ML091830846

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Pilgrim Watch'S Brief in Response to CLI-09-11 (Requesting Additional Briefing)
ML091830846
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 06/25/2009
From: Lampert M
Pilgrim Watch
To:
NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
50-293-LR, ASLBP 06-848-02-LR, CLI-09-11, RAS J-198
Download: ML091830846 (31)
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Text

IZA 5 3 - (97 DOCKETED' USNRC June 26,' 2009 (8:00am)

OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADJUDICATIONS STAFF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of ))

Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and )

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ) Docket No. 50-293-LR

)

) ASLBP No. 06-848-02-LR (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) )

PILGRIM WATCH'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO CLI-09-11 (REQUESTING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING)

Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, pro se 148Washington Street Duxbury, MA 02332 June 25, 2009

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TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 I. THE BOARD MAJORITY ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED CHALLENGES TO 2 ENTERGY'S USE OF THE STRAIGHT-LINE GAUSSIAN PLUME MODEL AND MAACS2 CODE A. The Board Majority Incorrectly Dismissed the Challenges As Generic 2 B. PW Submitted Substantial Evidence That Entergy's SAMA Analysis for the Pilgrim Plant is 3 Deficient.

1. PW Evidence Showed Deficiencies of Entergy's Use of a Straight-Line Gaussian Plume 4 Model to Characterize Consequences, Here
a. The Sea Breeze Effect 4
b. Behavior of Plumes Over Water 5
c. Storms 6
d. Geographical Variations, Terrain Effects, and Distance 6
2. PW Evidence Showed That Entergy's Inputs to the MACCS2 Code Were Deficient and 7 Did Not Account for Site-Specific Conditions.
a. Meteorological Inputs 7
b. Economic Inputs 10
c. Health Consequences 12
d. Cleaning Up After an Accident 12 II. PW PRESENTED A SUPPORTED GENUINE DISPUTE THAT COULD MATERIALLY 14 AFFECT THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS.

A. Entergy's Cost-Benefit Analysis Did Not "Subsume All Reasonably Possible Meteorologic 14 Patterns."

B. The Gaussian Plume Model/ MACCS2 Applied in Entergy's and the Board's Cost-Benefit 15 Analysis Was Not Conservative C. The Use of a Variable Trajectory Model and MACCS2 Code Modified to Accept Site- 16 Specific Conditions Could Indeed Materially Affect Whether Any Additional SAMAs May

Be Cost-Beneficial

1. Because Entergy used the straight-line Gaussian plume model instead of a variable 17 trajectory model it significantly underestimated the geographic area that would be affected and the radioactive concentration within that area.
a. Affected Area 17
b. Concentration 18
c. Precipitation, Moisture, Fog 18
d. Emergency Response Implications 19
2. Entergy Significantly Underestimated Health Costs 19
3. Entergy Ignored Consequences Of A Truly Severe Accident 20
4. Entergy significantly minimized the true and significant costs of clean-up 21
5. MACCS2 did not consider further dispersion material from deposited on site 22
6. A myriad of smaller economic costs were underestimated or totally ignored by the 22 applicant that when added together would in all likelihood add up collectively to a significant amount.
7. There is a supported, genuine dispute that could materially affect the ultimate 23 conclusions of the SAMA cost-benefit analysis CONCLUSION 24

INTRODUCTION Pilgrim Watch (herein after "PW") established a genuine dispute of material fact that Entergy's "SAMA anaylsis for the Pilgrim Plant is deficient in that the input data concerning (1) evacuation times, (2) economic consequences, and (3) meterological patterns are incorrect, resulting in incorrect conclusions ... such thatfurther analysis is calledfor." [LBP-06-23,64NRC at 341, italics added].

Throughout its decision, the Board majority improperly used summary disposition to weigh evidence and decide disputed issues of material fact. As Judge Young said (LBP-07-13,66 NRC, Dissent, fn 47) "my colleagues apply a standard that overlooks or ignores genuine issues of material fact that Intervenors present through reputable experts, as well as considerations of practical reality and fundamental fairness."

The Board majority was clearly "wrong to exclude challenges to the use of the straight-line Gaussian plume module to predict the atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides, or the. use of the MACCS2 code for determining economic costs." (Comm. Order, 7) NRC regulations are clear that the SAMA cost-benefit analysis is a Category II (site specific) issue that must be considered as part of a license renewal; and PW's contention is site specific -for the Pilgrim Plant. As Judge Young noted, even if the "Board had barred any challenge 'on a generic basis [to] the use of probabalistic techniques that evaluate risk,' it had not excluded 'specific challenges... ' such as challenges to the straight-line Gaussian plume model and the 'adequacy of the MACCS2 code as specifically applied with regardto the Pilgrimplant's SAMA analysis. "' (Comm. Order, 4, emphasis in original).

Nothing in NRC regulations requires the use of a Gaussian plume model or existing MACCS2 Code. PW submitted significant evidence that the straight- line Gaussian plume model "is not appropriate for the PNPS coastal location." [Egan Dec. at 13] and did not predict site-specific atmospheric dispersion; PW also showed that the MACCS2 code used by Entergy could not model many site-specific conditions and did not determine economic costs for Pilgrim's affected area that includes within its 50-mile radius densely populated areas of Boston, Providence, smaller cities and Cape Cod and Islands in summer, located across the bay.

'J., ,

2 PW presented a supported, genuine dispute that could materially affect the ultimate conclusions of the SAMA cost-benefit analysis by providing evidence that: (a) the use of a variable trajectory model could materially and significantly affect that additional SAMAs may be cost-beneficial; (b) the Gaussian plume model and the MACCS2 code (including the economic model) as applied [by the Board] in the cost benefit-analysis was not conservative; and (c) that "the cost-benefit analysis [of the Board] did not subsume all reasonably possible meterologic patterns."

PW presented substantial evidence on these points. The Board's "cost-benefit analysis" considered only the straight-line Gaussian plume model, and clearly failed to "subsume" any "other reasonably possible meterologic pattern[]," including the site appropriate pattern, a variable plume. The two reports and supplemental analyses Entergy relied on to show that its analyses were "conservative" do not support that conclusion. The record before the Board showed that the use of a variable trajectory model could materially affect whether additional SAMAs may be cost-beneficial. Using its straight-line Gaussian plume model, Entergy projected costs could well be as low as $567,000 or even $0.00. PW showed that by using a variable trajectory model, the projected costs could run from $31 to >$100 Billion dollars.

I. THE BOARD MAJORITY ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED CHALLENGES TO ENTERGY'S USE OF THE STRAIGHT-LINE GAUSSIAN PLUME MODEL AND MAACS2 CODE A. The Board Majority Incorrectly Dismissed the Challenges As Generic Under NRC Regulations, SAMAs are a Category 2 (site specific), and not a Category 1 (generic),

issue. Table 9.1 of NUREG 1437 lists both Category 1 and Category 2 issues, and identifies SAMAs as Category 2. Entergy agrees SAMAs are Category 2.1 Further the Board majority did not seem to appreciate that PW's admitted contention does not generically challenge either the Gaussian plume model PNPS Applicant's Environmental Report Operating License Renewal Stage, 4.21.4 says,"...severe accidents are a Category 2 issue for plants that have not performed a site-specific consideration of severe accident mitigation and submitted that analysis for Commission review.[Reference Section 5.5.2.5,US NRC, NUREG-1437, GEIS, Volumes I and 2, May 1996]

3 or the MACCS2 code. Pilgrim Watch's challenge is site-specific: "Applicant's SAMA analysis for the Pilgrimplant is deficient..."

