Text

Initial Exam 2008-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML090780282
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	07/21/2008
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: IC-1 100% power MOC. 2B AFW Pump OOS. SJAE Radiation Monitor OOS.

2C Charging Pump OOS.

Turnover: 100% Power MOL. The 2B MFW Pump has developed an oil leak and Mechanical Maintenance is standing by to add oil. 2B AFW pump has been OOS for the past 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for bearing repair. Expected return to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . SJAE Radiation Monitor has been OOS for past 7 days. 2C Charging pump is OOS for packing replacement.

Critical Tasks:

Stabilize RCS temperature after 2A SG has blown dry

Restore Feedwater to 2B SG using 2A AFW pump

~

Event Event No. No. Type* Description I I 1 R/RO Power reduction from 100% power to 45% power N/BOP Set turbine 2 1 1/ RO PZR Level Control HIC-111 0 Fails as is 3 2 C/BOP SBCS PCV-8801 drifts open 4 3 CI All 2MA Instrument Inverter fails T.S. SRO 5 4 T.S. SRO RPS Channel MA High Pressure bistable does not reset after Instrument bus re-energized 6 5 C/RO Main Feedwater Isolation Valve HCV-09-2A fails closed, reactor trip 7 6 2B MFW pump bearing failure post trip 8 7 MI ALL MSSV V8201 (2A SG) stick fully open on trip 9 8 C/BOP 2C AFW pump trips after AFAS. Restore AFW to 2B SG using 2A AFW pump 10 Isolate 2A SG

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 St. Lucie Unit 2 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power. The 2B AFW pump has been out of service for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for bearing repair. The 2B AFW pump is expected to be out of service for 8 more hours.

The 2C Charging pump has been out of service for packing replacement for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 2C charging Pump is expected to be out of service for 4 more hours. SJAE Radiation Monitor is out of service for the past 7 days. No estimated time for return to service.

2B Main Feedwater pump has an oil leak and needs to be removed from service. The crew is to reduce power to 45% and remove 2B Main Feedwater from service. An urgent call from the NPO stating the oil leak has gotten worse should result in the crew using 2-0NP-22.01, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, Pzr (Letdown) Level controller HIC-111 0 fails as is, requiring the crew to take manual control of HIC-111 0 in accordance with 2-0NP-02.03 Charging and Letdown and maintain Pressurizer level.

During the down power, Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) PCV-8801 drifts open requiring the crew to manually isolate PCV-8801 referring to 2-0NP-08.01 Steam Leak Off-Normal Operating Procedure to terminate the uncontrolled cooldown.

MA Instrument Inverter fails requiring the crew to place the MA Instrument bus on the Bypass bus using 2-0970030, 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) / QSPDS. As a result of the Instrument Inverter failure the 2A BAM pump stops and 2B BAM pump is unavailable and cannot be restarted until the Instrument Bus is re-energized. Also, as a result of the Instrument bus failure all Pressurizer heaters will de-energize and will need to be restored in accordance with 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level. When the Instrument bus is re-energized RPS channel MA High Pressurizer pressure bistable does not reset (remains tripped). T.S. 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 should be addressed and the channel placed in bypass.

Main Feedwater Isolation valve HCV-09-2A fails closed during the downpower. The crew should manually trip the Unit due to low SG level on the 2B SG, prior to the RPS automatic trip.

Post trip, if the crew does not stop the 2B Main Feedwater pump, the pump will trip on overcurrent due to bearing failure.

Upon the trip, the Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSV's) will open and MSSV 8201 (2A SG) does not close. 2A and 2B SG will continue to depressurize. The 2A 15% MFV 15% bypass does not open upon trip. The crew should close both MSIV's. This will terminate blowing down the 2B SG. 2A SG will continue to depressurize until dry. AFAS lockout will occur on the 2A SG due to

/}. steam pressure between 2A and 2B SG. The crew should stabilize RCS temperature when the 2A SG blows dry. The 2C AFW pump trips when triggered.

The crew should enter 2-EOP-05 Excess Steam Demand upon completion of 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. The crew may decide to enter 2-EOP-15 Functional Recovery.

Major mitigation strategy is to stabilize RCS temperature after the 2A SG has blown dry and isolate the 2A SG in accordance with 2-EOP-99 Appendix R.

The Crew should also enter 2-0NP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater to open the AFW crossties and feed the 2B SG with the 2A AFW pump.

2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The scenario should conclude with RCS temperature stabilized, 2A SG isolated in accordance with 2-EOP-99 Appendix R, and AFW restored to the 2B SG using the 2A AFW pump via AFW crosstie valves.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 1 Page 4 of 17 Event

Description:

Unit Downpower due to oil leak on 2B MFW Pump Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Setup Instructions:

Initiate modification to Ie set and verify equipment 005 .

Booth Operator Instructions:

If crew does not initiate downpower in timely manner, inform SRO oil leak is getting worse.

Supervise/Coordinate Power reduction in accordance with 2-SRO ONP-22.01 Rapid Down Power (attached, Page 6)

Direct Boration per Appendix C 2-0NP-22.01 Rapid Down Power (attached, Page 7)

Direct Lead group CEA insertion of 6 inches step 6.1.2 Direct DEH programmed for load rate step 6.1.3 When Tave decrease noted direct GO on the turbine step 6.1.4 May direct additional Charging pump started lAW 2-0NP-22.01

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D.

May direct Pzr. Placed on recirc lAW 2-0NP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Appendix E.

Begin Boration per Appendix C, ONP-22.01 RO (attached, Page 6)

Insert Lead CEA Group 6 inches

Select MANUAL SEQUENTIAL

Insert CEAs by taking IN/HOLD/OUT switch to insert 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 5 of 17

Page Event

Description:

Unit Downpower due to oil leak on 2B MFW Pump Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior If directed start additional Charging pump lAW 2-0NP-22.01

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D. (attached, Page 8)

If directed, place Pzr. On recirc. lAW 2-0NP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Appendix E. (attached, Page 9)

Program the DEH per ONP-22.01 step 6.1.3 for the desired load reduction rate.

Set reference by ensuring REF selected and then BOP depress desired MW endpoint, hit ENTER

Depress LOAD RATE type in desired load rate and hit ENTER

Depress GO pushbutton Notify Plant Dispatcher When Tave decrease is noted, start Turbine down per ONP-22.01 step 6.1.4 5

PROCEDURE TITLE:

RAPID DOWN POWER NO.:

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 OPERATOR ACTIONS Immediate Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE This Procedure may contain steps that could adversely affect reactivity.

ENSURE that proper consideration and appropriate briefings occur prior to performance of steps that could challen e reactivi

1. BEGIN boration per Appendix C.

2. INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature.

3. PERFORM the following:

A. PROGRAM the turbine DEH for the desired load reduction rate.

B. SET DEMAND I REF to desired power level.

NOTE While performing power maneuvers during which time Tavg and Tref are closely monitored, it may be advantageous to change TR-1111/1121 chart speed from 30 minutes per division to 1 minute er division.

4. When a Tavg decrease is noted, Then 4. 11 in turbine MANUAL, Then DEPRESS the GO pushbutton on the DEPRESS and RELEASE the GV turbine DEH control panel. LOWER pushbutton as necessary to reduce I control the load reduction rate.

END OF SECTION 6.1

PROCEDURE TITLE:

RAPID DOWN POWER 2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C RCS BORATION GUIDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE The steps in this Appendix are applicable when the CVCS is normally aligned, with no RCS boration or dilution in progress. If other than normal alignment, use guidance of 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

1. BORATE the RCS by the following:

A. START either Boric Acid Pump 2A or 2B.

B. PLACE FCV-2210Y control switch in AUTO.

C. If borating to the VCT, Then OPEN V2512, Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv.

D. If borating to the Charging Pump suction, Then OPEN V2525, Boron Load Control Valve ..

E. ADJUST FRC-2210Y to the desired flowrate.

NOTE Ensure a minimum of 10 gpm of boric acid flow at all times while BAM pump recirc valve is closed.

F. .!.f desired to maximize the boric acid flow rate, Then CLOSE the running BAM pump recirc valve.

G. MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

H. .!.f necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, Then DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position.

NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these chan es on a new Operator Aid placecard.

END OF APPENDIX C

RAPID DOWN POWER 1t.. t<'..Jvc:.uur~c:. NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX D CHARGING PUMP GUIDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

!f Charging Pump(s) are to be started, Then PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE that each Charging pump that is desired to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO, if time permits.

B. !f associated Charging Pump Recirc Valve is operable, Then ENSURE that it is OPEN prior to starting the Charging Pump.

NOTE Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow which may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5' Pipe Penetration Room or 19.5' Letdown Cubicle Room to exceed 1000 mrlhr (Locked High Radiation Area limit) due to reduced trans ort time of short-lived radioactive isotopes.

C. START the Charging pump.

D. NOTIFY Health Physics of the charging pump alignment.

E. ADJUST the bias on HIC-111 0, Level, using the upper knurled knob to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer Level to program RRS Pressurizer Level for current plant conditions, if required.

F. !f FIA-2212, Chg Flow to Regen Hx, is in service, Then VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing FIA-2212 raise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

G. !f FIA-2212, Charging to Regen Hx, is NOT in service, Then VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

H. ENSURE the running Charging Pump Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

I. PLACE the Chrg Pump Sel Running-BtU switch in the proper position for current plant conditions per operator aid placard on RTGB-205. (Charging:'

pump combinations vs. selector switch)

END OF APPENDIX D

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

14A RAPID DOWN POWER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX E PRESSURIZER RECIRCULATION GUIDELINES (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE

. The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.

From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Heater Banks may be determined as follows:

Time (in min.) to correct mismatch = [(pzr ppm - RCS ppm) -

25 ppm] x 3 To place the Pressurizer on recirculation:

A. PLACE all available Backup Heater Bank control switches to ON.

B. Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on PIC-1100X or PIC-1100Y, the selected "Pressurizer Pressure" controller, to maintain normal operating pressure.

C. OBSERVE HIC-1100, "Pressurizer Spray" output and PCV-1100E 11100F, "Pressurizer Spray Valve" position indication to verify Main Spray flow.

NOTE Normally, the required number of Backup Bank heaters in service is dependent upon:

1. The magnitude of thermal losses from the system, including leakage to the Quench Tank.

2. The number of heater elements out of service.

The normal configuration is to have enough Backup Bank heaters in service to keep the Pro ortional Bank heaters at approximatel 50% out ut.

END OF APPENDIX E Q

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 2 Page 6 of 17 Event

Description:

PRZR Level Controller HIC-1110 Failure controller is fails as-is Time II Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate malfunction when directed. Failure should be inserted prior to second charging pump is started.

Booth Operator Instructions:

When requested I&C will initiate a work order to repair .

RO Verify HIC1110 responding to rising pressurizer level Direct actions lAW 2-0NP-02.03 Charging and Letdown SRO section 6.12 step A. (attached, Page 11)

RO/BOP Place HIC1110 in MANUAL and control pressurizer level to

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

15A CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

U. NOTIFY Health Physics that dose rates near CVCS ion exchangers and piping may change when ion exchanger is placed in service.

V. PLACE the Letdown Ion Exchangers back in service by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the AUTO Position.

12. If Letdown Level control is 12.

malfunctioning, Then PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the output of A.1 PLACE HIC-1110 in MANUAL by HIC-1110, LEVEL, is performing the following:

responding as expected to current plant

1. BALANCE HIC-1110 MANUAL to AUTO conditions.

controller output Signals by previewing and using the MANUAL control knob to match the manual and auto controller output signals.

2. PLACE HIC-1110 to MANUAL.

3. ADJUST letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

4. PERFORM a system walkdown observing for leaks or lifting relief valves.

B. VERIFY the selected B.1 PLACE the Alternate Level control level control valve is valve in service in accordance responding as expected with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and to HIC-1110 output. Letdown.

It

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 3 Page 7 of 17 Event

Description:

SBCS PCV-8801 Fails full open II Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Upon cue from Examiner, initiate 'PCV 8801 Drifts Open'.

Booth Operator Instructions:

When directed, initiate 'Isolate PCV 8801' Control Room Indications:

Red I Green light on PCV-8801, Valve indicates CYAN on DCS Recognize open indication on PCV-8801, CYAN indication on BOP SBCS DCS page.

Recognize Tave lowering faster than expected for the given RO down power Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-0NP-08.01 Steam SRO Leak Off-Normal Operating Procedure step 6.2.2.L (attached, Pages 14 - 15)

Direct Manual control and attempt to close PCV-8801

Direct SBCS permissive taken to OFF

Direct Emergency Off

Direct closure of V08359 manual isolation for PCV-8801

Direct turbine power adjustment as valve isolated Notifies shift manager and I&C of event When PCV-8801 manually isolated direct SBCS permissive switch and EMER off switch placed back to on.

SRO (NOTE: SBCS will not be available if not placed back to Auto/Manual)

Place PCV-8801 in manual and attempt to close BOP I

Appendix D _ Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 3 Page 8 of 17 Event

Description:

SBCS PCV-8801 Fails full open Time i Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Place SBCS permissive switch to off.

Annunciator (L-4 SBCS UNAVAILABLE.)

Emergency OFF may selected using DCS screens Contact NPO to close V08359 manual isolation valve for PCV-8801 Reset SBCS EMER OFF and SBSC Permissive back to Auto/Manual when directed.

l3

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

2 STEAM LEAK OFF-NORMAL OPERATING NO.: PROCEDURE 2-0NP-OS.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

L. Ensure Steam Bypass Valves are in L.1 Perform the following:

the proper positions for the current mode of RCS Temperature control.

1. Take manual control of the affected SBCS valve controllers.

2. If desired, Then CLOSE ALL SBCS valves:

a. If SBCS valves do NOT respond to manual control, Then close all SBCS valves by taking the SBCS Permissive switch to OFF and VERIFY the "Steam Bypass System Unavailable" annunciator (LA) actuates.

b. If SBCS valves still do NOT respond, Then close all SBCS valves by performing the following:

1. NAVIGATE to the SBCS overview screen on either FW Flat Panel Display.

2. SELECT the

[EMERGENCY OFF] button and bring up the

[EMERGENCY OFF] button overlay.

~ ____________________________________________________________ ~

u N

III

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

2 STEAM LEAK OFF-NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE NO.: PROCEDURE 2-0NP-08.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. L.1 2. b. (continued)

3. SELECT the

[EMERGENCY OFF] button on the overlay.

4. VERIFY the "Steam Bypass System Unavailable" annunciator (LA) reflashes.

3. .!f necessary, Then dispatch an operator to isolate the affected SBCS valve:

a. Close V08359 to isolate PCV-8801.

b. Close V08307 to isolate PCV-8802.

c. Close V08349 to isolate PCV-8803.

d. Close V08277 to isolate PCV-8804.

e. Close V08330 to isolate PCV-8805.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 4,5 Page 9 of 17 Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter Fails. Loss of 2A BAM pump and Pressurizer Heaters.

Four TCB's open. RPS Channel MA high Pressure bistable does not reset.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Upon cue from Examiner, initiate '2MA Inverter Fails Input Breaker' Booth Operator Instructions:

If status of input breaker is requested, state breaker is tripped.

Booth Operator Instructions:

When directed, initiate '2MA on Bypass - Alt to source to load' Evaluator Note:

When Instrument bus placed on bypass, RPS Channel MA High Pressurizer Pressure bistable remains in trip condition.

Control Room Indication available:

key alarm B-43 MA inst. Bus trouble Recognize numerous alarms, 4 Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers SRO/BOP open. Channel A RPS and ESFAS de-energized. 2MA IRO Instrument bus de-energized.

