Text

Initial Exam 2009-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML092850008
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	10/10/2009
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
References
	50-395/09-301
	Download: ML092850008 (168)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VCSUMMER Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2009 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-11, 75% Power, MOL

RB Spray Pump "B" is tagged out for cleaning and maintenance of the breaker cubicle. 64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months remain on TS 3.6.2.1.

Radiation Monitor RM-A2, Reactor Building Particulate Monitor failed to ZERO 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Planning & Scheduling is preparing a work package. The Action Statement for TS 3.4.6.1.a is in effect.

The National Weather Service has issued a severe weather alert due to a line of heavy thunderstorms moving into the area.

Turnover:

Start Condensate Pump "cn and shutdown Condensate Pump "A" then raise power to 100% in accordance with requirements for conditioned fuel. GOP-4A, Step 3.16.e is in effect.

Critical Task:

Energize ESF Bus 1DB prior to performing EOP-6.0, Step 6.

Start the TDEFW Pump before WR level in any two SGs is less than 15%.

Open MVG-8801 B before reporting the completion of EOP-1.0, Attachment 3.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 N/A N -BOP, Shift operating Condensate Pumps.

CRS R-RO Raise power.

2 CVC010B I-RO VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO.

3 FWM012 C-BOP Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller fails HI.

4 ANN DG014 TS-CRS Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm.

5 XMTFW0170 I-BOP MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails HI.

6 PRS001B I-RO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-445 Fails HI.

TS-CRS 7 EPS001 M-Crew Loss of Off-site Power.

8 EPS006B C-Crew DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 implementation).

9 FWM003B C-BOP MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip.

MSS0017A TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically.

10 RCS006A M-Crew 600 gpm SBLOCA after Bus 1DB Recovery.

11 VLVSI004P C-RO/BOP MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) fails to OPEN.

Terminate when cooldown is initiated in EOP-2.1.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 VC Summer NRC Scenario #1 The crew will assume the watch having pre-briefed on the Initial Conditions, the plan for this shift and the related operating procedures: (1) shift operating Condensate Pumps; (2) resume the power escalation.

The BOP will shift from Condensate Pumps "An and "Bn in operation to Condensate Pumps "B" and "C" in operation in accordance with SOP-20B, CONDENSATE SYSTEM. After the Condensate Pumps are shifted, the crew will commence a power escalation to 100% in accordance with GOP-4A, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 - ASCENDING). The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2, VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO, when the evaluating team is satisfied with the power change.

The RO will respond to the VCT Level Channel failure in accordance with the Alarm Response Procedure (ARP). The AUTO Makeup should be terminated by placing the mode selector switch in MANUAL. The crew should determine that any subsequent makeup will have to be done in MANUAL. The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 3, Condensate Flow to Deaerator Flow Controller fails HI, when desired.

The BOP will initially respond to the Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow Controller failure in accordance with the ARP for low hotwell level. The ARP does not lead the crew directly to the problem therefore the crew must diagnose the problem considering factors affecting hotwell inventory. Once diagnosed, the BOP should take MANUAL control of 1FK-3136, CONDENSATE FLOW TO DEAERATOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE, and restore conditions to normal. While it is unlikely, failure to act in a timely manner will result in a Condensate Pump trip on HI-HI DA Tank level and implementation of AOP-20B.1, CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP.

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 4, Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm, when desired.

The BOP will respond to the DG "An alarm in accordance with the ARP. The dispatched field operator will report local lubricating oil temperature below the value which requires the DG to be declared inoperable. The CRS should declare the DG inoperable and enter TS 3.B.1.1. The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5, MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-50B Fails LO, after the DG TS declaration. DG "A" will fail to start in AUTO and MANUAL when the loss of off-site power occurs.

The BOP will respond to the failed MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter in accordance with multiple SG level deviation alarms or an observed change in feedwater flow. The crew should enter AOP-21 0.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION, place the Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL in MANUAL and restore the proper DIP relationship. The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6, PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-445 Fails HI, when SG levels and feedwater flow are restored to normal.

Pressurizer pressure alarms or observation of lowering RCS pressure will alert the RO to PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-445 Fails HI. The RO should rapidly diagnose the problem and perform the immediate actions of AOP-401.5, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL FAILURE, closing any open PZR PORV and then taking control of PZR Spray. The CRS should enter TS 3.4.4 for inoperable PZR PORV(s) and enter and exit TS 3.2.5 (DNB) for PZR Pressure.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, a loss of off-site power will occur; resulting in an automatic reactor trip. DG "A" will not start in AUTO or MANUAL. DG "Bn will fail to automatically start but Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 can be started in MANUAL. The TO Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump will fail to AUTO start.

The crew will perform the immediate actions of EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, and may transition to EOP-6.0, LOSS OF ALL ESF AC POWER. However, they may avoid entry into EOP-6.0 by manually starting DG "8" in accordance with management expectations regarding compensatory actions for AUTO failures. For the same reason, they may also initiate a MANUAL start of the Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump before a procedural step is reached. After the crew transitions to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP, a progressive small break LOCA will initiate. The crew will perform EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP, for a short period of time but will return to EOP-1.0 when a MANUAL or AUTO SI occurs. If the crew pursues to investigate the failure of DG "An then manual start capability will be restored when Attachment 3 - SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION has been reported as completed. The crew should start DG "An, verify loading, and will eventually transition to EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT. They will perform EOP-2.0 to the transition to EOP-2.1, POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, to initiate a plant cooldown.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when the cooldown is underway.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 VCS08 NRC Scenario 1 Simulator Setup INITIAL CONDITIONS

IC-11, 75% Power.

Tag on RS Spray Pump "S"

Tag(on) on RM-A2 particulate

Reactivity Management PlanlTurnover Sheet for IC.

Provide a copy of SOP-208, Section S, for shifting Condensate Pumps

Provide copy of GOP-004A, marked up through Step 3.15.d.2), STP102.002 - Power Range Heat Salance.

Crew should pre-brief on procedures, the steps in effect and turnover so that they are prepared to commence actions when the watch is assumed.

PRE-LOAD

OVR-SP008A RS Spray Pump US" cleared and tagged

OVR-SP008F RS Spray Pump US" cleared and tagged

MAL-RMS001 D {SET To 0}RM-A2 particulate failed

MAL-EPS006A DG 'A' Failure {SET To FAIL}

MAL-EPS006S DG 's' Failure {SET To NO AUTO START}

MAL-MSS0017A: TDEFW Pump AUTO start failure

FWM003S: MDEFW Pump S breaker trip coincident with AUTO start. {Pre-loaded with Trigger-29}

VLV-SI004P: MVG-8801 S SI HI HEAD INJ FAIL POSITION {SET To O} MVG-8001 S fails to automatically OPEN on AUTO SI actuation TRIGGERS

Trigger 2 CVC010S: VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO

Trigger 3 FWM012: Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow Controller fails to 100%

Trigger 4 ANN DG014: Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature ....Alarm

Trigger 5 XMTFW0170: MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO

Trigger 6 PRS001 S: PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-445 Fails HI

Trigger 7 EPS001: Loss of Off-site Power

Trigger 10 RCS006A: SSLOCA - 600 GPM

Trigger 29 EFW Pump'S' Trips 30 seconds after Auto Start

Trigger 30 Delete Malfunction on MVG 8801 S {allows opening of MVG-8801 S when handswitch taken to open}

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

--1 Scenario # 1 Event #

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Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Page 5 of 43

-=~

~~

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When/if contacted, report "C" Condensate Pump ready for start. When/if contacted post-start, report that conditions are normal.

Indications Available: N/A Evaluator's Note: The crew assumes the watch with power at 75% and an escalation on hold to facilitate a swap from Condensate Pump "C" to Condensate Pump "B". After the Condensate Pumps are swapped the crew wi,1I begin raising power to 100%.

BOP Enters SOP-208, CONDENSATE SYSTEM,Section III.B.

BOP Determines INITIAL CONDITIONS (Section 1.0) are met.

Evaluator's Note: Expected alarms when pump is started:

XCP-6271-3, FW HTR 5,6 LVL HI HI

XCP-625-1-4 (2-4, 3-4), FWP A (B, C) SL WTR TEMP HI

The BOP should make an announcement prior to the start of the pump Ensure the discharge valve for the pump to be started is BOP closed:

XVB-614C, C DISCH ISOL.

BOP Start one of the following: (PEER,f)

XPP-0042C, CO PUMP C.

BOP Open the associated pump discharge valve: (PEER ")

XVB-614C, C DISCH ISOL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: - . .;;......-

Scenario # 1 Event # Page 6 of 43

-- - ~--------

~------- -=~

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Event

Description:

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Enters SOP-208, CONDENSATE SYSTEM,Section III.C.

BOP Verifies INITIAL CONDITIONS are met (two pumps running)

BOP Stop one of the following:

XPP-0042A, COP PUMP A.

BOP Verify the associated pump discharge valve closes:

XVB-614A, A DISCH ISOL.

BOP Reports completion of the Condensate Pump swap.

Evaluator's Note: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2 (VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO) with the power change in progress but should wait until the evaluators are satisfied with control of the evolution since the crew may terminate the power change when an alarm actuates.

Evaluator'S Note: The crew may start a dilution before commencing the power change. Alternate Dilute steps are not in GOP-004A but are included for evaluator use.

Returns to GOP-4A, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 -

CRS ASCENDING).

BOP Select 1/2 on LOAD RATE LMT-% PER MIN.

Slowly raise LOAD SET to attain 80% Reactor Power while BOP continuing with this procedure.

At 80% Reactor Power, align Control Valve drain valves as BOP follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

-- Scenario # 1 Event # 1 ____

_1~

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Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power Page 7 of _4;.;;,.3---1 43

-~

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Ensure PVG-2898B, DV-4, is open as follows:

Verify Control Valve #4 is closed.

Verify PVG-2898B, DV-4, is open.

If both PVG-2898B, DV-4, and Control Valve #4 are closed, open PVG-2898B, DV-4, by opening MVG-2898D, STM LEAD DRN FOR CV-1.

Open MVG-2897, COMB CNTRL VLV BSD.

When Control Valve #4 indicates greater than 5% open, BOP perform the following:

Ensure PVG-2898B, DV-4, is CLOSED.

Ensure PVG-2898B, DV-4, is CLOSED.

AL TERNATE DILUTE STEPS (SOP-106, Section E)

Procedure Note:

Energizing additional Pressurizer Heaters will enhance mixing.

LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will begin to modulate to the HU-TK position at 70% level on LI-115, VCT LEVEL %.

RO Verify at least one Reactor Coolant Pump is running.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AL T DIL.

(Peer -V)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to desired flow RO rate.

RO Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator to desired

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

--:....- Scenario # 1 Event # __

Shift Operating Condensate Pumps; Raise Power

__ _ Page 8 of _4;.;,.3--1

_4.....

3--1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior volume. (Peer ") >/)

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

RO Verify desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

Verify dilution stops when preset volume is reached on RO FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator.

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AUTO.

RO (Peer >I)

RO Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to 7.5 (120 gpm).

RO Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 2, VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO (CVC010B), when desired but not during a dilution operation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

...,;2;;;....-_ _ _ _ Page of _4.;.;;,3---t Op Test No.: .-;....-

Scenario # 1 Event #

2 9 43

~~

Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I Position JI Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger for VCT Level XMTR LT-115 fails LO Indications Available: XCP-613-3-1, VCT LVL HIILO RO Responds to and reports alarm XCP-613-3-1, VCT LVL HIILO CREW Enters ARP-001-XCP-613-3-1 Evaluator's Note: The RO may immediately recognize the failure of LT-115 and place the RX Cool SYS MU Switch to STOP to terminate the unwarranted automatic makeup_

ARP -613-3-1 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Makeup flow in excess of Charging flow.

Makeup system not armed for automatic makeup.

Failure of ILT00115, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITIER.

Failure of ILT00112, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITIER.

RO Reports failure of LT-115.

ARP-613-3-1 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Automatic makeup should start at 20% and stop at 40%.

At 70%, LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will position to begin diverting letdown to the Recycle Holdup Tank.

At 80%, LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will position to full divert.

At 5%, the Charging Pump suction will align to the RWST.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 1 Event # 2 ____

...;2~

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Page 10 of _4;,.;;.3---t 43

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Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Places the RX. COOL SYS MU Switch to STOP.

ARP-613-3-1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify the appropriate automatic action.

Verify VCT level on LI-112A, LEVEL %, if ILT00115, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER, has failed.

Verify VCT level on LI-115, LEVEL %, if ILT00112, VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER, has failed.

RO Determines LT -112A must be used for VCT level indication.

ARP-613-3-1 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS

If auto makeup control is lost, refer to SOP-106.

If necessary, attempt to makeup to the VCT manually per SOP-106.

If makeup flow is high, reduce makeup flow.

If Charging Pump suction swaps to RWST, 2300 ppm boron may be injected into RCS. Reduce load and trip the turbine, if necessary, to establish control.

Acknowledges that use of MANUAL Makeup in accordance RO with SOP-106 may be required.

CRS Contacts Work control and/or I&C for assistance.

Booth Operator Note: If contacted, remove the failed channel from service but do not repair the channel before the scenario is terminated.

Report that it appears that the DIP Cell needs to be replaced

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # .....

2_ _

....;2~ __

_ _____ Page 11 of - 43

_4..;.,;3;""--1

-..;..-- ---f Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel LT-115 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior and a work plan will be required.

I I Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 3, Condensate Flow to Deaerator Flow Controller fails HI, when desired.

I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Scenario # 1 Event # _3;;....-_ _ _ _ Page Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI 12 of _4;.;;.,3--1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-627 1, CNDSR HOTWEll lVl lO XCP-627-1-3, CO PP DISCH HDR PRESS HI/HI HI Responds to alarm XCP-627-2-1, CNDSR HOTWELL LVL LO, BOP or change in indicated Deaerator f1ow/Hotwell level BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-627-2-1 Evaluator's Note: The ARP will NOT lead the crew directly to the problem.

The problem must be diagnosed by looking at Deaerator Tank and Hotwell level. While it is unlikely, failure to act in a timely manner will result in a Condensate Pump trip on HI-HI DA Tank level and implementation of AOP-20S.1, CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP.

ARP-001-XCP-627 1 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Hotweillevel control system malfunction.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify flow from the CST to the Condenser Hotwell as indicated on FR-3009.

BOP Verifies flow on FR-3009.

ARP-001-XCP-627 1 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Dispatch an operator to verify proper operation of the

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ...;...-

Scenario # 1 Event # ...,;3;;...._ _ _ _ Page 13 of _4;.;,,3--1 Event

Description:

Condensate Flow to Dearator Flow controller Fails HI Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior hotwelilevel control system.

Open XVT00655-CO, COND A HOTWELL EMER MU CO NT VLV BYPASS (TB-412), to bypass ILV03011-CO, COND A HOTWELL EMER MAKE-UP CO NT VLV (TB-412), to regain normal hotwell level.

Check operation of ILV03000-CO, COND REJECT TO COND STG TK CONTROL VLV (TB-412).

CREW Dispatches AO to investigate problem/check valve lineup.

Booth Operator Note: If dispatched, wait 3 minutes then report that the hotwell level control system appears to be operating properly but level is not recovering. ILV03011-CO, COND A HOTWELL EMER MAKE-UP CO NT VLV, is OPEN and ILV03000-CO, COND REJECT TO COND STG TK CONTROL VLV, is SHUT.

Reports IFK-3136, CONDENSATE FLOW TO DEAERATOR BOP FLOW CONTROL VALVE, is 100% OPEN Places IFK-3136 in MANUAL and lowers flow to re-establish BOP normal DA Tank and Hotwellieveis.

CRS Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 4 (EDG "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm) when secondary-side conditions have stabilized and corrective actions will not be jeopardized by the alarm. The purpose of the next event is for a TS call and to set up the first major event. There are limited control room actions.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 1 Event # _4.:..-_

4

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_ _ _ Page 14 of _4__

43

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3--1 Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-636-6-3, DG A ENG TEMP TRBL Responds to/reports alarm XCP-636-6-3, DG A ENG TEMP BOP TRBL BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-636-6-3 ARP-001-XCP-636-6-3 PROBABLE CAUSE:

High/Low lube oil temperature:

Lube Oil Heater failure.

Lube Oil Filter Pump not running.

Loss of Service Water to Lube Oil Cooler.

High/Low coolant temperature:

Coolant Heater failure.

Jacket Water Pump not running.

Loss of Service Water to Jacket Water Cooler.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The diesel will trip at 195°F (coolant high temp.) or 175°F (lube oil high temp.), unless it was started by an Emergency Start signal, in which case PVG-3105A, FS TO DG A, will open to cool the diesel.

BOP Automatic action N/A - DG not running.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Dispatch an operator to identify the cause of the alarm.

Ensure AUTOMATIC ACTIONS have occurred if the alarm is due to High Temp.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario #

1 Event #

4

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Page 15 of 43

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Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "A" Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Perform Corrective Actions per ARP-004-XCX-S201.

CREW Dispatches AO to DG "A" to investigate.

Booth Operator Note: Wait 3-5 minutes then report: Local alarm ARP-004-XCX-5201-1-3, LOW LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE, is actuated.

Lube Oil Temperature is 108 OF and the heater will not energize from the switch. If electrical maintenance is contacted, wait 5 more minutes and then report that the DG must be cleared and tagged to replace the failed heater.

ARP-001-XCP-636-6-3 SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Perform Supplemental Actions per ARP-004-XCX-S201.

When lube oil temperature or jacket water temperature is CRS low, monitor and record the applicable temperature on a generic log once every two hours.

If the diesel generator is inoperable, refer to Tech Spec 3.8.1.

Evaluator's Note: Per a note in ARP-004-XCX-5201-1-3, the DG is inoperable when LO temperature is less than 110 OF.

CRS Enters TS 3.8.1.1.b, Action b.

1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter, and

2. If the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing:

a) determine the OPERABLE EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or b) demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1 .2.a.3 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # _4_ _ _ _ _ _ Page 16 of _4.;.:3:'-'-1 Event

Description:

Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) "An Low Lube Oil Temperature Alarm Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

3. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , verify that required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices that depend on the remaining EDG as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE and in MODE 1, 2, or 3, that the Turbine Driven Emergency Feed Pump is OPERABLE. If these conditions are not satisfied within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 5 (MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO) after the CR5 Evaluator has completed his/her evaluation of the T5 entry and/or elects to follow up after the scenario is terminated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event #

~-

Event

Description:

MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate the trigger for MFP Discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Indications Available: XCP-624-1-5; 2-5; 3-5, SG LVL DEV Responds to multiple SG LVL DEV alarms and/or change in BOP feedwater flow.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew may first enter an ARP but could go directly to AOP-210.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION, based on multiple alarms or early diagnosis. The scenario guide is conservatively written as if an ARP will be entered.

At some point prior to or during procedure implementation the BOP should diagnose the problem as a Feedwater Header Pressure instrument (PT-508) failure.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 or 2-5 or 3-5 ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Step load increase or decrease.

Steam Generator A level control system malfunction.

FCV-478, A FCV, malfunction.

Testing in progress.

Instrument failure.

BOP Determines all SG's are responding in the same manner.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

FCV-478, A FCV, will modulate to restore level to 61.6%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # .....;5~_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _4..;,;3;""'-1 Event

Description:

MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Determines all FCV's are responding the same way.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

BOP

Evaluate SG A Narrow Range level indicators LI-474 , LI-475, and LI-476.

If required, restore Steam Generator A level to between 60% and 65% by performing either or both of the following:

Manually control PVT-478, SG A FWF, as required .

Manually control Feedwater Pump speed as follows:

Place the Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL in MAN.

Adjust the differential pressure between Feedwater Pump discharge header pressure and Main St

If FCV-478, A FCV, malfunctioned go to AOP-21 0.1, Feedwater Flow Control Valve Failure.

If a Main Feedwater Pump has tripped or is malfunctioning go to AOP-21 0.3, Feedwater Pump Malfunction.

If an instrument channel failed, go to AOP-401.11, Steam Generator Level Control and Protection Channel Failure.

Places Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL in MAN and BOP adjusts to restore SG levels CRS Enters AOP-21 0.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION.

BOP Performs Immediate Actions

Verify at least one Feedwater Pump is running (YES)

Check if a Feedwater Pump trip occurred (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 13

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-- 1 Scenario # 1 Event # _5;...-_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _4_3~-f Event

Description:

MFP discharge Header Pressure Transmitter PT-508 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Manually control Feedwater Pump speed using MCB MASTER BOP SPEED CONTROL

Place the Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL in MAN.

Adjust Feedwater Pump speed to maintain discharge header pressure 150 to 250 PSIG greater than Main Steam Header Pressure on:

PI-SOB, FW PP DISCH HDR PRESS PSIG .

PI-464C, MS HDR PRESS PSIG .

Adjust PUMP A(B)(C} SPEED CNTRL (MCB MIA Stations) setpoint potentiometers, as necessary to balance all operating Feedwater Pumps speed to within 120 rpm of each other.