B. PW Submitted Substantial Evidence That Entergy's SAMA Analysis for the Pilgrim Plant is Deficient.

PW submitted substantial evidence that the Applicant's SAMA analysis, based on the straight-line Gaussian plume model to predict the atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides from Pilgrim and its use of the MACCS2 code to predict the economic effect of those radionuclides, was deficient.

The disputed issues of material fact raised by PW include (i) whether meteorological inputs that Entergy's Gaussian plume model igncred, e.g., the variability of winds, sea breeze effects, the behaviorof plumes over water, and re-suspension of contaminants, could lead to different conclusions as to where a concentrated plume from PNPS would travel, and thus significantly increase the affected area and costs; and (ii) whether appropriate, and more complete meteorological, economic and evacuation time estimate inputs into the MACCS2 code would lead to a different cost-benefit analysis and thus bring more SAMAs into play. 2 These material factual disputes cannot properly be resolved by summary disposition.

The Gaussian plume model assumes that a released radioactive plume travels in a steady-state straight-line [Egan, 9], i.e., the plume functions much like a beam from a flashlight. The MACCS2 code used by Applicant is based upon this straight-line, steady-state model; it also assumes meterological conditions that are steady in time and uniform spatially across the study region [Egan, 9]. However, PW presented evidence that, "the assumption of a steady-state, straight-line plume are inappropriate when complex inhomogeneous wind flow patterns happen to be prevailing in the affected region."

[Rothstein, 2]

PW evidence showed that another significant defect in Applicant's model is that its meterological inputs (e.g., wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability and mixing heights) into the MACCS2 are based on data collected by Applicant at a snl on-site anemometer, plus precipitation data from 2 The issue is not, as Applicant apparently contends, whether Entergy's simulations input a reasonable balance of wet and dry days, or still and blustery winds.

4 Plymouth airport, some 5 or so miles inland [Application ER, E. 1.5.2.6], and that the data is from only one year.

1. PW Evidence Showed Deficiencies of Entergy's Use of a Straight-Line Gaussian Plume Model to Characterize Consequences Here Entergy's straight-line, steady-state Gaussian plume model does not allow consideration for the fact that the Winds for a given time period may be spatially varying, and it ignores the presences of sea breeze circulations which dramatically alter air flow patterns. Because of these failings the straight-line Gaussian plume model "is not appropriate for the PNPS coastal location." [Egan 9, 13]

PW showed that the nearby presence of the ocean greatly affects atmospheric dispersion processes and is of great importance to estimating the consequences in terms of human lives and health effects of any radioactive releases from the facility [Egan, 9], and that the transport, diffusion, and deposition of airborne species emitted along a shoreline can be influenced by mesoscale atmospheric motions. These cannot be adequately simulated using a Gaussian plume model. [Feasibility of Exposure Assessment for The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant, Dr. J.D. Spengler and Dr. G.J. Keeler, May 12, 1988, 9]

a. The Sea Breeze Effect: The sea breeze effect, ignored by Entergy's model, is a critical feature to consider at Pilgrim's coastal location. Egan explained, at 10, The sea breeze circulation is well documented (Slade, 1968, Houghton, 1985, Watts, 1994, Simpson, 1994).... [T]he presence of a sea breeze circulation changes the wind directions, wind speeds and turbulence intensities both spatially and temporally through out its entire area of influence. The classic reference Meteorology and Atomic Energy, (Section 2-3.5 ) (Slade, 1968) succinctly comments on the importance of sea breeze circulations as "The sea breeze is important to diffusion studies at,,seaside locations because of the associated changes in atmospheric stability, turbulence and transport patterns. Moreover its almost daily occurrence at many seaside locations during the warmer seasons results in significant differences in diffusion climatology over rather short distances."

Spengler and Keeler, 1988 showed that the sea breeze at Pilgrim's coastal location increases doses on communities inland to an approximate 15 Km. [Spengler; see also Egan, 12], and that the topography of a coastal environment plays an important role in the sea breeze circulation, and can alter the typical flow pattern expected from a typical sea breeze along a flat coastline. [Spengler, 40] But as PW showed,

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"[t]The atmospheric model included in the [MACCS2] code does not model the impact of terrain effects on atmospheric dispersion." 1997 User Guide for MACCS2.

PW's expert specifically contradicted Entergy's expert Kevin O'Kula statements about the sea breeze effect at Pilgrim Station. [Egan, 13, replying to O'Kula's declaration, item 10]

1) [Mr. O'Kula's] statement that the meteorological data collected at the PNPS site would reflect the.

occurrence of the sea breeze in terms of wind speeds and direction is not necessarily true.

2) A measurement at a single station tower, 220 feet, will not provide sufficient information to allow one to project how an accidental release of a hazardous material would travel.3 Measurement data from one station will definitely not suffice to define the sea breeze.
3) [Mr. O'Kula's] contention that the seabreeze is 'generally beneficial in dispersing the plume and in decreasing doses' is incorrect. In fact, the development of seabreeze flow that would transfer a release inland is the greatest danger. Contrary to the implications of this declaration, the development of a sea breeze flow is the common meteorological condition that must be most closely monitored at the PNPS.
4) [Mr. O'Kula's] statement reflects a misconception that the sea breeze is "generally a: highly beneficial phenomena that disperses and dilutes the plume concentration and thereby lowers the projected doses downwind from the release point." If the same meteorological conditions (strong solar insolation, low synoptic-scale winds)'that are conducive to the formation of sea breezes at a coastal site occurred at a non coastal location, the resulting vertical thermals developing over a pollution source would carry contaminants aloft. In contrast, at a coastal site, the sea breeze would draw contaminants across the land and inland subjecting the population to potentially larger doses.
b. Behavior of Plumes Over Water: Entergy's Gaussian plume model assumed that plumes blowing out to sea would have no impact. PW showed that a plume over water, rather than being rapidly dispersed, License Application 2.10 Meteorology and Air Quality at 2-31; and at Attachment E, E.1.5.2.6 at E.1-631

6 will remain tightly concentrated due to the lack of turbulence, and will remain concentrated until winds blow it onto land [Zager et al.; Angevine et al. 2006]. This can lead to hot spots of radioactivity in places along the coast, certainly to Boston. [Beyea, 11] The compacted plume also could be blown ashore to Cape Cod, directly across the Bay from Pilgrim and heavily populated in summer. [Rep. Patrick, 2] An alternative model that Entergy did not use, CALPUFF, could provide the ability to account for reduced turbulence over water and could be used for sensitivity studies. [Beyea, 11-12].

c. Storms: "The storm cycle consists generally of northeasters in the winter and spring (and)

[h]Hurricanes sometimes.occur in the late summer and fall." [Applicant's LA Apprendix E, 2-31]. The accompanying strong and variable winds would carry a plume to a considerable distance.

d. Geographical Variations, Terrain Effects, and Distance: PW showed that topography of.a coastal environment plays-an important role in the sea breeze circulation, and can alter the typical flow pattern expected from a typical sea breeze along a flat coastline. [Spengler, 40] But "[t]The atmospheric model included in the [MACCS2] code does not model the impact of terrain effects on atmospheric dispersion."

[1997 User Guide for MACCS2.]

The Gaussian plume model also does not take terrain effects, which PW showed can have a highly complex impact on wind field patterns and plume dispersion, into account. Wind blowing inland will experience the frictional effects of the surface which decrease speed and direction. [PW Motion to Intervene, May 25, 2006 citing Lyman, Chernobylon the Hudson, 27; Rothstein, Appendix A].

EPA has recognized that "geographical variations can generate local winds and circulations, and modify the prevailing ambient winds and circulations" and that "assumptions of steady-state straight-line transport both in time and space are inappropriate." [EPA Guidelines on Air Quality Models (Federal Register Nov. 9, 2005, Section 7.2.8, Inhomogeneous Local Winds, italics ,added EPA's November 9, 2005 modeling Guideline (Appendix A to Appendix W) lists EPA's "preferred model;" the Gaussian

7 plume model used by Entergy (ATMOS) is not on the list. EPA recommends that CALPUFF, a non-straight-line model, be used for dispersion beyond 50 Km.

The essential difference between the models that EPA recommends for dispersion studies and the two-generation-old Gaussian plume model (ATMOS) used by Entergy and the NRC is more than determining where a plume will likely to go. Major improvements in the simulation of vertical dispersion rates have been made in the EPA models by recognizing the importance of surface conditions on turbulence rates as a function of height above the ground (or ocean) surfaces. We know that turbulence rates and wind speeds vary greatly as a function of height above a .surface depending upon whether the surface is rough or smooth (trees vs over water transport) (Roughness), how effectively the surface reflects or absorbs incoming solar radiation (Albedo) and the degree that the surface converts latent energy in moisture into thermal energy (Bowen ratio). These parameters are included in the AERMOD and CALPUFF models and determine the structure of the temperature, wind speed and turbulent mixing rate profiles , as a function of height above the ground. Entergy's ATMOS model does not include these parameters. This is an especially important deficiency when modeling facilities located along coastlines, such as Pilgrim.

2. PW Evidence Showed That Entergy's Inputs to the MACCS2 Code Were Deficient and Did Not Account for Site-Specific Conditions.
a. Meteorological Inputs: One fundamental defect in Entergy's use of the MACCS2 code is that its meterological inputs to that code are all based on the straight-line Gaussian plume equation. PW showed that this equation does not allow consideration of the fact that the winds for a given time period may be spatially varying. [Egan, 9] The 1997 User Guide for MACCS2, SAND 97-05945 makes a related point:

"The atmospheric model included in the code does not model the impact of terrain effects on atmospheric dispersion."

/

4 Appendix A to Appendix W to 40 CFR Part 51, EPA Revision to the Guideline on Air Quality Models:

Adoption of a Preferred General Purpose (Flat and Complex Terrain) Dispersion Model and Other Revisions; Final Rule, November 9, 2005. http://www.epa.gov/ scram001/guidance/guide/appw 05.pdf.

5 Chanin, D.I., and M.L. Young, Code Manual for MACCS2:Volume 1, User's Guide, SAND97-0594 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, (1997)

8 Indeed, the MACCS2 Guidance Report, June 2004,6 is even clearer that Entergy's inputs to the code do not account for variations resulting from site-specific conditior's suich as those present at PNPS. (1)The "code does not model dispersion close to the source (less than 100 meters from the source)." Thereby ignoring resuspension of contamination blowing offsite. (2)'The code "should be applied with caution at distances greater than ten to fifteen miles, especially if meteorological conditions are likely to be different from those at the source of release." There are large potentially affected population concentrations more than 10-15 miles from Pilgrim - for example: Boston, Providence, Brockton, New Bedford, Fall River, Quincy, Cape Cod. (3) "Gaussian models are inherently flat-earth models, and perform best over regions where there is minimal variation in terrain." Entergy description of the PNPS site says that the,

"[t]opography consists of rolling forested hills interspersed with urban areas." [Lic.A, Appendix E, 2-1]

A second defect in the Applicant's inputs into the MACCS2 code lies in the data itself. Entergy input meteorological data for only a single year [O'Kula Dec. at 21; WMSM at 22], and except for precipitation all of the data was collected from a single, on-site weather station. [Application ER, E. 1.5.2.6]

PW showed that one year of data would have been insufficient even if more than one station had been used; "Seasonal wind distributions can vary greatly from one year to the next." [Spengler and Keeler Report, Page 22]. "The NRC staff considers 5 years of hourly observations to be representative of long-term trends at most sites, " although "with sufficient justification [not presented by Entergy here] of its representativeness, the minimum meteorological data set is one complete year (including all four seasons) of hourly observations." (NRC Regulatory Guide 1.194, 2003)

The simple fact is that measurements from a single 220' high anemometer will not provide sufficient information to project how an accidental release of a hazardous material Would travel. [Egan, 13] For cases when the sea breeze was just developing and for cases when the onshore component winds do not reach entirely from the ground to the anemometer height. The occurrence of a sea breeze would not be identified. The anemometer would likley indicate an offshore wind indication. Furthur PW demonstrated 6 MACCS2 Guidance Report June 2004 Final Report page 3-8:3.2 Phenomenological Regimes of Applicability

9 that basing wind direction on the single on-site meteorologidal tower data ignores "shifting wind patterns away from the the Pilgrim Plant including temporary stagnations, re-circulations, and wind flow reversals that produce a different plume trajectory." [Rothstein, Town of Plymouth Nuclear Matters Committee Recommendation to Selectmen, Appendix A Meteorology, 13]

"Since the 1970s, the USNRC has historically documented all the advanced modeling technique concepts and potential need for multiple meteorological towers especially in coastal regions." [Rothstein, June 24, 2006 letter, 2] NRC Regulatory Guide 123 (Safety Guide 23) On Site Meteorological Programs 1972, states that, "at some sites, due to complex flow patterns in non-uniform terrain, additional wind and temperature instrumentation and more comprehensive programs may be necessary."[Ibid., cited in Appendix 1]; and an EPA 2000 report, Meteorological Monitoring Guidance for Regulatory Model Applications, EPA-454/R-99-005, February 2000, Sec 3.4 points to the need for multiple inland meteorological monitoring sites. See also Raynor, G.S.P. Michael, and S. SethuRaman, 1979, Recommendations for Meteorological Measurement Programs and Atmospheric Diffusion Prediction Methods for Use at Coastal Nuclear Reactor Sites. NUREG/CR-0936.

Entergy should have taken data from more locations over a longer period; and modified the MACCS2 code to account for the inability of the code that Entergy used to account for site-specific conditions.

"The user has total control over the results that will be produced." [1997 User Guide, Section 6.10].

Finally, PW presented evidence that statements made in the O'Kula declarations that were relied on by Entergy to support its contention that the inputs into the MACCS2 code were sufficient are incorrect or misleading. As Egan, at 13, established,

1) MACCS2 is not a state-of-the-art computer model. It does not rely upon or utilize current understandings of boundary layer meteorological parameterizations such as those adopted by the EPA in the models AERMOD OR CALPUFF (EPA, 2001).
2) The Gaussian plume model employed in the PNPS MACCS2 model may be the standard for NRC but it is not the basis for advanced modeling used by other US regulatory agencies.

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3) Computational time should not be a major factor in the choice of a dispersion model used for non-real time applications. Contrary to Entergy, these applications are not "simply impracticable"
4) The idea that randomly chosen meteorological conditions would give the same results as inputting meteorological conditions as a function of time is erroneous. To accommodate the real role of persistence in dispersion modeling EPA requires sequential modeling for all averaging times from 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> averages to annual averages..
5) The fact that a model may seem to be conservative in particular applications or in limited data comparisons does not mean that the model is better or should be recommended. Models can be conservative but have incorrect simulations of the underlying physics. Sensitivity studies do not add useful information if the primary model is flawed.
b. Economic Inputs: The evidence presented by PW also established important disputes of material fact with respect to Entergy's site specific economic inputs into its MACCS2 code analyses., Pilgrim Watch evidence showed that Entergy choices of inputs consistently and significantly underestimated the 7

economic consequences of a radioactive release from PNPS.

Entergy's choice of a straight-line Gaussian plume rather than a variable trajectory model drastically reduced, to a wedge, the size of the area that might potentially be impacted by a release.

Entergy's analyses also assumed a "small" accident that had no real impact beyond 10 miles. Entergy did not consider the potential of the by far largest, and perhaps also the most likely,. potential radiological release - from the spent fuel pool. In addition, Entergy chose to use the MACCS2 Code that, absent site specific modifications that Entergy chose not to make, cannot provide credible cost estimates.

Entergy's code inputs effectively ignored many costs of health consequences, underestimated the cost of cleaning-up after an accident, and ignored or underestimated other important costs that collectively could be significant.

7 Beyond its statements that PW's challenges were "immaterial," the Board majority opinion gives no indication of what PW evidence the majority actually considered. In dissent, Judge Young said that "my colleagues apply a standard that overlooks or ignores genuine issues of material fact that Intervenors present through reputable experts, as well as considerations of.practical reality and fundamental fairness." [LBP-06-848, 02-LR, at 40]

11 The use of a variable trajectory model, rather than the straight-line Gaussian plume, would have significantly increased the area potentially affected by a released readioactive plume, and thus would also greatly increase the size of the affected population and property, and the economic effect, beyond 10 miles.

Entergy admits that its MACCS2 analysis does not assume an evacuation zone of greater than 10 miles because "to do so would not be realistic" [Sowden, 4-5]. Entergy's KLD Time Estimates assume that the only area to be evacuated will be an area 2-miles around the reactor and the area within the "key-hole" from 2-5 miles, or perhaps extended within the key-hole, 5-10 miles. [Sowden, 3; KLD 1998 Report, 9-1.; and KLD 2004 Report, 2-2]. A variable plume analysis would increase the "potentially affected area" to far more than 2 miles around the plant and a few miles within the key-hole, resulting in potentially far greater risk and damage and also increasing evacuation time estimates. Despite orders to the contrary, more people inside and outside the EPZ will self evacuate. [Martecchini, 3; Zeigler,l-2]

PW showed that the consequences from a severe accident would not be restricted to a key-hole shaped wedge within a 10 mile radius, or to the entire populated area within 10 miles, but rather could encompass a much wider area including the densely populated metropolitan areas of Boston (38 miles NNW), Providence (44 miles SW), smaller cities of Quincy, Brockton, New Bedford and Fall River, and the summer population of Cape Cod and the Islands. The majority of the Cape's population is within 10-20 miles; the summer population approximates 600,000, the year round about 210,000. [Rep. Patrick, 2]

A second major defect in the MACCS2 inputs is that Entergy apparently assumed that the only source of radiation in the event of an accident would be from the reactor within the containment. The potentially far greater source of leaked radiation, the spent fuel pool, contains far more radioactive material and is located outside the containment. It was ignored. [Beyea Decl.]

Absent modifications to permit inputs that address the MACCS2 code limitations discussed above, the MACCS2 code used by Entergy is incapable of providing an accurate estimate of economic consequence, here. David Chanin author of the code said, "If you want to discuss economic costs ... the

'cost model' of MACCS2 is not worth anyone's time. My sincere advice is to not waste anyone's time

(

12 (and money) in trying to make any sense of it." (and) "I have spent many many hours pondering how MACCS2 could be used to calculate economic costsand concluded it was impossible." [Chanin Decl.]

c. Health Consequences: Whether or not the Board correctly concluded that health consequences per se were beyond the scope of the proceeding, health costs are arn important part of economic consequences.

Entergy's inputs to the MACCS2 code underestimated cancer mortality [Beyea, 14; Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequence, Sandia National Laboratory, 1982; BEIR VII]; assigned an unrealistically low value of a life lost [Beyea, 14]; and ignored that cancer is only one of the many health effects from exposure to radiation in a severe radiological event [National Academy of Sciences, BEIR VII Report, 2005]. In particular:

1) Entergy's "life lost" value is much too low. EPA values a life lost at $6.1 million [U.S.E.P.A., 1997, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990, Report to US Congress (October), pages 44-45]. The current ER assigns a value of $2000 per person rem [Beyea, 14].
2) Entergy's estimates of how many lives might be lost are too low. The 1982 Sandia National Laboratory report, using 1970 census data, estimated the number of cancer deaths to be 23,000 from a core melt at Pilgrim. [CRAC 2, Sandia, 1982]. The population of the affected area, no matter what model is used, has greatly increased during the intervening almost 40 years; SAMAs project forward to 2032 based on projected demographics. Entergy estimated the population within 50-miles (2032) to total 7,489,767. [Entergy License Application, Appendix E, Table E. 1-13]
3) Cancer incidence was not considered; neither were the many other potential health effects from exposure in a severe radiological event [National Academy of Sciences, BEIR VII Report, 2005].
d. Cleaning Up After an Accident: Entergy's inputs into the code also underestimated the cost of "cleaning-up" after a severe accident and by definition "severe" is the type of accident upon which a SAMA analysis must be based [Sand 96-0957, Appendix E, 11; Beyea, 9-10].

The MACCS2 clean-up assumptions are based on a radiological weapon event. In that case, the particulates are relatively large and swept up with a broom. The characteristics of a release from a reactor accident are very different and, as Chernobyl demonstrated, cannot be swept up with a broom. [Sand 96-0957, Appendix E, 11]. Also not considered is wind driven re-suspension, especially from remediation

13 activities, that carries radioactivity to new areas in the immediate weeks and years following the release.

[Beyea, 19] In Entergy's inputs and analyses, lessons learned from.Chernobyl were ignored. Chernobyl released 2,403,000 curies of C-137; Pilgrim's core during license extension will have more than twice as much - 5,130,000 curies of C-137, alone. [Beyea Decl., License Application A]

The quantity released will depend on the source of the release. The total amount potentially that could be released from a spent fuel pool fire, ignored by Entergy, is approximately 8 times the amount than would be released by a core melt. [Beyea; License Application, PNPS]

Finally, Entergy's economic inputs did not take into account the site specific characteristics of Pilgrim's coastal communities, as a SAMA analysis requires, that greatly increase the difficulty" of decontamination, e.g., increased urbanization; buildings with rough surfaces are more difficult to clean; rain, moisture, and wetlands make decontamination difficult to impossible. [Applicant Environmental Report, Appendix E: 2.1 Location and Features;2.10 Meteorological and Air Quality]

The bottom line is that no one forced Entergy to use a straight-line Gaussian plume model that did not accruately reflect plume dispersion from PNPS; neither was it forced to use MACCS2 code that did not reflect PNPS site specific meterological and economic conditions. As Dr. Egan said:

Dispersion models rely upon the adequacy of the input meteorological data to represent the important air flow regime. The field of dispersion modeling has developed rapidly since models were first routinely used in regulatory applications in the 1960 s and early 1970s.... As a result of the Clean Air Amendments of 1977, The US EPA has been instrumental in encouraging and supporting the development of improved models including those defined as guideline models AERMOD and CALPUFF (EPA, 2005). AERIMOD includes highly sophisticated algorithms for including spatial variations of the ground surface parameters of roughness lengths, surface albedo and the Bowen ratio into the parameterizations of wind and turbulence levels as a function of height. CALPUFF has the added features of allowing spatially variable wind fields. These models are now routinely used for most state and federal regulatory air quality applications and for health risk assessments.

Entergy chose not to to use these plainly better models. The Board majority improperly denied PW the opportunity to challenge Entergy's choice.