Direct implementation of 2-0970030 '120V Instrument AC SRO (Class 1E) I QSPDS step 7.2

Direct Instrument bus placed on its respective maintenance bypass bus 2-0970030 step 7.2.1.C

Recognize entry into T.S. 3.8.3.1 Action b (24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to energize from inverter connected to DC bus)

RO Ensure plant parameters stable step 7.2.1.B

Recognize loss of 2A BAM pump

Recognize loss of Pressurizer heaters As directed, notify SNPO to place MA Instrument bus on SRO bypass lAW 2-0970030 step 7.2.1.C.1 and C.2

Direct SNPO to close Bkr. 2-41207 Static Inverter 2A Maint. Bypass X-fmr 2A

Direct SNPO to select "ALT Source to LOAD"

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 4,5 Page 10 of 17 Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter Fails. Loss of 2A BAM pump and Pressurizer Heaters.

Four TCB's open. RPS Channel MA high Pressure bistable does not reset.

Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Direct implementation of 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level to restore Pressurizer heaters.

Step 7.2.2.G (attached, Pages 18 - 19)

Direct review of 2-0970030 '120V Instrument AC (Class 1E) I QSPDS Table 1 when bus restored.

Step 7.2.1 F Notifies shift manager and I&C of event Recognize entry into the DNB T.S. 3.2.5 when pressurizer SRO/RO pressure lowers to less than 2225 psia.

RO Verify 2A BAM pump restarted after bus reenergized.

As directed, close 2A 4.16KV Pressurizer Heater BOP transformer breaker Breaker 20204 As directed, reset all 480V Pressurizer heater breakers.

2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level to restore RO Pressurizer heaters Step 7.2.2.G. Energize heaters as necessary to restore pressure >2225 psia BOP As directed, close TCB's 1, 5, 2, 6 SRO/ROI Recognize Annunciator L-20 Pzr. Press. Hi did not clear BOP when bus restored.

RPS Hi Press Bistable did not reset. Recognize entry into T.S. 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1. Directs bypassing MA Pressurizer SRO Pressure. lAW 2-0NP-99.01 'Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation'

Bypass or trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

T.S. Action 2#

\1

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

25 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL ,,"

PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE With less than 27% level on Channel X, the "A" pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20204) trips and the "8" side 480V power supplies deenergize. With less than 27% level on Channel Y, the "B" pressurizer heater transformer feeder breaker (2-20403) trips and the "A" side 480V power supplies deenergize. The backup interlock bypass keyswitch selected to the level position, allows the 480V heater power su lies to be reset.

G. Verify pressurizer level indicating G. !f pressurizer heaters are controllers (selected and non- deenergized or level indicating selected) are operating properly and controller(s) failed, Then power is available to pressurizer perform the following:

heaters.

1. !f either level control channel has failed, Then shift to the operable channel and reset heaters as follows:

a. Place the backup interlock bypass keyswitch (RTG8-203) to the LEVEL position.

(This regains power to the proportional and backup heater banks controlled by the selected channel.)

b. Reset pressurizer heater banks as

. needed.

OR lS

SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

25 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. G. (continued) 2. G. (continued)

2. If actual pressurizer level had decreased below 27%

and has been restored, Then reset pressurizer heaters by:

a. Resetting 4160KV feeder breakers 2-20204 and 2-20403, and Then resetting pressurizer heater control switches.

H. Verify that pressurizer PORV's I H. If leakage is indicated, Then Safeties are NOT leaking or close PORV block valve(s) actuated as indicated by: V-1476 and lor V-1477 as required, and refer to 2-0120036, Pressurizer Relief I Safety Valve Off-Normal Operating Procedure.

1. PORV I Safety Valve acoustic flow monitors.

2. Downstream tailpipe temperatures.

3. Quench tank level, temperature, and pressure.

I. Manually start a third charging pump, if conditions require.

J. Ensure letdown valve limiter bypass switch is in the NORMAL position.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 6,7,8 Page 11 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Feedwater Isolation Valve HCV-09-2A Closes. Reactor trip, crew enters 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. MSSV V8201 (2A SG) sticks open.

Time II Position I Apj>licant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When Directed initiate 'B' train MFIV Fails Closed' Booth* Operator Instructions:

Shortly after being asked to perform Appendix 'X' inform the Control Room there is one MSSV open on the 2A SG.

Control Room Indications available:

Annunciator P*26 HCV*09*2A DC Fail Accum Press Low, L*48 DCS, G*92B SG level Hi I Lo Recognize HCV-09-2A 'B' train MFIV closed.

RO (Annunciator P-26 HCV-09-2A DC Fail Accum Press Low)

BOP Recognize 2B SG level rapidly lowering SRO Direct manual Reactor trip as SG level approaches 40% NR.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

Direct closing MSIV's when SG pressures less than or SRO approaching 750 psia Direct one RCP stopped when Tcold approaches 500°F Direct Emergency boration due to uncontrolled cooldown at 500°F.

Direct throttling of AFW to approximately 220 gpm when AFAS -2 actuates (about 5 minutes after trip)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 6,7,8 Page 12 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Feedwater Isolation Valve HCV-09-2A Closes. Reactor trip, crew enters 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. MSSV V8201 (2A SG) sticks open.

Time II Position JI Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Close MSR reheat block valves Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of EOP-99.

Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of BOP Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)

All vital and non vital DC Buses energized.

RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has feedwater available (stopping RCP due no FW na)

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535 F

Verify ADVs. SBCS valves as Tavg drops low.

Close MSIV at 750 psia.

Close Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814 Containment Conditions

Verify containment pressure <2 psig

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm

Verify containment temperature is less than 120 F

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 6,7,8 Page 13 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Feedwater Isolation Valve HCV-09-2A Closes. Reactor trip, crew enters 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. MSSV V8201 (2A SG) sticks open.

Time i Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize increasing motor Amps on 2B Main Feedwater BOP pump (about 10 minutes after trip).

Manually stop 2B Main Feedwater pump.

Throttle AFW to approximately 220 gpm when directed NOTE: AFAS-1 will lockout about 17 minutes after trip due to SG ilP.

Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering.

Verify startup rate is negative.

Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.

Inventory Control

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% (take manual control of chg pumps and isolate letdown)

Pressure Control

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia (at 1736 psia verify SIAS and stop RCP in each loop)

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)

Verify RCS subcooling is >20 F

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 6,7,8 Page 14 of 17 Event

Description:

Main Feedwater Isolation Valve HCV-09-2A Closes. Reactor trip, crew enters 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. MSSV V8201 (2A SG) sticks open.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Core Heat Removal

Verify at least one RCO running with CCW ( if >10 minutes with no CCW must secure)

Verify loop delta Tis <10 F Critical Close MSIV's when directed (from RCS Heat Removal Safety Task Function)

Stop one RCP when directed as T cold approaches 500°F Emergency borate when directed (from RCS Heat Removal RO Safety Function)

Ensure V2525 Load control valve closed

Start 2A or 2B BAM Pump

Close V2650 Tank 2A Recirc valve

Close V2651 Tank 2B Recirc valve

Open V2514 Emergency Borate valve

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Scenario # 1 Event # 8 15 of 17 Op Test No.:

,--- Page Event

Description:

. MSSV V8201 (2A SG) stick open. Enter 2-EOP-05 Excess Steam Demand.

Time . II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Enter 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart

Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC)

Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's NOTE: SIAS will come in about 13 minutes post trip. RCP's may be stopped in EOP-01 .

If SIAS present verify SI flow lAW Figure 2

Direct one RCP/LOOP stopped when SIAS received

Direct CCW restored to RCP's per Appendix J 2-EOP-99.

Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify SRO Critical

Direct RCS temperature stabilized within the limits of Figure 1A, using 28 ADV's when 2A SG blown dry.

Task RO Open '8' ADV's to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of Critical Figure 1A when 2A SG blown dry (attached, Page 26)

Task RO Stop one RCP/LOOP when directed Perform SFSC's EOP-05 when directed.

STA

Verify SI flow lAW Figure 2 (attached, Page 27)

Perform EOP-99 Appendix J CCW restoration to RCP's when directed (attached, Pages 28 - 29)

Perform Appendix A when directed (attached, Pages 30 - 31)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 9 Page 16 of 17 Event

Description:

2C AFW Pump Trips.

Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Trigger '2C AFW Pump trips' when directed. Should be triggered after crew enters EOP-05 and B SG water level is >20% to ensure crew does not have to enter 2-EOP-15

As NPO: If asked to investigate 2C AFW T& T valve MV-OB-03, report the linkage is bent, does not look like it will reset.

Recognize the 2C AFW pump T&T valve MV-08-03 tripped as RO/BOP indicated by Annunciator G-46.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1A RCSPRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)

(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)

CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.

g 1600 I l!!

i a.

1400

.~ I

s 1200 I .,

I ,.. I

~

II I

I I

I*

800 ~ ... +--. RCP NPSH

! Requirement" "lH~ -I*

200LJ~~!

rli SllUtdDWtl EnvelOpe

~ ~ M '; oJ i ...t o i... ..

a 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Indicated ReS Temperature (F)

RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 40 to 180°F 1000 psi a to 500 psia 50 to 170°F Less than 500 psia 80 to 160°F

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1)

P R

E S

S U

R I

Z E

R P

R E

S S

U R

E p

s i

a TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (P/OPSI2-EOP.WfRg2!Rev.OItif}

PROCEDURE TITLE:

APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CSO TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2)

D 1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-1S-1 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards si nals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-SA (HCV-14-SB) starts to open.

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset.

D 2. If SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-SA 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-9 'N' Hdr Isol Suction OR

HCV-14-SB 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-10 'N' Hdr Isol Suction D 3. ALIGN CCW to I from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

D HCV-14-1, CCWTo RC PUMP D HCV-14-2, CCW From RC PUMP D HCV-14-7, CCW To RC PUMP D HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP D 4. If CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

NO.: TITLE:

35 APPENDICES' FIGURES 'TABLES' DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CBO TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 20QoF. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

o 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

o HCV-14-11-A1, CCWFrom 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B1, CCW From 2B1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 2B2 RCP Seal Cooler o 6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (-.J) B Train C.J) o 1. .!.f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

o A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will 0 en the CCW "N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. .!.f SIAS has closed the "N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER "A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-8A

HCV-14-9 OR

HCV-14-8B

HCV-14-10 36

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CECIURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2) o 3. if CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples for activity and boron.

o 5. if S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A 31

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 9,10 Page 17 of 17 Event

Description:

Crosstie AFW, Isolate the 2A SG.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When directed, initiate 'Open AFW Cross Tie Valves'

When directed, initiate 'Isolate 2A SG' per App R SRO Implement 2-0NP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Appendix C Critical

Direct opening MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie Task valves to restore feed 2B SG using 2A AFW pump

Direct feeding 2B SG using 2A AFW pump Direct isolation of 2A SG, 2-EOP-99 Appendix R BOP Establish AFW to 2B SG per 2-0NP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Critical Appendix C, when directed.

Task

Ensure closed MV-09-10 2B Dish. To 2B SG

Ensure 2A AFW pump running

Open SE-09-2 2A AFW pump Discharge to 2A SG

Coordinate with NPO to open MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves.

Throttle MV-09-10 2B Discharge to 2B SG not to exceed 150 gpm for 5 minutes or until SG level has risen.

Perform Appendix R to isolate the 2A SG when directed (attached, Pages 33 - 35)

Scenario Termination Cues:

2A SG isolated,

RCS temperature is stabilized and

AFW is restored to 2B SG.

ON NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6) l::selctlcln 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation CAUTION If S/G isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

1. ENSURE HCV-OB-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.

o 2* .!f HCV-OB-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

o 3. ENSURE MV-OB-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

o 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

o 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

o 6. .!f BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

o A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

o MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve o LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass o MV-09..,3, 2A 100% Bypass o B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

33

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 . APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6) 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued) o 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

o 9. ENSURE MV-OS-1SA, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 10.CLOSE MV-OS-14, 2A S/G ADV 1501.

11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.

o 12. ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.

o 13.ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

o 14. PLACE MV-OS-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

o 15.ENSURE MV-OS-19A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 16.CLOSE MV-OS-15, 2A S/G ADV 1501.

o 17.PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

o A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o c. CLOSE SE-OS-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

o D. 1f SE-OS-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE VOSSS4, SE-OS-2 Inlet Isolation.

(continued on next page)

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXR STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6) on 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

17. (continued) o E. 11 MV-08-13, S/G 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

o 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

o 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

o a. CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

o b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

o V08622, CB #67 Drain o V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol o V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol End of Section 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators: BOP RO SRO Initial Conditions: IC-1 100% power MOL, 2A EDG out of service for governor repair. 2C Charging Pump being returned to service after packing replacement. (storepoint 61)

Turnover: 100% power MOL. 2A EDG developed a governor oil leak during the surveillance run. It was just removed from service, expected back in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . AB electrical busses have been aligned to the B side per 2-NOP-52.02, Alignment of 2AB busses and Components. 2C Charging Pump being returned to service after a breaker repair. The 2B Heater Drain pump discharge valve has a packing leak that has degraded to the point where management had directed removing the pump from service. Reduce power to remove 2B Heater Drain pump from service.

Critical Tasks:

Close 2B EDG output breaker on LOOP

Start 2B HPSI pump after SIAS Event Malf., Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RIRO Power decrease from 100% to 90% power N/BOP 2 1 T.S. SRO RWST level transmitter L1S-07-2A fails low.

3 2 IIRO Boric Acid FCV-221 OY fails closed 4 3 II BOP DEH power supply failure, turbine control swaps to manual 5 4 CIRO 2B Charging Pump recirc valve fails to close on pump start TS/SRO 6a 5 Reference leg for LT-111 OX ruptures (common leg failure) 6b 6 M/AII LOOP/LOCA 7 7 C/BOP 2B EDG does not close on LOOP 8 CIRO 2B HPSI pump does not start on SIAS

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 st. Lucie The crew assumes the shift at 100% power. The 2A Emergency Diesel Generator has just been declared out of service due to a governor oil leak discovered during the surveillance run. Reairs are in progress. The EDG is expected to be back in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . AB busses have been aligned to the B side lAW 2-NOP-52.02, "Alignment of AB busses and Components". The 2C Charging pump is being returned to service after repairs to the breaker. The 2B Heater Drain Pump has a seal leak that has degraded to the point where management has directed removing the pump from service. The direction to the crew is to reduce reactor and turbine power from 100% to 90%.

The crew will initiate a power reduction lAW 2-0NP-22.01, 'Rapid Downpower'.

RWST level transmitter LlS-07-2A fails low. SRO should enter 2-0NP-99.01 Loss of Technical Specification Instrumentation and TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 applicable.

Shortly after the RO commences boration to reduce RCS temperature, the Boric Acid flow control valve FCV-2210Yfails closed. This will require entry into 2-0NP-02.01, 'Boron Concentration Control'.

The RO will be required to use the Emergency Borate Valve and cycle the Boric Acid Makeup Pump during the down power.

After the power reduction is commenced, a power supply failure will occur and the DEH system will swap control from automatic to manual. The BOP will be required to reduce turbine load manually, which will require close coordination with the RO and SRO. Off-Normal procedure 2-ONP-22.03, 'DEH Turbine Control System' will be implemented.

At some point after the down power has commenced, the RO will be required to start a second charging pump. When the 2B Charging Pump is started, the recirc valve will fail to close. This failure will not cause an alarm and the RO will have to notice that charging flow is not adequate, determine that the recirc valve did not stroke closed and start the 2C Charging Pump. The 2B Charging Pump will be required to be declared out of service, entry into TS 3.5.2 and it will be determined that no charging pumps are currently operable. After the 2C Charging is verified to start and run with sufficient flow, the Technical Specification can be exited.

