Text

Initial Exam 2009-301 Final Simulator Scenarios Region Ii/Drs/Operator Licensing Branch/Initial Examinations/Mcguire/Exam 2009-301
	ML092400627
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	08/26/2009
From:	; NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
References
	50-369/09-301, 50-370/09-301
	Download: ML092400627 (110)
	v • d • e

FACILITY NAME:

McGuire Nulear Plant Section 10 REPORT N UM BER: __

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FINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIOS CONTENTS:

tlnal Simulator Scenarios o 'As given' with changes made during administration annotated o Each containing ES-D-1 "Scenario Outline" o Each containing ES-D-2 "Required Operator Actions" Location of Electronic Files:

Submitted By: ___

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FACILITY NAME:

McGuire Nulear Plant Section 10 REPORT N UM BER: __

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FINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIOS CONTENTS:

/

~ Final Simulator Scenarios o 'As given' with changes made during administration annotated o Each containing ES-O-1 "Scenario Outline" o Each containing ES-O-2 "Required Operator Actions" Location of Electronic Files:

Submitted By: ___

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Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1A CF Pump. The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago. The present plan is to observe operation of the 1 A CF Pump at this pow.er level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Dispatch has indicated that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated. It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of of OP/1/Al6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." It is expected to raise power on the upcoming shift at 2 MWe/Minute. Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute,"

of OP/1/Al6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved.

The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1 EMF27, SM Line D/lnner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1 AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malt.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-BOP Power Increase N-RO N-SRO 2

XMT I-RO Feed Flow Channel fails low CF018 I-SRO 3

ILE001 I-BOP NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage NC012B I(TS)-SRO 4

EP003C C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move IRE009 C(TS)-SRO in AUTO IRE010 5

SG001B C-BOP Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)

C(TS)-SRO 6

SG001B M-RO SGTR (B)

M-BOP M-SRO 7

XMT NA Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high CA012 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1A CF Pump. The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago. The present plan is to observe operation of the 1A CF Pump at this power level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Dispatch has indicated that there have been interm ittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated. It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of of OP/1/A/61 00/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." It is expected to raise power on the upcoming shift at 2 MWe/Minute. Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute,"

of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved.

The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Ot-Service:

1 EMF27, SM Line D/lnner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, tailed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1 AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-BOP Power Increase N-RO N-SRO 2

XMT I-RO Feed Flow Channel fails low CF018 I-SRO 3

ILE001 I-BOP NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage NC012B I(TS)-SRO 4

EP003C C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbackiStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move IRE009 C(TS)-SRO in AUTO IRE010 5

SG001B C-BOP Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)

C(TS)-SRO 6

SG001B M-RO SGTR (B)

M-BOP M-SRO 7

XMT NA Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high CA012 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor McGuire 2009 NRC Scenario #1 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1 A CF Pump. The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago. The present plan is to observe operation of the 1 A CF Pump at this power level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Dispatch has indicated that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated. It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 1 of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." It is expected to raise power on the upcoming shift at 2 MWe/Minute. Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved.

The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1 EMF27, SM Line D/lnner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (lAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.21.10 of.1, "Power Increase," of OP/1/A/61 00/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations."

The RO will control the Turbine Generator in accordance with Enclosure 4.1, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/1/A6300/001A, Turbine-Generator Load Change,"

and the BOP will conduct an NC System Boron dilution in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control."

During the power increase, the controlling Feed Flow Transmitter (FCF-5060) on the D Steam Generator will fail low, causing a Steam Generator D Feed Flow Mismatch alarm. The operator will respond by implementing AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," recognize the failure and select an operating Feed Flow channel.

After this, the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output will fail high. This will cause the PORV 1 NC34A and both spray valves to open, and NC Pressure will start to drop.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies."

The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the valve now leaks by its closed seat. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)." Ultimately, IAE will correct the problem with the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, and it will be placed back in automatic control.

Subsequently, a Zone 1 B Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the 1 B Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, "Load Rejection." During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Additionally, the operator will notice that Control Rod M12 will remain stuck in its original position.

During the plant stabilization, a slow developing Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1B Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," and sequentially reduce and isolate Letdown and start a second McGuire 2009 NRC Scenario #1 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1 A CF Pump. The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago. The present plan is to observe operation of the 1 A CF Pump at this power level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Dispatch has indicated that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated. It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 1 of OP/1/A/61 001003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." It is expected to raise power on the upcoming shift at 2 MWe/Minute. Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/61501009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved.

The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1 EMF27, SM Line D/lnner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.21.10 of.1, "Power Increase," of OP/1/A/61 001003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations."

The RO will control the Turbine Generator in accordance with Enclosure 4.1, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/1/A63001001A, "Turbine-Generator Load Change,"

and the BOP will conduct an NC System Boron dilution in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/61501009, "Boron Concentration ControL" During the power increase, the controlling Feed Flow Transmitter (FCF-5060) on the D Steam Generator will fail low, causing a Steam Generator D Feed Flow Mismatch alarm. The operator will respond by implementing AP/1/A/5500106, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," recognize the failure and select an operating Feed Flow channel.

After this, the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output will fail high. This will cause the PORV 1 NC34A and both spray valves to open, and NC Pressure will start to drop.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies."

The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the valve now leaks by its closed seat. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)." Ultimately, IAE will correct the problem with the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, and it will be placed back in automatic control.

Subsequently, a Zone 1 B Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the 1 B Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500103, "Load Rejection." During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Additionally, the operator will notice that Control Rod M12 will remain stuck in its original position.

During the plant stabilization, a slow developing Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1B Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," and sequentially reduce and isolate Letdown and start a second Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 NV Pump. Ultimately, the leak will degrade to a 260 gpm SGTR. the operator will trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. The attempt to isolate Auxiliary Feedwater flow into the B Steam generator will be complicated by the failure of the Auxiliary Feed Flow transmitter (FCA-5100) to the B Steam Generator.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23.c of E-3, after the crew has closed 1 NI-9A and 1 NI-1 OB.

Critical Tasks:

E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of ~P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of ~P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of ReS leakage into the SG.

E-38 Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct ReS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the ReS temperature is too high when ReS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the ReS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if ReS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the ReS depressurization.

E-3C Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before ruptured SG level reaches 100% Wide Range Level.

Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the ReS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

If ReS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 NV Pump. Ultimately, the leak will degrade to a 260 gpm SGTR. the operator will trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/SOOO/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

The operator will transition to EP/1/A/SOOO/E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. The attempt to isolate Auxiliary Feedwater flow into the B Steam generator will be complicated by the failure of the Auxiliary Feed Flow transmitter (FCA-S100) to the B Steam Generator.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23.c of E-3, after the crew has closed 1 NI-9A and 1 NI-1 OB.

Critical Tasks:

E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of t.P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of t.P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of ReS leakage into the SG.

E-38 Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct ReS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the ReS temperature is too high when ReS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the ReS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if ReS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the ReS depressurization.

E-3C Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before ruptured SG level reaches 100% Wide Range Level.

Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the ReS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a "Significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

If ReS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.

o Sim. Setup o

o o

o Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Rod Step On Reset to Temp IIC 152.

RUN Update Status Board, Setup OAC Setup ICCM, Turbine Displays, & Trend Recorders.

Check Rod Step Counters agree with rod positions Check Make-up Control Switch in "ARMED."

Ensure DRPI Screen is Re-zeroed.

Ensure CF Pump Lovejoy reset.

Place orange Work Request Sticker on 1 AD-6/E-11 Panel board.

Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NLO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info. Insert MALF-EMF227 = 6; EMF-27 Failure Event 6, Insert XMT-CA012, Set = 600, Ramp = 600 seconds (Connected to P4)

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

o Sim. Setup o

o o

o Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Reset to Temp IIC 152.

RUN Update Status Board, Setup OAC Setup ICCM, Turbine Displays, & Trend Recorders.

Check Rod Step Counters agree with rod positions Check Make-up Control Switch in "ARMED."

Ensure DRPI Screen is Re-zeroed.

Ensure CF Pump LoveJoy reset.

Place orange Work Request Sticker on 1 AD-6/E-11 Panel board.

Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NLO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info. Insert MALF-EMF227 = 6; EMF-27 Failure Event 6, Insert XMT-CA012, Set = 600, Ramp = 600 seconds (Connected to P4)

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

o o

0 0

0 o

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/Al61 00/003 marked up from 3.21.1 - 3.21.9. Marked up as follows:

Check Box on step 3.21.1 checked.

Check Box on step 3.21.2 checked.

Step 3.21.3 initialed and Todd St.Claire entered as Person Notified.

Step 3.21.4 initialed.

Check Box on step 3.21.5 checked.

Step 3.21.6.1 initialed and Don Gabriel entered as Person Notified.

Step 3.21.6.2 NA and initialed.

Step 3.21.6.3 NA and initialed.

Check Box on step 3.21.7 checked.

Step 3.21.8 NA and initialed.

Step 3.21.9 NA and initialed.

4. Provide OP/1/A6300/001, "Turbine-Generator Startup/Shutdown," and OP/1/Al6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," with Enclosure 4.4 marked up through Step 3.5.

5. Provide a Reactivity Plan W/Pwr ascension Guidelines of 2 MWe/minute.

6. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-O At direction of examiner At direction of examiner At direction of examiner Begin Familiarization Period (XMT) CF018 Set = 0, 30 Second Ramp Trigger #1 (MALF) ILE001 Set = 1700, 30 second Ramp (MALF) NC012B Set = 1 (OVR) NC088B = ON Trigger #3 Power Increase Feed Flow Channel fails low.

NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage ILE001 will be deleted during the course of the recovery.

LOA-NC33A=Racked Out, 600 second Delay; on Trigger #15 (PORV Isolation Valve Breaker) o o

0 0

0 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Prior to Crew Briefing Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/61 00/003 marked up from 3.21.1 - 3.21.9. Marked up as follows:

Check Box on step 3.21.1 checked.

Check Box on step 3.21.2 checked.

Step 3.21.3 initialed and Todd St.Claire entered as Person Notified.

Step 3.21.4 initialed.

Check Box on step 3.21.5 checked.

Step 3.21.6.1 initialed and Don Gabriel entered as Person Notified.

Step 3.21.6.2 NA and initialed.

Step 3.21.6.3 NA and initialed.

Check Box on step 3.21.7 checked.

Step 3.21.8 NA and initialed.

Step 3.21.9 NA and initialed.

4. Provide OP/1/A6300/001, "Turbine-Generator Startup/Shutdown," and OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," with Enclosure 4.4 marked up through Step 3.5.

5. Provide a Reactivity Plan W/Pwr ascension Guidelines of 2 MWe/minute.

6. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-O At direction of examiner At direction of examiner Begin Familiarization Period (XMT) CF018 Set = 0, 30 Second Ramp Trigger #1 Power Increase Feed Flow Channel fails low.

o At direction of (MALF) ILE001 NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage examiner Set = 1700, 30 second Ramp (MALF) NC012B Set = 1 (OVR) NC088B = ON Trigger #3 ILE001 will be deleted during the course of the recovery.

LOA-NC33A=Racked Out, 600 second Delay; on Trigger #15 (PORV Isolation Valve Breaker)

0 0

o o

At direction of examiner At direction of examiner Continued from Event 6 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 (MALF) EP003C (MALF) IRE010M12 (MALF) IRE009 = 0 Trigger #5 (MALF) SG001 S Set = 260 Ramp = 360 seconds Trigger #9 (XMT) CA012 Set = 600 Ramp = 600 seconds Trigger #11 Zone 18 lockout causing Runback/Stuck Rod/Rods fail to move in AUTO LOA IPP003 = Override, Trigger #7; IPS Fan Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (8)

LOA-SA003 = 0, Trigger #13; TDCA Pump Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Set up to Trigger on Reactor Trip (Trigger #11)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner 0 0

o o

At direction of examiner At direction of examiner Continued from Event 6 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 (MAL F) EP003C (MALF) IRE010M12 (MALF) IRE009 = 0 Trigger #5 (MALF) SG001 B Set = 260 Ramp = 360 seconds Trigger #9 (XMT) CA012 Set = 600 Ramp = 600 seconds Trigger #11 Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbackiStuck Rod/Rods fail to move in AUTO LOA IPP003 = Override, Trigger #7; IPB Fan Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)

LOA-SA003 = 0, Trigger #13; TOCA Pump Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Set up to Trigger on Reactor Trip (Trigger #11)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

.....;... ____ Page 8

of...,;5;.;;;,2----l1 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 4.1, "Power Increase," of OP/1/A/61 001003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations."

The RO will control the Turbine Generator in accordance with.1, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/1 IA63001001 A, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," and the BOP will conduct an NC System Boron dilution in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/61501009, Concentration Control."

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA OP/1/A16100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE "Boron SRO (Step 3.21.10) Continue power increase to 95% RTP."

NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.

OP/11 Al6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE BOP (Step 3.6) Ensure Boric Acid Flow Counter reset to zero.

BOP (Step 3.7) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.5. (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.8) WHEN Total Make Up Flow Counter cover closed, check counter at desired value. (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.9) Select "ALTERNATE DILUTE" on "NC Sys M/U Controller".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

Page 8

of 52

~--------

--~~I Event

Description:

Power Increase Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 4.1, "Power Increase," of OP/l/A/61 001003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations."

The RO will control the Turbine Generator in accordance with.1, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/l/A63001001A, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," and the BOP will conduct an NC System Boron dilution in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/l I A/61501009, Concentration Control."

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA OP/1/A16100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE "Boron SRO (Step 3.21.10) Continue power increase to 95% RTP."

NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.

OP/1/A161501009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE BOP (Step 3.6) Ensure Boric Acid Flow Counter reset to zero.

BOP (Step 3.7) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.5. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.8) WHEN Total Make Up Flow Counter cover closed, check counter at desired value. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.9) Select "ALTERNATE DILUTE" on "NC Sys M/U Controller".

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

Page 9

of 52

~

Event

Description:

Power Increase Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3.10) If desired to makeup only through 1 NV-17SA (BA Blender to VCT Outlet),

select CLOSED on 1 NV-171A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet).

BOP (Step 3.11) IF desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow using the "BA Blend Discharge Cntrl" potentiometer, adjust "BA Blend Discharge Cntrl" potentiometer setpoint to achieve desired flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.12) If desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

Place "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" in manual.

Adjust "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.13) IF required to lower VCT leveL...

NOTE: It is NOT required to lower VCT level.

BOP (Step 3.14) IF plant parameters require termination of dilution, place "NC System Makeup" to "STOP". (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.1S) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up". (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.16) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1 NV-17SA (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) open.

BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1 NV-2S2A (Rx M/U Water To Blender control) open or throttled as required.

Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

......;.. _____ Page Event

Description:

Power Increase Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3.10) If desired to makeup only through 1 NV-175A (BA Blender to VCT Outlet),

select CLOSED on 1 NV-171 A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet).

BOP (Step 3.11) IF desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow using the "BA Blend Discharge Cntrl" potentiometer, adjust "BA Blend Discharge Cntrl" potentiometer setpoint to achieve desired flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.12) If desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

Place "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" in manual.

Adjust "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" output to control reactor makeup water flow rate.

Form ES-D-2 9

of _5;;,;2;;""'-1 BOP (Step 3.13) IF required to lower VCT leveL...

NOTE: It is NOT required to lower VCT level.

BOP (Step 3.14) IF plant parameters require termination of dilution, place "NC System Makeup" to "STOP". (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up". (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.16) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) open.

BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1 NV-252A (Rx M/U Water To Blender control) open or throttled as required.

Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

......;.. _____ Page Event

Description:

Power Increase Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1 NV-171 A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet) in "AUTO", check 1NV-171A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet) open.

BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.22) Do NOT continue until one of the following occurs:

Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.S added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

IF in "AUTO", ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump 1 B Rx M/U Water Pump Ensure the following closed:

1 NV-17SA (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) 1 NV-2S2A (RX M/U Water To Blender Control) 1NV-171A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet)

BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1 NV-171 A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet) in "AUTO".

Form ES-D-2 10 of 52

""";';;""'",1 Appendix 0 Operator Action Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

......;.. _____ Page Event

Description:

Power Increase Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1 NV-171 A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet) in "AUTO", check 1NV-171A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet) open.

BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.22) Do NOT continue until one of the following occurs:

Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.5 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

IF in "AUTO", ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump 1 B Rx M/U Water Pump Ensure the following closed:

1 NV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water To Blender Control) 1 NV-171 A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet)

BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1 NV-171 A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet) in "AUTO".

Form ES-O-2 1 0 of _5;;.;;2=--",1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

......;., ____ Page 11 of

.....;;.;52~-I1 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure "BA Blend Disch Ctrl" in "AUTO". (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.26) Ensure "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" potentiometer set at 5.6 (90 gpm). (A.M.)

BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1 NV-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3-Way Control) in "AUTO".

BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender" BOP (Step 3.29) Select "AUTO" for "NC Sys M/U Controller".

BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up".

BOP (Step 3.31) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero:

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

OP/1/ Al6300/001 A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

--.;... ____ Page 11 of _5;;,;;2;;"-'-11 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure "BA Blend Disch Ctrl" in "AUTO". (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.26) Ensure "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" potentiometer set at 5.6 (90 gpm). (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3-Way Control) in "AUTO".

BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender" BOP (Step 3.29) Select "AUTO" for "NC Sys M/U Controller".

BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up".

BOP (Step 3.31) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero:

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

OPI1/Al6300/001A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_______ Page 12 of _5;;,;;2--'-11 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

IF Turbine in "OPERATOR AUTO",

perform the following:

Ensure desired change within "Calculated Capability Curve".

I F turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

Depress "LOAD RATE".

Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

MWe/Min loading rate.

Depress "ENTER".

Depress "REFERENCE".

Enter desired load in "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

Depress "ENTER".

Depress "GO" Check load changes at selected rate.

After 15-25 Mwe increase, OR at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

......;.. _____ Page 12 of _5.;;,;2;;"""-11 Event

Description:

Power Increase Position A

licant's Actions or Behavior IF Turbine in "OPERATOR AUTO",

perform the following:

Ensure desired change within "Calculated Capability Curve".

IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

Depress "LOAD RATE".

Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

MWe/Min loading rate.

Depress "ENTER".

Depress "REFERENCE".

Enter desired load in "VARIABLE DISPLAY".

Depress "ENTER".

Depress "GO" Check load changes at selected rate.

After 15-25 Mwe increase, OR at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

...,;2;;.....____ Page 13 of _5;;.;2;;""-1 Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time II Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior During the power increase, the controlling Feed Flow Transmitter (FCF-5060) on the D Steam Generator will fail low, causing a Steam Generator D Feed Flow Mismatch alarm.

The operator will respond by implementing AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," recognize the failure and select an operating Feed Flow channel.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #1 (XMT -CF018 (0% - 30 second ramp>>

Indications Available:

Annunciator 1AD-4/A4, "S/G D Flow Mismatch Lo Stm Flow."

Annunciator 1AD-4/B4, "S/G D Level Deviation."

Annunciator 1 AD-4/C4, "S/G D Flow Mismatch Lo CF Flow."

D CF flow decreases.

D NR Level decreases.

AP/1/A15500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of AP6, prior to the SRO addressing the AP.

RO (Step 1) IF CF control valve OR bypass valve Immediate Action has failed, THEN perform the following:

Place affected valve in manual.

Restore S/G level to program.

RO (Step 2) IF CF pump speed control has failed...

RO (Step 3) On each S/G, check the following channels - INDICATING the SAME:

Feed flow Immediate Action NOTE: The CF pump speed control has NOT failed.

NOTE: Channel I Feed Flow has failed Iowan D SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 13 of 52

~--------

~~~

Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior During the power increase, the controlling Feed Flow Transmitter (FCF-5060) on the D Steam Generator will fail low, causing a Steam Generator D Feed Flow Mismatch alarm.

The operator will respond by implementing AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," recognize the failure and select an operating Feed Flow channel.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #1 (XMT -CF018 (0% - 30 second ramp>>

Indications Available:

Annunciator 1AD-4/A4, "S/G D Flow Mismatch Lo Stm Flow."

Annunciator 1 AD-4/S4, "S/G D Level Deviation."

Annunciator 1AD-4/C4, "S/G D Flow Mismatch Lo CF Flow."

D CF flow decreases.

D NR Level decreases.

AP/1/A15500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of AP6, prior to the SRO addressing the AP.

RO (Step 1) IF CF control valve OR bypass valve Immediate Action has failed, THEN perform the following:

Place affected valve in manual.

Restore S/G level to program.

RO (Step 2) IF CF pump speed control has failed...

RO (Step 3) On each S/G, check the following channels - INDICATING the SAME:

Feed flow Immediate Action NOTE: The CF pump speed control has NOT failed.

NOTE: Channel I Feed Flow has failed low on D SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

2 Page 14 of 52

~--------

~

Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3 RNO) Select an operable channel on NOTE: operator will select the affected S/G(s).

Channel II on Steam Flow, Feed Flow and NR level.

RO (Step 4) Check unit status as follows:

Reactor trip breakers - CLOSED Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

RO (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME S/G NR level NOTE: This is a Continuous approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform Action. The SRO will make the following:

both board operators aware.

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check reactor power - GREATER THAN 3%.

RO (Step 8) Check CM/CF - PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.

RO (Step 9) Check S/G levels - STABLE OR NOTE: By this time NR level TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

should be at or trending to programmed level.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_2~ ____ Page 14 of _5;;,;2;;"""-11 Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3 RNO) Select an operable channel on NOTE: operator will select the affected S/G(s).

Channell! on Steam Flow, Feed Flow and NR level.

RO (Step 4) Check unit status as follows:

Reactor trip breakers - CLOSED Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

RO (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME S/G NR level NOTE: This is a Continuous approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform Action. The SRO will make the following:

both board operators aware.

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check reactor power - GREATER THAN 3%.

RO (Step 8) Check CM/CF - PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.

RO (Step 9) Check S/G levels - STABLE OR NOTE: By this time NR level TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

should be at or trending to programmed level.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

2 Page 15 of 52

~--------

~

Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 10) Check NC temperatures as follows:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO DESIRED TEMPERATURE.

NOTE: NC Tavg should be stable.

RO (Step 11) Check all S/G CF control valves -

NOTE: 1 D CF Control Valve IN AUTO.

will be in MANUAL.

(Step 11 RNO) WHEN the following conditions met, THEN place affected CF control valve in automatic:

Automatic control - DESIRED Affected S/G level(s) - AT PROGRAM LEVEL Selected control channels -INDICATE CORRECTLY ON CHART RECORDER:

Feed flow Steam flow S/G level RO (Step 12) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves - IN MANUAL AND FULL OPEN.

RO (Step 13) Check both CF pumps - IN AUTO.

RO (Step 14) Check all CA pumps - OFF.

NOTE: operator will place 1 D CF Control Valve back in AUTO.

NOTE: The SRO may check TS, however, there are NO associated TS with this failure.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

2 Page 15 of 52

""";';;"""-11 Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 10) Check NC temperatures as follows:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC NOTE: NC Tavg should be T-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO stable.

DESIRED TEMPERATURE.

RO (Step 11) Check all S/G CF control valves -

NOTE: 1 D CF Control Valve IN AUTO.

will be in MANUAL.

(Step 11 RNO) WHEN the following conditions met, THEN place affected CF control valve in automatic:

Automatic control-DESIRED Affected S/G level(s) - AT PROGRAM LEVEL Selected control channels - INDICATE CORRECTLY ON CHART RECORDER:

Feed flow Steam flow S/G level RO (Step 12) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves - IN MANUAL AND FULL OPEN.

RO (Step 13) Check both CF pumps - IN AUTO.

RO (Step 14) Check all CA pumps - OFF.

NOTE: operator will place 1 D CF Control Valve back in AUTO.

NOTE: The SRO may check TS, however, there are NO associated TS with this failure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_2;;;;-.____ Page 16 of _5_2--'-11 Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time J

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address the failure.

If so, Booth Instructor ackl10wledge as WCC.

NOTE: SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: This failure renders the Thermal Power Best Estimate inaccurate. The crew will need to use NIS and/or NC System aT to determ ine Reactor Power.

NOTE: after the Focus Brief, it is likely that the crew will resume the power increase.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

2 Page 16 of _5;;..;2;"""-11 Event

Description:

Feed Flow Channel fails low Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address the failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: This failure renders the Thermal Power Best Estimate inaccurate. The crew will need to use NIS and/or NC System b.. T to determ ine Reactor Power.

NOTE: after the Focus Brief, it is likely that the crew will resume the power increase.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

...,;3;..... ____ Page 17 of....,;5;,:;.2----l1 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior After this, the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output will fail high. This will cause the PORV 1 NC34A and both spray valves to open, arid NC Pressure will start to drop.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/SSOO/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies." The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the valve now leaks by its closed seat. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)." Ultimately, IAE will correct the problem with the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, and it will be placed back in automatic control.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (MALF-ILE001 (1700,30 second ramp); MALF-NC012B (1%), OVR-NC088B (ON>>

Indications Available:

1AD-6/A-S, "Pzr Hi Press Dev Control."

1AD-6/A-6, "Pzr La Press PORV NC34 Blocked."

1 AD-6/B-6, "Pzr Lo Press PORV NC32 & 36 Blocked."

1AD-6/A-9, "Pzr Safety Discharge Hi Temp."

1AD-6/B-9, "Pzr PORV Discharge Hi Temp."

1 AD-6/C-12, "PORV NC-34 Actuated."

1AD-6/F-S, "1 NC1, 2 or 3 Flo Detected."

NC Pressure drops to 2216 psig (TS value).

Dual position indication on 1 NC-34A.

NOTE: If the power increase has been restarted, the CRSRO will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AP/1/A15500/11, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check actual Pzr pressure - HAS GONE DOWN.

BOP (Step 2) Check all Pzr pressure channels -

INDICATING THE SAME.

Immediate Action NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of AP11,

prior to the SRO addressing the AP.

Immediate Action Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 17 of 52

~--------

~I Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior After this, the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output will fail high. This will cause the PORV 1 NC34A and both spray valves to open, arid NC Pressure will start to drop.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies." The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1 NC34A when it is determined that the valve now leaks by its closed seat. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate BOiling (DNB) Limits," and 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)." Ultimately, IAE will correct the problem with the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, and it will be placed back in automatic control.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (MALF-ILE001 (1700, 30 second ramp); MALF-NC012B (1 %), OVR-NC088B (ON>>

Indications Available:

1AD-6/A-5, "Pzr Hi Press Dev Control."

1AD-6/A-6, "Pzr Lo Press PORV NC34 Blocked."

1AD-6/B-6, "Pzr Lo Press PORV NC32 & 36 Blocked."

1AD-6/A-9, "Pzr Safety Discharge Hi Temp."

1AD-6/B~9, "Pzr PORV Discharge Hi Temp."

1AD-6/C-12, "PORV NC-34 Actuated."

1AD-6/F-5, "1 NC1, 2 or 3 Flo Detected."

NC Pressure drops to 2216 psig (TS value).

Dual position indication on 1 NC-34A.

NOTE: If the power increase has been restarted, the CRSRO will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AP/1/A15500/11, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check actual Pzr pressure - HAS GONE DOWN.

BOP (Step 2) Check all Pzr pressure channels -

INDICATING THE SAME.

Immediate Action NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of AP11,

prior to the SRO addressing the AP.

Immediate Action

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

3 Page 18 of

..;;;52=--~

Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time

\\I Position

\\I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following:

Close PORVs.

II IF PORV will not close, THEN close PORV isolation valve.

Immediate Action NOTE: Pzr PORV 1 NC-34A has opened and NOT fully closed.

Immediate Action NOTE: 1 NC-34A will continue to display dual position indication.

NOTE: The operator will close the 1 NC-34A PORV isolation valve (1 NC-33A).

BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

Immediate Action BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

Close Pzr spray valve(s).

IF AT ANY TIME a reactor trip occurs AND spray valve still open, THEN stop 1A and 1B NC pumps.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

(Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

IF associated PORV isolation valve will not close AND pressure going down rapidly, THEN......

Close associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1 NC-34A (pzr PORV) failed, THEN close 1 NC-270 (pzr PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A)

NOTE: depending on event timing, the Pzr Spray mayor may NOT be closed. If they are move to Step 5.

Immediate Action NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve will close.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

3 Page 18 of 52 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following:

Close PORVs.

IF PORV will not close, THEN close PORV isolation valve.

Immediate Action NOTE: Pzr PORV 1 NC-34A has opened and NOT fully closed.

Immediate Action NOTE: 1 NC-34A will continue to display dual position indication.

NOTE: The operator will close the 1 NC-34A PORV isolation valve (1 NC-33A).

BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

Immediate Action BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

Close Pzr spray valve{s).

IF AT ANY TIME a reactor trip occurs AND spray valve still open, THEN stop 1A and 1 B NC pumps.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

(Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

IF associated PORV isolation valve will not close AND pressure going down rapidly, THEN......

Close associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1 NC-34A (Pzr PORV) failed, THEN close 1 NC-270 (Pzr PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A)

NOTE: depending on event timing, the Pzr Spray mayor may NOT be closed. If they are move to Step 5.

Immediate Action NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve will close.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

Event #

....;..3 _____ Page 19 of _5;..,;2;"'-'-11 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

SRO (Step 7) GO TO Step 9.

SRO (Step 9) Announce occurrence on page.

BOP (Step 10) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 11) Check the following Pzr heaters -

ON:

1A 1B 1D BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:

co Place Pzr heater mode select switches in manual.

Turn on heaters as necessary to control pressure.

BOP (Step 12) Check 1 C Pzr heaters - ON.

BOP (Step 12 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:

Place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in manual.

Control pressure.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

Event #

_3.;;....-____ Page 19 of.....;;,;52=---11 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

SRO (Step 7) GO TO Step 9.

SRO (Step 9) Announce occurrence on page.

BOP (Step 10) Check 1 NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 11) Check the following Pzr heaters -

ON:

1A 1B 1 D BOP (Step 11 RNa) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:

Place Pzr heater mode select switches in manual.

Turn on heaters as necessary to control pressure.

BOP (Step 12) Check 1 C Pzr heaters - ON.

BOP (Step 12 RNa) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:

Place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in manual.

Control pressure.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_3,;;... ____ Page 20 of _5... 2""'-11 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage Time I

Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

~Z-,+M

":Br~ ~~{'fi" ii

~ ~,;;;;

k -~I_.= -..

"~-'. ___ I_I_.

~$"ad icl""

".~ *~

"'i~'~~~

t Jl:x;<~I'\\~L

\\t'<~_~_/;I_A It

~_

WHEN Pzr pressure returns to normal NOTE: This is a Continuous AND automatic Pzr pressure control Action. The SRO will make desired, THEN place "PZR PRESS both board operators aware; MASTER" in auto.

and will be used when the failure is corrected by IAE.

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure - GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

BOP (Step 14) Check "1 NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch-SELECTED TO "NORMAL".

SRO (Step 14 RNO) Notify station management to NOTE: SRO may call ensure switch restored to "NORMAL" once WCC/IAE to address the spray valve is repaired.

switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

BOP (Step 15) Check "1 NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch-SELECTED TO "NORMAL".

SRO (Step 15 RNO) Notify station management to NOTE: SRO may call ensure switch restored to "NORMAL" once WCC/IAE to address the spray valve is repaired.

switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

SRO (Step 16) GO TO Step 24.

BOP (Step 24) Ensure Pzr Press Rec Select is on NOTE: SRO will likely conduct operable channel.

a Focus Brief.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

3 Page 20 of 52

~---------

-~~

Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior WHEN Pzr pressure returns to normal AND automatic Pzr pressure control desired, THEN place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in auto.

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure - GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

BOP (Step 14) Check "1 NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch-SELECTED TO "NORMAL".

SRO (Step 14 RNO) Notify station management to ensure switch restored to "NORMAL" once spray valve is repaired.

BOP (Step 15) Check "1 NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch-SELECTED TO "NORMAL".

SRO (Step 15 RNO) Notify station management to ensure switch restored to "NORMAL" once spray valve is repaired.

SRO (Step 16) GO TO Step 24.

BOP (Step 24) Ensure Pzr Press Rec Select is on operable channel.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware; and will be used when the failure is corrected by IAE.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

......;;.3 _____ Page 21 of _5;,;;2;""-11 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor:

Delete ILEOO1 Within 5 minutes, as WCC report that IAE discovers a blown fuse in the Pzr Master Controller circuitry, which has been replaced, and that IAE recommends that the Pzr Master Pressure Controller be placed back in AUTO.

As Station Management, report that Pzr Spray Valve Switches can be returned to NORMAL when system response is satisfactory.

SRO Return to Continuous Action of Step 12 RNO.

BOP (Step 12 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:

Place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in manual.

Control pressure.

WHEN Pzr pressure returns to normal NOTE: The BOP will:

AND automatic Pzr pressure control Manually adjust Spray Valve desired, THEN place "PZR PRESS Controllers to 0 demand MASTER" in auto.

Place the Spray Valve Controllers to AUTO Place the Master Pressure Controller to about 50%

output.

Place the Master Pressure Controller to AUTO.

Place the Emergency Close Switch for the Spray Valves to NORMAL.

Control Pzr Heaters as needed.

Appendix 0 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_3 _______ Page NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Form ES-O-2 21 of 52

""";';;"""-11 Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Instructor:

Delete ILEOO1 Within 5 minutes, as WCC report that IAE discovers a blown fuse in the Pzr Master Controller circuitry, which has been replaced, and that IAE recommends that the Pzr Master Pressure Controller be placed back in AUTO.

As Station Management, report that Pzr Spray Valve Switches can be returned to NORMAL when system response is satisfactory.

SRO Return to Continuous Action of Step 12 RNO.

BOP (Step 12 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:

Place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in manual.

Control pressure.

WHEN Pzr pressure returns to normal NOTE: The BOP will:

AND automatic Pzr pressure control Manually adjust Spray Valve desired, THEN place "PZR PRESS Controllers to 0 demand MASTER" in auto.

Place the Spray Valve Controllers to AUTO Place the Master Pressure Controller to about 50%

output.

Place the Master Pressure Controller to AUTO.

Place the Emergency Close Switch for the Spray Valves to NORMAL.

Control Pzr Heaters as needed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

....;.,3 _____ Page 22 of _5;;,;;2;;""'-1 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS SRO 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow NOTE: NC System Pressure Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) drops to =2150 pSig on the Limits.

failure, and TS 3.4.1 was entered and exited during the transient.

SRO LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

SRO ACTIONS SRO CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS)

SRO 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_3;;...... ____ Page 22 of _5;;,;2=---11 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS SRO 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow NOTE: NC System Pressure Departure from Nucleate Bailing (DNB) drops to ::::2150 psig on the Limits.

failure, and TS 3.4.1 was entered and exited during the transient.

SRO LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

SRO ACTIONS SRO CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS)

SRO 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

~3__________ Page NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Form ES-D-2 23 of 52

""";';--'-11 Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, and 3.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The operator ACTION TIME determ ines that LCO 3.4.11 is B.

One or two B.1 Close 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months NOT met, and that condition B PORVs associated must be applied.

inoperable block and not valves capable of AND being manually B.2 Remove 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months cycled.

power from associated block valves AND B.3 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months one PORV to OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC to address the Pzr PORV Isolation Valve Breaker position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Operate Trigger #15:

LOA-Ne33A = Racked Out, 600 second Delay.

As NLO, report action when complete.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

~3__________ Page 23 of _5.;.,;2;"""-11 Event

Description:

NC Master Pressure Controller fails highlPORV Leakage Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, and 3.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The operator ACTION TIME determines that LCO 3.4.11 is B.

One or two B.1 Close 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months NOT met, and that condition B PORVs associated must be applied.

inoperable block and not valves capable of AND being manually B.2 Remove 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months cycled.

power from associated block valves AND B.3 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months one PORV to OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC to address the Pzr PORV Isolation Valve Breaker position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Operate Trigger #15:

LOA-NC33A = Racked Out, 600 second Delay.

As NLO, report action when complete.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

4 Page ~

of 52 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Subsequently, a Zone 1 B Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the 1 B Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500103, "Load Rejection."

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. Additionally, the operator will notice that Control Rod M12 will remain stuck in its original position.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (MALF-EP003C, MALF-IRE01 OM12 and IRE009 (O>>

Indications Available:

MWe decreases.

Control Rods do NOT move inward in automatic as expected.

DRPI for control rod M12 indicates that the rod is stuck.

AP/1/A15500/03, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto.

RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator - TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output - GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RO will inform the SRO of the situation, and the SRO will direct that the RO control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

4 Page ~

of......;;,;52;;"-'-11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Subsequently, a Zone 1 B Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the 1 B Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500103, "Load Rejection."

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. Additionally, the operator will notice that Control Rod M12 will remain stuck in its original position.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (MALF-EP003C, MALF-IRE01 OM12 and IRE009 (O>>

Indications Available:

MWe decreases.

Control Rods do NOT move inward in automatic as expected.

DRPI for control rod M12 indicates that the rod is stuck.

AP/1/A15500/03, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto.

RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator - TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output - GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RO will inform the SRO of the situation, and the SRO will direct that the RO control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4.;.... ____ Page ~

of _5;;,;;2;;"""-11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

Check control banks - MOVING IN AS REQUIRED.

RO (Step 3 RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

Place Control Rods in manual.

Insert rods to reduce T -avg equal to programmed T-Ref.

If no rods will move, THEN.....

RO Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

(Step 3b RNO) IF 2 or more control rods are misaligned greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Trip Reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

NOTE: The Control Rods will NOT be moving in as required.

NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

NOTE: At this point Control Rod M12 is misaligned.

NOTE: The operator may recognize the Stuck Rod, but WILL continue with the rod insertion.

EXAMINER NOTE: At this point TS 3.1.4 for Rod Misalignment has been entered, however, with the plant transient in progress, the SRO will not check TS. This TS is shown on Page 50, and should be checked after exam termination.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

.....;.4 _____ Page ~

of _5

.... 2 ___ -11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

Check control banks - MOVING IN AS REQUIRED.

RO (Step 3 RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

RO Place Control Rods in manual.

Insert rods to reduce T -avg equal to programmed T-Ref.

If no rods will move, THEN.....

Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

(Step 3b RNO) IF 2 or more control rods are misaligned greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Trip Reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/SOOO/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

NOTE: The Control Rods will NOT be moving in as required.

NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

NOTE: At this point Control Rod M12 is misaligned.

NOTE: The operator may recognize the Stuck Rod, but WILL continue with the rod insertion.

EXAMINER NOTE: At this point TS 3.1.4 for Rod Misalignment has been entered, however, with the plant transient in progress, the SRO will not check TS. This TS is shown on Page 50, and should be checked after exam termination.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4.:.... ____ Page ~

of _5_2....... -11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbackiStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps - RUNNING.

1 CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass control) - OPEN.

RO (Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 PSIG.

SRO (Step 6) Announce: "UNIT 1 LOAD REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG".

RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters - LESS THAN 20%.

SRO I (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

RO Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.

SRO GO TO Step 9.

RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves-MODULATING OPEN.

BOP (Step 10) Check "IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE" alarm (1AD-11, J-5) - DARK.

RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PB cooling as follows:

NOTE: The runback will terminate =56%.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will designate the RO to observe this action.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4...;.... ____ Page ~

of......;.,;52;""'-11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbackiStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time

~

Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps - RUNNING.

1 CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass control) - OPEN.

RO (Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 PSIG.

SRO (Step 6) Announce: "UNIT 1 LOAD REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG".

RO (Step 7) Check PIR meters - LESS THAN 20%.

SRO I (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

RO Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, TH EN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.

SRO GO TO Step 9.

RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves -

MODULATING OPEN.

BOP (Step 10) Check "IPS AIR FLOW TROUBLE" alarm (1AD-11, J-5) - DARK.

RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PS cooling as follows:

NOTE: The run back will terminate ""56%.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will deSignate the RO to observe this action.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4 ______ Page ~

of _5

... 2--.-t Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbackiStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior IF "MAIN GENERATOR" less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps, THEN........

NOT < 10,000 amps.

SRO Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The SRO will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an NLO.

Room of results within 5 minutes:

1 A Main Step Up Transformer 1 B Main Step Up Transformer Unit 1 IPB Fan Enclosure area.

SRO Record approximate time lockout occurred.

SRO Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor:

given sufficient time (approximately 5 Within 3 minutes, as NLO minutes) to complete fire inspection.

report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.

SRO IF operator confirms no fire has NOTE: The SRO will dispatch occurred, THEN dispatch operator to an NLO.

perform the following at the Unit 1 "IPB ALARM PANEL":

Depress "LOCKOUT OVERRIDE" on the fan in "MAN".

IF IPB fan in "MAN cannot be Booth Instructor:

started, THEN depress "LOCKOUT Operate Trigger #7 (LOA-OVERRIDE" on the fan in "AUTO".

IPP003 (Override).

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that the 1A IPB Fan is running in Manual.

IF neither IPB fan can be started,.....

NOTE: The 1A IPB Fan is running.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:

Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.

Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.

Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4..;.... ____ Page ~

of _5.;,;2;;"""-11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF "MAIN GENERATOR" less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps, THEN........

NOT < 10,000 amps.

SRO Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The SRO will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an NLO.

Room of results within 5 minutes:

1A Main Step Up Transformer 1 B Main Step Up Transformer Unit 1 IPB Fan Enclosure area.

SRO Record approximate time lockout occurred.

SRO Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor:

given sufficient time (approximately 5 Within 3 minutes, as NLO minutes) to complete fire inspection.

report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.

SRO IF operator confirms no fire has NOTE: The SRO will dispatch occurred, THEN dispatch operator to an NLO.

perform the following at the Unit 1 "IPB ALARM PANEL":

Depress "LOCKOUT OVERRIDE" on the fan in "MAN".

IF IPS fan in "MAN cannot be Booth Instructor:

started, THEN depress "LOCKOUT Operate Trigger #7 (LOA-OVERRIDE" on the fan in "AUTO".

IPP003 (Override).

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that the 1 A IPB Fan is running in Manual.

IF neither IPB fan can be started,.....

NOTE: The 1A IPB Fan is running.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:

Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.

Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.

Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4 ______ Page ~

of _5_2 __

~1 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 11.c RNO) WHEN Pzr pressure is less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Ensure Pzr PORVs are closed.

NOTE: 1 NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.

IF any PORV cannot be closed, THEN close its isolation and inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV failed, THEN close NOTE: These valves have the following:

been previously closed.

1 NC-33A (PZR PORV Isol).

1 NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A).

BOP (Step 11 d) Check Pzr spray control valves - CLOSED.

RO (Step 12) Check load rejection - DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

SRO (Step 12 RNO) GO To Step 15.

RO (Step 15) Check turbine impulse pressure -

LESS THAN 260 PSIG.

RO (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME turbine impulse NOTE: This is a Continuous pres_sure drops to less than 260 PSIG, Action. The SRO will make THEN GO TO Step 16.

both board operators aware.

SRO GO TO Step 19.

RO /

(Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows:

BOP Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

.....;.,4 _____ Page ~

of

_5;;,;;2;......~1 Event

Description:

Zone 18 Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 11.c RNO) WHEN Pzr pressure is less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Ensure Pzr PORVs are closed.

NOTE: 1 NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.

IF any PORV cannot be closed, THEN close its isolation and inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV failed, THEN close NOTE: These valves have the following:

been previously closed.

1 NC-33A (PZR PORV Isol).

1 NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A).

BOP (Step 11 d) Check Pzr spray control valves - CLOSED.

RO (Step 12) Check load rejection - DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

SRO (Step 12 RNO) GO To Step 15.

RO (Step 15) Check turbine impulse pressure -

LESS THAN 260 PSIG.

RO (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME turbine impulse NOTE: This is a Continuous pressure drops to less than 260 PSIG, Action. The SRO will make THEN GO TO Step 16.

both board operators aware.

SRO GO TO Step 19.

RO /

(Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows:

BOP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4,,;,-.____ Page ~

of _5;;,;;2;;"-'-11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck RodIRods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check Generator Breakers - EITHER GENERATOR BREAKER CLOSED.

Check Generator - TIED TO GRID.

Check generator power factor - 0.9 TO 1.0 LAGGING.

SRO GO TO Step 20.

SRO (Step 20) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

RO (Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following:

Check reactor power - GREATER THAN 40%.

Check S/G "CF FLOW" - LESS THAN 15%.

RO (Step 21.b RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME CF flow will be maintained less than 15%, THEN RETURN TO Step 21.c to swap CF flow to S/G CF Bypass control valves.

SRO GO TO Step 21.g.

RO (Step 21.g) Check either CF pump -

RUNNING IN AUTO.

BOP Slowly throttle closed 1 CM-420 (Unit 1 Generat.or Load Rejection Bypass Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure.

BOP WHEN 1CM-420 is closed, THEN check load rejection signal reset (OAC turn on code "CM").

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

.....;.4 _____ Page ~

of -.;;.;52=---11 Event

Description:

Zone 18 Lockout causing RunbacklStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check Generator Breakers - EITHER GENERATOR BREAKER CLOSED.

Check Generator - TIED TO GRID.

Check generator power factor - 0.9 TO 1.0 LAGGING.

SRO GO TO Step 20.

SRO (Step 20) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

RO (Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following:

Check reactor power - GREATER THAN 40%.

Check S/G "CF FLOW" - LESS THAN 15%.

RO (Step 21.b RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME CF flow will be maintained less than 15%, THEN RETURN TO Step 21.c to swap CF flow to S/G CF Bypass control valves.

SRO GO TO Step 21.g.

RO (Step 21.g) Check either CF pump -

RUNNING IN AUTO.

BOP Slowly throttle closed 1 CM-420 (Unit 1 Generat.or Load Rejection Bypass Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure.

BOP WHEN 1 CM-420 is closed, THEN check load rejection signal reset (OAC turn on code "CM").

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_4 _______ Page ~

of _5..;,,;2 ___ -11 Event

Description:

Zone 1 B Lockout causing RunbacklStuck RodIRods Fail to move in AUTO Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Reposition manual loader for 1 CM-420 to 100% open.

SRO IF thermal power is greater than 15%

THEN within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance.

RO Check T-avg - GREATER THAN 561°F.

RO Check "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD-2, B-9) - DARK.

RO I (Step 21.n) Check "CONTROL ROD BOP BANK LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD-2, A-9) -

DARK.

RO (Step 22) Check load rejection - DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

SRO (Step 22 RNO) Go To Step 24.

BOP (Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running plant equipment as follows:

SRO Condensate Booster pumps and place in auto.

Hotwell pumps and place in auto.

IF desired to secure,....... HDPs.

(Step 25) IF power change greater than 15%

in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to perform required Tech Spec sampling.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to secure the HDPs.

NOTE: SRO may contact Chemistry.

If so, Booth Instructor:

acknowledge as Chemistry.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #5-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

4 Page ~

of _5;.;2;;""-11 Event

Description:

Zone 18 Lockout causing RunbackiStuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO lit ition

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Reposition manual loader for 1 CM-420 to 100% open.

SRO IF thermal power is greater than 15%

THEN within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance.

RO Check T-avg - GREATER THAN 561°F.

RO Check "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD-2, B-9) - DARK.

RO /

(Step 21.n) Check "CONTROL ROD BOP BANK LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD-2, A-9)-

DARK.

RO (Step 22) Check load rejection - DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

SRO (Step 22 RNO) Go To Step 24.

BOP (Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running plant equipment as follows:

SRO Condensate Booster pumps and place in auto.

Hotwell pumps and place in auto.

IF desired to secure,....... HDPs.

(Step 25) IF power change greater than 15%

in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to perform required Tech Spec sampling.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to secure the HDPs.

NOTE: SRO may contact Chemistry.

If so, Booth Instructor:

acknowledge as Chemistry.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #5-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_5"""..-.6..-.&_7 ___ Page ~

of...... 5=2----4 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior During the plant stabilization, a slow developing Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1B Steam Generator.

The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," and sequentially reduce and isolate Letdown and start a second NV Pump. Ultimately, the leak will degrade to a 260 gpm SGTR. the operator will trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. The attempt to isolate Auxiliary Feedwater flow into the B Steam generator will be complicated by the failure of the Auxiliary Feed Flow transmitter (FCA-51 00) to the B Steam Generator. The scenario will terminate at Step 23.c of E-3, after the crew has closed 1 NI-9A and 1 NI-10B.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (MALF-SG001 B (260 over 360 seconds>>

Indications Available:

(XMT-CA012 (600 on 600 second ramp>> Trigger #11 Conditional on Rx Trip 1 RAD1/C-1, "1 EMF 71 S/G A Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/D-1, "1 EMF 72 S/G B Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/D-2, "1 EMF 73 S/G C Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/D-3, "1 EMF 74 S/G D Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/B-1, "1 EMF 33 Cond Air Eject Exh Hi Rad."

1 RAD3/E-5, "1 EMF 24, 25, 26, 27 S/G A, B, C, D Steam line Hi Rad."

Pzr Level drops.

Charging flow increases in automatic.

API1/Al5500110, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE RO /

(Step 1) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR BOP GOING UP.

BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_5;.:. *...;.6...;.&;..;.7 ___ Page ~

of

....;5=2~

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior During the plant stabilization, a slow developing Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1 B Steam Generator.

The operator will enter AP/1/A/SSOO/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," and sequentially reduce and isolate Letdown and start a second NV Pump. Ultimately, the leak will degrade to a 260 gpm SGTR. the operator will trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/SOOO/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

The operator will transition to EP/1/A/SOOO/E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and isolate the flow into and out of the 1 B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. The attempt to isolate Auxiliary Feedwater flow into the B Steam generator will be complicated by the failure of the Auxiliary Feed Flow transmitter (FCA-S100) to the B Steam Generator. The scenario will terminate at Step 23.c of E-3, after the crew has closed 1 NI-9A and 1 NI-10B.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (MALF-SG001B (260 over 360 seconds>>

Indications Available:

(XMT-CA012 (600 on 600 second ramp>> Trigger #11 Conditional on Rx Trip 1 RAD1/C-1, "1 EMF 71 S/G A Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/D-1, "1 EMF 72 S/G B Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/D-2, "1 EMF 73 S/G C Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/D-3, "1 EMF 74 S/G D Leakage Hi Rad."

1 RAD1/B-1, "1 EMF 33 Cond Air Eject Exh Hi Rad."

1 RAD3/E-S, "1 EMF 24, 2S, 26, 27 S/G A, B, C, D Steam line Hi Rad."

Pzr Level drops.

Charging flow increases in automatic.

AP/1/A15500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE RO /

(Step 1) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR BOP GOING UP.

BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,:..;;6:..;;&... 7 ____ Page ~

of _5

... 2 __ -11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) opening.

BOP Open 1 NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Reduce or isolate letdown.

NOTE: The SRO will likely direct that Letdown be reduced to 45 gpm.

After Letdown has been reduced to 45 gpm, and Pzr Level is still lowering, the SRO will likely direct that Letdown be isolated.

Start additional NV pump.

NOTE: When it is determined that the Pzr level is still lowering with Letdown Isolated, the SRO will direct that a 2nd Charging Pump be started.

IF CLAs are isolated, AND Pzr level is NOTE: The CLAs are NOT going down,......

isolated.

SRO IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow, THEN perform the following:

1 F 1 B OR 1 C S/G identified as NOTE: The SRO will dispatch ruptured, THEN immediately have an NLO.

another operator initiate actions to Booth Instructor:

isolate TO CA pump steam supply from ruptured S/G PER Enclosure 3 Operate Trigger #13 {LOA-(TO CA Pump Steam Supply SA003 (O>>.

Isolation).

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the B SG.

ROI Trip reactor.

BOP Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;;.,l,..;;6;..;&;;..7.;..... __ Page ~

of

_5;;.;;2;;..-.~

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time

.11 Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) opening.

BOP Open 1 NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Reduce or isolate letdown.

Start additional NV pump.

IF CLAs are isolated, AND Pzr level is going down,......

SRO IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow, THEN perform the following:

1 F 1 B OR 1 C S/G identified as ruptured, THEN immediately have another operator initiate actions to isolate TD CA pump steam supply from ruptured S/G PER Enclosure 3 (TD CA Pump Steam Supply Isolation).

RO/

Trip reactor.

BOP NOTE: The SRO will likely direct that Letdown be reduced to 45 gpm.

After Letdown has been reduced to 45 gpm, and Pzr Level is still lowering, the SRO will likely direct that Letdown be isolated.

NOTE: When it is determined that the Pzr level is still lowering with Letdown Isolated, the SRO will direct that a 2nd Charging Pump be started.

NOTE: The CLAs are NOT isolated.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO.

Booth Instructor:

Operate Trigger #13 (LOA-SA003 (0>>.

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the B SG.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09*1 Scenario #

Event #

...;;.05,..,;6;..;&;;.;..;..7 ___ Page ~

of _5

... 2...... -11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

~QPJicant's Actions or Behavior SRO WHEN reactor tripped OR auto SII setpoint reached, THEN ensure SII initiated.

GO TO EP/11A15000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

NOTE: The SRO will transition to E-O.

EXAMINER NOTE: At this point TS 3.4.13 for RCS Leakage has been entered, however, with the plant transient in progress, the SRO will not check TS. This TS is shown on Page 49, and should be checked after exam term ination.

EPI1IA15000/E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

All rod bottom lights - LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN IIR amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

If reactor will not trip......

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the SRO addressing the EP.

NOTE: The RO will take the RNO action because Control Rod M12 is NOT on the bottom (Le. Rod Bottom light is NOT LIT).

NOTE: The RO will report that the Reactor is tripped.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09*1 Scenario #

Event #

_5,;.:,... 6... &;,;".7,;,.....__ Page =--- of _5.;,,;2;""'-11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO WHEN reactor tripped OR auto SII setpoint reached, THEN ensure SII initiated.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

NOTE: The SRO will transition to E-O.

EXAMINER NOTE: At this point TS 3.4.13 for RCS Leakage has been entered, however, with the plant transient in progress, the SRO will not check TS. This TS is shown on Page 49, and should be checked after exam termination.

EP/1/A15000/E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

RO All rod bottom lights - LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN IIR amps - GOING DOWN.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

If reactor will not trip......

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the SRO addressing the EP.

NOTE: The RO will take the RNO action because Control Rod M12 is NOT on the bottom (Le. Rod Bottom light is NOT LIT).

NOTE: The RO will report that the Reactor is tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;,,1 *..;;6;.,;&;;..;..7 ___ Page ~

of _5;;,;2;""-1 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB-ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 5) IF either CF pump is in Manual Direct Valve Position (MDVP) mode, THEN trip affected pump(s).

ROI (Step 6) Check if SII is actuated:

BOP "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI-18) - LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

SRO (Step 7) Announce "Unit 1 Safety Injection".

BOP (Step 8) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5 - DARK.

Group 3 - LIT.

OAC - IN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F - LIT AS REQUIRED.

SRO GO TO Step 9.

NOTE: If SI has NOT automatically actuated, it should be manually actuated here.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

~5,~6~&

7 ___ Page ~

of

_5~2 __ -I1 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time

~

Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB -

ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 5) IF either CF pump is in Manual Direct Valve Position (MDVP) mode, THEN trip affected pump(s).

ROI (Step 6) Check if SII is actuated:

BOP "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1 SI-18) - LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

SRO (Step 7) Announce "Unit 1 Safety Injection".

BOP (Step 8) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5 - DARK.

Group 3 - LIT.

OAC - IN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F - LIT AS REQUIRED.

SRO GOTO Step 9.

NOTE: If SI has NOT automatically actuated, it should be manually actuated here.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;.:.,.-.6.-.&.... 7 ___ Page ~

of _5_2 ___ -11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position

..

I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO I (Step 9) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP MD CA pumps - ON.

N/R level in at least 3 SIGs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 10) Check all KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 11) Check both RN pumps - ON.

SRO (Step 12) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

RO (Step 13) Check all SIG pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 14) Check Containment Pressure-HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15) Check SII flow:

Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" gauge -INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure NO pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1 ND-68A (1 A NO Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1 ND-67B (1 B NO Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

NOTE: Containment Pressure is normal.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

1 Event #

_5;;...:,....;6....;&;.;..7.;...... __ Page ~

of _5;.,;2;"""-11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO I (Step 9) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP MD CA pumps - ON.

N/R level in at least 3 SIGs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 10) Check all KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 11) Check both RN pumps - ON.

SRO (Step 12) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

RO (Step 13) Check all SIG pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 14) Check Containment Pressure -

HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15) Check SII flow:

Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" gauge - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1 ND-68A (1 A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1 ND-67B (1 B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

NOTE: Containment Pressure is normal.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

...;,j5,:..;6:..;&;;..;...7 ___ Page ~

of

_5;;,;2~",*

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 16.

(Step 16) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

RO (Step 17) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

BOP Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO WHEN N/R level in any S/G greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain N/R levels between 11 %

(32% ACC) and 50%.

RO (Step 18) Check NC temperatures:

IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

BOP (Step 19) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

BOP All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 19a RNO) if Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close Pzr PORV9s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:

Close its isolation valve.

Close the following valve.

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: 1 NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

-.;;.i5,:..;6:..;&;;;...;..7___ Page ~

of

_5;;..;;2~-II Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 16.

(Step 16) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

RO (Step 17) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

BOP Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO WHEN N/R level in any S/G greater than 11 % (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain N/R levels between 11 %

(32% ACC) and 50%.

RO (Step 18) Check NC temperatures:

IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

BOP (Step 19) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

BOP All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 19a RNO) if Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close Pzr PORV9s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:

Close its isolation valve.

Close the following valve.

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: 1 NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;;.:,..;6;..;;&;;..7.;...... __ Page ~

of _5_2_-11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, THEN close 1 NC-270 (PZR PORV Dm Isol For 1 NC-34A).

IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed,......

41 IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or

isolated, (Step 19b) Normal Pzr spray valves -

CLOSED.

BOP (Step 19b RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG,......

RO (Step 20) Check NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - GREATER THAN O°F.

ROI (Step 21) Check if main steam lines intact:

BOP All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs - PRESSURIZED.

BOP (Step 22) Check if S/G tubes intact:

The following secondary EMFs -

NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1 EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (La Range))

1 EMF-24 (S/G A) 1 EMF-25 (S/G B) 1 EMF-26 (S/G C)

NOTE: These valves have been previously closed.

NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve is closed.

NOTE: The PORVs are either closed or isolated.

NOTE: Pzr Pressure is > 2100 psig.

NOTE: All S/G EMFs are NOT Normal, and the 1 B SG Level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5.;;.,l,~6;..;&;;;...;...7___ Page ~

of _5;;,;;2;"'--11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, THEN close 1 NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A).

IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed,......

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or

isolated, (Step 19b) Normal Pzr spray valves -

CLOSED.

BOP (Step 19b RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG,......

RO (Step 20) Check NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - GREATER THAN O°F.

ROI (Step 21) Check if main steam lines intact:

BOP All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs - PRESSURIZED.

BOP (Step 22) Check if S/G tubes intact:

The following secondary EMFs -

NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1 EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1 EMF-24 (S/G A) 1 EMF-25 (S/G B) 1 EMF-26 (S/G C)

NOTE: These valves have been previously closed.

NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve is closed.

NOTE: The PORVs are either closed or isolated.

NOTE: Pzr Pressure is > 2100 psig.

NOTE: All S/G EMFs are NOT Normal, and the 1 B SG Level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

....;5;..:.,..;;.6..;;&~7 ___ Page ~

of _5;;;,;2;;"'--11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 EMF-27 (S/G D).

S/G levels - STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

SRO (Step 22 RNO) IF S/G levels going up in an uncontrolled manner OR any EMF abnormal, THEN perform the following:

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture).

NOTE: The SRO will transition to E-3.

EP/1/Al5000/E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP (Step 2) Identify ruptured S/G(s):

Any S/G N/R level - GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Chemistry or RP has determined ruptured S/G by sampling OR Any of the following EMFs - ABOVE NORMAL:

1 EMF-24 (S/G A) 1 EMF-25 (S/G B) 1 EMF-26 (S/G C)

NOTE: The 1 B SG Level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner.

NOTE: The SRO may contact Chemistry for sampling.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as appropriate.

NOTE: The S/G related EMFs are NOT normal, with 1 EMF-25 reading the highest.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

......;.,.5,~6~&~7 ___ Page ~

of

_5.;.;2~-II Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 EMF-27 (S/G D).

S/G levels - STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

SRO (Step 22 RNO) IF S/G levels going up in an uncontrolled manner OR any EMF abnormal, THEN perform the following:

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture).

NOTE: The SRO will transition to E-3.

EP/1/A150001E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP (Step 2) Identify ruptured S/G(s):

Any S/G N/R level - GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Chemistry or RP has determined ruptured S/G by sampling OR Any of the following EMFs - ABOVE NORMAL:

1 EMF-24 (S/G A) 1 EMF-25 (S/G B) 1 EMF-26 (S/G C)

NOTE: The 1 B SG Level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner.

NOTE: The SRO may contact Chemistry for sampling.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as appropriate.

NOTE: The S/G related EMFs are NOT normal, with 1 EMF-25 reading the highest.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6 & 7 Page ~

of _5_2;;""'-H Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 EMF-27 (S/G D)

RO (Step 3) Check at least one S/G -

AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.

RO (Step 4) Isolate steam flow from ruptured S/G(s) as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV -

CLOSED.

IF TO CA pump is the only source of feedwater, Check S/Gs 1 Band 1 C - INTACT.

BOP (Step 4c RNO) Isolate TO CA pump steam supply from ruptured S/G as follows:

Ensure operators dispatched in next step immediately notify Control Room Supervisor when valves are closed.

Immediately dispatch 2 operators to concurrently verify (CV), unlock and close valves on ruptured S/G(s):

NOTE: 1 EMF-27 is OOS. The CRSRO may call Chemistry and direct that the 1 0 SG be sampled to ensure that a SGTRISGTL does NOT exist in the 1G SG.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

NOTE: the TO CA Pump is NOT the only source of feed water.

NOTE: the 1 B SG is NOT intact.

Examiner NOTE: This action may have already taken place.

If so, continue with Step 4d.

NOTE: If NOT already done, the SRO will direct two NLOs to CLOSE 1 SA-2 and 78.

Booth Instructor: Set LOA-SA003 = 0, (1 SA-2/78)

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the B SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6 & 7 Page ~

of

......;.;52;......~

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 EMF-27 (S/G D)

RO (Step 3) Check at least one S/G -

AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.

RO (Step 4) Isolate steam flow from ruptured S/G(s) as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV -

CLOSED.

IF TD CA pump is the only source of feedwater, Check S/Gs 1 Band 1 C - INTACT.

BOP (Step 4c RNO) Isolate TD CA pump steam supply from ruptured S/G as follows:

Ensure operators dispatched in next step immediately notify Control Room Supervisor when valves are closed.

Immediately dispatch 2 operators to concurrently verify (CV), unlock and close valves on ruptured S/G(s):

NOTE: 1 EMF-27 is OOS. The CRSRO may call Chemistry and direct that the 1 D SG be sampled to ensure that a SGTR/SGTL does NOT exist in the 1G SG.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

NOTE: the TD CA Pump is NOT the only source of feedwater.

NOTE: the 1 B SG is NOT intact.

Examiner NOTE: This action may have already taken place.

If so, continue with Step 4d.

NOTE: If NOT already done, the SRO will direct two NLOs to CLOSE 1 SA-2 and 78.

Booth Instructor: Set LOA-SA003 = 0, (1 SA-2/78)

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the B SG.

AppendixD Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;.:,...;6...;&.. 7 ____ Page ~

of _5

..... 2;""'-11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO For 1B S/G:

1 SA-2 (1 B S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Maint Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+12, FF-53) 1 SA-78 (1 B S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Loop Seal Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+10, FF-53.

IF AT ANY TIME local closure of SA valves takes over 8 minutes, THEN isolate TD CA pump steam supply PER Enclosure 2 (Tripping TD CA Pump Stop Valve or Alternate Steam Isolation).

RO (Step 4d) Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured S/G(s) - CLOSED:

For 1B S/G:

1 BB-2B (1 B S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1 BB-6A (B S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

Close steam drain on ruptured S/G(s).

1 SM-89 (B SM Line Drain Isol)

Close the following on ruptured S/G(s):

MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

RO (Step 5) Control ruptured S/G(s) level as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) N/R level-GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Isolate feed flow to ruptured S/G(s):

Close 1CA-54AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. If NOT already done, the SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5,;"l,...;;6...;;&;;..;...7 ___ Page ~

of _5;,;;2;;""'-11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO RO RO For1BS/G:

1 SA-2 (1 B S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Maint Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767 + 12, FF-53) 1SA-78 (1B S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Loop Seallsol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+10, FF-53.

IF AT ANY TIME local closure of SA valves takes over 8 minutes, THEN isolate TD CA pump steam supply PER Enclosure 2 (Tripping TD CA Pump Stop Valve or Alternate Steam Isolation).

(Step 4d) Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured S/G(s) - CLOSED:

For 1B S/G:

1 BB-2B (1 B S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1 BB-6A (B S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

Close steam drain on ruptured S/G(s).

1 SM-89 (B SM Line Drain Isol)

Close the following on ruptured S/G(s):

MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

(Step 5) Control ruptured S/G(s) level as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) N/R level-GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Isolate feed flow to ruptured S/G(s):

Close 1 CA-54AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. If NOT already done, the SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;;.1,..;;6;..;&;;..;..7 ___ Page ~

of _5;;,;2;;;..-.","

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK:

Close 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol).

NOTE: Because CA flow has failed on 1 B SG, the CRSRO may direct an NLO to check the position of the valve locally.

If so, Booth Instructor report back as NLO, that the valves are closed.

(E-3A) Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of ~P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of ~P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

RO (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s)pressure -

GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.

BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump - RUNNING.

BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG SRO (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:

Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured S/G pressure:

RO Check the following on the ruptured S/G(s) - CLOSED.

MSIV NOTE: SRO determines to cooldown to 508-520oF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5~,~6~&

___ 7___ Page ~

of __

52...... -11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK:

Close 1 CA-58A (1 A CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol).

NOTE: Because CA flow has failed on 1 B SG, the CRSRO may direct an NLO to check the position of the valve locally.

If so, Booth Instructor report back as NLO, that the valves are closed.

(E-3A) Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of l'.P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of l'.P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

RO (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s)pressure -

GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.

BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump - RUNNING.

BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG SRO (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:

Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured S/G pressure:

RO Check the following on the ruptured S/G(s) - CLOSED.

MSIV NOTE: SRO determines to cooldown to 508-520oF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5

....,_6_&--...7___ Page ~

of _5_2 ___....

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO MSIV bypass valve Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV-CLOSED.

Check S/Gs 1B and 1C -INTACT.

(Step 9.d RNO) IF 1 B OR 1 C S/G is ruptured, THEN do not continue until steam is isolated to TDCA pump from ruptured S/G per one of the following:

Local isolation of SA line (per Step 4.c)

OR Tripping TD CA pump stop valve (per Step 4.c)

RO Check condenser available:

"C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI-18)

- LIT MSIV on intact S/G(s) - OPEN Check S/Gs 1B and 1C -INTACT.

RO (Step 9.f) Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:

Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.

Adjust "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signal.

Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.

NOTE: If NOT already done, the SRO will direct two NLOs to CLOSE 1 SA-2 and 78.

Booth Instructor: Set LOA-SA003 = 0, (1SA-2n8)

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the B SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

....;.:5,:...;6:...;&;.;..;..7 ___ Page ~

of _5;.,;2;""'-11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO MSIV bypass valve Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV-CLOSED.

Check S/Gs 1 Band 1 C - INTACT.

(Step 9.d RNO) IF 1 B OR 1 C S/G is ruptured, THEN do not continue until steam is isolated to TDCA pump from ruptured S/G per one of the following:

Local isolation of SA line (per Step 4.c)

OR Tripping TO CA pump stop valve (per Step 4.c)

RO Check condenser available:

"C-g COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1 SI-18)

- LIT MSIV on intact S/G(s) - OPEN Check S/Gs 1 Band 1 C - INTACT.

RO (Step 9.f) Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:

Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.

Adjust "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signal.

Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.

NOTE: If NOT already done, the SRO will direct two NLOs to CLOSE 1 SA-2 and 78.

Booth Instructor: Set LOA-SA003 = 0, (1 SA-2/78)

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TO CA Pump from the B SG.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;.:,....;6....;&;;..7.;......__ Page ~

of _5.;..;2 __ -11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP RO WHEN "P-12 LO-LO TAVG" status light (1SI-18) lit, THEN place steam dumps in bypass interlock.

Dump steam from intact S/G(s) to condenser at maximum rate while attem pting to avoid a Main Steam Isolation.

Check Low Pressure Steamline Isolation

- BLOCKED.

(Step 9.i RNO) Perform the following:

Depressurize Pzr to less than 1955 PSIG using one of the following:

Maximum available Pzr spray.

OR IF normal Pzr spray is not available, THEN use Pzr PORV.

e Do not continue until Pzr pressure is less than 1955 PSIG.

e Depress "BLOCK" on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches.

Close Pzr spray valve(s) and Pzr PORVs.

Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG.

(Step 9.D Check Core exit T/Cs-LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

SRO (Step 9.j RNO) Perform the following:

WHEN Core exit TICs are less than required temperature, THEN perform the following:

Stop NC System cooldown.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6 & 7 Page ~

of

_5;;.;2~-!I Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP RO WHEN "P-12 LO-LO TAVG" status light (1SI-18) lit, THEN place steam dumps in bypass interlock.

Dump steam from intact S/G(s) to condenser at maximum rate while attem pting to avoid a Main Steam Isolation.

Check Low Pressure Steamline Isolation

- BLOCKED.

(Step 9.i RNO) Perform the following:

Depressurize Pzr to less than 1955 PSIG using one of the following:

Maximum available Pzr spray.

OR IF normal Pzr spray is not available, THEN use Pzr PORV.

Do not continue until Pzr pressure is less than 1955 PSIG.

Depress "BLOCK" on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches.

Close Pzr spray valve(s) and Pzr PORVs.

Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG.

(Step 9.D Check Core exit T/Cs-LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

SRO (Step 9.j RNO) Perform the following:

WHEN Core exit TICs are less than required temperature, THEN perform the following:

Stop NC System cooldown.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;;.:,~6;..;&;;..;...7 ___ Page ~

of

_5;;.;2=--~

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 11a.li_~"J0:t"'r~_:;'_*~ __

1

'fJiI' b 4~:¥

~',y "Mi' r'

o ti

~@h f~

Th1;tWd i

~

C<<

Maintain core exit TICs less than required temperature.

SRO GO TO Step 10.

RO (Step 10) Control intact S/G levels:

Check N/R level in any intact S/G -

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 22% (32% ACC) and 50%.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:

Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

AVAILABLE.

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

NOTE: 1 NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.

BOP (Step 11 b RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close Pzr PORV(s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, NOTE: This valve has been THEN close its isolation valve.

previously closed.

IF PORV isolation valve cannot be NOTE: The PORV Isolation closed......

valve is closed.

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or NOTE: All PORVs are either

isolated, closed or isolated.

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN close the following valve:

IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, NOTE: This valve has been THEN close 1 NC-270 (PZR previously closed.

BOP (Step 11c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve - OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6 & 7 Page ~

of

_5~2;;"-'-fl Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Maintain core exit TICs less than required temperature.

SRO GO TO Step 10.

RO (Step 10) Control intact S/G levels:

Check N/R level in any intact S/G -

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 22% (32% ACC) and 50%.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:

Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

AVAILABLE.

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 11 b RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close Pzr PORV(s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN close its isolation valve.

IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed......

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or

isolated, IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN close the following valve:

IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, THEN close 1 NC-270 (PZR BOP (Step 11 c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve - OPEN.

NOTE: 1 NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.

NOTE: This valve has been previously closed.

NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve is closed.

NOTE: All PORVs are either closed or isolated.

NOTE: This valve has been previously closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;.:,..;;6;..;&;;.7.;.....__ Page ~

of _5;;,;2=:'--II Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak {B)/SGTR {B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 12) Reset the following:

SII Sequencers Phase A Isolation Phase B Isolation BOP (Step 13) Establish VI to containment:

Open the following:

1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))

1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))

1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

RO (Step 14) Check if NC System cooldown should be stopped as follows:

Check Core exit TICs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

RO (Step 14a RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME while in this step ruptured S/G pressure changes by over 100 PSIG, AND ruptured S/G pressure is greater than 400 PSIG, THEN select a new target temperature from table in Step 9.a.

Do not continue until core exit TICs are less than target temperature.

RO (Step 14b) Stop NC System cooldown.

Maintain Core exit TICs - LESS THAN REQURIED TEMPERATURE.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6 & 7 Page ~

of....,;.,;52--'-11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 12) Reset the following:

SII Sequencers Phase A Isolation Phase B Isolation BOP (Step 13) Establish VI to containment:

RO RO RO Open the following:

1 VI-12gB (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))

1 VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))

1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

(Step 14) Check if NC System cooldown should be stopped as follows:

Check Core exit TICs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

(Step 14a RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME while in this step ruptured S/G pressure changes by over 100 PSIG, AND ruptured S/G pressure is greater than 400 PSIG, THEN select a new target temperature from table in Step g.a.

Do not continue until core exit TICs are less than target temperature.

(Step 14b) Stop NC System cooldown.

Maintain Core exit TICs - LESS THAN REQURIED TEMPERATURE.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6 & 7 Page ~

of

_5.;.;2;;....~1 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior (Step 15) Check ruptured S/G( s) pressure -

STABLE OR GOING UP.

RO (Step 16) Check NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - GREATER THAN 20°F.

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-3B) Establish/maintain an ReS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depressurization.

RO (Step 17) Depressurize NC System as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) NR level - LESS THAN 73% (63% ACC).

BOP Check normal Pzr spray flow -

AVAILABLE.

Initiate NC depressurization using maximum available spray.

IF AT ANY TIME during this step, spray NOTE: The SRO may decide valves are not effective at reducing NC that Pzr Spray is ineffective at pressure, OR ruptured S/G(s) NR level is reducing pressure, and approaching 83% (73% ACC), THEN GO proceed to Step 18. If so, TO Step 18.

proceed forward to Step 18 on Page 47.

ROI Do not continue until any of the following BOP conditions satisfied:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5~,~6....;&~7 ___ Page ~

of _5_2 __..,1 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior (Step 15) Check ruptured S/G(s) pressure -

STABLE OR GOING UP.

RO (Step 16) Check NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - GREATER THAN 20°F.

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-3B) Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depress urization.

RO (Step 17) Depressurize NC System as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) NR level - LESS THAN 73% (63% ACC).

BOP Check normal Pzr spray flow -

AVAILABLE.

Initiate NC depressurization using maximum available spray.

IF AT ANY TIME during this step, spray NOTE: The SRO may decide valves are not effective at reducing NC that Pzr Spray is ineffective at pressure, OR ruptured S/G(s) NR level is reducing pressure, and approaching 83% (73% ACC), THEN GO proceed to Step 18. If so, TO Step 18.

proceed forward to Step 18 on Page 47.

ROI Do not continue until any of the following BOP conditions satisfied:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;.:,..;6;..;&;;;..;..7 ___ Page ~

of _5;;,;2;;""-11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - LESS THAN O°F Pzr level-GREATER THAN 76%

(58%ACC)

Both of the following:

RO I NC pressure - LESS THAN BOP RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE.

Pzr level-GREATER THAN 11 % (29% ACC).

BOP Close Pzr spray valves.

BOP (Step 17.g) Check 1 NV-21 A (NV Spray to PZr Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 17.h) Observe Caution prior to Step 20 and GO TO Step 20.

BOP (Step 18) Depressurize NC System using Pzr NOTE: This step will only be PORV as follows:

performed if the SRO determines that the Pzr Spray is NOT effective at reducing NC System pressure.

BOP Check at least one Pzr PORV -

AVAILABLE.

BOP Open one Pzr PORV.

BOP Do not continue until any of the following OR OR conditions satisfied:

NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - LESS THAN O°F Pzr level-GREATER THAN 76%

(58% ACC)

Both of the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;;.: *....;;6;..;&;;;..;..7 ___ Page ~

of

..;;.;52~-I1 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - LESS THAN OaF Pzr level-GREATER THAN 76%

(58% ACC)

Both of the following:

RO I NC pressure - LESS THAN BOP RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE.

Pzr level-GREATER THAN 11% (29% ACC).

BOP Close Pzr spray valves.

BOP (Step 17.g) Check 1 NV-21 A (NV Spray to PZr Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 17.h) Observe Caution prior to Step 20 and GO TO Step 20.

BOP (Step 18) Depressurize NC System using Pzr NOTE: This step will only be PORV as follows:

performed if the SRO determines that the Pzr Spray is NOT effective at reducing NC System pressure.

BOP Check at least one Pzr PORV-AVAILABLE.

BOP Open one Pzr PORV.

BOP Do not continue until any of the following conditions satisfied:

OR OR NC subcooling based on core exit TICs - LESS THAN OaF Pzr level-GREATER THAN 76%

(58% ACC)

Both of the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5001,_6_&_7~__ Page ~

of _5.;,;2 __ -11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior NC pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE.

Pzr level-GREATER THAN 11 % (29% ACC).

BOP Close Pzr PORV.

BOP Close Pzr spray valves.

BOP (Step 19) Check NC pressure - GOING UP.

CRITICAL TASK (E-3C) Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before ruptured SG level reaches 100% Wide Range Level.

Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.

RO I (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria:

BOP NC subcooling based on core exit TICs -

GREATER THAN OaF.

Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least one intact S/G -

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC)

Or Total feed flow available to S/G(s)-

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level-GREATER THAN 11% (29%

ACC).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;;,j,...;;6;..;&;;..7.;.....-__ Page ~

of

......;.;52;;.....~1 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior NC pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE.

Pzr level-GREATER THAN 11 % (29% ACC).

BOP Close Pzr PORV.

BOP Close Pzr spray valves.

BOP (Step 19) Check NC pressure - GOING UP.

CRITICAL TASK (E-3C) Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before ruptured SG level reaches 100% Wide Range Level.

Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.

RO I (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria:

BOP NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs-GREATER THAN OaF.

Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least one intact S/G -

GREATER THAN 11 % (32% ACC)

Or Total feed flow available to S/G(s)-

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level-GREATER THAN 11 % (29%

ACC).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;.:,....;;6;..;&;..7.;......__ Page ~

of _5;;,;2;;""-i/

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 21) Stop SII pumps as follows:

NI pumps.

All but one NV pump.

BOP (Step 22) Isolate NV SII flowpath:

Check NV pump - SUCTION ALIGNED TO FWST.

Check NV pumps minimflow valves-OPEN:

1 NV-1S0B (NV Pumps Recirculation)

BOP 1NV-1S1A (NV Pumps Recirculation).

Close the following valves:

1 NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV)

1 N 1-1 OB (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

At the discretion of the lead Examiner terminate the exam.

EXAMINER NOTE: Following Exam termination, Examiner should follow-up with TS Requirements during the Steam Generator Tube Leak.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL lEAKAGE SRO 3.4.13 ReS Operational LEAKAGE SRO LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

Event #

_5~':..;6:..;&;;...;...7___ Page ~

of

_5;.;2;......~

Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 21) Stop S/I pumps as follows:

NI pumps.

All but one NV pump.

BOP (Step 22) Isolate NV S/I flowpath:

Check NV pump - SUCTION ALIGNED TO FWST.

Check NV pumps minimflow valves-OPEN:

1 NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation)

BOP 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).

Close the following valves:

1 NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV)

1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

EXAMINER NOTE: Following Exam termination, Examiner should follow-up with TS Requirements during the Steam Generator Tube Leak.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE SRO 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE SRO LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

_5;;,i,..;;6..;;&;..7;...... __ Page ~

of _5... 2--'-11 Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through anyone steam generator (SG).

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.

RCS A.1 Reduce 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Operational LEAKAGE LEAKAGE within not within limits.

limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

NOTE: The SRO will determ ine that LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met, and that Condition A is applicable, during the course of the transient.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4, ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS SRO 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

~5'...;;6...;;&;;..7;...... __ Page ~

of _5.;;,;2;;"""-11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Time II Position J AQ(:lIicant's Actions or Behavior 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through anyone steam generator (SG).

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.

RCS A.1 Reduce 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Operational LEAKAGE LEAKAGE within not within limits.

limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

NOTE: The SRO will determine that LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met, and that Condition A is applicable, during the course of the transient.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4, ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS SRO 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6& 7 Page ~

of _5;;;,;2;;""'_11 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)I Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high

.11 e II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

'SRO LCO 3.1.4 - All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME B. One rod not within B.l Restore rod to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months alignment limits.

within alignment limits.

QB.

B.2.1.1 Verify SDM is within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the limit specified in theCOLR.

QB.

B.2.1.2 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND B.2.2 limit.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

.s75%RTP.

AND B.2.3 Verify SDM is within the limit specified in Once per the COLA.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

~

B.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1.

AND B.2.5 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Perform SR 3.2.2.1.

AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate safety analyses and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.

5 days NOTE: The SRO will determ ine that LCO 3.1.4 is NOT met, and that Condition B is applicable, during the course of the transient.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

Event #

5,6 & 7 Page 51 of 52 Steam Generator Tube Leak (8)/SGTR (8)1 Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to 8 SG fails high Position A

licant's Actions or Behavior

'SRO SRO SRO LCO 3.1.4 - All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION TIME ACTION B. One rod not within B.1 Restore rod to alignment limits.

within alignment limits.

OR B.2.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Verify SDM is within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the limit specified in the COLA.

OR B.2.1.2 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND B.2.2 limit.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months So 75% RTP.

AND B.2.3 Verify SDM is within the limit specified in Once per the COLR.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND B.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1.

AND B.2.5 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Perform SR 3.2.2.1.

AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate safety analyses and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.

5 days NOTE: The SRO will determine that LCO 3.1.4 is NOT met, and that Condition B is applicable, during the course of the transient.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level: 75%

NCS [B] 1136 ppm Pzr [B]: 1149 ppm Xe: PerOAC Power History:

The Plant is at 75% power (MOL),

Core Burnup: 250 EFPDs for two days.

CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/61 00103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (See Reactivity Plan and Power Ascension Guidelines)

OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1 A CF Pump.

The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago.

The present plan is to observe operation of the 1A CF Pump at this power level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Dispatch has indicated that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated.

It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of of OP/1/A/61 001003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation."

Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/61501009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved.

The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.

The crew has been directed to raise power at 2 MWe/Minute.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1 EMF27, SM Line Dllnner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Aux Bldg. John Turb Bldg. Bob 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya Unit 2 Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Mike UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level:

75%

NCS [B] 1136 ppm Pzr [B]: 1149 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History:

The Plant is at 75% power (MOL),

Core Burnup: 250 EFPDs for two days.

CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A/61 00/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (See Reactivity Plan and Power Ascension Guidelines)

OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1A CF Pump.

The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago.

The present plan is to observe operation of the 1A CF Pump at this power level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Dispatch has indicated that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated.

It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of of OP/1/A/61 00/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation."

Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved.

The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.

The crew has been directed to raise power at 2 MWe/Minute.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1 EMF27, SM Line D/lnner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The Plant is at 100% power (EOl), steady-state operation. The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1 CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance. An NlO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity. System Engineering has indicated that Turbine load does not need to be reduced to perform this. When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1 B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

SG NR level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating). MCB Annunciator 1 AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE MIG SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malt.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA N-RO Swap CF Control Valve Circuit N-SRO 2

ILE001 I-BOP Pressurizer Level Transmitter fails high I(TS)-SRO 3

NV028A C-BOP NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts NV023A C(TS)-SRO and fails open 4

NA N-BOP Establish Excess letdown N-SRO 5

XMT I-RO Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure SM003 I(TS)-SRO 6

IFE006A C-RO FCV Controller failure C-SRO 7

XMT M-RO SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS CF032 M-BOP M-SRO 8

IPEOO1A1B NA Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/ Automatic Turbine Trip IPEOO2A1B DEH003A 9

CA005 NA TD CA Pump trip 10 CA004A NA 1 A CA Pump fails to start (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The Plant is at 100% power (EOL), steady-state operation. The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1 CF-32 (A SIG CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance. An NLO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity. System Engineering has indicated that Turbine Load does not need to be reduced to perform this. When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1 B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

SG NR Level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating). MCB Annunciator 1 AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE MIG SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA N-RO Swap CF Control Valve Circuit N-SRO 2

ILE001 I-BOP Pressurizer Level Transmitter fails high I(TS)-SRO 3

NV028A C-BOP NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts NV023A C(TS)-SRO and fails open 4

NA N-BOP Establish Excess Letdown N-SRO 5

XMT I-RO Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure SM003 I(TS)-SRO 6

IFE006A C-RO FCV Controller failure C-SRO 7

XMT M-RO SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS CF032 M-BOP M-SRO 8

IPEOO1A1B NA Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/ Automatic Turbine Trip IPEOO2A1B DEH003A 9

CA005 NA TO CA Pump trip 10 CA004A NA 1 A CA Pump fails to start (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor McGuire 2009 NRC Scenario #3 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The Plant is at 100% power (EOL), steady-state operation. The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1 CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance. An NLO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity. System Engineering has indicated that Turbine Load does not need to be reduced to perform this. When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1 B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

SG NR Level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating). MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE MIG SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift from Normal to the Alternate CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1CF-32, (A S/G CF Control Valve) in accordance with section 3.6 of.22, "Swapping CF Control Valve Control Circuit," of OP/1/A/62501001, "Condensate and Feedwater System." When the procedure is complete 1 CF-32 will be in Automatic Control on the Alternate Control Circuit.

Immediately afterwards, the controlling Pzr Level Transmitter (LNC-5160) will rapidly fail high causing charging flow to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level DEV Control," determine that a failed instrument has occurred and swap to an operable channel. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," 3.3.3, "PAM Instrumentation," 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System."

Following this, the retention element on the in-service NV System Demineralizer will fail causing an immediately plugging of Letdown Filter A, and causing Letdown Line Relief Valve to lift, and then fail open. There are two possible success paths for the operating crew. The operator may elect to isolate Letdown, and then implement AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," due to the loss of Letdown flow. On the other hand, the operator may respond in accordance with 1AD-7, 1-4, "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP," and then implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," Case II, "NC System leakage."

In either situation the operator will isolate normal letdown and establish excess letdown. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

After excess Letdown is established, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel 1 will fail low causing Tref to go low, and Control Rods to move inward in auto to maintain Tavg-Tref deviation. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation."

The operator will also address SLC 16.7.1, "A TWS/AMSAC."

Subsequently, the controller for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) will fail in Automatic control causing the valve to go closed. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500106, "S/G Feedwater Malfunctions," and take manual control of the control valve. The controller will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

Shortly afterwards, the D SG NR Level Channel 2 will fail high causing an FWIS.

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually; and the Turbine will fail to trip automatically. The operator will be expected to enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or McGuire 2009 NRC Scenario #3 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The Plant is at 100% power (EOL), steady-state operation.

The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1 CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance. An NLO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity. System Engineering has indicated that Turbine Load does not need to be reduced to perform this. When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1 B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

SG NR Level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating). MCB Annunciator 1 AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE MIG SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift from Normal to the Alternate CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1 CF-32, (A S/G CF Control Valve) in accordance with section 3.6 of.22, "Swapping CF Control Valve Control Circuit," of OP/1/A/62501001, "Condensate and Feedwater System." When the procedure is complete 1 CF-32 will be in Automatic Control on the Alternate Control Circuit.

Immediately afterwards, the controlling Pzr Level Transmitter (LNC-5160) will rapidly fail high causing charging flow to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level DEV Control," determine that a failed instrument has occurred and swap to an operable channel. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," 3.3.3, "PAM Instrumentation," 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System."

Following this, the retention element on the in-service NV System Demineralizer will fail causing an immediately plugging of Letdown Filter A, and causing Letdown Line Relief Valve to lift, and then fail open. There are two possible success paths for the operating crew. The operator may elect to isolate Letdown, and then implement AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," due to the loss of Letdown flow. On the other hand, the operator may respond in accordance with 1AD-7, 1-4, "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP," and then implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," Case II, "NC System leakage."

In either situation the operator will isolate normal letdown and establish excess letdown. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

After excess Letdown is established, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel 1 will fail low causing Tref to go low, and Control Rods to move inward in auto to maintain Tavg-Tref deviation. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation."

The operator will also address SLC 16.7.1, "A TWSI AMSAC."

Subsequently, the controller for 1 CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) will fail in Automatic control causing the valve to go closed. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500106, "S/G Feedwater Malfunctions," and take manual control of the control valve. The controller will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

Shortly afterwards, the 0 SG NR Level Channel 2 will fail high causing an FWIS.

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually; and the Turbine will fail to trip automatically. The operator will be expected to enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the Reactor. When the Reactor does not trip, the operator will be expected to transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor and the Turbine.

Upon event initiation, the TD CA Pump will overspeed. Additionally, the 1A CA Pump will trip on overcurrent causing a Red Path to exist on Heat Sink. Following completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

Upon entry into FR-H.1, the Steam Generator levels will approach the point at which NCS Bleed and Feed must be established.

The scenario is expected to terminate at Step 29 of FR-H.1, after the crew has established NCS Bleed and Feed cooling.

Critical Tasks:

FR-S.1 C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality.

A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

FR-S.1 A Trip the Turbine prior to Wide Range Steam Generator levels dropping to < 24%

Safety Significance: Turbine trip is important in maintaining Steam generator inventory and primary-to-secondary heat transfer. If the Turbine is NOT tripped the Steam Generator U-Tubes uncover sooner and faster. Thus, primary-to-secondary heat transfer starts to deteriorate earlier in the transient and deteriorates more rapidly. The result is that once tube uncovery begins, NC System temperature and pressure increase more rapidly and reach higher values.

FR-H.1 B Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover. Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the Reactor. When the Reactor does not trip, the operator will be expected to transition to EP/1 IA/5000/FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor and the Turbine.

Upon event initiation, the TO CA Pump will overspeed. Additionally, the 1A CA Pump will trip on overcurrent causing a Red Path to exist on Heat Sink. Following completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

Upon entry into FR-H.1, the Steam Generator levels will approach the point at which NCS Bleed and Feed must be established.

The scenario is expected to terminate at Step 29 of FR-H.1, after the crew has established NCS Bleed and Feed cooling.

Critical Tasks:

FR-S.1 C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality.

A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

FR-S.1 A Trip the Turbine prior to Wide Range Steam Generator levels dropping to < 24%

Safety Significance: Turbine trip is important in maintaining Steam generator inventory and primary-to-secondary heat transfer. If the Turbine is NOT tripped the Steam Generator U-Tubes uncover sooner and faster. Thus, primary-to-secondary heat transfer starts to deteriorate earlier in the transient and deteriorates more rapidly. The result is that once tube uncovery begins, NC System temperature and pressure increase more rapidly and reach higher values.

FR-H.1 B Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

Establishing feed water flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS o

Sim. Setup o

0 0

Rod Step On Reset to Temporary IC-100% Steady-State EOl 153 RUN Update Status Board, Setup OAC Setup ICCM, Turbine Displays, & Trend Recorders.

Check Rod Step Counters agree with rod positions Check Make-up Control Switch in "ARMED."

Ensure DRPI Screen is Re-zeroed.

Ensure CF Pump loveJoy reset.

Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

lOA CA-010=Racked Out, 1 B CA Pump is OOS XMT-CF031 = 100, LCF-5580, SG D #4 NR Level OOS MAlF IPE001 AlB, Failure of Automatic Rx Trip MAlF IPE002A1B, Failure of Manual Rx Trip MAlF DEH003A, Failure of Automatic Turbine Trip MAlF CA004A=2, Failure of 1A CA Pump to start (Both Auto and Manual) 1 B CA Pump OOS Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS o

Sim. Setup o

0 0

Rod Step On Reset to Temporary IC-100% Steady-State EOl 153 RUN Update Status Board, Setup OAC Setup ICCM, Turbine Displays, & Trend Recorders.

Check Rod Step Counters agree with rod positions Check Make-up Control Switch in "ARMED."

Ensure DRPI Screen is Re-zeroed.

Ensure CF Pump loveJoy reset.

Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

lOA CA-Ol O=Racked Out, 1 B CA Pump is OOS XMT-CF031 = 100, lCF-5580, SG D #4 NR level OOS MAlF IPE001 AlB, Failure of Automatic Rx Trip MAlF IPE002A1B, Failure of Manual Rx Trip MAlF DEH003A, Failure of Automatic Turbine Trip MAlF CA004A=2, Failure of lA CA Pump to start (Both Auto and Manual) 1 B CA Pump OOS

o o

0 0

Prior to Crew Briefing Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Spec. Log.

Fill out the NLO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

RUN LCF-5580, SG D #4 NR Level OOS Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements.

2. Provide crew with OP/1/A/6250/001, Enclosure 4.22, completed through Steps 3.1 - 3.3.

3. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-O At direction of examiner At direction of examiner At direction of examiner Continued from Event 3 Begin Familiarization Period NA (XMT) ILE001 Set = 100 Ramp = 30 seconds Trigger #1 (MALF) NV028A Set = 100 Trigger #3 (MALF) NV023A Set = OPEN Trigger #5 NA Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Pzr Level Transmitter fails high NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open When Letdown Hi Pressure Annunciator alarms, Operate Trigger #5.

Establish Excess Letdown o

o o

o 0

0 Prior to Crew Briefing Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Fill out the NLO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

RUN LCF-5580, SG 0 #4 NR Level OOS Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements.

2. Provide crew with OP/1/A/6250/001, Enclosure 4.22, completed through Steps 3.1 - 3.3.

3. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-O At direction of examiner At direction of examiner At direction of examiner Continued from Event 3 Begin Familiarization Period NA (XMT) ILE001 Set = 100 Ramp = 30 seconds Trigger #1 (MALF) NV028A Set = 100 Trigger #3 (MALF) NV023A Set = OPEN Trigger #5 NA Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Pzr Level Transmitter fails high NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open When Letdown Hi Pressure Annunciator alarms, Operate Trigger #5.

Establish Excess Letdown

0 At direction of examiner 0

At direction of examiner 0

Continued from Event 7 0

Continued from Event 7 o

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 (XMT) SM003 Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter Failure Set=O Ramp = 30 seconds Trigger #7 (MALF) IFE006A FCV Controller failure Set=O Ramp = 60 seconds Trigger #9 (XMT) CF032 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS Set = 100 (LCF-5600, SG D #2 NR Level)

Trigger #11 (MALF) IPE001 AlB Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/ Automatic Turbine Trip (MALF) IPE002A1B (T=O)

(MALF) DEH003A (T=O)

(MALF) CA005 TD CA Pump trip Trigger #13 (w/P4)

Trigger #13 = Conditional on reactor trip (P4).

(MALF) CA004A 1A CA Pump fails to start Set = BOTH (Pump will fail to start in Auto or Manual)

(T=O)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner 0 At direction of examiner 0

At direction of examiner 0

Continued from Event 7 0

Continued from Event 7 o

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 (XMT) SM003 Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter Failure Set = 0 Ramp = 30 seconds Trigger #7 (MALF) IFE006A FCV Controller failure Set =0 Ramp = 60 seconds Trigger #9 (XMT) CF032 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS Set = 100 (LCF-5600, SG D #2 NR Level)

Trigger #11 (MALF) IPE001 AlB Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Tripi Automatic Turbine Trip (MALF) IPE002A1B (T=O)

(MALF) DEH003A (T=O)

(MALF) CA005 TD CA Pump trip Trigger #13 (w/P4)

Trigger #13 = Conditional on reactor trip (P4).

(MALF) CA004A 1A CA Pump fails to start Set = BOTH (Pump will fail to start in Auto or Manual)

(T=O)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

--.;... ____ Page 8

of _5;;,;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Time I

Position I

AjJlllicant's Actions or Behavior Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift from Normal to the Alternate CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1CF-32, (A S/G CF Control Valve) in accordance with section 3.6 of Enclosure 4.22, "Swapping CF Control Valve Control Circuit," of OP/1/A/6250/001, "Condensate and Feedwater System."

When the procedure is complete 1 CF-32 will be in Automatic Control on the Alternate Control Circuit.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA OPI1IA16250/001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.22, SWAPPING CF CONTROL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT RO (Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

ROI NLO Section 3.5, Swap CF Control /valve Control Circuit For 1 CF-32AB (1 A S/G CF Control)

(Step 3.5) Swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit For 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control)

(Step 3.5.1) IF swapping from Normal to Alternate Control Circuit, check Alternate Control Power available for 1 CFSV0234 on TB 691 (Unit 1 Turbine Building Basement).

RO (Step 3.5.2) Place 1CF-32A (1A S/G CF Control) in "MAN." (A.M.)

NOTE: The RO will contact NLO.

Booth Instructor: Report that Alternate Control power is available for 1 CVSV0234 on TB691.

NOTE: The RO may direct the NLO to perform Steps 3.5.3.

through 3.5.5.

If so, Booth Instructor: make the following reports all at once.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

Page 8

of 59

~--------

~~~I Event

Description:

Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Time Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift from Normal to the Alternate CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1CF-32, (A S/G CF Control Valve) in accordance with section 3.6 of Enclosure 4.22, "Swapping CF Control Valve Control Circuit," of OP/1/A/6250/001, "Condensate and Feedwater System."

When the procedure is complete 1 CF-32 will be in Automatic Control on the Alternate Control Circuit.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA OP/1/A16250/001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.22, SWAPPING CF CONTROL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT RO (Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

ROI NLO Section 3.5, Swap CF Control Ivalve Control Circuit For 1 CF-32AB (1 A S/G CF Control)

(Step 3.5) Swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit For 1 CF-32AB (1 A S/G CF Control)

(Step 3.5.1) IF swapping from Normal to Alternate Control Circuit, check Alternate Control Power available for 1 CFSV0234 on TB 691 (Unit 1 Turbine Building Basement).

RO (Step 3.5.2) Place 1CF-32A (1A S/G CF Control) in "MAN." (R.M.)

NOTE: The RO will contact NLO.

Booth Instructor: Report that Alternate Control power is available for 1 CVSV0234 on TB691.

NOTE: The RO may direct the NLO to perform Steps 3.5.3 through 3.5.5.

If so, Booth Instructor: make the following reports all at once.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

....;.. _____ Page 9

of

_5;.;9~-II Event

Description:

Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior ROI *

(Step 3.5.3) Check the following green NOTE: The RO will contact NLO lights on the HART Interface Module NLO.

(H 1M) alternate controller (1 CFEMOO08)

Booth Instructor: Report that for 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) lit:

the Input, Ready, Trip1, and Trip 2 green lights are lit on the HART Interface Module alternate controller for 1 CF-32AB.

Input Ready Trip 1 Trip 2 ROI (Step 3.5.4) Check the following green NOTE: The RO will contact NLO lights on the HART Interface Module NLO.

(HIM) normal controller (1CFEM0004) for Booth Instructor: Report that 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) lit:

the Input, Ready, Trip1, and Trip 2 green lights are lit on the HART Interface Module normal controller for 1 CF-32AB.

Input Ready Trip 1 Trip 2 (Step 3.5.5) Check digital readout on NOTE: The RO will contact 1 CFEM0008 and 1 CFEM0004 indicate NLO.

within 10%.

Booth Instructor: Report that the digital readout on 1 CFEM00008 and 1 CMEM0004 are within 10%.

RO (Step 3.5.6) Place 1 CF-32AB "SELECTOR SWITCH" to desired control circuit:

"ALT" OR "NORM" Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

________ Page 9

of 59

II Event

Description:

Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Time II Position

~

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior ROI (Step 3.5.3) Check the following green NOTE: The RO will contact NLO lights on the HART Interface Module NLO.

(HIM) alternate controller (1 CFEMOO08)

Booth Instructor: Report that for 1 CF-32AB (1 A S/G CF Control) lit:

the Input, Ready, Trip1, and Trip 2 green lights are lit on the HART Interface Module alternate controller for 1 CF-32AB.

Input Ready Trip 1 Trip 2 ROI (Step 3.5.4) Check the following green NOTE: The RO will contact NLO lights on the HART Interface Module NLO.

(HIM) normal controller (1 CFEM0004) for Booth Instructor: Report that 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) lit:

the Input, Ready, Trip1, and Trip 2 green lights are lit on the HART Interface Module normal controller for 1 CF-32AB.

Input Ready Trip 1 Trip 2 (Step 3.5.5) Check digital readout on NOTE: The RO will contact 1 CFEM0008 and 1 CFEM0004 indicate NLO.

within 10%.

Booth Instructor: Report that the digital readout on 1 CFEM00008 and 1CMEM0004 are within 10%.

RO (Step 3.5.6) Place 1 CF-32AB "SELECTOR SWITCH" to desired control circuit:

"ALT" OR "NORM"

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

Op Test No.:

......;,, _____ Page 10 of _5...,9 __....

Event

Description:

Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Time

~

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3.5.7) Maintain 1 A S/G level programmed level.

RO (Step 3.5.8) WHEN desired, place 1 CF-32AB (1 A S/G CF Control) in "AUTO" as follows: (A.M.)

Ensure the following:

Selected control channels for 1 A S/G indicating correctly on chart recorder for the following:

Feed Flow Stm Flow S/G Level 1A S/G level at programmed level.

Place 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in "AUTO".

NOTE: The RO may contact NLO to observe system operation as normal.

If so, Booth Instructor: as NLO, report that System operation is Normal.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~

_____ Page 1 0 of _5;;.,;9;""'--11 Event

Description:

Swap CF Control Valve Circuit Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 3.5.7) Maintain 1 A S/G level programmed level.

RO (Step 3.5.8) WHEN desired, place 1 CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in "AUTO" as follows: (A.M.)

Ensure the following:

Selected control channels for 1A S/G indicating correctly on chart recorder for the following:

Feed Flow Stm Flow S/G Level 1A S/G level at programmed level.

Place 1 CF-32AB (1 A S/G CF Control) in "AUTO".

NOTE: The RO may contact NLO to observe system operation as normal.

If so, Booth Instructor: as NLO, report that System operation is Normal.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...;2~ ____ Page 11 of

_5.;..;9~-I Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Immediately afterwards, the controlling Pzr Level Transmitter (LNC-5160) will rapidly fail high causing charging flow to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level DEV Control," determine that a failed instrument has occurred and swap to an operable channel. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," 3.3_3, "PAM Instrumentation," 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System."

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger#1 (XMT-ILE001 (100 over 30 seconds>>

Indications Available:

Annunciator 1AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level Dev Control."

Annunciator 1AD-7/A-7, "Pzr Hi level Alert."

Charging flow decreases.

Channel #3 Pzr level indicates 100%.

Actual Pzr Level decreases.

NOTE: The SRO may address AP12, however, this AP will NOT mitigate the failure. The crew will eventually recognize that the ARP mitigates the failure and address it.

OP/1/A161001010G, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1AD-6 C-7, PZR HI LEVEL DEV CONTROL BOP (IA Step 1) Check backup heaters are on and charging flow is decreasing.

BOP (IA Step 2) IF instrument malfunction, manually control charging flow at the appropriate man/auto station:

Pzr Level Master Cntrl 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control)

NOTE: The BOP will place 1 NV-238 in MANUAL to control Charging flow.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...;2;;;......____ Page 11 of _5;.,;9;""'-11 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high Time Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Immediately afterwards, the controlling Pzr Level Transmitter (LNC-5160) will rapidly fail high causing charging flow to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with 1 AO-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level OEV Control," determine that a failed instrument has occurred and swap to an operable channel. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," 3.3.3, "PAM Instrumentation," 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System."

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger#1 {XMT-ILE001 (100 over 30 seconds>>

Indications Available:

Annunciator 1 AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level Dev ControL" Annunciator 1AD-7/A-7, "Pzr Hi level Alert."

Charging flow decreases.

Channel #3 Pzr level indicates 100%.

Actual Pzr Level decreases.

NOTE: The SRO may address AP12, however, this AP will NOT mitigate the failure. The crew will eventually recognize that the ARP mitigates the failure and address it.

OPI1IA16100/010G, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1AD-6 C-7, PZR HI LEVEL DEV CONTROL BOP (IA Step 1) Check backup heaters are on and charging flow is decreasing.

BOP (IA Step 2) IF instrument malfunction, manually control charging flow at the appropriate man/auto station:

Pzr Level Master Cntrl 1 NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control)

NOTE: The BOP will place 1 NV-238 in MANUAL to control Charging flow.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...;2~ ____ Page 12 of.... 5;..;.9--0 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior li.iliDl __

.!BBit~I_~I_

PD Pump Speed BOP (IA Step 3) IF instrument malfunction, place NOTE: The BOP will select "Pzr Level Cntrl Selecf' to unaffected position 3-2 on Pzr Level channels.

Control.

SRO (SA Step 1) IF required to control NOTE: The SRO may isolate Letdown/Charging, go to OP/1/Al6200/001 A Letdown. If so, AP12 will be (Chemical and Volume Control System entered to re-establish Letdown) or O!'/1/Al6200/001 B (Chemical Letdown.

and Volume Control System Charging).

SRO (SA Step 2) Refer to Tech Specs for NOTE: The SRO will likely minimum instrumentation requirements.

conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The SRO may call WCC/IAE to address failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, RTS INSTRUMENTATION SRO Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation SRO LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

SRO ACTIONS Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~2~________ Page 12 of _5;;,;9;""'--11 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP SRO SRO PO Pump Speed (IA Step 3) IF instrument malfunction, place "Pzr Level Cntrl Select" to unaffected channels.

(SA Step 1) IF required to control Letdown/Charging, go to OP/1/A/6200/001 A (Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown) or OP/1/A/6200/001 B (Chemical and Volume Control System Charging).

(SA Step 2) Refer to Tech Specs for minimum instrumentation requirements.

NOTE: The BOP will select position 3-2 on Pzr Level Control.

NOTE: The SRO may isolate Letdown. If so, AP12 will be entered to re-establish Letdown.

NOTE: The SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The SRO may call WCC/IAE to address failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, RTS INSTRUMENTATION SRO Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation SRO LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

SRO ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...;2;;;.... ____ Page 13 of _5;;,;9;""'-11 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1i~:!*~I_lII\\I!J!m.~I&~=~~III\\_"~_1

@,,'l,

&' ~!!I!.'

C" iii. ""

(tittWMha:

~

W1g' D

Wfu~j:

11

(~

00.

NOTE: The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3-1 shows that function 9 is applicable in Mode 1 above P-7, and determine that Action M is applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME M.

NOTE----

One channel One channel inoperable.

maybe bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing.

M.1 Place channel in trip.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months POWER to

< P-7.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.3, PAM INSTRUMENTATION SRO Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation SRO LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2 and 3.

SRO ACTIONS Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 13 of 59

~~-II Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high Time II Position 1 Aj)Qlicant's Actions or Behavior CONDITION M.

One channel inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION

NOTE----

One channel maybe bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing.

M.1 Place channel in COMPLETION TIME trip.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to

< P-7.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months NOTE: The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3-1 shows that function 9 is applicable in Mode 1 above P-7, and determine that Action M is applicable.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.3, PAM INSTRUMENTATION SRO Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation SRO LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2 and 3.

SRO ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

....;;;.2 _____ Page 14 of _5;;,;9;;""-11 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CONDITION B.

One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.

B.1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.

COMPLETION TIME 30 days NOTE: The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3.3-1 shows that function 11 is applicable and determine that Action B is applicable.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM SRO Remote Shutdown System SRO LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2 and 3.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION A.

One or more required Functions inoperable.

A.1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore required Function to OPERABLE status.

COMPLETION TIME 30 days NOTE: The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3.4-1 shows that function 4 is applicable and determine that Action A is applicable.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #3-4.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high 2

Page Form ES-O-2 14 of 59

~

Time Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CONDITION B.

One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.

B.1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.

COMPLETION TIME 30 days NOTE: The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3.3-1 shows that function 11 is applicable and determine that Action B is applicable.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM SRO Remote Shutdown System SRO LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2 and 3.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION A.

One or more required Functions inoperable.

A.1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore required Function to OPERABLE status.

COMPLETION TIME 30 days NOTE: The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3.4-1 shows that function 4 is applicable and determine that Action A is applicable.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #3-4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3

... &.-.....4 ___ Page 15 of _5;.,;9 __ -4 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failurelLetdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Following this, the retention element on the in-service NV System Demineralizer will fail causing an immediately plugging of Letdown Filter A, and causing Letdown Line Relief Valve to lift, and then fail open. There are two possible success paths for the operating crew. The operator may elect to isolate Letdown, and then implement AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," due to the loss of Letdown flow. On the other hand, the operator may respond in accordance with 1AD-7, 1-4, "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP," and then implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," Case II, "NC System leakage." I n either situation the operator will isolate normal letdown and establish excess letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (MALF-NV028A (100>>

When Letdown High Pressure Annunciator alarms, Operate Trigger #5 (MALF-NV23A (Open>>

Indications Available:

1AD-7/H-1, LETDN HI OUTLET HI PRESS 1AD-7/1-4, LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP OACAlarms.

NOTE: The crew actually has two success paths. They could isolate the leak by isolating Letdown, and go to AP12. This success path is scripted first.

On the other hand, they could address the ARP and then go to AP10. If so, Examiner following script starting on

22.

NOTE: The operator may recognize from the onset of the event that Letdown must be isolated to stop the leak, take action to do so, and enter AP12. If so, Examiner start here.

AP/1/A/5500/12, LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...;3;;...&;;;....;..4 ___ Page 15 of _5;;.;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Following this, the retention element on the in-service NV System Demineralizer will fail causing an immediately plugging of Letdown Filter A, and causing Letdown Line Relief Valve to lift, and then fail open. There are two possible success paths for the operating crew. The operator may elect to isolate Letdown, and then implement AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," due to the loss of Letdown flow. On the other hand, the operator may respond in accordance with 1AD-7, 1-4, "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP," and then implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," Case II, "NC System leakage." In either situation the operator will isolate normal letdown and establish excess letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (MALF-NV028A (100>>

When Letdown High Pressure Annunciator alarms, Operate Trigger #5 (MALF-NV23A (Open>>

Indications Available:

1AD-7/H-1, LETDN HI OUTLET HI PRESS 1AD-7/1-4, LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP OAG Alarms.

NOTE: The crew actually has two success paths. They could isolate the leak by isolating Letdown, and go to AP12. This success path is scripted first.

On the other hand, they could address the ARP and then go to AP10. If so, Exam iner following script starting on

22.

NOTE: The operator may recognize from the onset of the event that Letdown must be isolated to stop the leak, take action to do so, and enter AP12. If so, Examiner start here.

AP/1/A15500112, LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3~&...;4 _____ Page 16 of _5...,9--'-11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 1) IF a loss of charging through the Regenerative HX has occurred, THEN....

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr level - LESS THAN 96%.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME "REGEN HX LETDN HI TEMP" alarms (1AD-7; 1-2), THEN close the following valves:

1NV-1A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx) 1 NV-2A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx).

RO (Step 4) Stop any power or temperature changes in progress.

SRO (Step 5) Announce occurrence on paging system.

SRO (Step 6) IF this AP entered due to loss of letdown only, THEN GO TO Step 36.

BOP (Step 36) Ensure the following are closed:

1 NV-458A (75 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol) 1 NV-457A (45 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol) 1 NV-35A (Variable UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

BOP (Step 37) Ensure "NC SYS M/U CONTROLLER" in "AUTO".

NOTE: A loss of Charging has NOT occurred.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: These valves are most likely already closed.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

NOTE: The SRO will need to answer YES to this condition if this procedure is to be of any use to the crew.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~3~&~4~ _____ Page 1 6 of _5;;,;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 1) IF a loss of charging through the Regenerative HX has occurred, THEN....

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr level - LESS THAN 96%.

NOTE: A loss of Charging has NOT occurred.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME "REGEN HX NOTE: This is a Continuous LETDN HI TEMP" alarms (1AD-7, 1-2), THEN Action. The SRO will make close the following valves:

both board operators aware.

1NV-1A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx) 1 NV-2A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx).

RO (Step 4) Stop any power or temperature changes in progress.

SRO (Step 5) Announce occurrence on paging system.

SRO (Step 6) IF this AP entered due to loss of letdown only, THEN GO TO Step 36.

BOP (Step 36) Ensure the following are closed:

1 NV-458A (75 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol) 1 NV-457A (45 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol) 1 NV-35A (Variable UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

BOP (Step 37) Ensure "NC SYS M/U CONTROLLER" in "AUTO".

NOTE: These valves are most likely already closed.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

NOTE: The SRO will need to answer YES to this condition if this procedure is to be of any use to the crew.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3.;....;;.;&.....;4 ____ Page 17 of 59

....... 0.--1 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 38) Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

BOP (Step 39) Check "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP" alarm (1AD-7, 1-4) - HAS REMAINED DARK.

BOP (Step 39 RNO) Evaluate if low failure of letdown pressure instrument caused loss of letdown.

BOP (Step 40) Check 1 NV-21 A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 41) Operate Pzr heaters as follows:

Check all Pzr heater group supply breakers - CLOSED.

Check normal Pzr spray - AVAILABLE.

Place the following Pzr heater groups in manual and "ON" to maximize spray flow:

A B

D BOP (Step 42)Check the following valves -

OPEN:

1NV-1A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx).

1 NV-2A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx).

SRO (Step 43) GO TO Step 48.

NOTE: The BOP may take manual control of Charging flow via 1 NV-238.

NOTE: These valves have been previously closed.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3;;;...;;;&...;4 ____ Page 17 of

_5;..;9~-I1 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 38) Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

BOP (Step 39) Check "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP" alarm (1AD-7, 1-4) - HAS REMAINED DARK.

BOP (Step 39 RNO) Evaluate if low failure of letdown pressure instrument caused loss of letdown.

BOP (Step 40) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 41) Operate Pzr heaters as follows:

Check all Pzr heater group supply breakers - CLOSED.

Check normal Pzr spray - AVAILABLE.

Place the following Pzr heater groups in manual and "ON" to maximize spray flow:

A B

D BOP (Step 42)Check the following valves -

OPEN:

1NV-1A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx).

1 NV-2A (NC UD Isol To Regen Hx).

SRO (Step 43) GO TO Step 48.

NOTE: The BOP may take manual control of Charging flow via 1 NV-238.

NOTE: These valves have been previously closed.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3.;;..;;;&....;4~___ Page 18 of _5;;.,;9;""-1 NV Demin Retention Element failurelLetdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 48) Establish normal letdown:

NOTE: The SRO will need to know that the procedure is directing an action that plant conditions will NOT allow, and go to the RNO.

SRO (Step 48 RNO) GO TO Step 49.

BOP (Step 49) Establish excess letdown:

NOTE: The SRO may direct the BOP step by step, or handout this section of the procedure to the BOP.

BOP Adjust charging to minimum while maintaining the following:

NC pump seal injection flow greater than 6 GPM Pzr level at program level.

SRO/

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP be established, THEN observe Note prior Action.

to Step 50 and GO TO Step 50 to establish letdown using Rx Vessel Head Vents.

SRO/

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP be established, THEN observe Note prior Action.

to Step 50 and GO TO Step 50 to establish letdown using Rx Vessel Head Vents.

BOP Open the following:

1 KC-315B (Excess UD Hx Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

1 KC-305B (Excess UD Hx Sup Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

BOP Ensure 1 NV-27B (Excess UD Hx Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) selected to "VCT" position.

BOP Open 1 NV-26B (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP Wait 2 minutes.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

.....;;.3.;;;&..;4~ ___ Page 18 of

_5;;.;9;....~

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 48) Establish normal letdown:

NOTE: The SRO will need to know that the procedure is directing an action that plant conditions will NOT allow, and go to the RNO.

SRO (Step 48 RNO) GO TO Step 49.

BOP (Step 49) Establish excess letdown:

NOTE: The SRO may direct the BOP step by step, or handout this section of the procedure to the BOP.

BOP Adjust charging to minimum while maintaining the following:

NC pump seal injection flow greater than 6 GPM Pzr level at program level.

SRO/

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP be established, THEN observe Note prior Action.

to Step 50 and GO TO Step 50 to establish letdown using Rx Vessel Head Vents.

SRO/

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP be established, THEN observe Note prior Action.

to Step 50 and GO TO Step 50 to establish letdown using Rx Vessel Head Vents.

BOP Open the following:

1 KC-315B (Excess UD Hx Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

1 KC-305B (Excess UD Hx Sup Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

BOP Ensure 1 NV-27B (Excess UD Hx Otft 3-Way Cntrl) selected to "VCT" position.

BOP Open 1 NV-26B (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP Wait 2 minutes.

Appendix D OpTest No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3.;;..;;.;&...;4~ ___ Page 19 of...;5;,;9;""-11 NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP Close 1 NV-26B (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP Check the following valves - OPEN:

1 NV-94AC (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Inside Isol) 1 NV-95B (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Outside Isol).

BOP Open 1 NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP Open 1 NV-2SB (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP Check the following:

Reactor - CRITICAL 1 NV-27B - ALIGNED TO VCT BOP Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

BOP Slowly open 1 NV-26B while maintaining NOTE: BOP will fully open excess letdown HX temperature less 1 NV-26B over time, in order to than 200°F.

control inventory.

SRO/

GO TO Step 49.r.

BOP BOP Notify Primary Chemistry that excess NOTE: SRO/BOP may call letdown is in service.

Chemistry to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chem istry.

BOP Adjust charging flow as desired while maintaining:

NC pump seal injection flow greater than 6 GPM.

Pzr level at program level.

BOP Operate Pzr heaters as desired.

BOP WHEN time allows, THEN notify NOTE: SRO/BOP may call engineering to document the following WCC to address.

transients:

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix 0 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-O-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Close 1 NV-26B (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl}.

BOP Check the following valves - OPEN:

1 NV-94AC (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Inside Isol) 1 NV-9SB (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Outside Isol).

BOP Open 1 NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP Open 1 NV-2SB (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP Check the following:

Reactor - CRITICAL 1 NV-27B - ALIGNED TO VCT BOP Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

BOP Slowly open 1 NV-26B while maintaining NOTE: BOP will fully open excess letdown HX temperature less 1 NV-26B over time, in order to than 200°F.

control inventory.

SRO/

GO TO Step 49.r.

BOP BOP Notify Primary Chemistry that excess NOTE: SRO/BOP may call letdown is in service.

Chemistry to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

BOP Adjust charging flow as desired while maintaining:

NC pump seal injection flow greater than 6 GPM.

Pzr level at program level.

BOP Operate Pzr heaters as desired.

BOP WHEN time allows, THEN notify NOTE: SRO/BOP may call engineering to document the following WCC to address.

transients:

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page 20 of _5.;;.;9;;""-1 NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Letdown isolation.

Potential charging nozzle transient.

IF NV Aux Spray was in service, NOTE: NV Aux Spray has THEN........

NOT been used.

BOP Check 1 NV-27B (Excess UD Hx Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) - ALIGNED TO "VCT".

BOP IF AT ANY TIME VCT level needs to be NOTE: This is a Continuous lowered AND NCDT is available to pump Action.

water outside containment, THEN perform the following:

Place 1 NV-27B to "NCDT".

Adjust 1 NV-2SB (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl) as necessary to maintain NCDT pressure less than 8 PSIG.

WHEN VCT at desired level, THEN return 1 NV-27B to "VCT".

SRO/

WHEN normal letdown available, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP establish normal letdown PER Steps 42 Action.

through 48.

BOP WHEN desired to isolate excess NOTE: This is a Continuous letdown, THEN perform the following:

Action.

Close 1 NV-2SB (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

Close 1 NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

Close 1 NV-2SB (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx los I).

Close 1 KC-30SB (Excess UD Hx Sup Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

BOP Close 1 KC-31SB (Excess UD Hx Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

Appendix 0 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-O-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page 20 of 59

....;..~-II NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Letdown isolation.

Potential charging nozzle transient.

IF NV Aux Spray was in service, NOTE: NV Aux Spray has THEN........

NOT been used.

BOP Check 1 NV-27B (Excess UD Hx Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) - ALIGNED TO "VCT'.

BOP IF AT ANY TIME VCT level needs to be NOTE: This is a Continuous lowered AND NCDT is available to pump Action.

water outside containment, THEN perform the following:

Place 1 NV-27B to "NCDT'.

Adjust 1 NV-26B (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl) as necessary to maintain NCDT pressure less than 8 PSIG.

WHEN VCT at desired level, THEN return 1 NV-27B to "VCT'.

SRO/

WHEN normal letdown available, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP establish normal letdown PER Steps 42 Action.

through 48.

BOP WHEN desired to isolate excess NOTE: This is a Continuous letdown, THEN perform the following:

Action.

Close 1 NV-26B (Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

Close 1 NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

Close 1 NV-2SB (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx losl).

Close 1 KC-30SB (Excess UD Hx Sup Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

BOP Close 1 KC-31SB (Excess UD Hx Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

.....;;.3.;;;&...;4 ____ Page 21 of

_5;;.;9~-II Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time I

Position 1

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SRO/

RETURN TO procedure and step in BOP effect.

NOTE: SRO/BOP may call WCC to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Examiner NOTE: Move forward to event termination on Page 36.

Examiner NOTE: If the crew uses the ARP and then goes to AP10 to respond to the Letdown Relief Valve lifting, Start Here.

OP/11A16100/010H, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL1AD-7 1-4, LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP BOP (Immediate Action) Monitor letdown pressure and correct if necessary.

BOP (Supplementary Action Step 1) Monitor VCT and PRT.

BOP (SA Step 2) IF in Mode 4 AND placing ND in NOTE: The plant is NOT in service AND it is determined 1 NV-6 is Mode 4.

leaking,.........

BOP (SA Step 3) IF determined 1 NV-6 leaking, perform the following:

BOP Place 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in "MAN".

Adjust 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) as required to establish 250 psig letdown pressure.

BOP IF determined 1 NV-6 (Letdown Header Relief) still leaking, perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 21 of 59

--~-------

-~~

Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO/

RETURN TO procedure and step in BOP effect.

NOTE: SRO/BOP may call WCC to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Examiner NOTE: Move forward to event termination on Page 36.

Examiner NOTE: If the crew uses the ARP and then goes to AP10 to respond to the Letdown Relief Valve lifting, Start Here.

OP/1/A16100/010H, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL1AD-7 1-4, LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP BOP (Immediate Action) Monitor letdown pressure and correct if necessary.

BOP (Supplementary Action Step 1) Monitor VCT and PRT.

BOP (SA Step 2) IF in Mode 4 AND placing NO in NOTE: The plant is NOT in service AND it is determined 1 NV-6 is Mode 4.

leaking,.........

BOP (SA Step 3) IF determined 1 NV-6 leaking, perform the following:

BOP Place 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in "MAN".

Adjust 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) as required to establish 250 psig letdown pressure.

BOP IF determined 1 NV-6 (Letdown Header Relief) still leaking, perform the following:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page 22 of 59 NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time I

Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO SRO Ensure "Regen Hx UfD Temp" less than 340°F.

Adjust 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) as required to establish 150

- 250 psig letdown pressure.

Ensure 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) potentiometer set to control at desired pressure.

Place 1 NV -124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in "AUTO".

(SA Step 4) Refer to APf1fA/5500f010 (NC System Leakage Within Capacity of Both NV Pumps).

(SA Step 5) Refer to Tech Spec for leakage specifications.

NOTE: This action cannot be done. The SRO will decide to leave this controller in Manual.

NOTE: The SRO will decide to leave this controller in Manual.

NOTE: The SRO will transition to AP-10.

NOTE: The SRO will note that LCO 3.4.13 and SLC 16.9.7 are applicable.

SRO (SA Step 6) IF instrument failure, notify WCC NOTE: SRO may call WCC to SRO.

address the relief valve leakage.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

AP/11A15500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check leak - KNOWN TO BE IN THE AUX BUILDING.

SRO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

IF containment entry is in progress NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be in the Aux Building.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page 22 of 59 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO SRO SRO Ensure "Regen Hx UfD Temp" less than 340°F.

Adjust 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) as required to establish 150

- 250 psig letdown pressure.

Ensure 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) potentiometer set to control at desired pressure.

Place 1 NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in "AUTO".

(SA Step 4) Refer to APf1fA/5500f010 (NC System Leakage Within Capacity of Both NV Pumps).

(SA Step 5) Refer to Tech Spec for leakage specifications.

(SA Step 6) IF instrument failure, notify WCC SRO.

NOTE: This action cannot be done. The SRO will decide to leave this controller in Manual.

NOTE: The SRO will decide to leave this controller in Manual.

NOTE: The SRO will transition to AP-10.

NOTE: The SRO will note that LCO 3.4.13 and SLC 16.9.7 are applicable.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC to address the relief valve leakage.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

AP/1/A15500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check leak - KNOWN TO BE IN THE AUX BUILDING.

SRO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

IF containment entry is in progress NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be in the Aux Building.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3..._&... 4 _____ Page 23 of 59

........ ---11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time I

Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF in Modes 1-4, OR no-mode, THEN GO TO Step 2.

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN perform Step 2.

BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr pressure - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 5) Check main steam line intact:

Reactor power - AT TURBINE POWER NC Loop T -Avg - STABLE.

SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

RO /

(Step 7) Estimate leak rate using any of the BOP following methods:

Monitor OAC NC graphic OR Compare charging flow to letdown flow plus seal return flow OR Monitor VCT level trend (OAC point M1 P1271).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3~&....;4 ____ Page 23 of _5.;.;9;"""--11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess letdown Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF in Modes 1-4, OR no-mode, THEN GO TO Step 2.

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, TH EN perform Step 2.

BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr pressure - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 5) Check main steam line intact:

Reactor power - AT TURBINE POWER NC Loop T-Avg - STABLE.

SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

RO /

(Step 7) Estimate leak rate using any of the BOP following methods:

Monitor OAC NC graphic OR Compare charging flow to letdown flow plus seal return flow OR Monitor VCT level trend (OAC point M1 P1271).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3.;...;;;&...;4____ Page 24 of.....,59--'-11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 8) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

SRO (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

BOP BOP Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify security is SSF is inoperable.

(Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level goes below 16% ("VCT ABNORMAL LEVEL" alarm (1AD-7, 0-3) low setpoint), THEN align NV pump suction to FWST.

(Step 11) IF AT ANYTIME Containment pressure exceed Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSI G),

THEN evaluate placing all 4 VL AHU mode select switches in "HGIH" to prevent them from cycling around 0.5 PSIG.

BOP (Step 12) check sealleakoff on all NC pumps

- LESS THAN 6 GPM.

BOP (Step 13) Check NC pump thermal barriers intact as follows:

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 BOP to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page 24 of _5;;,;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown e

II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 8) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

SRO (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

BOP BOP Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify security is SSF is inoperable.

(Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level goes below 16% ("VCT ABNORMAL LEVEL" alarm (1AD-7, 0-3) low setpoint), THEN align NV pump suction to FWST.

(Step 11) IF AT ANY TIME Containment pressure exceed Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG),

THEN evaluate placing all 4 VL AHU mode select switches in "HGIH" to prevent them from cycling around 0.5 PSIG.

BOP (Step 12) check sealleakoff on all NC pumps

- LESS THAN 6 G PM.

BOP (Step 13) Check NC pump thermal barriers intact as follows:

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 BOP to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 25 of 59

~

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior NC pump thermal barrier KC outlet flows and temperatures on OAC KC graphic-NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC pumps)

KC surge tank level rates on OAC KC graphic - NORMAL.

KC Surge Tank level-NORMAL 1 EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling)

-NORMAL 1 EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling)

-NORMAL SRO (Step 14) GO TO Step 16.

BOP (Step 16) Check leak - SUSPECTED ON NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.

suspected to be on the Letdown Line near the Oem ineralizers.

SRO (Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 18.

BOP (Step 18) Check leak - KNOWN TO BE ON NOTE: in order to use this flow NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.

path the BOP must recognize that the leak was on the letdown Line, and answer YES to this question.

BOP (Step 19) Isolate leak as follows:

Check leak - KNOWN TO BE DUE TO LETDOWN LINE RELIEF OPEN.

Check letdown pressure - BETWEEN 150 TO 350 PSIG.

Perform Supplementary actions PER Annunciator Response for "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP" (1AD-7, 1-4).

Check leak - ISOLATED.

Appendix 0 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-O-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 25 of 59

~~-------

-~~

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NC pump thermal barrier KC outlet flows and temperatures on OAC KC graphic-NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC pumps)

KC surge tank level rates on OAC KC graphic - NORMAL.

KC Surge Tank level-NORMAL 1 EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling)

-NORMAL 1 EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling)

- NORMAL SRO (Step 14) GO TO Step 16.

BOP (Step 16) Check leak - SUSPECTED ON NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.

suspected to be on the Letdown Line near the Dem ineralizers.

SRO (Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 18.

BOP (Step 18) Check leak - KNOWN TO BE ON NOTE: in order to use this flow NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.

path the BOP must recognize that the leak was on the letdown Line, and answer YES to this question.

BOP (Step 19) Isolate leak as follows:

Check leak - KNOWN TO BE DUE TO LETDOWN LINE RELIEF OPEN.

Check letdown pressure - BETWEEN 150 TO 350 PSIG.

Perform Supplementary actions PER Annunciator Response for "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP" (1AD-7, 1-4).

Check leak - ISOLATED.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...;;,.3.;;;;&....;4____ Page 26 of _5;;,;9;""-li NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 19.d RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 19.f and GO TO Step 19.f.

SRO (Step 19.f) Check letdown isolation-DESIRED.

BOP Close the following letdown isolation valves:

1 NV-458A (75 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1 NV-457A (45 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1 NV-35A (Variable UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

Check leak -ISOLATED.

Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

IF tube leak is suspected on Letdown Hx,.......

Check leak - ISOLATED.

Place 1 NV-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) to "HUT" to ensure VCT is isolated from leak.

Establish excess letdown PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), (Establishing Excess Letdown).

NOTE: the only way to know if the leak is isolated is to check that the PRT Level has stabilized.

NOTE: A tube leak on the Letdown HX is NOT suspected.

NOTE: The SRO will direct the BOP to establish Excess Letdown using Generic.

EP/1/A15000/G-1, GENERIC ENCLOSURES ENCLOSURE 2, ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

......;;.3..;;;&....;4____ Page 26 of _5;;,;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 19.d RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 19.f and GO TO Step 19.f.

SRO (Step 19.f) Check letdown isolation -

DESIRED.

BOP Close the following letdown isolation valves:

1 NV-458A (75 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1 NV-457A (45 GPM UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1 NV-35A (Variable UD Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

Check leak -ISOLATED.

Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

IF tube leak is suspected on Letdown Hx,.......

Check leak -ISOLATED.

Place 1NV-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) to "HUT" to ensure VCT is isolated from leak.

Establish excess letdown PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), (Establishing Excess Letdown).

NOTE: the only way to know if the leak is isolated is to check that the PRT Level has stabilized.

NOTE: A tube leak on the Letdown HX is NOT suspected.

NOTE: The SRO will direct the BOP to establish Excess Letdown using Generic.

EP/1/A15000/G-1, GENERIC ENCLOSURES ENCLOSURE 2, ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...::.3..;:&~4:-___ Page 27 of _5;;,;9:--1/

NV Demin Retention Element failurelLetdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 1) Check KC System alignment as follows:

Containment pressure - HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG All KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 1.b RNO) IF either train KC pumps off, THEN perform the following:

Close from control room or dispatch operator to close the following valves on idle train:

A train:

1 KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) aux bldg, 750+12, JJ-55, above north end of KC HX 1A).

1 KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Non Ess Ret Isol) aux bldg, 733+8, HH-55, north of column HH-55).

BOP WHEN idle train isolated from Reactor Bldg header per step above, THEN open the following valves on operating train:

1 KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

Do not continue until KC aligned to Reactor Bldg header.

BOP (Step 1.c) Open the following:

1 KC-305B (Excess UD Hx Sup Hdr Cont Otsd 'Isol) 1 KC-315B (Excess UD Hx Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

Check containment pressure - HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG.

Appendix 0 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page Form ES-O-2 27 of 59

~;""""-II NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 1) Check KC System alignment as follows:

Containment pressure - HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG All KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 1.b RNO) IF either train KC pumps off, THEN perform the following:

Close from control room or dispatch operator to close the following valves on idle train:

A train:

1 KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) aux bldg, 750+12, JJ-55, above north end of KC HX 1A).

1 KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Non Ess Ret Isol) aux bldg, 733+8, HH-55, north of column HH-55).

BOP WHEN idle train isolated from Reactor Bldg header per step above, THEN open the following valves on operating train:

1 KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

Do not continue until KC aligned to Reactor Bldg header.

BOP (Step 1.c) Open the following:

1 KC-305B (Excess UD Hx Sup Hdr Cant Otsd 'Isol) 1 KC-315B (Excess UD Hx Ret Hdr Cant Otsd Isol).

Check containment pressure - HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

....;;.,3.;;;&...;4~___ Page 28 of _5;;,;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failurelLetdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time i

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 2) Place 1 NV-27B (Excess UD Hx Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) to "VCT" position.

BOP (Step 3) Open 1 NV-26B (U1 Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP (Step 4) Wait 2 minutes.

BOP (Step 5) Close 1 NV-26B (U1 Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP (Step 6) Check the following valves - OPEN:

1 NV-94AC (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Inside Isol) 1 NV-95B (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Outside Isol).

BOP (Step 7) Check reactor - SUBCRITICAL.

BOP (Step 7 RNO) IF reactor critical, THEN perform the following:

Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 8) Open 1 NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP (Step 9) Open 1 NV-25B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP (Step 10) Open 1 NV-25B (U1 Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl) while maintaining Excess letdown Hx temperature less than 200°F.

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

....;;.,3.;.;&...;4~___ Page 28 of

_5.;.;9~-I!

Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 2) Place 1 NV-27B (Excess UD Hx Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) to "VCT" position.

BOP (Step 3) Open 1 NV-26B (U1 Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP (Step 4) Wait 2 minutes.

BOP (Step 5) Close 1 NV-26B (U1 Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP (Step 6) Check the following valves - OPEN:

1 NV-94AC (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Inside Isol) 1 NV-95B (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Outside Isol).

BOP (Step 7) Check reactor - SUBCRITICAL.

BOP (Step 7 RNO) IF reactor critical, THEN perform the following:

Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 8) Open 1 NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP (Step 9) Open 1 NV-25B (C NC Loop To Exs UD Hx Isol).

BOP (Step 10) Open 1 NV-25B (U1 Excess UD Hx Outlet Cntrl) while maintaining Excess letdown Hx temperature less than 200°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

-.;.3.;;&...;4____ Page 29 of _5;;,;9;""'-1 Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 11) Notify Chemistry that excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 12) WHEN time allows, THEN notify engineering to document transients on letdown and charging.

BOP (Step 13) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The BOP will call Chemistry.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

NOTE: The BOP may call WCC to document transients.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The BOP reports that excess Letdown is established and SRO returns to AP1 o.

AP/1/A15500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE SRO Power operation may continue as long as NC System activity and chem istry requirements are met.

GO TO Step 29.

SRO (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location and size of leak.

SRO (Step 30) Contact station management to evaluate need to shutdown.

NOTE: SRO will call RP.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/Management to address the need to shutdown.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

.-,;;.3.;;;&...;4____ Page 29 of

_5;;;.;9;.....~

Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 11) Notify Chemistry that excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 12) WHEN time allows, THEN notify engineering to document transients on letdown and charging.

BOP (Step 13) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The BOP will call Chemistry.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

NOTE: The BOP may call WCC to document transients.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The BOP reports that excess Letdown is established and SRO returns to AP1 O.

AP/1/A15500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE SRO Power operation may continue as long as NC System activity and chemistry requirements are met.

GO TO Step 29.

SRO (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location and size of leak.

SRO (Step 30) Contact station management to evaluate need to shutdown.

NOTE: SRO will call RP.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/Management to address the need to shutdown.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_3.;;;..;;;&...;4~ ___ Page 30 of _5;;,;9;.....,",*

Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 31) Check unit shutdown -

REQUIRED.

SRO (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 34.

SRO (Step 34) WHEN leak less than Tec Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

BOP Check VCT -INTACT.

Check NV pump suction - ALIGNED TO VCT.

SRO IF Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service, THEN contact station management to evaluate securing filter train PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System),.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions)

IF VL AHU mode select switches were placed to "HIGH" in Step 11,......

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/Management to address the OAFPT alignment.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The VL AHU Mode Select Switches were NOT placed in HIGH.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE SRO 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE SRO LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE; 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

....;;.3.;;;;&....;4~ ___ Page 30 of

....;;;.;59;;.....~

Event

Description:

NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 31) Check unit shutdown -

REQUIRED.

SRO (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 34.

SRO (Step 34) WHEN leak less than Tec Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

BOP Check VCT -INTACT.

Check NV pump suction - ALIGNED TO VCT.

SRO IF Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service, THEN contact station management to evaluate securing filter train PER OP/O/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System),.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions)

IF VL AHU mode select switches were placed to "HIGH" in Step 11,......

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/Management to address the OAFPT alignment.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The VL AHU Mode Select Switches were NOT placed in HIGH.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE SRO 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE SRO LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

No pressure boundary LEAKAG E; 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and

Appendix 0 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-O-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3&4 Page 31 of...;5;;;9;""'-1 NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open! Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through anyone steam generator (SG).

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.

RCS A.1 Reduce 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Operational LEAKAGE LEAKAGE within not within limits.

limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

NOTE: The SRO will determ ine that LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met, and that Condition A is applicable, during the course of the transient.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix 0 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~3~&~4________ Page Form ES-O-2 31 of 59

.....;..;~-Il NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through anyone steam generator (SG).

SRO APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

SRO ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.

RCS A.1 Reduce 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Operational LEAKAGE LEAKAGE within not within limits.

limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

NOTE: The SRO will determine that LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met, and that Condition A is applicable, during the course of the transient.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 32

~----

of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior After excess Letdown is established, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel 1 will fail low causing Tref to go low, and Control Rods to move inward in auto to maintain Tavg-Tref deviation. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will be left in. manual control for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation." The operator will also address SLC 16.7.1, "ATWS/AMSAC."

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #7 {XMT-SM003 (O over 30 seconds>>

Indications Available:

Channel I Impulse Pressure indicates low.

Control rods heard and observed to be moving in Auto.

API1IA15500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, Immediate Action THEN perform the following:

NOTE: No Rods have dropped.

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/SOOO/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement - STOPPED.

Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step S) Check "ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE" alarm (1AD-2, A-10) - DARK.

RO (Step 6) Check the following reactor control NOTE: The Channel 1 Turbine instruments - NORMAL:

Impulse Pressure has failed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 32

~-----

of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior After excess Letdown is established, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel 1 will fail low causing Tref to go low, and Control Rods to move inward in auto to maintain Tavg-Tref deviation. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation." The operator will also address SLC 16.7.1, "ATWS/AMSAC."

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #7 (XMT-SM003 (0 over 30 seconds>>

Indications Available:

Channel I Impulse Pressure indicates low.

Control rods heard and observed to be moving in Auto.

AP/11 Al5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, Immediate Action THEN perform the following:

NOTE: No Rods have dropped.

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement - STOPPED.

Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 5) Check "ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE" alarm (1AD-2, A-10) - DARK.

RO (Step 6) Check the following reactor control NOTE: The Channel 1 Turbine instruments - NORMAL:

Impulse Pressure has failed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_5.;;...... ____ Page 33 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior "1 A NC LOOP T -AVG" "1B NC LOOP T-AVG" "1C NC LOOP T-AVG" "1 D NC LOOP T-AVG"

TURB IMP PRESS CH 1" SRO (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:

IF "NC LOOP T-AVE" channel failed, GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response to Continuous Rod Movement).

NOTE: Loop Tavg has NOT failed.

NOTE: The SRO will go to.

AP/1/A15500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION, ENCLOSURE 3, RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT SRO (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging system.

SRO (Step 2) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:

Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.

Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactor's response.

RO (Step 3) Check the following - NORMAL:

TURB IMP PRESS CH 1" T-Ref indication.

RO (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following:

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 33 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior "1A NC LOOP T-AVG" "1 B NC LOOP T-AVG" "1C NC LOOP T-AVG" "1 D NC LOOP T-AVG"

TURB IMP PRESS CH 1" SRO (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:

IF "NC LOOP T-AVE" channel failed, GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response to Continuous Rod Movement).

NOTE: Loop Tavg has NOT failed.

NOTE: The SRO will go to.

AP/1/A15500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION, ENCLOSURE 3, RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT SRO (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging system.

SRO (Step 2) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:

Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.

Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactor's response.

RO (Step 3) Check the following - NORMAL:

TURB IMP PRESS CH 1" T-Ref indication.

RO (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following:

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 _____ Page 34 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF TURB IMP PRESS CH 1" failed, THEN ensure P-7 and P-13 interlocks are in required state for existing unit conditions (Tech Spec 3.3.1.16).

SRO Notify IAE to repair failed channel.

IF unit coastdown in progress,........

RO Perform any of the following as necessary to maintain T-Colds 555°F to 557°F:

Position control rods in manual.

OR Borate/dilute NC System OR Adjust turbine load.

SRO GO TO Step 6.

RO (Step 6) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN perform the following:

Ensure T-Avg at T-Ref +/- 1°F.

IF auto rod control desired, THEN place rods in auto.

SRO (Step 7) Exit this procedure.

NOTE: SRO may call WCCIIAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE.

NOTE: Coastdown is NOT in progress.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, RTS INSTRUMENTATION SRO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 34 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO RO SRO RO IF TURB IMP PRESS CH 1" failed, THEN ensure P-7 and P-13 interlocks are in required state for existing unit conditions (Tech Spec 3.3.1.16).

Notify IAE to repair failed channel.

IF unit coastdown in progress,........

Perform any of the following as necessary to maintain T-Colds 555°F to 55]oF:

Position control rods in manual.

OR Borate/dilute NC System OR Adjust turbine load.

GO TO Step 6.

(Step 6) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN perform the following:

Ensure T-Avg at T-Ref +/- 1°F.

IF auto rod control desired, THEN place rods in auto.

SRO (Step 7) Exit this procedure.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE.

NOTE: Coastdown is NOT in progress.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, RTS INSTRUMENTATION SRO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 35 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

SRO APPLCIABILlTY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

SRO ACTIONS SRO CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.

One or A.1 Enter the Immediately more Condition Functions referenced with one or in Table more 3.3.3-1 tor required the channels channel(s).

inoperable.

T.

One or T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months more interlock is channel(s) in required inoperable.

state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months MODE 2.

NOTE: The SRO will determine that Functional Units 16.b and 16.e on Table 3.3-1 are affected by this event, and that Conditions A and T are required.

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.7.1, AMSAC SRO 16.7.1 ATWS/AMSAC SRO COMMITMENT: The ATWS/AMSAC system shall be OPERABLE.

SRO APPLCIABILlTY: MODE 1 above 40% RTP.

SRO ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 35 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

SRO APPLCIABILlTY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

SRO ACTIONS SRO CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.

One or A.1 Enter the Immediately more Condition Functions referenced with one or in Table more 3.3.3-1 for required the channels channel(s).

inoperable.

T.

One or T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months more interlock is channel(s) in required inoperable.

state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months MODE 2.

NOTE: The SRO will determine that Functional Units 16.b and 16.e on Table 3.3-1 are affected by this event, and that Conditions A and T are required.

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.7.1, AMSAC SRO 16.7.1 ATWS/AMSAC SRO COMMITMENT: The ATWS/AMSAC system shall be OPERABLE.

SRO APPLCIABILlTY: MODE 1 above 40% RTP.

SRO ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 36 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The SRO will ACTION TIME determine that Condition A is A.

A.1 7 days required.

ATWS/AMSAC Restore system inoperable.

ATWS/AMSAC system to OPERABLE status.

OR A.2 Prepare and 37 days submit a Special.

Report outlining the cause of the malfunction and plans for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

T.

One or T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months more interlock is channel(s) in required inoperable.

state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months MODE 2.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 36 of 59 Event

Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A.

A.1 ATWS/AMSAC Restore system inoperable.

ATWS/AMSAC system to OPERABLE status.

OR A.2 COMPLETION TIME 7 days Prepare and 37 days submit a Special Report outlining the cause of the malfunction and plans for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

T.

One or T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months more interlock is channel(s) in required inoperable.

state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months MODE 2.

NOTE: The SRO will determine that Condition A is required.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 Page 37 of 59 Event

Description:

FCV Controller failure Time

~

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Subsequently, the controller for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) will fail in Automatic control causing the valve to go closed. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunctions," and take manual control of the control valve.

controller will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (MALF-IFE006A (0 over 60 seconds>>

Indications Available:

1AD-4/B-1, S/G A LEVEL DEVIATION 1AD-4/C-1, S/G A FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW AP/1/A15500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF CF control valve OR bypass valve has failed, THEN perform the following:

Place affected valve in manual.

Restore S/G level to program.

The RO (Step 2) IF CF pump speed control has failed,...

NOTE: CF speed control has NOT failed.

RO (Step 3) On each S/G, check the following channels -INDICATING THE SAME:

Feed flow Steam flow S/G level.

RO (Step 4) Check unit status as follows:

Reactor trip breakers - CLOSED Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 Page 37 of 59 Event

Description:

FCV Controller failure Time j

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Subsequently, the controller for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) will fail in Automatic control causing the valve to go closed. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunctions," and take manual control of the control valve_

controller will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (MALF-IFE006A (0 over 60 seconds>>

Indications Available:

1AD-4/8-1, S/G A LEVEL DEVIATION 1AD-4/C-1, S/G A FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW AP/1/A15500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF CF control valve OR bypass valve has failed, THEN perform the following:

Place affected valve in manual.

Restore S/G level to program.

The RO (Step 2) IF CF pump speed control has failed,...

NOTE: CF speed control has NOT failed.

RO (Step 3) On each S/G, check the following channels -INDICATING THE SAME:

Feed flow Steam flow S/G level.

RO (Step 4) Check unit status as follows:

Reactor trip breakers - CLOSED Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 Page 38 of 59 Event

Description:

FCV Controller failure Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step S) IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform the following:

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/SOOO/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

RO (Step 7) Check reactor power - GREATER THAN 3%.

RO (Step 8) Check CM/CF - PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.

RO (Step 9) Check S/G levels - STABLE OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

RO (Step 10) Check NC temperatures as follows:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO DESIRED TEMPERATURE.

RO (Step 11) Check all S/G CF control valves -

IN AUTO.

RO (Step 11 RNO) WHEN the following conditions met, THEN place affected CF control valve in automatic:

Automatic control-DESIRED NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

NOTE: Due to maintenance being performed, the 1 A CF Control Valve will need to remain in MANUAL.

NOTE: AUTO control is NOT desired.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 Page 38 of 59 Event

Description:

FCV Controller failure Time II Position i

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform the following:

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

RO (Step 7) Check reactor power - GREATER THAN 3%.

RO (Step 8) Check CM/CF - PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.

RO (Step 9) Check S/G levels - STABLE OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

RO (Step 10) Check NC temperatures as follows:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO DESIRED TEMPERATURE.

RO (Step 11) Check all S/G CF control valves -

IN AUTO.

RO (Step 11 RNO) WHEN the following conditions met, THEN place affected CF control valve in automatic:

Automatic control - DESIRED NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

NOTE: Due to maintenance being performed, the 1A CF Control Valve will need to remain in MANUAL.

NOTE: AUTO control is NOT desired.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 Page 39 of 59 Event

Description:

FCV Controller failure Time

~

Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Affected S/G level(s) - AT PROGRAM LEVEL Selected control channels - INDICATE CORRECTLY ON CHART RECORDER:

CD Feed flow CD Steam flow S/G level.

RO (Step 12) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves - IN MANUAL AND FULL OPEN.

RO (Step 13) Check both CF pumps - IN AUTO.

RO (Step 14) Check all CA pumps - OFF.

NOTE: SRO may dispatch an NLO to investigate valve.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as NLO.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

At the discretion of the lead Examiner move to Events #7~1 O.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 Page 39 of 59 Event

Description:

FCV Controller failure Time

~

Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Affected S/G level(s) - AT PROGRAM LEVEL Selected control channels - INDICATE CORRECTLY ON CHART RECORDER:

Feed flow Steam flow S/G level.

RO (Step 12) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves - IN MANUAL AND FULL OPEN.

RO (Step 13) Check both CF pumps - IN AUTO.

RO (Step 14) Check all CA pumps - OFF.

NOTE: SRO may dispatch an NLO to investigate valve.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as NLO.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #7-10.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

...:.07,:.,:8., ;;;.,9,;;;;&...;1.;;;,0 __ Page ~

of _5;;,;9;""-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Shortly afterwards, the D SG NR Level Channel 2 will fail high causing an FWIS.

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually; and the Turbine will fail to trip automatically. The operator will be expected to enter EP/1/A/5000/E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the Reactor. When the Reactor does not trip, the operator will be expected to transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor and the Turbine. Upon event initiation, the TD CA Pump will overspeed. Additionally, the 1A CA Pump will trip on overcurrent causing a Red Path to exist on Heat Sink. Following completion ofFR-S.1, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

Upon entry into FR-H.1, the Steam Generator levels will approach the pOint at which NCS Bleed and Feed must be established. The scenario is expected to terminate at Step 29 of FR-H.1, after the crew has established NCS Bleed and Feed cooling.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (XMT-CF032 (100>>

Trigger #13 (CA005) will operate on P4 (Reactor Trip)

Indications Available:

1AD-1/A-4, S/G D HI-HI LVL TURB TRIP.

1 FO-1/F-5, TURB TRIP CAUSES RX TRIP.

Reactor Trip Breakers remain closed.

Main Turbine does NOT trip.

Normal feedwater to SG is isolated.

OAC does NOT indicate Red Path on Heat Sink, although the Red Path exists.

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the SRO addressing the EP.

EP/1/A15000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

Immediate Action RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights - LIT Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7;":",.;;;,8...,;, 9~&_1.;..;O~_ Page ~

of _5_9~-I!

Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Shortly afterwards, the 0 SG NR Level Channel 2 will fail high causing an FWIS.

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually; and the Turbine will fail to trip automatically. The operator will be expected to enter EP/1/A/SOOO/E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the Reactor. When the Reactor does not trip, the operator will be expected to transition to EP/1IA/SOOO/FR-S.1,

"Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor and the Turbine. Upon event initiation, the TO CA Pump will overspeed. Additionally, the 1 A CA Pump will trip on overcurrent causing a Red Path to exist on Heat Sink. Following completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/SOOO/FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."

Upon entry into FR-H.1, the Steam Generator levels will approach the point at which NCS Bleed and Feed must be established. The scenario is expected to terminate at Step 29 of FR-H.1, after the crew has established NCS Bleed and Feed cooling.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (XMT -CF032 (100>>

Trigger #13 (CA005) will operate on P4 (Reactor Trip)

Indications Available:

1AD-1/A-4, S/G 0 HI-HI LVL TURB TRIP.

1 FO-1/F-5, TURB TRIP CAUSES RX TRIP.

Reactor Trip Breakers remain closed.

Main Turbine does NOT trip.

Normal feedwater to SG is isolated.

OAC does NOT indicate Red Path on Heat Sink, although the Red Path exists.

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-O, prior to the SRO addressing the EP.

EP/lIAl5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

Immediate Action RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights - LIT

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

..;..:7,:.,;;8.,,;.9,;;;&...;,1.;.0__ Page ~

of _5;;.;9;""'-1\\

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN IfR amps - GOING DOWN.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

NOTE: The reactor trip will fail, and the crew will need to transition to FR-S.1.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONlATWS RO RO (Step 1) Check Reactor Trip:

All rod bottom lights - LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN IfR amps - GOING DOWN.

(Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip the reactor.

IF reactor will not trip, THEN manually insert rods.

Critical Task: (FR-S.1 C)

Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will drive Rods in, in MANUAL until Reactor Trip Breakers have been opened.

Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7.;.,.:.,.;;8;.:., *.;;;.9..;;;&~1....;;O __ Page

_41_ of _5;;,;9;""-11 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of AutomaticlManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN IfR amps - GOING DOWN.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

NOTE: The reactor trip will fail.

and the crew will need to transition to FR-S.1.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS RO RO (Step 1) Check Reactor Trip:

All rod bottom lights - LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN IfR amps - GOING DOWN.

(Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip the reactor.

IF reactor will not trip. THEN manually insert rods.

Critical Task: (FR-S.1 C)

Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will drive Rods in. in MANUAL until Reactor Trip Breakers have been opened.

Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity. under the postulated plant conditions.

results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7,;,,:,..;;8.,,;.9.;;;&;..,;1..;,0 __ Page ~

of _5,;.;9;""'-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIs/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Tripi TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 2) check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

Critical Task: (FR-S.1 A)

Trip the Turbine prior to Wide Range Steam Generator levels dropping to < 24%

Safety Significance: Turbine trip is important in maintaining Steam generator inventory and primary-to-secondary heat transfer. If the Turbine is NOT tripped the Steam Generator U-Tubes uncover sooner and faster. Thus, primary-to-secondary heat transfer starts to deteriorate earlier in the transient and deteriorates more rapidly. The result is that once tube uncovery begins, NC System temperature and pressure increase more rapidly and reach higher values.

Booth Instructor:

Delete MALF-IPE001 AlB 30 seconds after an operator is dispatched to locally trip the reactor.

SRO (Step 3) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps - ON.

Check N/R Level in at least3 S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System:

Ensure one NV pump - ON.

Align boration flowpath as follows:

Open 1 NV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps).

Start both boric acid transfer pumps.

NOTE: All CA Pumps will be OFF, and will NOT be able to be started.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC to address the CA Pump failures.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7,;..:,..;;8;.:..,.;.9.;;;&~1..;;O __ Page ~

of

-.;;..;59~-I1 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWISI Failure of AutomaticlManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine TripI TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 2) check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

Critical Task: (FR-S.1 A)

Trip the Turbine prior to Wide Range Steam Generator levels dropping to < 24%

Safety Significance: Turbine trip is important in maintaining Steam generator inventory and primary-to-secondary heat transfer. If the Turbine is NOT tripped the Steam Generator U-Tubes uncover sooner and faster. Thus, primary-to-secondary heat transfer starts to deteriorate earlier in the transient and deteriorates more rapidly. The result is that once tube uncovery begins, NC System temperature and pressure increase more rapidly and reach higher values.

Booth Instructor:

Delete MALF-IPE001 AlB 30 seconds after an operator is dispatched to locally trip the reactor.

SRO (Step 3) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps - ON.

Check N/R Level in at least3 S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System:

Ensure one NV pump - ON.

Align boration flowpath as fOllows:

Open 1 NV-265B (BoriC Acid To NV Pumps).

Start both boric acid transfer pumps.

NOTE: All CA Pumps will be OFF, and will NOT be able to be started.

NOTE: SRO may call WCC to address the CA Pump failures.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7,;.,l,:.,;;8.,.;;.9.;;&;..;1:.;;0__ Page ~

of

_5;;.;9~-II Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time I

Position I

AJ)Qlicant's Actions or Behavior Check emergency boration flow -

GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

BOP (Step 5b3 RNO) IF NV pump suction is aligned to VCT, THEN.....

BOP (Step 5c) Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System:

1 NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) - OPEN 1 NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) - OPEN.

BOP (Step 5c RNO) Perform the following:

IF NV pump suction is aligned to VCT, THEN align to FWST as follows:

Open 1 NV-221 A (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).

Open 1 NV-222B (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).

Close 1NV-141A (VCT Outlet Isol).

Close 1NV-142B (VCT Outlet Isol).

Open the following:

1 NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

SRO GO TO Step 5e.

BOP (Step 5d) Ensure charging flow is greater than em ergency boration flow.

NOTE: This step will only be applicable if an SI has occurred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

-"",7,_8~,_9_&~1_0 __ Page ~

of ~59

__ -I1 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump tripl1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check emergency boration flow-GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

BOP (Step 5b3 RNO) IF NV pump suction is aligned to VCT, THEN.....

BOP (Step 5c) Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System:

1 NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) - OPEN 1 NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) - OPEN.

BOP (Step 5c RNO) Perform the following:

IF NV pump suction is aligned to VCT, THEN align to FWST as follows:

Open 1NV-221A (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).

Open 1 NV-222B (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).

Close 1NV-141A (VCT Outlet Isol).

Close 1 NV-142B (VCT Outlet Isol).

Open the following:

1 NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

SRO GO TO Step 5e.

BOP (Step 5d) Ensure charging flow is greater than emergency boration flow.

NOTE: This step will only be applicable if an SI has occurred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~7,~8.,.;..9.;;;;&...;.1.;;.0 __ Page ~

of _5_9""'-11 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Tripi TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time i

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 5e) Check Pzr pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

BOP (Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:

1VQ-1A (U1 Cont Air Release Inside Isol) 1VQ-6A (U1 Cont Air Addition Inside Isol) 1VQ-2B (U1 Cont Air Release Outside Isol) 1 VQ-5B (U1 Cont Air Addition Outside Isol).

SRO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/I signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:

Have another Licensed Operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3 (Subsequent S/I Actions).

Continue with this procedure.

NOTE: If an SI has occurred the SRO will hand this off to the BOP, and continue through FR-S.1 with the RO.

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with if BOP is assigned by SRO to perform. Others go to Page 46 to continue with FR-S.1.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONlATWS ENCLOSURE 3, SUBSEQUENT SII ACTIONS BOP (Step 1) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB -

ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 2) Check both LCOA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7

....,.... 8.:,., -..9 _&_1..... 0__ Page ~

of.....;.,;59;"""-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of AutomaticlManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Tripi TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 5e) Check Pzr pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

BOP (Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:

1VQ-1A (U1 Cont Air Release Inside Isol) 1 VQ-6A (U1 Cont Air Addition Inside Isol) 1 VQ-2B (U1 Cont Air Release Outside Isol) 1 VQ-5B (U1 Cont Air Addition Outside Isol).

SRO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/I signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:

Have another Licensed Operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3 (Subsequent S/I Actions).

Continue with this procedure.

NOTE: If an SI has occurred the SRO will hand this off to the BOP, and continue through FR-S.1 with the RO.

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with if BOP is assigned by SRO to perform. Others go to Page 46 to continue with FR-S.1.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS ENCLOSURE 3, SUBSEQUENT S/I ACTIONS BOP (Step 1) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB -

ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 2) Check both LCOA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7'-"...;8.,..;.9...-&... 1-.0__ Page ~

of _5_9--.....

Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIs/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5, - DARK.

BOP Group 3 - LIT.

OAC - IN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F - LIT AS REQUIRED.

BOP (Step 3d RNO) Perform the following; Ensure both trains Phase A Isolation are initiated.

Align or start SII and Phase A components with individual windows in Group 4 as required.

GO TO Step 3.f.

BOP (Step 3 continued) Check LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light (1SI-14) on energized train(s) - LIT.

Check the following windows on Monitor Light Panel Group 4 - LIT:

C-3 "CONT ISOL PHASE A TRN A VLVS ALIGNED" C-S "CO NT ISOL PHASE A TRN B VLVS ALIGNED" F-4 "SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN A COMPONENTS ALIGNED" F-5 "SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN B COMPONENTS ALIGNED".

BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps - ON.

NIR level in at least 3 SIGs - GREATER THAN 17%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,:..;8;...,,-.9.... &... 1:..;0 __ Page ~

of _5;..;9 __ -11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of AutomaticlManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5, - DARK.

BOP Group 3 - LIT.

OAC - IN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F - LIT AS REQUIRED.

BOP (Step 3d RNO) Perform the following; Ensure both trains Phase A Isolation are initiated.

Align or start SII and Phase A components with individual windows in Group 4 as required.

GO TO Step 3.f.

BOP (Step 3 continued) Check LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light (1SI-14) on energized train(s) - LIT.

Check the following windows on Monitor Light Panel Group 4 - LIT:

C-3 "CONT ISOL PHASE A TRN A VLVS ALIGNED" C-6 "CONT ISOL PHASE A TRN B VLVS ALIGNED" F-4 "SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN A COMPONENTS ALIGNED" F-5 "SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN B COMPONENTS ALIGNED".

BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps - ON.

NIR level in at least 3 SIGs - GREATER THAN 17%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7,;.,j,:..,;;8., _9_&~1_0__ Page ~

of

_5;;.;9~-II Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWISI Failure of AutomaticiManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 4b RNO) Ensure TD CA pump on.

BOP (Step 5) Check all KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 6) Check both RN pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 7) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

BOP (Step 8) Check all S/G pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 9) Check Containment Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

BOP (Step 10) IF AT ANYTIME while in this procedure containment pressure goes above 3 PSIG, THEN perform Step 9.

BOP (Step 11) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The BOP may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I).

acknowledge as OSM.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONlATWS RO (Step 8) Check if the following trips have occurred:

Reactor trip.

Turbine trip.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,8,9&10 Page ~

of

_5;;.;9~-II Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump tripl1 A CA Pump fails to start I

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 4b RNO) Ensure TO CA pump on.

BOP (Step 5) Check all KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 6) Check both RN pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 7) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."

BOP (Step 8) Check all S/G pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 9) Check Containment Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

BOP (Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure containment pressure goes above 3 PSIG, THEN perform Step 9.

BOP (Step 11) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The BOP may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I).

acknowledge as OSM.

FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS RO (Step 8) Check if the following trips have occurred:

Reactor trip.

Turbine trip.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

-=....7,~8;.:.'..;.9.;;&;..;1.;;0__ Page ~

of _5;;,;9:""--lI Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Tripi TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical:

P/R channels - LESS THAN 5%.

W/R Neutron Flux - LESS THAN 5%

IIR SUR - NEGATIVE.

SRO (Step 10) GO TO Step 17.

BOP (Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin:

Obtain current NC boron concentration from Primary Chemistry.

WHEN current NC boron concentration is obtained, THEN perform shutdown margin calculation PER OP/0IAl61 001006 (Reactivity Balance Calculation).

WHEN following conditions satisfied, THEN NC System boration may be stopped:

Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.

Uncontrolled cooldown has been stopped.

SRO (Step 18) REFER TO RP/0IAl57001000 (Classification of Emergency).

SRO (Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The SRO will contact Chemistry.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as Chemistry.

NOTE: The SRO will hand this off to another SRO.

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as another SRO.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: The SRO will transition back to E-O, however a Red Path will exist on Heat Sink, and the transition should be made to FR-H.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,8,9&10 Page ~

of _5~9~"'1 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical:

P/R channels - LESS THAN 5%.

W/R Neutron Flux - LESS THAN 5%

I/R SUR - NEGATIVE.

SRO (Step 10) GO TO Step 17.

BOP (Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin:

Obtain current NC boron concentration from Primary Chemistry.

WHEN current NC boron concentration is obtained, THEN perform shutdown margin calculation PER OP/0IAl61 001006 (Reactivity Balance Calculation).

WHEN following conditions satisfied, THEN NC System boration may be stopped:

Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.

Uncontrolled cooldown has been stopped.

SRO (Step 18) REFER TO RP/0IAl57001000 (Classification of Emergency).

SRO (Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The SRO will contact Chemistry.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as Chemistry.

NOTE: The SRO will hand this off to another SRO.

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as another SRO.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The SRO may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: The SRO will transition back to E-O, however a Red Path will exist on Heat Sink, and the transition should be made to FR-H.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7.;..,l,~8;.o..'.;.9....

&_1.... 0__ Page ~

of......;.;59;;"'-'-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine TriplTD CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO lOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK BOP (Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 GPM due to operator action, BOP I (Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is RO required:

NC pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE.

Any NC T-Hot - GREATER THAN 350°F (347°F ACC).

SRO (Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page.

BOP (Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps - AVAILABLE:

1A NV pump OR 1B NV pump.

RO (Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated:

Check W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs-LESS THAN 25% (36% ACC).

RO /

(Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Monitor feed and bleed initiation criteria.

NOTE: total feed flow is NOT

< 450 gpm due to operator action.

NOTE: Foldout Criteria for Bleed and Feed may be met at this point. If so, move forward to Step 20 on Page 56.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~7,~8...., _9_&~1_0 __ Page ~

of

_5.;.,;9~_1I Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

.11 Applicant's Actions or Behavior EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK BOP (Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 GPM due to operator action, BOP f (Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is RO required:

NC pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SfG PRESSURE.

Any NC T-Hot - GREATER THAN 350°F (347°F ACC).

SRO (Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page.

BOP (Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps - AVAILABLE:

1A NV pump OR 1B NV pump.

RO (Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated:

Check W fR level in at least 3 SfGs -

LESS THAN 25% (36% ACC).

RO f (Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Monitor feed and bleed initiation criteria.

NOTE: total feed flow is NOT

< 450 gpm due to operator action.

NOTE: Foldout Criteria for Bleed and Feed may be met at this point If so, move forward to Step 20 on Page 56.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7...,....

8,-",9;..;&-..1....,0 ___ Page ~

of _5_9 ___ -11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Tripi TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior WHEN criteria satisfied, THEN GO TO Step 20.

SRO GO TO Step 6.

RO /

(Step 6) Ensure S/G BB and NM valves BOP closed PER Enclosure 3 (S/G BB and Sampling Valve Checklist).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Examiner NOTE: If at any time during the event the Bleed and Feed Criteria of this step is met, move to Page 56.

Examiner NOTE: The SRO may assign the RO or the BOP to perform this Enclosure.

If so, RO/BOP Examiner follow actions of RO/BOP in.

Examiners not following operator assigned, moved forward to FR-H.1 actions on Page 50.

EP/1 IAl5000/FR-H. 1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 3, S/G BB AND SAMPLING VALVE CHECKLIST RO /

(Step 1) Check the following valves -

BOP CLOSED:

1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-2B (1 B S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-3B (1 C S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-4B (1 D S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1 BB-6A (B S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~7':..;;8;.,l,,'.;..9.;..&;...1:..;;0 __ Page ~

of

_5;;.;;9~-i Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump tripl1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior WHEN criteria satisfied, THEN GO TO Step 20.

SRO GO TO Step 6.

RO /

(Step 6) Ensure S/G BB and NM valves BOP closed PER Enclosure 3 (S/G BB and Sampling Valve Checklist).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

Examiner NOTE: If at any time during the event the Bleed and Feed Criteria of this step is met, move to Page 56.

Examiner NOTE: The SRO may assign the RO or the BOP to perform this Enclosure.

If so, RO/BOP Examiner follow actions of RO/BOP in.

Examiners not following operator assigned, moved forward to FR-H.l actions on Page 50.

EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 3, S/G BB AND SAMPLING VALVE CHECKLIST RO /

(Step 1) Check the following valves -

BOP CLOSED:

1 BB-1 B (1 A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-2B (1 B S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-3B (1 C S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-4B (1 D S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1 BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1 BB-6A (B S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7.;..:. *...;;.8.... 9_&-..-1 O~_ Page ~

of

_5;;.;9~-I1 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWls/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Tripi TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 BB-7 A (C S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1 BB-8A (0 S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1NM-187A (1A S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-190A (1A S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-201 A (1 B S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-207A (1C S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-210A (1C S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-221A (10 S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-191B (1A S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-197B (1B S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-200B (1 B S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-211 B (1 C S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-217B (10 S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-220B (10 S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED.

EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO /

(Step 7) Attempt to establish CA flow to at BOP least one S/G as follows:

Check power to both MD CA pumps -

AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7;.,.l'...;;8;.:.'.;.9.;;;&~1..;;.O __ Page ~

of _5.;;,;9;""'-11 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump tripl1A CA Pump fails to start e

II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 BB-7A (C S/G BB Cant Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1 BB-8A (D S/G BB Cant Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1NM-187A (1A S/G Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-190A (1A S/G Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-201A (1B S/G Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-207A (1C S/G Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-210A (1C S/G Blowdown Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 N M-221 A (1 D S/G Blowdown Sam pie Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-191B (1A S/G Blowdown Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-197B (1 B S/G Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-200B (1 B S/G Blowdown Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-211 B (1 C S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cant Outside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-217B (1 D S/G Upper Shell Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1 NM-220B (1 D S/G Blowdown Sample Cant Inside Isol) - CLOSED.

EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO /

(Step 7) Attempt to establish CA flow to at BOP least one S/G as follows:

Check power to both MD CA pumps -

AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,8,9&10 Page _51_ of 59 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior ROI BOP SRO (Step 7.a RNO) Perform the following:

1&

IF essential power is not available,......

41 IF the essential bus is energized, THEN dispatch operator to determine cause or breaker failure.

RO I (Step 7.b) Ensure control room CA BOP valves aligned PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve Alignment).

NOTE: Essential power is available.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO.

Booth Instructor:

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that the 1 A CA Pump Breaker has a 51 relay tripped.

NOTE: The SRO may assign the RO or the BOP to perform this Enclosure.

If so, RO/BOP Examiner follow actions of RO/BOP in.

Exam iners not following operator assigned, moved forward to FR-H.1 actions on Page 54.

EP/lIAl5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 4, CA VALVE ALIGNMENT BOP I (Step 1) Check the following valves - OPEN:

RO 41 1 CA-66AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1 A S/G Isol) - OPEN 41 1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol) -OPEN 41 1CA-54AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol) - OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,8,9&10 Page _51_ of _5,;;,,;9;""'-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of AutomaticiManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior (Step 7.a RNO) Perform the following:

RO /

IF essential power is not available,......

NOTE: Essential power is BOP available.

SRO IF the essential bus is energized, THEN NOTE: The SRO will dispatch dispatch operator to determine cause or an NLO.

breaker failure.

RO /

(Step 7.b) Ensure control room CA BOP valves aligned PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve Alignment).

Booth Instructor:

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that the 1A CA Pump Breaker has a 51 relay tripped.

NOTE: The SRO may assign the RO or the BOP to perform this Enclosure.

If so, RO/BOP Examiner follow actions of RO/BOP in.

Exam iners not following operator assigned, moved forward to FR-H.1 actions on Page 54.

EPI1IA15000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 4, CA VALVE ALIGNMENT BOP /

(Step 1) Check the following valves - OPEN:

RO 1 CA-66AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1 A S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol) -OPEN 1CA-54AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol) - OPEN

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,8,9&10 Page ~

of _5;;.,;9 __ -11 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Tripi TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 CA-58A (1 A CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-50B (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol) - OPEN 1 CA-4SB (1 B CA Pump Disch To 1 C S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-38B (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Isol) - OPEN 1 CA-42B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Isol) - OPEN.

BOP/

(Step 2) Check the following valves - OPEN:

RO 1CA-S4AB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1 A S/G Control - OPEN 1CA-SOA (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-52AB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-5SA (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-48AB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1 C S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-44B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-3SAB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Isol) - OPEN 1 CA-40B (1 B CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Control) - OPEN.

BOP/

(Step 3) Check CA Storage tank (water RO tower) level-GREATER THAN 1.5 FT.

BOP /

(Step 4) Check the following valves-RO CLOSED:

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7;.01".,.;;,8:..;;.9;...;&;.;..1.;..;0;......_ Page ~

of _5.;;.,;9;"-'-11 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/

RO BOP/

RO 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-50B (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-46B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-38B (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-42B (1B CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Isol) - OPEN.

(Step 2) Check the following valves - OPEN:

1CA-64AB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1 A S/G Control - OPEN 1CA-60A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-52AB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1 B S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-56A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-48AB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-44B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-36AB (U1 TO CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-40B (1B CA Pump Disch To 10 S/G Control) - OPEN.

(Step 3) Check CA Storage tank (water tower) level-GREATER THAN 1.5 FT.

BOP /

(Step 4) Check the following valves-RO CLOSED:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7.:..1'..;:8 **.;;.,9.;;;&...;.1.;;.0 __ Page ~

of _5;;;,;9;......... 11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 RN-69A (1A RN Assured Supply To U1 CA Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-86A (U1 TD CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Iso I) - CLOSED 1CA-15A (1A CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) - CLOSED 1 RN-162B (1 B RN Assured Supply To U1 CA Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-116B (U1 TD CA Pump Suction From 1 B RN Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-18B (1B CA Pump Suction From 1B RN Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP /

(Step 5) Check the following valves - OPEN:

RO 1CA-11A (1A CA Pump Suction Isol)-

OPEN 1CA-7AC (U1 TD CA Pump Suction Isol)

-OPEN 1 CA-9B (1 B CA Pump Suction Isol) -

OPEN.

BOP /

(Step 6) GO TO Step 8.

RO BOP /

(Step 8) Check 1CA-2 (U1 CA Pumps Suct RO From CA Storage Tank Isol) - OPEN.

BOP /

(Step 9) Check CA pump suction from UST RO and CA Condensate Storage Tank (service bldg roof tank) valves - CLOSED:

1CS-18 (U1 UST To CA Pump Suct Hdr Isol) - CLOSED 1 CA-4 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From UST Isol) - CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7~'....;8....,.;..9_&_1...;.0 __ Page ~

of

_5_9;.....,~t Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump tripl1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1 RN-69A (1 A RN Assured Supply To U1 CA 1501) - CLOSED 1CA-86A (U1 TO CA Pump Suction From 1 A RN 1501) - CLOSED 1CA-1SA (1A CA Pump Suction From 1A RN 1501) - CLOSED 1RN-162B (1B RN Assured Supply To U1 CA 1501) - CLOSED 1CA-116B (U1 TO CA Pump Suction From 1 B RN 1501) - CLOSED 1CA-18B (1B CA Pump Suction From 1B RN 1501) - CLOSED.

BOP /

(Step 5) Check the following valves - OPEN:

RO 1 CA-11 A (1 A CA Pump Suction 1501) -

OPEN 1CA-7AC (U1 TO CA Pump Suction 1501)

-OPEN 1 CA-9B (1 B CA Pump Suction 1501) -

OPEN.

BOP /

(Step 6) GO TO Step 8.

RO BOP /

(Step 8) Check 1 CA-2 (U1 CA Pumps Suct RO From CA Storage Tank 1501) - OPEN.

BOP /

(Step 9) Check CA pump suction from UST RO and CA Condensate Storage Tank (service bldg roof tank) valves - CLOSED:

1CS-18 (U1 UST To CA Pump Suct Hdr 1501) - CLOSED 1CA-4 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From UST 1501) - CLOSED

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7,;"j,...;;8;.l..'.;.9.;.&~1...;.O __ Page.:!..- of _5.;;.,;9;"""-11 SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1CA-6 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From CA CST Isol) - CLOSED.

EP/1/Af5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO lOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ROI *

(Step 7.c) Start all available CA pumps.

BOP Check TO CA pump - RUNNING.

(Step 7.d RNa) Perform the following as necessary:

IF 1SA-48ABC (SM From S/G C To TO CA Pump Isol) is closed,.......

IF 1 SA-49AB (SM From S/G B to TO CA Pump Isol) is closed, THEN...

IF TO CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN" alarm (1AO-5, F-3) is lit, THEN dispatch operator to reset 1 SA-3 (Unit 1 TO CA Pump Turb Stop Valve) PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), 4 (Resetting TO CA Stop Valve).

IF reason for loss of steam supply to TO CA pump not determined,.....

ROI (Step 7.e) Check total flow to S/G(s)-

BOP GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

RO I (Step 7.e RNa) Perform the following:

BOP IF any CA pump is started,.....

IF any feed flow to at least one S/G is indicated,......

NOTE: 1 SA-48ABC is NOT closed.

NOTE: 1 SA-49AB is NOT closed.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO.

Booth Instructor:

Within 3 minutes, as NlO report that the TD CA Pump linkage appears to be broken.

NOTE: The reason for the loss of steam supply to the TO CA Pump turbine is known.

NOTE: All CA pumps are OFF.

NOTE: There is no feed flow to any SG.

Appendix D Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7 ':..;8., _9_&~1_0__ Page.:!..- of

_5;...;9~-II SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of AutomaticlManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine TriplTD CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1CA-6 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From CA CST Isol) - CLOSED.

EP/1/A15000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ROI (Step 7.c) Start all available CA pumps.

BOP Check TO CA pump - RUNNING.

(Step 7.d RNa) Perform the following as necessary:

IF 1SA-48ABC (SM From S/G C To TO CA Pump Isol) is closed,.......

IF 1 SA-49AB (SM From S/G B to TO CA Pump Isol) is closed, THEN...

IF TO CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN" alarm (1AO-5, F-3) is lit, THEN dispatch operator to reset 1 SA-3 (Unit 1 TO CA Pump Turb Stop Valve) PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), 4 (Resetting TO CA Stop Valve).

IF reason for loss of steam supply to TO CA pump not determined,.....

ROI (Step 7.e) Check total flow to S/G(s)-

BOP GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

RO I (Step 7.e RNa) Perform the following:

BOP IF any CA pump is started,.....

IF any feed flow to at least one S/G is indicated,......

NOTE: 1 SA-48ABC is NOT closed.

NOTE: 1 SA-49AB is NOT closed.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO.

Booth Instructor:

Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that the TO CA Pump linkage appears to be broken.

NOTE: The reason for the loss of steam supply to the TO CA Pump turbine is known.

NOTE: All CA pumps are OFF.

NOTE: There is no feed flow to any SG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

..;..:7,_8.,.-9.... &... 1.... 0 __ Page ~

of _5;..,;9 __ -t Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highiFWIs/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/TD CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

~

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SRO IF no feed flow indicated, THEN perform the following:

IF no CA pump can be started, THEN dispatch operator and maintenance to CA pumps to try to restore one CA pump to service.

Dispatch operator to ensure CA valves aligned PER Enclosure 5 (Local CA Valve Alignment).

SRO

GO TO Step 8.

RO (Step 8) Check steam dumps:

Check condenser available:

"C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI-18)

-LIT Any MSIV - OPEN RO "STEAM DUMP SELECT" -IN T-AVG MODE.

RO Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:

Ensure "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" setpoint at 1092 PSIG (pot setting of 8.4).

Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.

Adjust "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signal.

Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO, and contact WCC/Maintenance.

Floor Instructor:

acknowledge as NLO.

Booth Instructor:

acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO.

Floor Instructor:

acknowledge as NLO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

......;..ol7,,.;;8;.:.,,.;..9.;;;&....;.1..;.0 __ Page ~

of _5;;.;9;""-ij Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO IF no feed flow indicated, THEN perform the following:

IF no CA pump can be started, THEN dispatch operator and maintenance to CA pumps to try to restore one CA pump to service.

Dispatch operator to ensure CA valves aligned PER Enclosure 5 (Local CA Valve Alignment).

SRO

GO TO Step 8.

RO (Step 8) Check steam dumps:

Check condenser available:

"C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI-18)

- LIT Any MSIV - OPEN RO "STEAM DUMP SELECT" -IN T-AVG MODE.

RO Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:

Ensure "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" setpoint at 1092 PSIG (pot setting of 8.4).

Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.

Adjust "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signal.

Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO, and contact WCC/Maintenance.

Floor Instructor:

acknowledge as NLO.

Booth Instructor:

acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The SRO will dispatch an NLO.

Floor Instructor:

acknowledge as NLO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7.;....:,..,;;8..

, 9;;;....;;;&....;.1,;;,,0__ Page ~

of

_5;;.;9~-iI Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIs/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time lL Position

~

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in auto.

BOP (Step 9) Stop all NC pumps.

SRO (Step 20) Perform Steps 21 through 25 quickly to establish NC heat removal by NC feed and bleed.

BOP (Step 21) Ensure all NC pumps - OFF BOP (Step 22) Initiate SII.

BOP (Step 23) Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" - INDICATING FLOW.

BOP (Step 24) Establish NC System bleed path as follows:

Check all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

OPEN.

Select "OPEN" on two Pzr PORVs that have an open Pzr PORV isolation valve.

Align N2 to Pzr PORVs by opening:

1 NI-430A (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1 NC-34A) 1 NI-431 B (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1 NC-32B & 36B).

Check power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves - AVAILABLE.

Examiner NOTE: If at any time during the event the Bleed and Feed Criteria of this step is met, the crew will move forward to HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7.;..,l,...;;8;,;.,,,;;.9.;;;;&;...;1...;;0__ Page ~

of

_5;;;,,;9~-I\\

Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1 A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position ij Applicant's Actions or Behavior Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in auto.

BOP (Step 9) Stop all NC pumps.

SRO (Step 20) Perform Steps 21 through 25 quickly to establish NC heat removal by NC feed and bleed.

BOP (Step 21) Ensure all NC pumps - OFF BOP (Step 22) Initiate SII.

BOP (Step 23) Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" - INDICATING FLOW.

BOP (Step 24) Establish NC System bleed path as follows:

Check all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

OPEN.

Select "OPEN" on two Pzr PORVs that have an open Pzr PORV isolation valve.

Align N2 to Pzr PORVs by opening:

1 NI-430A (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1 NC-34A) 1 NI-431 B (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1 NC-32B & 36B).

Check power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves - AVAILABLE.

Examiner NOTE: If at any time during the event the Bleed and Feed Criteria of this step is met, the crew will move forward to HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,8,9&10 Page ~

of _5;;;,;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of AutomaticiManual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start A

licant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 25) Check two Pzr PORVs and associated isolation valves - OPEN.

Critical Task: (FR-H.1 A)

Establish ReS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range levels reach 0%, and the NeS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

BOP (Step 26) Isolate NV Recirc flowpath as follows:

Close:

1NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation) 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).

Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.

BOP (Step 2&) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:

Place A,B, and 0 Pzr heaters in manual and off.

Open "C PZR HTR GRP SUP BKR".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

~7

,~8;.:..'.;.9..;;.&~1~O__ Page ~

of

_5;..;9~-II Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails highlFWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 25) Check two Pzr PORVs and associated isolation valves - OPEN.

Critical Task: (FR-H.1 A)

Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

BOP (Step 26) Isolate NV Recirc flow path as follows:

Close:

1 NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation) 1 NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).

Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.

BOP (Step 2&) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:

Place A,B, and D Pzr heaters in manual and off.

Open "C PZR HTR GRP SUP BKR".

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 N09-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

_7.;..:,..,;8.,,;.9.;;;;&..;1..;;.0__ Page ~

of _5;;,;9;"""-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 28) Have another licensed operator check SII equipment PER Enclosure 9 (Subsequent SII Actions) while continuing with this procedure.

BOP (Step 29) Maintain NC System heat removal by performing the following:

Maintain SII flow Maintain 2 Pzr PORV flowpaths - OPEN.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 BOP to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

At the discretion of the lead Examiner terminate the exam.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

N09*1 Scenario #

3 Event #

7,8,9&10 Page ~

of....;;,;59;"""-11 Event

Description:

SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TO CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time II Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Step 28) Have another licensed operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 9 (Subsequent S/I Actions) while continuing with this procedure.

BOP (Step 29) Maintain NC System heat removal by performing the following:

Maintain S/I flow Maintain 2 Pzr PORV flowpaths - OPEN.

NOTE: SRO may ask U2 BOP to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam_

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power level: 100%

NCS [B] 76 ppm Pzr [B]: 79 ppm Xe: PerOAC Power History:

At this power for 288 days Core Burnup: 485 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/11A161 00103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The Plant is at 100% power (EOl), steady-state operation.

The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1 CF-32 (A SIG CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance.

An NlO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity.

System Engineering has indicated that Turbine load does not need to be reduced to perform this.

When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1 B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

1 D SG NR Level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE MIG SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Aux Bldg. John Turb Bldg. Bob 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Mike UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power level:

100%

NCS [B] 76 ppm Pzr [B]: 79 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History:

At this power for 288 days Core Burnup: 485 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A/61 00/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The Plant is at 100% power (EOl), steady-state operation.

The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1 CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance.

An NlO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity.

System Engineering has indicated that Turbine load does not need to be reduced to perform this.

When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1 B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

1 D SG NR level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1 AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE M/G SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

ML092400627

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