14 II. PW PRESENTED A SUPPORTED GENUINE DISPUTE THAT COULD MATERIALLY AFFECT THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS.

As discussed above, PW presented substantial evidence establishing a genuine dispute that Entergy's inputs were defective and that further cost-benefit analysis is required. PW also presented substantial evidence that such further analysis could materially affect Entergy's SAMA cost-benefit analysis and show that additional SAMAs would be cost-beneficial.

A. Entergy's Cost-Benefit Analysis Did Not "Subsum e All Reasonably Possible Meteorologic Patterns."

The most "reasonably possible meteorologic pattern" at PNPS is not a straight-line Gaussian plume. Rather, it is a variable plume caused by, among other things, the ocean, winds that vary spatially, sea breeze circulations, and terrain affects and geographical variations. [See response to Question 1]. A variable model in which winds vary spatially over time is fundamentally different from, and by defintion cannot be "subsumed" by, Entergy's Gaussian plume model, which assumes and is limited to meteorological conditions steady in time and uniform spatially [Egan 9]. The variable plume model also is fundamentally different from the "relatively simple" atmospheric models used in Entergy's MACCS2 code which cannot account for variations at Pilgrim's site and in which "'[r]eleased material is assumed to travel downwind in a straight line." [NUREG/CR-6853 (October 2004), 5].

Entergy may seek to excuse its use of the Gaussian plume model on the ground that alternative and better models were not available. Dr. Egan said unequivocally that this is not so. "The, EPA has been instrumental in encouraging and supporting the development of improved models including those defined as guideline models AERMOD and CALPUFF (EPA, 2005). AERMOD .includes highly sophisticated algorithms for including spatial variations of the ground surface parameters. CALPUFF has the added features of allowing spatially variable wind fields. These models are now routinely used for regulatory applications and for risk assessments." [Egan, 7]. Dr. Egan's Cape Cod research of airborne pollutants using CALPUFF, SCIPUFF and other trajectory models, is "an example of the advanced capabilities that have been developed forcomplex flow situations generally and for sea breeze flows specifically."

15 (Egan, 11). In short, the "reasonably possible" meteorologic pattern" is not "subsumed" in Entergy's Gaussian plume model analysis; a variable plume model could and should have been used.

B. The Gaussian Plume Model/ MACCS2 Applied in Entergy's and the Board's Cost-Benefit Analysis Was Not Conservative Entergy's experts cited two reports (Lewellen and Mollenkamp8 ) that, Entergy claimed, showed that the straight-line Gaussian model was conservative. [Entergy, Motion for Summary Disposition, 12]

PW established a material dispute whether these studies support Entergy's contention that the Gaussian plume model produces "conservative" estimates for the PNPS site. The fundamental flaw in Entergy's contention is that a comparison made in the high desert land in Idaho, Kansas or Oklahoma tells little or nothing about what a comparision made in Plymouth, Massachusetts would show. As shown above, the PNPS site is characterized by its coastal location, varying terrain, "forested hills interspersed with urban areas" (Appendix E, 2.1). In contrast, the Lewellen and Mollenkamp studies were performed in areas that are not in the least comparable to the PNPS site. As a predictor of what might happen at PNPS, Entergy's reports are not "conservative;" they are simply meaningless. Whether the Gaussian plume model is "conservative" relative to the Pilgrim site cannot be determined without running both ATMOS (the Gaussian plume) and an alternative model (e.g. MM5 and CALPUFF) with PNPS site specific data.

NRC has said that the Mollenkamp study site in central Oklahoma and Kansas did not have "topography that would interact with the large-scale flow producing local modification of wind speed and direction" and that it did not have "changes in surface properties that could affect local flow, such as a coastal site with a land-sea breeze" [NUREG/CR 6853, 3]. The Mollenkamp sites are " relatively smooth and (have) has minimal effect on the wind field and the-surface is fairly uniform and therefore produces relatively little thermal forcing." The NUREG says that it "would have preferred a site with greater topological and diurnal homogeneity" (NUREG/CR-6853, Oct. 2004, at xi and 2); and readily admitted 8 WSMS refers to the results from a test that released a tracer conducted in 1981 at the Idaho National lab (INL is located in high desert land, eastern Idaho), Lewellen, 1985, NUREG/CR-4159; Mollenkamp et al (2004) compared several codes for recorded data in the Midwest, NUREG/CR-6853]

16 that "it would be best if MACCS2 and RASCAL/RATCHET results could be compared with measurements over the long distances and types of terrain of interest to the NRC." The only reason that "the less desirable comparison with a state-of-the art code was chosen to provide input into the decision on the adequacy of MACCS2 ATD was that such measurements do not exist." (Ibid at 2)

Entergy's two supplemental sensitivity studies, by Enercon and WSMS, similarly fail to support Entergy's contention. The WSMS report says it performed "a series of sensitivity studies to evaluate the effects of changes in the input parameters challenged by PW on the results of the SAMA analysis"

[Entergy Material Facts, 15-18]. But even though WSMS may have made "wide ranging changes" to such inputs as wind speed and direction, WSMS still used MACCS2 code and the fundamentally flawed straight-line Gaussian plume equation, in which "released material is assumed to travel downwind in a straight line." [NUREG/CR-6853 (October 2004), 3] No matter how many "scenarios" WSMS may have studied using a "downwind in a straight line" assumption, PW evidence showed that they cannot provide a valid comparison to variable trajectory "scenarios" that WSMS never studied. The same holds true for Enercon; it added on to Entergy's base figure (assuming its limitations) and simply input additional limited economic data into the fundamentally flawed MACCS2 code.

Dr. Beyea showed yet another way. in which Entergy's analyses were not "conservative."

New epidemiolgy studies show a dramatic increase in health consequences-at low doses and undermine the MACCS2's assumption that a linear non-threshold theory (LNT) is conservative and provides a margin of safety. The new data shows a risk representing a 5-fold increase over the risk estimated by BEIR VII. Little's 1998 paper appears to represent a factor of 10 over the "standard value" used in the Entergy's MACCS2 computer code. [Beyea, 15]

C. The Use of a Variable Trajectory Model and MACCS2 Code Modified to Accept Site-Specific Conditions Could Indeed Materially Affect Whether Any Additional SAMAs May Be Cost-Beneficial.

The Use of a Variable Trajectory Model and MACCS2 Code Modified to Accept Site-Specific Conditions could materially affect whether any additional SAMAs may be cost - effective. This is largely because: (1) the Applicant used the straight-line Gaussian plume model, instead of a variable trajectory

17 model, and thus significantly minimized the geographic area and concentration; (2) health related costs were either underestimated or ignored; (3) clean-up costs f6r this specific area were minimized; (4) The huge consequences/costs from a spent fuel pool fire were not considered; (5) Entergy minimized what a real "severe accident" event could entail; (6) MACCS2 is not used to measure dispersion of the plume within 100 meters of the source ignoring resuspension of material blowing offsite that will impact cost; and, (7) a myriad of smaller economic costs were short-changed or ignored that when added together would in all likelihood add up collectively to a significant amount.

1. Because Entergy used the straight-line Gaussian plume model, instead of a variable trajectory model, it significantly underestimated the geographic area that would be affected and the radioactive concentration within that area.
a. Affected Area. Sixty percent of the area around Pilgrim within a 50-mile radius is open water.

[Lic. Appendix E, 2.1]. Entergy's model appears to assume that a plume blowing out to sea would soon dilute and be of no real consequence to any land area; no matter what direction thewind might blow, the only area of significance affected will be limited to a not more than 10-mile, straight-line path, plus a small radius surrounding the plant. This is incorrect for at least two important reasons and resulted in Entergy drastically underestimating the potentially affected area and population.