Determine and correct the cause of the Feedwater Pump CRS speed control malfunction.

Evaluator's Note: The previous AOP-21 0.3 step remains in effect until the malfunction is repaired. The channel will NOT be repaired prior to the end of the scenario.

CRS Contacts I&C andlor Work Control for assistance.

Booth Operator: When SG levels are under control, call the control room as an AO. Report the wind picking up and a dark sky on the horizon with Significant lightning visible.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 6 (PZR Pressure PT-445 Fails HI) when SG levels are under control, channel repair actions have been initiated, and the degrading weather report is made to the control room.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6

~----

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-445 Fails HI Page 20 of 43

-';';'--f Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-616-2-3, PZR PRESS HIILO; XCP-616-2-6, PZR CNTRL PRESS HI Evaluator Note: The ONB Pressure TS (2206 PSIG) will be exceeded and exited during this event RO Responds to alarms.

RO Reports PZR Pressure channel failure.

Performs immediate actions of AOP-401.5, PRESSURIZER RO PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL FAILURE.

IMMEDIATE Verify the PZR PORV's are closed (NO)

ACTION STEP 1

If PZR PRESS is less than 2300 PSIG (YES), then perform the following:

Close the affected PORV's:

PCV-445A, PWR RELIEF

PCV-445B, PWR RELIEF IMMEDIATE ACTION Compare the PZR control channel indication to the protection STEP 2 channel indications:

PI-455, PRESS PSIG.

PI-456, PRESS PSIG.

PI-457, PRESS PSIG.

RO Reports PI-445 reading higher than any protection channel.

IMMEDIATE Check if PI-444, CNTRL CHAN PRESS PSIG, indication is ACTION normal (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Event # _6~ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of Op Test No.:

Scenario # 43 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-445 Fails HI Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior STEP 3 CRS Enters AOP-401.5 Procedure Note: Throughout this procedure, "AFFECTED" refers to any PZR PORV that has actuated as the result of the instrument failure.

Step 2 Note: PZR PRESS control channels PI-444 and PI-445 connect to the same reference leg as protection channel PI-457.

CRS Reads immediate actions.

RO Verifies immediate actions.

Check if PI-445, CNTRL CHAN PRESS PSIG, indication is RO normal (NO)

If PI-445 is failed, then within one hour close the affected RO PORV Block Valves:

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL

MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL RO Ensure ROD CNTRL BANK SEL Switch is in AUTO.

RO Maintain RCS pressure between 2220 psig and 2250 psig.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

CRS Contacts I&C and/or Work Control for assistance.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

_6~ _ _ _ _ Page 22 Op Test No.:

- - Scenario # 1 Event # of 43 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-445 Fails HI Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

While the following TS-related action has already been directed by the AOP, the CRS must still enter TS 3.4.4.a.

CRS Enters TS 3.4.4.a.

With one or more PORV(s) inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or

close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 7 (Loss of Offsite Power with emergency diesel generator and EFW failures) when the TS actions are complete.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;,.;3;"'--1

_4.,.;3;""--1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.O (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate the trigger for the Loss of Offsite power.

Indications Available: Multiple reactor trip and electrical lockout related alarms and lighting shifts.

CRS Enters EOP-1.0, Step 1.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Evaluator's Note: The EOP REFERENCE PAGE requirements that apply to this scenario after the SI actuation are:

Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

Booth Operator Note: When/if the Electrical System Controller is contacted regarding the availability of off-site power, report the following: There is a major problem on the grid that is still being analyzed. I will contact you when a projected return time becomes available.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

(YES)

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit. (YES)

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing. (YES)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4,,;.;3;"'-'-11 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Verify Turbine/Generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VLVs are closed. (YES)

Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open. (YES)

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open. (YES)

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped. (YES)

BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized. (NO)

BOP Perform the following:

Verify at least one ESF bus is energized: (NO)

7.2 KV BUS 1DA is energized.

OR

7.2 KV BUS 1DB is energized.

IF no ESF bus is energized, THEN try to restore power to at least one ESF bus using the DG.

IF power can NOT be restored to at least one ESF bus, THEN GO TO EOP-6.0, LOSS OF ALL ESF AC POWER, Step 1.

Evaluator Note: The crew may avoid EOP-6.0 entry if the crew manually starts EDG "8" in accordance with management expectations for compensatory actions relative to automatic failures. If so, then proceed to Scenario Guide Page 27 for continuation of EOP-1.0 actions.

CRS Enters EOP-6.0, LOSS OF ALL ESF AC POWER.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1~_ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;.,;3;"""-1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time J Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Notes:

Steps 1 and 2 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Critical Safety Function status trees should be monitored for information only. Procedures referenced from the status trees should NOT be used during this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify Turbine/Generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VLVs are closed.

Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

RO Isolate the RCS.

RO Verify all PZR PORVs are closed (YES).

RO Ensure all Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

PVT-8149A(B)(C), LTDN ORIFICE A(B)(C) ISOL (CLOSES)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ____ Scenario #

-.;...._ 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4;..;;.3--1

_4__

3---1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time JI Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

LCV-459 and LCV-460, LTDN LINE ISOL. (CLOSES)

PVT-8153 and PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL. (YES)

CREW Ensure all PZR AND RCS sample valves are closed:

SVX-93648 and SVX-93658, RCS LP 8 SMPL ISOL.

SVX-9364C and SVX-9365C, RCS LP C SMPL ISOL.

SVX-9356A, PZR STM SMPL ISOL.

SVX-93568, PZR LlQ SMPL ISOL.

SVX-9357, PZR SMPL ISOL.

Verify total EFW flow to INTACT SGs is GREATER THAN 450 80P gpm. (NO)

Perform the following:

Ensure all TD EFW Flow Control Valves FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TD EFP TO SG A(8)(C) are open.

(YES)

Start the TD EFW Pump:

CRITICAL TASK

Open PVG-2030, STM SPLY TO TO EFP TRN A(8) before wide range level in any two SGs is less than 15%.

ENSURE AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOLLOWING safety injection MONITOR LIGHTS IS DIM:

XCP-6103 3-5 (MS LOOP C TO TDEFP 28028)

XCP-6103 4-16 (MS LOOP 8 TO TDEF 2802A).

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page _4.;.;3~-I

~ of _4_3~-I Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution Step 5:

If power can NOT be restored to at least one ESF bus within ten minutes, all RCPs should be stopped to prevent RCP damage.

When a DG is running, the Service Water System must be in operation OR PVG-3105A(B), FS TO DG A(B),

must be open to supply cooling water.

BOP Try to restore power to any ESF bus:

Attempt to start any DG from the Main Control Board (starts "B")

CRITICAL TASK

Energize ESF bus 1DB from the running DG before performing Step 6 of EOP-6.0

Verify the energized ESF Bus voltage is normal and frequency is stable.

Procedure Note - Step 5.d Procedures referenced in EOP-12.0, MONITORING OF CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS, may now be implemented.

CRS RETURN TO the Procedure and Step in effect.

Booth Operator: Ramp in the SBLOCA from 0 to 600 GPM over 5 minutes when the crew transitions to EOP-1.1.

CRS Returns to EOP-1.0, RNa Step 3.b

Try to restore power to the deenergized bus while continuing with this procedure. REFER TO AOP-304.1, LOSS OF BUS 1DA (1DB) WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4..;.;3~~

Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator/Evaluator Note:

If the crew has dispatched operator(s) to investigate the EDG "A" failure then wait until EOP-1.0 - Attachment 3 has been completed, call the control room indicating controls have been reset and specify that a start attempt can be made.

The scenario guide assumes that the crew power will restore power to Bus iDA.

RO Check if SI is actuated: (NO)

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-6107 1-1. (NO)

OR

Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row. (NO)

CRS Go to Step 5.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew will go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP, begin perfonning steps then detennine that PZR level cannot be maintained greater than 12%, initiate a MANUAL SI and return to EOP-1.0.

Adverse Containment values will be reached during the scenario.

RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1850 psig.

OR

RP pressure GREATER THAN 3.6 psig.

OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: _1___ Scenario #

_1:.-_ 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4...;.;3~-t

_4..;.;3;...-.-<<

Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior OR

Steamline differential pressure GREATER THAN 97 psid.

CRS Transitions to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP Procedure CAUTION:

If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, should be performed to stabilize the plant Procedure NOTE:

Main Turbine vibration should be monitored during coastdown .

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

BOP Check FW status:

a. Check if RCS Tavg is LESS THAN 564 OF. (YES)

b. Verify FW Isolation:

Ensure the FW Flow Control Valves, FCV*

478(488)(498), are closed. (YES)

Ensure the Main FW Isolation Valves, PVG-1611A(B)(C), are closed. (YES)

Ensure the FW Flow Control Bypass Valves, FCV-3321(3331)(3341), are closed. (YES)

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

1) Ensure both MD EFW Pumps are running. (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

~ of _4.;.;3~-II Op Test No.:

Scenario #

--.;...- Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page _4;.;;,3---i Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus lOB Recovery; MVG-8801B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

2) Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels. (Evaluators: See critical task criteria on Page 26)

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

BOP Trip all Main FW Pumps.

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 557 OF. (YES)

Evaluator Note: The Scenario Guide assumes that the EOP-1.1 REFERENCE PAGE for Sllnitiation has been met at this time or the CRS has made a conservative decision to manually initiate.

RO Actuate SI using either SI ACTUATION Switch.

Evaluator's Note: Actions for ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERI FICATlON, are provided on the final 3 pages of this scenario guide.

BOP Initiate ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 psig on PR-RO 951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1~_

_1_ _ Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10, & 11 Page ll- of _4;..;..3---f

_4;,.;;.3--t Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF.

With no RCP running, RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (YES)

RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL

MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Procedure Note: Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all Reps.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped: (None running)

BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED:

No SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.

(YES)

No SG is completely depressurized. (YES)

Verify Secondary radiation levels indicate SG tubes are NOT CREW RUPTURED: (YES to all)

RM-G19A (B) (C) STMLN HI RNG GAMMA

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS MONITOR.

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _ _ Scenario#

-.;..._ 1 Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4;.;;,.3---1

_4=3---1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

RO Check if the RCS is INTACT: (NO to any or all)

RB radiation levels are normal on:

RM-G7, CONTAINMENT HI RNG GAMMA

RM-G18, CNTMNT HI RNG GAMMA.

RB Sump levels are normal.

RB pressure is LESS THAN 1.5 psig.

The following annunciators are NOT lit:

XCP-606 2-2 (RBCU 1N2A DRN FLO HI)

XCP-607 2-2 (RBCU 1B/2B DRN FLO HI)

Transitions to EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR CRS SECONDARY COOLANT.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped (NONE running).

BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED:

No SG decreaSing in an uncontrolled manner (YES)

No SG completely depressurized (YES)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _ _ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4~3---1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Check Intact SG levels:

NR level in intact SGs >30% [50%]

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%]-60% NR level RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RO/BOP Check if Secondary radiation levels are normal: (YES to all)

Check radiation levels normal on:

RM-G19A(B)(C), STMLN HI RNG GAMMA.

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS MONITOR. I

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LIQUIDI MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW' DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

Place SVX-9398A(B)(C), SG A(B)(C) SMPL ISOL, in AUTO.

Notify Chemistry to sample all SG secondary sides, and screen samples for abnormal activity using a frisker.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

Verify power is available to the PZR PORV Block Valves:

MVG-8000A, B, C (NO - power has been removed from the leaking PORV isolation valve)

Verify all PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ...;..._ Scenario# 1 Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;..;,3---1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEa A(B) RESETS to:

NON-ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERVo

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPLY TO RB.

RO Check if SI flow should be reduced:

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP OF, is GREATER THAN 30 OF. (YES)

Secondary Heat Sink is adequate (YES)

RCS Pressure is stable or increasing (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 11.

RO Check if RB Spray should be stopped:

Check if any RB Spray Pumps are running. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 12. Observe the CAUTION prior to Step 12.

Procedure Caution: RCS pressure should be monitored. If RCS pressure decreases in an uncontrolled manner to LESS THAN 250 psig, the RHR Pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.

RO Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1~_ Scenario# 1 Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4,;.;;.3---1

_4;.;;.3--1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Check RCS pressure:

RCS pressure is GREATER THAN 250 psig. (YES)

Check if RCS Pressure is stable or increasing (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 13.

RO Check if RCS pressure is stable or decreasing. (YES)

BOP Check if pressure in all SGs is stable or increasing. (YES)

BOP Check if DGs should be stopped:

Verify both ESF buses are energized by offsite power. (NO)

Restore offsite power to both ESF buses. REFER TO the appropriate procedure, based on existing plant conditions:

SOP-304, 7.2 KV SWITCHGEAR.

SOP-306, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.

AOP-304.1, LOSS OF BUS 1DA(1DB) WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE.

IF offsite power is NOT available, THEN REFER TO AOP-304.3, LOSS OF ALL BALANCE OF PLANT BUSES, to supply necessary BOP loads from ESF buses.

Stop any unloaded DG. REFER TO SOP-306, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR. (N/A)

RO Verify equipment is available for Cold Leg Recirculation:

Verify power is available for at least one RHR Pump:

PUMP A. (YES)

PUMP B. (YES)

Open both MVB-9503A(B), CC TO RHR HX A(B).

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1___ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4;.,;.3--1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or BehavIor Procedure Caution:

If the swing CCW Pump is NOT available, the running pump should NOT be secured to shift it to fast speed, to prevent damage to the Charging Pump on that train.

If CCW can NOT be shifted to fast speed, this procedure should be continued. CCW alignment will be addressed in EOP-2.2, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

Shift the CCW Train to fast speed in the Active Loop.

REFER TO SOP-118, COMPONENT COOLING WATER.

Consult with TSC personnel to determine if equipment required for Cold Leg Recirculation is available.

Procedure Note - Step 17 Presence of abnormally high levels of radioactivity in the AS indicates that a Containment breach may be in progress. Conditions for upgrading the Emergency status should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Check the AS for evidence of ECCS leakage: (No leakage RO indicated because all questions will be answered YES)

Verify AS radiation levels are normal on:

RM-A3

RM-A13

RM-A11

Local area monitors.

Verify annunciator XCP-631 6-1 is NOT lit (AS SMP LVL HI).

Verify annunciators XCP-606 3-4 and XCP-607 3-4 are NOT lit (LD TRSL AS SMP/FLDRN LVL HI).

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1;......._ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4;..;.3--f Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Obtain necessary Chemistry samples:

Ensure all RCS sample valves are in AUTO:

SVX-9364B and SVX-9365B, RCS LP B SMPL ISOL.

SVX-9364C and SVX-9365C, RCS LP C SMPL ISOL.

Notify Chemistry to sample the following:

RCS.

All SGs for isotopic activity.

Shut down and stabilize the Secondary Plant. REFER TO BOP AOP-214.1, TURBINE TRIP.

RO Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:

RCS pressure is GREATER THAN 250 psig. (YES)

GO TO EOP-2.1, POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND CRS DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

BOP Verify all AC buses are energized by offsite power. (NO)

Restore offsite power to all AC buses. Refer to the appropriate CRS procedure based on existing plant conditions.

SOP-304, 115KV/7.2KV OPERATIONS.

SOP-306, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;..._ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4...;,.3--,1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

AOP-304.1, LOSS OF BUS 1DA(1 DB) WITH THE DIESEL NOT AVAILABLE.

AOP-304.3, LOSS OF ALL BALANCE OF PLANT BUSES.

AOP-304.3A(B)(C), LOSS OF BALANCE OF PLANT BUS 1A(1 B)(1 C).

IF offsite power can NOT be restored to BOP buses, THEN REFER TO AOP-304.3, LOSS OF ALL BALANCE OF PLANT BUSES, to supply necessary BOP loads from ESF buses.

Procedure Caution - Step 2 PZR Heaters should NOT be energized until PZR water level is GREATER THAN the minimum level recommended by TSC personnel to ensure the heaters are covered.

RO Deenergize PZR Heaters:

Place both BU GRP 1(2) Switches in PULL TO LK NON-A.

Secure the CNTRL GRP Heaters.

Consult TSC personnel for a minimum indicated PZR water level that will ensure heaters are covered.

Procedure Caution: RCS pressure should be monitored. If RCS pressure decreases in an uncontrolled manner to LESS THAN 250 psig, the RHR Pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.

Evaluator Note: If RCS Pressure has stabilized when the next step is read then the crew will stop both RHR Pumps.

CRS Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped.

Check if any RHR Pump is running with suction aligned to the RWST (YES)

Check RCS Pressure:

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1____ Scenario #

_1;.....-_ 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4..;.;3~-I

_4....3_-1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time .lI Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

RCS Pressure is greater than 250 PSIG (YES)

RCS Pressure is stable or increasing (NO)

BOP Check Intact SG levels:

NR level in intact SGs greater 40% [50%]

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%] - 60% NR level Procedure Note - Step 5

Before the Low Steamline Pressure SI signal is blocked, Main Steam Isolation will occur if the Low Steam Pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Shutdown margin should be monitored during ReS cooldown.

CRS Initiate RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown:

Maintain the cooldown rate in the RCS Cold Legs LESS THAN 100 of/hr.

Use the RHR System if it is in service. REFER TO SOP-115, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL.

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552 OF), THEN:

Place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to BYP INTLK. Place both STMLN SI TRAIN A(B) Switches to BLOCK.

Close the MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C), for any FAULTED or RUPTURED SGs.

BOP Dump steam from each intact SG to the condenser.

Verify permissive C-9 light is bright on XCP-6114-1-3. (NO)

BOP Dump steam from each intact SG using the Steam line PORVs:

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # Event # 7,8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;.;3;"""-1

_4..;,;3;""'-1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Place the Steamline Power Relief A(B)(C) Mode Switch(s) in PWR RLF.

Adjust the PWR RELIEF A(B)(C) SETPT Controller(s) to establish the desired cooldown rate.

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Terminate the scenario anytime after the cooldown is started.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1~_

_1_ _ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page +/-!.- of _4...;,.3---1

_4;.;;.3---1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-1.0, AITACHMENT 3 Evaluator'S Note:

Only equipment powered from Bus 1DB will have power available when Attachment 3 is performed.

There will be no flow indicated from RHR because RCS Pressure will remain above the shutoff head.

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running. (NO)

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels. (AUTO start is blocked)

BOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open: (YES)

FCV-3531 (3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(B)(C)

MVG-2802A(B), MS LOOP B(C) TO TO EFP.

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

BOP Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed: (YES)

FW Flow Control

FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(B)(C).

FW Flow Control Bypass, FCV-3321(3331)(3341).

SG Blowdown, PVG-503A(B)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(B)(C).

Ensure all Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ....;...._ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;,;3;"'--1

_4.;.,;3;"'--1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG UB" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure SI Pumps are running: (Only B Train available)

Two Charging Pumps are running.

Both RHR Pumps are running.

Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per BOP train) (Only B Train available)

BOP Verify Service Water to the RBCUs: (Only B Train available)

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP B DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running. (Only B Train available)

Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP (Only B Train available)

BOP Check if Main Steamlines should be isolated: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

'RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR

Steam line pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR

Steamline flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1___ Scenario # 1 Event # 7,8,9, 7,8,9,10, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4;.;;;,3---1

_4;.;;;,3--1 Event

Description:

Loss of Off-site Power; DG "B" Fails to Start Automatically (EOP-6.0 Implementation); MDEFW Pump "B" Breaker Trip, TDEFW Pump Fails to Start Automatically; 600 GPM SBLOCA After Bus 1DB Recovery; MVG-8801 B (HI HEAD CL INJECTION MOV) Fails to OPEN Time I Position I Ap{)licant's Actions or Behavior Applicant's

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C) .

BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed: (YES)

PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment BOP Ventilation Isolation on XCP-6103, 6104, and 6106. (YES)

REFER TO ATIACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

CRITICAL TASK

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-6104. (NO - Opens MVG-8801B, HI HEAD TO CL INJECTION VALVE, before reporting the completion of this Attachment)

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-6106.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig.

Verify RHR flow on:

FI-605A, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP A FLOW GPM AND

FI-605B, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP B FLOW GPM .

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VCSUMMER Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2009 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-10, 100% Power, MOL

RB Spray Pump "8" is tagged out for cleaning and maintenance of the breaker cubicle. 64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months remain on TS 3.6.2.1.

Radiation Monitor RM-A2, Reactor Building Particulate Monitor failed to ZERO 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Planning and Scheduling is preparing a work package. The Action Statement for TS 3.4.6.1.a is in effect.

The National Weather Service has issued a severe weather alert due to a line of heavy thunderstorms moving into the area.

Turnover:

Maintain 100% power.

Critical Task:

Isolate steam from the ruptured SG to the TDEFW Pump before performing Step 6 of EOP-4.0.

Isolate affected SG before NR level reaches 100%.

Trip all RCP's before exiting EOP-2.0.

Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 FWM006A N-BOP, Feedwater Booster Pump" An Trip.

CRS R-RO Power Reduction.

2 NIS003D I-RO PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO.

TS-CRS 3 EH001 C-BOP EHC Pump Trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO start failure.