After the charging pump operation is complete, an RCS leak on the Pressurizer Level Transmitter LT-111 OX reference leg will occur. The candidates will eventually be required to trip the reactor and turbine due to LOCA greater than the capacity of the charging pumps. Upon the trip, a loss of offsite power (LOOP) will occur and the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator breaker fails to close, requiring the BOP to manually close the breaker. After completing 2-EOP-01,

'Standard Post Trip Actions', the crew will transition to 2-EOP-03, 'Loss of Coolant Accident'.

Only the B train of Safety Injection will be available due to the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator being out of service and the 2B HPSI Pump will fail to start on SIAS. This will require the candidates to manually start the 2B HPSI pump.

The scenario will conclude with 2-EOP-03 in progress, a cooldown and depressurization to shutdown cooling entry conditions in progress.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 1,2 Page 3 of 18 Event

Description:

Power decrease from 100% to 90%. RWT level transmitter fails low Time ~ Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Setup Instructions:

Initiate IC set and ensure 2A Emergency Diesel Generator out of service and 2B charging pump recirc valve failed open. Ensure 2A Charging pump running and 2B Charging Pump is off.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Call from SNPO 'closing in 2C Charging Pump breaker' about 5 minutes after okay from examiner following failure of the 2B Chg Pump recirc valve.

NOTE: This will allow the SRO to evaluate T.S. due to only one Charging pp operable.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Trigger place AB charger in service when crew calls to verify AB charger is ready to place the charger in service Booth Operator Instructions:

When directed, trigger RWT level LlS-07-2A fail low Control Room Indications Available:

Annunciators S-19 RWT RAS and Q-2 ESFAS ATI Fault Supervise/Coordinate Power reduction in accordance with 2-SRO ONP-22.01 Rapid Down Power:

Direct Boration per Appendix C 2-0NP-22.01 Rapid Down Power Direct Lead group CEA insertion of 6 inches step 6.1.2 Direct DEH programmed for load rate step 6.1.3 When Tave decrease noted direct GO on the turbine step 6.1.4 May direct additional Charging pump started lAW 2-0NP-22.01

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D. Event 5 shows up if 2B Charging pump started here.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 1,2 Page 4 of 18 Event

Description:

Power decrease from 100% to 90%. RWT level transmitter fails low Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior May direct Pressurizer placed on Recirc. lAW 2-0NP-22.01 SRO

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix E.

Direct the implementation of 2-0NP-99.01 6.3.2 B (attached, SRO Page 6) RWT level L1S-07-2A fail low. Implement T.S. 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3. (action 19).

Direct placing ESFAS channel MA RWT level in bypass or'trip lAW 2-ONP-99.01 'Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation' step 6.3.2B.

Commence boration per Appendix C, ONP-22.01 for power RO reduction as directed. (attached, Page 7)

Insert control rods approx. 6 inches per ONP-22.01 step 6.1.2 for power reduction as directed. (CEDMCS Control switch to MS and IN/HOLD/OUT switch to IN.)

If directed start charging pump lAW 2-0NP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D. (attached, Page 8)

If directed place Pressurizer on recirc. lAW 2-0NP-22.01

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix E. (attached, Page 9)

Recognize L1S-07-2A has failed low. Annunciators S-19 RWT RO RAS and 0-2 ESFAS ATI.

Program DEH per ONP-22.01 step 6.1.3 for power reduction as directed.

Set reference by ensuring REF selected and then BOP depress desired MW endpoint, hit ENTER

Depress LOAD RATE type in desired load rate and hit ENTER

Depress GO pushbutton 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions . Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 1,2 Page 5 of 18 Event

Description:

Power decrease from 100% to 90%. RWT level transmitter fails low Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior When Tave decrease is noted start Turbine down per ONP-BOP 22.01 step 6.1.4 Bypass or trip ESFAS RWT level channel MA as directed.

BOP

Obtain key 131.

Ensure A Channel is bypassed .

5

20 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.3 ESFAS Channel Malfunction (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

CAUTION The ESFAS keyswitch and bistable trip unit to which it applies do NOT, in some instances, directly line up. It is necessary to verify the labels of the bypass key, key switch, and actuation trip unit being placed in Bypass to ensure that the correct trip unit is b passed.

NOTE

RWT level indications are covered by Tech Spec 3.3.2, Table 3.3.-3.

. ESFAS cabinet door ke , ke B. Refueling Water tank Level B.1 PERFORM ONE of the following:

instrumentation indication L1S-07-2A I B I C I D.

-1': BYPASS the affected RAS channel using key 131.

2. PLACE the affected ESFAS trips units in TRIP in accordance with Appendix A, Placing Trip Units in Trip.

PROCEDURE 14A RAPID DOWN POWER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX C RCS BORATION GUIDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE The steps in this Appendix are applicable when the CVCS is normally aligned, with no RCS boration or dilution in progress. If other than normal ali nment, use guidance of 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

1. BORATE the RCS by the following:

A. START either Boric Acid Pump 2A or 2B.

B. PLACE FCV-2210Y control switch in AUTO.

C. If borating to the VCT, Then OPEN V2512, Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv.

D. If borating to the Charging Pump suction, Then OPEN V2525, Boron Load Control Valve.

E. ADJUST FRC-2210Y to the desired f1owrate.

NOTE Ensure a minimum of 10 gpm of boric acid flow at all times while BAM pump recirc valve is closed.

F. If desired to maximize the boric acid flow rate, Then CLOSE the running BAM pump recirc valve.

G. MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

H. If necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, Then DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position.

NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these chan es on a new 0 erator Aid lacecard.

END OF APPENDIX C

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

14A RAPID DOWN POWER NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX D CHARGING PUMP GUIDANCE (Page 1 of 1)

1. If Charging Pump(s) are to be started, Then PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE that each Charging pump that is desired to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO, if time permits.

B. If associated Charging Pump Recirc Valve is operable, Then ENSURE that it is OPEN prior to starting the Charging Pump.

NOTE Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow which may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5' Pipe Penetration Room or 19.5' Letdown Cubicle Room to exceed 1000 mrthr (Locked High Radiation Area limit) due to reduced transport time of short-lived radioactive isotopes.

C. START the Charging pump.

D. NOTIFY Health Physics of the charging pump alignment.

E. ADJUST the bias on HIC-111 0, Level, using the upper knurled knob to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer Level to program RRS Pressurizer Level for current plant conditions, if required.

F. If FIA-2212, Chg Flow to Regen Hx, is in service, Then VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing FIA-2212 raise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

G. !f FIA-2212, Charging to Regen Hx, is NOT in service, Then VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.

H. ENSURE the running Charging Pump Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

I. PLACE the Chrg Pump Sel Running-BtU switch in the proper position for current plant conditions per operator aid placard on RTGB-205. (Charging pump combinations vs. selector switch)

END OF APPENDIX D 8

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

14A RAPID DOWN POWER NO.:

2-0NP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 .

APPENDIXE PRESSURIZER RECIRCULATION GUIDELINES (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE

The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.

From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Heater Banks may be determined as follows:

Time (in min.) to correct mismatch::; [(pzr ppm - RCS ppm) -

25 ppm] x 3

1. To place the Pressurizer on recirculation:

A. PLACE all available Backup Heater Bank control switches to ON.

B. Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on PIC-1100X or PIC-1100Y, the selected "Pressurizer Pressure"; controller, to maintain normal operating pressure.

C. OBSERVE HIC-1100, "Pressurizer Spray" output and PCV-1100E I 1100F, "Pressurizer Spray Valve" position indication to verify Main Spray flow.

NOTE Normally, the required number of Backup Bank heaters in service is dependent upon:

1. The magnitude of thermal losses from the system, including leakage to the Quench Tank.

2. The number of heater elements out of service.

END OF APPENDIX E

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 6 of 18 Event

Description:

Boric acid FCV-2210Y fails closed Time I Position I. Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger FCV-2210Y fail closed on examiner cue Note: Failure should be inserted after downpower is started approx 97-95% power.

Booth operator response: When requested by I&C to investigate failure of FCV 2210Y respond will investigate. Response after investigation, valve diaphragm has failed resulting in the valve being unable to open.

Control room Indications Available:

Boric acid flow goes to full scale low, indicating lights for FCV-2210Y goes from dual to green. No associated alarms SRO Recognizes FCV-2210Y is closed and boric acid flow is lost Refers to 2-0NP-02.01, "Boron Concentration Control" step 6.0.9 Directs BOP to go to HOLD on turbine (if already started)

Directs RO to open V2514 (Emergency Borate valve) I cycle Boric Acid Makeup pumps for power reduction per step 6.0.9.

Notifies shift manager and I&C of event RO Recognizes FCV-2210Y is closed and boric acid flow is lost Manually controls boric acid flow using V2514 and BAM pumps as directed per step 6.0.9 of 2-0NP-02.01, "Boron Concentration Control". M-47 alarms when Emergency Borate Valve is opened. (attached, Page 11)

BOP Puts turbine on HOLD as directed (if already started)

Monitors plant parameters while event in progress ID

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

6C BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.01 . ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Prolonged use of V2514, Emergency Borate, can lead to uncontrolled power reduction rates. Boric Acid flow rate is equal to the charging pump flow rate when using the emergency borate valve.

9. !f FCV-221 OY, Boric Acid Valve, fails to OPEN when a power reduction is required, Then PERFORM the following:

A. START either Boric Acid pump.

B. OPEN V2514 C. PLACE Makeup Mode Selector switch in MANUAL.

D. CYCLE the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control boric acid addition rate and the rate of power reduction.

E. MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tave END OF SECTION 6.0 l1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 7 of 18 Event

Description:

DEH power supply failure, turbine swaps to manual Time I Position ! Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger DEH P2000 Computer Dead. Failure should be inserted during the downpower.

Indications Available: No alarms associated with failure.

SRO Recognizes DEH computer swapped to Manual Refers to Off-Normal procedure 2-0NP-22.03, "DEH Control System" step 6.2. (Guidance also in Rapid Downpower ONP)

May direct RO to secure boric acid flow Directs BOP to perform load reduction in Turbine Manual Notifies shift manager and I&C of event RO Secures boric acid flow if directed Monitors plant parameters while event in progress BOP Recognizes DEH computer swapped to Manual Performs power reduction in manual control as directed per 2-ONP-22.03, "DEH Control System" step 6.2.2.A. GV Lower pushbutton (attached, Page 13) or 2-0NP 22.01 Rapid Downpower

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

8A DEH TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM IPRC)CEC)URE NO.:

2-0NP-22.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 2 Loss Of DEH Computer INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. 'I' RECORD initial conditions on Data Sheet 1, Initial Conditions.

NOTE

The GV Raise and GV Lower push buttons operate on an exponential component. The longer the pushbutton is depressed, the faster the change in load will be made.

Chan in Turbine load will chan e Reactor power.

2. 11 load changes are necessary, Then PERFORM the following:

A. CHANGE load using the following pushbuttons:

GV Raise

GV Lower B. PERFORM load changes in accordance with ONE of the following:

2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1.

2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown Full Load to Zero Load.

3. NOTIFY I&C.

4. CHECK the following indication:

CONT OFF light NOT LIT on Operator Console A.

CONT RESET light LIT on Operator Console B.

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 8 of 18 Event

Description:

2B Charging Pump recirc valve fails to close on start Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Malfunction is part of initial conditions and will show up when pump is started.

If called to close manual isolation for 2B charging pump recirc, respond that valve is frozen and the MOV won't move either Control room Indications Available:

2B Charging Pump recirc valve indication stays red, charging flow remains at -44 gpm Examiners note: Starting of additional charging pump is optional as stated in 2-ONP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower'. If the crew does not start the 2B Charging pump here, it is required to be started during event 7, L T-111 OX failure.

SRO Recognizes 2B Charging Pump recirc valve not closing Directs RO to secure 2B Charging Pump (may direct NLO to locally close recirc isolation valve, but valve will not close) ryJay direct RO and BOP to secure power reduction.

Directs RO to start 2C Charging Pump lAW 2-0NP-22.01

'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D Notifies shift manager of event Recognizes 2B Charging Pump recirc valve not closing, no RO increase in Charging flow Secures 2B Charging Pump Secures boric acid flow if directed Starts 2C Charging Pump as directed lAW 2-0NP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Appendix D. (attached, Page 8)

I~

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 5 of 18 Event

Description:

2B Charging Pump recirc valve fails to close on start Time J Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Monitors plant parameters while event in progress BOP Secures from turbine load reduction if directed

Appendix D . Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6a Page 10 of 18 r

Event

Description:

ReS Leak occurs, Reference leg for LT -1110X ruptures (common leg failure)

Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Trigger PZR Reference leg failure on cue from examiner Control Room Indications Available:

Multiple pressurizer level and pressure alarms locked in.

Key Annunciators: H*9 Pressurizer pressure Hi/Low, H*17 Pressurizer level Hi/low Recognizes reference leg rupture:

Pressurizer pressure alarms (low)

Pressurizer level alarms (high)

SRO

Rx cavity sump alarms

Containment Pressure increasing

Containment Radiation increasing

Containment Temperature increasing Refers to 2-0120031, 'Excessive RCS Leakage' ONP if time permits:

Directs reactor to be tripped if PZR level or pressure can not be maintained 7.2 2.8

Starts additional charging pumps 7.2 2.F

Energizes additional pressurizer heaters7.2 2.F

Isolates letdown if PZR level can not be maintained 7.2 2.F (attached, Pages 18 - 19)

Informs SM of leak, may need to classify the event lAW the emergency plan.

Recognizes pressurizer reference leg rupture by PI-1108 failing low and U-111 OX failing high. Directs pressure and level channels swapped to 'Y'. May refer to 'Pressurizer Pressure and Level' 2-0120035 Step 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.

Directs RO to start additional charging pumps and isolate letdown

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6a of 18 Event

Description:

Res Leak occurs, Reference leg for LT-1110X ruptures (common leg failure)

Time 11 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize Pressurizer pressure PI-11 02A RPS channel A SRO TMPL tripped. T.S. 3.3.1 table 3.3-1.ESFAS 3.3.2, table 3.3-3.

Recognizes DNB T.S. when Pressure lowers to <2225 psia.

T.S.3.2.5 Directs HO to trip reactor on decreasing pressurizer level and pressure. (Directions should be given prior to or when TMLP pretrip comes in)

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip SRO Actions".

Recognizes pressurizer reference leg rupture by PI-11 08 fail RO low and LI-1110X fail high. Swaps pressure and level channels to 'Y' when directed.

Start additional charging pumps and isolates letdown as directed Manually trips reactor as directed.

BOP Verifies turbine trip on reactor trip

NO.:

23B EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PROCEDURE NO.: LEAKAGE 2-0120031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS

.1 Immediate Operator Actions

1. None

.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. !! in Modes 1 thru 3 and SIAS is NOT blocked, Then go to step 2.

!! in Modes 3 thru Mode 6 and SIASis blocked, Then go to step 3.

2. ACTIONS WHEN IN MODES 1 THRU MODE 3 (SIAS NOT BLOCKED)

A. 11 RCS leakage is indicated, Then analyze the information available and determine as accurately as possible the magnitude and seriousness of the leak.

B. 11 at any time RCS leakage exceeds the capacity of the charging pumps and pressurizer level cannot be maintained, Then:

1. In Modes 1 and 2, trip the reactor and turbine and perform 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

2. 11 in Mode 3 (SIAS is NOT Blocked), Then enter 2-EOP-03, Loss of Coolant Accident.

C. 11 the containment CIS radiation C. Manually actuate CIAS.

monitors exceed the present alarm point level, Then ensure containment isolation signal is actuated.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

23B EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PROCEDURE NO.: LEAKAGE 2-0120031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

D. !f pressurizer PORV or safety valve leakage is indicated, Then ensure ONOP 2-0120036, Pressurizer Relief I Safety Valve, has been implemented.

NOTE RCV-14-1 CCW Surge Tank Vent, will align to the Chemical Drain Tank on hi h CCW activity.

E. !f a CCW high activity alarm is received, Then refer to 2-0NP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.

F. Ensure charging and letdown is F. Manually control charging and automatically controlling pressurizer letdown as required to level. maintain pressurizer level.

G. \f' !f plant conditions permit, Then determine the primary leak rate, per 2-0SP-01.03, Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Fonn ES-D-2 12 18 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event #

6b,7 Page of Event

Description:

LOOP/LOCA EOP-01 (2B EDG breaker fails to close, 2B HPSI fails to start)

Time i Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Verify LOOP actuates on Reactor trip Control Room Indications Available:

Degraded lighting in control room, 2BEDG breaker did not close, 2B HPSI not running on SIAS Examiners note: SIAS will actuate approximately 3 minutes after Reactor trip.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

SRO

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core* Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

Recognizes 2B EDG breaker failed to close.

Critical Directs BOP to close 2B EDG breaker Task Direct ADV's placed in service in Auto at 900 psia Evaluate diagnostic flow chart of 2-EOP-01 Directs entry to 2-EOP-03, "Loss of Coolant Accident" Recognizes 2B HPSI Pump did not start on SIAS Critical Directs RO to start 2B HPSI Pump Task Directs RO to throttle auxiliary feedwater after actuation

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # Event # 13 18 3

-6b,7- - - - Page of Event

Description:

LOOP/LOCA EOP-01 (2B EDG breaker fails to close, 2B HPSI fails to start)

Time .11 Position 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory control, Pressure control and Core Heat Removal Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering

Verify startup rate is negative.

Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.

Inventory Control

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% (Level is not trending, manual start of chg pumps and isolate letdown)

Pressure Control

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia (at 1736 psia verify SIAS and stop RCP in each loop)

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)

Verify RCS subcooling is >20°F Core Heat Removal

Verify at least one RCO running with CCW if >10 minutes with no CCW must secure (RCPs off due to LOOP)

Verify loop delta T is <10°F (delta T may be> due to onset of natural circulation)

Throttles auxiliary feedwater after actuation as directed

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6b,7 Page 14 of 18 Event

Description:

LOOP/LOCA EOP-01(2B EDG breaker fails to close, 2B HPSI fails to start)

Time i Position ! Applicant's Actions or Behavior Places ADVs in service in Auto at 900 psia BOP/RO

2B SG on RTGB~202

2A SG on PACB (Plant Auxiliary Control Board)

BOP Recognizes 2B EDG breaker failed to close Verifies Turbine tripped when Reactor tripped.

BOP Manually closes 2B EDG breaker, must use sync plug.

Critical (This action should be done during period between trip and Task beginning of SPTA's)

Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Maintenance of Vital auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal and Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A3 not energized, 2AB, and 2B3 energized from EDG)

All vital and non vital DC Buses energized.

(2A, 2B, 2AB 2C and 20 DC Buses)

RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has feedwater available

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 0 and 535 0 F

Verify SG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig.

(Places ADV's in service in Auto at 900 psia)

Close the 4 MSR Block valves (no power TCV must be close on Reheat Panel)

~~-~-~~.------------------------------~~~~~

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6b,T Page 15 of 18 Event

Description:

LOOP/LOCA EOP-01 (2B EDG breaker fails to close, 2B HPSI fails to start)

Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Containment Conditions

Verify containment pressure <2 psig (Pressure is increasing)

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm (Radiation is increasing)

Verify containmenUemperature is less than 120°F Temperature is slowly increasing)

. Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms.

Upon unit trip. notify NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99. (outside CR actions)

Places ADVs in service in Auto at 900 psia

B SG on RTGB 202

ASG on PACB

- Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6b,7 Page 16 of 18 Event

Description:

LOOP/LOCA EOP-01(2B EDG breaker fails to close, 2B HPSI fails to start)

Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate Restore Instrument air when Appendix H requested.

Record Time of SIAS initiation Examiners Note:

Due to LOOP and no power on 'A' side AFAS-1 lockout will occur. The crew should manually initiate AFAS-1 to initiate AFW flow to the 2A SG.

SIAS Initiation Time is available on the ERDADS and SOE printout.

SRO Implement 2-EOP-03, "Loss of Coolant Accident"

Directs BOP to perform SFSC's

Contact SM to classify the event

Direct implementation of Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's

Ensure SIAS flow adequate per Figure 2 SI flow Vs.

RCS pressure.

Direct implementation of Appendix H EOP-99 to restore Instrument air.(required to restore CCW to RCP's)

Direct CCW restored to RCP's per Appendix J 2-EOP-99 within 30 minutes or isolate CCW. (must complete Appendix H, Instrument air, to be able to restore CCW)

Directs BOP to place Hydrogen Analyzer in service per Appendix L

Direct closing MSIV's due to LOOP (may direct completion of Appendix X section 2)

--~-'--

-A~p-p-e-nd~ix~D~------~--~~~R-e~q-ul~'re-d~O-p-e-ra-t-0-r~A-ct~io-n-s~------------~F~or-m~E~S~-~D-~2-Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6b,7 Page 17 of 18 Event

Description:

LOOP/LOCA EOP-01 (2B EDG breaker fails to close, 2B HPSI fails to start)

Time ~ Position l Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Direct RO to perform RCS cooldown not to exceed 100°F (if subcooling is lost) in anyone hour using SRO ADV's. (If RCPs are off and subcooling regained cooldown limited to 50°F in anyone hour.)

Ensures containment spray actuates at 5.4 psig Direct AFAS-1 initiation when identified AFAS-1 locked out due to LOOP.

Perform cooldown using ADV's not to exceed 100°F in anyone RO hour to regain subcooling. (If subcooling is restored cooldown rate should be reduce to 50° F in anyone hour)

Monitor subcooling per Figure 1A RCS pressure Temperature (attached, Page 27)

Manually initiate AFAS-1 when directed. Throttle AFW flow to RO/BOP approximately 220 gpm after initiation Restore CCW to RCP's per Appendix J 2-EOP-99 within 30 BOP minutes or isolate CCW. (must complete Appendix H, Restore IA, to be able to restore CCW) (attached, Pages 28 - 29)

Places the hydrogen analyzer in service per Appendix L of 2-EOP-99 (attached, Page 30 - 31)

Compares SI flow to RCS pressure, Figure 2.

(attached, Page 32)

Recognizes 2B HPSI Pump did not start on SIAS Critical Manually starts 2B HPSI Pump as directed Task

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6b,7 Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

LOOP/LOCA EOP-01 (2B EDG breaker fails to close, 28 HPSI fails to start)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform App H to restore Instrument air (attached, Pages 33 - 36)

Perform Appendix A sampling SG's (attached, Pages 37 - 38)

Close MSIV's when directed (may be requested to complete Appendix X section 2) (attached, Pages 39 - 42)

Verifies containment spray actuates and flow is adequate.

STA Perform SFSC's in EOP-03 every 15 minutes when directed Scenario Termination Cue

RCS cooldown progressing, and

SI flow meeting Figure 2

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)

(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)

CAUTION The Rep NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.

2400 2200 2000 1800 .. !

. T' I"'! 1 1600

li

f

l" f

Q.

1400 i

II

~

'C:

~

f 1200 j J.J! ,. ..*1 I Q.

II I, .1!

~ 1000

'i5 E

Minimum SubCooled'

~,: I I; L, .1 800

[

RCPNPSH Requirement"

. I 600 .~

~

.. j .~. ~

i 1- ~

Ii

. I I 400 L.l\

. ; I !

*1"tlud~.. lnstrtJ""'nt U"e~rtaintie$'

200 ~~~~~~r-F?"f-+-'i-~L.~-~':"::':;'.:...:..Jll" 'r" :i t

I t i l

> 1

, I !

I I

I!

I !!

I' l

! t, I

I 0 +-._. __ 1 L

_ 1 . _j ~ .1 ' __ .1 .. l _....L .L--i 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Indicated ReS Temperature (F)

RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 40 to 180°F 1000 psi a to 500 psi a 50 to 170°F Less than 500 psia 80 to 160°F

PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDlXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND ceo TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2)

1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-18-1 to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards si nals are still resent. .

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14~8B) starts to open.

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will 0 en the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset.

2. 1f SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-8A 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-9 'N' Hdr Isol Suction OR

HCV-14-8B 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-10 'N' Hdr Isol Suction o 3. ALIGN CCW to I from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

o HCV-14-1, CCWTo RC PUMP o HCV-14-2, CGW From RC PUMP o HCV-14-7, CCW To RC PUMP o HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP

4. 1f CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

NO.: PROCEDURE 35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC>CEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CBO TO THE RCPs (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function. CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been 0 ened.

5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

o HCV-14-11-A1, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B1, CCW From 2B1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 2B2 RCP Seal Cooler

6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J

NO.: TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (-J) B Train (-J)

1. SELECT ONE sample point by PLACING the sample valve selector switch in the desired position. FSE-27-8_ FSE-27-12 (Upper Cntmt. Dome) (Lwr. Cntmt.)

FSE-27-9_ FSE-27-13 (Pzr. Area) (2B2 RCP)

FSE-27-10_ FSE-27-14 (2A 1 RCP) (2B 1 RCP)

FSE-27-11 (2A2 RCP)

2. OPEN the Containment Isolation Valves. FSE-27-15 FSE-27-17 (Sample in to H2 Analyzer)

AND FSE-27-16 FSE-27-18 (Sample out of H2 Analyzer)

3. ENSURE the function selector switch is in the SAMPLE position.

4. PLACE the OFF I STANDBY I ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.

NOTE If power is interrupted and then restored to an in-service Hydrogen Analyzer (such as after an ESFAS or Undervoltage Relay actuation) the remote control selector pushbutton must be depressed to allow for continued o eration of the anal zer from the Control Room.

5. DEPRESS the remote control selector pushbutton.

6. VERIFY the red sample light energizes.

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 2)

A Train (-..J) B Train (..J)

7. START the Hydrogen Analyzer Recorder. (switch located inside recorder)

8. Allow five to ten minutes for the Hydrogen Analyzer to stabilize as indicated by the (%) indication leveling off.

END OF APPENDIX L 31

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1300 ; ~ f ***1 1

, I

1. I j f .j.!

i ' 1 I i

I I II f i*

1200 p I ,Ifigure, Then SI System lineup should be I verifi~d. II II R 1100 I\\ I I E

S s

u R

1000 900 tH--i---*-

t I r-"

Ii I 1

"'---i I

I

~ 1\ I I I I I .j

+ .

Z 800 f*t-1\**_**1*****_*******

E R

P R

700

_****J***f* !

. . -......... I 1-..

I

-. . . . j 1

E S

s u

R 600 500 r' r f

Ie

\1 ,i~~~~~

I ~--T I

r---r---.-r-I -t- I 1

-1 E 400 L- r-- I r**

I 2 Full Trains I' -Ili

"* I I in Operation i I p

300

-*T==V~l----r*-r*---t*-+-I----*-l s

i 200 1" .. L** . ! .. , ***I***-*~***** .....

I---~:: I a

100 J-****t-,--rrt-- ~

o f*

1000 2000 3000 4000 TF~

11 5000 6000:

TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (P/OPSI2-EOP-99/F1g2lRev.0Itif)

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES 1 TABLES 1 DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H OPERATION OF THE 2A AND 2B INSTRUMENT AIR COMPR (Page 1 of 4) on 1: Placing 2A Instrument Air Compressor in Service D 1. ENSURE the following breakers are aligned as indicated.

Component ID Component Name POSITION (...J)

Bkr 41331 (MCC 2A6) Instr Air Compr 2A ON Bkr 42414 (MCC 2AB) Instrument Air Compressor Cooler Fan ON -

Bkr 42416 (MCC 2AB) Cooling System Water PP ON -

D 2. !f TCW is NOT available, Then PERFORM the following:

D A. ALIGN 2A Instrument Air Compressor for emergency cooling and operation.

Component ID Component Name POSITION (...J)

V13197 2A Instr Air Camp Jacket Inlet Isol OPEN -

V13201 2A Instr Air Camp Jacket Outlet Isol OPEN -

V13383 Air Comprs Outlet Hdr 1501 CLOSE -

V13380 Air Comprs Inlet Hdr 1501 CLOSE -

V13417 Air Compr Coolers Inlet Hdr from Recirc Pump Isol OPEN -

V13420 Air Compr Coolers to Fan Cooler Isol OPEN V13424 2A Recirc Pump from I to 2A Expan Tank Isol OPEN -

V13419 Air Compr Coolers to Fan Cooler Isol OPEN -

V13418 2A Recire Pump Disch Isol OPEN -

V18109 Instr Air Rcvr Inlet from 2A Aftereooler Isol OPEN -

V18660 2C 1 2D Instr Air Camps Disch Isol CLOSE -

D B. ENSURE the Instrument Air Compressor Head Tank level is at least 3/4 full.

D C. START the Emergency Cooling System Recirculation Pump.

D D. START the Emergency Cooling System Radiator Fan.

33

APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H OPERATION OF THE 2A AND 28 INSTRUMENT AIR CO (Page 2 of 4)

Section 1: Placing 2A Instrument Air Compressor in Service (continued) o 3. 1f TCW is available, Then ALIGN 2A Instrument Air Compressor for normal cooling and operation:

Component 10 Component Name POSITION (..J)

V13197 2A Instr Air Comp Jacket Inlet 1501 OPEN -

V13201 2A Instr Air Comp Jacket Outlet 1501 OPEN -

V18109 Instr Air Rcvr Inlet from 2A Aftercooler 1501 OPEN -

V18660 2C I 2D Instr Air Comps Disch 1501 CLOSE -

o 4. NOTIFY Unit 2 Control Room to RESET the 2A Instrument Air Compressor on the plant auxiliaries panel.

o 5. Locally START the 2A Instrument Air Compressor.

6. NOTIFY Unit 2 Control Room that 2A Instrument Air Compressor is running.

End of Section 1

ION NO.:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H RATION OF THE 2A AND 2B INSTRUMENT AIR CO (Page 3 of 4) on 2: Placing 2B Instrument Air Compressor in Service o 1. ENSURE the following breakers are aligned as indicated:

Component 10 Component Name POSITION (...J)

Bkr 42192 (MCC 2B6) Instr Air Compr 2B ON -

Bkr 42414 (MCC 2AB) Instrument Air Compressor Cooler Fan ON -

Bkr 42416 (MCC 2AB) Cooling System Water PP ON -

o 2. If TCW is NOT available, Then PERFORM the following:

o A. ALIGN 2B Instrument Air Compressor for emergency cooling and operation:

Component 10 Component Name POSITION (...J)

V13209 28 Instr Air Camp Jacket Inlet 1501 OPEN -

V13213 28 Instr Air Camp Jacket Outlet Isol OPEN -

V13383 Air Comprs Outlet Hdr 1501 CLOSE -

V13380 Air Comprs Inlet Hdr 1501 CLOSE -

V13417 Air Compr Inlet Hdr from Recirc Pump 1501 OPEN -

V13420 Air Compr Coolers to Fan Cooler 1501 OPEN -

V13424 2A Recirc Pump from I to 2A Expan Tank 1501 OPEN -

V13419 Air Compr Coolers to. Fan Cooler Isol OPEN V13418 2A Recire Pump Disch 1501 OPEN V18118 Instr Air Rcvr Inlet from 2B Aftercooler 1501 OPEN V18660 2C I 2D Instr Air Camps Disch 1501 CLOSE -

o B. ENSURE the Instrument Air Compressor Head Tank level is at least 3/4 full.

o C. START the Emergency Cooling System Recirculation Pump.

o D. START the Emergency Cooling System Radiator Fan.

APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX H OPERATION OF THE 2A AND 28 INSTRUMENT AIR COM (Page 4 of 4)

Q,rTlr.n 2: Placing 28 Instrument Air Compressor in Service (continued) o 3. 11 TCW is available, Then ALIGN 2B Instrument Air Compressor for normal cooling and operation:

Component 10 Component Name POSITION (--J)

V13209 28 Instr Air Comp Jacket Inlet Isol OPEN -

V13213 28 Instr Air Comp Jacket Outlet Isol OPEN -

V18118 Instr Air Rcvr Inlet from 28 Aftercooler Isol OPEN -

V18660 2C I 20 Instr Air Comps Disch Isol CLOSE -

o 4. NOTIFY Unit 2 Control Room to RESET the 2B Instrument Air Compressor on the plant auxiliaries panel.

o 5. Locally START the 2B Instrument Air Compressor.

o 6. NOTIFY Unit 2 Control Room that 2B Instrument Air Compressor is running.

End of Section 2 END OF APPENDIX H

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (--J) B Train C.J)

1. !f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

o A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. !f SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-8A

HCV-14-9 OR

HCV-14-8B

HCV-14-10 37

SIONNO.: TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)

3. If CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

o 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples for activity and boron.

o 5. !f S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A

PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CEC'URE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 8) on 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, with the control switch in RECIRC.

o 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.

o 3. jf AFAS has actuated, o 3.1 jf AFAS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feedwater is and use of Main Feedwater is desired, desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the Then PERFORM ALL of the following: following:

o A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET. o A. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.

o B. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main o B. For EACH MFW header to FRV] Block valves CLOSED. be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.

1. MV-09-5

2. MV-09-6 o C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power o C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL. MIA Stations in MANUAL.

o D. For EACH MFW header to be o D. DEPRESS BOTH ' ..'="_'.

placed in service, ENSURE pushbuttons to RESET the the associated MFIVs are Low Power Feedwater OPEN. Valves.

o E. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons o E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA to RESET the Low Power Stations AS NECESSARY to Feedwater Valves. control S/G levels.

',,"C'LII NO.:

35 . APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 8) 15e~r:tlon 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. (continued) o F. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control S/G levels.

o G. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.

o 4. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.

o 5. ENSURE BOTH of the following:

o A. Bearing Oil Pump o A.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil and Seal Oil Backup Pump Pump RUNNING.

RUNNING.

o B. When the turbine reaches

600 rpm, Then Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING.

o 6. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN.

o 7. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING.

o 8. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing o 8.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust Oil temperature between 110 to TCW to the in-service TLO Cooler 120°F. to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.

n.v.....l::uv.,1:: TITLE:

35 . APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CECIURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 8)

I~ectlcm 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 9. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO D 9.1 PERFORM ALL of the following:

rpm.

Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES.

D A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL.

D B. VERIFY the Turning Gear Permissive Light is ON.

D C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED.

D D. Locally START the Turning Gear.

D 10.1f Reactor power history is low, Then CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature.

D 11. Place Boron Dilution Alarm D 11.1 1f BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation. System channels are NOT operating, When indicated Reactor power is Then PERFORM applicable less than 10-5 %, actions of ONP-02.01, Boron Then PERFORM BOTH of the Concentration Control.

following:

D A.* ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation.

D B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating.

NO.:

~~-~ ~--- - - 35 ----4

- APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CECIURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 8) l~elCtlCm 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMC's room, and impact equipment reliabili if 15 KW heaters are not ener ized after lant shutdown.

o 11.NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMC's room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.10, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.

o 12.CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects.

END OF APPENDIX X

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators: BOP RO SRO Initial Conditions: IC-15, 45% power, MOL 2A HPSI, 2A Containment Spray Pump OOS, 2B AFW pump OOS for bearing repair.

Turnover: 45% Power, MOL, 2A HPSI and 2A Containment Spray pump OOS for CCW to seal cooler line modifications. 2B AFW pump OOS for bearing repair. 2B MFW Pump returned to service after oil leak repair. Increase power to 100%.

Critical Tasks:

Manually Actuate B train SIAS

Manually start 2B Containment Spray Pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RI All Power increase from 45% to 100% power N/BOP 2 1 T.S. SRO 2A5 Undervoltage Relay failed. Relay 27N-8/2AS/1833 3 2 I/BOP 2A SG Level DCS failure.

4 3 T.S. SRO L1C 90130 fails high from DCS failure 5 4 IIRO HIC 1100 Spray Controller drifts high 6 5 C/RO 2A2 MCC de-energizes (Manually stop Charging Pumps) 6a BOP/N Restore Charging and Letdown 7 6 M/AII 2A SGTR, Manual Trip ESD Post trip 8 7 II RO B SIAS train fails to actuate 9 8 C/RO 2B Containment Spray Pump fails to Start post CSAS 10 Isolate 2A SG

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 St. Lucie The crew assumes the shift at 45% power. The unit has been at reduced power for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to repair an oil leak on the 2B Main Feedwater pump. The oil leak has been repaired and the pump has been returned to service.

Engineering has identified non-class parts on the new modifications to the 2A HPSI and 2A Containment Spray pump seal coolers. Both pumps were taken out of service 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago for part replacement, and are scheduled to be returned to service in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . 2B AFW pump is OOS for bearing repair. Bearing failure was noted during a surveillance run. The 2B AFW Pump is not expected back on this shift.

The crew will initiate a power ascension lAW 2-GOP-201, 'Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1'.

The SNPO will call the Control room with a failed 2A5 undervoltage relay. (Relay 27N-B/2A5/1833). The SRO will implement 2-0NP-99.01 'Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation'. The relay will be required to be placed in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Electrical Maintenance supervisor will be required to assist. Technical Specification 3.3.2 and Table 3.3-3 should be referenced.

2A Steam Generator experiences a reference leg failure that causes level to decrease, requiring the candidates to place the 2A Feedwater system in manual and control Steam Generator level manually during the power ascension. Off-Normal procedure 2-0700030, 'Main Feedwater' will be implemented. Steam Generator 2A Narrow Range indication LlC-9013D will eventually fail high, requiring the Unit Supervisor to enter 2-0NP-99.01 and implement Technical Specification Action statement (TSAS) 3.3.2a.

Pressurizer Main Spray controller HIC-11 00 fails high causing the main spray valve to go fully open. The candidates will be required to place the controller in manual and control pressurizer pressure manually for the remainder of the scenario. Off-Normal Operating Procedure 2-0120035 "Pressurizer Pressure and Level" will be implemented. If action is not taken promptly, the Unit Supervisor will be required to enter TSAS 3.2.5 for DNB margin (RCS pressure <2225 psia).

2A2 MCC (non-vital) de-energizes causing the letdown pressure and level control valves to isolate. The candidates will be required to stop charging pumps and then troubleshoot to determine which electrical bus has failed, since there are no alarms associated with the MCC failure. Two Off-Normal Operating Procedures, 2-0NP-47.02, "Loss of a Non-Safety Related AC Bus" and 2-0NP-02.03, "Charging and Letdown" will be required to be implemented. The BOP will have to take action to restore charging and letdown.

After Charging and Letdown has been restored, a 400 GPM tube leak will ramp in on the 2A Steam Generator. This will require the candidates to manually trip the reactor and turbine.

Upon the trip, a moderate excess steam demand on the same steam generator (2A) will occur inside containment. After performance of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions", the crew will transition to 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" due to the dual event.

When pressurizer pressure decreased to <1736, SIAS on the "B" side will not actuate (no HPSI pumps will be available initially). The candidates will have to manually initiate SIAS and ensure 2B HPSI pump is running in order to meet RCS and Core heat removal safety function.

2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 When containment pressure increases to 5 psig, the 28 Containment Spray Pump will fail to start requiring the candidates to manually start the pump. If the pump is not started, Containment Temperature and Pressure safety function will not be met.

The scenario will conclude with the isolation of the 2A Steam Generator lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R and a cooldown and depressurization to shutdown cooling entry conditions in progress.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 4 of 19 Event

Description:

Power Increase from 45% to 100%

Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Setup Instructions:

Initiate IC set and ensure 2A HPSI and 2A CS pumps are 005. Start 2B MFW pump and switch is in AUTO. Annunciator l-23 is in alarm due to a simulator DR on AS!.

NOTE:

Inform the crew 2-GOP-210 step 6.129 has been signed off by RE and power ascension is approved.

SRO Direct power increase lAW 2-GOP-201 step 6.130 Control Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-1 01 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached, Pages 5- 6)

Commence Dilution for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 6.5 (attached, Pages 7 - 8)

Withdraw CEA's to control Rx power and ASIIAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached, Pages 5 - 6)

CEA Withdrawal, select MS on the CEDMCS Control Switch

Move the IN/HOLD/OUT Switch in the OUT direction Program DEH for power increase at a rate lAW 2-GOP-1 01 step 6.1.2

Set reference by ensuring REF selected and then BOP depress desired MW endpoint, hit ENTER

Depress LOAD RATE type in desired load rate and hit ENTER

Depress GO pushbutton 4

SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

9 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY I---------i PROCEDURE NO.: STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Power Level Escalations NOTE CEAs should be above the Long-term Steady State Insertion Limit (102 inches withdrawn on Group 5) before reaching 20% core power and at a position to begin controlling ASI at the ESI between 20% and 50% power.

Refer to NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for further guidance.

1. As Main Generator loading commences, MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref by:

A. CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

ANDIOR B. Boron concentration changes in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

2. At or above 50% power:

A. All planned reactivity additions should be made by boration or dilution in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

B. USE CEAs for ASI control, CONSIDER the reactivity effect of CEAs when adjusting AS!.

C. REFER to NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for specific instructions regarding ASI control during power escalations.

D. ,-[1 When raising Reactor power, all power escalation rates should be within the following fuel preconditioning guidelines:

Max Equivalent Turbine Category Max Core Power Escalation Rate Generator Load Rate 1 3%/HR at or above 15% Power .42 MW/MIN 2 3%/HR above 50% Power .42 MW/MIN 3 20%/HR above 50% Power 2.80 MW/MIN 4 30%/HR above 50% Power 4.2 MW/MIN

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

9 1--------1 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Power Level Escalations (continued)

2. D. (continued)

NOTE To determine the correct category for a power escalation, Appendix B, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines Worksheet, may be used. Contact Reactor En ineering if further assistance is required.

Category Definitions:

1. Category 1:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been previously sustained in this core cycle for at least 72 continuous hours.

2. Category 2:

a. INCREASE in power following 30 continuous days or more at a power level less than 70% of rated thermal power.

OR

b. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for more than 3 continuous hours during the past 60 days.

3. Category 3:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has not been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

4. Category 4:

a. INCREASE in power to a level which has been maintained for 3 continuous hours or more during the past 8 days.

3. 1f available, Then ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating.

If necessary, START an additional Charging Pump in accordance with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and Letdown.

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation in accordance with Appendix A, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE to load the Main Generator in accordance with 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1.

END OF SECTION 6.1

SION NO.: PROCEDU 22C BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution NOTE

An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205 PNL "N". Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard.

The Operations Supervisor SHALL be notified and a CR submitted of any unexplained or unplanned Reactivity change in accordance with OPS Policy 105 (i.e., >.5 deg Tcold change or >.5% power change).

If a Reactivity management issue occurs, refer to procedure ADM-09.11, Reactivity Management.

If constant dilution is desired then ensure flow on FRC-2210X is observable.

1. DODD ENSURE Section 3.0, Prerequisites is completed at least once per shift.

2. DODD ENSURE Section 4.0, Precautions I Limitations, has been reviewed at least once per shift.

3. DODD ,-r2 ENSURE calorimetric power is less than 100.00% prior to any dilutions by obtaining a DCS calorimetric power.

4. DODD DETERMINE the desired volume of primary water to be added.

5. DODD PLACE the Makeup Mode Selector switch in MANUAL.

6. DODD ENSURE FRC-2210X, Water Flow, is in MANUAL and REDUCE the controller output to ZERO.

7. DODD ENSURE FRC-2210Y, Boric Acid Valve Control Switch is CLOSE.

8. DODD ENSURE either Primary Makeup Water Pump is running.

9. DODD PLACE FCV-221 OX, Reactor Makeup Control Switch in Auto.

10. DODD If diluting to the VCT, Then OPEN V2512, Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv.

11. DODD If diluting to the Charging Pump suction, Then OPEN V2525, Boron Load Control Valve.

SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

22C BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.5 Aligning for MANUAL Dilution (continued)

CAUTION To preclude lifting the VCT relief valve while using V2525, do NOT allow PMW flowrate to exceed the runnin Char in pump(s) capaci .

12. 0 0 0 0 ADJUST FRC-221OX to the desired flowrate (and if using V2525 do NOT exceed the flowrate for the number of running Charging Pumps).

13. 0 DOD MAINTAIN VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig by opening and closing V2513, VCT Vent, as needed.

14. 0 DOD If necessary to maintain the desired VCT level, Then DIVERT the letdown flow to the Waste Management System by placing V2500, VCT Divert Valve, in the WMS position:

A. 0 0 0 0 ENSURE V2500 VCT Divert Valve indicates OPEN.

B. 0 0 0 0 When the desired VCT level is reached, PLACE V2500 in AUTO.

C. 0 0 0 0 ENSURE V2500 indicates CLOSED.

15. 0 DOD When the desired amount of primary water has been added, Then CLOSE FCV-221 OX, Reactor Makeup.

16. DOD 0 IfV2512 Reactor Makeup Water Stop Vlv was opened, Then PLACE V2512 in CLOSEand ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

17. 0 0 0 0 If V2525 Boron Load Control Valve was opened, Then PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE it indicates CLOSED.

18. 0 DOD REDUCE FRC-2210X, Makeup Water Flow controller output to ZERO.

19. DOD 0 MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tave.

20. 0 0 0 0 §1 RECORD on Data Sheet 1, Boration I Dilution Log, the number of gallons of Primary Makeup Water added as indicated on FQI-2210X, Water Flow Totalizer.

21. 0 0 0 0 If additional dilutions are desired, or if the expected changes to Tave or Boron concentration are NOT achieved, Then REPEAT Steps 6.5.1 through 6.5.20.

u N

N

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 5 of 19 Event

Description:

2A5 Under Voltage Relay Failure Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: At direction of examiner, trigger 2A5 relay fail.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Call the control room as SNPO and state the undervoltage relay 27N-B/2A5/1833 has failed (tripped).

Examiners note: Relay failure does not result in an alarm. Logic is 2/3.

TSSRO Implement 2-0NP-99.01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation, Appendix B step 3. Notify EM supervisor to jumper (trip) relay.

Verify minimum channels operable within 1 (one) hour in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2 and Table 3.3-3.

(attached, Page 10) g

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

20 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX B UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY TRIP (Page 4 of 7)

CAUTION Prior to placing jumper(s) on failed relay, verify that no other undervoltage relays are in the tripped condition (i.e. no u/v relay targets or pickup LEOs are on).

NOTE

Only the failed relay should be jumpered. Relays NOT placed in trip should be N/A.

27N Relays are for Degraded Voltage Protection.

271 Relays are for Loss of Voltage Protection.

11 a 480V Load Center 2A5 Undervoltage Relay has failed, Then TRIP the failed Relay by jumpering as directed in the following table:

PSB-1 RELAY CABINET 2A 480 VOLT EMERGENCY BUS 2A5 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS JUMPER PERF IV FAILED RELAY JUMPER LOCATION FROM TO INITIAL INITIAL 14 15 BACK OF RELAY 27N-N2A5/1833 (SEE CWO 1836) 11 12 14 15 BACK OF RELAY 27N-B/2A5/1833 (SEE CWO 1836) 11 12 14 15 BACK OF RELAY 27N-C/2A5/1833 11 12 (SEE CWO 1836) 14 15 BACK OF RELAY 271-N2A5/1833 (SEE CWO 1836) 11 12 14 15 BACK OF RELAY 271-B/2A5/1833 (SEE CWO 1836) 11 12 14 15 BACK OF RELAY 271-C/2A5/1833 (SEE CWO 1836) 11 12 NONE 27NXl2A5/1836 * *

(SEE CWO 1836)

NONE 271X12A5/1836 * *

(SEE CWO 1836)

00 NOT JUMPER TERMINALS - REPAIR OR REPLACE RELAY I CIRCUIT

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 3,4 Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

2A SG Reference leg failure Time ! Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Trigger 2A Feedwater failure on cue from examiner.

Control Room Indications Available:

2A S/G level decreasing, LlC*9013D slowly trending up SRO Recognizes 2A S/G level trending down Directs BOP to take manual control of 2A S/G level May direct placing turbine on HOLD stopping the power increase Refers to 2-0700030, "Main Feedwater" step 6.2.1 (attached, Pages 12 - 16)

Actual Level lowering, Safety Channel Rising

Directs DCS NR level bypassed Notifies shift manager and I&C of event Directs BOP to stabilize 2A S/G level in manual Refers to Technical Specifications /2-0NP-99.01, "Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation" step 6.3.2 (attached, Pages 17 - 18)

RPS T.S. 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Bypass or trip/one hour (action 2#)

ESFAS T.S.3.3.2 Table 3.3-1 Bypass or trip/one hour Directs RO / BOP to bypass D channel RPS S/G level trip and D channel AFAS 1, and Hi Level Override.

RO Recognizes 2A S/G level trending down ll

""'C111""~"" NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

36A MAIN FEEDWATER NO.:

2-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (less than 60% or greater than 70%)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION

If Main Feed Regulating Valve(s) is pinned open and a Rx trip occurs, Main Feedwater Block Valve(s) must be CLOSED.

ENSURE appropriate considerations and/or briefings occur prior to the initiation of actions in this procedure that could adversely affect reactivity.

With one NR SG level channel bypassed and the remaining channel becomes inaccurate (signal drift or fail on scale), the FWCS will control to the inaccurate signal which could result in major FW valve and flow swings.

If a SG NR level channel is bypassed, stationing a dedicated RCO at the FW controls should be considered.

NOTE

A 1% change in wide range level is approximately equal to a 5% change in narrow range level.

S/G wide range level indication will lead narrow range level indication by approximately 30 seconds to 2 minutes as feedwater flow to the steam generator changes. Therefore, wide range level should be used as a predictor in determining the need for changes in feedwater flow while feedwater regulating valves and/or bypass valves are in manual. For example, if narrow range level is falling but wide range level is stable or increasing, stop increasing feedwater flow to the S/G and wait for narrow range level to turn around. If S/G narrow range level is used as the only level trend indication, an overfeed condition could occur, and a feedwater isolation and/or turbine trip on high S/G level is extremely likely.

Steam generator level control will be adversely effected by changes in steam generator pressure. For example, if steam generator pressures are not stable due to fluctuations in SBCS operation, this will be seen in steam generator level perturbations.

If S/G level reaches 20.5% narrow range, a Rx trip will occur.

One of 2 SG NR level control channels and the single WR level channel used by the DCS on both Trains share a reference leg with each other as well as sharing it (i.e., same reference leg) with a Safety Level Channel (MD on both Trains). Because of this configuration, a reference leg leak would not only cause all 3 channel indicators to rise but would cause the DCS Arbitration logic to choose the failing (rising)

NR level control channel resulting in an actual lowering of SG level. Any SG level alarms or DCS indications (particularly High Level) should be immediately compared against all four Safety Level Channels in order to ascertain actual SG level.

1J

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

36A MAIN FEEDWATER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0700030 S1. LUCIE UNIT 2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (less than 60% or greater than 70%)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. VERIFY SG level by comparing DCS indicated level with NR Level Safety Channels MA - MD on RTGB 202.

A. If DCS and Safety Level channels agree in direction, Then PROCEED to Step 2.

B. lfthe DCS WR and VALIDATED SG NR level indicators are High and/or rising and the majority of the NR level channels are indicating low and/or are lowering, Then PERFORM the following:

1. GO TO the 2A (2B) S/G FW INPUTS screen.

2. SELECT BYPASS for the NR Control Channel that is indicating High Level.

3. VERIFY the VALIDATED SG level Output signal approximately matches the majority of the Safety Level Channels.

4. VERIFY that the Feedwater Control valves are Opening to return SG level back to setpoint.

5. CHECK all Safety Level Channels and TAKE appropriate actions for any deviating channels.

6. INFORM I&C and Engineering.

.~ "~~~~O~ - - -36A

4 MAIN FEEDWATER IPRC)CEDIURE NO.:

2-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (less than 60% or greater than 70%)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. VERIFY proper configuration of feedwater system automatic control valves:

A. Main Feedwater Pump Recirc. A.1 .!f Main Feedwater Pump Valve(s) FCV-09-1A2, (FCV-09-1 B2) recirc valve is open with Main are CLOSED with Main Feedwater Feedwater Pump flow greater Pump flow greater than or equal to than or equal to 2500 gpm, 2500 gpm by the following: Then PERFORM the following:

1. Closed Recirc valve indication on 1. DOWNPOWER as FPD FW Overview screen or required to control SG RTGB green indicating position level(s).

lights.

2. CLOSE downstream isolation V09163 or (V09173).

2. Feed pump control switches in

'Auto Recirc' position.

B. VERIFY FCV-12-1, Condensate System Recirc. Valve is in the required position.

1. CLOSED with normal 1.1 CLOSE upstream isolation condensate flow of <:: 8000 gpm V12304.

as indicated by local flow indicator FIC-12-1 or annunciator G-48 NOT in alarm.

2. OPEN with abnormal condensate flow of S 8000 gpm as indicated by local flow indicator FIC-12-1 or annunciator G-48 IN ALARM.

ION NO.:-- PROCEDURE TITLE:

36A MAIN FEEDWATER 2-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (less than 60% or greater than 70%)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE With the high power feedwater valve (FCV-9011/9021) in MANUAL and the low power feedwater valve (FCV-9005/9006) in AUTO the DCS algorithm provides a demand signal to the low power feedwater valve whenever the high power feedwater valve is re-positioned. This demand signal is designed to compensate for movement of the high power feedwater valve such that there is no net impact to flow (essentially on "opposite" signal).

This signal may override the normal level and steam I feed flow demands if a large demand is place on the high power valve (low power valve will open if high power valve is rapidl closed).

c. VERIFY FCV-9011 (FCV-9021), SG C.1 If FCV-9011 (FCV-9021), SG 2A (2B) FEED REG Valves are 2A (2B) FEED REG Valves controlling SG levels at setpoint. are NOT controlling SG levels, at setpoint, Then PERFORM '

the following:

1. ENSURE that the applicable control station, LlC-9005 for SG 'A' (or LlC-9006 for SG 'B'), LOW PWR MIA STA is selected to AUTO (A).

2. PLACE applicable control station, FIC-9011 (FIC-9021), HIGH PWR MIA STA in MANUAL (M).

3. CLOSE S/G 2A (2B) FEED REG Valve using the Manual Down Arrow until the 15% BYPASS Valve OPENS to between 20% to 50% as indicated on the LOW PWR MIA STA POS indicator.

36A MAIN FEEDWATER PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0700030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 2 Abnormal Steam Generator Level (less than 60% or greater than 70%)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. C.1 (continued)

4. MAINTAIN SG level at setpoint and adjust Main Feed Reg Valve manual position as required to maintain 15% BYPASS Valve position between 20% to 50% open.

3. If local operation of Main Feedwater Regulating Valves is required, Then PERFORM Appendix A or B (of this procedure) as required.

4. VERIFY LCV-900S (LCV-9006) 15% 4.1 PERFORM the following:

BYPASS VALVE is controlling SG level at setpoint in AUTO.

A. ENSURE FIC-9011 (FIC-9021),

2A (2B) HIGH PWR MIA STA in MANUAL.

B. PLACE LlC-900S (LlC-9006),

2A (2B) LOW PWR MIA STA in MANUAL.

C. CONTROL SG level at setpoint using LlC-900S (LlC-9006), 2A (2B) LOW PWR MIA STA in MANUAL.

D. If an Uppower is in progress, Then PERFORM the following:

1. RAISE power level SLOWLY while maintaining SG level.

20 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION NO.:

2-0NP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ESFAS Channel Malfunction (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. (continued) 2. (continued)

NOTE

S/G level indicators are covered by Tech Spec 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1 for RPS and Tech Spec 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 for ESFAS.

ESFAS cabinet door ke , ke ESFAS.

H. Steam Generator Level H.1 PERFORM ONE of the following:

instrumentation indication:

L1C-9013A1B/C/D 1. BYPASS the following channels affected by the failed

LI C-9023A1B/C/D instrument:

Lo Lvi SG RPS trip unit (key 104)

1f SG-2A, Then AF AS-1 AFAS cabinet door key 202 chan A - key 203 chan B - key 204 chan C - key 205 chan 0 - key 206

1f SG-2B, Then AFAS-2 AF AS cabinet door key 202 chan A - key 203 chan B - key 204 chan C - key 205 chan 0 - key 206

Place the affected channel steam generator Hi Lvi Override Keyswitch to bypass.

chan A - key 15 chan B - key 16 chan C - key 17 chan 0 - key 18 OR II

REVISION NO.:

20 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.3 ESFAS Channel Malfunction (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. H.1 (continued)

. CAUTION

~1 An AFAS channel in the TRIPPED condition is limited to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months in accordance with OPS-503, Technical Specification Guidance.

NOTE

~1 It is preferable to leave the AFAS trip units in BYPASS if it is necessary to place the RPS and ESFAS trip units in TRIP.

2. PLACE the affected RPS and AFAS trip units in TRIP in accordance with Appendix A, Placing Trip Units in Trip and place the affected channel steam generator Hi Level Override Keyswitch to bypass.

chan A - key 15 chan B - key 16 chan C - key 17 chan 0 - key 18 END OF SECTION 6.3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # . 4 Event # 3,4 of 19 Event

Description:

2A SG Reference leg failure Time 1 Position 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Takes manual control of 2A MFRV with SRO concurrence

On the T-800 or OCS screen selects MANUAL RO/BOP

Using the UP arrows (single or double) opens the MFRV

Monitors level response on unaffected NR levels Secures dilution if directed by SRO Monitors plant parameters while event in progress BOP Recognizes 2A S/G level trending down Places OEH control panel on hold (depresses HOLD PB) if directed by SRO Places 2A S/G feedwater control in manual as directed Bypass SG OCS NR level as directed by 2-0700030 step 6.2.1.B.1 Restores 2A S/G level to normal value as directed Bypasses 0 channel RPS S/G level trip (key 104) and 0 channel AFAS 1 (keys 202 and 206), and 0 Hi Level Override (key 18), when directed 19

Appendix D Required Operator Actions . Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 5. of 19 Event

Description:

Main Spray Valves Fail OPEN Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Trigger PIC-11 OOX Pressurizer pressure output fail high on cue from examiner.

Booth Operator response:

When requested I&C reports the output of PIC 11 OOX to HIC 1100 has failed high.

Control Room Indications Available:

Pressurizer pressure decreasing and both main spray valves fully open.

Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down I main spray SRO valves fully open Directs RO to take manual control of H IC-11 00 (or may direct swapping pressurizer pressure control channel to 'Y')

Refers to 2-0120035, "Pressurizer Pressure and Level" step 7.2.1 (attached, Page 22)

May direct hold on power increase (if still in progress)

Directs RO to control RCS pressure by energizing additional heaters, if available and manual control of spray valves.

Notifies shift manager and I&C of event Refers to Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB) if pressure <2225 psia.

Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down I main spray RO valves fully open Places HIC-11 00 in manual or swaps to operable pressure channel'Y' as directed

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 5 of 19 Event

Description:

Main Spray Valves Fail OPEN Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Secures dilution if directed by SRO (if still in progress)

Places DEH control panel on hold if directed by SRO (if still in BOP progress)

"- Monitors secondary plant parameters while event in progress

PROCEDURE TITLE:

25 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS

.1 Immediate Operator Actions

1. None

.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS - CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE

Technical Specifications 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation, and 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, are applicable for Pressurizer Level and Pressure Instrumentation malfunctions.

If SIAS has actuated, SIAS must be RESET before Pressurizer Heaters can be ener ized.

1. ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER 1.

PRESSURE CONDITION NOTE Appendix "A" contains a listing of pressurizer pressures which are associated with automatic actions.

A. Verify pressurizer spray, proportional A. If system is NOT operating and back-up heaters are operating properly in automatic, Then properly in automatic. Refer to perform the following as Appendix "A" for expected automatic necessary:

responses.

1. .If selected pressure channel has failed, Then shift to the operable pressure channel.

2. If selected pressure channel has failed high (greater than 2340 psia),

Then after selecting the operable channel, reset heater control switches on RTGS 203.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 6,6a Page 10 of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 2A2 MCC I Restoration of Charging and Letdown Time II Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Loss of 2A2 MCC on cue from examiner Booth Operator Instructions:

When SNPO asked to investigate, report breaker 40121 feeder breaker is open. It appears a worker handling scaffolding piping tripped the breaker.

If EM called, report back in 5 minutes, no apparent damage and recommend attempt to close breaker.

Close breaker when directed.

Control Room Indications Available:

Letdown pressure and level control valves close, letdown indication goes low. Loss of indicating lights on various equipment mostly RTGB 205.

Annunciator F-15 PW disch. Press Lo Lo Recognizes letdown flow lost I 2A2 MCC is lost (will have to SRO recognize de-energized equipment to determine which MCC is lost) Refer to 2-ADM-03.01 C Power Distribution Breaker List Directs RO to stop Charging Pumps upon loss of Letdown, step 6.1 of 2-0NP-02.03, "Charging and Letdown May direct hold on power increase (if still in progress)

Refers tc;> 2-0NP-02.03, "Charging and Letdown" Refers to 2-0NP-47.02, "Loss of a Non Safety Related AC Bus" Appendix G (attached, Page 25)

Notifies Management of event Direct SNPO one attempt to close breaker after Electrical Maintenance reports.

Directs BOP to restore Charging and Letdown lAW 2-0NP-02.03 step 6.0.11when power restored.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 6,6a of 19 Event

Description:

Loss of 2A2 MCC I Restoration of Charging and Letdown Time Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognizes letdown flow lost / 2A2 MCC is lost (will have to recognize de-energized equipment to determine which MCC is RO lost)

Closes V2515, 2516 and V2522 Letdown Isolation Valves.

Stops all running Charging Pumps as directed Secures dilution if directed by SRO (if still in progress) although previous running PMW pump will be off.

Monitors plant parameters while event in progress BOP Recognize loss of 2A Primary water pump Restore 2A2 MCC per 2-0NP-47.02 (attached, Page 25)

Restores Charging and Letdown lAW 2-0NP-02.03 step 6.0.11.A-V as directed (attached, Pages 26 - 30)

Conducts board walkdown when power restored to assure lost equipment re-energized.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

2 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED A.C. BUS PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-47.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX G RESTORATION OF 2A2 480V MCC (Page 1 of 1)

CHECK

.!f the deenergized bus is the 2A2 480V MCC, Then PROCEED as follows:

CAUTION

Various instruments and equipment that are normally used for the assessment of critical safety functions may not be operable. Use all available indications.

DO NOT ATTEMPT to reset and close the Feeder Breaker 2-40121 UNLESS an emer enc situation exists.

NOTE Table 1 contains a listing of the ma'or loads that have been lost.

A. START 2B Waste Gas Compressor (if not already in AUTO).

B. START 2B Closed Blowdown Cooling Water Pump (if not already running).

C. INVESTIGATE and ANALYZE the cause of the bus deenergization.

D. NOTIFY Electrical Maintenance of the current condition of the MCC.

E. When conditions on the 2A2 MCC are cleared and the MCC is ready to be restored, Then PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE 2-40121 (MCC 2A2 Supply).

2. RESTORE normal loads as directed by Unit Supervisor.

END OF APPENDIX G

REVISION NO;: PROCEDURE TITLE:

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 S1. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. If letdown is unavailable, Then MAINTAIN pressurizer level by temporarily cycling charging pumps.

NOTE

§3 If one or more charging pumps have lost pumping ability, gas binding may have occurred. This can result from pumping the VCT dry (hydrogen binding) or rupture of a charging pump suction accumulator (nitrogen binding). If this occurred, the charging pumps must be vented after restoring a source of water to the suction.

10. If the charging pumps are gas bound, Then REFER TO Appendix C, Venting a Gas Bound Charging Pump.

11. ltcharging and letdown has 11.

been lost and can be restored, Then RE-ESTABLISH charging and letdown flow as follows:

A. ENSURE adequate VCT A.1 RESTORE the VCT level is indicated. to a normal level in accordance with 2-0NP-02.01, Boron Concentration Control. -

B. ENSURE the Level Control Valve selector switch and the Pressure Control Valve selector switch are selected to the level and pressure control valves presently in service.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE 15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

C. PLACE HIC-111 0, Level, controller in MANUAL.

D. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is in AUTO and set to maintain 150 psig.

E. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch in the BYPASS position.

F. ENSURE the Level Control Valves are CLOSED.

G. BYPASS Letdown Ion Exchangers by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the BYPASS RESET POSITION.

H. START one charging pump I. VERIFY charging flow is indicated.

NOTE If V2515 closed due to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Temp High, it may be necessary to cycle V2515 while opening the PZR Level control valve until flow is adequate to clear the high temperature alarm.

J. VERIFY the regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm, SIAS or CIS alarms are NOT present.

dl

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

K. OPEN V2515, Stop Valve-IC.

L. OPEN V2516, Containment Isol Valve-IC.

M. OPEN V2522, Containment Isol Valve-OC.

N. SLOWLY OPEN the Level Control Valve and ESTABLISH approximately 5 gpm letdown flow.

CAUTION Prolonged use of charging without letdown could result in the pressurizer going solid. Pressurizer level must be closely monitored.

NOTE TI-2229, Charging Temp Outlet Regen HX should NOT be allowed to increase more than 60°F per minute.

O. WHEN Letdown 0.1 .!f letdown cannot be temperature stabilizes on restored, TIC-2221, Temp Regen Then INITIATE charging Hx Tube Out, as required for restoring Then RAISE letdown pressurizer level, or flow at a rate NOT to boration.

exceed 5 to 10 gpm over at least a 4 minute period~

P. ENSURE PIC-2201, Pressure controller is maintaining letdown pressure at 150 psig.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

CHARGING AND LETDOWN NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

Q. When PZR level is at its setpoint, Then PERFORM the following:

1. BALANCE HIC-1110, LEVEL, controller AUTO to MANUAL output signals, using the BIAS control knob while previewing the AUTO signal.

2. PLACEHIC-1110, LEVEL, controller to AUTO.

3. MONITOR pressu'rizer level for abnormal trends.

R. PLACE the Position Limiter Bypass key switch to the NORM position.

CAUTION V2345, LTDN CNTL VLV STATION SAFETY RELIEF, will open at 600 psig.

s. SLOWLY RAISE PIC-2201, Pressure, setpoint to 430 psig.

T. ENSURE letdown pressure is being maintained at 430 psig.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

15 CHARGING AND LETDOWN PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

U. NOTIFY Health Physics that dose rates near CVCS ion exchangers and piping may change when ion exchanger is placed in service.

V. PLACE the Letdown Ion Exchangers back in service by placing V2520 Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve to the AUTO Position.

12. 11 Letdown Level control is 12.

malfunctioning, Then PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the output of A.1 PLACE HIC-1110 in MANUAL by HIC-1110, LEVEL, is performing the following:

responding as expected

1. BALANCE HIC-1110 to current plant MANUAL to AUTO conditions.

controller output signals by previewing and using the MANUAL control knob to match the manual and auto controller output signals.

2. PLACE HIC-1110 to MANUAL.

3. ADJUST letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

4. PERFORM a system walkdown observing for leaks or lifting relief valves.

B. VERIFY the selected B.1 PLACE the Alternate Level control level control valve is valve in service in accordance responding as expected with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and to HIC-1110 output. Letdown.

3D

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 12 of 19 Event

Description:

2A SGTR with steam leak on same generator, Manual Trip EOP-01 B SIAS train fails to actuate; 2B Containment Spray Pump fails to start Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger SGTR and ESDE on cue from examiner Control Room Indications Available:

Pressurizer level decreasing rapidly, containment pressure increasing on reactor trip SRO Recognizes pressurizer level decreasing rapidly Directs RO to isolate letdown (if re-established)

Directs RO to start 3rd Charging pump Directs RO to trip reactor when Pressurizer level cannot be maintained Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

Recognizes MSIS on Containment pressure. MSIV's closed Directs RO to stop 1 RCP in each loop on SIAS Recognize B train SIAS did not actuate Critical Directs RO to manually actuate B train SIAS Task Directs RO to re-establish CCW to RCP lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix J or trip all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes.

31

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 13 of 19 EVent

Description:

2A SGTR with steam leak on same generator, Manual Trip EOP-01 B SIAS train fails to actuate; 2B Containment Spray Pump fails to start Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize 28 Containment Spray Pump did not start on CSAS Critical Directs RO to manually start 28 Containment Spray Pump Task RO Recognizes pressurizer level decreasing rapidly Isolates letdown (if re-established) as directed Starts 3rd Charging Pump as directed RO Manually trips reactor as directed.

Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control and Core Heat Removal Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering

Verify startup rate is negative.

Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.

Inventory Control

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

~

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% (Level is not trending, manual start of chg pumps and isolate letdown)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 14 of 19 Event

Description:

2A SGTR with steam leak on same generator, Manual Trip EOP-01 B SIAS train fails to actuate; 2B Containment Spray Pump fails to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Pressure Control

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia (at 1736 psia verify SIAS and stop RCP in each loop)

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)

Verify RCS subcooling is >20°F Core Heat Removal

Verify at least one RCO running with CCW ( if >10 minutes with no CCW must secure)

Verify loop delta T is <10°F RO Recognizes B train SIAS did not actuate Critical Manually actuates B train SIAS as directed / verify all pumps step and valves actuated Stops 1 RCP in each loop on SIAS initiation as directed Recognizes increasing trends on SJAE radiation monitor, Main BOP Steam Line Monitor and SG Blowdown monitor Verify turbine trips on reactor trip Manually closes MSR block valves Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Maintenance of vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal and Containment Conditions 33

Appendix D ~ Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 15 of 19 Event

Description:

2A SGTR with steam leak on same generator, Manual Trip EOP-01 B SIAS train fails to actuate; 2B Containment Spray Pump fails to start Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

BOP

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized.

(2A3 not energized, 2AB, and 2B3 energized from EDG)

All vital and non vital DC Buses energized.

(2A, 2B, 2AB 2C and 20 DC Buses)

RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has feedwater available

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525° and 535° F

Verify SG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig. (It is trending lower, ensures ADV's and SBCS valves are closed)

Close the 4 MSR Block valves (no power TCV must be close on Reheat Panel)

Containment Conditions

Verify containment pressure <2 psig (Pressure is increasing ensures 4 containment cooling fans on)

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm (radiation is from SG tube rupture, very small amount)

Verify containment temperature is less than 120°F (Temperature is slowly increasing)

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms (MS rad monitor and Steam Jet Air Ejector are trending upward).

Upon unit trip, notify NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99. (outside CR actions)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 7,8,9 Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

2A SGTR with steam leak on same generator, Manual Trip EOP-01 B SIAS train fails to actuate; 2B Containment Spray Pump fails to start Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize 2B Containment Spray Pump did not start on CSAS Re-establish CCW to RCPs lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix J as BOP directed or stop all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes. (this may be done in 2-EOP-01)

Critical Manually start 2B Containment Spray Pump when directed step

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 10 Page 17 of 19 Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE EOP-15 Isolate 2A Steam Generator Time ~ Position A Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs entry to 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" due to dual SRO event (SGTR / ESDE) ( steps 1-11) (attached, Pages 39 - 43)

Directs RO to re-establish CCW to RCP lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix J or trip all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes.

Direct RO to perform Table 13 RCP operating limits.

Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's Direct Hydrogen Analyzers placed in service per Appendix L EOP-99 Direct BOP to perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 Direct Safety Function Status Check's performed every 15 minutes Identify Success paths in service per Attachment 3 as:

RC-1 MVA-DC-1 MVA-AC-1 IC-2 PC-1 HR-2 CI-1 (not met until 2A SG Isolated)

CTPC-3 (if 2B Containment Spray started)

CCGC-1 Performs success path instructions for CI-1 (attached) first due to Safety Function not being met until 2A SG isolated .

.r

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Event # 18 19 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4

- - - Page of Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE EOP-15 Isolate 2A Steam Generator Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Refers to HR-2 (step 4.6.19) to address isolation of 2A SG, then returns to CI-1 when the 2A SG isolated.

(attached Page 55)

When Tho! <510°F direct isolation of 2A SG lAW Appendix R SRO EOP-99.

Determines CI-1 satisfied by Condition 2

Most affected SG isolated

CIAS actuated When CI satisfied refer to IC-2 May direct manual AFW start due to trip at low power, no Main Feedwater due to MSIS.

RO Stabilizes RCS temperature if 2A S/G blows dry as directed Perform Table 13 RCP Operating limits (attached, Page 58)

Manually start AFW and feed 2B SG when directed.

Re-establish CCW to RCPs lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix J as BOP directed or stop all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes.

(attached, Pages 59 - 60)

Perform Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's, when directed BOP (attached, Pages 61 - 62)

Directs BOP to isolate 2A S/G lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R (attached, Pages 63 - 65).

37

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 4 Event # 10 Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

SGTR, ESDE EOP-15 Isolate 2A Steam Generator Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform Appendix L EOP-99 Hydrogen Analyzers when BOP directed (attached, Pages 66 - 67)

Perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 when directed (attached, Pages 68 - 71)

Perform SFSC's of EOP-15 every 15 minutes Scenario Termination Cue:

2A SG is isolated,

RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized and

all Safety Functions are met in EOP-15

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A harsh containment condition exists if containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should be used for determination of saturation margin when indicated containment temperature is less than or equal to 200°F. Figure 1B should be used when indicated containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should also be used if containment temperature had exceeded 200°F during event progression but was lowered to 200°F or less b containment coolin s stems.

NOTE

Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available. Reg Guide 1.97 designated instruments should be used for diagnosis of events and confirmation of safety functions.

Steps designated with an

may be performed non-sequentially or are to be erformed continuousl .

o 1. Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.

REFER TO EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies.

o 2. Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Placekeeper and NOTE the time of EOP entry.

TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 3. RCP Trip Strategy A. 11 ANY of the following conditions exist,

2A or 2B AFW Pump is the ONLY source of Feedwater

., RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia

RCS Temperature is less than 500°F Then STOP ONE RCP in EACH loop.

B. 11 ANY of the following conditions exist,

Main or Auxiliary Feedwater flow can NOT be re-established

<<I RCS subcooling is less than minimum subcooling

CCW is LOST to the RCPs for greater than 10 minutes Then STOP ALL RCPs.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 4. Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. VERIFY CCW to the RCPs. A.1 If SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then RESTORE CCW.

REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs.

A.2 if ccw is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.

B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACiNG the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.

B. !f BOTH of the following conditions exist, e RCPs have CCW flow

CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleed off flowpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleedoff flowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 5. Verify RCP Operating Limits 5.1 STOP RCPs that do NOT satisfy operating limits.

11 RCPs are RUNNING, Then VERIFY RCP operating limits are satisfied.

REFER TO Table 13, RCP Operating Limits.

D 6. Sample SIGs Sample BOTH S/Gs for activity and boron.

REFER TO Appendix A, Sampling Steam Generators.

D 7. Place Hydrogen Analyzers in Service PLACE BOTH Hydrogen Analyzers in service.

REFER TO Appendix L, Placing Hydrogen Analyzer in Service.

o 8. Protect Main Condenser PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. 11 a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:

1. ENSURE MSIVs are CLOSED.

2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.

B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant AS NECESSARY.

REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.

TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 9. Restore Instrument Air If a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

o 10. Perform Safety Function Status Checks PERFORM the Safety Function Status Checks every 15 minutes.

REFER TO Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check Sheet.

o 11. Identify Success Paths IDENTIFY the success paths to be used to satisfy each safety function.

REFER TO Attachment 3, Functional Recovery Success Paths.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. Ensure Containment Isolation and Cooling If ANY of the following conditions exist,

Containment pressure greater than 3.5 psig

Containment radiation greater than 10 R/hr

SIAS is ACTUATED Then PERFORM ALL the following:

A. ENSURE BOTH the following:

1. ENSURE CIAS has 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN CIAS ACTUATED. components.

REFER TO Table 2, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.

2. If Containment pressure is 2.1 Manually START/ALIGN MSIS greater than 3.5 psig, components.

Then ENSURE MSIS has REFER TO Table 5, Main Steam ACTUATED. Isolation Actuation Signal.

B. ENSURE ALL available Emergency Containment HVAC systems are RUNNING:

At least ONE train of SBVS

At least ONE train of Containment Fan Coolers

ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 Success Path 1 - A (continued) Isolation (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION J1 there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.

o 2. Determine If SGTR Present J1 a SGTR has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following,

S/G activity

Main steam piping radiation

S/G level change when NOT feeding

S/G blowdown activity

ONE S/G level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same for BOTH

Feedflow mismatch between S/Gs

Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a S/G PRIOR to the trip Then IDENTIFY and ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.

REFER TO Heat Removal Success Path HR-1 or HR-2, and RETURN TO this success path when the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

4. 7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 Success Path 1 - Au (continued) Isolation (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 3. Verify No RCS to CCW Leak 3.1 !f RCS to CCW leakage is suspected, VERIFY NO RCS leakage into the Then ISOLATE the leak.

CCWsystem: REFER TO 2-0NP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.

A. Absence of CCW Surge Tank high level alarm (Annunciator LB-10).

B. ENSURE sample flow to the CCW radiation monitors and NO indication of activity.

FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 Success Path 1 - A"T,..rn~'TI (continued) Isolation (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 4. Verify CI-1 Satisfied 4.1 If Containment Isolation is still in jeopardy, VERIFY CI-1 (Automatic/Manual Then PURSUE Containment Isolation) is satisfied by ANY of the Isolation following conditions being satisfied: and other jeopardized safety functions simultaneously.

Condition 1: 4.2 CONTINUE efforts to establish Containment Isolation by A. 1f ANY secondary plant activity evaluating further actions based on monitor alarms All of the following:

or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is

The urgency of other ISOLATED. jeopardized safety functions B. Containment pressure is less

The risk to plant personnel than 3.5 psig. and the public of leaving certain containment C. NO containment area penetrations unisolated or atmospheric radiation monitor alarms

The feasibility of isolating or unexplained rise. containment penetration(s) by alternate means D. 1f a SGTR exists, Then the isolated S/G pressure is less than 915 psig (930 psi a) and NOT steaming via ADV.

Condition 2:

A. 1f ANY secondary plant activity monitor alarms or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.

B. CIAS is ACTUATED.

SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG W HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION 11 there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.

o 9. Determine If ESD Present If an ESD has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following,

High steam flow from S/G

Lowering S/G pressure

.. Lowering S/G level

.. Lowering RCS cold leg temperature

Lowering Pressurizer pressure

Lowering Pressurizer level Then DETERMINE the MOST affected steam generator.

D 10. If No ESD, GO TO Step 15

!! there are NO ESD indications, Then GO TO Step 15.

o 11. Isolate the MOST Affected SIG 11 MSIS has NOT isolated the leak, Then ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.

REFER TO Appendix R, Steam Generator Isolation.

4c

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 Res and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - S/G W HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 12. Verify Correct S/G was Isolated 12.1 if the wrong S/G was isolated, Then RESTORE feeding and VERIFY the MOST affected S/G is steaming capability to the isolated isolated by observing ALL of the S/G.

following:

12.2 When RCS heat removal is

S/G pressures re-established on the least affected S/G,

S/G levels Then ISOLATE the most affected S/G.

It RCS cold leg temperatures REFER TO Appendix R, Steam Generator Isolation.

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY NO.:

2-EOP":15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 13. Stabilize RCS Temperature 13.1 Steam using 2C AFW Pump and alternate steaming flow paths.

!f there are NO indications of a LOCA REFER TO Table 12, Alternate or SGTR, S/G Heat Removal Paths.

Then STABILIZE RCS temperature by performing ALL of the following:

A. STEAM the LEAST affected S/G using the ADV.

B. CONTROL feedwater to the LEAST affected S/G.

C. ENSURE the RCS is within the limits of Figure 1A or 1B, RCS Pressure Temperature.

D. !f BOTH of the following conditions are met,

NO RCPs are RUNNING

The limits of Figure 1A or 1B were exceeded Then PERFORM BOTH of the

1. RECORD the temperature, pressure and time when control of RCS temperature was regained.

2. MAINTAIN RCS Pressure and Temperature stable for a minimum of TWO hours.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcoolin D 14. Cooldown RCS 11 indication of a LOCA or SGTR exists, Then PERFORM the following:

A. COOLDOWN the RCS using A.1 COOLDOWN using ADVs.

SBCS.

A.2 COOLDOWN using alternate

1. 11 RCPs are operating, steaming paths.

Then COOLDOWN not to REFER TO Table 12, Alternate exceed 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months S/G Heat Removal Paths.

period.

2. 11 RCPs are NOT operating, Then COOL DOWN not to exceed 50°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period.

3. 11 RCPs are NOT operating, and a S/G is ISOLATED for a SGTR event, Then COOLDOWN not to exceed 30°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period.

B. BORATE the RCS until Shutdown Margin is greater than the value required by the COLR.

REFER TO 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

N NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG W HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION if there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.

o 15. Determine If SGTR Present if a SGTR has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following:

III S/G sample activities

.. Main Steam Line radiation monitoring trending prior to the trip

S/G level change when NOT feeding

SGBD radiation monitoring

" ONE S/G level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same

" Feed flow mismatch between S/Gs

Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a S/G prior to the trip Then DETERMINE the MOST affected S/G.

o 16. If No SGTR, GO TO Step 29

!! there are NO SGTR indications, Then GO TO Step 29.

'\

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 .RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG HR-2 (continued) - (continued)

. INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Operation of the 2C AFW Pump should be avoided to minimize direct releases to the environment. If motor driven AFW pumps are NOT available, steam from the least affected S/G should be used.

o 17. RCS Cooldown to less than 510°F 17.1 COOLDOWN the RCS using ADVs.

COOLDOWN the RCS to T HOT less than 510°F using SBCS. 17.2 COOLDOWN using 2C AFW Pump and alternate steaming flow paths on the unisolated S/G.

REFER TO Table 12, Alternate S/G Heat Removal Paths.

S3

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 .

4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG W HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE RCP operation is desirable while depressurizing the RCS during a SGTR event.

RCP operation takes precedence over equalizing primary and secondary pressures.

Monitor RCPs for cavitation as the NPSH curve is approached and exceeded.

Maintain minimum subcoolin within the limits of Fi ure 1A or 1B.

o 18. Depressurize the RCS 18.1 If RCS pressure can NOT be LOWERED and MAINTAINED PERFORM a controlled RCS within the specified criteria, depressurization as follows: Then OPERATE the PORVs or RCGVS to reduce pressure.

A. MAINTAIN RCS pressure within REFER TO Pressure Control ALL the following criteria (listed Success Path PC-2.

in order of priority):

Within the limits of Figure 1A or 1B, RCS Pressure Temperature

Less than 930 psia

Above the minimum pressure for RCP operation

Approximately equal to the most affected S/G pressure (within 50 psia)

B. OPERATE Main or Auxiliary Pressurizer spray.

C. If HPSI throttle criteria are met, Then THROTTLE SI flow.

REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration.

TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONALRECOVERY IPRC)CEDIURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 19. Isolate the MOST Affected SIG When RCS hot leg temperature is less than 510°F, Then ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.

REFER TO Appendix R, Steam Generator Isolation.

o 20. Maintain ISOLATED SIG below 915 psig (930 psia)

MAINTAIN the ISOLATED S/G pressure less than 915 psig (930 psia) by ANY of the following:

Manual operation of the MSIV Bypass valve. (If condenser vacuum exists)

Manual operation of the associated ADV

Local operation of the associated ADV o 21. Verify Correct SIG was Isolated 21.1 11 the wrong S/G was isolated, Then RESTORE feeding and VERIFY the MOST affected S/G is steaming capability to the isolated isolated by observing ALL of the 8/G.

following:

21.2 When RCS heat removal has been

S/G sample activities re-established on the least affected S/G,

SGBD monitor radiation levels Then ISOLATE the most affected S/G. REFER TO Appendix R,

SJAE exhaust monitor radiation Steam Generator Isolation.

level

S/G levels

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. lUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcoolin D 22. Cooldown RCS A. COOlDOWN the RCS using A.1 COOlDOWN using ADVs.

SBCS.

A.2 COOlDOWN using alternate

1. !f RCPs are operating. steaming paths.

Then COOlDOWN not to REFER TO Table 12, Alternate exceed 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months S/G Heat Removal Paths.

period.

2. !f RCPs are NOT operating, Then COOlDOWN not to exceed 50°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period.

3. li RCPs are NOT operating.

and a S/G is ISOLATED for a SGTR event, Then COOlDOWN not to exceed 30°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period.

B. BORATE the RCS until Shutdown Margin is greater than the value required by the COlR.

REFER TO 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

PROCEDURE TITLE:

29 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - SIG HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 23. Sample RCS for Dilution

!f RCS pressure is less than the ISOLATED S/G pressure, Then SAMPLE the RCS for boron concentration in 30 minute intervals.

o 24. Disable RCPs in the ISOLATED SIG loop

!f ALL RCPs have been STOPPED, Then DISABLE BOTH RCPs associated with the ISOLATED S/G:

A. PLACE the Associated Oil Lift Pump control switch in OFF.

B. REMOVE the CLOSE fuses for the associated RCP breakers.

o 25. Maintain ISOLATED SIG Level less than 90% NR MAl NTAI N the ISOLATED S/G level less than 90% NR by ANY of the following methods:

Lowering RCS pressure to below isolated S/G pressure (back flow is the MOST preferred method)

Blowing down the isolated S/G to the MST

Steaming the isolated S/G to the condenser

Steaming the isolated S/G to atmosphere (steaming to atmosphere is the LEAST preferred method)

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 TABLE 13 RCP OPERATING LIMITS (Page 1 of 1)

ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF ACTIONS WHEN CONDITIONS ARE OPERATION OUTSIDE ACCEPTABLE RANGE T COLD must be greater than 500°F for 4 11 TCOLD is approaching or is less than 500°F, RCPs to be RUNNING. Then ENSURE at least ONE RCP is STOPPED.

RCS Pressure Temperature is above MONITOR RCP instrumentation for and to the left of the RCP NPSH cavitation or seal failure requirement curve of Figure 1A or 1B,

11 cavitation or multiple seal failure is RCS Pressure Temperature. indicated, Then STOP the affected RCPs Guide bearing temperatures are less STOP the affected RCPs.

than 185°F.

Thrust bearing temperatures are less STOP the affected RCPs.

than 200°F.

CCW flow greater than 200 gpm. 11 CCW flow is lost and can NOT be re-established within 10 minutes Then STOP the affected RCPs.

Oil Reservoir Levels +2 to -2 inches. 11 valid, rapidly changing or full scale high or low indicated level in either the upper or lower oil reservoir Then STOP the affected RCPs.

Controlled Bleedoff and Lower Cavity 11 Controlled Bleedoff or Lower Seal Cavity Seal temperature is less than 250°F. temperature is greater than or equal to 250°F, Then STOP the affected RCPs.

END OF TABLE 13

ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CSO TO THE RCPs (Page 1 of 2) o 1. ENSURE Instrument Air to Containment is available by PLACING HCV-1S-1 to CLOSE / OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

CAUTION*

Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards si nals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-SA (HCV-14-SB) starts to open.

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset.

o 2. 11 SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-SA 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-9 'N' Hdr Isol Suction OR

HCV-14-SB 'N' Hdr Isol Discharge

HCV-14-10 'N' Hdr Isol Suction D. 3. ALIGN CCW to / from the RCPs by OPENING ALL of the following valves:

o HCV-14-1, CCWTo RC PUMP o HCV-14-2, CCW From RC PUMP o HCV-14-7, CCW To RC PUMP o HCV-14-6, CCW From RC PUMP o 4. 11 CIAS has isolated controlled bleedoff flow to the VCT, Then OPEN V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.

NO.:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDlXJ RESTORATION OF CCW AND CSO TO THE Reps (Page 2 of 2)

CAUTION RCP Seal Cooler isolation valves automatically close on high Seal Cooler outlet temperature of 200°F. Maintaining the control switch in the OPEN position will override this function: CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage should conditions warrant the valve(s) to be maintained in the open position. Consideration should be given to returning the control switch(es) to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

o 5. ENSURE ALL RCP Seal Cooler Isolation valves are OPEN:

o HCV-14-11-A1, CCW From 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-A2, CCW From 2A2 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B1, CCW From 2B1 RCP Seal Cooler o HCV-14-11-B2, CCW From 2B2 RCP Seal Cooler

6. VERIFY RCP CCW related alarms are CLEAR or have been evaluated and dispositioned.

END OF APPENDIX J

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train ("1/) B Train C")

o 1. !f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:

o A. ENSURE 2AB 4S0V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.

CAUTION Under SIAS conditions the CCW 'N' header should only be aligned to ONE essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-SA (HCV-14-SB) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. !f SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then RESTORE flow from EITHER 'A' or 'B' CCW Header by PLACING the control switches for the desired train to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-SA

HCV-14-9 OR

HCV-14-SB

HCV-14-10

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES / TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)

3. !f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE / OVERRIDE and then to OPEN.

o 4. DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples for activity and boron.

o 5. !f S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A

PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA EDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)

~'-TBnn 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation CAUTION If S/G isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.

D 2. !f HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

D 6. !f BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

D MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve D LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass D MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

NO.:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA IPRC)CEC'URE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6) on 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued) o 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.

o 9. ENSURE MV-OB-1BA, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 10.CLOSE MV-OB-14, 2A S/G ADV Isol.

o 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.

o 12.ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.

13.ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

14. PLACE MV-OB-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

1S.ENSURE MV-OB-19A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.

o 16.CLOSE MV-OB-15, 2A S/G ADV Isol.

o 17.PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

o A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

o C. CLOSE SE-OB-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

o D. !f SE-OB-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE VOBBB4, SE-OB-2 Inlet Isolation.

(continued on next page)

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6) ection 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued) 17.(continued) o E. If MV-08-13, S/G 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

o 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

o 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

o a. CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

o b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

o V08622, CB #67 Drain D V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol D V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol End of Section 1

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 1 of 2)

A Train ("-J) B Train ("-J)

1. SELECT ONE sample pOint by PLACING the sample valve selector switch in the desired position. FSE-27-8 FSE-27-12 (Upper Cntmt. Dome) (Lwr. Cntmt.)

FSE-27-9_ FSE-27-13 (Pzr. Area) (2B2 Rep)

FSE-27-10 FSE-27-14 (2A1 RCP) (2B1 RCP)

FSE-27-11 (2A2 RCP)

2. OPEN the Containment Isolation Valves. FSE-27-15 FSE-27-17 (Sample in to H2 Analyzer)

AND FSE-27-16 FSE-27-18 (Sample out of H2 Analyzer)

3. ENSURE the function selector switch is in the SAMPLE position.

4. PLACE the OFF I STANDBY I ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.

NOTE If power is interrupted and then restored to an in-service Hydrogen Analyzer (such as after an ESFAS or Undervoltage Relay actuation) the remote control selector pushbutton must be depressed to allow for continued operation of the anal zer from the Control Room.

5. DEPRESS the remote control selector pushbutton.

6. VERIFY the red sample light energizes.

NO.:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX l PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 2)

A Train tv)

7. START the Hydrogen Analyzer Recorder. (switch located inside recorder)

8. Allow five to ten minutes for the Hydrogen Analyzer to stabilize as indicated by the (%) indication leveling off.

END OF APPENDIX l

NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 8) on 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, with the control switch in RECIRC.

o 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.

o 3. 1f AFAS has actuated, o 3.1 1f AFAS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feedwater is and use of Main Feedwater is desired, desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the Then PERFORM ALL of the following: following:

o A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET. o A. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.

o B. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main o B. For EACH MFW header to FRV] Block valves CLOSED. be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.

1. MV-09-5

2. MV-09-6 o C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power o C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL MIA Stations in MANUAL.

o D. For EACH MFW header to be o D. DEPRESS BOTH ...,. ...,-.

placed in service, ENSURE pushbuttons to RESET the the associated MFIVs are Low Power Feedwater OPEN. Valves.

o E. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons o E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA to RESET the Low Power Stations AS NECESSARY to Feedwater Valves. control S/G levels.

APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA Irn.L-'<=L.'U",<= NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 8) ection 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. (continued) 0 F. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control S/G levels.

0 G. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.

o 4. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.

o 5. ENSURE BOTH of the following:

0 A. Bearing Oil Pump OA.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil and Seal Oil Backup Pump Pump RUNNING.

RUNNING.

0 B. When the turbine reaches 600 rpm, Then Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING.

o 6. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN.

o 7. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING.

o 8. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing 08.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust Oil temperature between 110 to TCW to the in-service TLO Cooler 120°F. to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.

NO.: I'V,-,"'UV"'" TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 8) on 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 9. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO 0 9.1 PERFORM ALL of the following:

rpm, Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES.

o A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL o B. VERIFY the Turning Gear Permissive Light is ON.

o C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED.

o D. Locally START the Turning Gear.

o 1O.1f Reactor power history is low, Then CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature.

o 11. Place Boron Dilution Alarm o 11.1 If BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation. System channels are NOT operating, When indicated Reactor power is Then PERFORM applicable less than 10-5 %, actions of ONP-02.01, Boron Then PERFORM BOTH of the Concentration Control.

following:

o A. ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation.

o B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating.

TITLE:

35 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 8)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMC's room, and impact equipment reliabili if 15 KW heaters are not ener ized after lant shutdown.

o 11.NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMC's room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.10, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.

o 12.CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects.

END OF APPENDIX X

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