ML082381091
| ML082381091 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2008 |
| From: | Bates M NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR-08-003 | |
| Download: ML082381091 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000338/2008003
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
August 25, 2008
Mr. David A. Christian
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060
SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000338/2008003, 05000339/2008003, AND 07200056/2008003
Dear Mr. Christian:
On June 30, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report
documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 9, 2008 and July 30, 2008 with
Mr. Daniel Stoddard, and on August 22, 2008 with other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they related to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your
licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance
(Green) was identified which involved a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, one
licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed
in this report. NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with
Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the
violations and because they were entered into your corrective action program. If you contest
these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.:
Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region II, the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the North Anna
Power Station.
VEPCO 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark A. Bates, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000338/2008003, 05000339/2008003, and 07200056/2008003
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl. (See next page)
___________________
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS
SIGNATURE Non Concur Non -Concur /RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/ /RA By BDesai/
NAME JReece RClagg RMoore CPeabody CEven GGardner KMiller
DATE 8/25/08 8/25/08 7/28/08 7/28/08 7/22/08 7/28/08 7/28/087/28/08
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRP
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
NAME JHelm JDodson JMoorman
DATE 8/25/08 8/25/08
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
VEPCO 3
cc w/encl:
Chris L. Funderburk Eugene S. Grecheck
Director Vice President - Nuclear Development
Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
Leslie N. Hartz
D. G. Stoddard Vice President - Nuclear Support Services
Site Vice President Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
North Anna Power Station 5000 Dominion Boulevard
Electronic Mail Distribution Glen Allen, VA 23061
Executive Vice President Eric Hendrixson
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Director - Nuclear Safety and Licensing
Electronic Mail Distribution Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
County Administrator
Louisa County Michael M. Cline
P.O. Box 160 Director
Louisa, VA 23093 Virginia Department of Emergency
Services Management
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq. Electronic Mail Distribution
Senior Counsel
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Electronic Mail Distribution
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Senior Resident Inspector
Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station
U.S. NRC
P.O. Box 490
Mineral, VA 23117
VEPCO 4
Report to D. A. Christian from M. A. Bates dated August 25, 2008.
Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII EICS (Part 72 Only)
L. Slack, RII EICS
OE Mail (email address if applicable)
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
S. P. Lingam, NRR (PM: NA, SUR)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339,72-056
Report No: 05000338/2008003, 05000339/2008003, 07200056/2008003
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Location: 1022 Haley Drive
Mineral, Virginia 23117
Dates: April 1, 2008 to June 30, 2008
Inspectors: J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Clagg, Resident Inspector
R. Moore, Senior Reactor Inspector, Section 4OA5.1
C. Peabody, Reactor Inspection, Section 1R17
C. Even, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17
G. Gardner, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17
K. Miller, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17
J. Helm, Reactor Inspector, Section 1R17
Approved by: M. A. Bates, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
CONTENTS
Summary of Plant Status...4
REACTOR SAFETY.......4
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection..4
1R04 Equipment Alignment..4
1R05 Fire Protection..5
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program...6
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness6
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control....8
1R15 Operability Evaluations...9
1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Test, or Experiments and Permanent Plant
Modifications 9
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing.. 12
1R22 Surveillance Testing 13
OTHER ACTIVITIES......13
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ... 13
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems .. 14
4OA3 Event Followup.17
4OA5 Other Activities 18
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit..20
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations.. 20
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Key Points of Contact.....A-1
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed...A-1
List of Documents Reviewed.A-3
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000338/2008-003, 05000339/2008-003; 04/01/2008 - 06/30/2008; North Anna Power
Station, Units 1 and 2. Routine Integrated Resident and Regional Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and reactor
inspectors from the region. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV), was
Identified, and one licensee identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety
significance are listed in this report. The significance of most findings is identified by their color
(Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance
Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or
be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-
1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4, dated December, 2006.
A. NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Green. A Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS)
5.4.1.a was identified for failure to adequately establish procedural requirements for
repair of the Unit 1 1H emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start check valves. The
licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program as condition report
098146, revised the procedure, and successfully completed repairs to the '1H' EDG.
The finding was more than minor because it directly impacted the mitigating systems
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems
that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related
attribute of procedure quality in that the procedure failed to ensure air start check
valves were properly assembled following maintenance. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609, Appendix A, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance
(Green) because it did not result in a loss of operability due to a design or qualification
deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, did not result in a train
being out of service longer than allowed by TS, and was not potentially risk significant
due to possible external events. (Section 1R12)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations.
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have
been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and
corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 and 2 began the period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and operated at or near full
RTP for the entire report period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather preparations for hot weather
operations, specified in 0-GOP-4.1, Rev 23, 07/10/08, Hot Weather Operations, and
the licensees correction action data base for hot weather related issues. The
inspectors walked down the two risk-significant areas listed below to verify compliance
with the procedural requirements and to verify that the specified actions provided the
necessary protection for the structures, systems, or components.
- Unit 1 & 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump rooms;
- Unit 1 & 2 quench spray (QS) pump rooms; and
- Unit 1 outside recirculation spray (RS) and low head safety injection (LHSI)
pump room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted four equipment partial alignment walkdowns to evaluate the
operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other
train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional
systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system
operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system
lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the
systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any
discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.
5
- Unit 2 '2J' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and support systems during
planned maintenance on '2H' EDG;
and,
- Unit 1 'B' LHSI pump during planned maintenance on 'A' LHSI pump and related
valves.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown and inspection of the Unit 1 'A' Train
outside RS system components external to containment to assess proper alignment and
to identify discrepancies that could impact its availability and functional capacity. The
inspectors assessed the physical condition and position of each recirculation spray and
casing cooling valve, whether manual, power operated or automatic to ensure correct
positioning of the valves. The inspection also included a review of the alignment and the
condition of support systems including fire protection, room ventilation, and emergency
lighting. Equipment deficiency tags were reviewed and the condition of the system was
discussed with the engineering personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the eight areas listed below that are important to
reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as
described in Virginia Power Administrative Procedure VPAP-2401, Rev 28, 12/14/07,
Fire Protection Program. The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related
to: (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) the material
condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems,
equipment, and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire
propagation.
- Emergency Diesel Generator 2H Unit 2 (fire zone 9A-2a / EDG-2H);
- Emergency Switchgear Room Unit 1 (fire zone 6-1a / ESR-1);
- Emergency Switchgear Room Unit 2 (fire zone 6-2a / ESR-2);
- Emergency Diesel Generator 2J Unit 2 (fire zone 9B-2a / EDG-2J);
6
- Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 1 (fire zone 14B-1a /
MDAFW-1);
- Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 1 (fire zone 14A-1a /
TDAFW-1)
- Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 2 (fire zone 14A-2a /
TDAFW-2); and,
- Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Unit 2 (fire zone 14B-2a /
MDAFW-2).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a crew examination that involved a reactor coolant system
(RCS) leak with a partial loss of annunciators, a loss of instrument air outside
containment, a failure of 1-RC-PT-1554 that fails open a pressurizer power operated
relief valve (PORV), and a rod ejection resulting in a small break loss of coolant accident
(LOCA). The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability
to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct
use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely
control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and
oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify
and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training
critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training
were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
For the four equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of
the corresponding licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors
performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office
reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers.
The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the
Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) using ER-AA-MRL-10, Rev 2, 12/18/07,
Maintenance Rule Program, and Engineering Transmittal CEP-97-0018, Rev 12,
08/04/99, North Anna Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix.
7
- Condition report (CR) 099531, A MRule Evaluation was not assigned for
CR091536 and respective MRE006778, MRule Eval to Eng for 1-EE-BKR-1J1-
1-F2 contactor failed;
- CR096110, 1A leak to B water box vacuum breakers, for maintenance issues
concerning Unit 2 Condenser Outlet Waterbox vacuum break;
- CR098146, During maintenance run #8 air start check valve supply pipe to
header melted at fitting, and respective MRE006709, MRule; #8 Air Start
Ckvalve Supply Pipe to header melted at fitting;" and,
- CR091169, "2-SW-P-1B Automatically tripped," and respective MRE006467,
"MRule evaluation: 2-SW-P-1B Automatically tripped."
b. Findings
Introduction: A self-revealing, Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1.a was
identified for the failure to adequately establish procedural requirements for repair of the
Unit 1 1H EDG air start check valves.
Description: On May 7, 2008, during a maintenance run of the '1H' EDG following
activities associated with a scheduled 80 hour9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> maintenance outage, the air start check
valve associated with the #8 cylinder stuck open. This allowed combustion gas into the
air start header, subsequently causing it to rupture due to heating of the soldered joints.
An evaluation by the licensee determined that the self-locking nut associated with the #8
cylinder air start check valve had disengaged from the threaded check valve shaft and
was oriented in such a way as to prevent the check valve from reseating. Further
evaluation by the licensee determined that the self locking nuts were consumable items
that were intended to be replaced with new self-locking nuts after each use. The
licensee determined that maintenance procedure O-MCM-0701-14, Rev 5, 05/12/06,
Repair of Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Check Valves, was inadequate in that
it did not include guidance to treat the self locking nuts as consumable items. The
licensee revised maintenance procedure, 0-MCM-0701-14 and completed repairs to the
air start check valve and air start header. The licensee also conducted inspections of
the remaining air start check valves and returned the '1H' EDG to an operable status on
May 10, 2008.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately establish procedural
requirements for repair of the 1H EDG air start check valves was a performance
deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related
attribute of procedure quality in that the procedure failed to ensure air start check valves
were properly assembled following maintenance. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609,
Appendix A, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)
because it did not result in a loss of operability due to a design or qualification
deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, did not result in a train
being out of service longer than allowed by TS, and was not potentially risk significant
due to possible external events.
8
Enforcement: TS 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established,
implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Specifically, Section 9 requires, in part,
that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be
properly performed in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions
appropriate to the circumstances. Licensee procedure O-MCM-0701-14, Repair of
Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Check Valves, Rev 5, 05/12/06, contains
instructions for rebuilding EDG air start check valves. Contrary to this, the licensee
failed to adequately establish appropriate procedural requirements in 0-MCM-0701-14 in
that the procedure did not contain instructions to replace the consumable, self-locking
nuts for the air start check valves. Because the finding is of very low safety significance
and because it has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as
CR098146, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of
the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000338/2008003-01, Failure to Adequately
Establish Procedural Requirements for Air Start Check Valve Maintenance for the '1H'
EDG.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:
(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were
conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation,
necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities;
and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately
identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety
monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2.
- Emergent work on 1H EDG due to #8 cylinder air start check valve failure
resulting in the extension of a maintenance outage, but overall risk remained
Green;
- Emergent work for instrument air leak to 'B' water box vacuum breakers; overall
risk remained Green;
- Emergent entry into 0-AP-41, Rev 39, 06/06/08, Severe Weather Conditions,
due to a tornado watch which when combined with other unavailable equipment
resulted in a yellow risk condition;
- Emergent work due to failure of '1H' EDG battery charger; overall risk remained
Green.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
9
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six operability evaluations affecting the risk-significant
mitigating system, listed below, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of
the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether
other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4)
whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended,
and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered
unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance
in accordance with the Significance Determination Process (SDP). The inspectors
review included a verification that determinations of operability were made as specified
by procedure VPAP-1408, Rev 4, 05/28/08, System Operability.