EH002 4 RCS002B C-RO SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI.

TS-CRS 5 FWM023A C-BOP SG "A" Feedwater Control Valve (FCV-478) fails to respond in AUTO during power reduction.

6 EPS004C M-ALL Loss of Service Bus 1C.

7 PCS009AB C-RO AUTO Reactor Trip Failure

!<¥{vv( tit /) / '<"';v-r 5. I~

PCS-9BB ~/ r ~,L";. .>-<

>-<" /U/L

/ . JJ E ,

/J/A / .a.: fV'

.,a; 7., ~

8 RCS002B M-ALL SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip.

VLVRCOO5P PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI.

VLVRC013P 9 MSS006B C-BOP SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close.

Terminate at the transition to EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 VC Summer NRC Scenario #2 The crew assumes the watch with power at 100% and instructions to maintain current conditions. They will have pre-briefed on the Initial Conditions.

Within one minute after assuming the watch, Feedwater Booster Pump "A" will trip. The BOP will respond to the associated alarm and enter the ARP. The ARP directs a power reduction to 95% in accordance with GOP-4C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION. The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2, PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO, when the plant is stable at or below 95% and the reactivity control evaluation is complete.

When PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO the RO should respond to alarms and uncontrolled rod motion then perform the immediate actions of AOP-401.1, POWER RANGE CHANNEL FAILURE; placing rod control in MANUAL. The crew should remove the channel from service and the CRS should enter Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1. When Tavg has been restored, the actions of AOP-401.1 are complete, and the TS declaration made, the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 3: EHC Pump trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO start failure.

The BOP should respond to the EHC Pump trip in accordance with the Alarm Response Procedure (ARP). This involves a manual start of the standby pump, dispatching an AO to investigate, and diagnosing indications to verify that the cause is not a problem that will be common to both pumps. The Booth Operator will initiate Event 4, SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI, coincident with the EHC Pump problem.

The SG "B" tube leak will initiate and stabilize at 12 GPM until the TS entry is complete. The crew should respond to indications of RCS inventory loss/rising secondary-side radiation and enter AOP-112.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK NOT REQUIRING SI. The crew should estimate SGTL as greater than the TS limit and the CRS should enter TS 3.4.6.2.c. After the TS entry is complete, the leak will be ramped up to 50 GPM to require some additional AOP actions by the crew. The RO will stabilize PZR level by raising charging and minimizing letdown. The CRS should direct a shutdown to HOT STANDBY in accordance with the requirements of AOP-112.2 since the shutdown rate specified by that procedure is greater than that specified by the TS.

When the shutdown is initiated, SG "N Feedwater Control Valve FCV-478 will fail "AS-IS" in AUTO. If the BOP fails to recognize that FCV-478 is not responding in AUTO then a SG "A" level deviation alarm will actuate. In either case, the BOP should take MANUAL control of FCV-478 and restore SG "A" level. When SG "A" level is under control, the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6: Loss of Service Bus "C".

When Service Bus "C" trips then power to RCP "C" is lost but the automatic reactor trip is blocked. The RO should recognize the reactor trip demand, initiate a MANUAL reactor trip and the crew will perform EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION.

Coincident with the reactor trip, the SG "B" tube leakage will ramp up to 600 GPM. The crew will likely go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY, then initiate a MANUAL SI based on the EOP-1.1 REFERENCE PAGE Criteria and return to EOP-1.0. When SI is initiated, one PZR PORV will fail open. Reactor Coolant Pumps should be stopped in accordance with EOP-1.0 REFERENCE PAGE Criteria. When the PZR PORV and associated block valve cannot be closed, the crew will transition to EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Based on EOP-2.0 REFERENCE PAGE Criteria for uncontrolled SG level rise, the crew should transition to EOP-4.0, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE. In EOP-4.0, the crew should isolate EFW to SG "B", isolate SG "B", and trip the TDEFW Pump to terminate the release through that path. They will initiate a cooldown to a target temperature and then be directed to EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, because of the open and un isolated PZR PORV.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario at the transition to EOP-4.2.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 VCSOS NRC Scenario 2 Simulator Setup SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Attach a copy of the current revision of SOP-106, IV.D - BORATING THE RCS USING THE EMERGENCY BORATION VALVE to this scenario guide for evaluator use if that boration method is implemented by the crew.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

IC-10, 100% Power.

Tag on RB Spray Pump "B"

Tag(on) on RM-A2 particulate

Reactivity Management Planrrurnover Sheet for IC.

Crew should pre-brief on the Initial Conditions so that they are prepared to assume the watch with minimum delay.

PRE-LOAD

OVR-SP008A RB Spray Pump "B" cleared and tagged

OVR-SP008F RB Spray Pump "B" cleared and tagged

MAL-RMS001 D RM-A2 particulate failed

MAL-PCS009AB {Set To AUTO UV} Blocks the AUTO Reactor trip on A Train

MAL-PCS009BB {Set To AUTO UV} Blocks the AUTO Reactor trip on B Train

MAL-MSS006B {Set To FAILURE TO CLOSE}: Blocks AUTO and MANUAL closure of MSIV"B"

PMP-EH002F Blocks the AUTO start of EHC Pump "B" TRIGGERS

Trigger 1 MAL-FWM006A: Feedwater Booster Pump "A" trip

Trigger 2 MAL-NIS003D: PRNIS Channel 44 fails to ZERO

Trigger 3 PMP-EH001T: Trip of EHC Pump "An

Trigger 3 MAL-RCS002B: SG "B" Tube Leak 12 GPM @ 1GPM

Trigger 4 MAL-FWM023A: FCV-478 fails "AS-IS" in AUTO when the power reduction begins

Trigger 5 MAL-EPS004C: Loss of Service Bus "1C"

Trigger 27 Leak rate on SG 'B' increase to 50 GPM over 10 minutes when leak rate reaches 12 GPM

Trigger 28 MAL-RCS002B: SG "B" Tube Leak ramps to 600 GPM over 10 minutes coincident with the reactor trip breakers opening

Trigger 29 VLV-RC005B: PCV-445B fails open coincident with the MANUAL or AUTO SI

Trigger 30 VLV-RC013P Blocks the closure of MVG-8000C , coincident with the MANUAL or AUTO SI Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

~_ Scenario # 2 Event #

Page 5 of 39

~~~

~--~

Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" Trip, Power Reduction Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-625-1-2, FWPB AlB/C/o TRIP Evaluatorl Booth Operator Note:

The crew has pre-briefed on the Initial Conditions. Initiate Event 1, Feedwater Booster Pump Trip, approximately 30-60 seconds after the crew assumes the watch.

BOP Responds to alarm XCP-625-1-2, FWBP AlB/C/O TRIP.

CREW Enters ARP-001-XCP-625-1-2.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Pump or pump motor malfunction.

Breaker overload trip.

Low level in Oeaerator Storage Tank at 468'6" (equivalent to 2'6" as read on wide range indicator LI-3135).

Low oil pressure trip at 5 psig decreasing sensed by one of the following:

IPS03408B.

IPS03418B.

IPS03428B.

IPS03438B.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

Recirculation valve associated with the tripped Feedwater Booster Pump opens.

Procedure Note: This alarm has reflash capabilities.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # ...;...1 1 _ _ _ _ _ Page 6 of _3,;;.;9;....-ooi 39

~- ~-------- ~~~

Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" Trip, Power Reduction Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

If the number of Feedwater Booster Pumps in operation is less than the number of Feedwater Pumps in operation, immediately trip the Reactor and enter EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION. (NO-3/3)

If three Feedwater Booster Pumps and three Feedwater Pumps are in operation, reduce Reactor power to 95% per GOP-4C, RAPID POWER REDUCTION. (YES)

CRS Enters GOP-4C.

CRS Verifies Initial Conditions:

The plant is in Mode 1. (YES)

Conditions exist that do not require a Reactor Trip but do require the Reactor to be in Mode 2 in less time than would be allowed by performing a normal shutdown. (NO, but the ARP has directed use of GOP-4C)

Note 3.1 through 3.10

If time allows, load reductions should be discussed with the Load Dispatcher.

Thermal Power changes of greater than 15% in any one hour require completion of Attachment III.H. of GTP-702.

CREW Informs Load Dispatcher.

Commence rapid Plant Shutdown as follows:

RO

Energize all Pressurizer Heaters.

Procedure Note 3.1.b

Setting FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW SET PT to 8.3 will yield 33 gpm Boration flow rate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Scenario # 2 Event # ...;.._ _ _ _ _ Page

~--------

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" Trip. Power Reduction 7 of _3;;.;9~-I 39

~~~

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Maintain the following with rod motion or boron concentration changes:

Tavg within 1QOF and trending to Tref.

Lil within limits.

Control Rods above the rod insertion limit.

Evaluator's Note: The crew may initiate a boration before or after the power reduction. Boration steps are not in GOP-4C but are included for evaluator use following the load reduction steps.

BOP Reduce load by either of the following methods:

By use of the DEC LOAD RATE circuit as follows:

De-energize LOAD LIMIT circuit.

Energize DEC LOAD RATE circuit.

Select desired rate on LOAD RATE LMT-% PER MIN.

up to 5% per minute.

Decrease LOAD SET to the load desired.

By use of the load limiter as follows:

Ensure LOAD LMT light is lit.

Tum the LOAD LMT SET potentiometer counterclockwise, up to a nominal 5% per minute, until the desired load is reached.

BORATION STEPS (SOP-106, Section F - All steps performed by the RO)

Evaluator Note: The RO could elect to borate in accordance with SOP-106,Section IV.D - BORATING THE RCS USING THE EMERGENCY BORATION VALVE. A copy of that procedure page is attached at the end of this scenario guide.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

- - Scenario #

2 Event #

_1,;..-.

1 _ _ _ _ Page 8 of ....;3;.;.,9---1

~~

39 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" Trip, Power Reduction Time I Position .1I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.0

Energizing additional Pressurizer Heaters will enhance mixing.

LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will begin to modulate to the HU-TK position at 70% level on LI-115, VCTLEVEL%.

RO Ensure at least one Reactor Coolant Pump is running.

Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to BOR.

(Peer ")

Set FIS-113, BA TO BLNDR FLOW, Batch Integrator to the desired volume (Peer 1/)

Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to START.

Procedure Note 2.6 Step 2.6 may be omitted when borating less than 10 gallons.

Place FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW, controller in AUTO.

Procedure Note 2.7 The AUTO setpoint dial for FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW, controller may be adjusted slowly to obtain the desired flow rate.

Verify the desired Boric Acid flow rate on FR-113, BA TO BLNDR GPM (F-113).

When the preset volume of boric acid has been reached,

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 2 Event #

- . ; . . _ _ _ _ Page 9 of ...,;3;.,;;.9----t

~~

39 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" Trip, Power Reduction Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior perform the following:

Place FCV-113A&S, SA flow controller in MAN.

Verify boration stops.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Procedure Note 2.10

If plant conditions require repeated borations, Step 2.10 may be omitted.

The volume in the piping between the blender and the VCT outlet is approximately 3.8 gallons.

Alternate Dilute 4 to 6 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to flush the line downstream of the blender by performing the following:

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to ALT OIL. (Peer ")

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to desired flow rate.

Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator to desired volume. (Peer ")

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Verify desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

Verify alternate dilution stops when preset volume is reached on FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AUTO.

(Peer ")

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to 7.5 (120 gpm).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 2 Event # _1~

1 ____

~--------

Page 10 of ...,;3;;.;;,9--1

~~

39 Event

Description:

Feedwater Booster Pump "A" Trip, Power Reduction Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior In MAN, adjust FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW OUTPUT, to the required position which will ensure proper Boric Acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Adjust FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW SET PT, to the desired position to ensure proper boric acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the in-service Boric Acid Tank.

If necessary, start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the Boric Acid Tank on recirculation.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 2 (PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO) when power is stabilized at (or below) the required value and the reactivity control evaluation is complete.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ~_ Scenario # 2 Event # ...;2_ _ _ _ _ _ Page

..,:2:::..-____ 11 of .,..;3=9---11

_3_9---11

~-

Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV Responds to alarm XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV, and/or rod RO motion.

Evaluator's Note: The crew will likely go directly to AOP-401.1 0, POWER RANGE CHANNEL FAILURE, rather than to implement the ARP.

RO Enters ARP-001-XCP-620-1-4 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Dropped Rod.

Quadrant Power Tilt.

Power Range channel in test.

Power Range channel failure.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Observe Power Range meters NI-41 B, NI-42B, NI-43B, and NI-44B.

Verify proper Control Rod pOSitions.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If a rod dropped, refer to AOP-403.6, DROPPED CONTROL ROD. (NO)

Determine if a quadrant power tilt exists by: (NO)

Display TFMMI on the IPCS .

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

- - Scenario #

2 Event # 2 _ _ _ _ Page

....;2~

12 of ...;3;..;;.9~

~~

39 Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

If the IPCS is not available, perform STP-108.001, QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO.

If a Power Range channel is in test, place the COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to the channel being tested.

If an instrument failure is suspected, refer to AOP-401.1 0, POWER RANGE FAILURE.

CRS Enters AOP-401.1 0 RO Performs immediate actions

Verify normal indication on Power Range Channel N-44.

(NO)

IF Power Range Channel N-44 has failed, THEN place the ROD CNTRL BANK SEL Switch in MAN.

Stabilize any plant transients in progress.

CREW Maintain stable plant conditions.

Verify no testing is in progress on the operable Power Range CREW channels.

Place ROD STOP BYPASS Switch (on the MISCELLANEOUS BOP CONTROL AND INDICATION PANEL) for the failed Power Range channel in BYPASS.

RO Verify the appropriate Rod Stop Bypass status light is bright:

For N-44, B2 OP ROD STOP BYP (XCP-6111 4-4).

RO Adjust Control Rods to maintain Tavg within 1.0 'F of Tref.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1~_

1 Scenario # 2 Event # _2;;..-._ _ _ _ Page

..,;2;;.-. 13 of ..-3;.,;",9--1

...;;3;.;;.9---f

~-

Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Notify the I&C Department to record detector currents and CRS status lights on POWER RANGE A and POWER RANGE B drawers.

Procedure Caution - Step 9 The empty fuse holders should NOT be reinstalled as this will allow a small amount of current flow through the blown fuse indicator.

Evaluator Note:

The following are expected alarms when the fuses are pulled in the next step:

XCP-620-1-1, PR HI SETPT FLUX HI

XCP-620-1-2, PR LO SETPT FLUX HI

XCP-620-1-5, PR UP DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-1-6, PR LOW DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-2-1, PR DET VOLT LOSS

XCP-620-2-2, PR FLUX HI RATE SINGLE CHAN ALERT BOP Deenergize the failed Power Range channel:

Remove the CONTROL POWER fuses from the POWER RANGE A drawer.

Remove the INSTR POWER fuses from the POWER RANGE B drawer.

Evaluator Note:

The following alarms will clear during the next step:

XCP-620-1-4, PR CHAN DEV

XCP-620-1-5, PR UP DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT

XCP-620-1-6, PR LOW DET FLUX HI DEV AUTO DEFEAT BOP Align the Power Range channel comparator circuits:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

--:...- Scenario # 2 Event #

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO

....;2~_ _ _ _ Page 14 of ...,;3;.;;.,9--t

....,;3;.,;;.9---t Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Place the following switches to the failed Power Range channel position:

COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch (on the COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer).

UPPER SECTION Switch (on the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer).

LOWER SECTION Switch (on the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer).

Ensure NR-45 is selected to the appropriate operable RO channels.

RO Check if Reactor power is LESS THAN 75%. (NO)

Initiate GTP-702, Attachment IV.F. (AFD Monitoring)

RO Check if Reactor power is LESS THAN 50%. (NO)

Initiate GTP.:.702, Attachment IV.D. (QPTR Monitoring)

Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the failed channel protection bistables in CRS a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel.

REFER TO Attachment 1.

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument

Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

STPs.

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;.._ Scenario #

.1..-

2 Event # ....

2_______

....;2~ _ _ _ _ Page 15 of _3;.;9~-I

_3_9~-I Event

Description:

PRNIS Channel N-44 Fails LO Time JI Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1.

Determines ACTION 2 applies:

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per Specification 4.2.4.2.

Determine and correct the cause of the Power Range channel CRS failure.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 3 (EHC Pump trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO start failure) after the TS declaration and the channel is bypassed.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -:...._ Scenario # 2 Event # _3_ _ _ _ _ _ Page 16 of ...,;3;.;;,,9---1 Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO Start Failure Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When dispatched to investigate pump failure, report no leaks or apparent reason.

Inform the Lead Evaluator then activate the trigger for the 12 GPM SG "B" Tube leak while this event is in progress.

Indications Available: XCP-631-1-4, EHC PP A MOTOR OVRLD XCP-631-1-2, EHC FLUID PRESS LO BOP Responds to alarm XCP-631-1-4, EHC PP A MOTOR OVRLD BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-631-1-4 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Excessive flow due to an internal leak within the servo valves.

Excessive flow due to an external leak.

Mechanical binding of the pump or motor.

Breaker XSW1C1 060, EHC FLUID PUMP A XPTOO03-PP1-EH, racked out.

Evaluator's Note: The BOP may start the standby pump before the automatic start setpoint is reached since no EHC Pump is running.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The pump may trip if the condition is not corrected.

If the pump trips, the standby pump starts at 1300 psig.

If EHC PUMP A is still running, verify high amps. (NO. Pump BOP tripped)

BOP Start EHC PUMP B and observe motor amps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 17 of 39

-.;....- --------- ~~

Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip/Standby EHC Pump AUTO Start Failure Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior If EHC PUMP A is still running with higher amps than EHC BOP PUMP B, secure EHC PUMP A and continue to monitor EHC PUMP B. (EHC Pump A already tripped)

CREW Dispatch an operator to check for EHC System leaks.

If EHC PUMP B is drawing high amps with EHC PUMP A tripped, attempt to restart EHC PUMP A and run both pumps BOP until an external leak is located or a low level in the EHC fluid tank alarm is received. (NO)

If EHC PUMP B overload annunciator is received after starting, BOP commence a Turbine Runback at 5% per minute per GOP-4C.

(N/A)

Evaluator's Note: This step should be completed in its entirety prior to exiting to another procedure.

Upon receipt of a low level alarm in the EHC fluid tank, perform BOP the following: (N/A)

If Reactor power is greater than 50% (P-9), perform the following:

Trip the Reactor and implement EOP-1.0, Reactor Trip/Safety Injection Actuation.

Trip the Main Turbine.

Place the EHC Pumps in PULL TO LK NON-A.

CRS Contacts Work Control and/or Maintenance for assistance.

Lead Evaluator:

Event 4 (SG "8" SGTL Not Requiring SI) will be in progress during the EHC Pump problem ..

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~_ Scenario # 2 Event #

4 ____

_4~ Page 18 of ...;3;.;;.9--f

~~

39 Event

Description:

SG "8" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 800th Operator Instructions:

Raise SG "8" Tube leakage to 50 GPM after the TS 3.4.S.2.c is entered.

Fail Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 at the existing position (AUTO only) when the power reduction associated with the SGTL begins.

Indications Available: XCP-642-2-1, MN STM LINE RM-G19 HI RAD CREW Refer to alarm response procedure.

Verify the alarm is valid and identify the Main Steam line RO/BOP affected by observing RM-G19A, B, and C and RlR-8.

Request Health Physics perform radiological surveys around CRS Main Steam Lines.

CRS Direct Chemistry to sample all SGs for activity.

Booth Operator: In the next step, wait 3 minutes then report:

XVB00110-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PP CHAR EXH DISCH VALVE, OPEN

XVB00109-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PUMP ATMOS DISCH VALVE, CLOSED Align the condenser exhaust to the Auxiliary Building Charcoal CREW exhaust as follows: (Dispatches AO)

Open XVB00110-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PP CHAR EXH DISCH VALVE (TB-436).

Close XVB00109-AR, MN&AUX COND VAC PUMP ATMOS DISCH VALVE (TB-436).

BOP Reduce all Steam Generator Blowdown Flows to minimum.

Enters AOP-112.2, Steam Generator Tube Leak Not Requiring CRS SI.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

- - Scenario #

2 Event # _4.;...._ _ _ _

_4~ Page 19 of ...,.;3-.,9--1

...,.;3;;.;;,,9---;

Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check if PZR level can be maintained:

Open FCV-122, CHG FLOW, as necessary to maintain PZR level.

Verify PZR level is at or trending to program level (YES)

RO Reduce Letdown to one 45 gpm orifice:

Set PCV-145, LO PRESS LTON, to 70%.

Ensure PVT-8149A, LTON ORIFICE A ISOL, is open.

Close both PVT-8149B(C), LTON ORIFICE B(C) ISOL.

Adjust PCV-145, LO PRESS LTON, to maintain PI-145, LO PRESS LTON PRESS PSIG, between 300 psig and 400 psig.

Place PCV-145, LO PRESS LTON, in AUTO.

CRS/RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following criteria are met:

Check if any of the following criteria are met:

OR

PZR level is approaching 12%, OR

PZR pressure is approaching 1870 psig CRS Go to Step 3.

RO Verify VCT level is being maintained between 20% and 40%.

IF Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage has not CRS/RO been determined, THEN perform the following:

Estimate the RCS leak rate refer to IPCS CHG NET

Calculate the RCS leak rate. REFER TO STP-114.002, OPERATIONAL LEAK TEST.

Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.:

Scenario # 2 Event # _4.:....._ _ _ _ Page

_4.;..... 20 _3;...;.9---1 of ...,;3;.;.9---1 Event

Description:

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI Time I Position JI Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Comply with the applicable Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 action statement.

Evaluator's Note: The AOP shutdown requirement is more restrictive than the TS requirement in that it specifies a rate of power reduction.

The CRS should enter the TS action statement but implement the AOP-112.2, Step 5 table requirement for ~

150 GPO.

CRS Determines SGTL exceeds TS 3.4.6.2.c (150 GPD)

Action a:

With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or with primary-to-secondary leakage not within limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Procedure Note - Step 5

Rate of plant shutdown must be evaluated based on magnitude of RCS leak rate (Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage).

Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage rate, and rate of increase, is represented by the following IPCS Computer points:

UR1 019, SIG LEAKAGE FROM RMA9 (in gpd).

UR1019-R, SIG LEAKAGE FROM RMA9-RATE (in gpd/hr).

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

IF RCS leak rate (Steam Generator primary to secondary tube leakage) is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 75 gpd (.05 CRS gpm), THEN initiate a plant shutdown per the following table using GOP-4B, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 DESCENDING).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

~_ Scenario # 2 Event #

SG "B" SGTL Not Requiring SI 4 _ _ _ _ Page

_4~

21 of ...,;3;.;,9--1

~~

39 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Be in Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Evaluator's Note: Feedwater Flow Control Valve FCV-478 will fail at the existing position (in AUTO only) when the power reduction begins. Allow the BOP/CREW to deal with that malfunction then the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (Loss of Service Bus 1C).

Initiate a Reactor shutdown: REFER TO GOP-5, REACTOR CRS SHUTDOWN FROM STARTUP TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 2 TO MODE 3), while continuing with this procedure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

-.:...._ Scenario # 2 Event # ....;5~_ _ _ _ Page ~ of _3_9~-II

_3;.,;9;"-'-11 SG "A" Feedwater control Valve (FCV-478) Fails to Respond in AUTO During Power Reduction Time II Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-624-1-5, SG A LVL DEV Responds to SG LVL DEV alarms and/or observation of BOP different FCV/SG response.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5.

Evaluator's Note: The BOP may take MANUAL control of FCV-478 before an alarm setpoint is reached in accordance with management expectations for operator response.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Step load increase or decrease.

Steam Generator A level control system malfunction.

FCV-478, A FCV, malfunction.

Testing in progress.

Instrument failure.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

FCV-478, A FCV, will modulate to restore level to 61.6%.

BOP Reports FCV-478 appears to not be tracking the AUTO signal.

Evaluate SG A Narrow Range level indicators L1-474, L1-475, and L1-476.

If required, restore Steam Generator A level to between 60% and 65% by performing either or both of the following:

Manually control PVT-478, SG A FWF, as required .

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event 6 (Loss of Service Bus 1C) when SG A level is under control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;...._

Scenario # 2 Event # ..,;6;;,.:.,.:..7,z..;8;.:,.,

... 6..,..;,.7'1,..;8;.:.".;;;.&..;;.9

&.;,;",.;,.9_ _ Page ~ of ...;3;;.;9~-I

_3;.;;9~-I Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: Multiple Alarms; FLOW LO P-8 PERMSV CREW Responds to multiple alarms.

RO Reports Reactor Trip demand signal.

RO Initiates a MANUAL Reactor trip.

Booth Operator: Coincident with the MANUAL Reactor Trip, ramp the SG "B" SGTL to 600 GPM over 10 minutes.

CRS Enters EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify Turbine/Generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VLVs are closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ...;....-

Scenario # 2 Event # ...,;6;.:..

_6 ....,*....

..;.,7.:..,;;8;.:,..

7....

,8 &.;.;...;..9_ _ Page

....,_&_9____ ~ of .-30..;.,9---1

_3;;.;9~-I Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, Trip. PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time .1I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized. (YES)

RO Check if SI is actuated:

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-6107 1-1. (NO)

OR

Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row. (NO)

CRS Go to Step 5.

RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1850 psig.

OR

RB pressure GREATER THAN 3.6 psig.

OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig.

OR

Steamline differential pressure GREATER THAN 97 psid.

CRS Go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # _6;..:,*..;.,.71..,;.8;.:..

.;.;.&..;;.9_ _ Page ~ of .....;3;,;;.9---t

~-

Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip. PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution: If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, should be performed to stabilize the plant.

Procedure Note:

Main Turbine vibration should be monitored during coastdown.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Evaluator's Note:

The SG "8" SGTR symptoms will become evident during the conduct of EOP-1.1. It is likely that the crew will initiate a MANUAL SI before an AUTO setpoint is reached. Several EOP-1.1 steps are included in the scenario guide.

The EOP Reference Page action to be monitored in EOP-1.1 is:

SI ACTUATION CRITERIA IF either of the following conditions occurs, THEN actuate SI and GO TO EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, Step 1:

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(8), A(8) TEMP of, is LESS THAN 30 OF.

OR

PZR level can NOT be maintained GREATER THAN 12%.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

Check FW status:

RO

Check if RCS Tavg is LESS THAN 564 of. (YES)

BOP

Verify FW Isolation:

Ensure the FW Flow Control Valves, FCV-478(488)(498), are closed. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;..._ Scenario #

____ Scenario .2- Event #

Event _6;":".,;..7' 8;;.,1'...;;&;;..;9~_

1"",;8,,;..'

_6;;.,1'...;.7.:.., .;..&..;.9_ _ Page ~ of ...;3;.;.,9--1

_3_9~-I Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPENIPORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Ensure the Main FW Isolation Valves, PVG-1611A(B)(C), are closed. (YES)

Ensure the FW Flow Control Bypass Valves, FCV-3321 (3331)(3341), are closed. (YES)

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW Pumps are running. (YES)

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels. (NOT required)

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Trip all Main FW Pumps.

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 557 oF. (YES)

Evaluator's Note:

At some point early in EOP-1.1, SGTR symptoms will be evident from lowering PZR level and pressure. The CRS should direct a MANUAL SI when it is clear that the Reference Page Sllnitiation criteria will be met

When SI is initiated a PZR PORV will fail OPEN and will not close or isolate.

CRS Directs a MANUAL SI.

RO Initiates a MANUAL SI.

CRS Returns to EOP-1.0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --.;....-

Scenario # 2 Event # _6;.:"..;..7:..;,8~,.-.&..;;.9_ _ Page ll- of ...,;3;.:;.9--1 Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note: The EOP-1.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA

IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

REDUCING CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION

Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

REFER TO SOP-505, CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM.

Evaluator's Note:

Actions for ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION, are provided on the final 3 pages of this scenario guide.

Adverse containment values will be reached during the scenario.

BOP Initiate ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 psig on PR-RO 951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen. (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

--1

-=-- Scenario # 2 Event # _6;;,:,'..;.7~,

_6;..:.,_7,...8 .... _&....

, .;;;.&..;;.9 8;.:." 9 _ _ Page ~ of -.;3;.;;;,9---f

....;3~9---f Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPENIPORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

PZR PORVs are closed. (NO PCV-455B OPEN)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL

MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV BI,?ck Valve is open. (YES)

RO Attempts to close PCV-455B and reports it will not close.

RO Attempts to close MVG-8000C and reports it will not close.

Booth Operator: The crew may direct local closure of the PORV isolation valve. If so, wait 5 minutes and then report that the clamp on ammeter has broken and you are searching for another.

IF the Block Valve can NOT be closed, THEN GO TO EOP-2.0, CRS LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

CRS Transitions to EOP-2.0.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-:....- Scenario # 2 Event # _6:;.t,

_6;,.:..'*..;.,7:..;.

_7.:.-8 8;.:..

.;;.;.&.;;;.9 9__ _ _ Page ~ of .....;3;..;.9---4

_3_9---t

~-

Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip. PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I ~licant's Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note: The EOP-2.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA

IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

TUBE RUPTURE TRANSITION CRITERIA

IF any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR if any SG has abnormal radiation, THEN start Charging Pumps and operate valves as necessary, and GO TO EOP-4.0, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.

CRITICAL TASK RO Stops all running RCP's before exiting EOP-2.0.

Evaluator's Note: The crew may perform some steps in EOP-2.0 but should transition to EOP-4.0, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, on the Reference Page Criteria shortly after entering EOP-2.0.

CRS Transitions to EOP-4.0.

Evaluator's Note: The only EOP-4.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies is a continuation of the requirement to reduce control room ventilation that started with the implementation of EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs .

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;..._

Scenario # 2 Event # _6....,-..7,:....;8

_6;.:.,..;..71,..;'....

, .;;;.&...;.9 8;,.:.., .;..&..;.9_ _ Page ~ of _3;;;.;9

_3;;.;9:"'--f Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped (None running)

Procedure Caution - Step 2 Radiation levels may have increased in steamlines. Proper radiological precautions must be taken when obtaining samples to minimize personnel exposure.

CREW Identify the RUPTURED SG(s):

Narrow Range level in any SG increasing in an uncontrolled manner. (SG "8")

As determined by Chemistry sample analysis for abnormal activity using a frisker.

Procedure Caution - Step 3 At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

80P Isolate flow from each RUPTURED SG:

Place the Steamline PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) in MAN and closed.

Adjust the PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) to 8.85 (1150 psig).

Place the Steamline Power Relief 8 Mode Switch(s) in PWR RLF.

Place the PWR RELIEF 8 SETPT Controller(s) in AUTO.

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552 OF), THEN place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to 8YP INTLK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;...-

Scenario # 2 Event # 8'-:'...;;&.;..;9~_

_6;':"..;..7:..0'8;.:,.

_6.;.:,..;,7.:,., * .;;.;.&..;;.9_ _ Page _3.;;.;9~-I

~ of _3;;.;9~-I Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, Trip. PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Verify the Steamline PORV (B) closed.

Procedure Caution: If the TO EFW Pump is the only available source of feed flow, the steam supply to the TO EFW Pump must be maintained from at least one SG, to maintain a secondary heat sink.

Procedure Note - Step 3.g If the TO EFW Pump is tripped, it should be reset as time permits.

BOP IF SG B OR SG C is RUPTURED, THEN perform the following:

CRITICAL TASK

IF at least one MO EFW Pump is running, THEN isolate the TO EFW Pump by placing PVG-2030, STM SPLY TO BOP TO EFP TRN A(B), to CLOSE prior to performing EOP-4.0, Step 6 - Oetermine required core exit - - - .

Notify operators to perform Alternative Action Step 3.g while continuing with this procedure.

BOP Close the following for each RUPTURED SG:

SG Blowdown, PVG-503B

MS Drain Isolation, PVT-2843B

MS Drain Isolation, PVT-2877 for SG B BOP Close the following for each ruptured SG:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801 B

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869B BOP Reports MS Isolation Valve, PVM-2801 B, will not close BOP Close the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # _6;;.:.,..;.7.,8....,.;..&..;.9

....;6;;,:.,..;.,7,:,..;;8.,.;;;,&.;;,9_ _ Page ~ 3~9--t of __

_3_9---1 Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

All remaining MS Isolation AND MS Isolation Bypass Valves.

PCV-2058, MS TO AUX STM.

MVG-1701, STEAM SEAL FEED VLV.

MVG-2896A, SV-1 BSD.

MVG-2896B, SV-2 BSD.

MVG-2896C, SV-3 BSD.

MVG-2896D, SV-4 BSD.

IPV-2231, MS/PEGGING STM TO DEAERATOR.

At the Digital Control Station for the MSRs, ensure the following are closed:

MVG-2811.

XVG-2807.

Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and close.

Place the ST DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS.

Place the following in AUTO and ensure the valves are closed (REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1, ALTERNATE ISOLATION OF RUPTURED STEAM GENERATORS, if necessary to locally isolate valves):

PVT-2870, TO MSR A & B DRN.

PVT-2875, TO MSR A & B DRN.

PVT-2851A, B, C, D, MS LINES TO TURB DRN.

PVT-2713A, B, C, D, STM DUMP DRN BYP.

PVT-2838A, B, HDR DRNS.

Direct the Turbine Building Operator to complete ATTACHMENT 1, ALTERNATE ISOLATION OF RUPTURED STEAM GENERATORS

Use INTACT SG(s) Steamline PORV(s) as needed in subsequent steps to dump steam.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 2 Event # _6;;.:.,..:.7.:..;,8;.:.,.;;;;.&..;;.9

...,;6:.:"..:..7:..,;,8;.:..,;;;;.&..;;.9_ _ Page ~ of ..-;3;;;.9--1

.....;3;.;;;.9---1 Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF any RUPTURED SG can NOT be isolated from at least one INTACT SG, THEN GO TO EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF CRS REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1. (NfA)

BOP Check level in each RUPTURED SG:

Verify Narrow Range level in each RUPTURED SG is GREATER THAN 30% [50%].

Stop EFW flow to each RUPTURED SG:

CRITICAL TASK

Close FCV-3541, MD EFP TO SG B before indicated level reaches 100%.

Close FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TD EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

Maintain Narrow Range level in each RUPTURED SG GREATER THAN 40% [50%].

Procedure Caution - Step 5 The major flowpaths from each RUPTURED SG (MSIV and the TO EFW Pump) must be isolated before performing Step 5, to minimize radiological releases and ensure RCS subcooling is maintained.

Verify each RUPTURED SG pressure is GREATER THAN 350 BOP psig. (YES)

Determine the required core exit TC temperature for RCS CRS cooldown from the table below:

Determines as target temperature .

ROfCRS Check if any RCP is running. (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-:....-

Scenario # 2 Event # _6;;.:.

_6.;;.:*...;,7..:...

...;..7.:..;8;.0,..~&...;..9_ _ Page 8.;;.:*..;;&;;..;9~_ ~ of _3;;.;;9~-I

_3;;.,;9;""--1 Event

Description:

Loss of Service 8us 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "8" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip. PZR PORV 4458 Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "8" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or 8ehavior With no RCP running, RCS cooldown and depressurization may cause RUPTURED loop Tcold to falsely indicate a CRS transition to EOP-16.0, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK, is required. Disregard the RUPTURED loop Tcold indication prior to performing Step 34.

Procedure Note - Step 8 The Rep trip criteria does NOT apply after a controlled cooldown is initiated. Before the Low Steam line Pressure SI signal is blocked, Main Steam Isolation will occur if the Low Steam Pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Dump steam from each INTACT SG: (Steam Dump not BOP available with unaffected MSIVs closed)

Dump steam from each INTACT SG using the Steam line BOP PORVs:

Place the Steamline Power Relief A(C) Mode Switch(s) in PWR RLF.

Adjust the PWR RELIEF A(C) SETPT ControlJer(s) to open Procedure Note - Step 9 Steps 11 through 18 should be performed as time permits, while the cooldown is in progress.

Evaluator's Note: The crew will continue in the procedure and return to the cooldown isolation step when the target temperature is reached.

Verify core exit TC temperature is LESS THAN the value RO determined in Step 6. (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

--1 Scenario # 2 Event # _6.;..:.,_7 ...

, 8.....

, _&_9

_6..., ..;..7,_8;.:..'.;;,;..&..;..9_ _ Page Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR

~ of .... 3;..;..9---1

.....3;..;.,9--1 After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior WHEN core exit TC temperature is LESS THAN the value CREW determined in Step 6, then complete Step 10.

Go to Step 11 BOP Check intact SG levels:

Verify Narrow Range level in intact SGs is greater than 30% [50%].

Control EFW flow to maintain narrow range level in intact SGs between 40% [50%] and 60%.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

Verify power is available to PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL

MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Procedure Caution - Step 12.b If any PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, Step 12.b should be repeated after pressure decreases to LESS THAN 2300 psig, to ensure the PORV recloses.

BOP Verify all PZR PORVs are closed. (NO)

IF PZR pressure is LESS THAN 2300 psig, THEN close the PZRPORV.

IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN close its Block Valve.

IF the Block Valve can NOT be closed, THEN GO TO EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT:

SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 1.

Transitions to EOP-4.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR CRS COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # _6;.:.....:,7..:,..

_6;;;.: 8.-....;&...9___ Page

...;.7..:,..~8.:..:&;;;.,9::..-_ ~

~ _3_9__-1 of _3;;;.:9~-I

~--

Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip. PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time JI Position JI Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario at the transition to EOP4.2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event # _6;;';"..;,,7:...;,8

_6::.:.,..:.7:..;'8;..l...

,.,'.;;.&.;;.9__

.;.,&..;,,9_ _ Page R- 9 ---i1 of .....;3;..;..9---f

_3_

Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-1.0, ATTACHMENT 3 Evaluator Note:

There will be no RHR flow indicated because RCS pressure will remain above the discharge head of the pumps.

All other equipment should be in the design condition unless pre-emptive actions have been taken based on accident diagnosis.

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running.

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open:

FCV-3531 (3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

MVG-2802A(B), MS LOOP B(C) TO TO EFP.

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed:

FW Flow Control

FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(B)(C).

FW Flow Control Bypass, FCV-3321 (3331 )(3341).

SG Blowdown, PVG-503A(B)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(B)(C).

Ensure all Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;....-

Scenario # 2 Event # ..,.;6;;.:"..;,.7:....;,8;,.:..,.; ; .&,.; ;,9_ _ Page

_6;.:,..;.7.,8;.:,...;;&;..;9;....._ ~ of _3;;";9;...-....,,

_3;";9;.......,,

Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure SI Pumps are running:

Two Charging Pumps are running.

Both RHR Pumps are running.

Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per BOP train).

BOP Verify Service Water to the RBCUs:

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP B DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP Check if Main Steam lines should be isolated:

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR

Steamline flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --:..._

Scenario # 2 Event # _6....,_7,....8

_6;,l,'..;..7:..;;' __

, .;.;.&.;;.9 8;.:."....

&_9_ _ Page ~ ...;3~9--f of ...,;3

__9--f Event

Description:

Loss of Service Bus 1C; AUTO Reactor Trip Failure; SG "B" 600 gpm SGTR After Reactor Trip, PZR PORV 445B Fails OPEN/PORV Isolation Valve Fails to Close Coincident with SI: SG "B" MSIV Fails to Close Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment BOP Ventilation Isolation on XCP-61 03, 6104, and 6106.

REFER TO ATTACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-61 04.

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-61 06.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig.

Verify RHR flow on:

FI-605A, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP A FLOW GPM AND

FI-605B, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP B FLOW GPM .

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VC SUMMER Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2009 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC- NEW, 100% Power, EOL, MFP "B" Vibration at 2.1 mils.

RB Spray Pump "B" is tagged out for cleaning and maintenance of the breaker cubicle. 64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months remain on TS 3.6.2.1.

Radiation Monitor RM-A2, Reactor Building Particulate Monitor failed to ZERO 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Planning is preparing a work package. The Action Statement for TS 3.4.6. 1.a is in effect.

The National Weather Service has issued a severe weather alert due to a line of heavy thunderstorms moving into the area.

Turnover:

Maintain current conditions.

Critical Task:

Initiate a MANUAL Turbine Trip no later than the verification of the EOP-13.0 immediate actions.

Minimize EFW flow in accordance with EOP-3.1.

Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 VLVRC04L C-RO Leaking PRZ PORV (PCV-445B)

TS-CRS 2 CND001A C-BOP Condenser Vacuum Pump A" Trips.

U st 3 TUR012A I-RO 1 Stage Pressure Channel PT-446 Fails LO.

TS-CRS

4. FWP025B R-RO Main Feedwater Pump "B" rising vibration N-BOP, Lower Power following the manual trip of MFP "B".

CRS 5 FWP014D I-BOP MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is.

6 TUR002B M-ALL Main Turbine Trip on riSing Vibration.

7 PCS009AB C-ALL ATWS PCS009BB 8 MSS016 M-ALL Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip.

9 MSS006A, C-BOP All MSIVs Stuck Open.

B,C Terminate when normal charging is restored.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 VC Summer 2009 NRC Scenario #3 The crew has pre-briefed on the Initial Conditions and plan for the shift. The crew will take the watch with directions to maintain current conditions.

The BOOTH OPERATOR will activate the leak through PZR PORV PCV-445B shortly after the crew assumes the watch. The RO will respond to the tailpipe temperature alarm and enter the alarm response procedure (ARP). The ARP will direct the crew to determine the leaking PORV using SOP-101, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM,Section V.A - PRESSURIZER PORV TAILPIPE HIGH TEMPERATURE. When the leaking PORV is diagnosed and isolated then the CRS should enter TS 3.4.4.a for the isolated but capable of being cycled PORV.

When the PORV is isolated and the TS entry is complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of the running Condenser Vacuum Pump (CVP). The BOP should respond in accordance with the ARP; opening the condenser suction valve for CVP "C" and starting CVP "C". The crew may enter AOP-206.1, LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM, but essentially the same actions would occur. The dispatched field operator will report a ruptured oil line on CVP "A".

After all relevant actions are completed on the CVP's the Lead Evaluator can cue the Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel LO failure. The RO should respond to the alarm and uncontrolled inward rod motion. The crew should enter AOP-401-7, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILURE, and place Rod Control in MANUAL. The RO should restore Tavg to the pre-MALF value and shift to the alternate channel. Rod Control can be returned to AUTO after the channel is shifted. The CRS should enter the TS for both Reactor Trip and ESF instrumentation.

When Tavg is stable, Rod Control in AUTO and the TS entry complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue increasing vibration on Main Feedwater Pump "B". The crew will enter the ARP and determine that the pump must be tripped and power reduced to ::091 % in accordance with GOP-4B, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 - DESCENDING). During the power reduction, the MASTER Feedwater Pump Speed Controller will fail "AS-IS". The BOP may observe the problem or respond to SG level deviation alarms. The crew will enter AOP-210.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION. The BOP will take MANUAL control and adjust the speed of Main Feedwater Pumps "A" and "C" to maintain SG levels.

When SG levels are under control and the specified power level is reached, the Lead Evaluator can cue the progressive rise in Main Turbine vibration. The crew should enter the ARP and the CRS should set a target for initiating a Main Turbine trip. Since power is greater that P-9 the reactor should be tripped first. At some point the CRS will direct a reactor/turbine trip. The reactor will fail to trip. The crew should enter EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SI ACTUATION, and then transition to EOP-13.0, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION. They should trip the main turbine and initiate emergency boration. After emergency boration flow is verified the dispatched operator will trip the reactor locally. The crew will confirm the reactor trip and return to EOP-1.0. Upon return to EOP-1.0, a steam break will initiate downstream of the MSIV's and all MSIV's will fail to close. The crew will continue in EOP-1.0 to the faulted SG diagnostic steps and then transition to EOP-3.0, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

Shortly after entering EOP-3.0 they will be directed to EOP-3.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. After Emergency Feedwater flow is minimized in EOP-3.1, local operations will close all MSIVs and the crew will transition back to EOP-3.0 on EOP-3.1 REFERENCE PAGE Criteria of at least one SG pressurizing. In EOP-3.0 the crew should terminate HHSI flow.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when HHSI isolation valves are closed and charging flow is under operator control.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 VCSOS NRC Scenario 3 Simulator Setup INITIAL CONDITIONS

IC-NEW, 100% Power.

Tag on RB Spray Pump UB"

Tag(on) on RM-A2 particulate

Reactivity Management PlanfTurnover Sheet for IC.

Crew should pre-brief on procedures, the steps in effect and turnover so that they are prepared to commence actions when the watch is assumed.

PRE*LOAD

OVR-SP008A RB Spray Pump UB" cleared and tagged

OVR-SP008F RB Spray Pump "B" cleared and tagged

MAL-RMS001 D {SET To O} RM-A2 particulate failed

MAL-PCS009AB {SET To BOTH} Blocks the AUTO Reactor trip on A Train

MAL-PCS009BB {SET To BOTH} Blocks the AUTO Reactor trip on B Train

MAL-MSS006A Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure {S/G A} Failure (Set To FAILURE TO CLOSE). SG 'A' MSIV FAILS TO CLOSE

MAL-MSS006B Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure {S/G B} Failure (Set To FAILURE TO CLOSE) SG 'B' MSIV FAILS TO CLOSE

MAL-MSS006C Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure {S/G C} Failure (Set To FAILURE TO CLOSE) SG 'C' MSIV FAILS TO CLOSE

MAL-FWM025B FWP B VIBRATION {SET To 2.1 MILS}

TRIGGERS

Trigger 2 MAL-FWP014D FWP D (SC-509A) {SET To Current Value of Controller Output} AUTO CONTROL FAILURE: MFW Pump MASTER Speed Controller fails "AS-IS

Trigger 3 VLV-RC004L {SET To 0.5%): PZR PORV PCV-445A leakage

Trigger 4 MAL-CND001A: Condenser Vacuum Pump "A" trip

Trigger 5 MAL-TUR012A {SET To O}: Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel fails to ZERO

Trigger 6 MAL-TUR002B {SET To 13 MILS With 10 Minute Ramp}: Rising Main Turbine

. Bearing # 3 vibration.

Trigger 25 MAL-MSS016 {SET To 3 Million MPP} Main Steam Line Break Downstream of MSIVs. Occurs on opening of Rx Trip Breakers.

Trigger 26 Delete Malfunction MAL-PCS009AB (failure of Rx Trip BKR A to open).

{When NI-44 < 90% 2 Yz minute delay}

Trigger 27 Delete Malfunction MAL-PCS009BB (failure of Rx Trip BKR B to open).

{When NI-44 < 90% 2 minute delay}

Trigger 28 MAL-PCS009AA Rx Trip BKR 'A' Failure (Inadvertent Open). {When NI-44 <

90% 2 Yz minute delay}, (Backup to Trigger 26 if no trip signal present)

Trigger 29 MAL-PCS009AA Rx Trip BKR 'A' Failure (Inadvertent Open). {When NI-44 <

90% 2 Yz minute delay}, (Backup to Trigger 27 if no trip signal present)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3

Trigger 30

REMOVE MAL-MSS006A

REMOVE MAL-MSS0068

REMOVE MAL-MSS006C Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -..;...-

Scenario # 3 Event # _1.;....._ _ _ _ Page 6 of _4;.;;.0---1

_4_0---1 Event

Description:

Leaking PRZ PORV (PCV-445A)

Time JI Position 1I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Inform Lead Evaluator and activate Trigger 3 (PZR PORV PCV-445A leakage) approximately 1 minute after the crew assumes the watch.

Indications Available: XCP-616-4-2, PZR RLF LINE TEMP HI XCP-616-4-2, PRT LVL LOrrEMP/LVUPRESS HI RO Responds to alarm XCP-616-4-2, PZR RLF LINE HI TEMP.

RO Enters ARP-001-616-4-2.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

One or more of the following has lifted or is leaking:

PCV-444B, PWR RELIEF.

PCV-445A, PWR RELIEF.

PCV-445B, PWR RELIEF.

RTD failure.

High energy line leakage inside containment.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Determine if a PORV has lifted or is leaking by monitoring the Pressurizer pressure on P1-444(445) , CNTL CHAN PRESS PSIG.

Monitor the following computer points for individual PORV tailpipes:

TI0753(PCV-444B)

TI0754(PCV-445A)

TI0755(PCV-445B)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # ~_ _ _ _ Page

...;... 7 _4.;.;;.0---i of _4;.;...O~

Event

Description:

Leaking PRZ PORV (PCV-445A)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO

Refer to SOP-1 01,Section V, PRESSURE PORV TAILPIPE HIGH TEMPERATURE.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If leakage cannot be stopped, determine if primary system leakage is within the limits of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.

Refer to Technical Specification 3.4.4 for PORV requirements.

RO SOP-101,Section V Procedure Note 2.0 For properly seated Pressurizer Safety Valves, T1075, T1076 and T1077 should all agree to within approximately 2°F.

Observe the following computer points for any indication of RO valve seat leakage:

Pressurizer PORV Tailpipe Temperature (T1074).

"C" Pressurizer Safety Tailpipe Temperature (T1075).

"8" Pressurizer Safety Tailpipe Temperature (T1076).

"A" Pressurizer Safety Tailpipe Temperature (T1077).

If the alarm is due to an increasing Pressurizer Safety Valve RO Tailpipe Temperature, go to the appropriate Annunciator Response Procedure. (NO)

If the alarm is due to a higher than normal Pressurizer PORV RO Tailpipe Temperature, perform the following to determine which PORV is leaking:

Close MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445A ISOL

Close MVG-8000C, RELIEF 4458 ISOL

Observe Pressurizer PORV Tailpipe Temperatures.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

-- Scenario # 3 Event #

Leaking PRZ PORV (PCV-445A)

~--------

Page 8 of 40

~~

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.3.d If a PORV is leaking, the PORV Tailpipe Temperature should first decrease as the loop seal passes through and then begin to increase to the alann setpoint.

If Pressurizer PORV Tailpipe Temperatures decrease, perform RO the following:

Open MVG-8000C, RELIEF 4458 ISOL.

If PORV Tailpipe Temperatures increase, perform the following:

Close MVG-8000C, RELIEF 4458 ISOL.

Open MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445A ISOL.

If PORV Tailpipe Temperatures do not increase, then ensure MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445A ISOL, remains closed.

If Pressurizer PORV Tailpipe Temperatures do not decrease, RO then perform the following: (N/A)

Open MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445A ISOL.

Open MVG-8000C, RELIEF 4458 ISOL.

Close MVG-80008, RELIEF 4448 ISOL.

After determination and isolation of leaking Pressurizer PORV, CRS have Plant Support Engineering evaluate the leaking PORV.

After a leaking PORV has been isolated for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , cycle its associated isolation valve, MVG-8000A(8)(C), full open and CRS reclosed, to prevent potential thermal binding, unless the isolation valve has power removed per Tech Spec 3.4.4.

CRS Enters TS 3.4.4.a With one or more PORV(s) inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 3 Event #

1

~---------

Page 9 of 40

-~~

~~~

Event

Description:

Leaking PRZ PORV (PCV-445A)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or

Close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 2, Condenser Vacuum Pump "A" trip, after the PZR PORV TS declaration is complete.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;....-

Scenario # 3 Event # 2 ____

...;2~ Page 10 of _4-..0---1 40

~-------- --~

Event

Description:

Condenser Vacuum Pump "A" Trips Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Activate Trigger 4 MAL-CND001A: Condenser Vacuum Pump "A" trip, on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: XCP-628-1-1, VCP AlBIC TRIP BOP Responds to alarm XCP-628-1-1, CVP AlBIC TRIP BOP Enters ARP-001- XCP-628-1-1 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Pump or motor malfunction causing an overload.

Oil pressure less than 4 psig.

Discharge air temperature greater than 190°F.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: NONE Procedure Note: This alarm has reflash capabilities.

Evaluator's Note: The crew may go to SOP-20S, MAIN AND AUXILIARY CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM, to start Main CVP C.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

BOP

Determine which vacuum pump tripped. ("An)

If Main Vacuum Pump A tripped, perform the following:

Open MVB-102A, VAC PP C TO CNDSR A.

Start XAC-0001 C, MAIN CVP C.

Place XAC-0001A, MAIN CVP A, to STOP.

Verify vacuum is stable on PI-3006(3016), MAIN A(B) PRESS BOP INCHES HG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

~-

Scenario # 3 Event #

Condenser Vacuum Pump "An Trips

_2;;..-._ _ _ _ Page

_2~

11 of

t 40

---t Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior n

Dispatches AO to check CVP "C and investigate trip of CVP CREW "A".

Booth Operator: As AO, report a broken oil line on CVP "A" and stopping the auxiliary oil pump.

BOP If necessary, start the following per SOP-206: (N/A)

XAC-0002A, AUX CVP A.

XAC-0002B, AUX CVP B.

Refer to AOP-206.1, DECREASING MAIN CONDENSER CRS VACUUM.

CRS Contacts Work Control/Maintenance for assistance.

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 3, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Channel PT -446 Fails LO, after a standby CVP is running, all field reports have been made, and the crew has verified stable condenser vacuum.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ~_ Scenario # 3 Event # _3;;;...-_ _ _ _ Page

..,;3:;..-.____ 12 of _4;.;.0---1

_4;.;.0--1

~-

st Event

Description:

1 Stage Pressure Channel PT-446 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Activate Trigger 5 MAL-TUR012A: Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel fails to ZERO, on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: Uncontrolled Rod Motion XCP-615, 2-5, RCS TAVG-TREF HI/LO; XCP-624-4-2, 5-2, 6-2; SG A, B, C STM FLO HI Evaluator's Note: The crew could enter the ARP but it is likely that they will recognize the entry condition for AOP-401.7, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILURE.

RO Performs the immediate actions of AOP-401. 7

Place Rod Control Bank Select Switch to MANUAL Enters AOP-401. 7, Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel CRS Failure RO Place Rod Control Bank Select Switch to MANUAL Ensure Tref 1st STG PRESS switch is positioned to the RO operable channel

PT-447, CH IV RO Adjust control rods until Tavg is within 1.0 degrees F of Tref BOP Check if Main Turbine load is greater than 10% (YES)

CRS Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , verify the following permissives are dim:

P-13, 1st STG PRESS (YES)

P-7, REACTOR TRIP BLOCKED (YES)

CRS Restore Automatic Rod Control:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ____ Scenario #

_____ -1.- Event # _3_ _

~3::..- _____ ___ Page 13 of _4.;.;;.0--1

_4;..;.0---1 st Event

Description:

1 Stage Pressure Channel PT-446 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Check if AUTO rod control is desired

Verify reactor power is >15% (C-5 Status Light Dim)

Verify Tavg is within 1 degree F of Tref.

Place Rod Control Bank Select Switch in AUTO.

BOP Place Steam Dump Mode Select Switch in STM PRESS.

CRS Notify I&C to place AMSAC in BYPASS.

Notify I&C to place the failed channel protection bistables in a CRS tripped condition within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months s:

FB-474A

FB-484A

FB-494A CRS Refer to Technical Specifications:

Table 3.3-1, Item 19.B, E (Action 7 within 1 hr)

Table 3.3-3, Item 4.d (Action 24 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months )

Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the failed channel protection bistables in a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel.

REFER TO Attachment 1.

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument.

Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

STPs.

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # _3_ _

_3~ __ ___ ___ Page 14 of _4..;.;O

__-f

_4.;.;O:"'--f st Event

Description:

1 Stage Pressure Channel PT-446 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Initiate a 30 day R&R for placing AM SAC in BYPASS .

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 4, Rising vibration on MFP "B".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

_4.;..;O~-I Op Test No.: ...:...- Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;..;&;;..;;..5_ _ _ Page 15 of Event

Description:

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position J Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, activate the trigger for rising vibration on MFP "B"

Fail the AUTO MASTER Feedwater Pump Controller "AS-IS" when the crew begins the power reduction.

Indications Available: XCP-625-3-2, FWP AlBIC VIBRATION HI BOP Responds to alarm CREW Enters ARP-001-XCP-625-3-2 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Flow instability.

Bearing failure.

Instrument failure.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None Procedure NOTE: This alarm has reflash capabilities.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Monitor GRAPHIC 301, 302 and 303 screens to determine which bearing is in alarm.

If either of the following vibration limits are exceeded, and appears to be valid, trip the affected Feedwater Pump and reduce power as necessary per GOP-4B:

a. <?: 3.0 mils (sustained).

b. <?: 2.0 mils and increasing at a rate of 0.1 mils per hour.

CRS Directs BOP to trip MFW Pump "B"

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-.;...-

Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;..&;;;..;.5_ _ _ Page 16 of _4.;.;;.0--:t Event

Description:

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position J Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP Trips MFW Pump "B" CRS Enters GOP-4B CRS Verifies Initial Conditions:

Procedure CAUTION 3.1 through 3.12

Thermal Power changes of greater than 15% in any one hour require completion of Attachment litH. of GTP-702.

VCS PIO Report, POWER CHANGE SEARCH, should be periodically performed to ensure a thermal power change of greater than 15% in anyone-hour period is detected.

Procedure NOTE 3.1 through 3.12

a. Step 3.1 lowers Reactor Power from 100% to 90%.

b. If the RCS will be opened for maintenance during the shutdown, degassing of the RCS should be initiated per SOP-102, Chemical And Volume Control System.

c. The setpoint for IFK3136, FLOW TO OEAERATOR, should be adjusted during power changes to maintain LI-3136, OEAER STOR TK NR LVL, between 2.5 and 5.0 feet.

CREW Informs Load Dispatcher.

Evaluator's Note: The crew may initiate a boration before the power reduction begins. Boration steps are not in GOP-4B but are included for evaluator use following the load reduction steps in this scenario guide.

BOP Reduce power to 90% by either of the following methods:

By use of the DEC LOAD RATE circuit as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 4&5 Page 17 of 40

~- ~~----- ----~

Event

Description:

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

De-energize LOAD LIMIT circuit.

Energize DEC LOAD RATE circuit.

Select desired rate on LOAD RATE LMT-% PER MIN, up to 5% per minute.

Decrease LOAD SET to the load desired.

By use of the load limiter as follows:

Ensure LOAD LMT light is lit.

Turn the LOAD LMT SET potentiometer counterclockwise, up to a nominal 5% per minute, until the desired load is reached.

As load decreases, adjust Megavars using GEN FIELD VOLT BOP ADJ as requested by the Load Dispatcher and within the Estimated Generator Capability Curve (Enclosure A).

Maintain Tavg within the control band by Control Rod motion or RO boron concentration changes.

Borate or dilute per SOP-106, Reactor Makeup Water System, RO to maintain the following parameters:

1) f11 within limits.

2) Control Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit.

BORATION STEPS (SOP-106,Section III.F - All steps perfonned by the RO)

Procedure Note 2.0

Energizing additional Pressurizer Heaters will enhance mixing.

LCV-115A, LTDN DIVERT TO HU-TK, will begin to modulate to the HU-TK position at 70% level on LI-115, VCT LEVEL %.

RO Ensure at least one Reactor Coolant Pump is running.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;..&;.;..;;..5

_4.;..;&;;;...;;;.5_ _ _ Page 18 of _4..;;,.0---1

_4;.;.0--1 Event

Description:

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to BOR.

(Peer ~)

Set FIS-113, BA TO BLNDR FLOW, Batch Integrator to the desired volume. (Peer -V)

Place RX COOL SYS MU Switch to START.

Procedure Note 2.6 Step 2.6 may be omitted when borating less than 10 gallons.

Place FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW, controller in AUTO.

Procedure Note 2.7 The AUTO setpoint dial for FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW, controller may be adjusted slowly to obtain the desired flow rate.

Verify the desired Boric Acid flow rate on FR-113, BA TO BLNDR GPM (F-113).

When the preset volume of boric acid has been reached, perform the following:

Place FCV-113A&B, BA flow controller in MAN .

Verify boration stops .

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Procedure Note 2.10

If plant conditions require repeated borations, Step 2.10 may be omitted.

The volume in the piping between the blender and the VCT outlet is approximately 3.8 gallons.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;....-

Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;...&~5_ _ _ Page 19 of _4;.;.0--11 Event

Description:

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Alternate Dilute 4 to 6 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to flush the line downstream of the blender by performing the following:

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AL T DIL. (Peer ")

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to desired flow rate.

Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator to desired volume. (Peer ")

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Verify desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

Verify alternate dilution stops when preset volume is reached on FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, batch integrator.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to STOP.

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT switch to AUTO.

(Peer ")

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, to 7.5 (120 gpm).

In MAN, adjust FCV-113 A&B, BA FLOW OUTPUT, to the required position which will ensure proper Boric Acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Adjust FCV-113A&B, BA FLOW SET PT, to the desired position to ensure proper boric acid addition for subsequent Automatic Makeup operations.

Place RX COOL SYS MU switch to START.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;,.&;;;..,;;,,5

_4.;,.;&;;,.;;..5_ _ _ Page 20 of _4;.;..0---f

_4_0---t Event

Description:

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the in-service Boric Acid Tank.

If necessary, start XPP-13A(B), BA XFER PP A(B), for the Boric Acid Tank on recirculation.

Event 5 (AUTO MASTER Feedwater Pump Controller fails AS-IS) Actions:

Responds to failure of MFP's A and C to compensate for power BOP reduction or multiple SG LVL DEV alarms.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 or 2-5 or 3-5 ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 PROBABLE CAUSE:

Step load increase or decrease.

Steam Generator A level control system malfunction.

FCV-478, A FCV, malfunction.

Testing in progress.

Instrument failure.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

FCV-478, A FCV, will modulate to restore level to 61.6%.

BOP Determines/reports all FCV's are responding the same way.

ARP-001-XCP-624-1-5 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 .

Op Test No.: -.;...-

Scenario # 3 Event # _4.;..&~5_ _ _ Page 21 of _4.;.;;.0---1 Event

Description:

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Evaluate SG A Narrow Range level indicators LI-474, LI-475, and LI-476.

If required, restore Steam Generator A level to between 60% and 65% by performing either or both of the following:

Manually control PVT-478, SG A FWF, as required.

Adjust the differential pressure between Feedwater Pump discharge header pressure and Main Steam header pressure, as required, to restore Steam Generator water level.

If FCV-478, A FCV, malfunctioned go to AOP-21 0.1, Feedwater Flow Control Valve Failure.

If a Main Feedwater Pump has tripped or is malfunctioning go to AOP-21 0.3, Feedwater Pump Malfunction.

CRS Enters AOP-210.3, FEEDWATER PUMP MALFUNCTION.

BOP Performs Immediate Actions:

Verify at least one Feedwater Pump is running (YES)

Check if a Feedwater Pump trip occurred (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 13.

Manually control Feedwater Pump speed using MCB MASTER BOP SPEED CONTROL

Place the Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL in MAN.

Adjust Feedwater Pump speed to maintain discharge header pressure 150 to 250 PSIG greater than Main Steam Header Pressure on:

PI-508, FW PP DISCH HDR PRESS PSIG.

PI-464C, MS HDR PRESS PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Scenario # 3 Event # _4..;...;.;&...;5____ Page 22 of _4.;.,;0;...-......

MFP "B" Vibration; Lower Power; MFP Master Speed Controller Fails As-Is Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Adjust PUMP A(C) SPEED CNTRL (MCB MIA Stations) setpoint potentiometers, as necessary to balance all operating Feedwater Pumps speed to within 120 rpm of each other.

Determine and correct the cause of the Feedwater Pump CRS speed control malfunction.

Evaluator's Note: The previous AOP-210.3 step remains in effect until the malfunction is repaired.

CRS Contacts I&C andlor Work Control for assistance.

Lead Evaluator: When SG level is under control, cue Event 6, Main Turbine Rising Vibration

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --:..._ Scenario #

3 Event # ..,;6;.:."..;,.7,:..,;8;.:,.,

_6;;.:.*..;..7:...;.8;.:., .;;;.&.;;.9_ _ Page

.;;;..&..;;.9__ ~ of _4.;.;0;"-'-1

_4....;0;"-'-1 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position II Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: On cue from Lead Evaluator, activate trigger for rising Main Turbine Vibration Indications Available: XCP-632-4-2, MN TURB VIB HI XCP-632-1-4, TURB SUPERVISORY INSTR BOP Responds to alarm XCP-632-4-2, MN TURB VIB HI.

Evaluator Note: The crew may initiate a power reduction in an attempt to stabilize vibration.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-632-4-2.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Insufficient bearing oil flow.

Lube oil temperature change.

Bearing damage.

Turbine operation in the critical speed range.

IYR05602-TB, TURBINE VIBRATION RECORDER (CB-463), failure.

463).

Low Turbine Exhaust Hood temperature.

Gland packingfTurbine Rotor rub.

Turbine rotor imbalance.

Generator MVARS less than 100 MVARS.

Temperature difference between the inlets to the Low Pressure Turbine is greater than 50°F.

Hot Reheat Steam temperature changes greater than 125°F/hr.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

None.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 3 Event # _6~,_7_,

_6~'..;.7.:..,8 8~'..;&;..;9;....._

9 _ _ Page ~ of _40";';;"--1

_40";";"'--1 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: This Annunciator has reflash capabilities.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

CREW

Evacuate all unnecessary personnel from the Turbine Building.

BOP

Monitor Main Turbine vibration levels:

IYR05602-TB, TURBINE VIBRATION RECORDER.

IPCS, type in TURBRG.

BOP Reports Bearing 3 as highest reading point.

Evaluator's Note: The vibration limits from the table are:

10 mils for 15 minutes

12 mils requires immediate trip

5 mils acceptable for continued operation The eRS should establish guidance as to when to initiate a reactor and turbine trip.

If any of the above vibration trip conditions are exceeded, perform the following:

Trip the Main Turbine.

Implement AOP-214.1 while monitoring for indications of imminent Turbine damage per Step 4.

If vibration levels exceed 14 mils and Turbine speed is greater than 900 RPM perform the following:

Evacuate all personnel from the Turbine Building.

Break vacuum in the Main Condenser as follows:

Stop all operating Condenser Vacuum Pumps .

Open MVB-101, CNDSR A & B VAC BKR.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES*D-2 Op Test No.: -=-_

-.;...- Scenario # 3 Event # _6~'.;..7:..;;', ,;;;.:8,..;:&;;..;9;;...-_

_6,;;;.:,..;,7....8;.:..,.;;.;.&..;.9_ _ Page _4..:.;O;;...-~

~ of _4.;.;O~~

Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

When the Turbine Building is accessible, complete the shutdown of the Condenser Air Removal System per SOP-206.

BOP Monitors and reports vibration readings.

CRS Directs a MANUAL reactor trip.

CRS Enters EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open. (NO)

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit. (NO)

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing. (NO)

If the reactor is not tripped using both reactor trip switches, or CRS the reactor is NOT subcritical, then go to EOP-13.0, Response to Abnormal Nuclear Power Generation, Step 1.

CRS Enters EOP-13.0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 3 Event # _6';"':'...;.7.:..,8,;",:'...;&,;..;9~_ Page ~ of _4;..;;.,0---4 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution: To prevent core damage due to low flow:

All three RCPs must remain in operation if Reactor power is above 38%.

At least two RCPs must remain in operation if Reactor Power is above 10%.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 and 2 are Immediate Operator Actions.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Procedure Note Step 1:

Manual or Automatic rod control may be used to perform Alternative Action Step 1, whichever provides the fastest Control Rod insertion rate.

RO Verify reactor Trip: (NO)

Trip the Reactor using both the Reactor Trip Switches.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

If the reactor will not trip or is not subcritical, then insert control RO rods.

Dispatch an operator to trip the reactor locally lAW EOP-13.0, CRS Attachment 1.

Booth Operator:

Trip the reactor locally after Emergency Boration flow has been verified.

Initiate the steamline break when the crew returns to EOP-1.0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-- Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;.:.*..;..7:...;.8;.:.

.;;.;.&.;:.9_ _ Page ll..- of _4;.;;.O--f Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP Verify Turbine/Generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM STOP VLVs are closed.

Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay).

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MD EFW Pumps are running. (STARTS)

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

RO Initiate emergency boration of the RCS:

Ensure at least one charging Pump is running.

Verify PZR pressure is LESS THAN 2335 psig.

Verify SI ACT status light is NOT lit.

Open MVT-8104. EMERG BORATE.

Verify XPP-13B, BA XFER PP B, is running.

Verify GREATER THAN 30 gpm flow on FI-110, EMERG BORATE FLOW GPM.

Caution - Step 5: If an 51 signal exists or occurs, Steps 1 through 8 of EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION.

Should be performed to verify proper 51 actuation, while continuing with this procedure.

Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation Valves closed by RO verifying the following SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim:

XCP-6103 3-4 (Post ACCID HR EXH 6057 & 6067).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;...-

Scenario # 3 Event # _6;.:,*..;,.7:.,.;.8;.,l,.'.;;;,&..;.9_ _ Page ~ of _4_0_-1 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

XCP-6103 2-1 (Post ACCIO HR EXH 6056/6066).

RO/CRS Verify the Reactor is subcritical: (YES)

Power Range channels indicate LESS THAN 5%.

Intermediate Range channels indicate a negative startup rate.

GO TO Step 15. Observe the CAUTION prior to Step 15.

Caution - Step 15: Boration should be continued to obtain adequate shutdown margin during subsequent actions.

CRS RETURN TO the Procedure and Step in effect.

CREW Returns to EOP-1.0, Step 1 Evaluator's Note: The crew has the authority in accordance with OAP-1 03.4 to minimize EFW flow as soon as the accident (aU SG's are faulted) is diagnosed.

The crew may enter and immediately exit EOP-15.0, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, during the scenario due to the directed EFW flow reduction.

Evaluator's Note: The EOP REFERENCE PAGE requirements that apply to this scenario are:

RCP Trip Criteria

Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

CREW Performs immediate actions:

RO Verify Reactor Trip: (YES)

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch .

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # _6,.,;._7.;..' 8.;..:*...;;&.;..;9~_

..;,7.:,..8,;.:

_6,;.: ...;;&__9____ Page ~ of _4..;.;O~-t

_4_0_-t Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized (YES).

RO Check if SI is actuated: (YES)

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-6107 1-1 .

OR

Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row.

row .

CREW Actuate SI using either SI ACTUATION Switch.

GO to Step 6.

Reports indications of steam break outside RB.

Evaluator's Note: Actions for ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERI FICATION, are provided on the final 3 pages of the scenario guide.

BOP Initiate ATTACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 pSig on PR-RO 951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 3 Event # _6...;",_7:....;,8...., ,.;..&..;.,9_ _ Page

_6;;.:.,..;.7:..;,8;.:",.;;;.&..;.9 ~ of _4;..;;.0---4

_4..;,.0---t Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF RCS temperature is LESS THAN 55TF AND decreasing, BOP THEN:

Close IPV-2231, MS/PEGGING STM TO DEAERATOR.

Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and close.

Place the STM DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS.

Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in AUTO.

Ensure all Steamline PORVs and Condenser Steam Dumps are closed.

COMPLETE ATTACHMENT 6, STEAM DRAIN VALVE ISOLATION.

RO/BOP

Perform one of the following:

IF Narrow Range SG level is LESS THAN 30% [50%] in all SGs, THEN reduce EFW flow as necessary to stop the cooldown, while maintaining total EFW flow GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

OR WHEN Narrow Range SG level is GREATER THAN 30%

[50%] in at least one SG, THEN control EFW flow as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature at 557 OF.

IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN close:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C). (Reports none will close)

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C) .

Ensure SG Blowdown Valves, PVG-503A(B)(C), are closed.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

PZR PORVs are closed (YES)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 3 Event # _6;;;.:,...;.,7l.,,;.8;.:,.. .;;;.&.;.9__ Page ll.- of 40 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL

MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Procedure Note Step 11:

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped:

Check if either of the following criteria is met:

Annunciator XCP-612-4-2 is lit (PHASE B ISOL) OR

RCS Pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig and SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLO/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Stop all RCPs.

BOP Verify no SG is Faulted:

No SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.

(NO, ALL)

No SG is completely depressurized.

CRS Go to EOP-3.0, Faulted SG Isolation.

Procedure Caution:

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Any FAULTED SG or secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS Cooldown, to prevent reinitiating the break.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;...-

Scenario # 3 Event # _6;,,:,'.;...7':..;8~,&.;,;.",;,.9_ _ Page ~ of _4;.;.0---1 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

BOP Ensure all the following are closed. (NO)

MS Isolation Valves PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

BOP Check if any SG is NON FAULTED:

Pressure in any SG is stable OR increasing. (NO)

Any SG is NOT completely depressurized.

If all SG pressures are decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized then GO TO EOP-3.1, BOP UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1.

CRS Transitions to EOP-3.1.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

BOP Isolate secondary pressure boundaries for all SGs:

Close all of the following valves:

MS Isolation, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

FW Flow Control, FCV-478(488)(498).

FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(B)(C).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Scenario # 3 Event # _6,;..:.*..;.7.:..;.8;.,:..* .;..&..;.9__ Page Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open

.E- of _4...;.0---1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SG Blowdown, PVG-503A(B)(C) .

FW Flow Control Bypass, FCV-3321(3331)(3341) .

Caution - Step 1.b: If the TO EFW Pump is the only available source of feed flow, the steam supply to the TO EFW Pump must be maintained from at least one SG, to maintain a secondary heat sink.

Complete isolation of all SGs.

CREW Close all of the following valves:

SG Chemical Feed Isolation, MVK-1633A(B)(C).

MS Drain Isolation:

PVT-2843A(B)(C)

PVT-2877A(B).

CREW Locally open the following breakers:

XMC1DA2X 05EH, EF PUMP MAIN STEAM BLOCK VLV XVG2802A-MS (IB-463).

XMC1DB2Y 05EH, EMERG FEEDWATER PUMP MAIN STEAM BLOCK XVG2802B-MS (AB-463).

CREW Locally close the following valves (IB-436 East Pen):

XVG02802A-MS, MS HEADER B EF PUMP TURBINE SUPPLYVLV.

XVG02802B-MS, MS HEADER C EF PUMP TURBINE SUPPLYVLV.

Place all Steamline PWR RELIEF A(B)(C) SETPT Controllers BOP in MAN and closed.

Place all Steam line Power Relief A(B)(C) Mode Switches in BOP PWRRLF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Scenario # 3 Event # _6~'..;.7.:.., 8~'..:;&;..;9:..-_

_6;.;.,_7':...;8;.:...'.-&....

9 _ _ Page ~ of _4.;.;0;.....-...;

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following

_4.;.;0:"--1 Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time JI Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Caution - Step 2 A minimum EFW flow of 50 gpm must be maintained to each SG that has a Narrow Range level LESS THAN 30%

[50%], to minimize thermal shock to SG components.

Note - Step 2 Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown.

BOP Ensure the RCS cooldown is minimized:

Place MD EFP RESET to RESET.

Place TD EFP RESET to RESET.

Verify the cooldown rate in the RCS Cold Legs is LESS THAN CREW 100 °F/hr. (NO)

CRITICAL No later than after the Step 2 CAUTION is read, reduce and TASK BOP maintain EFW flow to each SG at no less than 50 gpm until EOP-3.1 is exited.

CRS GO TO Step 2.e RO Verify RCS Thot is stable OR decreasing.

Booth Operator: Locally close all MSIV's after EFW flow has been minimized and no adjustments are in progress.

BOP Reports all MSIVs have closed.

Transitions back to EOP-3.0 on EOP-3.1 REFERENCE PAGE CRS Criteria:

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

-.:....- Scenario # 3 Event # ....;6;;.:.,..;..:7,~8;.:..,

_6;..:.. ..;.,7.:...;8;.:,..&;;;..;;.9

&.;.;...;..9_ _ Page Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open

~ of _4.....

0---1

_4;.;;.0---1 Time I Position JI Applicant's Actions or Behavior

IF any SG pressure increases at any time, except while performing SI Termination in Steps 15 through 20, THEN GO TO EOP-3.0, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.

SOP Identify any FAULTED SG(s): (NO)

Any SG Pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR

Any SG completely depressurized.

CREW Search for the initiating break:

Ensure steam dump valves are closed

Locally investigate the AS, IS and TS for breaks CRS GO TO Step 6 SOP Check if secondary radiation levels are normal: (YES)

Check radiation levels normal on all unisolated radiation monitors:

RM-G19A(S)(C). STMLN HI RNG GAMMA.

RM-L3. STEAM GENERATOR SLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG SLOWDOWN CW DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS MONITOR.

Notify Chemistry to sample all SG secondary sides, and screen samples for abnormal activity using a frisker.

RO Check if SI flow should be reduced: (YES)

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(S) A(S) TEMP of is GREATER THAN 30°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form E8-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Scenario # 3 Event # _6;.,:.,....

7,:...;8-.,, ; .;,&, ; ;, 9_ _ Page Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following

~ of _4;,,;;,,0---1 Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Secondary Heat Sink is adequate: (YES)

Total EFW flow to INTACT SGs is GREATER THAN 450 gpm OR

Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 30% [50%] in at least one INTACT SG.

RO RCS pressure is stable OR increasing. (YES)

RO PZR level is GREATER THAN 18% [38%]. (YES)

RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A-TRAIN A(B) CONTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B-TRAIN A(B) CONTMT ISOL.

BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEQ A(B) RESETS TO

NON-ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERVo

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPLY TO RB.

GO TO EOP-1.2, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION, CRS Step 1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 3 Event # _6;,:,'.;..7~,8;.:.,.,.;;.;.&..;;.9_ _ Page R- of _4..;.;0;"'-'-1 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

RO Stop all but one Charging Pump and place in Standby.

RO Verify RCS pressure is stable OR increasing. (YES)

RO Establish Normal Charging:

Close FCV-122, CHG FLOW.

Open both MVG-B107 and MVG-B10B, CHG LINE ISOL.

Adjust FCV-122, CHG FLOW, to obtain 60 gpm Charging flow.

Close both MVG-BB01A(8), HI HEAD TO COLD LEG INJ.

RO Control FCV-122, CHG FLOW, to maintain PZR level.

Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario after MVG-8801A(B) have been closed and FCV-122 is under operator control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --:....-

Scenario # 3 Event # ....;6;;.:.".;,.7,:...;8;.:,.,

_6.,.... .;.;.&..;.9 7:...;,8.,.:..,..;..& 9 _ _ Page

.... ~ of _4;.;;.0---11

_4....

0---11 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Attachment 3 - SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION Evaluator NOTE: All equipment verified on Attachment 3 will be in the design condition except:

A MALF is preventing the MSIV's from closing.

The crew may reduce EFW flow to <450 GPM based on the accident diagnosis.

There will be no indicated RHR flow because RCS pressure is above the shutoff head.

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running.

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open:

FCV-3531(3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

MVG-2802A(B), MS LOOP B(C) TO TO EFP.

BOP Verify total EFWflow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

BOP Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed:

FW Flow Control

FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(B)(C).

FW Flow Control Bypass, FCV-3321 (3331)(3341).

SG Blowdown, PVG-503A(B)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(B)(C).

Ensure All Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --.;...-

Scenario # 3 Event # ...,;6;;.:.,..;.,7,:..,.;8;.:..,

_6;.:.*..;..7:..;.8;.:.. &.;;;...;;..9_ _ Page

.;,;,&..;..9 ~ of _4.;.;O~-t

_4.;.;0;""'-4 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure SI Pumps are running:

Two Charging Pumps are running.

Both RHR Pumps are running.

Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per BOP train).

BOP Verify Service Water to the RBCUs:

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP B DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP Check if Main Steam lines should be isolated:

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR

Steamline flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 3 Event # ....;6;.:.,....;7,:..;8;.:..,

_6....., _7';".;8...:..,&_9 &.;;;...;.9_ _ Page ~ of _4_0---1

_4;..;;.0---"

Event

Description:

Main Turbine Trip on rising Vibration; ATWS; Steam Break Outside RB Following Reactor Trip; All MSIVs Stuck Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment BOP Ventilation Isolation on XCP-61 03, 6104, and 6106.

REFER TO ATTACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-61 04.

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-61 06.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig.

Verify RHR flow on:

FI-605A, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP A FLOW GPM AND

FI-605B, RHR DISCHARGE PUMP B FLOW GPM .

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: VC SUMMER Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2009 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-7, - 2% Power, MOL.

A tagout is being removed from Circulating Water Pump "An following a seal water line repair.

Main Feedwater Pump "An is running. MFW Pump MASTER Speed Control is in MANUAL.

GOP-004A, Step 3.6.b is complete.

Turnover:

Continue performing GOP-004A, beginning at Step 3.6.c.

Critical Task:

Stop any running RCP before the transition to EOP-2.0.

Close at least one Phase "A" isolation valve in each unisolated line prior to reporting the completion of EOP-1.0, Attachment 3.

Initiate an RCS cooldown prior to reducing SI flow.

Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A N - BOP, Raise power in preparation for rolling MTG.

CRS R-RO 2 CND004B C-BOP CWP "B" trips (with CWP "A" available for start).

3 RCS008A TS-CRS RCS Loop 1 T HOT RTD Fails LO.

4 CCW001 C-RO Leak in UD HX.

5 OVR- C-BOP Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature.

ANNEG017 6 PRSOO2A I-RO PZR Level Channel LT-459 Fails LO.

7 FWM003A TS-CRS MD EFW Pump "A" trips.

8 PCS009AA M-ALL Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "An Fails OPEN).

9 PRS008 M-ALL 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1)

RHR001A RHR Pump "A" breaker trips.

10 VLVCS042P C-RO/BOP Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual VLVCS051P Closure)

VLVlAOO2P VLVlAOO3P VLVIA004P 11 RHR001B C-ALL RHR Pump "B" trips at transition to EOP-2.0.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 VC Summer NRC Scenario #4 Evaluator NOTE: All events should be cued before the transfer from EFW to the Feedwater Control Valves begins (GOP-4A, Step 3.7.d.). The transfer process is very time-consuming, will add significant run time to the scenario, and preclude the BOP from perfonning any other duties while it is in progress.

The crew will assume the watch with GOP-4A, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 -

ASCENDING), in progress at Step 3.6.c - Reset the Feedwater Isolation signal. One Main Feedwater (MFW) Pump is running with the MASTER Speed Controller in MANUAL.

Circulating Water Pump "A" has been repaired and is being prepared for start. They will pre-brief on the Initial Conditions, the procedure in progress and the shift plan to be ready to assume the watch. The BOP will reset the Feedwater Isolation Signal and place the MASTER Speed Controller in AUTO. The RO will raise reactor power to the point of shifting from Emergency Feedwater (EFW) to MFW by withdrawing control rods. The Lead Evaluator can begin cueing malfunctions at that time.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, Circulating Water Pump "B" will trip. The crew will respond in accordance with the alarm response procedure (ARP), verifying the automatic valve alignment and starting the available Circulating Water Pump ("A").

After Circulating Water Pump "A" is started the Lead Evaluator can cue failure of the Loop 1 Thot RTD. The crew will respond in accordance with the ARP(s). There are no actual operations associated with this failure. The CRS should enter the applicable TS for Reactor Trip Instrumentation and ESF Instrumentation.

When the TS declarations are complete for the Loop 1 Thot RTD failure, the Lead Evaluator can cue the leak in the Letdown Heat Exchanger. The crew should respond in accordance with the Component Cooling Water (CCW) radiation monitor ARP(s). Based on CCW Surge Tank level, VCT level and Letdown Pressure Control response, the crew should diagnose the leak location.

They should then initiate excess letdown in accordance with SOP-102, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, isolate normal letdown and minimize charging.

When all letdown heat exchanger related operations are complete the Lead Evaluator can cue the Unit Auxiliary Transformer high temperature. The crew should respond in accordance with the ARP and dispatch an AO. The AO will report a high winding temperature with no apparent reason. If necessary, Maintenance and/or System Engineering will emphasize the need to unload the transformer for further testing and analysis. The crew should shift the BOP buses to the alternate source in accordance with SOP-304, 11SKVn.2KV OPERATIONS.

After the BOP buses are on the alternate source the Lead Evaluator can cue the controlling PZR Level channel failure. The crew should respond in accordance with AOP-401.06, PZR LEVEL CONTROL AND PROTECTION CHANNEL FAILURE. Letdown is already isolated but the RO must shift to an operable channel pair and restore PZR heaters to operation. There is a TS associated with this failure but it is not counted in that it is similar to the Loop 1 Thot RTD failure.

When the crew has completed the AOP-401-06 actions, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) Pump "A". If necessary, the BOP will adjust flow from MDEFW Pump "B" and/or the CRS may direct a power reduction and/or start of the Turbine-driven EFW (TDEFW) Pump. The CRS should enter TS 3. 7.1.2.a for the inoperable MDEFWPump.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 When the TS declaration is complete for the MDEFW Pump the lead Evaluator can cue Reactor Trip Breaker "A" opening. The crew should enter EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, and then transition the EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY.

After all control rods are confirmed as inserted, a PZR steam space break will occur. This will result in an AUTO SI on RCS pressure and a return to EOP-1.0. Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Pump "An will fail to start and be lost for the remainder of the scenario. The crew should stop all reactor coolant pumps when the criteria is met and the BOP must close at least one Phase "An isolation valve in each un isolated line (RCP Seal Return, RB Instrument Air) during the conduct of EOP-1.0, Attachment 3 - SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION. The crew will transition to EOP-2.0, lOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, based on containment conditions. In EOP-2.0, RHR Pump "B" will trip. This will eventually result in a transition to EOP-2.4, lOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION.

The lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario in EOP-2.4 after the crew has initiated makeup to the RWST, the RCS cooldown is in progress and one Charging Pump has been stopped.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 VCSOS NRC Scenario 4 Simulator Setup INITIAL CONDITIONS

IC-7, 2% Power.

Tag on Circulating Water Pump "An

Circulating Water Pump uN' Discharge Valve in MANUAL

Main Feedwater Pump MASTER Speed Control in MANUAL

Reactivity Management PlanfTurnover Sheet for IC.

Provide a copy of SOP-210, FEEDWATER SYSTEM, for placing MFP MASTER Control in AUTO in the brief room.

Provide marked up copy of GOP-004A, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1 -

ASCENDING), in the brief room.

During validation, need to canvas the operators to narrow the scope of the plan for this shift to avoid overload prior to assuming the watch. Crew should pre-brief on procedures, the steps in effect and turnover so that they are prepared to commence actions when the watch is assumed.

PRE-LOAD

Circulating Water Pump "An cleared and tagged

RHR001A: RHR Pump "An trips on ESFLS start

VLVCS042PNLVCS051 PNLVIA002PNLVIA003PNLVIA004P: Phase "An isolation valves fail to close TRIGGERS

CND004B: CWP UB" trips

RCSOOBA: RCS Loop 1 T HOT RTD Fails LO

CCW001: Leak in CCW HX

OVR-ANNEG017: Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature

PRSOO2A: PZR Level Channel LT -459 Fails LO

FWM003A: MD EFW Pump "An trips

PCS009AA: Reactor Trip Breaker "An opens

RHR001 B: RHR Pump "B" trips OPEN

Remote functions to OPEN when RWST fill is initiated:

XVDOB432-CS, RWST & RHT BA INLET HDR ISOL VALVE.

XVDOB434-CS, RWST BORIC ACID INLET HEADER ISOL VALVE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 4 Event #

1

~--------

Page 5 of 46

~~~

Event

Description:

Raise Power in Preparation For Rolling MTG Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Aj:>Qlicanfs Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: NIA Evaluator Note: Cue all events before the transfer from EFW to the Feedwater Control Valves begins (GOP-4A, Step 3.7.d.).

The transfer process is very time-consuming, will add significant run time to the scenario, and preclude the BOP from performing any other duties while it is in progress.

Reset the Feedwater Isolation signal by momentarily turning BOP the following switches to the right:

FW ISOL TRAIN A RESET.

FW ISOL TRAIN B RESET.

Procedure Caution 3.6.d:

Feedwater Header pressure should be maintained on program prior to opening Feedwater Isolation Valves to minimize water hammer.

Annunciator Point XCP-625 3-3 (FIV AlBIC ACCUM PRESS LO) should be verified clear or pressure locally verified greater than 500 psi prior to opening each Feedwater Isolation Valve. (ref. Tech Spec 3.7.1.6)

BOP Open the following:

PVG-1611A, A ISOL.

PVG-1611B, B ISOL.

PVG-1611C, C ISOL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Scenario # 4 Event #

Page

~--------

Raise Power in Preparation For Rolling MTG 6 of 46

~~

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 3.6.e:

Use MANUAL control only if the Master Speed Controller is unable to control in AUTO.

Ensure the MASTER SPEED CNTRL (MCB MIA station) is in BOP Automatic per SOP-210.

SOP-210, Section E - Step 2.8 steps are below Adjust the Feedwater Pump MASTER SPEED CNTRL (MCB BOP MIA station) to establish program Feedwater Pump DP per Enclosure B.

When the operating Feedwater Pump has stabilized, place the BOP MASTER SPEED CNTRL (MCB MIA station) in AUTO.

PI-50a, FW PP DISCH HDR PRESS PSIG, and PI-464C, MS HDR PRESS PSIG, indicate programmed DP is maintained.

Main Feedwater Regulating Valve demand indicates Feedwater pressure is adequate.

Narrow Range Steam Generator levels are being maintained between 60% and 65%.

When plant load is greater than 15%, close MOV-1-5A(B)(C),

BOP TURB DRN VLV (MCB).

CRS Complete the plant startup per GOP-4A.

Evaluator's Note:

The RO will raise power using MANUAL Rod Control.

The RO/CRS should agree on a target power level.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 4 Event #

Page 7 of 46

-~~

~~~

Event

Description:

Raise Power in Preparation For Rolling MTG Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution 3.7:

Reactor Power must be maintained less than or equal to 10% until Emergency Feedwater is aligned per STP-120.003, Emergency Feedwater Valve Verification. (ref. Tech Spec 4.7.1.2.a.4)

Prepare the Emergency Feedwater System for power RO ascension as follows:

Commence Reactor Power increase to between 6% and 9%.

CRS Log the time and date the plant entered Mode 1 Booth Operator's Note:

Before initiating Event 2 (Circulating Water Pump "B" trips),

clear the tag on Circulating Water Pump "A" and report that it is available for operation.

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 2 (Circulating Water Pump "B" trips) and the remaining events before the transfer from EFW to the Feedwater Control Valves begins (GOP-4A, Step 3.7.d.). The transfer process is very time-consuming, will add significant run time to the scenario, and prevent the BOP from perfonning any other duties.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: _1~_ ...;2=--_ _ _ _ Page 8 of _46__..--1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2

~--------

46

~--~

Event

Description:

CWP "B" Trips (With CWP "A" Available for Start)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-628-3-1, CWP AlBIC TRIP BOP Responds to alarm XCP-628-3-1, CWP AlB/C TRIP.

BOP Reports CWP "B" tripped/not running.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-628-3-1.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Pump or motor malfunction causing an overload.

Turbine Building flood level.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The discharge isolation valve for the tripped pump will close.

Procedure Note: This alarm has reflash capabilities.

EvaluatorlBooth Operator's Note:

Because CWP "A" has just been made available, an operator may be dispatched to verify start conditions are satisfactory.

The crew should announce the start of any major equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If only two pumps were operating prior to the pump trip, perform the following:

Verify the discharge valve for the operating Circulating Water Pump closes to 30% open while performing the next steps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ~_ Scenario # 4 Event # ...;2~

2 ____ Page 9 of _4......

46 6--t

~- ----------- -~~

Event

Description:

CWP "B" Trips (With CWP "A" Available for Start)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Verify the discharge valve for the idle Circulating Water Pump is in AUTO.

Start the idle Circulating Water Pump.

When the discharge valves for the operating Circulating Water Pumps are 30% open, open the discharge valves.

When the discharge valves for the operating Circulating Water Pumps are open, place the discharge valves in AUTO.

Reduce Turbine load as necessary per GOP-4B to maintain the following: (N/A)

Main Condenser vacuum less than 4" Hg absolute.

Aux Condenser vacuum less than 9" Hg absolute.

Circulating Water outlet temperature less than 113°F.

Determine which pump tripped and verify its discharge valve is fully closed.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Determine the cause of the pump trip and correct as soon as possible.

Return the Circulating Water System to normal operation as soon as possible per SOP-207.

Booth Operator's Note:

Report the Circulating Water Pump breaker tripped on overload - cause unknown.

CREW Dispatches an operator to investigate.

CRS Contacts Work Control/Maintenance for assistance.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Scenario # _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 10 of 46 Op Test No.:

- 4 Event #

---f Event

Description:

CWP "B" Trips (With CWP "A" Available for Start)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Lead Evaluator: Event 3 is a TS declaration - no operations are involved. Cue Event 3, RCS Loop 1 THOT RTD Fails LO, anytime after Circulating Water Pump "A" has been started.

I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # ...;3~_ _ _ _ Page 11 of _4.-,.6--1 Event

Description:

Res Loop 1 THOT RTD Fails LO Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-615-1-2, RCS TAVG LO; XCP-615-1-2, RCS TAVG LO-LO XCP-615-1-5, RCS TAVG DEV HIILO; XCP-615-3-5, RCS l1T DEV HI/LO RO Responds to multiple alarms.

RO Enters ARP-001-XCP-615-1-2.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Normal heatup or cooldown in progress.

Channel failure or testing.

The Rod Control System is maintaining Tavg at an improper low value.

Failure of a Steam Generator safety or a power operated relief valve.

Reports Loop 1 Thot failed LO.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

With 2 out of 3 channels tripped and a reactor trip signal present, feedwater isolation will occur.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Monitor TI-412D, TI-422D and TI-432D to determine if a channel failed.

Place Rod Control in MAN and match Tavg to Tref. (N/A)

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If a channel has failed, perform the following:

Refer to AOP-401.2 to trip all bistables associated with

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # _3;...-._ _ _ _

_3~ Page 12 of _4.;.;;.6---1

_4,;.;;,6---1

~-

Event

Description:

Res Loop 1 THOT RTD Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior that channel.

Refer to Technical Specification Table 3.3-3 for minimum channel requirements.

If the Rod Control System malfunctioned, refer to AOP-403.4, Failure of Control Rods to Move. (N/A)

Refers to AOP-401.2, PROTECTION CHANNEL RCS LOOP CRS RTD FAILURE.

Determine which RCS loop has a failed RTD by comparing RO loop [).T and Tavg indicators.

RO Reports Loop 1 Thot.

Ensure an operable loop is selected on [)'T TR-412 INPUT SEL RO Switch.

Booth Operator's Note:

Acknowledge direction to trip bistables and report that you will get it done before the end of the shift. The bistables need not be tripped during the scenario.

Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , place the failed channel protection bistables in CRS a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel.

REFER TO Attachment 1.

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument.

Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

STPs.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --.;...-

Scenario # 4 Event # ..,.;3;;....-____ Page 13 of _4_6__-t Event

Description:

Res Loop 1 THOT RTD Fails LO Time I Position I ARPlicant's Actions or Behavior

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Contacts Work Control/I&C for assistance.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

CRS Enters TS Table 3.3-1 (Items 7 and 8), Action 6 :

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; and

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

Lead Evaluator cue Event 4, Leak in Letdown HX, after the TS declaration is complete. The bistables need not be tripped to continue the scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ~_ Scenario # 4 Event # _4~

_4,;...-_

____ Page 14 _46_-i of _46~-i

~-

Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-644-1-3 CC LOOP A RM-L2A HI RAD; XCP-644-1-4 CC LOOP A RM-L2A TRBL; XCP-643-3-6 CC SRG TK VENT 7096 CLSD HI RAD RO Responds to alarm(s).

RO Enters ARP-001-XCP-644-1-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Radioactive inleakage into the Component Cooling Water System.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

1PW-7096, CC SURGE TK VLV, closes.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Verify the Automatic Action has occurred.

Verify the alarm is valid by observing RM-L2A and RlR-5 for increasing radiation.

Notify Health Physics and request a radiological survey.

Notify Chemistry and request a sample of the Component Cooling System.

Monitor Component Cooling System flows,'temperatures and annunciators for any indications of equipment failure.

Determines leak is in Letdown HX based on CCW indications, CREW PCV-145 response and VCT level.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.:...._ Scenario #

4 Event #

4

~-------

Page 15 of 46

~~~

Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Isolate the source of inleakage when confirmed by sample analysis or a radiological survey.

If leakage is from a Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier, verify adequate seal injection flow and close the associated following valve for the affected pump: (N/A)

If leakage is from the Letdown Heat Exchanger, perform the following:

Place Excess Letdown in service per SOP-1 02 .

RO SOP-102, Section C - Establishing Excess Letdown Verifies Initial Conditions:

RCS heatup is in progress or increased Letdown is required.

Component Cooling Water is in operation per SOP-118.

Procedure Note 2.0: Due to the heat loss generated not being an input to the calorimetric thermal power calculation, Core Power should be maintained at less than or equal to 2898 MWt prior to and during Excess Letdown operations.

RO Ensure HCV-137, XS LTDN HX, is closed.

Procedure Note 2.2: Excess Letdown should normally be directed to the VCT. If required, Excess Letdown may be aligned to the RCDT.

Place PVM-8143, XS LTDN TO VCT OR RCDT to one of the RO following as desired: (PEER ~)

VCT (preferred).

RCDT (alternate).

If required, reset Phase A Isolation by depressing the following:

RO (N/A)

MVT-81 00, SEAL WTR RTN ISOL.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 16 of 46

~- ~-------- ~~

Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

MVT-8112, SEAL WTR RTN ISOL.

RO Ensure MVG-9583, FROM XS LTON HX, is open.

RO Open PVT-8153, XS LTON ISOL.

RO Open PVT-8154, XS LTDN ISOL.

Procedure Note 2.8: When sending Excess Letdown to the RCDT, RCDT level and pump operation should be monitored locally at XPN0007, WASTE PROCESSING/BORON RECYCLE CONT PNL (AB-412).

RO Establish Excess Letdown flow as follows:

Slowly throttle open HCV-137, XS LTON HX.

Monitor TI-139, XS LETDOWN HX OUT TEMP of, to maintain less than 165°F.

Monitor the following to ensure flow between 0.2 gpm and 5.0 gpm:

FR-154A, RCP SL LKOFF HI RANGE.

FR-154B, RCP SL LKOFF LO RANGE.

RO Returns to ARP-001-XCP-644-1-3 to complete steps

Close PVT-8149A(B)(C), LTDN ORIFICE A(B)(C) ISOL.

Close LCV-460, LTDN LINE ISOL.

Close LCV-459, LTDN LINE ISOL.

Close PVT-8152, LTON LINE ISOL.

Close PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN.

Close FCV-122, CHG FLOW.

Adjust HCV-186, INJ FLOW, to maintain 6-13 gpm per pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # _4_ _

_4~ __ _ __ ___ Page 17 of _46';';;"--1

_46";';;;"---1 Event

Description:

Leak in UD HX Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Lead Evaluator cue Event 5, Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature, after HCV-186 has been adjusted or seal injection flow is evaluated as satisfactory.

I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # _5;;...-_ _ _ _ Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-633-6-3, UNIT AUX XFMR XTF-2 TRBL BOP Responds to alarm.

BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-633-6-3.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Transformer N2 pressure high: 8.5 psig

Transformer N2 pressure low: -1.5 psig

Empty N2 cylinder: 200 psig

Winding temperature high: 117°C

High oil temperature: 90°C

Low oil level.

Loss of voltage.

Mechanical relief: 10 psig

Sudden pressure: 5.5 psi/sec

Combustible limit: 1%

CREW Dispatches AO to investigate.

Booth Operator:

Wait approximately 3 minutes then (as AO) report winding temperature at 120 °C and rising slowly with all fans running.

If contacted as Maintenance or System Engineer, wait 3 minutes then report that the temperature appears to be valid but no reason is apparent Recommend unloading to allow testing.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --.;..._ Scenario # 4 Event # _5;;;...-____ Page 19 of _4;.;;.6--f Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

If the alarm is caused by a sudden pressure, the 86T2-1 ,

UNIT AUX DIFF LOCK-OUT RELAY, will actuate.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

If a trip occurs, refer to UNIT AUX DIFF LCKOUT 86T2-1 (XCP-639 3-2).

Dispatch an Operator to XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, to determine the cause of the alarm.

Notify the System Controller.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If necessary, transfer loads to the Emergency Auxiliary Transformers per SOP-304.

When the cause has been corrected, verify XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER, auxiliaries are returned to normal operation per SOP-303.

Contact Substation Maintenance for further assistance, if necessary.

Directs BOP to transfer loads to Emergency Auxiliary CRS Transformers per SOP-304.

BOP Verifies Initial Conditions:

The AUTO-MAN XFER Switch for each Balance of Plant bus is in AUTO.

XTF0031 and XTF0032, EMERGENCY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER #1 and #2 are in service per SOP-302.

Conditions exist which require removal of normal feed for the buses.

XTF0001, MAIN TRANSFORMER and XTF0002, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER are in service per SOP-302.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;..._

. - ; . . . - Scenario

4 Event #

_5;......

5 _ _ _ _ Page 20 of _46~-i 46

~~

Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.1 through 2.3:

When BUS 1A, 1B, or 1C is aligned to its alternate feed, automatic transfer to its normal feed is not available.

BOP Manually transfer BUS 1A to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1A AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1A ALT FEED breaker. (PEER ")

Open BUS 1A NORM FEED breaker. (PEER ")

Verify BUS 1A potential lights remain energized

Place BUS 1A AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER ")

BOP Manually transfer BUS 1B to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1B AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1B ALT FEED breaker. (PEER ")

Open BUS 1B NORM FEED breaker. (PEER ")

Verify BUS 1B potential lights remain energized.

Place BUS 1B AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO.

(PEER ")

Notify the System Controller of the applicable bus voltage limits CREW from Enclosure B. (Determine during validation)

If required, adjust the 115KV and/or 230KV alarm setpoints per CREW Attachment VA and/or Attachment VB for the current lineup.

(Determine during validation)

BOP Manually transfer BUS 1C to alternate feed as follows:

Place BUS 1C AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in MAN.

Close BUS 1C ALT FEED breaker. (PEER ")

Open BUS 1C NORM FEED breaker. (PEER ")

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --:..._ Scenario # 4 Event # ...;;;.,5_ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of 46 Event

Description:

Unit Auxiliary Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Verify BUS 1C potential lights remain energized .

Place BUS 1C AUTO-MAN XFER Switch in AUTO .

(PEER ..J)

Lead Evaluator cue Event 6, Controlling PZR Level Channel fails LO, after all buses have been transferred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;....-

Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 22 of 46

~- ~--------

~------- ~~

Event

Description:

PZR Level Chanel LT-459 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-614 5-1, CHG LINE FLO HI/LO XCP-6161-3, BLCK HTRS ISOL LTDN PZR LCS LO XCP-616 1-5, PZR LCS DEV HI/LO XCP-616 3-1, PZR HTR CNTRL OR BU GRP 1/2 TRIP XCP-616 4-6 SCR OUTPT LOSS RO Responds to multiple alarms.

Recognizes entry conditions for AOP-401.06, PZR LEVEL CREW CONTROL AND PROTECTION CHANNEL FAILURE.

RO Performs Immediate actions of AOP-401.6

Place PZR LEVEL CNTRL Switch to the position with two operable channels.

CRS Enters AOP-401.6 and verifies immediate action performance.

RO Select an operable channel on PZR LEVEL RCDR.

Control the PZR Heaters as necessary to maintain PZR RO pressure:

CNTRL GRP Heaters.

BU GRP 1 Heaters.

BU GRP 2 Heaters.

Evaluator's Note: Several steps will be contrary to the pre-event alignment for the Letdown HX leak with letdown isolated and charging minimized. The CRS should make decisions to maintain the pre-event conditions.

RO Verify Letdown is in service. (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

...,;6;;...-_ _ _ _ Page 23 of _4;.;;;,6--1 Op Test No.: -:....- Scenario # 4 Event #

Event

Description:

PZR Level Chanel LT-459 Fails LO Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check if PZR LVL MASTER CONTROLLER is responding RO appropriately:

Verify Charging flow is normal and responding to PZR level error.

Verify PZR level is stable at OR trending to program level.

Place FCV-122, CHG FLOW, in AUTO. REFER TO SOP-102, RO CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

Booth Operator/Evaluator's Note:

The bistables do NOT need to be tripped to continue the scenario.

Within six hours, place the failed channel protection bistables in CRS a tripped condition:

Identify the associated bistables for the failed channel REFER TO Attachment 1.

Record the following for each associated bistable on SOP-401, REACTOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEM, Attachment I:

Instrument.

Associated Bistable.

Bistable Location.

STPs.

Notify the I&C Department to place the identified bistables in trip.

CRS Determine and correct the cause of the channel failure.

Contacts Work Controlll&C for assistance.

CRS Enters TS Table 3.3-1, Item 11 - Action 6

AppendiX D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # _ _ _ _ Page

_6..0...-_

_6~ 24 of 46

~-

Event

Description:

PZR Level Chanel LT-459 Fails LO Timer Time I Position I Applicant's Aj>QIicant's Actions or Behavior With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; and

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

Lead Evaluator cue Event 7, MD EFW Pump "A" trips, after the TS determination or as desired. This TS determination is not required to meet the minimum for the scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario # 4 Event # _7~ _ _ _ _ Page 25 of 46 Event

Description:

MD EFW Pump "A" Trips Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: XCP-622-1-3, MO EFP A TRIP BOP Responds to alarms BOP Enters ARP-001-XCP-622-1-3 PROBABLE CAUSE: Pump overload or overcurrent relay actuated.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: None.

Evaluator's Note: The CRS could direct the RO to reduce power to ensure MO EFW Pump "B" is sufficient and/or for the BOP to start the TO EFW Pump. The TO EFW Pump is not normally used for SG level control during heatup/cooldown.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Start Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump B if necessary to maintain Steam Generator levels.

Reduce feedwater demand to less than 400 gpm.

Refer to SOP-211.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIONS:

If Steam Generator levels cannot be maintained with one motor driven pump, start the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump.

Place PUMP A control switch in NORMAL-AFTER-STOP to clear the alarm.

Determine the cause of the trip and correct as soon as possible.

If the pump is inoperable, refer to Tech Spec 3.7.1.2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # _7~_

...,;7;.....__

_ Page 26 of 46 Event

Description:

MD EFW Pump "A" Trips Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Dispatches an AO to investigate Booth Operator's Note:

Wait 2-3 minutes then report MD EFW Pump "A" breaker tripped and the overcurrent relay actuated.

CRS Contacts Work Control and/or Maintenance for assistance.

CRS Enters TS 3.7.1.2.a, Action a:

With one emergency feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required emergency feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Lead Evaluator: When SG levels are under control and the TS entry is complete, cue Event 8, Inadvertent Reactor Trip.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;....-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4,.;.;6;"-'-1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available: FIRST OUT ANNUNCIATOR - MAN RX TRIP CREW Responds to multiple alarms.

RO Reports Reactor Trip.

CRS Enters EOP-1.0.

Procedure Note:

Steps 1 through 5 are Immediate Operator Actions.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Trip the Reactor using either Reactor Trip Switch.

Verify all Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers are open.

Verify all Rod Bottom Lights are lit.

Verify Reactor Power level is decreasing.

BOP Verify Turbine/generator Trip:

Verify all Turbine STM Stop VLVs are closed.

Ensure Generator Trip (after 30 second delay):

Ensure the GEN BKR is open.

Ensure the GEN FIELD BKR is open.

Ensure the EXC FIELD CNTRL is tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;...-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8, 9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4~6;""--f

_4~6~-f Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I AppJicant's Actions or Behavior Applicant's BOP Verify both ESF buses are energized. (YES)

RO Check if SI is actuated:

Check if either:

SI ACT status light is bright on XCP-6107 1-1. (NO)

OR

Any red first out SI annunciator is lit on XCP-626 top row. (NO)

CRS Go to Step 5.

RO Check if SI is required: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1850 psig.

OR

RB pressure GREATER THAN 3.6 psig.

OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig.

OR

Steam line differential pressure GREATER THAN 97 psid.

CRS Go to EOP-1.1, REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY.

Procedure Caution: If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, should be performed to stabilize the plant.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -:..._ Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;.;6~-I

_4..;,;6;;""--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Procedure Note:

Main Turbine vibration should be monitored during coastdown.

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

RO Check FW status:

Check if RCS Tavg is LESS THAN 564 oF. (YES)

BOP Verify FW Isolation:

Ensure the FW Flow Control Valves, FCV-478(488)(498),

are closed. (YES)

Ensure the Main FW Isolation Valves, PVG-1611A(B)(C),

are closed. (YES)

Ensure the FW Flow Control Bypass Valves, FCV-3321(3331)(3341), are closed. (YES)

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MD EFW Pumps are running. (NO - only "B")

Verify the TD EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Trip all Main FW Pumps.

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 557 OF. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: --.;...-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _46.....-.--t

_46..;.;;;...--t Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "An Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Procedure Note - Step 4:

If a transition is made to AOP-112.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK NOT REQUIRING 51, the steps of EOP-1.1 which do NOT conflict with AOP-112.2 should be completed as time allows.

IF EOP-1.0 was entered from AOP-112.2, THEN RETURN TO CRS AOP-112.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK NOT REQUIRING SI, Step 7.

Booth Operator's Note:

Insert PZR Steam Space Break after all control rods are verified inserted.

RO Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

RO Reports rapidly lowering RCS Pressure/AUTO SI.

CRS Returns to EOP-1.0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-.;...-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;,.;6;.........

Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator'S Note: The EOP-1.0 Reference Page Criteria that applies in this scenario is:

RCP TRIP CRITERIA

IF Phase B Containment Isolation has actuated (XCP-612 4-2), THEN trip all RCPs.

IF both of the following conditions occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

SI flow is indicated on FI-943, CHG LOOP B CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM AND RCS Wide Range pressure is LESS THAN 1400 psig.

REDUCING CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION

Reduce Control Room Emergency Ventilation to one train in operation within 30 minutes of actuation.

REFER TO SOP-505, CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM.

Evaluator's Note: Actions for ATIACHMENT 3, SI EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION, are provided on the final 3 pages of this scenario guide. There is a critical task to close at least one Phase "A" Isolation Valve in two lines that have not properly isolated.

RB Instrument Air

RCP Seal Water Return BOP Initiate ATIACHMENT 3,81 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION.

CREW Reports failure of RHR Pump "An Booth Operator's Note:

If dispatched wait 2-3 minutes and then report RHR Pump "A" breaker tripped on overcurrent.

CREW Announce plant conditions over the page system.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _46_.....

~-

Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Verify RB pressure has remained LESS THAN 12 psig on PR-RO 951, RB PSIG (P-951), red pen (YES)

RO Check RCS temperature:

With any RCP running, RCS Tavg is stable at OR trending to 55rF.

With no RCP running, RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to 55rF. (NO)

IF RCS temperature is LESS THAN 557 OF AND decreasing, BOP THEN stabilize temperature by performing the following as required:

Close IPV-2231, MS/PEGGING STM TO DEAERATOR.

Perform one of the following:

IF Narrow Range SG level is LESS THAN 30% [50%] in all SGs, THEN reduce EFW flow as necessary to stop cooldown, while maintaining total EFW flow GREATER THAN 450 gpm. OR

WHEN Narrow Range SG level is GREATER THAN 30% [50%] in at least one SG, THEN control EFW flow as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature at 55TF.

COMMENCE ATTACHMENT 6, STEAM VALVE ISOLATION, while continuing with this procedure.

IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN close:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C).

RO Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

PZR Spray Valves are closed. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ....;....-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4;.;;,6---i

_4=6---1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Verify power is available to at least one PZR PORV Block Valve: (YES)

MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445 A ISOL.

MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444 B ISOL

MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445 B ISOL.

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Procedure Note: Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped:

CRITICAL TASK

Stop all RCP's before the transition to EOP-2.0.

BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED:

No SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.

(YES)

No SG is completely depressurized. (YES)

Verify Secondary radiation levels indicate SG tubes are NOT CREW RUPTURED: (YES to aU)

RM-G19A (B) (C) STMLN HI RNG GAMMA

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS MONITOR.

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

RO Check if the RCS is INTACT: (NO to any or aU)

RB radiation levels are normal on:

RM-G7, CONTAINMENT HI RNG GAMMA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ~_ Scenario # 4 Event # 8, 9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4~6---11

_4_6_-11

~-

Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP*2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

RM-G18, CNTMNT HI RNG GAMMA.

RB Sump levels are normal.

RB pressure is LESS THAN 1.5 psig.

The following annunciators are NOT lit:

XCP-606 2-2 (RBCU 1AJ2A DRN FLO HI)

XCP-607 2-2 (RBCU 1B/2B DRN FLO HI)

Transitions to EOP-2.0, LOSS OF REACTOR OR CRS SECONDARY COOLANT.

Procedure Note:

The EOP REFERENCE PAGE should be monitored throughout the use of this procedure.

Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Booth Operator's Note:

Trip RHR Pump "B" as the reading of the first step is in progress. If dispatched to investigate, report the breaker tripped and very hot motor with a smell of burned electrical insulation in the area of the pump.

RO Check if RCPs should be stopped (None running).

BOP Verify no SG is FAULTED

No SG decreasing in an uncontrolled manner (YES)

No SG completely depressurized (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: - .;...-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8, 9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;.;;.6---f

_4;.;;.6---f Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "N Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Check Intact SG levels

NR level in intact SGs >30% [50%]

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%]-60% NR level RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RO/BOP Check if Secondary radiation levels are normal: (YES to all)

Check radiation levels normal on:

RM-G19A(B)(C), STMLN HI RNG GAMMA.

RM-A9, CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS MONITOR. I

RM-L3, STEAM GENERATOR' BLOWDOWN LIQUID MONITOR.

RM-L 10, SG BLOWDOWN CW' DISCHARGE LIQUID MONITOR.

Place SVX-939BA(B)(C), SG A(B)(C) SMPL ISOL, in AUTO.

Notify Chemistry to sample all SG secondary sides, and screen samples for abnormal activity using a frisker.

RO Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

Verify power is available to the PZR PORV Block Valves:

MVG-BOOOA, B, C (YES)

Verify all PZR PORVs are closed. (YES)

Verify at least one PZR PORV Block Valve is open. (YES)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

-- Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4,;.;6:"--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEQ A(B) RESETS to:

NON~ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERV.

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPLY TO RB.

RO Check if SI flow should be reduced:

RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP OF, is GREATER THAN 30 OF. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 11.

RO Check if RB Spray should be stopped:

Check if any RB Spray Pumps are running. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 12. Observe the CAUTION prior to Step 12.

RO Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped: (None running)

RO Check if RCS pressure is stable or decreasing. (YES)

BOP Check if pressure in all SGs is stable or increasing. (YES)

BOP Check if DGs should be stopped:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

~-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9,10,&11 Page IL- of _4.;..;6~-I

_4;.,;;.6---1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Verify both ESF buses are energized by offsite power.

(YES)

Stop any unloaded DG. REFER TO SOP-306, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.

RO Verify equipment is available for Cold Leg Recirculation:

Verify power is available for at least one RHR Pump: (NO -

both breakers are tripped)

GO TO EOP-2.4, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT CRS RECIRCULATION.

Procedure Caution:

If Emergency Coolant Recirculation capability is restored, further recovery action should continue by RETURNING TO the Procedure and Step in effect, since further actions of this procedure are unnecessary.

If the suction source is lost to any SI OR RB Spray Pump, the AFFECTED pump should be stopped to prevent pump damage.

Procedure Note: Conditions for implementing Emergency Plan Procedures should be evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN.

Procedure Note - Step 1:

RHR Sump blockage is indicated by decreased and unstable pump amps, discharge pressure, OR discharge flow.

IF both RHR Pumps are secured due to cavitation, THEN GO CRS TO EOP-2.6, RHR SUMP BLOCKAGE, Step 1. (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

~-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;.;6~-t Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break

_4_6_-1 (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Try to restore at least one train of Emergency Coolant CRS Recirculation:

Notify TSC personnel of conditions and indications .

Booth Operator's Note:

If contacted, report that the TSC is still manning. You will call back when it is activated.

Procedure Caution - Step 2.b:

Equipment may be in abnormally high radiation areas.

Appropriate radiological precautions must be taken to minimize personnel exposure.

Dispatch emergency repair teams as directed by TSC CREW personnel.

RO Reset both SI RESET TRAIN A(B) Switches.

Reset both LATCHED SI RHR SUMP VLV TRAIN A(B)

RO Switches.

Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per BOP train).

RO Verify RWST level is GREATER THAN 6%. (YES)

RO Check if RB Spray should be aligned for recirculation:

Verify at least one RB Spray Pump is running. (NO)

CRS GO TO Step 9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ......;....-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8, 9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4,;,.;,,6--1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Reset Containment Isolation:

RESET PHASE A - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RESET PHASE B - TRAIN A(B) CNTMT ISOL.

RO/BOP Place both ESF LOADING SEQ A(B) RESETS to:

NON-ESF LCKOUTS

AUTO-START BLOCKS RO Establish Instrument Air to the RB:

Start one Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby.

Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERVo

Open PVT-2660, AIR SPLY TO RB.

Evaluator's Note: The RWST Makeup Initiation steps follow. It is likely that the scenario will be tenninated before the makeup terminates. All steps (except field operations) are perfonned by the RO.

RO Add makeup to the RWST:

REFER TO SOP-106, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM.

Place RX COOL SYS MU to STOP .

Place RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT to MAN .

(Peer <oj)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -:...._ Scenario #

--:....- 4 Event # 8, 9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _46~-II

_46=--11 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note 2.3: Boric Acid flow rate should be set slightly higher than required mixture rate to ensure Boric Acid flow terminates first and lines are flushed with Reactor Makeup Water.

Adjust FCV-113 A & B, BA FLOW SET PT, for desired flow rate.

Set FIS-113, BA TO BLNDR FLOW, batch integrator for desired quantity.(Peer..J)

Adjust FCV-168, TOTAL MU FLOW SET PT, for desired flow rate.

Set FIS-168, TOTAL MU FLOW, Batch Integrator for desired quantity. (Peer ..J)

Booth Operator's Note:

Determine REMOTE functions for the following step during validation.

CREW Open the following (AB-436):

XVD08432-CS, RWST & RHT BA INLET HDR ISOL VALVE.

XVD08434-CS, RWST BORIC ACID INLET HEADER ISOL VALVE.

Procedure Note 2.8: Normally open XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE, is locked closed in Mode 6 in compliance with Technical SpeCification surveillance requirement 4.9.1.3.

If required, unlock and open XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE (AB-412). (N/A)

If XVD08430-CS, BORIC ACID BLENDER INLET ISOL VALVE, is open and it is desired to only transfer boric acid to the RWST, place FCV-168B, MU WTR TO BLENDER, in CLOSE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

- - Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4....;6~-I Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

Place RX COOL SYS MU to START.

If desired, place FCV-113, A&B, BA FLOW, controller in AUTO.

Verify the following:

Desired flow rate on FR-113, BA TO BLNDR GPM (F-113).

Desired flow rate on FR-113, TOTAL MU GPM (F-168).

RWST level increases.

BOP Check Intact SG levels:

NR level in intact SGs >30% [50%] (YES)

Control EFW flow to maintain 40 [50%]-60% NR level Procedure Note - Step 5:

Before the Low Steamline Pressure SI signal is blocked, Main Steam Isolation will occur if the Low Steam Pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown.

CRITICAL Initiate RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown:

TASK CRS Initiate an RCS cooldown prior to taking any action to reduce SI flow.

Maintain the cooldown rate in the RCS Cold Legs LESS THAN 100 °F/hr.

WHEN RCS Tavg is LESS THAN P-12 (552 OF), THEN:

Place both STM DUMP INTERLOCK Switches to BYP INTLK.

Place both STMLN SI TRAIN A(B) Switches to BLOCK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _1~_

_1____ Scenario # -i.- Event # 8,9,10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;.,;6:""'-1

_4..-.6---1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Close the MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C), for any FAULTED or RUPTURED SGs.

BOP Dump steam from each intact SG to the condenser.

Verify permissive C-9 light is bright on XCP-6114-1-3.

(YES)

Evaluator's Note: The crew could elect to leave the MSIVs closed and initiate the cooldown on the Steamline Power Reliefs.

BOP Perform the following:

Verify the MS Isolation Valves PVM-2801A, B, C are open for the intact SGs.

BOP Place the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller in MAN and closed.

BOP Place the STM DUMP MODE SELECT Switch in STM PRESS.

Adjust the STM DUMP CNTRL Controller to obtain the desired BOP cooldown rate.

RO Check if SI System is in service.

Any Charging Pump is running with flow indicated on FI-940(943), CHG LOOP A(B) CLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

(YES)

OR

Any RHR Pump is running in the SI Mode. (NO)

RO Establish one train of SI flow to conserve RWST inventory:

Ensure only one Charging Pump running. Stops one Charging Pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

...;..-- Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9, 10, & 11 Page ~ of _4.;.,;6;...-....

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break

_4,;,.;6;...--t (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Verify RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig. (NO)

IF RHR is NOT the suction source for the Charging Pumps, THEN stop both RHR Pumps. (Neither running)

CRS GO TO Step 17.

Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario when Step 17 (Verify no backflow from the RWST - - - -) is started.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

~ of _46~-i Op Test No.:

- - Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9,10, & 11 Page Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "An Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-1.0, ATTACHMENT 3 Evaluator Note:

MDEFW Pump "A" and RHR Pump "A" will not be running.

There will be no flow from RHR Pump "8" (until it trips) because RCS pressure will remain above the shutoff head.

There is a critical task for isolating two Phase "A" lines.

BOP Ensure EFW Pumps are running:

Ensure both MO EFW pumps are running. (NO, "A" is failed)

Verify the TO EFW Pump is running if necessary to maintain SG levels.

BOP Ensure the following EFW valves are open:

FCV-3531 (3541)(3551), MO EFP TO SG A(B)(C).

FCV-3536(3546)(3556), TO EFP TO SG A(B)(C)

MVG-2802A(B), MS LOOP B(C) TO TO EFP.

BOP Verify total EFW flow is GREATER THAN 450 gpm. (YES)

BOP Ensure FW Isolation:

Ensure the following are closed:

FW Flow Control

FW Isolation, PVG-1611A(B)(C).

FW Flow Control Bypass, FCV-3321(3331)(3341).

SG Blowdown, PVG-503A(B)(C).

SG Sample, SVX-9398A(B)(C).

Ensure all Main FW Pumps are tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: -.;...-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9,10,&11 Page ~ of _4..;.;6~-II Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ensure SI Pumps are running:

Two Charging Pumps are running.

Both RHR Pumps are running. (NO - "N is failed and "B" may trip before Attachment 3 is completed)

Ensure two RBCU Fans are running in slow speed (one per BOP train).

BOP Verify Service Water to the RBCUs:

Ensure two Service Water Pumps are running.

Ensure both Service Water Booster Pumps A(B) are running.

Verify GREATER THAN 2000 gpm flow for each train on:

FI-4466, SWBP A DISCH FLOW GPM.

FI-4496, SWBP B DISCH FLOW GPM.

BOP Verify two CCW Pumps are running.

BOP Ensure two Chilled Water Pumps and Chillers are running.

BOP Check if Main Steamlines should be isolated: (NO)

Check if any of the following conditions are met:

RB pressure GREATER THAN 6.35 psig. OR

Steamline pressure LESS THAN 675 psig. OR

Steamline flow GREATER THAN 1.6 MPPH AND Tavg LESS THAN 552°F.

Ensure ALL the following are closed:

MS Isolation Valves, PVM-2801A(B)(C).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .-;...-

Scenario # 4 Event # 8,9,10,&11 Page ~ of _4.;.,;6;"'-'-11

_4..;.,;6;""-'-11 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Rx Trip (RTB "A" Fails OPEN); 850 gpm PZR Steam Space Break (After Transition to EOP-1.1), RHR Pump "A" Breaker Trips; Containment Isolation Phase A Valves Fail As-Is (Require Manual Closure); RHR Pump "B" Trips at Transition to EOP-2.0 Time 1I Position 1I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

MS Isolation Bypass Valves, PVM-2869A(B)(C) .

BOP Ensure Excess Letdown Isolation Valves are closed:

PVT-8153, XS LTDN ISOL.

PVT-8154, XS LTON ISOL.

Verify ESF monitor lights indicate Phase A and Containment BOP Ventilation Isolation on XCP-61 03, 6104, and 6106.

REFER TO ATTACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MCB STATUS LIGHT LOCATIONS, as needed.

CRITICAL TASK Closes at least one valve in each of the following pairs:

8100 AND/OR 8112, RCP Seal Water Return Isolations

2662A AND/OR 2662B, RB Instrument Air Isolations BOP Verify proper SI alignment:

Verify SI valve alignment by verifying SAFETY INJECTION/PHASE A ISOL monitor lights are bright on XCP-61 04.

Verify all SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim on XCP-61 06.

Verify SI flow on FI-943, CHG LOOP B COLD/HOT LG FLOW GPM.

Check if RCS pressure is LESS THAN 250 psig. (NO)

Verify RHR flow on: (No pumps running).

ML092850008

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