ML091980366

Issuance of Amendment No. 233, Modify Technical Specification Mode Change Limitations to Adopt TSTF-359, Revision 9, Increase Flexibility in Mode Restraints, and TSTF-485, Revision 0, Correct Example 1.4-1

ML091980366
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	07/28/2009
From:	Lyon C Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Minahan S Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
Lyon C Fred, NRR/DORL/LPL4, 301-415-2296
References
TAC MD9471
Download: ML091980366 (40)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 July 28, 2009 Mr. Stewart B. Minahan Vice President-Nuclear and CNO Nebraska Public Power District 72676 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321 SUB~IECT:

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:

INCREASING FLEXIBILITY IN MODE RESTRAINTS (TAC NO. MD9471)

Dear Mr. Minahan:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 233 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 for the Cooper Nuclear Station. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 19, 2008.

The amendment revises TS requirements for mode change limitations in accordance with NRC approved TS Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-359, Revision 9, "Increase Flexibility in MODE Restraints," and revises TS Section 1.4, "Frequency," in accordance with NRC-approved traveler TSTF-485, Revision 0, "Correct Example 1.4-1."

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-298

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 233 to DPR-46

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT DOCKET NO. 50-298 COOPER NUCLEAR STATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 233 License No. DPR-46

1.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Nebraska Public Power District (the licensee),

dated August 19, 2008, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 233, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~ lLU~1 Lb,tJr-9 ~

Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: Jul y 28, 2009

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 233 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46 DOCKET NO. 50-298 Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Operating License REMOVE INSERT Page 3 of 5 Page 3 of 5 Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT 1.4-3 1.4-3 3.0-1 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-2 3.0-5 3.0-5 3.3-22 3.3-22 3.3-26 3.3-26 3.4-10 3.4-10 3.4-12 3.4-12 3.4-14 3.4-14 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-2 3.5-2 3.5-3 3.5-3 3.5-11 3.5-11 3.8-1 3.8-1

(5)

Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by operation of the facility.

C.

This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2419 megawatts (thermal).

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 233, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(3)

Physical Protection The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "Cooper Nuclear Station Safeguards Plan," submitted by letter dated May 17, 2006.

(4)

Fire Protection The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Updated Safety Analysis Report and as approved in the Safety Evaluations dated November 29, 1977; May 23, 1979; November 21, 1980; April 29, 1983; April 16, 1984; June 1, 1984; January 3, 1985; August 21, 1985; April 10, 1986; September 9, 1986; November 7, 1988; February 3, 1989; August 15, 1995; and July 31 J 1998, subject to the following provision:

The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

Amendment No. 233 Revised by letter dated March 5, 2007 3 of 5

1.4 Frequency 1.4 Frequency EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.4-1 (continued) otherwise modified (refer to Examples 1.4-3 and 1.4-4), then SR 3.0.3 becomes applicable.

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, then SR 3.0.4 becomes applicable. The Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, as modified by SR 3.0.3, prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition, or the LCO is considered not met (in accordance with SR 3.0.1) and LCO 3.0.4 becomes applicable.

EXAMPLE 1.4-2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Verify flow is within limits.

Once within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after

~25% RTP 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter Example 1.4-2 has two Frequencies. The first is a one time performance Frequency, and the second is of the type shown in Example 1.4-1. The logical connector "AND" indicates that both Frequency reqUirements must be met. Each time reactor power is increased from a power level

< 25% RTP to ~ 25% RTP, the Surveillance must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The use of "once" indicates a single performance will satisfy the specified Frequency (assuming no other Frequencies are connected by "AND").

This type of Frequency does not qualify for the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2.

(continued)

Cooper 1.4-3 Amendment No. 233

LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2 and LCO 3.0.7.

LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required, unless otherwise stated.

LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a.

MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;

b.

MODE 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and

c.

MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:

(continued)

Cooper 3.0-1 Amendment No. 233

3.0 LCO Applicability 3.0 LCO APPLICABILITY LCO,3.0.4 (continued)

a.

When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; or

b.

After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications; or

c.

When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

LCO 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

LCO 3.0.6 When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

(continued)

Cooper 3.0-2 Amendment No. 233

3.0 SR Applicability 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.3 (continued)

If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3.

When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Cooper 3.0-5 Amendment No. 233

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.3.1 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. For Function 5, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.

A.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.

30 days B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1 Initiate action in accordance with Specification 5.6.6.

Immediately C. One or more Functions with two required channels inoperable.

OR One Function 2.c channel inoperable.

C.1 Restore one required channel to OPERABLE status.

7 days (continued)

Cooper 3.3-22 Amendment No. 233

Alternate Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3.2 Alternate Shutdown System LCO 3.3.3.2 The Alternate Shutdown System Functions shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required Functions inoperable.

A.1 Restore required Function to OPERABLE status.

30 days B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally energized.

(continued)

Cooper 3.3-26 Amendment No. 233

3.4.5 Res Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation LCO 3.4.5 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPEAABLE:

a.

Drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system: and

b.

One channel of the drywell atmospheric particulate or atmospheric gaseous monitoring system.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2. and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQU IRED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.

Drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system inoperable.

A.l Restore drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system to OPEAABLE status.

30 days B.

Required drywell atmospheric monitoring system inoperable.

8.1 AND B.2 Analyze grab samples of drywe11 atmosphere.

Restore required drywell atmospheric monitoring system to OPERABLE status.

Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 30 days (continued)

Cooper 3.4-10 Amendment No. 233

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.6 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity LCO 3.4~6 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 specific activity

~ O. 2 /LCi /gm.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1.

MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Reactor coolant specific activity

> 0.2 /LCi/glll and

~ 4.0 /LCi/glll DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

---

NOTE----------

LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable.

A.l Determine DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

AND A.2 Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 to within limits.

Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 48 hours B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

OR Reactor Coolant specific activity

> 4.0 /LCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

B.1 Determine DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

AND B.2.1 Isolate all main steam lines.

OR Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 12 hours (cont -j nued )

Cooper 3.4-12 Amendment No. 233

3.4.7 RHR Shutdown Cool i ng System - Hot Shutdown 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.7 Residual Heat Remova 1 (RHR) Shutdown Cool i ng System - Hot Shutdown LCO 3.4.7 Two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE. and.

with no recirculation pump in operation. at least one RHR shutdown cool i ng subsystem sha 11 be in operation,

---

NOTES-------------------------

1.

Both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and recirculation pumps may be removed from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period.

2.

One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem may be inoperable for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for the performance of Surveillances.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 3. with reactor steam dome pressure less than the shutdown cooling permissive pressure.

ACTIONS 7 -

- NOTE -

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable.

A.l Initiate action to restore RHR shutdown cooling subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

Immediately (continued)

Cooper 3.4-14 Amendment No. 233

3.5.1 ECCS - Operating 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure ~ 150 psig.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0A.b is not applicable to HPCI CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A,

One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

OR One LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable.

A,1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to

• operable status.

7 days

8.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

8.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> B.2 Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (continued)

Cooper 3.5-1 Amendment No. ~

3.5.1 ECCS - Operating ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

HPCI System inoperable.

C.1 Verify by administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE.

AND C.2 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days D.

HPCI System inoperable.

AND D.1 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

OR 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Condition A entered.

D.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> E.

One ADS valve inoperable.

E.1 Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.

14 days F.

One ADS valve inoperable.

AND F.1 Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.

OR 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Condition A entered.

F.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray sUbsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (continued)

Cooper 3.5-2 Amendment No. n.L

3.5.1 ECCS - Operating ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C, D, E, or F not met.

OR Two or more ADS valves inoperable.

G.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND G.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to

~ 150 psig.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours H.

Two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than condition A.

OR HPCI System and one or more ADS valves inoperable.

H.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray 31 days subsystem. the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.

(continued)

Cooper 3.5-3 Amendment No. ~

RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure> 150 psig.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

RCIC System inoperable.

A.1 Verify by administrative means High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to ~ 150 psig.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours Cooper 3.5-11 Amendment No. ~

AC Sources -

Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources -

Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and

b.

Two diesel generators (DGs).

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2, and 3.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One offsite circuit inoperable.

A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE offsite circuit.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter A.2 Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from discovery of no offsite power to one division concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

(continued)

Cooper 3.8-1 Amendment No. ~

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 233 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46 NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COOPER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50-298

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated August 19, 2008 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML082380878), Nebraska Public Power District (the licensee),

requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS).

The proposed changes would revise TS requirements for mode change limitations in Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.0.4 and the associated TS Bases by adopting the provisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) staff-approved TS Task Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF-359, Revision 9 (TSTF-359), "Increase Flexibility in MODE Restraints." The availability of TSTF-359 for adoption by licensees was announced by the NRC in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579), as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLlIP). Consistent with the application of the CLlIP, the licensee did not propose any variations or deviations from the TS changes described in the TSTF-359, Revision 9, other than cases in which the numbering of CNS TS sections differs from the Standard Technical Specifications (STS).

Additionally, the licensee proposed changes to Example 1.4-1 in TS Section 1.4, "Frequency,"

in accordance with TSTF-485, Revision 0, "Correct Example 1.4-1." This change is needed for consistency with the proposed changes of TSTF-359, Revision 9.

On July 17, 2002, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk Informed TS Task Force (RITSTF) submitted proposed change TSTF-359, Revision 7, to the Standard TS (STS) (NUREG Nos. 1430-1434) on behalf of the industry. TSTF-359, Revision 7, proposed to change the STS LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 requirements regarding mode change limitations by risk-informing limitations on entering the mode of applicability of an LCO. The Notice of Opportunity to Comment on the model safety evaluation (SE) using the CLlIP with respect to this change was published in the Federal Register on August 2,2002 (67 FR 50473). In response to the public comments received on that notice, the NRC staff found that TSTF-359, Revision 7, should be revised. The RITSTF submitted TSTF-359, Revision 8, on December 4,2002. The NRC staff

- 2 prepared a model SE incorporating changes resulting from the public comments and subsequently made minor editorial changes to the SE. TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified, provided the complete approved change, as discussed in the Federal Register notice dated April 4, 2003. The RITSTF subsequently incorporated the modifications to Revision 8 into TSTF-359, Revision 9.

TSTF-359 is one of the industry's initiatives under the risk-informed TS program. These initiatives are intended to maintain or improve safety while reducing unnecessary burden and to make TS requirements consistent with the Commission's other risk-informed regulatory requirements, in particular, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65, "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants," or the "Maintenance Rule."

The current TSs specify that a nuclear power plant cannot change modes of operation (or other specified conditions) unless all TS systems, normally required for the higher1 mode, are operable. This limitation is included in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4. LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 in the STS currently state, in part, that when an LCO or SR is not met, "entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the applicability shall not be made except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the applicability for an unlimited period of time." The industry believes that this requirement is unnecessarily restrictive and can delay plant startup while resources are being used to resolve startup issues that may be risk insignificant or low risk. For example, a maintenance activity affecting the operability of a safety function that takes longer than planned can delay a mode change and impact a plant startup and return to power operation. The objective of TSTF-359 proposed changes are to provide additional operational flexibility without compromising plant safety while retaining the current LCO 3.0.4 requirement as LCO 3.0.4(a).

Proposed changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 would allow mode changes with inoperable systems and components while relying on specific TS-required actions, provided a risk assessment is performed to confirm the acceptability of that action. Licensees will use LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 temporary non-compliance with TS only when they determine that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied within the LCO completion time (CT),

after the mode change. In addition, the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 non-compliance allowances can be applied to values and parameters in specifications if they are explicitly stated in the TS (e.g., non-system/component TS such as reactor coolant system specific activity). These changes are in addition to the current mode change allowance when a required action has an indefinite CT. LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are not permitted to be applied to mode change allowances for "higher risk" systems and components identified in Section 3.1.1 of this SE, subsection "Identification of Risk-Important TS Systems and Components." Two examples are:

(1) boiling-water reactor (BWR) plants cannot transition from Mode 3 to Mode 2 or to Mode 1 with the reactor isolation cooling system inoperable; and (2) BWR plants cannot transition up into any mode with required diesel generators (including other emergency/shutdown alternating current (AC) power supplies) inoperable.

MODE numbers decrease in the transition "up to a higher mode of operation"; power operation is MODE 1.

- 3

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

In 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," the Commission established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TSs are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) LCOs; (3) SRs; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TSs. As stated, in part, in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), "Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met." TS convention establishes that LCOs are contained in Sections 3.1 through 3.10 of the TS. TS Section 3.0, on "LCO and SR Applicability," provides general requirements for complying with the LCOs. LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 contain specific requirements for LCO compliance when transitioning between modes of operation.

TSs have taken advantage of risk technology as experience and capability have increased.

Since the mid-1990's, the NRC has been reviewing and granting improvements to TSs that are based, at least in part, on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) insights. In its final policy statement on TS improvements of July 22, 1993, the Commission stated that it expects that licensees will utilize any plant-specific PRA or risk survey in preparing their TS-related submittals. In evaluating these submittals, the staff applies the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Spedfic Changes to the Licensing Basis," dated July 1998 and in RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications," dated August 1998. The staff has appropriately adapted this guidance to assess the acceptability of upward mode changes with equipment inoperable. This review had the following objectives:

To ensure that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during the implementation of the proposed change (e.g., when the plant enters a higher mode while an LCO is not met). The risk increase is referred to as "temporary."

To compare and assess the risk impact of the proposed change to the acceptance guidelines of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement, as documented in RG 1.174. The risk impact, which is measured by the average yearly risk increase associated with the change, aims at minimizing the "cumulative" risk associated with the proposed change so that plant average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range.

To assess licensee capability to identify risk-significant configurations resulting from maintenance or other operational activities and take appropriate compensatory measures to avoid such configurations.

The NRC staff reviewed the extent to which non-high risk-significant systems and components rely on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and related guidance, to assess and manage the risk of upward mode changes. The Commission has found that compliance with the industry guidance for implementing 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as endorsed by RG 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk

- 4 Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants," dated May 2000, and required by LCO 3.0.4, and SR 3.0.4 (including SR 3.0.3), satisfies the configuration risk management objectives of RG 1.177 for TS upward mode changes with equipment inoperable. The NRC staff also noted that 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes, determined to be consistent with the provisions of the NRC-endorsed industry guidance, have been found adequate for managing risk for surveillances that are inadvertently exceeded, as described in the Federal Register notice dated September 28, 2001 (66 FR 49714).

The NRC staff review also had the objective of ensuring that existing inspection programs have the necessary controls in place to allow the NRC staff to oversee the implementation of the proposed change and reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes or programs. The inspection program also allows the NRC staff to adequately assess the licensee's performance associated with risk assessments. The review encompassed inspection procedures (IPs) (Le., NRC IP 62709, "Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk Management Process," dated December 28, 2000, and NRC IP 71111.13, "Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control," dated January 17, 2002), the significance determination process (SDP) (Le.,

draft "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process"), enforcement guidance (Le., draft Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.11, "Actions Involving the Maintenance Rule"), and the associated reactor oversight process (ROP).

2.1 Proposed Changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 Currently LCO 3.0.4 does not allow entrance into a higher mode (or other specified condition) in the applicability when an LCO is not met, except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in that mode or condition indefinitely or a specific exception is granted. Similarly, if an LCO surveillances have not been met within their specified frequency, then entry into a mode (or other specified condition) is not allowed by SR 3.0.4.

The current STS2 LCO 3.0.4 reads:

When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered allow unit operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability only for a limited period of time.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

2 Plant-specific wording for current equivalent LCO 3.0.4 is similar to current STS LCO 3.0.4 wording.

- 5 The revised LCO 3.0.4 will read:

When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:

(a)

When the associated Actions to be entered permit continued operation in that MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; or (b)

After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications; or (c)

When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The current STS3 SR 3.0.4 reads:

Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The revised SR 3.0.4 will conform to the changes to LCO 3.0.4 and read:

Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Plant-specific wording for current equivalent SR 3.0.4 is similar to current STS SR 3.0.4 wording.

3

- 6 The proposed LCO 3.0.4(a) retains the current allowance for when the required actions allow indefinite operation. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allows entering modes or other specified conditions in the applicability except when higher-risk systems and components (listed in Section 3.1.1 of this SE), for the mode being entered, are inoperable. The decision for entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability of the LCO will be made by plant management after the required risk assessment has been performed and requisite risk management actions established, through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Entry into the modes or other specified conditions in the applicability of the TSs shall be for no more than the duration of the applicable required actions CT, or until the LCO is met. Current notes in individual specifications that permitted mode changes are now encompassed by LCO 3.0.4(b) and can be removed. Notes that prohibit mode changes under LCO 3.0.4(b) must be added (Le., for higher-risk systems and components). The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance can involve multiple components in a single LCO or in multiple LCOs; however, use of the LCO 3.0.4(b) provisions are always contingent upon completion of a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)-based risk assessment.

The notes limiting the applicability to Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the current TS LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are holdovers from the existing STS. The notes limiting the applicability of LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are no longer needed and are removed in accordance with the approved guidance in TSTF-359, Revision 9. The industry owners group's analyses would subsequently support adding notes to various TSs, as defined by the tables of higher-risk systems, precluding entry into Modes 5 and 6. However, the addition of notes in these cases is made unnecessary by action statements that require immediate CTs, which means that entry into the Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability is not allowed and the notes would be superfluous.

LCO 3.0.4 allowances related to values and parameters of TSs are not typically addressed by LCO 3.0.4(b) risk assessments, and are therefore addressed by a new LCO 3.0.4(c).

LCO 3.0.4(c) refers to allowances already in the TSs and annotated in the individual TSs.

LCO 3.0.4(c) also allows for entry into the modes or other specified conditions in the LCO Applicability for no more than the duration of the applicable required actions CT or until the LCO is met or the unit is not within the Applicability of the LCO.

2.2 Proposed Changes to TS Section 1.4, "Frequency" The licensee proposes to revise TS Section 1.4, "Frequency," Example 1.4-1, to be consistent with the requirements of SR 3.0.4. SR 3.0.4 was revised by TSTF-359, Revision 9, and the current example is not consistent with the TS requirements.

The second paragraph of Example 1.4-1 is revised. The paragraph currently states:

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, the Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2 prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition. Failure to do so would result in a violation of SR 3.0.4.

- 7 The second paragraph of Example 1.4-1 is being revised to state:

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, then SR 3.0.4 becomes applicable. The Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, as modified by SR 3.0.3, prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition, or the LCO is considered not met (in accordance with SR 3.0.1) and LCO 3.0.4 becomes applicable.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

During the development of the current STS, improvements were made to LCO 3.0A, such as clarifying its applicability with respect to plant shutdowns, cold shutdown mode, and refueling mode. In addition, during the STS development, almost all the LCOs with CTs greater than or equal to 30 days, and many LCOs with CTs greater than or equal to 7 days, were given individual LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. During some conversions to the STS, individual plants provided acceptable justifications for other LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. All of these specific LCO 3.0.4 exceptions allow entry into a mode or other specified condition in the TS applicability while relying on the TS required actions and associated CTs. The proposed change under evaluation would provide standardization and consistency to the use and application of LCO 3.0.4, both internal to and between each of the specifications and STS NUREGs. This proposed change will also ensure consistency through the utilization of appropriate levels of risk assessment of plant configurations for application of LCO 3.0.4. However, nothing in this SE should be interpreted as encouraging upward mode transition with inoperable equipment. Good practice should dictate that such transitions should normally be initiated only when all required equipment is operable and that mode transition with inoperable equipment should be the exception rather than the rule.

The current LCO 3.0.4(a) allowances are retained in the proposed change and do not represent a change in risk from the current situation. The LCO 3.0A(b) allowances apply to systems and components, and require a risk assessment prior to utilization to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained. The LCO 3.0.4(c) allowances apply to parameters and values which have been previously approved by the NRC in plant-specific TS. The licensee will provide in its TS Bases a discussion and list of each NRC-approved LCO 3.0A(c)-specific value and parameter allowance. The bases of LCO 3.0.4 will be revised to explain the new allowances and their utilization.

The NRC staff did a qualitative assessment of the risk impact of the proposed change in LCO 3.0A(b) allowances by evaluating how the licensee's implementation of the proposed risk-informed approach is expected to meet the requirements of the applicable RGs. The staff referred to the guidance provided in RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," and in RG 1.177, "An approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications." RG 1.177 provides the NRC staff recommendations on utilizing risk information to assess the impact of proposed changes to nuclear power plant TSs on the risk associated with plant operation. Although RG 1.177 does not specifically address the type of generic

- 8 change in this proposal, the staff considered the approach documented in RG 1.177 in evaluating the risk information provided in support of the proposed changes in LCO 3.004.

The NRC staff evaluation of how implementation of the proposed risk-informed approach, used to justify LCO 3.004(b) allowances, agrees with the objectives of the guidance outlined in RG 1.177 is discussed in Section 3.1 of this SE. Oversight of the risk-informed approach associated with the LCO 3.004(b) allowances is discussed in Section 3.2 of this SE.

3.1 Evaluation of Risk Management Both the temporary and cumulative risk of the proposed change are adequately limited. The temporary risk is limited by the exclusion of higher-risk systems and components, and CT limits contained in TSs as discussed in Section 3.1.1 of this SE. The cumulative risk is limited by the temporary risk limitations and by the expected low frequency of the proposed mode changes with inoperable equipment as discussed in Section 3.1.2 of this SE. Adequate NRC oversight of the licensee's ability to use the LCO 3.004(b) provisions under appropriate circumstances (Le.,

to identify risk-significant configurations when entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO as discussed in Section 3.1.3 of this SE) is provided by NRC inspection of the licensee's implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) as applied to the proposed change.

3.1.1 Temporary Risk Increases RG 1.177 proposes the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and the incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) as appropriate measures of the increase in probability of core damage and large early release, respectively, during the period of implementation of a proposed TS change. In addition, RG 1.177 stresses the need to preclude potentially high risk configurations introduced by the proposed change. The ICCDP associated with any specified plant condition, such as the condition introduced by entering a higher mode with plant equipment inoperable, is expressed by the following equation:

ICCDP = b.R d =(R1 - Ro) d (1 )

where b.R = the conditional risk increase, in terms of core damage frequency (CDF), caused by the specified condition d = the duration of the specified plant condition R1 = the plant CDF with the specified condition permanently present Ro = the plant CDF without the specified condition The same expression can be used for ICLERP by substituting the measure of risk, Le., large early release frequency (LERF) for CDF. The magnitude of the ICCDP and ICLERP values associated with plant conditions applicable to LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances can be managed by controlling the conditional risk increase, b.R (in terms of both CDF and LERF) and the duration, d of such conditions. The following sections discuss how the key elements of the proposed risk-informed approach, used to justify LCO 3.004(b) allowances, are expected to limit b.R and d and, thus, prevent any significant temporary risk increases.

- 9 Identification of Risk-Important TS Systems and Components A major element that limits the risk of the proposed mode change flexibility is the exclusion of certain systems and associated LCOs for the mode change allowance. TSs allow operation in Mode 1 (power operation) with specified levels of inoperability for specified times. This provides a benchmark of currently acceptable risk against which to measure any incremental risk inherent in the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b). If system inoperability accrues risk at a higher rate in one or more of the transition modes than it would in Mode 1, then an upward transition into that mode should not be allowed without demonstration of a high degree of experience and sophistication in risk management. However, the risk management process evaluated in Section 3.1.3 is adequate if higher-risk systems/components are excluded from the scope of LCO 3.0.4(b).

The importance of most TS systems in mitigating accidents increases as power increases.

However, some TS systems are relatively more important during lower power and shutdown operations, because:

certain events are peculiar to modes of plant operation other than power operation, certain events are more probable at modes of plant operation other than power operation, some modes of plant operation have less mitigation system capability than power operation.

The risk information submitted in support of the proposed changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 includes qualitative risk assessments performed by each owners group to identify higher-risk systems and components at the various modes of operation, including transitions between modes, as the plant moves upward from the refueling mode of operation toward power operation.

The owners group's generic qualitative risk assessments are included as attachments to TSTF-359, Revision 9. Each of the owners group's generic qualitative risk assessments discuss the technical approach used and the systems/components subsequently determined to be of higher risk significance; the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 allowances for the various modes are listed. The Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group's (BWROG's) generic qualitative risk assessment is:

BWR Owners Group Risk-Informed Technical Specification Committee, "Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Improvements to Technical Specification Mode Restraints for BWR Plants," General Electric Company, GE-NE A13-00464 (Rev. 2)

The generic qualitative risk assessment discusses the technical approach used and the systems/components subsequently determined to be of higher risk significance; the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 allowances for the various modes are listed. Following interactions with the staff, the BWROG (and all owners groups) used the same

- 10 systematic approach in their qualitative risk assessments to identify the higher-risk systems in the 8T8, consisting of the following steps:

identification of plant conditions (i.e., plant parameters and availability of key mitigation systems) associated with changes in plant operating modes while returning to power identification of key activities that have the potential to impact risk and which are in progress during transitions between modes while the plant is returning to power identification of applicable accident initiating events for each mode or other specified condition in the applicability identification of the higher-risk systems and components by combining the information in the first three steps (qualitative risk assessment)

The risk assessments properly used the results and insights from previous deterministic and probabilistic studies to systematically search for plant conditions in which certain key plant components are more important in mitigating accidents than during operation at power (Mode 1). This search was systematic, taking the following factors into account for the various stages of returning the plant to power:

the status of accident mitigation and normally operating systems the status of key plant parameters such as reactor coolant system pressure the key activities that are in progress during transitions between modes which have the potential to impact risk (e.g., the transfer from auxiliary to main feedwater at some pressurized-water reactor plants when Mode 1 is entered) the applicable accident initiating events for each mode of plant operation design and operational differences among plants or groups of plants

- 11 The following systems and components were identified by the BWROG as higher-risk systems and components, when the plant is entering a new mode.

BWROG Plants System BWRType Entering Mode High Pressure Coolant Injection System BWR3&4 2, 1 High Pressure Core Spray BWR5&6 2, 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System BWR 3, 4, 5 & 6 2, 1 Isolation Condenser BWR2 2, 1 Diesel Generators (including other All All Emergency/Shutdown AC Power Supplies)

Hardened Wetwell Vent System BWR 2,3 & 4 with Mark 1 3,2,1 Containment Residual Heat Removal System All 4

If a licensee identifies a higher-risk system for only some of the modes of applicability, the TSs for that system would be modified by a note that reads, for example, "LCO 3.0.4(b) is not applicable when entering MODE 1 from MODE 2." Systems identified as higher risk for Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs are also excluded from transitioning up to the mode of higher risk, and, as previously discussed, notes for those transitions are superfluous. In addition, mode transitions for Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs will be addressed by administrative controls.

In summary, the NRC staff's review of the owners group's qualitative risk assessments finds that they are of adequate quality to support the application associated with entering higher modes of plant operation with equipment inoperable while returning to power. Additionally, higher-risk systems and components were identified.

The licensee proposes to make the following TS changes to implement TSTF-359, Revision 9:

Change LCO 3.0.4 (LCO Applicability) in accordance with TSTF-359.

Change SR 3.0.4 (SR Applicability) in accordance with TSTF-359.

Change TS 3.3.3.1, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," in accordance with TSTF-359. Delete ACTIONS Note 1, "LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable." Retain Note 2 as an unnumbered Note.

Change TS 3.3.3.2, "Alternate Shutdown System," in accordance with TSTF-359.

Delete ACTIONS Note 1, "LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable." Retain Note 2 as an unnumbered Note.

Change TS 3.4.5, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation," in accordance with TSTF-359. Delete the Note "LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable," in REQUIRED ACTION A.1 and B.1/B.2.

- 12 Change TS 304.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System Hot Shutdown," in accordance with TSTF-359. Delete ACTIONS Note 1, "LCO 3.004 is not applicable." Retain Note 2 as an unnumbered Note.

The licensee identified the following systems and components as high-risk systems and components, when the plant is entering a new mode. The LCO 3.004(b) and LCO 3.004(c) allowances apply to parameters and values which have been previously approved by the NRC in plant-specific TSs.

Change TS 3.4.6, "RCS Specific Activity," in accordance with TSTF-359.

Replace the Note "LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable" to REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 with new Note "LCO 3.004.c is applicable."

Change TS 3.5.1, "ECCS - Operating," consistent with TSTF-359. Add a new Note to the ACTIONS to read, "LCO 3.004.b is not applicable to HPCI."

Change TS 3.5.3, "RCIC System," consistent with TSTF-359. Add a new Note to the ACTIONS to read, "LCO 3.004.b is not applicable to RCIC."

Change TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," consistent with TSTF-359. Add a new Note to the ACTIONS to read, "LCO 3.004.b is not applicable to DGs."

Limited Time in TS Required Actions Any temporary risk increase will be limited by, among other factors, duration constraints imposed by the TS CTs of the inoperable systems. For the systems and components which are not higher risk, any temporary risk increase associated with the proposed allowance will be smaller than what is considered acceptable when the same systems and components are inoperable at power. This is due to the fact that CTs associated with the majority of TS systems and components were developed for power operation and pose a smaller plant risk for action statement entries initiated or occurring at lower modes of operation as compared to power operation.

The LCO 3.004(b) allowance will be used only when the licensee determines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied following the mode change. This will minimize the likelihood of additional temporary risk increases associated with the need to exit a mode due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. In most cases, licensees will enter into a higher mode with the intent to move up to Mode 1 (power operation). As discussed in Section 3.2 of this SE, the revised Rap monitors unplanned power changes as a performance indicator. The Rap, thus, discourages licensees from entering a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of an LCO, and moving up in power, when there is a likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. Another disincentive for licensees to enter a higher mode when an LCO is not met is related to reporting requirements. It states in 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors," and 10 CFR 50.73, "Licensee event report system," that a report is required when a nuclear plant shutdown is required by TSs. The NRC's oversight program will provide the framework for inspectors and other staff to

- 13 follow the history at a specific plant of entering higher modes while an LCO is not met, and use such information in assessing the licensee's actions and performance.

3.1.2 Cumulative Risk Increases The cumulative risk impact of the change to allow the plant to enter a higher mode of operation with one or more safety-related components unavailable (as proposed here), is measured by the average yearly risk increase associated with the change. In general, this cumulative risk increase is assessed in terms of both CDF and LERF (i.e., ~CDF and ~LERF, respectively).

The increase in CDF due to the proposed change is expressed by the following equation, which integrates the risk impact from all expected specified conditions (i.e., all expected plant conditions caused by mode changes with various TS systems and components unavailable).

(2) where

~CDFj = the CDF increase due to specified condition i ICCDPj = the ICCDP associated with specified condition i fj = the average yearly frequency of occurrence of specified condition i A similar expression can be used for ~LERF by substituting the measure of risk (i.e., LERF for CDF). The magnitude of the ~CDF and ~LERF values associated with plant conditions applicable to LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances can be managed by controlling the temporary risk increases, in terms of both CDF and LERF (i.e., ICCDP and ICLERP), and the frequency (f), of each of such conditions. In addition to the points made in the previous section regarding temporary risk increases, the following points put into perspective how the key elements of the proposed risk-informed approach, used to justify an LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance, are expected to prevent significant cumulative risk increases by limiting the frequency of its use:

The frequency of risk-significant conditions will be limited by not providing the LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances to the higher-risk systems and components.

The frequency of risk-significant conditions will be limited by the requirement to assess the likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied following the mode change.

The frequency of risk-significant conditions is limited by the fact that such conditions can occur only when the plant is returning to power following shutdown (i.e., during a small fraction of time per year). Data over the past 5 years indicate that the plants are averaging 2.1 startups per year.

The addition of the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances to the plant maintenance activities is not expected to change the plant's average (cumulative) risk significantly.

3.1.3 Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Mode Changes With all safety systems and components operable, a plant can transition up in mode to power operation. With one or more system(s) or component(s) inoperable, this change permits a plant

- 14 to transition up in mode to power operation if the inoperable system(s) or component(s) are not in the pre-analyzed higher risk category, a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based risk assessment is performed prior to the mode transition, and the requisite risk management actions are taken.

The proposed TS Bases state, When an LCO is not met, LCO 3.0.4 also allows entering MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability following assessment of the risk impact and determination that the impact can be managed. The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities to be assessed and managed.

It should be noted that the risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4(b), must take into account all inoperable TS equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the licensee's normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by RG 1.182. The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. A risk assessment and establishment of risk management actions, as appropriate, are required for determination of acceptable risk for entering MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. Elements of acceptable risk assessment and risk management actions are included in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities," as endorsed by RG 1.182, which addresses general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, gives quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and provides example risk management actions. These risk management actions include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, actions to increase risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the conditions, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable.

The guidance references state that a licensee's risk assessment process should be sufficiently robust and comprehensive to assess risk associated with maintenance activities during power operation, low power and shutdown conditions (all modes of operation), including changes in plant conditions. NUMARC 93-01 states that the risk assessment should include consideration of: the degree of redundancy available for performance of the safety function(s) served by the out-of-service equipment; the duration of the out-of-service condition; component and system dependencies that are affected; the risk impact of performing the maintenance during shutdown versus at power; and the impact of mode transition risk. For power operation, key plant safety functions are those that ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, ensure the capability to shut down and maintain the reactor in safe shutdown condition, and ensure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potentially significant offsite exposures.

While the inoperabilities permitted by the CTs of TS required actions take into consideration the safety significance and redundancy of the system or components within the scope of an LCO, the CTs generally do not address or consider concurrent system or component inoperabilities in

- 15 multiple LCOs. Therefore, the performance of the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment which looks at the entire plant configuration is essential (and required) prior to changing operational mode. The 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)-based risk assessment will be used to confirm (or reject) the appropriateness of transitioning up in mode given the actual status of plant safety equipment.

The risk impact on the plant condition of invoking an LCO 3.0A(b) allowance will be assessed and managed through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This program is consistent with RG 1.177 and RG 1.174 in its approach. The implementation guidance for paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule addresses controlling temporary risk increases resulting from maintenance activities. This guidance, consistent with guidance in RG 1.177, establishes action thresholds based on qualitative and quantitative considerations and risk management actions. Significant temporary risk increases following an LCO 3.0A(b) allowance are unlikely to occur unless:

high-risk configurations are allowed (e.g., certain combinations of multiple component outages), or risk management of plant operation activities is inadequate.

The requirements associated with the proposed change are established to ensure that such conditions will not occur.

The thresholds of the cumulative (aggregate) risk impacts, assessed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the associated implementation gUidance, are based on the permanent change guidelines in RG 1.174. Therefore, licensees will manage the risk exercising LCO 3.0A in conjunction with the risk from other concurrent plant activities to ensure that any increase, in terms of core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) will be small and consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement.

3.2 Oversight The Rap provides a means for assessing the licensee's performance in the application of the proposed mode change flexibility. The adequacy of the licensee's assessment and management of maintenance-related risk is addressed by existing inspection programs and guidance for 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Although the current versions of that guidance do not specifically address application of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) program to support risk informed TSs, it is expected that in most cases, risk assessment and management associated with risk-informed TSs would be required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) anyway because maintenance activities will be involved.

Adoption of the proposed change will make failure to assess and manage the risk of an upward mode change with inoperable equipment covered by TSs, prior to commencing such a mode change, a violation of TSs. Further, as explained above in general, under most foreseeable circumstances, such a change in configuration would also require a risk assessment under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Inoperable systems or components will necessitate maintenance to restore them to operability, and hence a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment would be performed prior to the performance of those maintenance actions (except for immediate plant stabilization and restoration actions if necessary). Further, before altering the plant's configuration, including

- 16 plant configuration changes associated with mode changes, the licensee must update the existing 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment to reflect those changes.

The notice in the Federal Register (64 FR 38553, dated July 19, 1999) issuing a revision to the maintenance rule, 10 CFR 50.65, along with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.13 and NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, dated February 22,2000, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities," all indicate that to determine the safety impact of a change in plant conditions during maintenance, a risk assessment must be performed before changing plant conditions. The bases for the proposed TS change mandate that the risk assessment and management of upward mode changes will be conducted under the licensee's program and process for meeting 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Oversight of licensee performance in assessing and managing the risk of plant maintenance activities is conducted principally by inspection in accordance with Reactor Oversight Program Baseline IP 71111.13, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control." SupplementallP 62709, "Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk Management Process," is utilized to evaluate the licensee's process, when necessary.

The ROP is described in overview in NUREG-1649, Revision 3, "Reactor Oversight Process,"

dated July 2000, and in detail in the NRC Inspection Manual. NRC IP 71111.13 requires verification of performance of risk assessments when they are required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and in accordance with licensee procedures. The procedure also requires verification of the adequacy of those risk assessments and verification of effective implementation of licensee prescribed risk management actions. The rule itself requires such assessment and management of risk prior to maintenance activities, including preventive maintenance, surveillance and testing (and promptly for emergent work), during all modes of plant operation.

The guidance documents for both industry implementation of (a)(4) and NRC oversight of that implementation indicate that changes in plant configuration (which would include mode changes) in support of maintenance activities must be taken into account in the risk assessment and management process. Revisions to NRC inspection guidance and licensee implementation procedures will be needed to address oversight of risk assessment and management required by TSs in support of mode changes that are not already required under the circumstances by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). This consideration provides performance-based regulatory oversight of the use of the proposed flexibility, and a disincentive to use the flexibility without the requisite care in planning.

The ROP considers inspection findings and performance indicators in evaluating the licensee's ability to operate safely. The SDP is used to determine the significance of inspection findings related to licensee assessment and management of the risk associated with performing maintenance activities under all plant operating or shutdown conditions. Unplanned reactor scrams and unplanned power changes are two of the Reactor Safety Performance Indicators that the ROP utilizes to assess licensee performance and inform the public. The ROP provides a disincentive to entering into power operation (Mode 1), when there is a significant likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT.

- 17 3.3 Summary of Proposed Risk-informed Changes to LCO 3.0.4 The industry, through the NEI RITSTF, has submitted a proposed TS change to allow entry into a higher mode of operation, or other specified condition in the TS applicability, while relying on the TS conditions, and associated required actions and CTs, provided a risk assessment is performed to confirm the acceptability of that action. The proposal revises STS LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4, and their application to the TS. New paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) are proposed for LCO 3.0.4.

The proposed LCO 3.0.4(a) retains the current allowance, permitting the mode change when the TS required actions allow indefinite operation.

Proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) is the change to allow entry into a higher mode of operation, or other specified condition in the TS applicability, while relying on the TS conditions and associated required actions and CTs, provided a risk assessment is performed to confirm the acceptability of that action for the existing plant configuration. The NRC staff review finds that the process proposed by the industry for assessing and managing risk during the implementation of the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, meets Commission guidance for TS changes. Key elements of this process are listed below.

A risk assessment shall be performed before any LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance is invoked.

The risk impact on the plant condition of invoking an LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be assessed and managed through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the associated guidance in RG 1.182. Allowing entry into a higher mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO after an 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)-based risk assessment and appropriate risk management actions are taken for the existing plant configuration will ensure that plant safety is maintained.

The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be used only when the licensee determines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied within the required action's CT.

TS systems and components which may be of higher risk during mode changes have been identified generically by each owner's group for each plant operational mode or condition. Licensees will identify such plant-specific systems and components in the individual plant TSs. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance does not apply to these systems and components for the mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO at which they are of higher risk.

Plants adopting LCO 3.0.4(b) will ensure that plant procedures in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) address the situation where entering a mode or other specified condition in the applicability is contemplated with plant equipment inoperable. Such plant procedures typically follow the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as revised in February 2000 and endorsed by NRC RG 1.182.

- 18 The NRC's Rap provides the framework for inspectors and other staff to oversee the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements at a specific plant and assess the licensee's actions and performance.

The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance does not apply to values and parameters of the TSs that have their own respective LCOs (e.g., reactor coolant system specific activity), but instead those values and parameters are addressed by LCO 3.0.4(c). The TS values and parameters for which mode transition allowances apply, will have a note that states LCO 3.0.4(c) is applicable.

The objective of the proposed changes are to provide additional operational flexibility without compromising plant safety. The proposed changes conform to TSTF-359, Revision 9, and comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36. Therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable.

3.4 TS Section 1.4, Example 1.4-1 The licensee proposes to revise Example 1.4-1 consistent with TSTF-485, Revision O.

Specifically, the licensee proposes to revise the second paragraph of the example to state:

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, then SR 3.0.4 becomes applicable. The Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, as modified by SR 3.0.3, prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition, or the LCO is considered not met (in accordance with SR 3.0.1) and LCO 3.0.4 becomes applicable.

Example 1.4-1 states that if the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, the Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2 prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition. Failure to do so would result in a violation of SR 3.0.4.

TSTF-359, Revision 9, modified SR 3.0.4 to state that when an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4. TSTF-359, Revision 9, modified LCO 3.0.4 to provide conditions under which it is acceptable to enter the Applicability of the LCO with the LCO not met. Therefore, it is possible to enter the Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO with a Surveillance not performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2, and this does not result in a violation of SR 3.0.4.

TSTF-485, Revision 0, revises Example 1.4-1 to be consistent with the current requirements of SR 3.0.4. In order to do this, the second paragraph of Example 1.4-1 is modified to parallel the discussion in the previous paragraph. The previous paragraph discusses Surveillances that exceed the interval without being performed while in the Applicability. The second paragraph would be modified to make a similar statement regarding Surveillances that exceed the interval while not being in the Applicability.

- 19 The second sentence of the second paragraph is modified to refer to the provisions of SR 3.0.3.

This is necessary since TSTF-359, Revision 9, modified SR 3.0.4 to recognize the possibility that performance of a missed Surveillance may have been extended, and that a MODE change occurs prior to performance of the missed Surveillance, but within the time permitted under SR 3.0.3.

The statement is deleted that failure to perform a Surveillance prior to entering the Applicability would constitute a violation of SR 3.0.4, and a statement is inserted to state that the LCO would not be met and LCO 3.0.4 becomes applicable. This is consistent with the revised SR 3.0.4.

The NRC approved TSTF-485, Revision 0, by letter from T. Boyce (NRC) to the TS Task Force dated December 6, 2005. Implementation of TSTF-485, Revision 0, is administrative and ensures consistency between Example 1.4-1 and the remainder of the TSs. No changes in the application of any TSs are involved.

The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's proposed changes are acceptable since they are administrative, do not alter the TS requirements, and are consistent with NRC-approved TSTF-485, Revision O.

3.5 TS Bases The licensee proposed changes to the TS Bases consistent with the proposed changes to the TSs. The NRC staff has no objections to the proposed changes to the TS Bases.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Nebraska State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIROt\\IMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on October 21, 2008 (73 FR 62565). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

- 20

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: C. Schulten Date: July 28, 2009

July 28, 2009 Mr. Stewart B. Minahan Vice President-Nuclear and CNO Nebraska Public Power District 72676 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321 SUB~IECT:

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:

INCREASING FLEXIBILITY IN MODE RESTRAINTS (TAC NO. MD9471)

Dear Mr. Minahan:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 233 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-46 for the Cooper Nuclear Station. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 19, 2008.

The amendment revises TS requirements for mode change limitations in accordance with NRC approved TS Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-359, Revision 9, "Increase Flexibility in MODE Restraints," and revises TS Section 1.4, "Frequency," in accordance with NRC-approved traveler TSTF-485, Revision 0, "Correct Example 1.4-1."

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RN Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-298

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 233 to DPR-46

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

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• memo dated OFFICE NRRlLPL4/PM NRRlLPL4/LA DIRS/ITSB/BC OGC NRR/LPL4/BC NRRlLPL4/PM NAME FLyon JBurkhardt RElliott*

Not Required MMarkley BSingal for FLyon DATE 7/23/09 7/22/09 7/21/09 ML072980209 7/28/09 7/28/09 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy