual:

1PIC-455B 1 PIC-455C

c. Adjust PRZR Master Pressure Controller 1 PIC-455A output to approximately 25%.

d. Select CH457/456 on 1 PS-455F.

e. Select P-457 on 1 PS-455G PRZR PRESS REC SEL.

OATC A10.

Restore automatic PRZR pressure control:

Check pressure 2220-2250 psig Place 1 HS-0455A in auto 0

(should remain in manual close due to event 1 failure)

Check PORV 455 remains closed Place PRZR heaters in AUTO Place PRZR spray valve controllers in AUTO Verify RCS pressure - stable or rising Return PRZR master pressure controller 1 PIC-455A to AUTO UO A11.

Select channel II SG control instruments by placing selector switches to the right (May ask for peer check) 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4of7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032':'C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO A12.

Restore SG levels to 65%

A13.

Return MFRVs and MFP master controllers to automatic as desired OATC A14.

Select DEFEAT 412 on 1TS-412T T-AVG DEFEAT SEL.

A15.

Select DEFEAT 411 on 1 TS-411 F DEL TAT DEFEAT SEL.

OATC NOTE Tref (1 PI-505) will fail due to loss of 1 AY1 A. The Tref pointer on TavglTref Indicator 1T1-412B and Indicator TI-412A will be inoperable.

A16.

Restore Tavg to program by performing the following:

a. Determine Tref from FIGURE 1, TREF VS TURBINE POWER.

b. Place ROD STOP BYPASS Switch to BYPASS PRN41 position. (This will clear alarm ALB10D03 - Overpower Rod Stop)

c. Adjust rod position to restore Tavg to Tref.

UO A17 Transfer Steam Dumps to Steam Pressure mode:

a. Check Condenser available

b. Verify PIC507 steam dump control set to auto at 1092 psig (7.28 on potentiometer) and zero demand

c. Place 1 HS-500C STEAM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT in "STM PRESSURE" 4

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO A12.

Restore SG levels to 65%

A13.

Return MFRVs and MFP master controllers to automatic as desired OATC A14.

Select DEFEAT 412 on 1TS-412T T-AVG DEFEAT SEL.

A15.

Select DEFEAT 411 on 1TS-411F DELTA T DEFEAT SEL.

OATC NOTE Tref (1 PI-505) will fail due to loss of 1 AY1A. The Tref pointer on Tavg/Tref Indicator 1T1-412B and Indicator TI-412A will be inoperable.

A16.

Restore Tavg to program by performing the following:

a. Determine Tref from FIGURE 1, TREF VS TURBINE POWER.

b. Place ROD STOP BYPASS Switch to BYPASS PRN41 position. (This will clear alarm ALB1 OD03 - Overpower Rod Stop)

c. Adjust rod position to restore Tavg to Tref.

UO A17 Transfer Steam Dumps to Steam Pressure mode:

a. Check Condenser available

b. Verify PIC507 steam dump control set to auto at 1092 psig (7.28 on potentiometer) and zero demand

c. Place 1 HS-500C STEAM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT in "STM PRESSURE" 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op.Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 50f7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC / UO A18.

Maintain stable plant conditions:

Tavg within 1 F of program value PRZR level within 5% of program PRZR pressure 2220 psig and 2250 pSig SG NR levels between 60% and 70%

SS/OATC A19.

Verify interlocks in required state for existing conditions:

(TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

(This is a Tech Spec required 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months action)

P6-0N P7 - OFF P8 - OFF P9 - OFF P10 and input to P7 - ON, OFF P13 - OFF P11 - OFF SS A20.

Dispatch operator to transfer 1 AY1 A to alternate supply (SOP 13431-1 )

OATC A21.

Check ACCW operation:

ACCW pump 1 started Proper operation of ACCW pump 1 Shutdown ACCW pump 2 Verify thermal barrier header return isolation valve (HV-2041) open 5

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC / UO A18.

Maintain stable plant conditions:

Tavg within 1 F of program value PRZR level within 5% of program PRZR pressure 2220 psig and 2250 psig SG NR levels between 60% and 70%

SS /OATC A19.

Verify interlocks in required state for existing conditions:

(TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

(This is a Tech Spec required 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months action)

P6-0N P7 - OFF P8 - OFF P9 - OFF P10 and input to P7 - ON, OFF P13 - OFF P11 - OFF SS A20.

Dispatch operator to transfer 1AY1A to alternate supply (SOP 13431-1 )

OATC A21.

Check ACCW operation:

ACCW pump 1 started Proper operation of ACCW pump 1 Shutdown ACCW pump 2 Verify thermal barrier header return isolation valve (HV-2041) open 5

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS A22.

Check 1AY1A restored from alternate or normal power Note: do not expect path below to be taken, power will be restored from the regulated transformer.

If 1AY1A cannot be re-energized in a timely manner:

Place standby NSCW and CCW pumps that started in PTL Initiate 18002-C, NIS malfunction AOP Refer to Attachment A, Table 1 to determine affected instruments Refer to Attachment A, Table 2 and 3 to determine additional equipment affected Refer to technical specifications and complete any applicable actions UO A23.

Check NSCW and CCW train A in service A24.

Shutdown and place in AUTO any standby NSCW or CCW pump which started due to loss of 1AY1A NOTE: CCW pump will auto restart if handswitch is not held in stop for several seconds to let discharge pressure stabilize.

IF CCW pump handswitch taken to PTL then INFO only LCD 3.7.7 CCW would apply SS A25.

Check loss of 1 A Y1 A due to inverter 1 AD111 failure A26.

Check 1AD111 Inverter repaired (NOT)

Goes to step A31 A31.

Check 1AY1A restored to inverter supply (NOT)

RNO.

Return to procedure and step in effect 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of 7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1 AY1 A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS A22.

Check 1 AY1 A restored from alternate or normal power Note: do not expect path below to be taken, power will be restored from the regulated transformer.

If 1AY1A cannot be re-energized in a timely manner:

Place standby NSCW and CCW pumps that started in PTL Initiate 18002-C, NIS malfunction AOP Refer to Attachment A, Table 1 to determine affected instruments Refer to Attachment A, Table 2 and 3 to determine additional equipment affected Refer to technical specifications and complete any applicable actions UO A23.

Check NSCW and CCW train A in service A24.

Shutdown and place in AUTO any standby NSCW or CCW pump which started due to loss of 1AY1A NOTE: CCW pum p will auto restart if handswitch is not held in stop for several seconds to let discharge pressure stabilize.

IF CCW pump handswitch taken to PTL then INFO only LCO 3.7.7 CCW would apply SS A25.

Check loss of 1AY1A due to inverter 1AD111 failure A26.

Check 1AD111 Inverter repaired (NOT)

Goes to step A31 A31.

Check 1 AY1 A restored to inverter supply (NOT)

RNO.

Return to procedure and step in effect 6

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Determine Technical Specifications impacted by failure:

LCO 3.3.1 - Functions 16a through f (P-6, P-7, P-8, P-9, P-10, and P-13) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (Completed at Step A19 of AOP 18032-1)

LCO 3.3.2 - Function 8b (P-11) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months LCO 3.8.7 Condition A (1 inverter inoperable) - restore inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and enter LCO 3.8.9 with any vital bus de-energized.

LCO 3.8.9 Condition B (vital AC bus) - restore vital bus from regulated transformer within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months SS Contact SSS to perform following:

Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry Initiate Condition Report 7

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of 7 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

A loss 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1AY1A occurs. The crew will diagnose the failure and take immediate actions to stabilize the affected control systems and then enter AOP 18032-C. This failure will be due to an inverter failure, the bus will be re-energized from the alternate power source, the regulated transformer.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Determine Technical Specifications impacted by failure:

LCO 3.3.1 - Functions 16a through f (P-6, P-7, P-8, P-9, P-10, and P-13) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (Completed at Step A19 of AOP 18032-1)

LCO 3.3.2 - Function 8b (P-11) - verify correct status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months LCO 3.8.7 Condition A (1 inverter inoperable) - restore inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and enter LCO 3.8.9 with any vital bus de-energized.

LCO 3.8.9 Condition B (vital AC bus) - restore vital bus from regulated transformer within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months SS Contact SSS to perform following:

Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry Initiate Condition Report 7

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

OATC returns CVCS letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 following loss of vital instrument bus 1 A Y1 A Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SOP 13006-1! Section 4.4.2 OATC 4.4.2.2 Verifies NCP miniflow (HV-81 09) is open 4.4.2.3 Perform the following:

a.

CLOSE LTON Orifice isolations (HV-8149A1B/C)

b.

CLOSE L TON isolations (LV-459/460)

c.

CLOSE PZR aux Spray (HV-8145)

d.

OPEN Pipe Break protection (HV-15214)

e.

OPEN L TON CNMT isolation (HV-8160)

f.

OPEN L TON CNMT isolation (HV-8152)

g.

L TON pressure controller (PV-131) - Manual 50%-75

h.

L TON HX outlet (TIC-130) - Manual to most recent position on rounds sheets

i.

Verify PZR level> 17%

j.

Verify one of the following are OPEN:

0 Normal charging to loop 1 (HV-8146)

OR 0

Alternate charging to loop 4 (HV-8147)

OATC 4.4.2.4 Verify charging to RCS isolations - OPEN (HV-8105 & HV-81 06)

OATC 4.4.2.5 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust 1 HC-182 output to maintain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

Adjust 1FIC-121 to raise CHG FLOW 1FI-121A to between 80 and 90 gpm.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

OATC returns CVCS letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 following loss of vital instrument bus 1 AY1 A Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SOP 13006-1, Section 4.4.2 OATC 4.4.2.2 Verifies NCP miniflow (HV-81 09) is open 4.4.2.3 Perform the following:

a.

CLOSE LTON Orifice isolations (HV-8149A/B/C)

b.

CLOSE L TON isolations (LV-459/460)

c.

CLOSE PZR aux Spray (HV-8145)

d.

OPEN Pipe Break protection (HV-15214)

e.

OPEN L TON CNMT isolation (HV-8160)

f.

OPEN L TON CNMT isolation (HV-8152)

g.

L TON pressure controller (PV-131) - Manual 50%-75

h.

L TON HX outlet (TIC-130) - Manual to most recent position on rounds sheets

i.

Verify PZR level> 17%

j.

Verify one of the following are OPEN:

0 Normal charging to loop 1 (HV-8146)

OR 0

Alternate charging to loop 4 (HV-8147)

OATC 4.4.2.4 Verify charging to RCS isolations - OPEN (HV-8105 & HV-81 06)

OATC 4.4.2.5 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust 1 HC-182 output to maintain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

Adjust 1FIC-121 to raise CHG FLOW 1FI-121A to between 80 and 90 gpm.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

OATC returns CVCS letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 following 1055 of vital instrument bus 1 A Y1 A Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.6 Open LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves by holding their handswitches in OPEN UNTIL the valves are fully open:

1-LV-460 1 HS-460 1-LV-459 1 HS-459 OATC 4.4.2.7 Establish Letdown flow:

a.

Simultaneously open a Letdown Orifice and maintain pressure by performing the following:

Open one LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valve by holding its handswitch in the OPEN position until fully open:

1 HS-8149B (75 gpm - odd fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-8149C (75 gpm - even fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-8149A (45 gpm)

Adjust 1PIC-131A to maintain LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A between 360 and 380 psig.

b.

Record the letdown orifice that was placed in service in the Unit Control Log.

NOTE: The crew may opt to increase letdown flow to 120 GPM after placin~ a 75 GPM orifice in service.

OATC 4.4.2,8 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1 PI-131A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place 1PIC-131 in AUTO.

OATC 4.4.2.9 Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP HIC-130 in AUTO and verify it maintains temperature less than 'or equal to 115°F.

2

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

OATC returns CVCS letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 following loss of vital instrument bus 1AY1A Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.6 Open LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves by holding their handswitches in OPEN UNTIL the valves are fully open:

1-LV-460 1 HS-460 1-LV-459 1 HS-459 OATC 4.4.2.7 Establish Letdown flow:

a.

Simultaneously open a Letdown Orifice and maintain pressure by performing the following:

Open one LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valve by holding its handswitch in the OPEN position until fully open:

1 HS-8149B (75 gpm - odd fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-8149C (75 gpm - even fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-8149A (45 gpm)

Adjust 1 PIC-131 A to maintain LETDOWN PRESS 1 PI-131 A between 360 and 380 psig.

b.

Record the letdown orifice that was placed in service in the Unit Control Log.

NOTE: The crew may opt to increase letdown flow to 120 GPM after placing a 75 GPM orifice in service.

OATC 4.4.2.8 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1 PI-131 A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place 1 PIC-131 in AUTO.

OATC 4.4.2.9 Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in AUTO and verify it maintains temperature less than or equal to 115°F.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 30f3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

OATC returns CVCS letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 following loss of vital instrument bus 1 A Y1 A Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.10 Verify LETDOWN REGEN HX OUT 1T1-127 indicates less than 380°F.

4.4.2.11 Monitor 1 LR-459 Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Level Setpoint.

4.4.2.12 Maintain Pressurizer Level within 1 % of Level Setpoint using 1 FIC-121.

OATC 4.4.2.13 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a.

Verify PRZR Level Controller 1 LlC-459 in AUTO.

b.

AFTER level has been stable within 1 % of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1 FIC-121 in AUTO.

RETURN TO EVENT 1 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

OATC returns CVCS letdown to service using SOP 13006-1 following loss of vital instrument bus 1AY1A Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.10 Verify LETDOWN REGEN HX OUT 1T1-127 indicates less than 380°F.

4.4.2.11 Monitor 1 LR-459 Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Level Setpoint.

4.4.2.12 Maintain Pressurizer Level within 1 % of Level Setpoint using 1 FIC-121.

OATC 4.4.2.13 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a.

Verify PRZR Level Controller 1 LlC-459 in AUTO.

b.

AFTER level has been stable within 1 % of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1 FIC-121 in AUTO.

RETURN TO EVENT 1 3

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

After 1AY1A is re-energized SG # 4 pressure channel II PT -545 fails low.

The UO will take immediate actions to restore SG # 4 level and manually control the speed of both MFPs. The crew will complete the corrective actions using AOP 18001-C, Section F.

Time Position A~plicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of controlling SG # 4 pressure channel:

Alarms:

STM GEN 4 HI STM PRESS RATE ALERT STM GEN 4 LO STEAMLINE PRESS ALERT STM GEN 4 FLOW MISMATCH STM GEN 4 HI/LO LVL DEVIATION Indications:

SG # 4 pressure channel II (PT -545) drops to 0 psig SG # 4 controlling steam flow channel drops to 0 MPPH Both main feed pumps speed starts lowering SGs 1, 2, and 3 feed flows start to lower UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

F1.

Check steam & feed flows matched on loop 4 RNO.

Takes manual control of SG 4 MFRV and both MFPs speed Restores SG NR levels to 60-70%

SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section F, Failure of SG Pressure Instrumentation And directs action for the OATC I UO listed in the following steps.

(Crew Update)

UO F2.

Checks controlling steam flow channel affected by pressure channel failure 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

After 1A Y1A is re-energized SG # 4 pressure channel II PT -545 fails low.

The UO will take immediate actions to restore SG # 4 level and manually control the speed of both MFPs. The crew will complete the corrective actions using AOP 18001-C, Section F.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of controlling SG # 4 pressure channel:

Alarms:

STM GEN 4 HI STM PRESS RATE ALERT STM GEN 4 LO STEAMLINE PRESS ALERT STM GEN 4 FLOW MISMATCH STM GEN 4 HI/LO LVL DEVIATION Indications:

SG # 4 pressure channel II (PT -545) drops to 0 psig SG # 4 controlling steam flow channel drops to 0 MPPH Both main feed pumps speed starts lowering SGs 1, 2, and 3 feed flows start to lower UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

F1.

Check steam & feed flows matched on loop 4 RNO.

Takes manual control of SG 4 MFRV and both MFPs speed Restores SG N R levels to 60-70%

SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section F, Failure of SG Pressure Instrumentation And directs action for the OATC I UO listed in the following steps.

(Crew Update)

UO F2.

Checks controlling steam flow channel affected by pressure channel failure

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

After 1A Y1A is re-energized SG # 4 pressure channel II PT -545 fails low.

The UO will take immediate actions to restore SG # 4 level and manually control the speed of both MFPs. The crew will complete the corrective actions using AOP 18001-C, Section F.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO F3.

Selects unaffected channel for SG 4 steam flow using Table F1.

TABLE F1 AFFECTED SG ASSOCIATED SELECTOR PRESSURE SG FLOW SG INSTRUMENT CHANNEL SWITCH PT-514 F512 FS-512C 1

PT-515 F513 PT-524 F522 FS-522C 2

PT-525 F523 PT-534 F532 FS-532C 3

PT-535 F533 PT-544 F542 FS-542C 4

PT-545 F543 UO F4.

Return MFPs speed controls to automatic F5.

Returns SG 4 MFRV to automatic OATCI F6.

Initiate continuous actions page UO UO F7.

Checks SG level control maintains NR level at 65%

SS Has SSS perform following:

F8.

Notifies I & C to initiate repairs Initiate Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 2

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

After 1AY1A is re-energized SG # 4 pressure channel II PT -545 fails low.

The UO will take immediate actions to restore SG # 4 level and manually control the speed of both MFPs. The crew will complete the corrective actions using AOP 1S001-C, Section F.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO F3.

Selects unaffected channel for SG 4 steam flow using Table F1.

TABLE F1 AFFECTED SG ASSOCIATED SELECTOR PRESSURE SG FLOW SWITCH SG INSTRUMENT CHANNEL PT-514 F512 FS-512C 1

PT-515 F513 PT-524 F522 FS-522C 2

PT-525 F523 PT-534 F532 FS-532C 3

PT-535 F533 PT-544 F542 FS-542C 4

PT-545 F543 UO F4.

Return MFPs speed controls to automatic F5.

Returns SG 4 MFRV to automatic OATC/

F6.

Initiate continuous actions page UO UO Fl.

Checks SG level control maintains NR level at 65%

SS Has SSS perform following:

FS.

Notifies I & C to initiate repairs Initiate Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

After 1A Y1A is re-energized SG # 4 pressure channel II PT -545 fails low.

The UO will take immediate actions to restore SG # 4 level and manually control the speed of both MFPs. The crew will complete the corrective actions using AOP 18001-C, Section F.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS F9.

Bypasses affected channel if desired (do not expect this tobe implemented)

F10.

Trip affected channel bistable and place associated master test switch in test per table F2 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (TS 3;3.2)

SS F11.

Initiate applicable action of Technical Specification 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4.

LCO 3.3.2 ESFAS Functions 1e, and 4d(1) action D - trip channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Function 4d(2) (SLI)

INFO LCO LCO 3.3.3 PAMS Function 8 INFO LCO SS F12.

Check repairs and surveillances complete (NOT)

RNa Returns to procedure and step in effect 3

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 30f3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

After 1AY1A is re-energized SG # 4 pressure channel" PT -545 fails low.

The UO will take immediate actions to restore SG # 4 level and manually control the speed of both MFPs. The crew will complete the corrective actions using AOP 18001-C, Section F.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS F9.

Bypasses affected channel if desired (do not expect this to be implemented)

F10.

Trip affected channel bistable and place associated master test switch in test per table F2 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (TS 3.3.2)

SS F11.

Initiate applicable action of Technical Specification 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4.

LCO 3.3.2 ESFAS Functions 1 e, and 4d( 1) action 0 - trip channel in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Function 4d(2) (SLI)

INFO LCO LCO 3.3.3 PAMS Function 8 INFO LCO SS F12.

Check repairs and surveillances complete (NOT)

RNO Returns to procedure and step in effect 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PORV-455 will fail to an intermediate position causing PRZR pressure to lower, additionally the PORV Block (PV-8000A) will fail to automatically close at 2185 psig. The crew will enter AOP 18000-C for this failure and isolate the malfunctioning PORV and restore PRZR pressure to normal and address the technical specifications.

Time Position CREW OATC Applicant's Action or Behavior Diagnoses failure of PORV 455:

Alarms:

PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK Indications:

Intermediate valve position for PV-455 PRZR pressure lowering PORV tailpipe temperature indication (TI-449) rising - 200°F PORV Block Valve PV-8000A fails to shut @ 2185 psig PRZR pressure Immediate Action:

1.

Verifies PRZR spray valves closed SS Enters AOP 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction (Crew Update) and directs actions of OATC / UO listed in the following steps.

OATC

2.

Energizes PRZR heaters as necessary to maintain 2235 psig OATC

3.

Verifies PORV 455 is shut: (NOT)

RNO.

Places handswitch for PORV-455 block valve in close Dispatches CBO to open PORV breaker 1AD1 M-04 OATC

4.

Checks PRZR Safety Valves closed:

IPC or PSMS valve position indication PRZR Safety tailpipe temperature indications

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PORV-455 will fail to an intermediate position causing PRZR pressure to lower, additionally the PORV Block (PV-8000A) will fail to automatically close at 2185 psig. The crew will enter AOP 18000-C for this failure and isolate the malfunctioning PORV and restore PRZR pressure to normal and address the technical specifications.

Time Position CREW OATC Applicant's Action or Behavior Diagnoses failure of PORV 455:

Alarms:

PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK Indications:

Intermediate valve position for PV-455 PRZR pressure lowering PORV tailpipe temperature indication (TI-449) rising - 200°F PORV Block Valve PV-8000A fails to shut @ 2185 psig PRZR pressure Immediate Action:

1.

Verifies PRZR spray valves closed SS Enters AOP 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction (Crew Update) and directs actions of OATC / UO listed in the following steps.

OATC

2.

Energizes PRZR heaters as necessary to maintain 2235 psig OATC

3.

Verifies PORV 455 is shut: (NOT)

RNO.

Places handswitch for PORV-455 block valve in close Dispatches CBO to open PORV breaker 1 AD1 M-04 OATC

4.

Checks PRZR Safety Valves closed:

IPC or PSMS valve position indication PRZR Safety tailpipe temperature indications

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PORV-455 will fail to an intermediate position causing PRZR pressure to lower, additionally the PORV Block (PV-8000A) will fail to automatically close at 2185 psig. The crew will enter AOP 18000-C for this failure and isolate the malfunctioning PORV and restore PRZR pressure to normal and address the technical specifications.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

5. Checks master controller PIC-455A operating properly using figure 1 of AOP 18000-C OATC

6. Checks PRZR pressure instruments reading properly SS

7. Complies with Technical Specifications:

3.4.11 PORVs - Condition B:

0 Close associated PORV block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and 0

Remove power from the associated block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1ABE-13 0

Restore PORV to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.4.1 DNB Parameters - Condition A - Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

8. Returns to procedure and step in effect SS Contacts SSS to perform following actions:

Remove power from PORV block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Initiate condition report Contact maintenance Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

PORV-455 will fail to an intermediate position causing PRZR pressure to lower, additionally the PORV Block (PV-8000A) will fail to automatically close at 2185 psig. The crew will enter AOP 18000-C for this failure and isolate the malfunctioning PORV and restore PRZR pressure to normal and address the technical specifications.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

5. Checks master controller PIC-455A operating properly using figure 1 of AOP 18000-C OATC

6. Checks PRZR pressure instruments reading properly SS

7. Complies with Technical Specifications:

3.4.11 PORVs - Condition B:

0 Close associated PORV block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and 0

Remove power from the associated block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1ABE-13 0

Restore PORV to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.4.1 DNB Parameters - Condition A - Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

8. Returns to procedure and step in effect SS Contacts SSS to perform following actions:

Remove power from PORV block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Initiate condition report Contact maintenance Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose SG Tube Leakage:

ALARMS:

INTMD RADIATION ALARM HIGH RADIATION RE-0724 - Primary to secondary leakage monitor RE-0810 - SJAE low range monitor RE-12839C - SJAE monitor INDICATIONS:

Charging flow increases if in auto (expect manual control)

PRZR level slowly lowers SS Enters AOP 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak and directs actions of OATC / UO listed in the following steps. (Crew Update)

OATC/UO

1.

Initiate continuous actions page OATC

2.

Maintains PRZR level by:

a. Adjusting charging flow

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising RNOb.1) Isolating letdown (only necessary if at 120 GPM letdown)

RNOb.2) Start additional charging pump (will not be necessary)

RNOb.3) IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a. Trip the Reactor.

b. WHEN Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c. Go to 19000 C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 1

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose SG Tube Leakage:

ALARMS:

INTMD RADIATION ALARM HIGH RADIATION RE-0724 - Primary to secondary leakage monitor RE-0810 - SJAE low range monitor RE-12839C - SJAE monitor INDICATIONS:

Charging flow increases if in auto (expect manual control)

PRZR level slowly lowers SS Enters AOP 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak and directs actions of OATC / UO listed in the following steps. (Crew Update)

OATC / UO

1.

Initiate continuous actions page OATC

2.

Maintains PRZR level by:

a. Adjusting charging flow

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising RNOb.1) Isolating letdown (only necessary if at 120 GPM letdown)

RNOb.2) Start additional charging pump (will not be necessary)

RNOb.3) !E PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a. Trip the Reactor.

b. WHEN Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c. Go to 19000 C, EO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior

3.

Try to identify affected SG:

SS

a. Direct Chemistry attempt to identify the leaking SG by initiating 31120-C UO

b. Check SG level indications stable or rising with relatively lower feed flow rate (will not be able to see this)

OATC

4.

Verifies VCT level maintained with automatic makeup control OATC/ SS

5.

Check leak rate < 5 GPM as determined by CVCS flow balance

[charging - (letdown + seal leak off)]

(Leak rate will be - 20 GPM)

RNO a. Initiate 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction RNO b. Be in mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months RNO c. Go to step 11.

SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-18013-C, Rapid Down Power Entry Condition Target Approx. Time

@3-5%/min 17015-D05 MFPT High Vibrations

<70% RTP 5-B minutes 17015-E01 17019-B04 Condenser Low Vacuum >22.42" 1 B025-C Vacuum Hg and STABLE or or Circ Water Pump Trip RISING or Loss of Utilit~ Water 1 B009-C SG Tube Leak (~75 gpd

<50% RTP within 1 10-17 minutes with an ROC ~30 hour ged/hr}

18009*C SG Tube Leak (~5 20% RTP within 1 16*27 gpm) hour & trip minutes reactor 1 B039-C Confirmed Loose Part 20% RTP quickly 16-27 minutes SS determination based As determined by on the SS plant conditions 2

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior

3.

Try to identify affected SG:

SS

a. Direct Chemistry attempt to identify the leaking SG by initiating 31120-C UO

b. Check SG level indications stable or rising with relatively lower feed flow rate (will not be able to see this)

OATC

4.

Verifies VCT level maintained with automatic makeup control OATC / SS

5.

Check leak rate < 5 GPM as determined by CVCS flow balance

[charging - (letdown + seal leak off)]

(Leak rate will be - 20 GPM)

RNO a. Initiate 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction RNO b. Be in mode 3 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months RNO c. Go to step 11.

SS Initiates a unit shutdown per AOP-18013-C, Rapid Down Power Entry Condition Target Approx. Time

@3-5%/min 17015-005 MFPT High Vibrations

<70% RTP 5-B minutes 17015-E01 17019-B04 Condenser Low Vacuum >22.42" 1 B025-C Vacuum Hg and STABLE or orCirc Water Pump Trip RISING or Loss of Utilit:t Water 1 B009-C SG Tube Leak (275 gpd

<50% RTP within 1 10-17 minutes with an ROC 230 hour0.00266 days 0.0639 hours 3.80291e-4 weeks 8.7515e-5 months gpd/hr) 18009-C SG Tube Leak (25 20% RTP within 1 16-27 gpm) hour & trip minutes reactor 1 B039-C Confirmed Loose Part 20% RTP quickly 16-27 minutes SS determination based As determined by on the SS plant conditions 2

(

Appendix D

. Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS

1.

Performs SHUTDOWN BRIEFING METHOD

Auto rod control should be used.

Reduce Turbine Load at approximately 3% RTP per minute (approx 36 MWe) up to 5% RTP (approx 60 MWe).

Borate considering the calculations from the reactivity briefing sheet and BEACON.

Maintain AFD within the doghouse.

SS (or SRO designee) - Maintain supervisory oversight.

All rod withdrawals will be approved by the SS.

Approval for each reactivity manipulation is not necessary as long as manipulations are made within the boundaries established in this briefing (i.e. turbine load adjustment up to 60 MWe, etc.).

A crew update should be performed at approximately every 100 MWe power change.

If manpower is available, peer checks should be used for all reactivity changes.

OPERATIONAL LIMITS

Maintain TAVG within +/-6°F ofTREF. If TAVG/TREF mismatch

>6°F and nottrending toward a matched condition or if TAVG

551°F, then trip the reactor.

If load reduction due to a loss of vacuum, every effort should be made to maintain the steam dumps closed (Permissive C-9

? 24.92" Hg).

INDUSTRYOE Shift supervision must maintain effective oversight and exercise conservative decision making.

Correction of significant RCS TAVG deviations should only be via secondary plant control manipulations and not primary plant control manipulations (i.e., do not withdraw control rods or dilute).

3 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS

1.

Performs SHUTDOWN BRIEFING METHOD

Auto rod control should be used.

Reduce Turbine Load at approximately 3% RTP per minute (approx 36 MWe) up to 5% RTP (approx 60 MWe).

Borate considering the calculations from the reactivity briefing sheet and BEACON.

Maintain AFD within the doghouse.

SS (or SRO designee) - Maintain supervisory oversight.

Ali rod withdrawals will be approved by the SS.

Approval for each reactivity manipulation is not necessary as long as manipulations are made within the boundaries established in this briefing (i.e. turbine load adjustment up to 60 MWe, etc.).

A crew update should be performed at approximately every 100 MWe power change.

If manpower is available, peer checks should be used for ali reactivity changes.

OPERATIONAL LIMITS Maintain TAVG within +/-6°F ofTREF. If TAVG/TREF mismatch

>6°F and not trending toward a matched condition 2! if TAVG

5: 551°F, then trip the reactor.

If load reduction due to a loss of vacuum, every effort should be made to maintain the steam dumps closed (Permissive C-9

~ 24.92" Hg).

INDUSTRYOE

Shift supervision must maintain effective oversight and exercise conservative decision making.

Correction of significant RCS TAVG deviations should only be via secondary plant control manipulations and not primary plant control manipulations (i.e., do not withdraw control rods or dilute).

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

2.

Verify rods in AUTO.

UO

3.

Reduce Turbine Load at the desired rate up to 5%/min (60 MWE/min).

OATC

4.

Borate as necessary by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

OATC / UO

5.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC / UO

6.

Check desired ramp rate - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MIN.

OATC

7.

Maintain Tavg within 6°F of Tref:

a. Monitor TavglTref deviation (UT -0495).

b. Verify rods inserting as required.

c. Energize Pressurizer back-up heaters as necessary.

OATC / UO

8.

Maintain reactor power and turbine power - MATCHED.

a. Balance reactor power with secondary power reduction using boration and control rods.

b. Check rate of reactor power reduction ADEQUATE FOR PLANT CONDITIONS.

c. Check RCS Tavg GREATER THAN 551°F (TS 3.4.2).

d. Check RCS Tavg - WITHIN 6°F OF TREF.

OATC

9.

Maintain PRZR Pressure AT 2235 PSIG.

4 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL> 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

2.

Verify rods in AUTO.

UO

3.

Reduce Turbine Load at the desired rate up to 5%/min (60 MWE/min).

OATC

4.

Borate as necessary by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

OATC / UO

5.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC / UO

6.

Check desired ramp rate - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MIN.

OATC

7.

Maintain Tavg within 6°F of Tref:

a. Monitor Tavg/Tref deviation (UT -0495).

b. Verify rods inserting as required.

c. Energize Pressurizer back-up heaters as necessary.

OATC / UO

8.

Maintain reactor power and turbine power - MATCHED.

a. Balance reactor power with secondary power reduction using boration and control rods.

b. Check rate of reactor power reduction ADEQUATE FOR PLANT CONDITIONS.

c. Check RCS Tavg GREATER THAN 551°F (TS 3.4.2).

d. Check RCS Tavg - WITHIN 6°F OF TREF.

OATC

9.

Maintain PRZR Pressure AT 2235 PSIG.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

10.

Maintain PRZR Level AT PROGRAM.

UO

11.

Maintain SG Level - BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.

SS

12.

Notify the System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

SS

13.

Notify SM to make the following notifications as appropriate:

Plant Management Notifications using 10000 C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

91001 C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

00152, FEDERAL AND STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Chemistry Technical Specification sampling for load reductions greater than 15% using 35110 C, CHEMISTRY CONTROL OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

QC to perform a NOPT inspection using 84008, RPV ALLOY 600 MATERIAL INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS for reactor shutdowns.

NOTE Event will continue until adequate power maneuver completed.

5 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 5 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

SG 2 develops a 20 GPM tube leak requiring entry into AOP 18009-C. With SGTL > 5 gpm a rapid shutdown using AOP 18013-C is required. This event will be used for the required reactivity manipulation.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

10.

Maintain PRZR Level AT PROGRAM.

UO

11.

Maintain SG Level - BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.

SS

12.

Notify the System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

SS

13.

Notify SM to make the following notifications as appropriate:

Plant Management Notifications using 10000 C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

91001 C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

00152, FEDERAL AND STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Chemistry Technical Specification sampling for load reductions greater than 15% using 35110 C, CHEMISTRY CONTROL OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

QC to perform a NOPT inspection using 84008, RPV ALLOY 600 MATERIAL INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS for reactor shutdowns.

NOTE Event will continue until adequate power maneuver completed.

5

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC Tries to maintain PRZR level: (Continuous action from AOP 18009-C) 2 Maintain PRZR Level

a.

Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level.

b.

Check PRZR level-STABLE OR RISING.

RNO b. Perform the following:

1)

Isolate letdown by closing:

a)

Letdown Orifice Valves b)

Letdown Isolation Valves c)

Excess Letdown Valves

2)

Start an additional Charging Pump as necessary

3)

IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a)

Trip the Reactor b)

When Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI c)

Go to 19000-C, E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Report to 55 unable to maintain PRZR levelthrough the normal charging path.

SS Directs OATC action per AOP 18009-C step 2 RNO actions listed above SS Directs OATC / UO actions using EOP 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 1 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC Tries to maintain PRZR level: (Continuous action from AOP 18009-C) 2 Maintain PRZR Level

a.

Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level.

b.

Check PRZR level-STABLE OR RISING.

RNO b. Perform the following:

1 )

Isolate letdown by closing:

a)

Letdown Orifice Valves b)

Letdown Isolation Valves c)

Excess Letdown Valves

2)

Start an additional Charging Pump as necessary

3)

IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a)

Trip the Reactor b)

When Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI c)

Go to 19000-C, E-O REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Report to 55 unable to maintain PRZR level through the normal charging path.

SS Directs OATC action per AOP 18009-C step 2 RNO actions listed above SS Directs OATC / UO actions using EOP 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures.,The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1 - Verifies Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights - LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN Neutron Flux - LOWERING 2 - Verifies Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED 3 - Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a. at least 1 4160 1 E bus energized - White lights - ON 3b. all AC Emergency buses energized - White lights - ON (4160V and 480V) 4 - Checks if SI / Actuated Any SI annunciator - LIT SI BPLP status light - LIT SS Plant page for Reactor Trip / Safety Injection OATC / UO

5.

Initiates Foldout Page

6.

Initiate OATC Initial Actions pages Initiate UO Initial Actions pages.

2

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 2 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures.,The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1 - Verifies Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights - LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN Neutron Flux - LOWERING 2 - Verifies Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED 3 - Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a. at least 1 4160 1 E bus energized - White lights - ON 3b. all AC Emergency buses energized - White lights - ON (4160V and 480V) 4 - Checks if SI / Actuated Any SI annunciator - LIT SI BPLP status light - LIT SS Plant page for Reactor Trip / Safety Injection OATC / UO

5.

Initiates Foldout Page

6.

Initiate OATC Initial Actions pages Initiate UO Initial Actions pages.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

1 Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

2 Checks Containment Isolation Phase A - actuated per MLBs 3

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCPs - running

b.

SI Pumps - running

c.

RHR pumps - running

d.

NCP - tripped 4

CCW pumps - only two running per train Sa NSCW pumps - only two running per train Sb NSCW tower return / bypass valves - in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLBs 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs 8

Containment pressure remained < 21.S 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 3 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

1 Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

2 Checks Containment Isolation Phase A - actuated per MLBs 3

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCPs - running

b.

SI Pumps - running

c.

RHR pumps - running

d.

NCP - tripped 4

CCW pumps - only two running per train 5a NSCW pumps - only two running per train 5b NSCW tower return / bypass valves - in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLBs 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs 8

Containment pressure remained < 21.5 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 9

Checks ECCS flows:

CRITICAL

a.

BIT Flow - None (Notifies 55 of no BIT flow, then aligns valves using Attachment B)

b.

RCS pressure < 1625 psig (NOT go to step 10)

c.

SI pump flow

d.

RCS pressure < 300 psig

e.

RHR pump flow ATTACHMENT B VALVE LINEUP FOR CCP COLD LEG INJECTION THROUGH THE BIT VALVE FUNCTION POSITION POSITION NUMBER INDICATION 1204-U4-207 RWST SUPPLY TO ECCS OPEN LOCAL (RWST)

LV-112D RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION OPEN MLB09 LV-112E RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION OPEN MLB10 LV-112B VCT OUTLET ISOLATION CLOSED MLB05 HV-8471A CCP-A SUCTION OPEN MLB01 HV-8509B CCP-A RVTO RWST ISOLATION OPEN MLB04 HV-8509A CCP-B RVTO RWST ISOLATION OPEN MLB03 HV-8471B CCP-B SUCTION OPEN MLB02 LV-112C VCT OUTLET ISOLATION CLOSED MLB06 HV-8508A CCP-A RVTO RWST ISOLATION ENABLED MLB09 HV-8508B CCP-B RVTO RWST ISOLATION ENABLED MLB10 HV-8485A CCP-A DISCHARGE ISOLATION OPEN MLB01 HV-8111A CCP-A MINIFLOW CLOSED MLB06 HV-8111B CCP-B MINIFLOW CLOSED MLB06 HV-8485B CCP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION OPEN MLB02 HV-8438 CCP DISCHARGE HEADER OPEN MLB02 CROSSCONNECT CRITICAL HV-8105 CHARGING TO RCS ISOLA TlON CLOSED MLB06 HV-8801A BIT DISCH ISOLATION OPEN MLB05 HV-8116 SAFETY GRADE CHARGING TO CLOSED MLB01 REGEN HX HV-8110 CCP-A&B COMMON MINIFLOW CLOSED MLB05 CRITICAL HV-8801B BIT DISCH ISOLA TlON OPEN MLB06 HV-8106 CHARGING TO RCS ISOLA TlON CLOSED MLB05 HV-8924 SI PMP-A SUCTION XCONN TO CCP OPEN MLB01 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 4 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 9

Checks ECCS flows:

CRITICAL

a.

BIT Flow - None (Notifies 55 of no BIT flow, then aligns valves using Attachment B)

b.

RCS pressure < 1625 psig (NOT go to step 10)

c.

SI pump flow

d.

RCS pressure < 300 psig

e.

RHR pump flow ATTACHMENT B VALVE LINEUP FOR CCP COLD LEG INJECTION THROUGH THE BIT VALVE FUNCTION POSITION POSITION NUMBER INDICATION 1204-U4-207 RWST SUPPLY TO ECCS OPEN LOCAL (RWST)

LV-112D RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION OPEN MLB09 LV-112E RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION OPEN MLB10 LV-112B VCT OUTLET ISOLATION CLOSED MLB05 HV-8471A CCP-A SUCTION OPEN MLB01 HV-8509B CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION OPEN MLB04 HV-8509A CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION OPEN MLB03 HV-8471B CCP-B SUCTION OPEN MLB02 LV-112C VCT OUTLET ISOLATION CLOSED MLB06 HV-8508A CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION ENABLED MLB09 HV-8508B CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION ENABLED MLB10 HV-8485A CCP-A DISCHARGE ISOLATION OPEN MLB01 HV-8111A CCP-A MINIFLOW CLOSED MLB06 HV-8111B CCP-B MINIFLOW CLOSED MLB06 HV-8485B CCP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION OPEN MLB02 HV-8438 CCP DISCHARGE HEADER OPEN MLB02 CROSSCONNECT CRITICAL HV-8105 CHARGING TO RCS ISOLA TION CLOSED MLB06 HV-8801A BIT DISCH ISOLA TION OPEN MLB05 HV-8116 SAFETY GRADE CHARGING TO CLOSED MLB01 REGEN HX HV-8110 CCP-A&B COMMON MINIFLOW CLOSED MLB05 CRITICAL HV-8801B BIT DISCH ISOLA TION OPEN MLB06 HV-8106 CHARGING TO RCS ISOLA TlON CLOSED MLB05 HV-8924 SI PMP-A SUCTION XCONN TO CCP OPEN MLB01 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 10 Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLBs 11 Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12 Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

UO Initial Operator Actions of E-O

1.

Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

Notifies SS the TDAFW pump failed to start, then opens steam supply valve HV-5106

2.

Checks NR SG levels - one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow

3.

Checks if SLI is required Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psig High rate bistables lit with low pressure SI/SLI blocked If any above met then verify MSIVs & BSIVs closed

4.

Verifies FWI:

MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut

5.

Verifies SGBD isolated places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running.

7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 - 65% N R

8.

Verify both MFPs tripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

5

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Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 5 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 10 Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLBs 11 Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12 Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

UO Initial Operator Actions of E-O

1.

Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

Notifies 55 the TDAFW pump failed to start, then opens steam supply valve HV-5106

2.

Checks NR SG levels - one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow

3.

Checks if SLI is required Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psig High rate bistables lit with low pressure SI/SLI blocked If any above met then verify MSIVs & BSIVs closed

4.

Verifies FWI:

MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut

5.

Verifies SGBD isolated places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running.

7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 - 65% NR

8.

Verify both M FPs tripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

5

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC I UO 19000-C

7.

Initiate Continuous Actions pages.

OATC

8.

Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

UO 8RNO. If necessary, takes actions to control RCS temperature.

Stop dumping steam.

Reduces AFW flow (not < 570 gpm if SG NR levels < 10% NR).

If cooldown continues shuts MSIVs and BSIVs If temperature> 557 F & rising then dump steam OATC 9 - Checks PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves 9a, PORVs closed and in AUTO 9b, Normal spray valves closed 9c, Power available to at least one block valve 9d, At least one block valve open (NOT) 9d RNO, verify open at least one block valve when RCS pressure

> 2185 psig.

6 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 6 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC / UO 19000-C

7.

Initiate Continuous Actions pages.

OATC

8.

Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

UO 8RNO. If necessary, takes actions to control RCS temperature.

Stop dumping steam.

Reduces AFW flow (not < 570 gpm if SG NR levels < 10% NR).

If cooldown continues shuts MSIVs and BSIVs If temperature> 557 F & rising then dump steam OATC 9 - Checks PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves 9a, PORVs closed and in AUTO 9b, Normal spray valves closed 9c, Power available to at least one block valve 9d, At least one block valve open (NOT) 9d RNO, verify open at least one block valve when RCS pressure

> 2185 psig.

6

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 10 - Checks if RCPs should be stopped 10a, CCP or SIP running 10b, RCS pressure < 1375 psig If yes then stop all RCPs if no then go to step # 11 UO/SS 11 - Checks for faulted SG and transition to E~2 SG pressures:

0 Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner, or 0

Completely depressurized If yes then go to 19020-C, E-2 If no then go to step # 12 7

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 7 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 10 - Checks if RCPs should be stopped 10a, CCP or SIP running 10b, RCS pressure < 1375 psig If yes then stop all RCPs if no then go to step # 11 UO / SS 11 - Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 SG pressures:

0 Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner, or 0

Completely depressurized If yes then go to 19020-C, E-2 If no then go to step # 12 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 8 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the SIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS/UO 12 - Checks for SG tubes intact.

a.

Directs chemistry to sample all SG one at a time for activity.

b.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

0 Main Steam Line Rad Monitors RE-13120 RE-13121 RE-13122 RE-13119 0

Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors RE-12839C RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale) 0 Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Slowdown) 0 SG sample radiation

c.

Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner

d.

If rad monitors abnormal or SG level rising uncontrollably, then go to 19030-C, E-3 EOP 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture SS Directs actions of OATC I UO using 19030-C.

(Crew Update)

OATC / UO

1.

Initiate Continuous Actions and Foldout Pages

1.

Monitor CSFSTs per 19200-C 8

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 8 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the SIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS I UO 12 - Checks for SG tubes intact.

a.

Directs chemistry to sample all SG one at a time for activity.

b.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

0 Main Steam Line Rad Monitors RE-13120 RE-13121 RE-13122 RE-13119 0

Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors RE-12839C RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale) 0 Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Slowdown) 0 SG sample radiation

c.

Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner

d.

If rad monitors abnormal or SG level rising uncontrollably, then go to 19030-C, E-3 EOP 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture SS Directs actions of OATC I UO using 19030-C.

(Crew Update)

OATC I UO

1.

Initiate Continuous Actions and Foldout Pages

1.

Monitor CSFSTs per 19200-C 8

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 9 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS

2.

c Directs SM to implement EPIPs (91001-C)

OATC

3.

Maintain RCP seal injection flow 8 to 13 GPM OATC

4.

Checks if RCPs should be stopped:

At least one CCP or SI pump running RCS pressure < 1375 psig (NOT)

If pressure lowers < 1375 psig prior to initiation of RCS cooldown then stop all RCPs UO

5.

Identifies Ruptured SG by any of the following:

Unexpected rise in SG # 2 narrow range level, or Report for chemistry High radiation from any SG steamline High radiation from any SG blowdown line UO

6.

Isolate Ruptured SG ARV:

Adjusts SG 2 ARV controller to 1160 psig (7.7.3 pot setting)

Notes SG 2 ARV fully open Verifies SG 2 pressure < 1160 psig with ARV open CRITICAL Manually closes SG 2 ARV to stop off site emergency release NOTE: This will require manual operation of the ARV later to prevent lifting a code safety valve.

9

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Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 9 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS

2.

c Directs SM to implement EPIPs (91001-C)

OATC

3.

Maintain RCP seal injection flow 8 to 13 GPM OATC

4.

Checks if RCPs should be stopped:

At least one CCP or SI pump running RCS pressure < 1375 psig (NOT)

If pressure lowers < 1375 psig prior to initiation of RCS cooldown then stop all RCPs UO

5.

Identifies Ruptured SG by any of the following:

Unexpected rise in SG # 2 narrow range level, or Report for chemistry High radiation from any SG steam line High radiation from any SG blowdown line UO

6.

Isolate Ruptured SG ARV:

Adjusts SG 2 ARV controller to 1160 psig (7.7.3 pot setting)

Notes SG 2 ARV fully open Verifies SG 2 pressure < 1160 psig with ARV open CRITICAL Manually closes SG 2 ARV to stop off site emergency release NOTE: This will require manual operation of the ARV later to prevent lifting a code safety valve.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 10 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

7.

Checks at lease one MDAFW pump running & capable of feeding SG(s) needed for RCS cooldown UO

8.

Closes SG 2 supply to TDAFW pump HV-3019 CRITICAL NOTE: This will result in no steam to the TDAFW pump.

UO

9.

Verifies SGBD isolation valves & handswitches in close UO

10.

Closes loop 2 MSIVs & BSIV's to isolate ruptured SG CRITICAL from intact SGs SS CAUTION Procedure should be performed in a timely manner to assure break flow in the ruptured SG is terminated before water enters the SGs main steam piping.

UO

11.

Maintains ruptured SG that is also faulted isolated unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sample UO

12.

Checks SG 2 isolated from intact SGs:

MSIVs & BSIVs on loop 2 shut Steam supply to TDAFW pump (HV-3019) shut UO

13.

Controls ruptured SG level:

CRITICAL Maintains feed flow until NR level> 10%, then isolates feed flow 10

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 10 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

7.

Checks at lease one MDAFW pump running & capable of feeding SG(s) needed for RCS cooldown UO

8.

Closes SG 2 supply to TDAFW pump HV-3019 CRITICAL NOTE: This will result in no steam to the TDAFW pump.

UO

9.

Verifies SGBD isolation valves & handswitches in close UO

10.

Closes loop 2 MSIVs & BSIV's to isolate ruptured SG CRITICAL from intact SGs SS CAUTION Procedure should be performed in a timely manner to assure break flow in the ruptured SG is terminated before water enters the SGs main steam piping.

UO

11.

Maintains ruptured SG that is also faulted isolated unless needed for RCS cool down or SG activity sample UO

12.

Checks SG 2 isolated from intact SGs:

MSIVs & BSIVs on loop 2 shut Steam supply to TDAFW pump (HV-3019) shut UO

13.

Controls ruptured SG level:

CRITICAL Maintains feed flow until NR level> 10%, then isolates feed flow 10

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 11 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

14.

Checks ruptured SG pressure> 290 pSig OATC 1 UO

15.

Checks if low steamline pressure SII SLI should be blocked:

a. Steam dumps available

b. PRZR pressure < 200 psig RNOb. Blocks low steam line pressure SIISLI when RCS pressure < 2000 psig and SG high steam pressure rate alarms are clear.

(HS-40068 & HS 40069)

UO

16.

Checks if automatic steam dump isolation should be bypassed:

a. RCS temperature> 550 F

b. As RCS cooldown initiated hold HS-500A and HS-500B in BYPASS INTERLOCK position until RCS temperature is < 550 F UO

17.

Raises intact SG levels prior to maximum rate cooldown OATC

18.

Checks at least one RCP running 11 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 11 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

14.

Checks ruptured SG pressure> 290 psig OATC I UO

15.

Checks if low steam line pressure SI I SLI should be blocked:

a. Steam dumps available

b. PRZR pressure < 200 psig RNOb. Blocks low steam line pressure SI/SLI when RCS pressure < 2000 psig and SG high steam pressure rate alarms are clear.

(HS-40068 & HS 40069)

UO

16.

Checks if automatic steam dump isolation should be bypassed:

a. RCS temperature> 550 F

b. As RCS cool down initiated hold HS-500A and HS-500B in BYPASS INTERLOCK position until RCS temperature is < 550 F UO

17.

Raises intact SG levels prior to maximum rate cooldown OATC

18.

Checks at least one RCP running 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 12 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW

19.

Determines required core exit temperature for cooldown:

Ruptured SG Core Exit Pressure Temperature (psig)

(OF)

> 1200 530 1100 to 1199 518 1000 to 1099 506 900 to 999 493 800 to 899 479 700 to 799 463 600 to 699 445 500 to 599 424 400 to 499 399 300 to 399 366 290 to 299 350 UO

20.

Initiates RCS cooldown at maximum rate using steam Dumps If in Tave mode:

1) Match demand on SG header pressure controller PIC-507 and SD demand meter UI-500

2) Transfer steam dumps to STM PRESS mode using HS-500C

3) Open all available steam dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507 If in steam pressure mode:

1) Open all available steam dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507 12

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 12 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW

19.

Determines required core exit temperature for cooldown:

Ruptured SG Core Exit Pressure Temperature (psig)

(OF)

> 1200 530 1100 to 1199 518 1000 to 1099 506 900 to 999 493 800 to 899 479 700 to 799 463 600 to 699 445 500 to 599 424 400 to 499 399 300 to 399 366 290 to 299 350 UO

20.

Initiates RCS cooldown at maximum rate using steam Dumps If in Tave mode:

1 ) Match demand on SG header pressure controller PIC-507 and SD demand meter UI-500

2) Transfer steam dumps to STM PRESS mode using HS-500C

3) Open all available steam dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507 If in steam pressure mode:

1) Open all available steam dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507 12

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 13 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

21.

Checks if RCS Cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs < required temperature "-

if not, perform 21 b & 21 c when < required temperature otherwise go to step 22

b. Stop RCS cooldown

c. Maintain core exit TCs < required temperature UO

22.

Checks intact SG levels:

a. NR level - at least one> 10%

if not maintain> 570 gpm total feed flow

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% and 65%

c. NR level - any rising in an uncontrolled manner:

if yes stop cooldown and return to step 3 If no go to step 23 OATC

23.

Checks PRZR PORVs and Block valves closed

a. Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.

b. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED.

c. PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RNO c. IF Block Valve NOT closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV, AND WHEN PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig, THEN verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve.

13

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 13 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

21.

Checks if RCS Cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs < required temperature-if not, perform 21 b & 21 c when < required temperature otherwise go to step 22

b. Stop RCS cool down

c. Maintain core exit TCs < required temperature UO

22.

Checks intact SG levels:

a. NR level-at least one> 10%

if not maintain> 570 gpm total feed flow

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% and 65%

c. NR level-any rising in an uncontrolled manner:

if yes stop cooldown and return to step 3 If no go to step 23 OATC

23.

Checks PRZR PORVs and Block valves closed

a. Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.

b. PRZR PORVs - CLOSED.

c. PRZR PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RNO c. IF Block Valve NOT closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV, AND WHEN PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig, THEN verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 14 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Reads LOSP caution to crew OATC

24.

Reset SI

25.

Reset Containment Isolation Phase A SS CAUTION Ensures HP and / or plant personnel aware of possible changes in radiation levels throughout plant as a result of resetting CIA UO

26.

Establish Instrument Air to Containment:

a. Instrument air pressure> 100 psig

b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378 Valve will not open due HS failure.

OATC

27.

Check if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. RHR pumps - any running with suction aligned to RWST if no go to step 29

b. RCS pressure> 300 psig

c. Stop RHR pumps 14

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 14 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

I Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Reads LOSP caution to crew OATC

24.

Reset SI

25.

Reset Containment Isolation Phase A SS CAUTION Ensures HP and / or plant personnel aware of possible changes in radiation levels throughout plant as a result of resetting CIA UO

26.

Establish Instrument Air to Containment:

a. Instrument air pressure> 100 psig

b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378 Valve will not open due HS failure.

OATC

27.

Check if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. RHR pumps - any running with suction aligned to RWST if no go to step 29

b. RCS pressure> 300 psig

c. Stop RHR pumps 14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 15 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter

. the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BiT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

28.

IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig, THEN restart RHR Pumps.

OATC

29.

Check if RCS cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

RNOa. Do NOT proceed until core exit TCs less than required temperature.

b. Stop RCS cooldown.

c. Maintain Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

CAUTION SS Ruptured SG pressure and RCS subcooling should begin to rise as RCS pressure recovers after the cooldown is stopped.

UO

30.

Check ruptured SG(s) pressure - STABLE OR RISING.

OATC

31.

Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 44°F

[58°F ADVERSE].

15 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 15 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

28.

IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig, THEN restart RHR Pumps.

OATC

29.

Check if RCS cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

RNOa. Do NOT proceed until core exit TCs less than required temperature.

b. Stop RCS cooldown.

c. Maintain Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

CAUTION SS Ruptured SG pressure and RCS subcooling should begin to rise as RCS pressure recovers after the cooldown is stopped.

UO

30.

Check ruptured SG(s) pressure - STABLE OR RISING.

OATC

31.

Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 44°F

[58°F ADVERSE].

15

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 16 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

32.

Check if RCS depressurization termination criteria is currently met:

BOTH of the following:

1)

RCS pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE.

2)

PRZR level-GREATER THAN 9%

[37% ADVERSE].

-OR-ReS Subcooling - LESS THAN 24 F [38 F ADVERSE].

-OR-PRZR level-GREATER THAN 75% [52% ADVERSE].

If NOT met go to step 34 (expected action)

OATC

34.

Check Normal PRZR Spray-AVAILABLE.

If not available go to step 36 (expected action)

OATC

36.

Check at least one PRZR PORV - AVAILABLE.

37.

Check at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve -

AVAILABLE.

CAUTION SS Possible PRT rupture while using PORV causing abnormal containment conditions Cycling of PRZR PORV should be minimized 16

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 16 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

32.

Check if RCS depressurization termination criteria is currently met:

BOTH of the following:

1 )

RCS pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE.

2)

PRZR level-GREATER THAN 9%

[37% ADVERSE].

-OR-RCS Subcooling - LESS THAN 24 F [38 F ADVERSE].

-OR-PRZR level-GREATER THAN 75% [52% ADVERSE].

If NOT met go to step 34 (expected action)

OATC

34.

Check Normal PRZR Spray-AVAILABLE.

If not available go to step 36 (expected action)

OATC

36.

Check at least one PRZR PORV - AVAILABLE.

37.

Check at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve -

AVAILABLE.

CAUTION SS Possible PRT rupture while using PORV causing abnormal containment conditions Cycling of PRZR PORV should be minimized 16

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 17 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

38.

Depressurize RCS using PORV to refill PRZR,

a. arm one train of COPS and check PRZR PORV Block Valve open

b. open one PORV

c. go to step 41 OATC

41.

Check if any of the following conditions are satisfied:

Both of the following:

1) RCS pressure < ruptured SG pressure

2) PRZR level> 9%

-- OR--

RCS subcooling < 24 F

-- OR-PRZR level> 75%

RNO Do NOT continue until termination criteria met.

OATC

42.

Terminates RCS depressurization:

a. Verify normal spray valves closed

b. Verify PRZR PORV(s) closed

c. Block COPS

d. Check auxiliary spray in service RNO d. go to step 43 17

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 17 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

38.

Depressurize RCS using PORV to refill PRZR,

a. arm one train of COPS and check PRZR PORV Block Valve open

b. open one PORV

c. go to step 41 OATC

41.

Check if any of the following conditions are satisfied:

Both of the following:

1) RCS pressure < ruptured SG pressure

2) PRZR level> 9%

-- OR--

RCS subcooling < 24 F

-- OR-PRZR level> 75%

RNO Do NOT continue until termination criteria met.

OATC

42.

Terminates RCS depressurization:

a. Verify normal spray valves closed

b. Verify PRZR PORV(s) closed

c. Block COPS

d. Check auxiliary spray in service RNO d. go to step 43 17

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 18 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

43.

Check RCS pressure rising CAUTION SS ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE TERMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling of the ruptured SGs.

OATC I UO

44.

Check if ECCS termination criteria met:

(SHOULD BE MET)

RCS subcooling > 24 F, and SG NR level in one intact SG > 10%, or

> 570 GPM flow to SGs, and RCS pressure stable or rising, and PRZR level> 9%

OATC

45.

Stops both SI pumps and one CCP END OF SCENARIO 18

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 1 Page 18 of 18 Event No.: 6 through 9 Event

Description:

The SGTL degrades into a SGTR with additional failures. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually establish HHSI flow through the BIT. The UO will have recognize and stop a release from the ruptured SG via a failed ARV. The UO will also have to manually start the TDAFW pump.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

43.

Check RCS pressure rising CAUTION SS ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE TERMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling of the ruptured SGs.

OATC / UO

44.

Check if ECCS termination criteria met:

(SHOULD BE MET)

RCS subcooling > 24 F, and SG NR level in one intact SG > 10%, or

> 570 GPM flow to SGs, and RCS pressure stable or rising, and PRZR level> 9%

OATC

45.

Stops both SI pumps and one CCP END OF SCENARIO 18

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.:

2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Examiners: Lea Operators:

NEW Initial Conditions: 100% 120wer, CNMT Mini-Purge in service, HV-3009 shut tagged for rel2airs (emergent work). SG ARV #3 tagged for rel2airs, BATP #2 tagged for rel2airs, Preload stuck rod M-2 (Malfunction RD-10K) Must add to IC #87 Turnover: New system l2eak record eXl2ected due to extremely hot weather. System loads at maximum due to unexl2ected unit tril2. LCO 3.7.5 Condition A (HV-3009}. INFO LCO 3.7.4 (ARV} INFO TR 13.1.3 (BATP}. 14410-1, Control Rod 0l2erability Test, was Qerformed 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago, shutdown bank A rod M-2 failed to move. The bank has been aligned to rod M2 at 228 steQs. I&C is recording lift coil currents to determine if this an electrical Qroblem in the rod control system.

Event Malf.

No.

1 CV13 100%

2 N/A 3

RH02A

@50%

4 MS11A

@O%

5 RH02A

@95%

6 FW17 Event Type*

I-SS I-OATC R-ALL SS-TS C-SS C-OATC TS-SS I-SS I-UO M-ALL I-SS I-UO Event Description VCT LT-185 fails high causing CVCS letdown to divert to the VCT via LV-112A. Automatic makeup at 100 gpm will occur when VCT level drops to 30%. With 120 gpm letdown in service the OATC must restore letdown to the VCT otherwise suction to the charging pumps will be lost when the VCT is drained. RWST auto swap will not work with this failure in. (ARP 17007-1 and AOP 18007-C)

I & C reports lift coil currents for shutdown bank rod M-2 are good indicating there are no electrical problems with rod movement.

SS reviews LCO 3.1.4 and determines rod M-2 is untrippable.

LCO 3.1.4 Condition A requires mode 3 entry within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months RCS leakage into PRT (AOP 18004-C) (15-20 gpm)

LCO 3.4.13 for RCS leakage PT -507 fails low (AOP 18001-C)

LOCA Outside CNMT (EOPs 19000 to 19112 to 19111)

(Set malfunction to 80-85% after SI to ensure RCS pressure lowering)

Remote Function: CV01 for Blender Makeup to RWST FWI failure Scenario 2 Page 1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.:

2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Examiners: Lea Operators:

NEW Initial Conditions: 100% 120wer, CNMT Mini-Purge in service, HV-3009 shut tagged for rel2airs (emergent work). SG ARV #3 tagged for rel2airs, BATP #2 tagged for rel2airs, Preload stuck rod M-2 (Malfunction RD-10K) Must add to IC #87 Turnover: New system l2eak record eXl2ected due to extremely hot weather. System loads at maximum due to unexl2ected unit tril2. LCO 3.7.5 Condition A (HV-3009}. INFO LCO 3.7.4 (ARV} INFO TR 13.1.3 (BATP}. 14410-1, Control Rod 0l2erability Test, was Qerformed 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago, shutdown bank A rod M-2 failed to move. The bank has been aligned to rod M2 at 228 steQs. I&C is recording lift coil currents to determine if this an electrical Qroblem in the rod control system.

Event Malf.

No.

1 CV13 100%

2 N/A 3

RH02A

@50%

4 MS11A

@O%

5 RH02A

@95%

6 FW17 Event Type*

I-SS I-OATC R-ALL SS-TS C-SS C-OATC TS-SS I-SS I-UO M-ALL I-SS I-UO Event Description VCT L T -185 fails high causing CVCS letdown to divert to the VCT via LV-112A. Automatic makeup at 100 gpm will occur when VCT level drops to 30%. With 120 gpm letdown in service the OATC must restore letdown to the VCT otherwise suction to the charging pumps will be lost when the VCT is drained. RWST auto swap will not work with this failure in. (ARP 17007-1 and AOP 18007-C)

I & C reports lift coil currents for shutdown bank rod M-2 are good indicating there are no electrical problems with rod movement.

SS reviews LCO 3.1.4 and determines rod M-2 is untrippable.

LCO 3.1.4 Condition A requires mode 3 entry within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months RCS leakage into PRT (AOP 18004-C) (15-20 gpm)

LCO 3.4.13 for RCS leakage PT-507 fails low (AOP 18001-C)

LOCA Outside CNMT (EOPs 19000 to 19112 to 19111)

(Set malfunction to 80-85% after SI to ensure RCS pressure lowering)

Remote Function: CV01 for Blender Makeup to RWST FWI failure Scenario 2 Page 1

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7

RH01A C-SS RHR pump trips due to water in room C-OATC NOTE: When SO sent to investigate - report RHR pump room full of water & steam cannot enter.

8 ES16 I-SS SSPS train B fails to auto actuate I-OATC 9

ALB35 C-SS OG-1A Jacket Water Pump failure C06,C07 C-UO C04,C03, Enter C06 & C07 first C05 Then enter C04, C03, C05 in that order with 15 second time delays.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

VCT level transmitter LT-185 fails high resulting in CVCS letdown diverting to the RHUT. ARP 17007-1 window E05 will direct entry into AOP 18007 -C, for lost makeup. The AOP will direct placing letdown divert valve LV-112A to the VCT position.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Place letdown divert valve LV-112A to the VCT position to restore letdown flow to the VCT.

Event 2:

I&C reports electrical testing of rod M-2 does not reveal any problems. The SS should refer to LCO 3.1.4 for applicable conditions. SS determines TS required shutdown is necessary and starts reducing power.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Lowers turbine load as directed by SS / OATC to complete unit shutdown OATC - maintain Tave / Tref matched with rods and / or boration, and maintain SOM with boration during load reduction.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.1.4 Condition A - rod untrippable - A.2 be in mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Entry should be from time of discovery 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago.

Event 3:

Loss of RCS inventory to PRT will require AOP 18004-C entry for RCS Leakage. Leakage will be greater than TS limit (10 gpm identified).

Scenario 2 Page 2 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7

RH01A C-SS RHR pump trips due to water in room C-OATC NOTE: When SO sent to investigate - report RHR pump room full of water & steam cannot enter.

8 ES16 I-SS SSPS train B fails to auto actuate I-OATC 9

ALB35 C-SS OG-1A Jacket Water Pump failure C06,C07 C-UO C04,C03, Enter C06 & C07 first C05 Then enter C04, C03, C05 in that order with 15 second time delays.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

VCT level transmitter LT-185 fails high resulting in CVCS letdown diverting to the RHUT. ARP 17007-1 window E05 will direct entry into AOP 18007 -C, for lost makeup. The AOP will direct placing letdown divert valve LV-112A to the VCT position.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Place letdown divert valve LV-112A to the VCT position to restore letdown flow to the VCT.

Event 2:

I&C reports electrical testing of rod M-2 does not reveal any problems. The SS should refer to LCO 3.1.4 for applicable conditions. SS determines TS required shutdown is necessary and starts reducing power.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Lowers turbine load as directed by SS / OATC to complete unit shutdown OATC - maintain Tave / Tref matched with rods and / or boration, and maintain SOM with boration during load reduction.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.1.4 Condition A - rod untrippable - A.2 be in mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Entry should be from time of discovery 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago.

Event 3:

Loss of RCS inventory to PRT will require AOP 18004-C entry for RCS Leakage. Leakage will be greater than TS limit (10 gpm identified).

Scenario 2 Page 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES*D*1 Verifiable Actions:

OA TC - maintain PRZR level with CVCS charging & letdown controls. Verify proper VCT automatic make up flows. Determines leakage is into PRT. Maintains Tave & Tref matched during power reduction.

UO - lowers turbine load as directed by SS/OATC Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 condition A - identified leakage> 10 gpm.

Required actions - reduce leakage within limits in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or Unit must be in mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

Event 4:

Steamline pressure transmitter PT-507 fails high causing MFP speeds to lower. This requires entry into AOP 18001-C Section I.

Verifiable Actions:

UO -Immediately place MFPs in manual control to match SG feed and steam flows. Verify steam dumps in Tave mode of operation Events 5.6.7, and 8:

RHR HL suction valves fail resulting in failure of RHR suction piping causing a LOCA outside CNMT and loss of emergency coolant recirculation. Crew enters 19000 and then transitions to 19112 (LOCA outside CNMT) and 19111 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

Verifiable Actions:

OATC-Manually actuates SI. Isolate and restore ECCS flow from each of the RHR and SI pumps discharge lines to attempt isolation of the leak. Minimize ECCS flow, make up to the RWST UO - Initiates a 100 F/hr RCS cooldown, Manually isolates feedwater to all SGs Event 9:

DG-1A Jacket Water Pump fails causing low pressure and high temperature alarms. DG will not trip due to emergency start. ARP 17035-1 will require DG shutdown if it is not needed for current plant conditions.

Verifiable Actions:

The UO will have to pull the annunciator response procedure and determine that DG should be shutdown to protect the equipment.

Critical actions:

1. Manually actuate 51 due to failure of train B SSPS to ensure full ECCS flow during LOCA

2. Minimizing ECCS flow to conserve RWST inventory during LOCA outside CNMT

3. Manually isolating Feedwater to all SGs on reactor trip to prevent excessive RCS cooldown

4. Makeup to the RWST to conserve ECCS pumps suction source during loss of ECR.

5. Emergency stop OG-1A after failure of engine driven jacket water pump.

6. Trip RCP's during small break LOCA when RCS pressure < 1375 psig.

Scenario 2 Page 3

(

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Verifiable Actions:

OATC - maintain PRZR level with CVCS charging & letdown controls. Verify proper VCT automatic make up flows. Determines leakage is into PRT. Maintains Tave & Tref matched during power reduction.

UO -lowers turbine load as directed by SS/OATC Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 condition A - identified leakage> 10 gpm.

Required actions - reduce leakage within limits in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or Unit must be in mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

Event 4:

Steamline pressure transmitter PT-507 fails high causing MFP speeds to lower. This requires entry into AOP 18001-C Section I.

Verifiable Actions:

UO - Immediately place MFPs in manual control to match SG feed and steam flows. Verify steam dumps in Tave mode of operation Events 5. 6. 7. and 8:

RHR HL suction valves fail resulting in failure of RHR suction piping causing a LOCA outside CNMT and loss of emergency coolant recirculation. Crew enters 19000 and then transitions to 19112 (LOCA outside CNMT) and 19111 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

Verifiable Actions:

OATC-Manually actuates SI. Isolate and restore ECCS flow from each of the RHR and SI pum ps discharge lines to attempt isolation of the leak. Minimize ECCS flow, make up to the RWST UO -Initiates a 100 F/hr RCS cooldown, Manually isolates feedwater to all SGs Event 9:

DG-1A Jacket Water Pump fails causing low pressure and high temperature alarms. DG will not trip due to emergency start. ARP 17035-1 will require DG shutdown if it is not needed for current plant conditions.

Verifiable Actions:

The UO will have to pull the annunciator response procedure and determine that DG should be shutdown to protect the equipment.

Critical actions:

1. Manually actuate 51 due to failure of train 8 SSPS to ensure full ECCS flow during LOCA

2. Minimizing ECCS flow to conserve RWST inventory during LOCA outside CNMT

3. Manually isolating Feedwater to all SGs on reactor trip to prevent excessive RCS cooldown

4. Makeup to the RWST to conserve ECCS pumps suction source during loss of ECR.

5. Emergency stop OG-1A after failure of engine driven jacket water pump.

6. Trip RCP's during small break LOCA when RCS pressure < 1375 psig.

Scenario 2 Page 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of2 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

VCT L T-185 fails high causing CVCS letdown to divert from the VCT to the RHUT. With a 120 gpm letdown in service, the crew must restore letdown to the VCT to prevent loss of charging pumps suction on low VCT level. Automatic swap over to the RWST is not available with LT-185 failed high.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses VCT makeup problems:

Alarms:

VCT HI/LO LEVEL Indications:

VCT level (LT-185) at 100%

VCT level (LT-112) < 50% and lowering LV-112A in the RHUT position (Amber light - ON) 100 gpm automatic makeup occurs at 30% VCT level VCT level continues to lower with 120 gpm letdown in service OATCI SS Refer to ARP 17007-1 for VCT HI/LO LEVEL SS Directs OATC action using AOP 18007-C, Section C for loss of makeup low OATC C1.

Stabilize plant conditions:

Reactor power RCS temperature PRZR pressure OATC C2.

Check the following:

a. At least one boric acid transfer pump running

b. At least one reactor makeup water pump running

c. VCT makeup valve alignment correct for selected mode

d. letdown divert valve LV-112A aligned to the VCT (NOT)

RNO d. Align LV-112A to VCT OATC I UO C3.

Initiate continuous action page 1

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of2 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

VCT L T -185 fails high causing CVCS letdown to divert from the VCT to the RHUT. With a 120 gpm letdown in service, the crew must restore letdown to the VCT to prevent loss of charging pumps suction on low VCT level. Automatic swap over to the RWST is not available with LT-185 failed high.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses VCT makeup problems:

Alarms:

VCT HIILO LEVEL Indications:

VCT level (LT-185) at 100%

VCT level (L T -112) < 50% and lowering LV-112A in the RHUT position (Amber light-ON) 100 gpm automatic makeup occurs at 30% VCT level VCT level continues to lower with 120 gpm letdown in service OATC/SS Refer to ARP 17007-1 for VCT HIILO LEVEL SS Directs OA TC action using AOP 18007 -C, Section C for loss of makeup low OATC C1.

Stabilize plant conditions:

Reactor power RCS temperature PRZR pressure OATC C2.

Check the following:

a. At least one boric acid transfer pump running

b. At least one reactor makeup water pump running

c. VCT makeup valve alignment correct for selected mode

d. letdown divert valve LV-112A aligned to the VCT (NOT)

RNO d. Align LV-112A to VCT OATC / UO C3.

Initiate continuous action page

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

VCT LT-185 fails high causing CVCS letdown to divert from the VCT to the RHUT. With a 120 gpm letdown in service, the crew must restore letdown to the VCT to prevent loss of charging pumps suction on low VCT level. Automatic swap over to the RWST is not available with LT-185 failed high.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC C4.

Checks VCT makeup flow restored SS C5.

Return to procedure and step in effect SS Has SSS perform following:

Write a condition report Notify I&C to repair Notify OPS duty manager of AOP entry 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

VCT LT-185 fails high causing CVCS letdown to divert from the VCT to the RHUT. With a 120 gpm letdown in service, the crew must restore letdown to the VCT to prevent loss of charging pumps suction on low VCT level. Automatic swap over to the RWST is not available with LT-185 failed high.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC C4.

Checks VCT makeup flow restored SS C5.

Return to procedure and step in effect SS Has SSS perform following:

Write a condition report Notify I&C to repair Notify OPS duty manager of AOP entry 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction to comply with LCD 3.1.4 condition A after I&C reports there is no electrical problem with rod M-2. The power reduction should occur with UOP 12004-C, since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months remain to be in mode 3.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Reviews LCD 3.1.4 and determines rod M-2 is untrippable based on no electrical problems report from I&C.

Enters Condition A and determines unit shut down to mode 3 is required within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of discovery time.

This will leave 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to have the unit in mode 3.

Rod was discovered stuck 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago during performance of 14410-1.

SS 4.2.1 IF unit shutdown/cooldown is anticipated AND with Chemistry Department concurrence, initiate RCS and Pressurizer Gaseous Activity Degassing by performing the following:

a.

Direct Chemistry to sample the RCS to obtain baseline data per 3111 O-C "Collection Of Data For Shutdown Primary Chemistry Calculations."

b.

Place Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Line in service.

c.

Notify Chemistry to adjust the pressurizer steam space sample flow rate to maximum.

OATC

d.

Energize the Pressurizer Backup Heaters to enhance RCS degassing.

e.

Initiate lowering RCS dissolved Hydrogen by performing the following:

(1 )

Adjust VCT pressure to minimum allowed (18 psig) to allow hydrogen concentration to slowly fall.

(2)

Raise VCT gas purge flow rate to the Gaseous Waste Processing System to approximately 1.2 scfm using HIC-1094, as limited by the Waste Gas Recombiner. (1985304126)

f.

Maximize CVCS letdown purification flow rate, per 13006, "Chemical Volume And Control System."

1

{

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction to comply with LCO 3.1.4 condition A after I&C reports there is no electrical problem with rod M-2. The power reduction should occur with UOP 12004-C, since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months remain to be in mode 3.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Reviews LCO 3.1.4 and determines rod M-2 is untrippable based on no electrical problems report from I&C.

Enters Condition A and determines unit shut down to mode 3 is required within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of discovery time.

This will leave 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to have the unit in mode 3.

Rod was discovered stuck 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago during performance of 14410-1.

SS 4.2.1 IF unit shutdown/cooldown is anticipated AND with Chemistry Department concurrence, initiate RCS and Pressurizer Gaseous Activity Degassing by performing the following:

a.

Direct Chemistry to sample the RCS to obtain baseline data per 3111 O-C "Collection Of Data For Shutdown Primary Chemistry Calculations."

b.

Place Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Line in service.

c.

Notify Chemistry to adjust the pressurizer steam space sample flow rate to maximum.

OATC

d.

Energize the Pressurizer Backup Heaters to enhance RCS degassing.

e.

Initiate lowering RCS dissolved Hydrogen by performing the following:

(1 )

Adjust VCT pressure to minimum allowed (18 psig) to allow hydrogen concentration to slowly fall.

(2)

Raise VCT gas purge flow rate to the Gaseous Waste Processing System to approximately 1.2 scfm using HIC-1 094, as limited by the Waste Gas Recombiner. (1985304126)

f.

Maximize CVCS letdown purification flow rate, per 13006, "Chemical Volume And Control System."

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction to comply with LCO 3.1.4 condition A after I&C reports there is no electrical problem with rod M-2. The power reduction should occur with UOP 12004-C, since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months remain to be in mode 3.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior

g.

Per Chemistry direction, place cation bed in service for Lithium removal.

h.

Consult with Chemistry AND if required for containment SS atmosphere cleanup, start one or both Containment Pre-access Filter Units per 13125, "Containment Purge System."

i.

Consult with Chemistry and if not already in progress, initiate 16035, " Chemistry/Operations Interface For RCS Chemistry Control During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns", for degassing the RCS.

SS 4.2.2 IF it is anticipated that the reactor shutdown will be performed by manually inserting the control and shutdown banks AND !E the All Rods Out (ARO) setpoint is above or below 228 steps:

a.

Reposition rods to an ARO position of 228 steps per 13502, "Control Rod Drive And Position Indication System."

b.

Notify Reactor Engineering to adjust IPC setpoints to restore the ROD DEVIATION alarm, (ALB010D06), to operable. (Compensatory action is described in 17010, "ARP for ALB1 0 on Panel 1 C1 on MCB.")

N/A 4.2.3 Control Tavg within 2°F of Tref during the power reduction by performing the following. (1985303667)

OATC

a.

Place the Rod Control System in MANUAL.

Concurrent Verification OATC

b.

WHILE reducing turbine load, adjust control rods/boron as necessary to maintain AFD within limits per the AFD control strategy and guidelines of Section 4.3.2.

c.

!E it is intended to continue power operation at a reduced power plateau, THEN AFD should be trended and maintained at or near the AFD target value.

2

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction to comply with LCO 3.1.4 condition A after I&C reports there is no electrical problem with rod M-2. The power reduction should occur with UOP 12004-C, since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months remain to be in mode 3.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior

g.

Per Chemistry direction, place cation bed in service for Lithium removal.

h.

Consult with Chemistry AND if required for containment SS atmosphere cleanup, start one or both Containment Pre-access Filter Units per 13125, "Containment Purge System."

i.

Consult with Chemistry and if not already in progress, initiate 16035, " Chemistry/Operations Interface For RCS Chemistry Control During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns", for degassing the RCS.

SS 4.2.2 IF it is anticipated that the reactor shutdown will be performed by manually inserting the control and shutdown banks AND !E the All Rods Out (ARO) setpoint is above or below 228 steps:

a.

Reposition rods to an ARO position of 228 steps per 13502, "Control Rod Drive And Position Indication System."

b.

Notify Reactor Engineering to adjust IPC setpoints to restore the ROD DEVIATION alarm, (ALB010D06), to operable. (Compensatory action is described in 17010, "ARP for ALB1 0 on Panel 1 C1 on MCB.")

N/A 4.2.3 Control Tavg within 2°F of Tref during the power reduction by performing the following. (1985303667)

OATC

a.

Place the Rod Control System in MANUAL.

Concurrent Verification OATC

b.

WHILE reducing turbine load, adjust control rods/boron as necessary to maintain AFD within limits per the AFD control strategy and guidelines of Section 4.3.2.

c.

!E it is intended to continue power operation at a reduced power plateau, THEN AFD should be trended and maintained at or near the AFD target value.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction to comply with LCO 3.1.4 condition A after I&C reports there is no electrical problem with rod M-2. The power reduction should occur with UOP 12004-C, since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months remain to be in mode 3.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS 4.2.4 if the auxiliary steam will be required following unit shutdown, initiate the following:

a.

Pressurize the Auxiliary Steam Header from the opposite unit per 13761, "Auxiliary Steam System."

b.

Start the second Steam Jet Air Ejector on auxiliary steam per 13620, "Condenser Air Ejection System."

c.

Transfer Turbine Steam Seal supply to the Auxiliary Steam Supply per 13825, "Turbine Steam Seal System."

SS 4.2.5 Notify System Operator of upcoming power decrease.

UO 4.2.6 Reduce turbine load as desired per 13800, "Main Turbine Operation."

SS

a.

Each time reactor power change exceeds 15% in a one hour period, notify Chemistry to perform the following samples: (1988314683,1988315234)

(1 )

RCS iodine sample per TS SR 3.4.16.2.

(Required between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after reactor power changes greater than or equal to 15% in a one hour period)

(2)

Gaseous release path samples per ODCM Table 3-3.

(3)

Record the time of the change and the person contacted in the Control Room Log.

OATC I UO

b.

Maintain Tavg within 2°F of Tref.

Proceed to event 3 after 10% power reduction 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The SS will direct a power reduction to comply with LCO 3.1.4 condition A after I&C reports there is no electrical problem with rod M-2. The power reduction should occur with UOP 12004-C, since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months remain to be in mode 3.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS 4.2.4 if the auxiliary steam will be required following unit shutdown, initiate the following:

a.

Pressurize the Auxiliary Steam Header from the opposite unit per 13761, "Auxiliary Steam System."

b.

Start the second Steam Jet Air Ejector on auxiliary steam per 13620, "Condenser Air Ejection System."

c.

Transfer Turbine Steam Seal supply to the Auxiliary Steam Supply per 13825, "Turbine Steam Seal System."

SS 4.2.5 Notify System Operator of upcoming power decrease.

UO 4.2.6 Reduce turbine load as desired per 13800, "Main Turbine Operation."

SS

a.

Each time reactor power change exceeds 15% in a one hour period, notify Chemistry to perform the following samples: (1988314683,1988315234)

(1 )

RCS iodine sample per TS SR 3.4.16.2.

(Required between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after reactor power changes greater than or equal to 15% in a one hour period)

(2)

Gaseous release path samples per ODCM Table 3-3.

(3)

Record the time of the change and the person contacted in the Control Room Log.

OATC / UO

b.

Maintain Tavg within 2°F of Tref.

Proceed to event 3 after 10% power reduction 3

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM ReS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose loss of Reactor Coolant inventory:

Alarms:

NONE Indications:

Charging flow control valve FV-121 @100%

PRZR level lowering PRT level & pressure slowly increasing RHR discharge pressure increased SS Directs OATC / UO action using AOP 18004-C, Section A, for RCS Leakage. (Crew Update)

SS A1.

Check plant conditions:

In mode 1 or 2

-OR-In mode 3 with RCS pressure> 1000 psig OATC/UO A2.

Initiate continuous actions page 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose loss of Reactor Coolant inventory:

Alarms:

NONE Indications:

Charging flow control valve FV-121 @100%

PRZR level lowering PRT level & pressure slowly increasing RHR discharge pressure increased SS Directs OATC / UO action using AOP 18004-C, Section A, for RCS Leakage. (Crew Update)

SS A1.

Check plant conditions:

In mode 1 or 2

-OR-In mode 3 with RCS pressure> 1000 psig OATC / UO A2.

Initiate continuous actions page

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 1 B004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

OATC A3.

Maintain PRZR level:

a. Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising RNOb. Perform the following:

1)

Isolate letdown by closing:

a) Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves b) Letdown Isolation Valves c) Excess letdown Valves

2)

Start an additional charging pump as necessary (not necessary)

OATC A4.

Maintains VCT level using automatic control SS A5.

Contacts SM to initiate 91001-C (EPIPs)

OATC A6.

Verifies PORVs closed A7.

Check PRZR Safety Valves closed UO AB.

Stop any load changes in progress OATC A9.

Check PRZR pressure trending to program OATC A10.

Monitor CNMT pressure:

< 3.B psig Stable OATC / UO A11.

Initiates 14905, RCS Leakage Calculation 2

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 1 B004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

OATC A3.

Maintain PRZR level:

a. Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising RNO b. Perform the following:

1 )

Isolate letdown by closing:

a) Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves b) Letdown Isolation Valves c) Excess letdown Valves

2)

Start an additional charging pump as necessary (not necessary)

OATC A4.

Maintains VCT level using automatic control SS A5.

Contacts SM to initiate 91001-C (EPIPs)

OATC A6.

Verifies PORVs closed A7.

Check PRZR Safety Valves closed UO AB.

Stop any load changes in progress OATC A9.

Check PRZR pressure trending to program OATC A10.

Monitor CNMT pressure:

< 3.B psig Stable OATC / UO A11.

Initiates 14905, RCS Leakage Calculation 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 30f9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

CREW A 12.

Locate source of leakage using Attachment A:

Determines leakage is into PRT using 18004-C, Attachment A NOTE: Crew may elect to drain the PRT using SOP 13004-1 Section 4.4.5. This is a/so attached for reference if it is used.

ATTACHMENT A LEAK IDENTIFICATION SYMPTOMS 1.

Leak from pressurizer steam space:

o System pressure degraded with pressurizer level normal and relatively stable.

o Rising temperature, pressure or level in PRT.

o ALB12 E01 PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP.

o ALB12 F01 PRZR SAFETY RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP.

o ALB12 E02 PRZR REL TANK HI PRESS.

o ALB12 F02 PRZR REL TANK HI/LO LEVEL.

o ALB12 E03 PRZR REL TANK HI TEMP.

o A pressurizer level/pressure instrument reference leg leak will display the following symptoms:

Affected pressure channel failing low and affected level channel failing high.

Unaffected pressure channels lowering and unaffected level channels normal and relatively stable.

ALB11 C01 PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON.

ALB11 E01 PRZR HI LEVEL ALARM.

ALB11 F01 PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT.

2.

Leak past reactor vessel head flange:

o ALB12 F03 RV FLG LKOF HI TEMP.

3.

Leak into auxiliary component cooling water:

o ALB 04 A05 (B05, C05, 005) ACCW RCP 1(2,3, 4) THERM BARRIER HX HI FLOW.

o ALB04 B06 ACCW RCP THRM BARRIER HI PRESS.

o ALB04 A01 ACCW SURGE TK HI/LO LVL.

o RE 1950 Auxiliary com ponent cooling water process monitor rising or alarm.

o ACCW outlet from seal water heat exchanger local ti 2075.

o ALB04 C02 ACCW EXCESS L TON HX LO FLOW extinguished.

o Low or no letdown flow indicated on FI 0132A/C with normal charging temperature indicated on TI 0126 (Letdown heat exchanger tube leak).

3

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 30f9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

CREW A 12.

Locate source of leakage using Attachment A:

Determines leakage is into PRT using 18004-C, Attachment A NOTE: Crew may elect to drain the PRT using SOP 13004-1 Section 4.4.5. This is a/so attached for reference if it is used.

ATTACHMENT A LEAK IDENTIFICATION SYMPTOMS 1.

Leak from pressurizer steam space:

System pressure degraded with pressurizer level normal and relatively stable.

Rising temperature, pressure or level in PRT.

ALB12 E01 PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP.

ALB12 F01 PRZR SAFETY RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP.

ALB12 E02 PRZR REL TANK HI PRESS.

ALB12 F02 PRZR REL TANK HI/La LEVEL.

ALB12 E03 PRZR REL TANK HI TEMP.

A pressurizer level/pressure instrument reference leg leak will display the following symptoms:

Affected pressure channel failing low and affected level channel failing high.

Unaffected pressure channels lowering and unaffected level channels normal and relatively stable.

ALB11 C01 PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON.

ALB11 E01 PRZR HI LEVEL ALARM.

ALB11 F01 PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT.

2.

Leak past reactor vessel head flange:

ALB12 F03 RV FLG LKOF HI TEMP.

3.

Leak into auxiliary component cooling water:

ALB 04 A05 (B05, C05, 005) ACCW RCP 1(2,3, 4) THERM BARRIER HX HI FLOW.

ALB04 B06 ACCW RCP THRM BARRIER HI PRESS.

ALB04 A01 ACCW SURGE TK HI/La LVL.

RE 1950 Auxiliary com ponent cooling water process monitor rising or alarm.

ACCW outlet from seal water heat exchanger local ti 2075.

ALB04 C02 ACCW EXCESS L TON HX La FLOW extinguished.

Low or no letdown flow indicated on FI 0132A/C with normal charging temperature indicated on TI 0126 (Letdown heat exchanger tube leak).

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 1S-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

ATTACHMENT A LEAK IDENTIFICATION SYMPTOMS

4.

Reactor coolant pump seal package:

ALB08 A03(B03,C03,D03) RCP1 (2,3,4) STANDPIPE HI LEVEL.

ALB08 AOS(BOS,COS,DOS) RCP1 (2,3,4) CONTROLLED LKG HIILO FLOW.

ALB08 A04(B04,C04,D04) RCP1 (2,3,4) NO.2 SEAL LKOF HI FLOW.

Abnormally high seal return flow indicated on FI 0160 or FI 01S8..

Low differential pressure across No.1 seal for any reactor coolant pumpl S.

Safety injection system accumulators:

ALB06 A03(B03,C03,D03) ACCUM TANK 1 (2,3,4) HIILO LEVEL.

Rising water level indication for any accumulator.

Rising pressure indication for any accumulator.

6.

Chemical and volume control system:

Abnormal temperatures in letdown or charging flow.

Abnormal pressure in letdown or charging flow.

Abnormal flows in letdown or charging flow.

ALBS1 B04 (ALBS2 B01) CVCS TRAIN A(B) PMP RM HI TEMP.

Pressurizer relief tank level, temperature or pressure rising from CVCS letdown line relief valve PSV 8117.

Seal return line relief valve PSV 8121 lifting.

ALB63 E01 CVCS PIPE BREAK RM PROT ACTUATION.

7.

Excess letdown line:

Rising temperature at Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet TI 0122.

Rising pressure at Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet PI 0124.

8.

Reactor vessel head vent line:

Rising temperature on Head Vent Line TI 0400.

Rising flow on Head Vent Line FI 0406A or FI 0407 A.

Rising level, temperature, or pressure in the pressurizer relief tank.

9.

RHR system:

Lifting of relief valves PSV 8708A or 87088 as indicated by rising PRT level, pressure or temperature.

ALB02(03) BOS CCW TRAIN A(B) SURGE TK HIILO LVL CCW process RAD RE 0017A(B) rising or alarm.

4 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

ATTACHMENT A LEAK IDENTIFICATION SYMPTOMS

4.

Reactor coolant pump seal package:

ALB08 A03(B03,C03,003) RCP1 (2,3,4) STANDPIPE HI LEVEL.

ALB08 A05(B05,C05,005) RCP1 (2,3,4) CONTROLLED LKG HIILO FLOW.

ALB08 A04(B04,C04,D04) RCP1 (2,3,4) NO.2 SEAL LKOF HI FLOW.

Abnormally high seal return flow indicated on FI 0160 or FI 0158..

Low differential pressure across NO.1 seal for any reactor coolant pumpl

5.

Safety injection system accumulators:

ALB06 A03(B03,C03,D03) ACCUM TANK 1 (2,3,4) HIILO LEVEL.

Rising water level indication for any accumulator.

Rising pressure indication for any accumulator.

6.

Chemical and volume control system:

Abnormal temperatures in letdown or charging flow.

Abnormal pressure in letdown or charging flow.

Abnormal flows in letdown or charging flow.

ALB51 B04 (ALB52 B01) CVCS TRAIN A(B) PMP RM HI TEMP.

Pressurizer relief tank level, temperature or pressure rising from CVCS letdown line relief valve PSV 8117.

Seal return line relief valve PSV 8121 lifting.

ALB63 E01 CVCS PIPE BREAK RM PROT ACTUATION.

7.

Excess letdown line:

Rising temperature at Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet TI 0122.

Rising pressure at Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet PI 0124.

8.

Reactor vessel head vent line:

Rising temperature on Head Vent Line TI 0400.

Rising flow on Head Vent Line FI 0406A or FI 0407A.

Rising level, temperature, or pressure in the pressurizer relief tank.

9.

RHR system:

Lifting of relief valves PSV 8708A or 87088 as indicated by rising PRT level, pressure or temperature.

ALB02(03) B05 CCW TRAIN A(B) SURGE TK HIILO LVL CCW process RAO RE 0017A(B) rising or alarm.

4

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 50f9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

ATTACHMENT A LEAK IDENTIFICATION SYMPTOMS

10.

Safety injection system, RHR subsystem:

Lifting of relief valves PSV 8842, 8856A or 88568 as indicated by rising boron recycle holdup tank levels.

11.

Safety injection system, SI pumps:

Lifting of relief valves PSV 8851, 8853A or 88538 as indicated by rising boron recycle holdup tank levels.

12.

Intersystem LOCA:

RWST level rising.

Any abnormal rise in inventory of a system connected to the RCS.

13.

Steam Generator Tube Leakage:

SG sample results indicate greater than minimum detectable activity.

Secondary radiation monitors indicate increasing leakage based on historical data.

5 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

ATTACHMENT A LEAK IDENTIFICATION SYMPTOMS

10.

Safety injection system, RHR subsystem:

Lifting of relief valves PSV 8842, 8856A or 88568 as indicated by rising boron recycle holdup tank levels.

11.

Safety injection system, SI pumps:

Lifting of relief valves PSV 8851, 8853A or 88538 as indicated by rising boron recycle holdup tank levels.

12.

Intersystem LOCA:

RWST level rising.

Any abnormal rise in inventory of a system connected to the RCS.

13.

Steam Generator Tube Leakage:

SG sample results indicate greater than minimum detectable activity.

Secondary radiation monitors indicate increasing leakage based on historical data.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

4.4.5 4.4.5.1 13004-1,PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK OPERATION Draining The PRT Establish communications between the Liquid Waste Processing System Panel (WPSL) and the Control Room.

PLPP (B-01) REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK RECIRC LO FLOW ALB05 A-01 LIQUID PROCESS PANEL TROUBLE 4.4.5.2 4.4.5.3 Stop the running REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 003B (WPSL).

CAUTION The RCDT level should be monitored to prevent tank flooding.

Align RCDT Pumps with suction from PRT and discharge to the RHUT as follows:

a.

Verify open WPSL RCDT PUMP DISCHARGE TO RECYC EVAP 1-1901-U6-327.

b.

Close REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP SUCTION VALVE 1-HV-7127 (WPSL).

c.

Place REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1003 in MANUAL(WPSL).

d.

Open REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1003 (WPSL).

e.

Close REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK RECIRCULATION VALVE 1-HV-7144 (WPSL).

f.

Open PRT RECIRC ISO VLV 1-HV-8031.

6 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

4.4.5 4.4.5.1 13004-1,PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK OPERATION Draining The PRT Establish communications between the Liquid Waste Processing System Panel (WPSL) and the Control Room.

PLPP (B-01) REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK RECIRC LO FLOW ALB05 A-01 LIQUID PROCESS PANEL TROUBLE 4.4.5.2 4.4.5.3 Stop the running REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 003B (WPSL).

CAUTION The RCDT level should be monitored to prevent tank flooding.

Align RCDT Pumps with suction from PRT and discharge to the RHUT as follows:

a.

Verify open WPSL RCDT PUMP DISCHARGE TO RECYC EVAP 1-1901-U6-327.

b.

Close REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP SUCTION VALVE 1-HV-7127 (WPSL).

c.

Place REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1003 in MANUAL(WPSL).

d.

Open REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1 003 (WPSL).

e.

Close REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK RECIRCULATION VALVE 1-HV-7144 (WPSL).

f.

Open PRT RECIRC ISO VLV 1-HV-8031.

6

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

4.4.5.4 Align N2 and drain the PRT as follows:

CAUTION Closely monitor PRT pressure on pump down to ensure that a positive pressure (3-5 psig as indicated by Pressurizer Relief Tank 1-PI-0469) is maintained within the PRT.

a.

Open PRT N2 SUPPLY ISO VALVES 1-HV-8033 and 1-HV-8047 if necessary to maintain adequate PRT pressure.

CAUTION The RCDT pump handswitch must be held in the start position until RCDT flow is greater than 85 gpm.

b.

Start REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 0038 (WPSL).

CAUTION If the low flow trip is bypassed, the operator must continuously monitor the flow and manually trip the pump if flow falls below 20 gpm.

c.

lE greater than 85 gpm can NOT be obtained, 1-HS-1013 may be placed in bypass to disable the low flow trip for the pump being operated.

(Key # 10P3-107)

d.

Monitor PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK 1-Ll-0470.

e.

At the desired PRT level, stop the running REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 0038 (WPSL).

7 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

4.4.5.4 Align N2 and drain the PRT as follows:

CAUTION Closely monitor PRT pressure on pump down to ensure that a positive pressure (3-5 psig as indicated by Pressurizer Relief Tank 1-PI-0469) is maintained within the PRT.

a.

Open PRT N2 SUPPLY ISO VALVES 1-HV-8033 and 1-HV-8047 if necessary to maintain adequate PRT pressure.

CAUTION The RCDT pump handswitch must be held in the start position until RCDT flow is greater than 85 gpm.

b.

Start REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 003B (WPSL).

CAUTION If the low flow trip is bypassed, the operator must continuously monitor the flow and manually trip the pump if flow falls below 20 gpm.

c.

IE greater than 85 gpm can NOT be obtained, 1-HS-1 013 may be placed in bypass to disable the low flow trip for the pump being operated.

(Key # 1 OP3-1 07)

d.

Monitor PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK 1-Ll-0470.

e.

At the desired PRT level, stop the running REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 003B (WPSL).

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

4A.5.5

f.

IF the low flow trip was bypassed, place 1-HS-1013 in the OFF position.

Restoration From PRT Drain

a.

Close PRT RECIRC ISO VLV 1-HV-8031.

b.

Open REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP SUCTION VALVE 1-HV-7127 (WPSL).

c.

Open REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK RECIRCULATION VALVE 1-HV-7144 (WPSL).

d.

Close REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1003 (WPSL).

CAUTION The RCDT pump handswitch must be held in the start position,until RCDT flow is greater than 85 gpm.

e.

Start REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 0038 (WPSL).

f.

Verify 1-LC-1003 setpoint adjusted to 50%, then place REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1 003 in AUTO (WPSL).

g.

Close PRT N2 SUPPLY ISO VALVES 1-HV-8033 and 1-HV-8047IF they were opened to maintain PRT pressure.

8 I.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

4.4.5.5

f.

!E the low flow trip was bypassed, place 1-HS-1013 in the OFF position.

Restoration From PRT Drain

a.

Close PRT RECIRC ISO VLV 1-HV-8031.

b.

Open REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP SUCTION VALVE 1-HV-7127 (WPSL).

c.

Open REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK RECIRCULATION VALVE 1-HV-7144 (WPSL).

d.

Close REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1 003 (WPSL).

CAUTION The RCDT pump handswitch must be held in the start position.until RCDT flow is greater than 85 gpm.

e.

Start REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP

1 1 HS-1 003A (WPSL).

2 1 HS-1 0038 (WPSL).

f.

Verify 1-LC-1 003 setpoint adjusted to 50%, then place REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL 1-LC-1 003 in AUTO (WPSL).

g.

Close PRT N2 SUPPLY ISO VALVES 1-HV-8033 and 1-HV-8047 !E they were opened to maintain PRT pressure.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS A13.

Isolate the leak RNO.

Perform the following:

a.

Initiate applicable action item of TS 3.4.13

b.

If an unidentified leak> 1 gpm or any pressure boundary leak, then place the unit in cold shutdown as soon as possible within the limits of applicable UOP

c.

If SG tube leakage is detected by secondary radiation levels then go to 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

SS Applies Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 Condition A for identified leakage> 10 GPM Reduce leakage within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or place unit in mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months SS Begins unit shutdown to comply with Technical Specifications 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of9 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

This event will cause 15-20 GPM RCS leakage into the PRT via the train A RHR hot leg suction piping and the suction relief to the PRT. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, RCS leakage after realizing charging flow is higher than normal and PRZR level is lowering.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS A13.

Isolate the leak RNO.

Perform the following:

a.

Initiate applicable action item of TS 3.4.13

b.

If an unidentified leak> 1 gpm or any pressure boundary leak, then place the unit in cold shutdown as soon as possible within the limits of applicable UOP

c.

If SG tube leakage is detected by secondary radiation levels then go to 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

SS Applies Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13 Condition A for identified leakage> 10 GPM Reduce leakage within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or place unit in mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months SS Begins unit shutdown to comply with Technical Specifications 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Steam pressure (PT-507) controlling MFPs speed will fail low causing MFPs speed to decrease. SG levels will start to lower due to the under feed situation. The UO will take immediate action to manually control MFP speeds and restore feed flow to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG levels. The crew will then enter AOP 18001-C to complete the actions to mitigate this event.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of main steam pressure failure:

Alarms:

SG LVL DEVIATION (all 4 loops)

Indications:

All 4 SG levels lowering All 4 SG feed rates below steam rates Both MFP speeds decreasing MFP discharge pressure lowering UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

AOP 18001-C,Section I, Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation

11.

Checks steam & feed flows matched on ALL SGs RNO.

Takes manual control of the following as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%:

SG feed flow valves MFP(s) speed SS Directs actions of UO / OATC using AOP 18001-C,Section I, Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation. (Crew Update)

OATC / UO

12.

Initiates Continuous actions page 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Steam pressure (PT-507) controlling MFPs speed will fail low causing MFPs speed to decrease. SG levels will start to lower due to the under feed situation. The UO will take immediate action to manually control MFP speeds and restore feed flow to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG levels. The crew will then enter AOP 18001-C to complete the actions to mitigate this event.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnose failure of main steam pressure failure:

Alarms:

SG LVL DEVIATION (all 4 loops)

Indications:

All 4 SG levels lowering All 4 SG feed rates below steam rates Both M FP speeds decreasing MFP discharge pressure lowering UO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

AOP 18001-C,Section I, Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation

11.

Checks steam & feed flows matched on ALL SGs RNO.

Takes manual control of the following as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%:

SG feed flow valves MFP(s) speed SS Directs actions of UO / OATC using AOP 18001-C,Section I, Failure of MFP Control Instrumentation. (Crew Update)

OATC/ UO

12.

Initiates Continuous actions page

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Steam pressure (PT-507) controlling MFPs speed will fail low causing MFPs speed to decrease. SG levels will start to lower due to the under feed situation. The UO will take immediate action to manually control MFP speeds and restore feed flow to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG levels. The crew will then enter AOP 18001-C to complete the actions to mitigate this event.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

13.

Maintains SG NR levels> 40% or trips the reactor and goes to 19000-C RNO.

Perform the following:

a.

Trip the reactor

b.

Go to 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection UO

14.

Check SIC-509A, B, and C MFPT SPEED CONTROL -

OPERATING PROPERLY:

ALB15-C05 MFPT LOSS OF FW SIGNAL-EXTINGUISHED.

Controller(s) maintaining stable MFPT speed.

Controller(s) maintaining MFP discharge pressure/SG pressure differential - BETWEEN 100 AND 225 PSI.

UO

15.

Check PT -507 operating properly RNO.

Verify steam dumps in Tavg mode by initiating 13601, Steam Generator and Main Steam System Operation.

UO 13601-1 section 4.4.7 Steam Dump Operation is N/A since steam dumps are in the Tavg mode of operation.

SS

16.

Contact I&C to initiate repairs.

UO

17.

Returns feed flow controls to AUTO as necessary 2

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Steam pressure (PT-507) controlling MFPs speed will fail low causing MFPs speed to decrease. SG levels will start to lower due to the under feed situation. The UO will take immediate action to manually control MFP speeds and restore feed flow to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG levels. The crew will then enter AOP 18001-C to complete the actions to mitigate this event.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

13.

Maintains SG NR levels> 40% or trips the reactor and goes to 19000-C RNO.

Perform the following:

a.

Trip the reactor

b.

Go to 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection UO

14.

Check SIC-509A, B, and C MFPT SPEED CONTROL -

OPERATING PROPERLY:

ALB15-C05 MFPT LOSS OF FW SIGNAL-EXTINGUISHED.

Controller(s) maintaining stable MFPT speed.

Controller(s) maintaining MFP discharge pressure/SG pressure differential - BETWEEN 100 AND 225 PSI.

UO

15.

Check PT -507 operating properly RNO.

Verify steam dumps in Tavg mode by initiating 13601, Steam Generator and Main Steam System Operation.

UO 13601-1 section 4.4.7 Steam Dump Operation is N/A since steam dumps are in the Tavg mode of operation.

SS

16.

Contact I&C to initiate repairs.

UO

17.

Returns feed flow controls to AUTO as necessary 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Steam pressure (PT-507) controlling MFPs speed will fail low causing MFPs speed to decrease. SG levels will start to lower due to the under feed situation. The UO will take immediate action to manually control MFP speeds and restore feed flow to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG levels. The crew will then enter AOP 1B001-C to complete the actions to mitigate this event.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior lB.

Check repairs and surveillances complete RNO.

Perform the following:

a.

When repairs and surveillances complete, then perform step 19.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

SS Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify I&C to initiate repairs Write a Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 3

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Steam pressure (PT-507) controlling MFPs speed will fail low causing MFPs speed to decrease. SG levels will start to lower due to the under feed situation. The UO will take immediate action to manually control MFP speeds and restore feed flow to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG levels. The crew will then enter AOP 1B001-C to com plete the actions to mitigate this event.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior lB.

Check repairs and surveillances complete RNO.

Perform the following:

a.

When repairs and surveillances complete, then perform step 19.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

SS Contacts SSS to perform the following:

Notify I&C to initiate repairs Write a Condition Report Notify OPS Duty Manager of AOP entry 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses deterioration of RCS leakage:

Alarms:

PRZR LO LEVEL DEVIATION PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK OVERTEMP L".T ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT RHR PMP 1 DISCH HI PRESS LVL D LEAK DETECTED (Back Panel)

Indications:

PRZR level lowering with maximum charging flow & letdown isolated Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior CREW Diagnoses deterioration of RCS leakage:

Alarms:

PRZR LO LEVEL DEVIATION PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK OVERTEMP L'. T ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT RHR PMP 1 DISCH HI PRESS LVL D LEAK DETECTED (Back Panel)

Indications:

PRZR level lowering with maximum charging flow & letdown isolated

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC AOP 18004-C continuous action A3.

Maintain PRZR level:

a. Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising RNOb. Perform the following:

1)

Isolate letdown by closing:

a) Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves b) Letdown Isolation Valves c) Excess letdown Valves

2)

Start an additional charging pump as necessary (will be necessary)

3)

IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a)

Trip the Reactor.

b)

WHEN Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c)

Go to 19000 C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Notifies 55 of inability to maintain PRZR level Trips reactor & verifies trip, then actuates 51 Will actuate second reactor trip handswitch when rod M-2 does not trip.

2

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC AOP 18004-C continuous action A3.

Maintain PRZR level:

a. Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level

b. Check PRZR level stable or rising RNOb. Perform the following:

1)

Isolate letdown by closing:

a) Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves b) Letdown Isolation Valves c) Excess letdown Valves

2)

Start an additional charging pump as necessary (will be necessary)

3)

IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a)

Trip the Reactor.

b)

WHEN Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c)

Go to 19000 C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Notifies 55 of inability to maintain PRZR level Trips reactor & verifies trip, then actuates 51 Will actuate second reactor trip handswitch when rod M-2 does not trip.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Directs action of OATC / UO using EOP 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Step # 1 - Verifies Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights - LIT (except for rod 0-2)

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN Neutron Flux - LOWERING Step # 2 - Verifies Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED Step # 3 - Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a, at least 1 4160 1 E bus energized - White lights - ON 3b, all AC Emergency buses energized - White lights - ON (4160 and 480V)

Step # 4 Checks if SI I Actuated Any SI annunciator lit - MANUAL SAFETY INJ REACTOR TRIP SI BPLP status light lit - ON SS ITEAM Step # 5 - Initiates Foldout Page NOTE: Expect RCP trip criteria to eventually be met Step # 6 - Initiates OATC Initial Actions pages and UO Initial Actions Pages.

3

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Directs action of OATC / UO using EOP 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Step # 1 - Verifies Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights - LIT (except for rod 0-2)

Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN Neutron Flux - LOWERING Step # 2 - Verifies Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED Step # 3 - Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a, at least 1 4160 1 E bus energized - White lights - ON 3b, all AC Emergency buses energized - White lights - ON (4160 and 480V)

Step # 4 Checks if SI / Actuated Any SI annunciator lit - MANUAL SAFETY INJ REACTOR TRIP SI BPLP status light lit - ON SS / TEAM Step # 5 - Initiates Foldout Page NOTE: Expect RCP trip criteria to eventually be met Step # 6 - Initiates OATC Initial Actions pages and UO Initial Actions Pages.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

1 Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

ECCS train B not aligning. Notifies SS and manually actuates SI.

2 Checks Containment Isolation Phase A - actuated per MLBs 3

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCPs - running

b.

SI Pumps - running

c.

RHR pumps - Notifies SS pump 1 is tripped

d.

NCP - tripped 4

CCW pumps - only two running per train 5a NSCW pumps - only two running per train 5b NSCW tower return / bypass valves - in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLBs 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs 8

Containment pressure remained < 21.5 9

Checks ECCS flows:

a.

BIT Flow

b.

RCS pressure < 1625 psig

c.

SI pump flow

d.

RCS pressure < 300 psig (NOT go to step 10)

e.

RHR pump flow 10 Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLBs 11 Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12 Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

4

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-O.

1 Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

ECCS train B not aligning. Notifies 55 and manually actuates 51.

2 Checks Containment Isolation Phase A - actuated per MLBs 3

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCPs - running

b.

SI Pumps - running

c.

RHR pumps - Notifies 55 pump 1 is tripped

d.

NCP - tripped 4

CCW pumps - only two running per train 5a NSCW pumps - only two running per train 5b NSCW tower return / bypass valves - in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLBs 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs 8

Containment pressure remained < 21.5 9

Checks ECCS flows:

a.

BIT Flow

b.

RCS pressure < 1625 psig

c.

SI pump flow

d.

RCS pressure < 300 psig (NOT go to step 10)

e.

RHR pump flow 10 Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLBs 11 Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12 Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO Initial Operator Actions of E-O

1.

Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

2.

Checks NR SG levels - one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow

3.

Checks ifSLI is required:

Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psig High rate bistables lit with low pressure SI/SLI blocked If any above met then verify MSIVs & BSIVs closed

4.

Verifies FWI - MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut FWI will fail UO will have manually close all valves to achieve FWI and sto'P potential overfeeding of SG's

5.

Verifies SGBD isolated places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running. - 4160 V & 60 Hz

7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 - 65% N R

8.

Verify both MFPstripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

19000-C OATC I UO

7.

Initiate continuous actions page 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO Initial Operator Actions of E-O 1.

Checks MDAFW and TDAFW pumps are running.

2.

Checks NR SG levels - one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow

3.

Checks if SLI is required:

Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psig High rate bistables lit with low pressure SI/SLI blocked If any above met then verify MSIVs & BSIVs closed

4.

Verifies FWI - MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut FWI will fail UO will have manually close all valves to achieve FWI and stop potential overfeeding of SG's

5.

Verifies SGBD isolated places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running. - 4160 V & 60 Hz

7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 - 65% NR

8.

Verify both MFPs tripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

19000-C OATC I UO

7.

Initiate continuous actions page 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

8.

Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 F:

With RCP(s) running - RCS average temperature Without RCP(s) running - RCS WR Cold leg temperatures.

UO 8RNO. If necessary, takes actions to control RCS temperature.

Stop dumping steam.

Reduces AFW flow (not < 570 gpm if SG NR levels < 10% NR).

If cooldown continues shuts MSIVs and BSIVs If temperature> 557 F & rising then dump steam OATC 9 - Checks PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves 9a, PORVs closed and in AUTO 9b, Normal spray valves closed 9c, Power available to at least one block valve 9d, At least one block valve open (NOT) 9d RNO, verify open at least one block valve when RCS pressure> 2185 psig.

OATC 10 - Checks if RCPs should be stopped 10a, CCP or SIP running 10b, RCS pressure < 1375 psig If yes then stop all RCPs if no then go to step # 11 NOTE: RCS pressure will eventuaJly drop < 1375 psig and the RCPs should be tripped 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

8.

Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 F:

With RCP(s) running - RCS average temperature Without RCP(s) running - RCS WR Cold leg temperatures.

UO 8RNO. If necessary, takes actions to control RCS temperature.

Stop dumping steam.

Reduces AFW flow (not < 570 gpm if SG NR levels < 10% NR).

If cooldown continues shuts MSIVs and BSIVs If temperature> 557 F & rising then dump steam OATC 9 - Checks PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves 9a, PORVs closed and in AUTO 9b, Normal spray valves closed 9c, Power available to at least one block valve 9d, At least one block valve open (NOT) 9d RNO, verify open at least one block valve when RCS pressure> 2185 psig.

OATC 10 - Checks if RCPs should be stopped 10a, CCP or SIP running 10b, RCS pressure < 1375 psig If yes then stop all RCPs if no then go to step # 11 NOTE: RCS pressure will eventually drop < 1375 psig and the RCPs should be tripped 6

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate Siand enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO/SS 11 - Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 SG pressures:

0 Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner, or 0

Completely depressurized If yes then go to 19020-C, E-2 If no then go to step # 12 SS/UO 12 - Checks for SG tubes intact.

a.

Directs chemistry to sample all SG one at a time for activity.

b.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

0 Main Steam Line Rad Monitors RE-13120 RE-13121 RE-13122 RE-13119 0

Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors RE-12839C RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale) 0 Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown) 0 SG sample radiation

c.

Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner RNO c. go to step 13

d.

If rad monitors abnormal or SG level rising uncontrollably, then go to 19030-C, E-3 7

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO / SS 11 - Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 SG pressures:

0 Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner, or 0

Completely depressurized If yes then go to 19020-C, E-2 If no then go to step # 12 SS / UO 12 - Checks for SG tubes intact.

a.

Directs chemistry to sample all SG one at a time for activity.

b.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

0 Main Steam Line Rad Monitors RE-13120 RE-13121 RE-13122 RE-13119 0

Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors RE-12839C RE-12839D (if on scale)

RE-12839E (if on scale) 0 Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors RE-0019 (Sample)

RE-0021 (Blowdown) 0 SG sample radiation

c.

Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner RNO c. go to step 13

d.

If rad monitors abnormal or SG level rising uncontrollably, then go to 19030-C, E-3 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

13.

Check if RCS intact inside Containment:

CNMT Radiation - Normal CNMT Pressure - Normal CNMT Emergency Recirculation Sump levels - Normal OATC/UO

14.

Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

a.

RCS Subcooling - > 24 F

b.

Secondary Heat sink available:

0 Total AFW flow> 570 gpm, or 0

NR level in at least one SG > 10%

c.

RCS pressure stable or rising If any of above not met go to step 22 (this will be the case)

d.

PRZR level - > 9%

If not met try to stabilize RCS pressure with normal PRZR spray.

Return to step 14a.

OATC / UO

22.

Initiate CSFSTs per 19200-C, F-O SS

23.

Initiate 91 001-C, E-Plan Classification & Implementing instructions 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

13.

Check if RCS intact inside Containment:

CNMT Radiation - Normal CNMT Pressure - Normal CNMT Emergency Recirculation Sump levels - Normal OATC/UO

14.

Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

a.

RCS Subcooling - > 24 F

b.

Secondary Heat sink available:

0 Total AFW flow> 570 gpm, or 0

NR level in at least one SG > 10%

c.

RCS pressure stable or rising If any of above not met go to step 22 (this will be the case)

d.

PRZR level - > 9%

If not met try to stabilize RCS pressure with normal PRZR spray.

Return to step 14a.

OATC / UO

22.

Initiate CSFSTs per 19200-C, F-O SS

23.

Initiate 91 001-C, E-Plan Classification & Implementing instructions 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

24.

Check intact SG levels:

a.

NR level - at least one> 10% [32% adverse]

RNO a. maintain total feed flow> 570 gpm

b.

Maintain NR levels 10%-65%

c.

NR level - any rising in an uncontrolled manner RNO c. go to step 25

d.

go to 19030-C, SGTR UO

25.

Check Auxiliary Building leak detection systems:

a.

Plant Vent Radiation Monitors - Normal:

RE-12442A EFFL PART RE-12442B EFFL IODINE RE-12442C EFFL RAD RE-12444C RADIOGAS RAD

b.

Auxiliary Building break detection system on QPCP - all leak detection status lights NOT lit The RHR pump 1 room leak detection light will be lit and the level D leak detected annunciator will be alarming (these are back panel indications)

RNO.

Evaluate cause of abnormal conditions If cause is loss of RCS inventory, then go to 19112-C, ECA 1.2 NOTE: If SO sent to investigate, he will report RHR pump room is full of water & steam NOTE: Crew may transition to 19010-C based on abnormal PRT conditions in next step (26). If they do they should then transition at step 18 of 19010 to the LOCA outside CNMT EOP (19112-C) 9 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

24.

Check intact SG levels:

a.

NR level-at least one> 10% [32% adverse]

RNO a. maintain total feed flow> 570 gpm

b.

Maintain NR levels 10%-65%

c.

NR level-any rising in an uncontrolled manner RNO c. go to step 25

d.

go to 19030-C, SGTR UO

25.

Check Auxiliary Building leak detection systems:

a.

Plant Vent Radiation Monitors - Normal:

RE-12442A EFFL PART RE-12442B EFFL IODINE RE-12442C EFFL RAD RE-12444C RADIOGAS RAD

b.

Auxiliary Building break detection system on QPCP - all leak detection status lights NOT lit The RHR pump 1 room leak detection light will be lit and the level D leak detected annunciator will be alarming (these are back panel indications)

RNO.

Evaluate cause of abnormal conditions If cause is loss of RCS inventory, then go to 19112-C, ECA 1.2 NOTE: If SO sent to investigate, he will report RHR pump room is full of water & steam NOTE: Crew may transition to 1901 O-C based on abnormal PRT conditions in next step (26). If they do they should then transition at step 18 of 19010 to the LOCA outside CNMT EOP (19112-C) 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 10 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Directs action of OATC / UO using EOP 19112-C, LOCA Outside Containment (Crew Update) 19112-C, ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT OATC

1.

Verify proper valve alignment:

a.

RHR Pump suction from RCS - CLOSED:

HV-8701A - RHR PMP-A DOWNSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 1 HV-8701 B - RHR PMP-A UPSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 1 HV-8702A - RHR PMP-B DOWNSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 4 HV-8702B - RHR PMP-B UPSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 4

b.

RHR Pump Hot Leg injection valve - CLOSED:

HV-8840 - RHR TO HL ISO VL V

c.

SI pump Hot Leg injection valves - CLOSED:

HV-8802A - SI PMP-A TO HOT LEG 1&4 ISO VLV HV-8802B - SI PMP-B TO HOT LEG 2&3 ISO VLV 10 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 10 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS Directs action of OATC / UO using EOP 19112-C, LOCA Outside Containment (Crew Update) 19112-C, ECA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT OATC

1.

Verify proper valve alignment:

a.

RHR Pump suction from RCS - CLOSED:

HV-8701A - RHR PMP-A DOWNSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 1 HV-8701 B - RHR PMP-A UPSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 1 HV-8702A - RHR PMP-B DOWNSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 4 HV-8702B - RHR PMP-B UPSTREAM SUCTION FROM HOT LEG LOOP 4

b.

RHR Pump Hot Leg injection valve - CLOSED:

HV-8840 - RHR TO HL ISO VLV

c.

SI pump Hot Leg injection valves - CLOSED:

HV-8802A - SI PMP-A TO HOT LEG 1&4 ISO VLV HV-8802B - SI PMP-B TO HOT LEG 2&3 ISO VLV 10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 11 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

2.

Try to identify and isolate RHR cold leg injection break:

a.

Close RHR PMP-A TO COLD LEG 1&2 ISO VLV HV-8809A NOTE: OATC will have position lockout HS-8809C - ON

b.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open RHR PMP-A TO COLD LEG 1&2 ISO VLV HV-8809A Go to step 2d

d.

Close RHR PMP-B TO COLD LEG 3&4 ISO VLV HV-8809B NOTE: OATC will have position lockout HS-8809D - ON

b.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open RHR PMP-B TO COLD LEG 3&4 ISO VLV HV-8809B Go to step 3 11 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 11 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

2.

Try to identify and isolate RHR cold leg injection break:

a.

Close RHR PMP-A TO COLD LEG 1&2 ISO VLV HV-8809A NOTE: OATC will have position lockout HS-8809C - ON

b.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open RHR PMP-A TO COLD LEG 1&2 ISO VLV HV-8809A Go to step 2d

d.

Close RHR PMP-B TO COLD LEG 3&4 ISO VLV HV-8809B NOTE: OATC will have position lockout HS-8809D - ON

b.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open RHR PMP-B TO COLD LEG 3&4 ISO VLV HV-8809B Go to step 3 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 12 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATe

3.

Try to identify and isolate SI Cold Leg injection break:

a.

Close SI PMP-A TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821A

b.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open SI PMP-A TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821A Go to step 3d

d.

Close SI PMP-B TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821B

e.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open SI PMP-B TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821B Go to step 3g

g.

Close COLD LEG INJECTION FROM SIS HV-8835 NOTE: OATC will have position lockout HS-8835A - ON

h.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO h. Close COLD LEG INJECTION FROM SIS HV-8835 Go to Step 4 OATC

4.

Check if break is isolated:

RCS pressure - RISING RNO.

Go to 19111-C, ECA-1.1 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION Directs actions of the OATC / UO using EOP 19111-C, Loss of SS Emergency Coolant Recirculation. (Crew Update)

SS CAUTION If suction source is lot to any ECCS or CS Pump, the pump should be stopped 12

(

\\

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 12 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

3.

Try to identify and isolate SI Cold Leg injection break:

a.

Close SI PMP-A TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821A

b.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open SI PMP-A TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821A Go to step 3d

d.

Close SI PMP-B TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821B

e.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO b. Open SI PMP-B TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821B Go to step 3g

g.

Close COLD LEG INJECTION FROM SIS HV-8835 NOTE: OATe will have position lockout HS-8835A - ON

h.

Check RCS pressure - RISING RNO h. Close COLD LEG INJECTION FROM SIS HV-8835 Go to Step 4 OATC

4.

Check if break is isolated:

RCS pressure - RISING RNO.

Go to 19111-C, ECA-1.1 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION Directs actions of the OATC I UO using EOP 19111-C, Loss of SS Emergency Coolant Recirculation. (Crew Update)

SS CAUTION If suction source is lot to any ECCS or CS Pump, the pump should be stopped 12

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 13 of 43 Event No.:

5*9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 19111*C

1.

Check emergency coolant recirculation capability - RESTORED

a.

Power available and operable:

TRAINA HV-8811A - CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-A SUCTION RHRPumpA HV-8809A - RHR PMP-A TO COLD LEG 1 &2 ISO VLV RHR Train A Hx TRAIN B HV-8811 B - CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-B SUCTION RHR Pump B HV-8809B - RHR PMP-B TO COLD LEG 3&4 ISO VLV RHR Train B Hx

b.

CNMT Emergency Sump Levels - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 13.5 INCHES AND RWST LEVEL IS LESS THAN 29%:

LI-764

-OR-LI-765 RNO.

Continue attempts to restore at least one train of recirculation When recirculation capability is restored, then return to procedure and step in effect.

Continue with Step 2.

13 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 13 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 19111-C

1.

Check emergency coolant recirculation capability - RESTORED

a.

Power available and operable:

TRAIN A HV-8811A - CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-A SUCTION RHR Pump A HV-8809A - RHR PMP-A TO COLD LEG 1 &2 ISO VLV RHR Train A Hx TRAIN B HV-8811 B - CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-B SUCTION RHR Pump B HV-8809B - RHR PMP-B TO COLD LEG 3&4 ISO VLV RHR Train B Hx

b.

CNMT Emergency Sump Levels - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 13.5 INCHES AND RWST LEVEL IS LESS THAN 29%:

LI-764

-OR-LI-765 RNO.

Continue attempts to restore at least one train of recirculation When recirculation capability is restored, then return to procedure and step in effect.

Continue with Step 2.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 14 of 43 Event No.:

5*9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

2.

Monitor RHR pumps suction condition:

RHR Pump Amps - STABLE IPC Points:

J9623 J9624 Discharge Flow - NORMAL FOR RCS PRESSURE IPC Points:

F0626 F0627 Discharge Pressure - STABLE IPC Points:

P6310 P6311 SS CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

RHR Pumps SI Pumps Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Unit Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

ESF Chilled Water Pumps (IF CRI is reset).

OATC

3.

Reset SI if necessary CREW

4.

Check Containment Cooling Units - RUNNING IN LOW SPEED.

14

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Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 14 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

2.

Monitor RHR pumps suction condition:

RHR Pump Amps - STABLE IPC Points:

J9623 J9624 Discharge Flow - NORMAL FOR RCS PRESSURE IPC Points:

F0626 F0627 Discharge Pressure - STABLE IPC Points:

P6310 P6311 SS CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

RHR Pumps SI Pumps Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Unit Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

ESF Chilled Water Pumps (IF CRI is reset).

OATC

3.

Reset SI if necessary CREW

4.

Check Containment Cooling Units - RUNNING IN LOW SPEED.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 15 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this pbint. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO Notes the following DG-1A Jacket Water alarms SS/UO DG1A LOW PRESS JACKET WATER DG1A TRIP LOW PRESS JACKET WATER DG1A HI TEMP JACKET WATER OUT DG1A HI TEMP JACKET WATER IN DG1A TRIP HI TEMP JACKET WATER Refers to ARP 17035-1 17035-1 ORIGIN SETPOINT 1-TSH-19112 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

WINDOW COS DG1A TRIP HI TEMP JACKET WATER

1.

Three-way Mixing Valve 1-TCV-19096 to Jacket Water Cooler has failed in the BYPASS position.

2.

Engine-driven Jacket Water Pump malfunction.

3.

Insufficient Nuclear Service Cooling Water flow through Jacket Water Cooler.

4.

Engine overloaded.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS

1.

If operating from a Normal Start, the Diesel Generator will shut down.

2.

If operating from an Emergency Start this alarm will only annunciate, NOT trip the Diesel Generator.

Determines DG-1A not needed for current plant conditions and emergency stops the DG to protect the equipment from further damage.

15 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 15 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this pOint. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO Notes the following DG-1A Jacket Water alarms SS/UO DG1A LOW PRESS JACKET WATER DG1A TRIP LOW PRESS JACKET WATER DG1A HI TEMP JACKET WATER OUT DG1A HI TEMP JACKET WATER IN DG1A TRIP HI TEMP JACKET WATER Refers to ARP 17035-1 17035-1 ORIGIN SETPOINT 1-TSH-19112 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE

WINDOW C05 DG1A TRIP HI TEMP JACKET WATER

1.

Three-way Mixing Valve 1-TCV-19096 to Jacket Water Cooler has failed in the BYPASS position.

2.

Engine-driven Jacket Water Pump malfunction.

3.

Insufficient Nuclear Service Cooling Water flow through Jacket Water Cooler.

4.

Engine overloaded.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS

1.

If operating from a Normal Start, the Diesel Generator will shut down.

2.

If operating from an Emergency Start this alarm will only annunciate, NOT trip the Diesel Generator.

Determines DG-1 A not needed for current plant conditions and emergency stops the DG to protect the equipment from further damage.

15

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 16 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

5.

Check RWST level> 8%

16

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Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 16 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

5.

Check RWST level> 8%

16

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 17 of 43 Event No.:

5*9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS / OATC

6.

Determine Containment Spray requirements:

a.

Check CS Pump suction - FROM RWST:

HV-9017A - CNMT SPRAY PMP-A RWST SUCT ISO VLV - OPEN HV-9017B - CNMT SPRAY PMP-B RWST SUCT ISO VLV - OPEN

b.

Determine number of CS Pumps required from Table:

RWST CONTAINMENT FAN SPRAY LEVEL PRESSURE COOLERS PUMPS IN SLOW REQUIRED GREATER THAN 52 N/A 2

PSIG BETWEEN 0

2 GREATER 21.5 PSIG and 52 4

1 THAN 29%

PSIG 8

0 LESS THAN 21.5 N/A 0

PSIG GREATER THAN 52 N/A 2

PSIG BETWEEN BETWEEN 3

1 8%and 29%

21.5 PSIG and 52 6

0 PSIG LESS THAN 21.5 N/A 0

PSIG LESS THAN N/A N/A 0

8%

17 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 17 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS / OATC

6.

Determine Containment Spray requirements:

a.

Check CS Pump suction - FROM RWST:

HV-9017A - CNMT SPRAY PMP-A RWST SUCT ISO VLV - OPEN HV-9017B - CNMT SPRAY PMP-B RWST SUCT ISO VLV - OPEN

b.

Determine number of CS Pumps required from Table:

RWST CONTAINMENT FAN SPRAY LEVEL PRESSURE COOLERS PUMPS IN SLOW REQUIRED GREATER THAN 52 N/A 2

PSIG BETWEEN 0

2 GREATER 21.5 PSIG and 52 4

1 THAN 29%

PSIG 8

0 LESS THAN 21.5 N/A 0

PSIG GREATER THAN 52 N/A 2

PSIG BETWEEN BETWEEN 3

1 8%and 29%

21.5 PSIG and 52 6

0 PSIG LESS THAN 21.5 N/A 0

PSIG LESS THAN N/A N/A 0

8%

17

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 18 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 6c.

Check CS Pumps running - EQUAL TO NUMBER REQUIRED.

SS

7.

Check if Containment Spray should be aligned for recirculation:

a.

CS Pumps - RUNNING.

RNOa. Go to Step 8 SS/OATC 8.

Makeup to the RWST as necessary:

CRITICAL Initiate 13701-1, BORIC ACID SYSTEM

-OR-Initiate Attachment A, RWST MAKEUP FROM THE SPENT FUEL POOL (These start on the next page) 18

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 18 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OA TC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC 6c.

Check CS Pumps running - EQUAL TO NUMBER REQUIRED.

SS

7.

Check if Containment Spray should be aligned for recirculation:

a.

CS Pumps - RUNNING.

RNOa. Go to Step 8 SS/OATC

8.

Makeup to the RWST as necessary:

CRITICAL Initiate 13701-1, BORIC ACID SYSTEM

-OR-Initiate Attachment A, RWST MAKEUP FROM THE SPENT FUEL POOL (These start on the next page) 18

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 19 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

13701-1 BORIC ACID SYSTEM 4.4.2 Makeup From The Boric Acid Storage Tank To The Refueling Water Storage Tank NOTE If makeup from the Boric Acid Storage Tank to the Refueling Water Storage Tank is in progress and the need arises for Emergency Boration, the recommended method to ensure adequate Emergency Boration flow is to initiate Emergency Boration per 13009-1, "CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System" and terminate the makeup from the Boric Acid Storage Tank to the Refueling Water Storage Tank until Emergency Boration is no longer needed.

CAUTIONS If in Mode 1,2, 3 or 4, refer to Technical Specifications TS 3.5.4 and Technical Requirements Manual TR 13.1.3 and 13.1.7.

If in Mode 5 or 6, refer to Technical Requirements Manual TR 13.1.2 and 13.1.6 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.3 4.4.2.4 4.4.2.5 4.4.2.6 4.4.2.7 Verify the CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System is operational per 13009-1, "CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System."

Verify the Refueling Water Storage Tank is capable of receiving makeup per 13105-1, "Safety Injection System."

IF the CVCS is operating AND Volume Control Tank Level 1-Ll-0185 is less than 50%, raise level to greater than 50% per 13009-1, "CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System."

Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001 B to STOP.

Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in OFF.

Verify 1-HS-0111A RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER is in AUTO and valve is closed.

Verify 1-HS-011 OA BA TO BLENDER is in AUTO and valve is closed.

19 I

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 19 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

13701-1 BORIC ACID SYSTEM 4.4.2 Makeup From The Boric Acid Storage Tank To The Refueling Water Storage Tank NOTE If makeup from the Boric Acid Storage Tank to the Refueling Water Storage Tank is in progress and the need arises for Emergency Boration, the recommended method to ensure adequate Emergency Boration flow is to initiate Emergency Boration per 13009-1, "cvcs Reactor Makeup Control System" and terminate the makeup from the Boric Acid Storage Tank to the Refueling Water Storage Tank until Emergency Boration is no longer needed.

CAUTIONS If in Mode 1, 2, 3 or 4, refer to Technical Specifications TS 3.5.4 and Technical Requirements Manual TR 13.1.3 and 13.1.7.

If in Mode 5 or 6, refer to Technical Requirements Manual TR 13.1.2 and 13.1.6 4.4.2.1 4.4.2.2 4.4.2.3 4.4.2.4 4.4.2.5 4.4.2.6 4.4.2.7 Verify the CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System is operational per 13009-1, "cvcs Reactor Makeup Control System."

Verify the Refueling Water Storage Tank is capable of receiving makeup per 13105-1, "Safety Injection System."

I.E the CVCS is operating AND Volume Control Tank Level 1-U-0185 is less than 50%, raise level to greater than 50% per 13009-1, "cvcs Reactor Makeup Control System."

Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001 B to STOP.

Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in OFF.

Verify 1-HS-0111A RX MU WTR TO BA BLENDER is in AUTO and valve is closed.

Verify 1-HS-0110A BA TO BLENDER is in AUTO and valve is closed.

19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 20 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

4.4.2.8 4.4.2.9 4.4.2.10 4.4.2.11 4.4.2.12 4.4.2.13 4.4.2.14 Place 1-HS-0111 B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT in CLOSE.

Place 1-HS-011 OB BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT in CLOSE.

a.

Install Caution Tag if make-up will continue longer than one shift.

Verify closed EMERGENCY BORATE Valve 1-HV-81 04.

Open CVCS DISCH BA BLEND TO BRS AND RWST 1-1208-U4-171.

Open CVCS SPL Y TO RWST FROM BA BLENDER 1-1208-U4-173.

Verify one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running or in AUTO.

Verify one (1) Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running or in AUTO.

NOTES RWST boron concentration limits per the Tech Specs and the TRM are between 2400 and 2600 ppm in Modes 1 through 6.

Performance of Sections 4.4.2.15.a and 4.4.2.15.b will result in both a change of Boron concentration and level. If a level change is required while maintaining a constant concentration, Section 4.4.2.15.c should be used.

20

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Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 20 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

4.4.2.8 4.4.2.9 4.4.2.10 4.4.2.11 4.4.2.12 4.4.2.13 4.4.2.14 Place 1-HS-0111 B BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT in CLOSE.

Place 1-HS-0110B BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT in CLOSE.

a.

Install Caution Tag if make-up will continue longer than one shift.

Verify closed EMERGENCY BORATE Valve 1-HV-81 04.

Open CVCS DISCH BA BLEND TO BRS AND RWST 1-1208-U4-171.

Open CVCS SPL Y TO RWST FROM BA BLENDER 1-1208-U4-173.