First, Entergy assumed that the plume would rapidly disperse. PW showed that a plume will remain tightly concentrated due to the lack of turbulence over water. If the concentrated plume continued in approximately the same direction until it hit land, it would likely significantly impact Barnstable County (Cape Cod and the Islands), directly across the Bay. PW multipled Entergy's estimated population for 2020 (Application Table 2-2, 2-17) by the cost per person figures provided by Entergy's supplemental sensitivity studies; the consequence could be over $56 billion; for the estimated population in 2040, the cost could exceed $69 billion. If the plume turned, it could lead to hot spots of radioactivity up the coast to densely-populated Metropolitan Boston. The program CALPUFF, a variable trajectory model (Scire et al. 2000) has the capability to account for reduced turbulance over ocean water; could be used in sensitivity studies; (and) "incorporating such meteorological understanding ...at Pilgrim.. could

18 bring more SAMAs into play.. .when combined with the increase arising from the incorporation of new values of radiation dose conversion coefficients." [Beyea,11-12].

Second, Entergy's model failed to take into accountithat in spring through early fall a plume that initially blows seaward is likely to turn around, come back ashore, and penetrate inland to 15 km. This sea breeze effect occurs at the time of peak tourist season in the area. [KLD, 2004, 3-11 thru 3-22]

b. Concentration. Entergy's cost-benefit analysis is based on its contention that the seabreeze is "generally beneficial in dispersing the plume and in decreasing doses." PW showed that this fundamental underlying assumption is incorrect. Dr. Egan explained that, "at a coastal site, the sea breeze would draw contaminants across the land and inland subjecting the population to potentially larger doses." [Egan, 13].

Spengler confirmed that "[t]hese flow reversals and stagnations documented here at our coast result in an increaced area impacted, increased concentration of the plume and ultimate cost. (Spengler, 3).

Closely related, Entergy also failed to take into account that wind direction changes and terrain features could not only change plume direction (resulting in a larger affected area), but could also reduce diffusion of the plume (increasing the amount of radiation received within the area). PW explained that a variable plume model could take account not only of the sea breeze, but also of wind direction changes that occur with height above the ground and terrain changes. Because Entergy's model reflects only the initial direction of the wind (as indicated by their onsite meterological tower, it further underestimates potential radiological damage and costs because it cannot reflect that offsite surface friction and surface features can decrease plume speed and change plume direction. [PW Motion to Intervene, citing Lyman at 27; Rothstein, Appendix A; MACCS2 Guidance Report, June 2004, Entergy LA, Appendix E, 2-1 ]

c. Precipitation, Moisture, Fog. Entergy failed to properly account for another site specific characteristic in Pilgrim's coastal location - precipitation, moisture, fog - that affects dispersion (concentration) and hence the cost-benefit analysis. Dispersion (concentration) is affected by precipitation that, like wind flow, is highly complex. Fog varies along the coast and also in the interior, affected by bogs and ponds. Fog with low inversion layer and constant easterly winds could result in less dispersion

2 19 of the plume. Because fog patches and precipitation can be highly localized, precipitation data from one location at Plymouth Airport 5 or so miles inland is inadequate. [PW Motion to Intervene, 3.3.3.1 .c]

d. Emergency Response Implications: "Realistic modeling assumptions and predictions are the key to forecasting and implementation of appropriate and effective emergency response and evacuation plans." [Rothstein, letter to BOS 5/9/06, 2-4]. If an inaccurate model is used, the wrong (and often a far too small) area only may be evacuated or told to shelter. Further, Pilgrim's plant's onsite meteorological tower cannot properly represent the variable flow conditions; and that information is used primarily as a basis for protective action calls. As a consequence, emergency planning protective action calls will not be based upon sound meteorological data and modeling. Hence, "a situation (may) be created where the public is driving right into the path of a radioactive plume".or not.directed to respond at all. [Rothstein, 5/9/06 NMC Recommendations, 1]
2. Entergy Significantly Underestimated Health Costs Whether or not the Board correctly concluded that health consequences, per se were beyond the scope of the proceeding, 9 health costs are an important part of economic consequences. For illustative purposes only, PW muliplied EPA's estimate of the value of a life lost ($6.1 million1') times (23,000) the number of cancer deaths projected by Sandia from a core melt at Pilgrim." It totaled $138,000,000,000.

The total would be far higher today; Sandia's estimates were based on 1970 census data that do not reflect the significant growth over the last 40 years. In estimating cost consequences, Entergy used decades old dose response estimates. It ignored more recent studies that show significant increases in the cancer risk assigned to low doses of radiation. 12 These should have been used in the SAMA, but they were not.

Entergy's cost-benefit analysis ignored a marked increase in the value of cancer mortality risk per unit of radiation at low doses (2-3 rem average), as shown by recent studies published on radiation 9 Improperly in Pilgrim Watch's view

'0U.S.E.P.A., 1997, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990, Report to US Congress (October),

pages 44-45 "1Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequence, Sandia National Laboratory, 1982 12 "For instance, there was a large increase in the risk coefficients estimated between the 1980 BEIR 111 report and the 1990 BEIR V Report (see Table 4-4 National Research Council 1990) where the lifetime risk estimates increased by a factor of 4.6-19, depending on the risk model." [Beyea,12]

20 workers (Cardis et al. 2005) and by the Techa River cohort (Krestina et al (2005). Both studies give similar values for low dose, pr`6tracted exposure, namely (1)' cancer death per Sievert (100 rem).

"According to the results of the study by Cardis et al.,... .and use of the risk numbers derived from the Techa River cohort (Krestiniana et al., 2005)..., the SAMAI'analyses prepared for Pilgrim.. .needs to be redone.., a number of additional SAMAs that were previously rejected by the applicant's methodology will now become cost effective." [Beyea, 12-14].

Cancer incidence and the other many health effects from exposure to radiation in a severe radiological event [National Academy of Sciences, BEIR VII Report, 2005] must be considered; they were not. Neither did Entergy appear to consider indirect costs. Medical expenditures are only one component of the total economic burden of cancer. The indirect costs include losses in time and economic productivity and liability resulting from radiation health related illness and death. Pilgrim Watch's evidence also showed that the Applicant's evacuation time input data into the code were incorrect; and that if correct evacuation times and assumptions regarding evacuation had been used, the analysis would show far fewer will evacuate in a timely manner, increasing health-related costs [Martecchini, 2-3; Rep.

Patrick, 2; Rothstein, April 24 letter, 3, and BOS Recommendation, 1 and Appendix A; Zeigler,l-2]

3. Entergy Ignored Consequences Of A Truly Severe Accident Pilgrim has the potential to release more than twice the amount of Cs-137 than was released at Chernobyl. The amount of Cs-137 released during Chernobyl in 1986 was 2,403,000 curies; the amount of Cs-137 in Pilgrim's Cote during license extension will be 190,000 TBq or 190,000 X 27 Ci 5,130,000 curies. In addition, during license extension there will be more than 44,010,000 curies of Cs-137 in Pilgrim's spent fuel pool during license extension - 8 times more than a core release [Beyea Decl.]

The "inventory of radioactive materials" in Pilgrim's spent fuel pool is approximately eight times that in its reactor core.

Entergy's MACCS2 model apparently estimated costs based on a release (i) of noble gases in the core inventory and (ii) of a small fraction of the core inventory of CsI [PNPS Radionuclide Release Category Summary, Figure E.1.1]:

21 E. 1.2.2. Magnitude of Release Source term results from previous risk studies suggest that categorization of release magnitude based on cesium iodide (CsI) release fractions are appropriate [Reference E. 1-5]. The CsI release fraction indicates the fraction of in-vessel radionuclides escaping to the environment. (Noble gas release levels are non-informative since release of the total core inventory is essentially complete given containment failure.)

The source terms were grouped into four distinct radionuclide release categories or bins according to release magnitude as follows: (1) High (HI) - A radionuclide release of sufficient magnitude to have the potential to cause early fatalities. This implies a total integrated release of

>10% of the initial core inventory of CsI [Reference E. 1-5].

Entergy did not estimate the consequences if any greater fraction of the 5,130,000 curies in the reactor core during license extension were released. Neither did it consider any of the consequences from a spent fuel pool fire in its SAMA analysis - a serious omission. Accidents are severe by reason of their consequence, not because of where originate [NUREG-1437, GEIS, Section 5].3 If the costs of an accident resulting from a pool fire was considered,. the value of SAMAs would rise significantly. Dr.

Beyea estimated the cost of a 10% release from a spent pool fire to be $105-175 billion dollars; and that a 100% release of C-137 would cost between $342-$488 billion. (Beyea, 10). Entergy modeled only the release of a relatively small amount of C-13 7 from the reactor core.

4. Entergy significantly minimized the true and significant costs of clean-up Entergy's MACCS2 code based its scenarios on assumptions that were in turn based on consequences from a nuclear weapons accident (SAND 96-0957, Appendix E, discussed previously at 12); but a nuclear weapons accident has far different, and smaller, consequences than a nuclear reactor accident. Entergy failed to include in its clean-up cost analysis lessons learned from Chernobyl, as applied to Pilgrim's offsite specific conditions, For example, Chernobyl taught that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to clean up moist areas, wetlands, ponds, bogs and other bodies of water - all characterize the PNPS area.[Entergy, Appendix E, E.1-62] It also taught that porous surfaces are far more difficult to decontaminate than smooth surfaces - buildings here are characteristically constructed of brick, wood, and concrete; and that material deposited by rain is much more difficult to remove than material deposited under dry conditions [Rain, 3"- 4.5/month; snow, 42"/yr., Entergy, Appendix E, 2.10].

13 As argued in, PW Petition for Review LBP-06-23, November 12, 2008, page 23

I! - ýý,! ;;,t, .

22 In addition, there is no ,evidence that a site exists now, or will develop, to which tons of contaminated soil and rubble might be shipped, or that there will not be lengthy litigation along transportation routes dramatically slowing a clean-up. None of this was taken into account by Entergy's SAMA analyses.

5. MACCS2 did not consider further dispersion from material deposited on site.

PW evidence also showed that the MACCS2 is not used to measure dispersion of the plume within one 100 meters (0.06 miles) from the source [O'Kula Decl. at 21; WSMS Report at 18-19].

Therefore it does not determine how much radioactive material was deposited within 100 meters, or allow for redistribution of re-suspended material to new locations. Yet Dr. Beyea declaration projects (at 19) that 10% may be blown off in the first few weeks with additional suspension over decades increased dramatically by activity during clean up and remediation. [See also Beyea, 24. ]

6. A myriad of smaller economic costs were underestimated or totally ignored by the applicant that when added together would in all likelihood add up collectively to a significant amount. For example, Entergy did not include in their economic cost estimates the business value of property and the incurred costs such as costs required from job retraining, unemployment payments, and inevitable litigation. Entergy used an assumed value of non-farm wealth that was approximately 30% too low for Plymouth County and 40% too low for the Pilgrim EPZ. [PW's Answer, 73-78, citing Banker and Tradesmen sales figures (Warren Decl.)] Entergy underestimated Farm Value by not considering the value of the farm property for development purposes as opposed to agricultural. Farm land assessments are intentionally very low to encourage farming and open space.[ PW Answer, 78-9, Finnegan Decl.]
7. There is a supported, genuine dispute that could materially affect the ultimate conclusions of the SAMA cos t-benefit analysis.

PW presented significant evidence showing a drastic difference between Entergy's projected costs of a radioactive release, and the costs that could, and likely would, result if the plume resulting from a "severe accident" traveled in the manner that a variable trajectory model (but not Entergy's straight-line Gaussian plume model) would predict.

ý:rý1ý !`,R ! ýit 23 In addition to the particulars set forth above, and simply to illustrate how Entergy's SAMA drastically minimized consequences, Pilgrim Watch's Answer Opposing Entergy's Motion for Summary Disposition included tables that compared the potential costs of a radiological accident if a straight-line Gaussian plume was used to the potential costs using a variable trajectory plume. Muliplying Entery's population figures per spatial element' 4 by Entergy's cost/per person figures from EntergEy's supplemental sensitivity case studies by Enercon and WSMS. PW demonstrated that these supplemental costs were dramatically underestimated. 15 [An additional table is provided in Appendix A].

As the Tables show, the highest cost estimated by Entergy using its straight-line Gaussian plume model was a little over $4 billion. The costs estimated using a variable plume model ranged from a low of more than $22 billion to a high of over $1.4 trillion. The tables showed also that the 1982 Sandia estimate for a Pilgrim core melt (about $82 billion), although far higher than Entergy's, is but a fraction of the $105-400 billion estimated by Dr. Beyea.

Summary Comparison- Population Multiplied by Sensitivity Case Population within area 1st sensitivity- $135,187.77/person [ 2nd sensitivity- $189,041/person Straight-Line Gaussian Plume Distribution Model Population SE Sector, (0-10 miles) 950 $128,428,382 > $128 Million $179,588,950 Population SSW Sector, (0-10 miles) 23695 $3,203,274,210 > $3 Billion $4,479,326,495 > $4 Billion Variable Trajectory Plume Distribution Model Population within 10 miles, 165236 $22,337,886,364 > $22 Billion $31,236,378,676 > $31 Billion Population within 20 miles,619601 $83,762,477,480 > $83 Billion $117,129,992,641 > $117 Billion Population within 50 miles $1,012,524,898,550 >$ ITrillion $ 1,415,873,043,447 > $1 Trillion Previous Projections- Sandia (CRAC-2) and Massachusetts Attorney General Core Melt, Pilgrim (1982) - CRAC-2, Sandia,1982' 6 $81.8 Billion Release C-137 from Core -Beyea $105-488 Billion [MA AGO, Dr. Beyea 17]

14 PNPS Applicant's Environmental Report Operating license Renewal Stage, Attachment E-E. 1-61, Table E.1.5.2.1 Projected Total Population by Spatial Element, 2032 15 Pilgrim Watch's Ans. Opposing Entergy's Motion for Summary Disposition of PW Contention 3, June 29, 2007, pages 58-71 16Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (CRAC-2),

Sandia National Laboratory, 1982 17 Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.'s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants Operating License and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design features to Protect Against Spent Fuel Pool Accidents, Docket No. 50-293, May 26, 2006 includes a Report to The Massachusetts Attorney General On The Potential Consequences Of A Spent Fuel Pool Fire At The Pilgrim Or Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, Jan Beyea, PhD., May 25, 2006.

24 In Entergy's SAMA analysis installing a filtered vent- highly effective in reducing offsite releases in a severe accident and relatively inexpensive ($3 million) - was considered "not cost effective."

[Entergy License Application, Appendix E, Table E.2-1; cited PW Motion to Intervene, 46]

PW recognizes that its estimates are just that, estimates, but they are more than enough to provide the answer to the Commission's core question - would additional SAMAs be justified?

As stated in its accepted contention, PW must show that the models and inputs used by Entergy are so defective that "further analyses should be made." The evidence that PW already has presented to show that is the case was clearly sufficient to preclude summary disposition.

In the hearing that should take place, it is not PW's burden to redo the SAMA analysis using variable trajectory models that Entergy should have used, or to run the number of "scenarios" that would be required to provide precise costs. "A petitioner is not required to redo SAMA analyses in order to raise a material issue" [Ini re Entergy Nuclear Operations, ASLBP No. 07-858-03-LR, BDO 1, Order of July 31, 2008, at 79]. PW alleged that the SAMA analysis was significantly flawed. NRC Regulations are quite clear that it is the applicant's burden to perform a site-specific appropriate SAMA analysis. 10 C.F.R § 2.325 Burden of Proof, says clearly that, "Unless the presiding officer otherwise orders, the applicant or the proponent of an order has the burden of proof." As Judge Young said in her dissent, "given the extremely complex, expensive, and time-consuming nature of the computer calculations that would be necessary to do this, which even the Applicant with its relatively greater resources, has called "impractical", requiring PW to "provide calculations proving the negative of Entergy's sensitivity analysis .... is unreasonable...." [LBP-07-13, 66 NRC, Dissent, 39]

CONCLUSION In short, the Board majority's grant of summary disposition by excluding Pilgrim Watch's challenges to the Gaussian plume model and MACCS2 code used by Entergy was wrong for at least three reasons:

25

1. The Board majority failed to recognize a) that SAMA challenges are Category 2 issues, and b) that PW was not generically challenging either the Gaussian plume model or the MAC CS2.
2. The Board majority failed to recognize that the evidence presented by PW raised substantial and important site-specific material issues of disputed fact showing severe deficiencies in Applicant's use of a Gaussian Plume model and Applicant's metrological and economic inputs into the MACCS2 code.
3. The Board majority improperly resolved disputed issues of material fact in Entergy's favor by:

rejecting Pilgrim Watch's evidence that Entergy's Gaussian plume model and MACCS2 code inputs were defective; rejecting Pilgrim's evidence showing the potentially significant costs if proper inputs and models were used; and rejecting inferences that properly should have been drawn in PW's favor. See, Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontaminationand Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-1 7, 39 NRC 359, 361 (1994)

PW demonstrated genuine material disputes, presented through reputable experts, as to material facts regarding Entergy's use of the straight line-Gaussian plume module to predict the atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides and use of the MACCS2 code for determining economic costs. Therefore, this contention should be remanded for hearing.

Respectfully submitted, Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, pro se.

148 Washington Street Duxbury, MA 02332 June 25, 2009

UN * ~; ~

APPENDIX A Table: Population Per Geographic Area Multiplied By Sensitivity Case I&2 Costs Steady State Straight-Line Gaussian Plume Distribution Model Sector Total Population Pop x $135,187.77/per person Pop x $189,041/person t

0-10 miles 1 sensitivity 2 d sensitivity N 0 0 0 NNE 3 $405,563.31 $567,123.00 NE 3 $405,563.31 $567,123.00 ENE 3 $405,563 $567,123 E 5 $675,939 $945,2050 ESE 23 $3,109,319 $4,347,943 SE 950 $128,428,381 $179,588,950 SSE 13289 $17,883,854,906 >17 billion $2,512,165,849 S 23695 $3,203,274,210 > 3 billion $4,479,326,495 SSW 23695 $3,203,274,210 $4,479,326,495 SW 23695 $3,203,274,210 $4,479,326,495 WSW 23695 $3,203,274,210 $4,479,326,495 W 22818 $3,084,714,536 $4,313,537,538 WNW 19494 $2,635,350,388 $3,685,165,254 NW 11269 $1,523,430,980 $2,130,303,029 NNW 5599 $756,916,324 $1,058,440,559 Variable Trajectory Plume Distribution Model Population within 10 miles, $22,337,886,364 $30,740,670,676 165,236 > 22 Billion >31 Billion Population within 20 miles $83,762,477,480 $117,129,992,641 619,601 > 83 Billion >117 Billion Population within 50 miles $1,012,524,898,550 $ 1,415,873,043,447 7,489,767 (1 Trillion +) > 1 Trillion Previous Projections Consequence Severe Accident Core Melt, Pilgrim (1982) $81.8 Billion 1

CRAC-2, Sandia,1982 Release C-137 from Core -Beyea $105-488 Billion [MA AGO, Dr. Beyea]

[ Based Massachusetts Attorney General']

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Docket # 50-293-LR Entergy Corporation Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application June 25, 2009 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the following was served June 25, 2009, Pilgrim Watch's Brief in Response to CLI-09-1 I(Requesting Additional Briefing) by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, and where indicated by asterisk by electronic mail.

  • U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission *Hon. Kristine L. Svinicki Office of Secretary of the Commission Commissioner Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-16 C1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 cmrsvinicki@nrc.gov hearingdocket@nrc.gov

[2 copies] *Administrative Judge Ann Marshall Young, Chair

  • Hon. Gregory B. Jaczko Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Chairman Mail Stop - T-3 F23, US NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 ann.young@nrc.gov chairman@nrc.gov
  • Administrative Judge
  • Hon. Peter B. Lyons Paul B. Abramson Commissioner Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T-3 F23,-US NRC Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 cmrlyons@nrc.gov paul.abramson@nrc.gov
  • Hon. Dale E. Kline Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 cmrkline@nrc.gov

I.,

  • Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Martha Coakley, Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board *Matthew Brock, Assistant Attorney Mail Stop -T-3-F23,US NRC General Commonwealth of Massachusetts Washington, DC 20555-0001 Office of Attorney General richard.cole@nrc.gov One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108
  • U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Commission Appellate *Entergy Nuclear Adjudication 1340 Echelon parkway Mail Stop 0-16 C I Mail Stop M-ECH-62 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Jackson, MS 39213 ocaamail@nrc.gov Terrence A. Burke, Esq.

tburke@entergy.com

  • United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission *Ms. Melissa Arrighi Office of General Counsel Town Manager, Town of Plymouth Mail Stop - O- 15 D21 11 Lincoln Street Washington, DC 20555-0001 Plymouth MA 02360
  • Susan L. Uttal, Esq. marrighi@townhall.plymouth.ma.us
  • David Roth, Esq.
  • Marcia Simon, Esq. *Sheila Slocum Hollis, Esq.
  • Andrea Jones, Esq. Town of Plymouth MA
  • Brian Newell, paralegal Duane Morris, LLP United States NRC 505 9th Street, N.W. 1000 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington D.C. 20004-2166 Susan.Utall(2nrc.gov; sshollis@duanemorris.com marcia.simon@nrc.gov; andrea.jones@nrc. gov *Richard R. MacDonald brian.newellgnrc.gov Town Manager, Town of Duxbury david.rothgnrc.gov 878 Tremont Street Duxbury, MA 02332 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission macdonald@town.duxbury.ma.us Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mail Stop: 01 -Fl *Fire Chief & Director DEMA, Washington, DC 20555-0001 Town of Duxbury
  • Perry Buckberg, Project Mgr, Plant Lic. 688 Tremont Street Branch 1-2, Operating Reactor Licensing P.O. Box 2824 perry.buckberg@nrc.gov Duxbury, MA 02331 nord@town.duxbury.ma.us
  • Paul A. Gaukler, Esq.
  • David R. Lewis, Esq.
  • Jason Parker,Esq.

Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037-1138 paul.gaukler(2pillsburylaw.com david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com Mary Lampert jason.parker@pillsburylaw.com Pilgrim Watch, pro se 148 Washington St.

Duxbury, MA 023332 2

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