- CR093429, review of OD000158, Evaluate leak by of terry turbine steam supply
valve;
- CR092489, review of OD000154, Deflected Control Rods on 2-SW-REJ-24E;
- CR092894, review of OD000156, Evaluate wall thickness;
- CR091976, review of OD000152, Perform OD for required actions on battery
chargers, relative to EDGs during high winds and cold ambient conditions;
- CR098251, 1H EDG air stop check valve supply fitting failure - common cause
failure review; and,
- CR091896, review of OD000151, #1 seal o-rings installed in 1-B RCP exceeded
6 year life on o-rings.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected samples of evaluations to confirm that the licensee
had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility, UFSAR,
or procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The
inspectors reviewed evaluations for eight changes and additional information, such as
drawings, calculations, supporting analyses, the UFSAR, and TS to confirm that the
licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes could be accomplished without
obtaining a license amendment. The eight evaluations reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
The inspectors reviewed samples of changes for which the licensee had determined that
evaluations were not required, to confirm that the licensees conclusions to screen out
these changes were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The twenty-three
screened out changes reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
10
The inspectors evaluated engineering design change packages (DCPs) for fourteen
material and design based modifications to evaluate the modifications for adverse
effects on system availability, reliability, and functional capability. The fourteen
modifications and the associated attributes reviewed are as follows:
DCP-99-003, Fuel Assembly Repair, 4/15/1999 (Barrier Integrity)
- Materials/Replacement Components
- Structural
- Licensing Basis
- Failure Modes
DCP-99-169, Charging Pump Upgrades, 1/27/2000 (Mitigating Systems)
- Materials/Replacement Components
- Failure Modes
- Licensing Basis
- Operations
DCP-01-160, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 1-III & 1-IV, 12/02/2005 (Mitigating
Systems)
- Energy Needs
- Control Signals
- Operations
- Licensing Basis
DCP-01-162, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 2-III and 2-IV, 4/28/05, (Mitigating
Systems)
- Energy Needs
- Material/Replacement Components
- Operations
- Structural
- Licensing Basis
DCP-02-015, Pump Modifications to Support Operation with Low Lake Anna Level,
10/24/2002 (Mitigating Systems)
- Process Medium
- Operations
DCP-02-016, Revision to Lake Anna Minimum Level, 3/24/2004 (Mitigating Systems)
- Operations
- Licensing Basis
- Structural
DCP-02-161, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Drain Header Replacement, 10/2/2002
- Energy Needs
- Materials/Replacement Components
- Structural
11
DCP 04-150, Install Manual Switch to Close Fire Protection Dampers in Unit 1&2
Emergency Switchgear Rooms, 1/13/05 (Mitigating Systems)
- Materials/Replacement Components
- Energy Needs
- Operations
DCP-05-007, Design Basis for North Anna Spent Fuel 100-hour Core Offload, 10/6/2005
(Barrier Integrity, Mitigating Systems)
- Heat Removal
- Licensing Basis
DCP-05-112, Replace FW Temperature RTDs and Re-scale Loop, 01/11/2006
- Energy Needs
- Control Signals
- Process Medium
- Licensing Basis
DCP-05-117, Removal of Spare 7300 Process Cards, 6/1/05, (Initiating Events)
- Control Signals
- Licensing Basis
- Failure Modes
DCP-05-143, Relocation of Switchyard Breaker H502, and Replacement of Switchyard
Breakers G1TH5 and G102, 02/07/2006 (Mitigating Systems)
- Energy Needs
- Timing
- Materials/Replacement Components
- Licensing Basis
DCP-06-138, Control Room Recorder Replacement, 12/14/2006 (Mitigating Systems)
- Energy Needs
- Process Medium
- Licensing Basis
DCP-07-155, CO2 Fire Protection System Design Zone 2-2 Nozzle Replacement
- Materials/Replacement Components
- Energy Needs
- Equipment Protection
- Operations
- Licensing Basis
Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modification design
and implementation packages, work orders, site drawings, corrective action documents,
applicable sections of the updated UFSAR, supporting analyses, Technical
Specifications, and design basis information. The inspectors additionally reviewed test
documentation to ensure adequacy in scope and conclusion. The inspectors verified
12
that all changes were incorporated in licensing and design basis documents and
associated plant procedures.
The inspectors also reviewed selected corrective action documents and the licensees
recent self-assessments associated with modifications and 10 CFR 50.59 screening /
evaluation issues to verify that problems were identified at an appropriate threshold,
were entered into the corrective action process, and appropriate corrective actions had
been initiated and tracked to completion.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, as
appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the
effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or
engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)
acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness
consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had
current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) test were
performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or
leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing;
and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with
licensee procedure VPAP-2003, Rev 12, 05/01/07, Post Maintenance Testing
Program.
- WO 00798652-01, Obtain samples per engineering 3A Heat and Vent Exhaust
Filter Bank;
- WO 00767749-01, Replace pump/motor assembly;
- WO 00804803-01 & 01A, Clean contacts on K1 relay;
- WO 00801938, Unit 2 2-SW-P-1A uncouple, couple replace seal;
- WO 00782951, Unit 2 1C Charging Pump Lube Flex Couplings - Clean Lube Oil
Coolers; and,
- WO 00790617-01, Replace MOT on 1J EDG.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
13
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the eight surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure,
witnessed testing, reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the
scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional
and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors
also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or
components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety
functions. The inspectors reviewed four in-service testing activities for a risk significant
pump or valve as part of the surveillance activities.
In-Service Test:
- 1-PT-63.1A.2, Quench Spray System - A Subsystem Comprehensive Pump
Test, Revision 12;
- 2-PT-213.7B, Valve Inservice Inspection (B Train of Recirc Spray System),
Revision 12;
- 2-PT-64.4B.2, Casing Cooling Pump (2-RS-P-3B) Biennial IST Comprehensive
Pump Test, Revision 3;
Pump Test and Valve Testing, Revision 3;
- 2-PT-75.2B, Service Water Pump (2-SW-P-1B) Quarterly Test, Revision 48;
and,
- 2-PT-14.1, Charging Pump 2-CH-P-1A, Revision 44.
Other Surveillance Tests:
- 2-PT-33.10, Reactor Trip System Channel Operational Test for Reactor Coolant
Pump Bus 2A Underfrequency, Revision 9; and,
- 2-PT-33.7, Reactor Trip System Channel Operational Test for Reactor Coolant
Pump Bus 2A Undervoltage, Revision 10.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures for developing the data for the
Barrier Integrity PI which are: (1) RCS Specific Activity; and (2) RCS Leakage. The
inspectors examined data reported to the NRC for the period April 2007 through March
14
2008. Procedural guidance for reporting PI information and records used by the
licensee to identify potential PI occurrences were also reviewed for both units. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee event reports, corrective action program documents,
and maintenance rules records as part of the verification process. The inspection was
conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator
Verification. The applicable planning standards, 10 CFR 50.0 and NEI 99-02,
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, were used as reference
criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of items Entered into the Corrective Action Program:
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries
and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.
.2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
the inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program and
associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more
significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and
corrective maintenance issues but also considered the results of daily inspector
corrective action program item screening. The review also included issues documented
outside the normal correction action program in system health reports, corrective
maintenance works orders, component status reports, site monthly meeting reports and
maintenance rule assessments. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-
month period of January 1, 2008 through June 30, 2008. The inspectors compared and
contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest integrated
quarterly assessment report. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues
identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy.
b. Assessments and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. In general, the licensee has identified trends
and has appropriately addressed the trends with their CAP. However, the inspectors
identified an adverse trend in the completion quality of safety-related work order
packages which may contain procedures used for performing maintenance or post-
maintenance tests (PMT). Specifically, the following deficiencies are indicated below:
15
- WO 00787908-01: NRC identified incomplete foreign material exclusion (FME)
checklist; incorrect date, incorrect step completion.
- WO 00796258-01: NRC identified no radiation work permit identified; incomplete
FME checklist, incorrect dates; incorrect step completion.
not performed.
- WO 00801935-01: NRC identified missing signatures for work completion.
Lead sheet.
completion.
not performed.
The licensee acknowledged the identified trend and entered all of the above
discrepancies into their CAP for appropriate corrective action.
.3 Annual Samples
CR091896, #1 Seal O-rings Installed on 1-B-RCP
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessments and corrective actions for
CR091896, #1 Seal O-rings installed in 1-B RCP seal reach the end of qualified life.
The condition report was reviewed to ensure that the full extent of the issue was
identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions
were specified and prioritized. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the
requirements of the licensees CAP as specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, Rev 2,
05/06/08, "Corrective Action Program," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. On February 2, 2008, Unit 2 was removed
from service because of degrading seal performance on the A RCP. During the
licensees root cause evaluation, RCE000219, a procedural error was discovered in
preventative maintenance procedure for RCP seals, 0-MPM-0110-01, Rev 19, 03/06/06,
Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection, that involved replacement of the #1 seal high
temperature o-rings. Specifically, the procedure states that the applicable o-ring service
history and current leak data must be reviewed, and if the o-rings have been installed
greater than 9 years or the #1 seal leak rate changes by greater than 0.3 gallons per
minute, then component engineering must perform an evaluation to determine
requirements for inspection or seal replacement. However, the seal vendor technical
manual recommends replacement of the #1 seal ring and runner o-rings every 45,000
hours of operation or 6 years. The licensee reviewed seal replacement history for both
16
units and determined that the Unit 2 B RCP #1 seal high temperature o-rings were
installed in October, 2001, but were not replaced during a subsequent refueling outage
in 2007. The licensee initiated CR091896 for corrective action and performed an
apparent cause evaluation, ACE013661, which determined a cause category of
inadequate written instructions.
The inspectors reviewed ACE013661 and verified the cause and related corrective
actions. The inspectors also noted and reviewed compensatory measures, described
below, initiated by the licensee due to the potential impact of a seal failure on the
licensees 10 CFR 50, Appendix R analysis.
- Initiate trending of Unit 2 B RCP #1 seal parameters for indications of degrading
performance.
- Establish a twice per shift fire watch in the auxiliary building areas involving the
charging pumps, component cooling (CC) pumps and respective power supply
cables to reduce the risk of an fire resulting in a loss of normal and backup seal
cooling.
- Establish zones prohibiting transient combustibles within 20 feet of Unit 1
charging pump power cables and reschedule any hot work involving
components in the areas of the charging pumps, CC pumps and respective
power cables. This protects the unit charging cross-tie function.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensees compensatory actions. The
inspectors also verified initiation of WO 00802328-01 to replace all o-rings in the Unit 2
B RCP #1 seal and actions to correct 0-MPM-0110-01.
CR094772, 2H EDG Oil Leakage Increasing and CR101714, Technical Specification
Violation for Two Service Water Pumps Inoperable for Greater Than Allowed Completion
Time
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed CR094772, "2H diesel oil leakage increasing," and related CRs
to ensure that the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was
performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The
inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees CAP as
specified in procedure, PI-AA-200, Rev 2, 05/06/08, "Corrective Action Program," and
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. On April 5, 2008, the licensee identified
increasing oil leakage on the '2H' EDG exhaust manifolds and performed an air roll of
the EDG which indicated the cylinders had excessive oil accumulation. The licensee
subsequently determined that the wrong size impeller had been installed in the standby
lube oil pump during a maintenance outage that occurred from March 24, 2008, through
March 29, 2008. The enforcement aspects are discussed in section 4OA7 of this report.
When the licensee declared '2H' EDG inoperable, they also declared the Unit 2 A SW
17
pump inoperable on April 5, 2008, in accordance with TS 3.8.1, due to inoperability of
the Unit 1 B SW pump, which was removed from service on April 1, 2008, and entered
a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO under TS 3.7.8. The Unit 1 B SW pump was subsequently returned to
service on April 6, 2008, and 2H EDG was returned to service on April 9, 2008. The
inspectors determined that the licensee correctly implemented Technical Specifications
from the time the service water pumps and EDG were declared inoperable; therefore,
there was no performance deficiency.
The inspectors reviewed the completed root cause evaluation, RCE000225, and related
documents including the licensees probabilistic risk analysis. The inspectors
determined that the installation of the incorrect impeller affected the EDG operability,
which also affected the operability of the associated service water pump. The inspectors
noted that although the Unit 2 A SW pump was technically inoperable, it remained
available based on the availability of its normal power supply. The licensee entered this
problem into their CAP as CR101714 and submitted Licensee Event Report 05000338,
339/2008-001-00 to document the problem.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000339/2007-004-00 and Revised LER
05000339/2007-004-01: Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Coolant Flow with
Power Greater Than 30 Percent
On December 25, 2007, at 2110 hours0.0244 days <br />0.586 hours <br />0.00349 weeks <br />8.02855e-4 months <br />, with Unit 2 at approximately full rated thermal
power an automatic reactor trip occurred due to loss of coolant flow in the B loop. The
cause was determined to be a trip of the B RCP motor due to actuation of the neutral
over current protection relay. The licensee installed a spare motor in order to return the
unit to service. The licensee documented the corrective actions associated with this
event in CR027748. The inspectors reviewed the LER and related cause evaluations.
This LER is closed.
.2 (Closed) LER 05000338, 339/2008-001-00: Two Service Water Pumps Inoperable
Greater Than Technical Specification Allowed Completion Time.
On April 1, 2008, the Unit 1 B SW pump was removed from service for motor
maintenance. On April 5, 2008, the Unit 2 2H EDG was declared inoperable due to
excessive oil leakage from the exhaust manifolds. In compliance with TS, inoperability
of the 2H EDG also rendered the Unit 2 A SW pump inoperable resulting in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
LCO per TS 3.7.8 for the SW system. Subsequently, the cause of the 2H EDG
inoperability was identified as an incorrect impeller installed in the associated standby
lube oil pump during a maintenance outage for the 2H EDG from March 24 through
March 29, 2008. Consequently, the two SW pumps were inoperable for greater than the
TS allowed completion time. The inspectors completed a review of the LER and related
corrective action documents.
18
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/166, Pressurized Water reactor Containment
Sump Blockage (NRC Generic Letter 2004-02) Units 1 & 2
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the status of the implementation of the licensees actions in
response to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on
Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors,
for Units 1 and 2. The onsite inspections which verified the installation of modifications
were performed in April and October of 2007 (NRC Report Nos.: 50-338,339/2007003
and 50-338,339/2007005). The licensees GL 2004-02 commitments which were
incomplete at the time of the on-site inspections included chemical effects and
downstream effects analyses to support the installed strainer design and program
changes to assure the assumptions of the GL 2004-02 /GSI-191 design basis
assumptions remained valid. The inspector requested information to review the status of
the incomplete commitment items and performed an in-office review during the week of
May 5-9, 2008, to verify completion of the outstanding commitment items.
The inspector reviewed the licensee design and licensing documentation to verify that
the GL 2004-02 modifications and program changes were complete and to determine
the status of GL 2004-02 commitments which were not completed during the previous
onsite inspections
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. Plant physical modifications and program
changes identified in the licensees initial and supplemental responses to GL 2004-02
were complete.
The chemical effects and downstream analyses were not complete. A completion date
extension for these analyses was granted until May 31, 2008 (USNRC letter to VEPCO,
dated 12/13/07). The licensee requested additional extension to September 30, 2008
(Dominion letter to USNRC, dated May 22, 2008). Any additional plant changes
identified as a result of these analyses will be reviewed via the routine design control
inspection activity implemented by the existing reactor oversight program.
A violation was identified and documented in a previous NRC inspection report related to
implementation of the GL 2004-02 strainer modification, NCV 05000339/2008002-04,
Inadequate Design Control Involving Unit 2 Containment Sump Strainer Gaps.
This documentation of TI-2515/166 completion as well as any results of sampling audits
of licensee actions will be reviewed by the NRC staff (Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation - NRR) as input along with the GL 2004-02 Potential Impact of Debris
Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-
Water Reactors responses to support closure of GL 2004-02 and Generic Safety Issue
(GSI)-191 Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor (PWR)
19
Sump Performance." The NRC will notify each licensee by letter of the results of the
overall assessment as to whether GSI-191 and GL 2004-02 have been satisfactorily
addressed at that licensees plant(s). Completion of TI-2515/166 does not necessarily
indicate that a licensee has finished all testing and analyses needed to demonstrate the
adequacy of their modifications and procedure changes. Licensees may also have
obtained approval of plant-specific extensions that allow for later implementation of plant
modifications. Licensees will confirm completion of all corrective actions to the NRC.
The NRC will track all such yet-to-be-performed items identified in the TI-2515/166
inspection reports to completion and may choose to inspect implementation of some or
all of them.
.2 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force
personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee
security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities
did not constitute additional inspection samples. They were considered an integral part
of the inspectors normal plant status review.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Review of the Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
(Inspection Procedure 60855.1)
a. Inspection Scope
Inspectors reviewed the normal operations of the ISFSI. The inspectors walked down
the ISFSI pad to assess the material condition of the casks, the installation of security
equipment, and the performance of the monitoring systems. In preparation for an
upcoming cask load involving the NUHOMS design the inspectors reviewed licensee
cask loading and handling procedures and reviewed previous cask loading and ISFSI
related plant issues and corrective actions status. Additionally, the inspectors observed
cask loading during the week of June 2, 2008, to verify that work was performed in
accordance with approved procedures and that loaded fuel assemblies were identified
and recorded in a controlled document.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
20
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On July 9, 2008 and July 30, 2008, the senior resident inspector presented the
inspection results for the routine integrated quarterly report to Mr. Dan Stoddard and
other members of the staff. The licensee acknowledged the findings. The inspectors
asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should
be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On August 22, 2008, the Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 presented the revised
inspection results for the routine integrated quarterly report to Mr. Page Kemp.
.2 Temporary Instruction 2515/166 Exit Meeting
An interim meeting was conducted via telephone on May 27, 2008 with Mr. P. Kemp.
.3 10 CFR 50.59, Modifications Exit Meeting
An interim exit meeting with licensee management and staff was conducted on June 4,
2008, to discuss the results of this inspection. Proprietary information, reviewed by the
team as part of routine inspection activities, was returned to the licensee in accordance
with prescribed controls.
4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of
the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for characterization as a NCV:
- 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires in part that activities affecting quality
shall be prescribed and accomplished by documented instructions of a type
appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to this, on April 5, 2008, the instructions
involving a part number for a pump impeller in a work order to repair the standby
lube oil pump were incorrectly prescribed and accomplished. This issue is in the
licensees CAP as CR094772 (4OA3).
ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel:
V. Armentrout, SG Programs, ISI Corporate
J. Bailey, Manager Vendor Quality
J. Breeden, Supervisor, Radioactive Analysis and Material Control
W. Corbin, Director, Nuclear Engineering
R. Evans, Manager, Radiological Protection and Chemistry
R. Foster, Supply Chain Manager
E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
S. Hughes, Manager, Nuclear Operations
P. Kemp, Supervisor, Station Licensing
J. Kirkpatrick, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
L. Lane, Plant Manager
G. Lear, Manager, Organizational Effectiveness
J. Leberstien, Licensing Technical Consultant
T. Maddy, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
M. Main, Component Engineer
G. Marshall, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning
C. McClain, Manager, Nuclear Training
J. McHale, Engineering Supervisor
F. Mladen, Manager, Nuclear Site Services
B. Morrison, Supervisor Nuclear Engineering
J. Rayman, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
J. Scott, Supervisor, Nuclear Training (operations)
D. Stoddard, Site Vice President
R. Williams, Component Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000338/2008003-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Establish Procedural Requirements
for Air Start Check Valve Maintenance for the '1H' EDG
(1R12)
Closed
2515/166 TI Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Sump Blockage
(NRC Generic Letter 2004-02) Units 1 & 2 (Section
4OA5.1)
Attachment
A-2
05000339/2007-004-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Coolant Flow With
Power Greater Than 30 Percent
05000339/2007-004-01 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Coolant Flow With
Power Greater Than 30 Percent (Revised)
05000338, 339/2008-001-00 LER Two Service Water Pumps Inoperable Greater Than
Technical Specification Allowed Completion Time
Discussed
None
Attachment
A-3
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R17: Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant
Modifications
Full Evaluations
- 99-SE-MOD-04, Fuel Assembly Repair 4/15/1999
- 06-SE-MOD-01, Abandonment of Incore Thermocouples, 3/29/2006
- 06-SE-OT-01, Reload Safety Evaluation, 3/31/2006
- 06-SE-OT-02, Technical Report NE-1453, Rev. 0, Addendum 002, Reload Safety
Evaluation, North Anna 2 Cycle 18 Pattern MOE, 3/31/2006
- 07-SE-OT-01, Reduced Recirculation Spray Pump Flowrates, 9/3/2007
- 07-SE-ST-01, Special Test Procedure, 0-ST-FP-001, Low Pressure CO2 Blower Door
Test, 8/27/2007
- DCP-99-003, Fuel Assembly Repair, 4/15/1999 (associated with 99-SE-MOD-04)
- DCP-99-169, Charging Pump Upgrades, 1/27/2000
- TSCR N-018, Eliminate Transmitter Response Time Testing Requirements, 9/11/2007
Screened Out Items - Modifications
- DCP 01-121, Safety Injection (SI) Accumulator Nozzle Replacement, 3/17/2001
- DCP 01-160, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 1-III & 1-IV, 12/02/2005
- DCP 01-162, Replacement of Vital Bus Inverters 2-III and 2-IV, 4/28/2005
10/24/2002
Switchgear Rooms, 12/16/2004
- DCP 05-007, Design Basis for North Anna Spent Fuel 100 hr Core Offload, 10/6/2005
- DCP 05-117, Removal of Spare 7300 Process Cards, 6/1/2005
- DCP 05-143, Relocation of Switchyard Breaker H502, and Replacement of Switchyard
Breakers G1th% and G102, 02/07/2006
- DCP 06-138, Control Room Recorder Replacement, 12/14/2006
Screened Out Items - Item Equivalency Evaluation Review (Like for Like)
- IEER NOM00163-000, Mechanical Seal 01-SW-P-22A/B-Pump, Chesterton 180 Seal
Replacing Chesterton 123 Seal, 10/23/2006
- IEER 10000001417, Installation of Chesterton 180 Seal Replacing Chesterton 123 on
1-SW-P-22A/B, 5/7/2008
- IEER NEL00950-000, RCS Temperature Transmitter, 6/7/2006
- IEER NEL00984-000, Emergency Diesel Generator Battery, 11/29/2006
- IEER NEL00961-000, Transient Event Recorder Power Supply - Replace Filter
Capacitor; Model 53D to Model 066151U400JS2, 05/09/2006
- IEER NEL01012-000, Circuit Breaker - Eaton Model, 4/20/2007
- IEER NVL 0009-002, 3 Globe Valve 1500#, 6/12/2006
Attachment
A-4
- IEER NVL 0175-000, 1/2 in. brass valve with Stainless Steel Trim, Air Operated valve,
Powers Flowrite 593ss in lieu of 591-7971, 9/6/2006
Screened Out Items Procurement Technical Evaluation (Commercial Grade Dedication)
- PTE 000 NOM00020-A03, Pump W/Motor, Service Water Radiation Monitoring,
01-SW-P-10, 4/18/2002
- PTE 42057909, 1 Inch brass relief valve for Control Room Chillers, 7/30/2007
Design Basis Documents
- SDBD-NAPS-EA, North Anna Power Generation System, Revision 10
- SDBD-NAPS-FP, System Design Basis Document for Fire Protection System North
Anna Power Station, Revision 9
- SDBD-NAPS-FP, DBD Change Request NFP-2007-06
- SDBD-NAPS-FP, DBD Change Request NFP-2008-01
- SDBD-NAPS-FP, System Design Basis Document for Control Room Ventilation System
North Anna Power Station, Revision 8
- SDBD-NAPS-HC, DBD Change Request NHC-2005-03
Licensing Basis Documents
- Technical Specifications, Current
- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Current
Corrective Actions
- N-2005-4372-R1, Initial Load Bank Testing on Inverter 2-IV Failed, 10/13/2005
Procedures
- VPAP-3001, Safety and Regulatory Reviews, Revision 15
- DNAP-3004, Dominion Program for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 - Changes,
Tests, and Experiments, Revision2
- 0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power, Revision 59
- 1-AP-20, Operation From the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Revision 23
- 2-AP-20, Operation From the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Revision 21
- 0-FS-CR-1, Control Room - Units 1 and 2 Safe Shutdown Equipment, Revision 0
- 1-OP-26.5, 120 V Vital Bus Distribution Revision 27
- 0-FCA-1, Mitigation of Spurious Valve Operation, Revision 34
- 0-NAT-E-001, Revision 0, Electrical Loop Functional Checkout Action Sheet, 10/13/2005
- 1-PT-138.3B, Combined Charging Pump 1B Head curve Verification and HHSI Branch
Flow Verification, Revision 6 and Revision 8
Flow Verification, Revision 5
- 0-ST-FP-001, Low Pressure CO2 Blower Door Test, Revision 0
- 1-ICP-RC-L-1460, Revision 3, Pressurizer Level Protection Channel II Calibration,
9/13/2007
- NASES 6.20, Revision 1, Test Plan for DCP 01-162, 4/26/2005
- 47241, Test Procedure for Seismic Testing of One DC Inverter, 5/20/2002
Attachment
A-5
Work Orders
- 1-PT-31.8.2-779573-01, Pressurizer Level Protection Channel II Calibration
Calculations
- 131035-Z2-2, Low Pressure CO2 Hydraulic Calculations, Unit 2, Revision 1
- EE-0057, DC Equipment Sizing, Revision 1
- EE-0718, North Anna Feedwater Temperature Uncertainty, Revision 0
- EE-0718, North Anna Feedwater Temperature Uncertainty, Revision 1
- 14258.79-E-4, Short Circuit Currents 120 V AC Vital Buses and Misc. Circuits-App. R
Evaluation, Revision 1
- ME-0491, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System Analysis, Revision 0
- NE-0154, Minimum Quantity for Fire Protection Low Pressure CO2 Tanks 1-FP-TK-06
and 1-FP-TK-5, Revision 002
- NE-0165, Volume Calculation of North Anna Fire Zones Protected by Low Pressure CO2
Revision 000
Drawings
- N-04150-0-1FE12AR, Wiring Diagram - Emergency Switchgear Room - Halon 1301
Aux Relay & Abort / Lockout Panels - North Anna Power Station - Units 1 & 2, Revision
0
- N-04150-0-1FP089, Sheet 1, Fire Protection System - Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear
Room Halon Control & Alarm, Revision 0
- N-04150-0-2FP041, Sheet 1, Fire Protection System - Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear
Room Halon Control & Alarm, Revision 0
- N-051430101FE1BD, One Line Switching Diagram Switchyard, Revision 0
- N-05143-1-FE1BB, One Line Diagram Electrical Distribution System, Revision 0
- N-05143-1-1ESK4CC-1-A, Outline Switchyard Monitor Panel, Revision 0
- N-05143-1-1ESK4CC-1-B, Outline Switchyard Monitor Panel, Revision1
- 11715-FE-1BB, One Line Diagram Electrical Distribution System, Revision 39
- 11715-FE-1BD, One Line Switching Diagram Switchyard, Revision 11
- 11715-FE-1BD, One Line Switching Diagram Switchyard, Revision 27
- 11715-FH-32A, Treatment Lagoon Discharge Structure Dike III SH-1 North Anna Power
Station, Revision 5
- NA-DW-6008D13, Loop #1 Feedwater Control System, Revision 0
- NA-DW-6008D49, Loop #2 Feedwater Control System, Revision 0
- NA-DW-6008D63, Loop #3 Feedwater Control System, Revision 0
Post Modification Testing
- NASES 6.20 Attachment 2, Test Plan for DCP 05-112, Revision 1
Revision 0
- Testing Release for 1-RC-LR-1310A, 02/19/2007
- Testing Release for 2-RC-LR-2310A, 02/15/2007
- Testing Release for 1-LM-PR-110B, 02/13/2007
- Testing Release for 1-RH-TR-1604, 01/31/2007
- Testing Release for 2-FW-LR-2477, 01/31/2007
- Testing Release for 2-RH-TR-2604, 01/31/2007
- Testing Release for 1-LW-FR-104, 01/10/2007
Attachment
A-6
- Testing Release for 1-L0-XR-SGVRP, 01/31/2007
- Testing Release for 2-LO-XR-SGVRP, 02/05/2007
- Testing Release for 2-LM-PR-210B, 02/12/2007
- Testing Release for 1-HC-H2R-101-1, 02/22/2007
- Testing Release for 2-HC-H2R-201-2, 01/10/2007
- Testing Release for 2-FW-FR-2478, 02/26/2007
- Testing Release for 2-FW-FR-2488, 02/26/2007
- Testing Release for 2-FW-FR-2498, 02/27/2007
Calibration Data
- Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 06/02/2006
- Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 11/30/2005
- Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 01/02/2008
- Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 06/04/2007
- Calibration Data Record for NQC-0496, 12/01/2006
Technical Reports
- NE-1401, Rev. 0, Operational Impact of Framatome Fuel and use of the
CASMO/SIMULATE Code Package at North Anna, April 2, 2004
- NE-1452, Rev. 0, Reload Safety Analysis Checklist North Anna 2 Cycle 18 Pattern MOE,
September 22, 2005
- NE-1453, Rev. 0, Addendum 002, Reload Safety Evaluation, North Anna 2 Cycle 18
Pattern MOE, April 2006
Engineering Transmittals
- ET-SE-99-086, Evaluation of Hydraulic Performance of CH/HHSI Rotating Assembly
Ingersoll-Dresser serial Number NE012911-01 - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 and 2,
Revision 0
- ET-N-01-122, Evaluation of Hydraulic Performance of CH/HHSI Rotating Assembly
Flowserve BR/Order 7029-2673 - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 and 2, Revision 0
- ET-N-02-068, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump
2-CH-P-1B - North Anna Power Station, Unit 2, Revision 0
- ET- N-03-0144, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump
2-CH-P-1A - North Anna Power Station, Unit 2, Revision 0
- ET- N-04-0057, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump
2-CH-P-1C - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, Revision 0
- ET- N-05-0072, Evaluation of Replacement Rotating Element for Charging Pump
2-CH-P-1B - North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, Revision 0
- ET-N-07-0049, Revision to North Anna Technical Specifications Bases to Eliminate
Periodic Pressure Sensor Response Time Tests and Periodic Protection Channel
Response Time Tests, Revision 0
- ET-N-07-0077, Evaluation of Low Pressure CO2 System Vendor Calculation and Blower
Test, Revision 1
- ET-N-07-0109, Estimating Water Flow Rate through Dike 3, Revision 0
Attachment
A-7
Vendor Manuals
- 59-W813-00006, Vendor Technical Manual for Weed Instrument RTD Temperature
Sensors
- 59-5984-00004, Component List For A Bill of Material, 3/20/02
Miscellaneous documents
- AREVA Letter FAB06-226, North Anna Advanced Mark-BW Top Nozzle Change
Evaluation, March 29, 2006
- Request for Engineering Assistance - Tracking No. R2003-128, 8/27/2003
- NCRODP-6, Fire Protection System, 5/2/2007
- Procurement Engineering Inspection Plan 208, 4/18/2002
- Purchase Order no. 45526645, 7/18/2007
- O-MAT-E-001, Electrical Loop Functional Checkout Sheet
- Short Circuit Simulation Results for G102-1 and G102-2
- NAP-0111, Specification for Vital Bus Static Inverters, Revision 0
- CM-NA-FCI-0213, Enhanced Surveillance Program for Rosemount Transmitters IAW
CB 90-01: Loss of Oil-Fill in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount, Revison 0
- LBDCR N-018, TS Bases Change Eliminate Periodic Pressure Sensor Response Time
Tests and Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests, Revision 0
- WCAP-14036-P-A, Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests,
Revision 1
Corrective Actions Written as a Result of this Inspection
- CR100465, Receipt Inspection Package contains typographical error, 6/3/2008
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/166
- Procedure VPAP-0301, Design Change Process, Revision 26
- Procedure VPAP-0905, Insulation Control Program, Revision 4
- DNES-VA-MAT-1007, Protective Coating Requirements for procured Equipment to be
Installed Inside Containment, Revision 0
Response to NRC GL 2004-02 Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency
Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at PWRs, dated February 29, 2008
and 3, North Anna Power Station Unit 1 and 2, Request for Extension of Completion
Dates for GL 2004-02 Corrective Actions, dated December 13, 2007
Support Containment Sump Modification, 08/14/07
- Design Change Package DCP-07005, NRC GSI-191, Containment Sump Strainer
Interferences, 08/08/07
- Design Change Package DCP-07129, NRC GSI-191, Piping Isulation Modifications,
08/08/07
Attachment
A-8
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agency-wide Document Access and Management System
CA Corrective Action
CAP Corrective Action Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
LHSI Low Head Safety Injection
NCV Non-cited Violation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS Publicly Available Records
PI Performance Indicator
QS Quench Spray
RCE Root Cause Evaluation
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
RTP Rated Thermal Power
SDP Significance Determination Process
SR Surveillance Requirements
TDAFWP Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
TS Technical Specifications
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved Item
VEPCO Virginia Electric and Power Company
VPAP Virginia Power Administrative Procedure
WO Work Order
Attachment