Verify one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump is running or in AUTO.

Verify one (1) Reactor Makeup Water Pump is running or in AUTO.

NOTES RWST boron concentration limits per the Tech Specs and the TRM are between 2400 and 2600 ppm in Modes 1 through 6.

Performance of Sections 4.4.2.15.a and 4.4.2.15.b will result in both a change of Boron concentration and level. If a level change is required while maintaining a constant concentration, Section 4.4.2.15.c should be used.

20

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 21 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

4.4.2.15 IE the RWST boron concentration must be adjusted, perform one of the following:

a.

For borating the RWST:

(1)

Determine the amount of boric acid solution from the BAST required for the boration using the following formula:

where:

VSA

=

Vj

=

CSAST =

Cj

=

Cf

=

V V [ Ci-Cf ]

BA =

i Cf - CBast Volume of boric acid solution from BAST Initial RWST volume BAST boric acid concentration Initial RWST boric acid concentration Final RWST boric acid concentration (2)

Reset Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FQI-011 0 and adjust it to the volume determined above.

(3)

Adjust Boric Acid Blender 1-FIC-011 0 setpoint as desired and place the controller in AUTO.

(4)

Place BA TO BLENDER 1-HS-011 OA in AUTO.

(5)

Place VCT Makeup Mode Select 1-HS-40001A in BOR.

(6)

Place VCT Makeup Control 1-HS-4000 1 B to START.

(7)

Check Boric Acid To Blender 1-HV-0110A throttles open to provide desired flow.

(8)

Monitor Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FQI-011 O.

21 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 21 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

4.4.2.15 IE the RWST boron concentration must be adjusted, perform one of the following:

a.

For borating the RWST:

(1)

Determine the amount of boric acid solution from the BAST required for the boration using the following formula:

where:

VSA

=

Vj

=

CSAST =

Cj

=

Cf

=

V V [

Ci-Cf ]

BA =

i Cf - CBast Volume of boric acid solution from BAST Initial RWST volume BAST boric acid concentration Initial RWST boric acid concentration Final RWST boric acid concentration (2)

Reset Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FOI-011 0 and adjust it to the volume determined above.

(3)

Adjust Boric Acid Blender 1-FIC-011 0 setpoint as desired and place the controller in AUTO.

(4)

Place BA TO BLENDER 1-HS-0110A in AUTO.

(5)

Place VCT Makeup Mode Select 1-HS-40001 A in BOR.

(6)

Place VCT Makeup Control 1-HS-4000 1 B to START.

(7)

Check Boric Acid To Blender 1-HV-0110A throttles open to provide desired flow.

(8)

Monitor Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FOI-011 O.

21

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES.. D.. 2 Op.. Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 22 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

b.

(9)

Check Boric Acid To Blender 1-HV-0110A closes when 1-FQI-011 0 reaches setpoint.

(10)

WHEN borating the RWST is complete, flush the flowpath from the Blender to the RWST with 120 gallons Blended Makeup per Step 4.4.2.15.c.

For Diluting the RWST:

(1 )

Determine the amount of reactor makeup water required for the dilution using the following formula:

Vrmw = Vi[Cf-GJ

-Cf where:

Vrmw =

Volume of reactor makeup water Vi

=

Initial RWST volume Ci

=

Initial RWST boric acid concentration Cj

=

Final RWST boric acid concentration (2)

Reset Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FQI-0111 and adjust it to the volume determined above.

(3)

Adjust Total Makeup Controller 1-FIC-0111 in AUTO.

(4)

Place RX MU WTR To BA Blender 1-HS-0111A in AUTO.

(5)

Place VCT Makeup Mode Select 1-HS-40001A in OIL or ALT OIL.

(6)

Place VCT Makeup Control 1-HS-40001 B to START.

(7)

Check RX MU WTR To BA Blender 1-HV-0111A throttles open to provide flow.

22

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Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 22 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

b.

(9)

Check Boric Acid To Blender 1-HV-0110A closes when 1-FOI-011 0 reaches setpoint.

(10)

WHEN borating the RWST is complete, flush the f10wpath from the Blender to the RWST with 120 gallons Blended Makeup per Step 4.4.2.15.c.

For Diluting the RWST:

(1 )

Determine the amount of reactor makeup water required for the dilution using the following formula:

Vrmw = Vi[Cf-CJ

-Cf where:

Vrmw =

Volume of reactor makeup water

\\tj

=

Initial RWST volume Cj

=

Initial RWST boric acid concentration Cf

=

Final RWST boric acid concentration (2)

Reset Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FOI-0111 and adjust it to the volume determined above.

(3)

Adjust Total Makeup Controller 1-FIC-0111 in AUTO.

(4)

Place RX MU WTR To BA Blender 1-HS-0111A in AUTO.

(5)

Place VCT Makeup Mode Select 1-HS-40001A in OIL or AL TOIL.

(6)

Place VCT Makeup Control 1-HS-40001 B to START.

(7)

Check RX MU WTR To BA Blender 1-HV-0111A throttles open to provide flow.

22

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 23 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

(8)

Monitor Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FQI-0111.

(9)

Check Reactor Makeup Water To Blender 1-HV-0111 A closes when 1-FQI-0111 reaches setpoint.

NOTES Due to system design, the boric acid flowrate will be limited to approximately 18 gpm when the total makeup flow is set at 100 gpm. As a result, the required RWST boron concentration cannot be met. Therefore, a total makeup flowrate less than 80 gpm is recom mended.

Blended Make up to the RWST using the formula below is designed to maintain a constant concentration while changing level.

c.

For Blended Makeup to the RWST:

(1)

IE RCS dilution valve tagout is active, and blended makeup is required per Step 4.4.2.15.a( 10), hang a Caution Tag with the following information at 1-FIC-0111 :

WHEN Dilution Tag Out is released, perform 13701-1, Step 4.4.2.15.c to flush the flowpath from the Blender to the RWST with 120 gallons Blended Makeup."

(2)

Determine desired total makeup flowrate and adjust Total Makeup Controller 1-FIC-0111 setpoint to this value.

23

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 23 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

(8)

Monitor Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FOI-0111.

(9)

Check Reactor Makeup Water To Blender 1-HV-0111 A closes when 1-FOI-0111 reaches setpoint.

NOTES Due to system design, the boric acid flowrate will be limited to approximately 18 gpm when the total makeup flow is set at 100 gpm. As a result, the required RWST boron concentration cannot be met. Therefore, a total makeup flowrate less than 80 gpm is recommended.

Blended Make up to the RWST using the formula below is designed to maintain a constant concentration while changing level.

c.

For Blended Makeup to the RWST:

(1)

IF RCS dilution valve tagout is active, and blended makeup is required per Step 4.4.2.15.a(1 0), hang a Caution Tag with the following information at 1-FIC-0111 :

WHEN Dilution Tag Out is released, perform 13701-1, Step 4.4.2.15.c to flush the flowpath from the Blender to the RWST with 120 gallons Blended Makeup."

(2)

Determine desired total makeup flowrate and adjust Total Makeup Controller 1-FIC-0111 setpoint to this value.

23

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 24 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

(3)

Determine the Boric Acid Flowrate by using the following formula:

[CRWST ]

mBA = ~

xmT where:

mBA

=

CRWST =

Cba

=

Boric Acid Flowrate Concentration of the RWST Concentration of the BAST Total Makeup Flowrate [Step 4.4.2.15.c(1)]

(4)

Determine Boric Acid Blender Controller 1-FIC-0110 flow setpoint using the Boric Acid Flowrate calculated in Step 4.4.2.15.c(3).

(5)

Adjust Boric Acid Blender Controller 1-FIC-0110 setpoint to the value determined in Step 4.4.2.15.c(4) and place the controller in AUTO.

(6)

Place Total Makeup Controller 1-FIC-0111 in AUTO.

(7)

Determine the amount of RWST makeup required using the Plant Technical Data Book.

(8)

Reset the Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FQI-0111 and adjust to the required blended RWST makeup volume.

24 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 24 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

(3)

Determine the Boric Acid Flowrate by using the following formula:

where:

mBA

=

CRWST =

Cba

=

Boric Acid Flowrate Concentration of the RWST Concentration of the BAST Total Makeup Flowrate [Step 4.4.2.15.c(1)]

(4)

Determine Boric Acid Blender Controller 1-FIC-0110 flow setpoint using the Boric Acid Flowrate calculated in Step 4.4.2.15.c(3).

(5)

Adjust Boric Acid Blender Controller 1-FIC-0110 setpoint to the value determined in Step 4.4.2.15.c( 4) and place the controller in AUTO.

(6)

Place Total Makeup Controller 1-FIC-0111 in AUTO.

(7)

Determine the amount of RWST makeup required using the Plant Technical Data Book.

(8)

Reset the Boric Acid Blend Control Integrator 1-FQI-0111 and adjust to the required blended RWST makeup volume.

24

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 26 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

NOTE Makeup can be stopped at any time by placing VCT Makeup Control Switch 1-HS-40001 B to STOP.

4.4.2.16 4.4.2.17 4.4.2.18 4.4.2.19 4.4.2.20 (16)

Monitor Boric Acid Blend Control Integrators 1-FQI-011 0 and 1-FQI-0111.

(17)

WHEN either integrator reaches its setpoint, place VCT Makeup Control Switch 1-HS-40001 B to STOP. '

(18)

Verify the following:

(a)

Reactor Makeup Water to Blender 1-FV-0111A is closed.

(b)

Boric Acid Tank to Blender 1-FV-0110A is closed.

Close CVCS SPL Y TO RWST FROM BA BLENDER 1-1208-U4-173. (IV REQUIRED)

Close CVCS DISCH BA BLEND TO BRS AND RWST 1-1208-U4-171. (IV REQUIRED)

Return the BA Blender Controls to the desired configuration per 13009-1, "CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System."

a.

Remove Caution Tag if installed.

NOTE If blended makeup to the RWST was performed per Step 4.4.2.15c., Steps 4.4.2.19 thru 4.4.2.21 may be marked N/A.

Place the RWST on recirculation per 13105-1, "Safety Injection System."

Request RWST boron concentration sample analysis and result from the Chemistry Department.

26 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 26 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

NOTE Makeup can be stopped at any time by placing VCT Makeup Control Switch 1-HS-40001 B to STOP.

4.4.2.16 4.4.2.17 4.4.2.18 4.4.2.19 4.4.2.20 (16)

Monitor Boric Acid Blend Control Integrators 1-FQI-011 0 and 1-FQI-0111.

(17)

WHEN either integrator reaches its setpoint, place VCT Makeup Control Switch 1-HS-40001 B to STOP. '

(18)

Verify the following:

(a)

Reactor Makeup Water to Blender 1-FV-0111A is closed.

(b)

Boric Acid Tank to Blender 1-FV-0110A is closed.

Close CVCS SPL Y TO RWST FROM BA BLENDER 1-1208-U4-173. (IV REQUIRED)

Close CVCS DISCH BA BLEND TO BRS AND RWST 1-1208-U4-171. (IV REQUIRED)

Return the BA Blender Controls to the desired configuration per 13009-1, "cvcs Reactor Makeup Control System."

a.

Remove Caution Tag if installed.

NOTE If blended makeup to the RWST was performed per Step 4.4.2.15c., Steps 4.4.2.19 thru 4.4.2.21 may be marked N/A.

Place the RWST on recirculation per 13105-1, "Safety Injection System."

Request RWST boron concentration sample analysis and result from the Chemistry Department.

26

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 27 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

4.4.2.21 Verify RWST boron concentration is within Technical Specification SR 3.5.4.3 and Technical Requirements Manual TRS 13.1.6.2 limits.

27

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 27 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

4.4.2.21 Verify RWST boron concentration is within Technical Specification SR 3.5.4.3 and Technical Requirements Manual TRS 13.1.6.2 limits.

27

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 28 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

ATTACHMENT A A. RWST MAKEUP FROM THE SPENT FUEL POOL USING TRAIN A CAUTION Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System should not be aligned to provide makeup to the RWST if Spent Fuel Pool level is less than 23 feet above top of the spent fuel (217 foot elevation).

A 1.

Verify the SFPCPS alignment by initiating 11719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM ALIGNMENT.

A2.

Verify CCW system is in service supplying the Train A SFP HX.

A3.

Verify SFP level greater than 23 feet above top of fuel.

A4.

Start SFP Pump.

1-1213-P6-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A53) 2-1213-06-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A91)

A5.

Open SFP Pump a Cooling Loop Demineralizer valve.

1-1213-U6-028 (AB-A53) 2-1213-U6-028 (AB-A91)

A6.

Bypass the SFP Demineralizer:

Open SFP DEMIN BYPASS ISO valve.

1-1213-U6-032 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-032 (AB-A83)

Close SFP DEMIN OUTLET ISO valve.

1-1213-U6-038 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-038 (AB-A83) 28

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 28 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

ATTACHMENT A A. RWST MAKEUP FROM THE SPENT FUEL POOL USING TRAIN A CAUTION Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System should not be aligned to provide makeup to the RWST if Spent Fuel Pool level is less than 23 feet above top of the spent fuel (217 foot elevation).

A 1.

Verify the SFPCPS alignment by initiating 11719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM ALIGNMENT.

A2.

Verify CCW system is in service supplying the Train A SFP HX.

A3.

Verify SFP level greater than 23 feet above top of fuel.

A4.

Start SFP Pump.

1-1213-P6-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A53) 2-1213-06-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A91)

A5.

Open SFP Pump a Cooling Loop Demineralizer valve.

1-1213-U6-028 (AB-A53) 2-1213-U6-028 (AB-A91)

A6.

Bypass the SFP Demineralizer:

Open SFP DEMIN BYPASS ISO valve.

1-1213-U6-032 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-032 (AB-A83)

Close SFP DEMIN OUTLET ISO valve.

1-1213-U6-038 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-038 (AB-A83) 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 29 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

CAUTION SFPCS purification flowrate should be limited, as indicated on FI-0631, to 250 gpm.

UNIT 1 AB-A31 UNIT 2 AB-A67 A7.

Open RWST FILL FROM SFPCPS FILTER OUT valve.

1-1204-U6-003 (AB-A04) 2-1204-U6-003 (AB-A97)

AB.

Throttle open SFPCPS SFP FILTER OUT RTN TO RWST valve, while monitoring FI-0631.

1-1213-U6~049 (AB-A31) 2-1213-U6-049 (AB-A67)

A9.

If necessary to obtain the desired RWST makeup rate, throttle closed SFPCS DEMIN DISCH TO SFP valve.

1-1213-U6-053 (AB-31) 2-1213-U6-053 (AB-A67)

A10.

When SFP level lowers to 23 feet above the top ofthe fuel elements (217' elevation), stop RWST makeup from the SFPCS.

Close SFPCPS SFP FILTER OUT RTN TO RWST valve.

1-1213-U6-049 (AB-A31) 2-1213-U6-049 (AB-A67)

Open SFPCPS DEMIN OUT TO SFP valve.

1-1213-U6-053 (AB-A31) 2-1213-U6-053 (AB-A67)

A 11. Place the SFP Demineralizer in service:

Open SFP DEMIN OUTLET ISO valve.

1-1213-U6-038 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-038 (AB-A83)

Close SFP DEMIN BYPASS ISO valve.

29 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 29 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

CAUTION SFPCS purification flowrate should be limited, as indicated on FI-0631, to 250 gpm.

UNIT 1 AB-A31 UNIT 2 AB-A67 A7.

Open RWST FILL FROM SFPCPS FILTER OUT valve.

1-1204-U6-003 (AB-A04) 2-1204-U6-003 (AB-A97)

AB.

Throttle open SFPCPS SFP FILTER OUT RTN TO RWST valve, while monitoring FI-0631.

1-1213-U6~049 (AB-A31) 2-1213-U6-049 (AB-A67)

A9.

If necessary to obtain the desired RWST makeup rate, throttle closed SFPCS DEMIN DISCH TO SFP valve.

1-1213-U6-053 (AB-31) 2-1213-U6-053 (AB-A67)

A 10.

When SFP level lowers to 23 feet above the top of the fuel elements (217' elevation), stop RWST makeup from the SFPCS.

Close SFPCPS SFP FILTER OUT RTN TO RWST valve.

1-1213-U6-049 (AB-A31) 2-1213-U6-049 (AB-A67)

Open SFPCPS DEMIN OUT TO SFP valve.

1-1213-U6-053 (AB-A31) 2-1213-U6-053 (AB-A67)

A 11. Place the SFP Demineralizer in service:

Open SFP DEMIN OUTLET ISO valve.

1-1213-U6-038 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-038 (AB-A83)

Close SFP DEMIN BYPASS ISO valve.

29

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 30 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

1-1213-U6-032 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-032 (AB-A83)

A 12. Close RWST FILL FROM SFPCPS FILTER OUT valve.

1-1204-U6-003 (AB-A04) 2-1204-U6-003 (AB-A97)

A 13. Stop SFP Pump if desired.

1-1213-P6-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A53) 2-1212-P6-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A91) 30 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 30 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

1-1213-U6-032 (AB-A46) 2-1213-U6-032 (AB-A83)

A 12. Close RWST FILL FROM SFPCPS FILTER OUT valve.

1-1204-U6-003 (AB-A04) 2-1204-U6-003 (AB-A97)

A 13. Stop SFP Pump if desired.

1-1213-P6-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A53) 2-1212-P6-002 (AT DOOR TO AB-A91) 30

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 31 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

9.

Check intact SG levels:

a.

NR level-AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10%

[32% ADVERSE]

b.

Maintain NR level between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%

c.

NR level - ANY RISING IN AN UNCOTROLLED MANNER RNO c. Go to Step 10

10.

Check CST level-GREATER THAN 15%

UO

11.

Initiate RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:

a.

Monitor shutdown margin by initiating 14005, SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND KEFF CALCULATIONS

b.

Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs < 100 F/hr

c.

Dump steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) using steam dumps 31

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 31 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior UO

9.

Check intact SG levels:

a.

NR level-AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10%

[32% ADVERSE]

b.

Maintain NR level between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%

c.

NR level - ANY RISING IN AN UNCOTROLLED MANNER RNO c. Go to Step 10

10.

Check CST level - GREATER THAN 15%

UO

11.

Initiate RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:

a.

Monitor shutdown margin by initiating 14005, SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND KEFF CALCULATIONS

b.

Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs < 100 F/hr

c.

Dump steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) using steam dumps 31

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 32 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC I UO

12.

Check if low steam line pressure SI/SLI should be blocked:

a.

Steam Dumps - Available

b.

PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2000 psig RNO b. WHEN PRZR pressure is less than 2000 psig and the high steam pressure rate alarms are clear, THEN block low steamline pressure SI/SLI by performing step 12d.

Go to Step 13.

c.

High steam pressure rate alarms - CLEAR

d.

Block low steam line pressure SI/SLI using the following:

HS-40068

HS-40069 OATC

13.

Check if ECCS is in service:

CCPs - ANY RUNNING

-OR-BIT NOT ISOLATED

-OR-RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING IN JECTION MODE 32

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 32 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC/UO

12.

Check if low steam line pressure SI/SLI should be blocked:

a.

Steam Dumps - Available

b.

PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2000 psig RNO b. WHEN PRZR pressure is less than 2000 psig and the high steam pressure rate alarms are clear, THEN block low steam line pressure SI/SLI by performing step 12d.

Go to Step 13.

c.

High steam pressure rate alarms - CLEAR

d.

Block low steam line pressure SI/SLI using the following:

HS-40068

HS-40069 OATC

13.

Check if ECCS is in service:

CCPs - ANY RUNNING

-OR-BIT NOT ISOLATED

-OR-RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING IN JECTION MODE 32

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 33 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

14.

Establish one train of ECCS flow:

CRITICAL

a.

CCP - ONY ONE RUNNING RNO a. Start or stop a CCP to establish only one Pump running

b.

SI Pump - ONY ONE RUNNING RNO b. Start or stop an SI Pump to establish only one Pump running

c.

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 300 PSIG RNO c. Stop RHR Pumps Go to Step 15.

d.

RHR Pump - ONL Y ONE RUNNING RNO d. Start or stop an RHR Pump to establish only one Pump running.

NOTE: CREW MA Y ELECT TO SHUT DOWN TRAIN A PUMPS DUE TO DG-1A NOT BEING AVAILABLE.

OATC

15.

Check no backflow from RWST to Containment Emergency Sumps:

a.

CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-A SUCTION - CLOSED:

HV-8811A

b.

CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-B SUCTION - CLOSED:

HV-8811 B 33 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 33 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

14.

Establish one train of ECCS flow:

CRITICAL

a.

CCP - ONY ONE RUNNING RNO a. Start or stop a CCP to establish only one Pump running

b.

SI Pump - ONY ONE RUNNING RNO b. Start or stop an SI Pump to establish only one Pump running

c.

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 300 PSIG RNO c. Stop RHR Pumps Go to Step 15.

d.

RHR Pump - ONL Y ONE RUNNING RNO d. Start or stop an RHR Pump to establish only one Pump running.

NOTE: CREW MA Y ELECT TO SHUT DOWN TRAIN A PUMPS DUE TO DG-1A NOT BEING AVAILABLE.

OATC

15.

Check no backflow from RWST to Containment Emergency Sumps:

a.

CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-A SUCTION - CLOSED:

HV-8811A

b.

CNMT SUMP TO RHR PMP-B SUCTION - CLOSED:

HV-8811 B 33

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 34 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

16.

Check if an RCP should be started

a.

All RCPs - STOPPED RNO a. Stop all but RCP 4 or RCP 1 Close Spray Valve for the idle RCP:

RCP1: PIC-455C RCP4: PIC-455B

b.

RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit TCs - GREATER THAN 24 F [38 F ADVERSE]

c.

Start RCP 4 or RCP1 or other RCP(s) as necessary to provide Normal Spray using ATTACHMENT D.

d.

Close Spray Valve for idle RCP:

RCP 1: PIC-455C RCP 4: PIC-455B 34

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 34 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

16.

Check if an RCP should be started

a.

All RCPs - STOPPED RNO a. Stop all but RCP 4 or RCP 1 Close Spray Valve for the idle RCP:

RCP1: PIC-455C RCP4: PIC-455B

b.

RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit TCs - GREATER THAN 24 F [38 F ADVERSE]

c.

Start RCP 4 or RCP1 or other RCP(s) as necessary to provide Normal Spray using ATTACHMENT D.

d.

Close Spray Valve for idle RCP:

RCP 1: PIC-455C RCP 4: PIC-455B 34

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 35 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

ATTACHMENT D STARTING A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP CAUTIONS This attachment is not to be used if the RCP seal number one temperature is greater than or equal to 220 F.

If RCP seal injection and ACCW cooling to an RCP thermal barrier has previously been lost, the affected RCP(s) should not be started prior to a status evaluation.

1.

Establish Initial Conditions:

o 13.8kV power available to RCP.

o Seal dP greater than or equal to 200 psid.

o Seal injection flow 8 gpm to 13 gpm.

o Sealleakoff flow within FIGURE 2.

2.

Check the following alarms clear or establish conditions to clear those alarms for the RCP to be started:

o RCP LOWER OIL RSVR HIILO LEVEL o

RCP UPPER OIL RSVR HIILO LEVEL o

VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET TEMP HI o

VCT HIILO PRESS o

RCP STNDPIPE LO LEVEL o

RCP STNDPIPE HI LEVEL 35 Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 35 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

ATTACHMENT D STARTING A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP CAUTIONS This attachment is not to be used if the RCP seal number one temperature is greater than or equal to 220 F.

If RCP seal injection and ACCW cooling to an RCP thermal barrier has previously been lost, the affected RCP(s) should not be started prior to a status evaluation.

1.

Establish Initial Conditions:

o 13.8kV power available to RCP.

o Seal dP greater than or equal to 200 psid.

o Seal injection flow 8 gpm to 13 gpm.

o Sealleakoff flow within FIGURE 2.

2.

Check the following alarms clear or establish conditions to clear those alarms for the RCP to be started:

o RCP LOWER OIL RSVR HIILO LEVEL o

RCP UPPER OIL RSVR HIILO LEVEL o

VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET TEMP HI o

VCT HIILO PRESS o

RCP STNDPIPE LO LEVEL o

RCP STNDPIPE HI LEVEL 35

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 36 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

o RCP MTR OVERLOAD o

RCP NO 2 SEAL LKOFF HI FLOW o

ACCW RCP CLR OUTLET HI TEMP o

ACCW RCP CLR LO FLOW o

ACCW RCP THRM BARRIER HX HI FLOW*

o ACCW RCP THRM BARRIER HI PRESS

3.

Verify all RCP ACCW thermal barrier isolation valves open:

o Supply:

o HV-1978 ACCW SPLY HDR IRC ISO VLV o

HV-1979 ACCW SPL Y HDR ORC ISO VLV o

Return:

o HV-1974 ACCW RTN HDR IRC ISO VLV o

HV-1975 ACCW RTN HDR ORC ISO VLV o

HV-19051 ACCW RCP-1 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-19053 ACCW RCP-2 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-19055 ACCW RCP-3 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-19057 ACCW RCP-4 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-2041 ACCW RCPS THERM BARRIER RTN VLV

4.

Start the associated RCP Oil Lift Pump.

CAUTIONS Two hot starts of an RCP are allowed if the pump coasts to a stop between starts (approximately 2 minutes).

Subsequent hot starts are allowed if the pump has been running for 20 minutes or idle for 45 minutes.

5.

After two minutes of Oil Lift Pump operation, start the RCP.

36

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 36 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

o RCP MTR OVERLOAD o

RCP NO 2 SEAL LKOFF HI FLOW o

ACCW RCP CLR OUTLET HI TEMP o

ACCW RCP CLR LO FLOW o

ACCW RCP THRM BARRIER HX HI FLOW o

ACCW RCP THRM BARRIER HI PRESS

3.

Verify all RCP ACCW thermal barrier isolation valves open:

o Supply:

o HV-1978 ACCW SPLY HDR IRC ISO VLV o

HV-1979 ACCW SPL Y HDR ORC ISO VLV o

Return:

o HV-1974 ACCW RTN HDR IRC ISO VLV o

HV-1975 ACCW RTN HDR ORC ISO VLV o

HV-19051 ACCW RCP-1 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-19053 ACCW RCP-2 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-19055 ACCW RCP-3 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-19057 ACCW RCP-4 THERMAL BARRIER RTN VLV o

HV-2041 ACCW RCPS THERM BARRIER RTN VLV

4.

Start the associated RCP Oil Lift Pump.

CAUTIONS Two hot starts of an RCP are allowed if the pump coasts to a stop between starts (approximately 2 minutes).

Subsequent hot starts are allowed if the pump has been running for 20 minutes or idle for 45 minutes.

5.

After two minutes of Oil Lift Pump operation, start the RCP.

36

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 37 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

6.

After approximately one minute, check the following alarms clear:

o RCP LOW FLOW ALERT o

RCP SHAFT VIBRATION ALERT o

RCP FRAME VIBRATION ALERT o

Those alarms in Step 2.

7.

After one minute of RCP operation, stop the Oil Lift Pump.

37 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 37 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

6.

After approximately one minute, check the following alarms clear:

o RCP LOW FLOW ALERT o

RCP SHAFT VIBRATION ALERT o

RCP FRAME VIBRATION ALERT o

Those alarms in Step 2.

7.

After one minute of RCP operation, stop the Oil Lift Pump.

37

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 38 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

o z

NOTE 2

~

6 NO.1 SEAL NORMAL OPERATING RANGE 200 500 1,000 NORMAL OPERATING RANGE 1,500 2,000 I 2,500 2,250 No.1 Seal Differential Pressure (PSI)

NOTE 3

1.

If the No.1 seal leak rates are outside the normal (1.0 to 5.0 gpm) but within the operating limits (0.8 to 5.5 gpm), continue pump operation. Verify that seal injection flow exceeds No.1 seal leak rate for the affected RCP. Closely monitor pump and seal parameters and contact Engineering for further instructions.

2.

Minimum startup requirements are 0.2 gpm at 200 PSID differential across the No.1 seal. For startups at differential pressures greater than 200 PSID, the minimum No.1 seal leak rate requirements are defined in the NO.1 SEAL NORMAL OPERATING RANGE (e.g., at 1000 psi differential pressure, do not start the RCP with less than 0.5 gpm).

3.

No.1 Seal Differential Press = RCS WR Press - VCT Press.

38

(

t.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 38 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

o z

NOTE 2 6

NO.1 SEAL NORMAL OPERATING RANGE 200 500 1,000 NORMAL OPERATING RANGE 1,500 2,000 I 2,500 2,250 No.1 Seal Differential Pressure (PSI)

NOTE 3

1.

If the No.1 seal leak rates are outside the normal (1.0 to 5.0 gpm) but within the operating limits (0.8 to 5.5 gpm), continue pump operation. Verify that seal injection flow exceeds No.1 seal leak rate for the affected RCP. Closely monitor pump and seal parameters and contact Engineering for further instructions.

2.

Minimum startup requirements are 0.2 gpm at 200 PSID differential across the No.1 seal. For startups at differential pressures greater than 200 PSID, the minimum No.1 seal leak rate requirements are defined in the NO.1 SEAL NORMAL OPERATING RANGE (e.g., at 1000 psi differential pressure, do not start the RCP with less than 0.5 gpm).

3.

No.1 Seal Differential Press = RCS WR Press - VCT Press.

38

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 39 of 43 Event No.:

5*9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

17.

Check if ECCS can be terminated:

a.

Applicable RVLlS indication:

RCP(s) running Required Indication 0

Full Range greater than 62%

1 Dynam ic Range greater than 25%

2 Dynamic Range greater than 34%

3 Dynamic Range greater than 50%

4 Dynam ic Range greater than 72%

RNO a. Go to Step 23

b.

RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit TCs - GREATER THAN 74 F [88 F ADVERSE]

RNO b. Establish minimum ECCS flow to remove decay heat by performing the following:

1)

Determine minimum ECCS flow required using the following:

TABLE 1 or FIGURE 1

2)

Throttle ECCS flow to minimum value.

3)

Go to Step 23.

39 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 39 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

17.

Check if ECCS can be terminated:

a.

Applicable RVLlS indication:

RCP(s) running Required Indication 0

Full Range greater than 62%

1 Dynamic Range greater than 25%

2 Dynamic Range greater than 34%

3 Dynamic Range greater than 50%

4 Dynamic Range greater than 72%

RNO a. Go to Step 23

b.

RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit TCs - GREATER THAN 74 F [88 F ADVERSE]

RNO b. Establish minimum ECCS flow to remove decay heat by performing the following:

1 )

Determine minimum ECCS flow required using the following:

TABLE 1 or FIGURE 1

2)

Throttle ECCS flow to minimum value.

3)

Go to Step 23.

39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 40 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

TABLE 1 MINIMUM ECCS FLOW VERSUS TIME Time Since ECCS Reactor Trip Flow Rate (Minutes)

(GPM) 10 615 15 555 20 515 30 471 40 435 50 399 60 381 70 363 80 344 90 337 100 326 150 294 200 268 300 232 400 214 500 205 600 196 800 181 1000 170 2000 141 3000 127 4000 116 5000 109 10000 91 40

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 40 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

TABLE 1 MINIMUM ECCS FLOW VERSUS TIME Time Since ECCS Reactor Trip Flow Rate (Minutes)

(GPM) 10 615 15 555 20 515 30 471 40 435 50 399 60 381 70 363 80 344 90 337 100 326 150 294 200 268 300 232 400 214 500 205 600 196 800 181 1000 170 2000 141 3000 127 4000 116 5000 109 10000 91 40

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 41 of 43 Event No.:

5*9 Event

Description:

The RGS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOGA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATG will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOGA and a failure of FWI.

FIGURE 1 MINIMUM EGGS FLOW VERSUS TIME 1000 900 800 700

E D-C) 600

~

~ 500

...J lL 1\\

"1\\

U) 400 0

0 w 300 200 I\\.,

1\\,

100 o

1 1 0 1 00 1 000 10000 TIME SINCE REACTOR TRIP {MINUTES}

41 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 41 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

FIGURE 1 MINIMUM ECCS FLOW VERSUS TIME 1000 900 800 700

~

a..

(!)

600 z

3:

500 0

....I LL 1\\

"1\\

en 400 u

u w

300 200

~

l\\~

100 0

I I

1 10 100 1000 10000 TIME SINCE REACTOR TRIP (MINUTES) 41

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 42 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS / OATC

23.

Check adequate CHARGING/ECCS flow:

a.

Applicable RVLlS indication:

RCP(s) running Required Indication 0

Full Range greater than 62%

1 Dynamic Range greater than 25%

2 Dynamic Range greater than 34%

3 Dynamic Range greater than 50%

4 Dynamic Range greater than 72%

RNO a. Raise charging/ECCS flow to maintain RVLlS indication as necessary

b.

Core Exit TC's - Stable or lowering RNO b. Raise charging/ECCS flow to maintain TCs stable or lowering 42

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 42 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior SS / OATC

23.

Check adequate CHARGING/ECCS flow:

a.

Applicable RVLlS indication:

RCP(s) running Required Indication 0

Full Range greater than 62%

1 Dynamic Range greater than 25%

2 Dynamic Range greater than 34%

3 Dynamic Range greater than 50%

4 Dynamic Range greater than 72%

RNO a. Raise charging/ECCS flow to maintain RVLlS indication as necessary

b.

Core Exit TC's - Stable or lowering RNO b. Raise charging/ECCS flow to maintain TCs stable or lowering 42

(

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES*D*2 Op*Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 43 of 43 Event No.:

5*9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

24.

Depressurize RCS to reduce RCS subcooling:

a.

Check RCS Subcooling greater than 34 F

[48 F ADVERSE]

RNO a. Go to Step 25.

b.

Use Normal Spray.

RNO b. If Normal Spray is NOT available, THEN depressurize RCS using one PORV.

IF PRZR PORVs NOT available, THEN use Auxiliary Spray

c.

Check if either of the following conditions satisfied:

RCS Subcooling - BETWEEN 24 F [38 F ADVERSE]

AND 34 F [48 F ADVERSE]

-OR-PRZR level-GREATER THAN 75% [52% ADVERSE]

RNO c. If RCS Subcooling less than 24 F [38 F ADVERSE],

THEN operate ECCS Pumps as necessary to restore Subcooling.

d.

Stop RCS depressurization END OF SCENARIO 43 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 43 of 43 Event No.:

5 - 9 Event

Description:

The RCS leakage into the PRT will increase above the capacity of the RHR suction relief, resulting in failure of the RHR suction piping. This will result in a LOCA outside containment. Leakage to the PRT will stop at this point. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level. The crew will actuate SI and enter the EOPs. Additional failures include a trip of the RHR in the room with the LOCA and a failure of FWI.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior OATC

24.

Depressurize RCS to reduce RCS subcooling:

a.

Check RCS Subcooling greater than 34 F

[48 F ADVERSE]

RNO a. Go to Step 25.

b.

Use Normal Spray.

RNO b. If Normal Spray is NOT available, THEN depressurize RCS using one PORV.

IF PRZR PORVs NOT available, THEN use Auxiliary Spray

c.

Check if either of the following conditions satisfied:

RCS Subcooling - BETWEEN 24 F [38 F ADVERSE]

AND 34 F [48 F ADVERSE]

-OR-PRZR level-GREATER THAN 75% [52% ADVERSE]

RNO c. If RCS Subcooling less than 24 F [38 F ADVERSE],

THEN operate ECCS Pumps as necessary to restore Subcooling.

d.

Stop RCS depressurization END OF SCENARIO 43

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Perform swap of AFW to Main Feed water. AFW flow will be swapped to the BFRV # 4 in accordance with UOP-12004 step 4.1.8.

Verifiable Action:

UO Swaps from AFW to BFRV # 4 while controlling SG level.

OATC Maintains reactor power stable during BFRV swap by manipulation of control rods or boration.

Event 2:

Perform power ramp from 3.5% to greater than 5% (Mode 1 entry). Crew will perform steps of UOP-12004 section for Power Ascent.

Verifiable Actions:

OA TC - Power increase. Operate control rods and the CVCS boration controls while the UO

- Initiates actions to prepare for Turbine startup.

Event 3:

Controlling PRZR level channel L T -459 will fail high resulting in an automatic reduction of charging flow via FV-0121. This will require entry into AOP-18001-C, section D for Failure of PRZR level instrumentation.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Takes manual control of charging flow control valve FV-0121 to restore charging flow to normal or isolate letdown. Selects an unaffected channel for control and restores letdown if initially isolated.

Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 - Reactor Trip - Function 9 - Condition M - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.3.3 - PAMS - Function 6 - INFO only 3.3.4 - Remote SID - Function 8 - Condition B - restore within 30 days Event 4:

Controlling Steam Generator # 3 Level Transmitter will fail low causing the BFRV to fully open requiring the BOP to take manual control. This will require entry into AOP-18001, section E for failure of Steam Generator Level Instrumentation.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Performs lOA to take manual control of MFRV # 3 to control SG # 3 level.

Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 - Reactor Trip - Function 13 - Condition E - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.3.2 - ESFAS:

Function 5c - P14 - Condition I - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Function 6c - AFW - Condition D - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.3.3 - PAMS - Function 5 - INFO Only Scenario 3 Page 2 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Perform swap of AFW to Main Feed water. AFW flow will be swapped to the BFRV # 4 in accordance with UOP-12004 step 4.1.8.

Verifiable Action:

UO Swaps from AFW to BFRV # 4 while controlling SG level.

OATC Maintains reactor power stable during BFRV swap by manipulation of control rods or boration.

Event 2:

Perform power ramp from 3.5% to greater than 5% (Mode 1 entry). Crew will perform steps of UOP-12004 section for Power Ascent.

Verifiable Actions:

OA TC - Power increase. Operate control rods and the CVCS boration controls while the UO

- Initiates actions to prepare for Turbine startup.

Event 3:

Controlling PRZR level channel L T -459 will fail high resulting in an automatic reduction of charging flow via FV-0121. This will require entry into AOP-18001-C, section D for Failure of PRZR level instrumentation.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC - Takes manual control of charging flow control valve FV-0121 to restore charging flow to normal or isolate letdown. Selects an unaffected channel for control and restores letdown if initially isolated.

Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 - Reactor Trip - Function 9 - Condition M - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.3.3 - PAMS - Function 6 - INFO only 3.3.4 - Remote SID - Function 8 - Condition B - restore within 30 days Event 4:

Controlling Steam Generator # 3 Level Transmitter will fail low causing the BFRV to fully open requiring the BOP to take manual control. This will require entry into AOP-18001, section E for failure of Steam Generator Level Instrumentation.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Performs lOA to take manual control of MFRV # 3 to control SG # 3 level.

Technical Specifications:

3.3.1 - Reactor Trip - Function 13 - Condition E - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.3.2 - ESFAS:

Function 5c - P14 - Condition I - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Function 6c - AFW - Condition D - trip bistables within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.3.3 - PAMS - Function 5 - INFO Only Scenario 3 Page 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:

CCW train A discharge header will fail requiring entry into AOP-18020 for Loss of CCW.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Place Train A CCW Pumps in PTL, Close demin water makeup valve, Start up train 8 CCW.

Technical Specifications:

3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) - Condition A - restore within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.4.6 RCS Loops Mode 4 - INFO only Event 6:

Loss of 120V AC 1 E Vital 8us 1 8Y1 8 will occur. This will result in an A TWT condition due to N 135 loss and 2/4 coincidence made up on SG Lo-Lo Level bistables. The OATC will manually trip the reactor and the crew will enter E-O and transition to ES-O.1 to stabilize the plant.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Performs manual reactor trip when ATWT condition recognized.

Event 7:

Shortly after the reactor trip, PRZR code safety valve will slowly fail open over several minutes resulting in a LOCA to the PRT. The crew will have to manually actuate SI Train "A" and manually align SI Train "8" components due to the loss of 1 8Y1 B.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manual SI actuation due to RCS pressure lowering uncontrolled. Perform manual alignment of Train "8" ECCS 1 SI components.

UO Performs manual start of DG "8". Performs manual alignment of Train "8" CIA 1 CVI valves and dampers.

OATC Performs Attachment 8 to manually align ECCS valves.

END OF SCENARIO Critical Tasks:

1. Manual reactor trip (manua"y trips reactor prior to pulling AOP-18032 or E-O)

2. Manual Safety Injection actuation.

(manua"y actuates SI prior to or shortly after receipt of PRZR Low Pressure SI annunciator or when it is determined that PRZR level and pressure cannot be maintained)

3. Trips RCPs when RCS pressure lowers to < 1375 pSig (trips RCPS no later than step 10 of E-O)

4. Manua"y starts SIP "B" (manua"y starts SIP "B" no later than OATC initial action step for checking SIPs running)

Scenario 3 Page 3 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:

CCW train A discharge header will fail requiring entry into AOP-18020 for Loss of CCW.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Place Train A CCW Pumps in PTL, Close demin water makeup valve, Start up train 8 CCW.

Technical Specifications:

3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) - Condition A - restore within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3.4.6 RCS Loops Mode 4 - INFO only Event 6:

Loss of 120V AC 1 E Vital 8us 1 8Y1 8 will occur. This will result in an A TWT condition due to N 135 loss and 2/4 coincidence made up on SG Lo-Lo Level bistables. The OATC will manually trip the reactor and the crew will enter E-O and transition to ES-O.1 to stabilize the plant.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Performs manual reactor trip when ATWT condition recognized.

Event 7:

Shortly after the reactor trip, PRZR code safety valve will slowly fail open over several minutes resulting in a LOCA to the PRT. The crew will have to manually actuate SI Train "A" and manually align SI Train "8" components due to the loss of 1 8Y1 B.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manual SI actuation due to RCS pressure lowering uncontrolled. Perform manual alignment of Train "8" ECCS 1 SI components.

UO Performs manual start of DG "8". Performs manual alignment of Train "8" CIA 1 CVI valves and dampers.

OATC Performs Attachment 8 to manually align ECCS valves.

END OF SCENARIO Critical Tasks:

1. Manual reactor trip (manua"y trips reactor prior to pulling AOP-18032 or E-O)

2. Manual Safety Injection actuation.

(manua"y actuates SI prior to or shortly after receipt of PRZR Low Pressure SI annunciator or when it is determined that PRZR level and pressure cannot be maintained)

3. Trips RCPs when RCS pressure lowers to < 1375 pSig (trips RCPS no later than step 10 of E-O)

4. Manua"y starts SIP "B" (manua"y starts SIP "B" no later than OATC initial action step for checking SIPs running)

Scenario 3 Page 3

Appendix 0 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Event No.: 1 Required Operator Actions Scenario No.: 3 (low power)

Form ES-D-2 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

The UO will swap feed flow for SG # 4 from Auxiliary Feed Water to the Main Feed Water System using the Bypass Feed Regulating Valve. UO will shutdown and place the AFW System in its normal standby alignment.

Time Position Applicant's Action or Behavior Transfers from Auxiliary Feed Water to Bypass Feed Water, by UO performing the following:

4.1.B.a - Verifies MFPT Delta P maintained between 100 - 150 psid.

4.1.B.b - Stabilizes SG NR level between 60% and 70% and note total feed flow.

4.1.B.c - Slowly open the BFRV # 4 and verify slight increase in feed water flow.

4.1.B.d - Close the Auxiliary Feed Water Supply valve to SG # 4, HV-5137 4.1.B.e - Adjust the BFRV # 4 to re-establish total feed flow as noted in previous step b.

4.1.B.f - Stabilize SG level and place the BFRV # 4 in automatic.

4.1.B.g - Not applicable 4.1.B.h - Exits LCO 3.3.2, AFW Actuation from trip of MFPTs UO 4.1.B.i - Stops MD AFW pumps and places in standby per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater, section 4.3.1.1 4.3.1.1.1.a - Partially opens MDAFW pump throttle valves 4.3.1.1.1.b - Stops MDAFW pumps A 4.3.1.1.2.a - Partially opens MDAFW pump throttle valves 4.3.1.1.2.b - Stops MDAFW pumps B 4.3.1.1.2 - Aligns system per Checklist 2,Section I & II for MDAFW pumps Fully Opens MDAFW discharge throttle valves Local operator checks LOR, manual miniflow valve positions, discharge piping NOT hot to touch.

Aligns system per Checklist 2,Section III for TDAFW pump HV-5106 Steam supply shut, HV-3009 & 3019 steam supply valves open TDAFW discharge valves all open PDIC-51BO in AUTO set for 100% demand Local operator checks T & T valve reset, no alarms, discharge piping NOT hot to touch UO verifies T & T valve open by red light indication (HS-15111)

UO verifies AFW pump house dampers shut at QHVC panel, HV-12010 and HV12010A 1

Appendix 0 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Event No.: 1 Required Operator Actions Scenario No.: 3 (low power)

Form ES-D-2 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

The UO will swap feed flow for SG # 4 from Auxiliary Feed Water to the Main Feed Water System using the Bypass Feed Regulating Valve. UO will shutdown and place the AFW System in its normal standby alignment.

Time Position A~plicant's Action or Behavior Transfers from Auxiliary Feed Water to Bypass Feed Water, by UO performing the following: