ML082200160
| ML082200160 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/2008 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| 50-400/08-301, ES-D-1 50-400/08-301 | |
| Download: ML082200160 (104) | |
Text
Draft Submittal (Pink Paper) l-I-Mif~ ZC08 -30I
~;, AJ6, 16ST ADMI,()SwveO silO/7S/t5( ?ag SIMULATOR SCENARIOS
~endixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility:
HARRIS Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
2008 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
IC-20: 100°A, power, EOL TDAFW Pump cleared and tagged to replace tappet nut on trip valve. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> remaining on TS 3.7.1.2 Action a 4 GPD tube leakage in SG "C" for past 30 days. Chemistry has CRC-804 in effect.
Radiation Monitor RM-01MS-3592SB, MSL "B" Monitor, was declared inoperable last shift. TS 3.3.3.6 Action c in effect.
Turnover:
Maintain 100% power Critical Tasks:
Establish feedwater flow to at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required Isolate AFW to SG "B" prior to terminating HHSI Event Malf.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
N/A N -SRO, Load Dispatcher directs rapid power reduction due to a fire at a BOP major switching station R-RO 2
CNS015 TS-SRO Loss of Control Power to Containment Spray Pump "A" during power reduction 3
CCW08A C-RO, Component Cooling Water Leak in the running pump suction SRO header TS - SRO 4
GEN01 C - BOP, Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure SRO 5
NIS08C I-RO, PRNIS Channel N-43 fails HI SRO 6
FT:497 I-BOP, Controlling FF Channel fails LO SRO 7
RCS03 M-ALL RCP "C" Locked rotor 8
CFW01A C-BOP MDAFW Pump "A" breaker trips ZR211158 MDAFW Pump "B" AUTO start fails ZOSQ2:13b 9
MSS11 M-ALL MSLB Outside Containment/No MSIV can be closed from the Control Room 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 1 of 34 REVISION 1
I Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I 10 MSS05B C-BOP MSIV "B" stuck OPEN ZRPK616A
~
Failure of AUTO AFW Block on SG "B" ZRPK616B (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 1
SUMMARY
The crew will assume the watch at 100% power, with directions to maintain current conditions. The Turbine-driven AFW Pump is cleared and tagged for repair of the tappet nut on the trip valve. TS 3.7.1.2.a is in effect. There is a 4 GPO tube leak in Steam Generator (SG) "C" that has been stable for 30 days. Chemistry is monitoring in accordance with their procedures. The radiation monitor on Main Steam Line "8" failed last shift. TS 3.3.3.6.c is in effect.
Shortly after the crew assumes the watch the Load Dispatcher will call with directions to reduce power to s 50°A> within the next hour due to a fire in a major switching station.
The SRO should direct the power reduction in accordance with AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER. After a 100 MW reduction or at evaluation team discretion, the Load Dispatcher will call and tell them to hold at the current level.
After the plant has been stabilized, the Lead Evaluator can cue the loss of control power to Containment Spray Pump "A". The crew should respond in accordance with the alarm response procedure and the SRO should enter TS 3.6.2.1.
After the Containment Spray Pump TS declaration, the Lead Evaluator can cue the leak in the CCW Suction Header. The leak will be less than makeup capability. The crew should respond to the CCW Surge Tank level change and/or alarm and enter AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER. A field operator will report the leak location shortly after being dispatched. The location of the leak will require shifting the operating pumps and locally closing isolation valves. The SRO should enter TS 3.7.3.
After the CCW leak has been isolated and the TS declaration is complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue failure of the Automatic Voltage Regulator on the Main Generator.
The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedures, place the voltage regulator in MANUAL, and restore parameters to the normal band.
After Main Generator voltage is under control, the Lead Evaluator can cue failure of the Power Range NIS channel. The crew should respond to the uncontrolled rod motion in accordance with AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND INDICATION SYSTEM. The crew should restore Tavg with Rod Control in MANUAL. It is not required that the channel be removed from service to continue the scenario and the TS declaration is not required to meet the minimum scenario requirements.
When the plant is in a stable condition, the Lead Evaluator can cue the SG "C" FF channel failure. The crew should respond in accordance with the alarm response procedure, controlling SG "C" level with the FRV in MANUAL and may switch controlling FF channels to restore control to AUTO. It is not required that the channel be removed 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 2 of 34 REVISION 1
IAppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I from service to continue the scenario and the TS declaration is not required to meet the minimum scenario requirements.
When SG "C" level is under control or in AUTO, the Lead Evaluator can cue the RCP locked rotor. This will result in an automatic reactor trip on RCS flow. The crew will perform the PATH-1 immediate actions and transition to EPP-4, REACTOR TRIP. In EPP-4 the crew should manually start MDAFW Pump "B" or initiate MFW flow using the FRV Bypass Valves. In EPP-4 a large steam leak will develop outside of containment.
All MSIV's will fail to close when the crew attempts to stop the cooldown. After diagnosis the crew should initiate a MANUAL SI, return to PATH-1, transition to EPP-14, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, and then to EPP-15, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. Shortly after a field operator is dispatched MSIV's "A" and "C" will close. The crew then will transition back to EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, and isolate SG "B". At some point SI Termination criteria will be met. The scenario can be terminated when normal charging is established.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 3 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 SETUP Form ES-D-1 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Clip a copy of GUIDE-1 Attachment 1 (SI Alignment) and Attachment 6 (Safeguards Actuation Verification) to each scenario guide for use by the evaluators.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
IC-20: 100% power, EOL Tag TDAFW Pump on the MC8 Reactivity Plan Turnover Sheet Ensure rod step counters reset to the correct value PRE-LOAD:
imf cfw01 C: TDAFW Pump under clearance irf rms170: Steamline "8" Rad Monitor failed HI imf cfw01A - MDAFW Pump "A" breaker trip coincident with AUTO or MANUAL start imf zr211158 FAIL_ASIS - MDAFW Pump "8" fails to AUTO start from SG Level or Load Sequencer imf zdsq2:13b FAIL_ASIS - MDAFW Pump "8" fails to AUTO start from SG Level or Load Sequencer imf zrpk616a FAIL_ASIS - AUTO AFW Isolation for SG "8" fails imf zrpk616a FAIL_ASIS - AUTO AFW Isolation for SG "8" fails TRIGGERS:
Event 2: irf cns015 CP_OFF - Loss of control power to CT Spray Pump "8" Event 3: imf ccw08A CCW suction header leak on A train (50 GPM)
Event 4: imf gen01 Main Generator AUTO Voltage Regulator failure - 130% over 5 minutes Event 5: imf nis08C - PRNIS N-43 fails HIGH (200%)
Event 6: imf FT:497, SG "C" Controlling Feed Flow Channel fails LO (0% )
Event 7: imf rcs03 PUMP 3 - Locked rotor on C RCP Event 9: Main Steam break outside CNMT (size to prevent RED or ORANGE on Integrity) imf mss11 (Initial: 40.0 E04, ramp to 4.0 E06 over one minute) imf mss05a - MSIV "A" fails to close imf mss05a - MSIV "8" fails to close imf mss05a - MSIV "C" fails to close Allow closure of MSIV "A" and "C" TRG= 10 dmf mss05a TRG= 10 dmf mss05a Field actions for GUIDE 1, Attachment 6 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 4 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE Booth Operator Instructions:
Call the MCR as the Load Dispatcher. There is a problem on the grid due to a transformer fire at a major switching station not directly associated with the HARRIS plant. Reduce load to 50% within one hour at a rate of 25 MW/minute. Report back when complete.
When load has been reduced by 100 MWe or on cue from the Lead Evaluator, call as the Load Dispatcher and tell them to HOLD at the current level until further notice.
Indications Available:
Call from Load Dispatcher.
SRO I Enters AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
This procedure contains no immediate actions.
Steps may *be performed simultaneously or out of sequence at the discretion of the Superintendent
- Shift Operations.
EVALUATOR/BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:
The crew may make calls to notify plant management before or during the power reduction. Acknowledge and request a report when more information becomes available.
REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO I Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point x.
SRO I NOTIFY Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load. (N/A)
PROCEDURE NOTE:
Boration of the RCS commences at Step 10.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The crew may use OP-107, Section 8.21 - RAPID ADDITION OF BORIC ACID TO RCS, to estimate the boration and perform the steps.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 5 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE RO/SRO RO DETERMINE required boric acid addition for desired power reduction, as follows:
CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:
Reactor power is 1000/0.
Target power level is provided in OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval MODE 1 at Full Power (50%, 30°A> or 5°A>>.
OBTAIN values from Attachment 2, Gallons of Boric Acid/Target Rod Height Required for Power Reduction.
Desired Boration gal Target Rod height (D Bank)
PROCEDURE NOTE:
If load reduction rates in excess of 45 MW/min are required, the Unit should be tripped.
If OSI-PI is available, the following path in PLANTSTATUS.PIW will assess VIDAR functionality:
Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu), DEH Trends, DEH_MEGAWATTS. If DEH_MEGAWATTS is flat-lining, VIDAR is NOT functioning properly.
If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics Display Computer (located in the Termination Cabinet Room near the ATWS Panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the VIDAR Unit is functioning properly.
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
Failure of the DEH computer VIDAR Unit while in OPER AUTO has resulted in a plant trip.
BOP I CHECK BOTH of the following:
DEH System in AUTO (YES)
VIDAR functioning properly (YES)
BOP I PERFORM the following at the DEH panel:
DEPRESS the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 6 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE ENTER desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in DEMAND display.
DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.
DEPRESS REF pushbutton.
ENTER desired load (120 MW if shutting down) in DEMAND display.
DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.
CHECK HOLD pushbutton LIT.
RO CHECK Rod Control in AUTO. (YES)
RO ENERGIZE ALL available PRZ Backup heaters.
SRO DISCUSS Attachment 3, Reactivity Brief, with the MCR staff.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
With the Megawatt and Impulse Pressure Feedback Loops out of service, the MW indication in the REFERENCE display will not reflect actual MW output.
An accurate indication of Main Generator output can be obtained from ERFIS point JEE15688 (Gross MWe).
RO COMMENCE turbine load reduction at the DEH panel:
CHECK OPER AUTO Mode AVAILABLE. (YES)
DEPRESS GO pushbutton.
VERIFY the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
To prevent over-boration, only the amount of boron required to reduce power to the desired power level should be added.
Adjustments should be made to boric acid flow based on actual core/rod responses.
RO COMMENCE RCS boration as required to maintain Control Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit (Curve F-X-1).
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 7 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The following boration steps are provided for evaluator use. They are not in AOP-038.
SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.
SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.
VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.
START the makeup system as follows:
TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.
CREW VERIFY Generator load AND Reactor power LOWERING.
BOP MAINTAIN Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
Opening 3A and 38 Feedwater Heater vents helps minimize water hammer in 3A and 38 Feedwater Heaters.
WHEN Turbine load is less than 950/0, THEN DISPATCH an SRO operator to open 3A and 3B Feedwater Heater vents per OP-136, Shutdown of Feedwater Heaters 3A and 3B.
RO CHECK Tavg within 5 of of Tref. (YES)
CREW NOTIFY Chemistry of the following:
Reactor power change will exceed 15%
in a one hour period.
The following surveillances specified in the applicable sections require performing:
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 8 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE RST-204, Reactor Coolant System Chemistry and Radiochemistry Surveillance RST-211, Gaseous Effluent Radiochemistry Surveillance SRO CHECK that a planned load reduction will take the Unit to Turbine shutdown. (NO)
GO TO Step 18.
CREW NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing requirements due to boration.
SRO CHECK Power level at the target value. (YES - when reached)
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2 (Loss of Control Power to Containment Spray Pump "A") after the load change is terminated and the plant is stabilized.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 9 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 2 - LOSS OF CONTROL POWER FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 'A' Booth Operator Instructions:
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET-2 (irf CNS015 - Loss of Control Power to Containment Spray Pump "A")
Indications Available:
ALB-001-2-4, SPRAY PUMP A OIC TRIP OR CLOSE CKT TROUBLE RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-001-2-4.
RO Performs APP-ALB-001-2-4.
BOP REPORTS loss of breaker control power on computer alarm CRT.
SRO DIRECT an operator to check status of breaker 1A2-SA-4C, Containment Spray Pump 1A-SA.
Booth Operator Note:
If dispatched, report: Containment Spray Pump "A" breaker is open, all indicating lights are extinguished and there is a smell of burnt electrical insulation in the general area. The Static Trip unit is blank.
SRO IF control power is lost with the breaker in the shut position, locally trip the breaker. (N/A)
SRO INITIATE an EIR for CAUSES 1,2, and 3.
SRO CONTACT Work Control to initiate corrective actions.
SRO ENTERS TS 3.6.2.1 (restore to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />).
Evaluator's Note:
Cue Event 3 (CCW Leak) after the TS declaration.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 10 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK Booth Operator Instructions:
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET 50 GPM CCW Leak (imfccw08a)
Indications Available: ALB-005-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM CCW SYSTEM Evaluator Note:
The crew may enter AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER, when the first alarm is confirmed.
RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-005-8-5 BOP REPORTS CCW Surge Tank level alarm on alarm screen.
RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-005-6-1, CCW SURGE TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL.
RO ENTERS APP-ALP-005-6-1.
Procedure Note:
The CCW Surge Tank baffle plate separates Side A and Side B up to the 38°k level.
RO CONFIRM alarm using:
LI-670A.1, CCW Surge Tank Level (Side A)
LI-676A.1, CCW Surge Tank Level (Side B). Reports Side A low.
RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:
CCW flow to the GFFD and Primary Sample Panel will isolate on a low CCW Surge Tank level (40%). (Alarm ALB-026-2-1 actuated.)
CCW Holdup Tank Transfer Pump and the CCW Drain Tank Transfer Pump will trip on a high CCW Surge Tank level (75°J'c,). (N/A)
RO PERFORM Corrective Actions:
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 11 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK IF surge tank level is high AND rising. (N/A)
IF radiation activity level is increasing, THEN GO TO AOP-016,Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. (NO)
IF the alarm is due to plant heatup, THEN DRAIN the surge tank to normal level. (NO)
SRO Procedure Note:
ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER.
This procedure contains no immediate actions.
SRO SRO SRO Loss of CCW may require implementation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.
REFER to PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.
EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate section:
CONTACTS AO to check RAB for CCW leaks.
Booth Operator Note:
Booth Operator Note:
If a report is requested: RadWaste reports increased RAB floor drain in-leakage.
Shortly after contacted, report a leak in the suction header between 1CC-27 and CCW Pump "A". After you are directed to close 1CC-27 and 1CC-36, wait two minutes then delete IMF CCW08A and report the valves closed.
Evaluator's Note:
CCW Pump start/stop actions are provided in the Scenario Guide, near the bottom of the next page.
The path through the procedure may be different for each crew since it depends on when the leak location is known and how certain questions are answered. However, each crew should initiate makeup, swap running pumps, isolate the leak, and address the TS.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 12 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK Procedure Note:
The GFFD and RCS sample panel will isolate on low CCW Surge Tank level of less than or equal to 40%.
RO MAINTAIN CCW Surge Tank level between 45% and 75%
Procedure Note:
An affected CCW Pump is one to which any of the following apply:
Less than 4%
level indicated on the CCW Surge Tank.
Exhibits abnormal flow.
Aligne.d to an affected Train pump through the non-essential header.
RO CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:
ALL operable CCW Surge Tank level indicators are greater than 4%
(YES)
CCW Pump flow indication is NORMAL (YES)
PLACE and HOLD the control switch for ALL affected CCW RO Pumps to STOP until CCW header pressure is less than 52 psig. (N/A)
SRO CHECK EITHER RHR Train in Shutdown Cooling Mode. (NO)
RO/SRO CHECK RCS temperature greater than 200°F. (YES)
CHECK the Non-Essential header affected or previously RO/SRO isolated (insufficient flow, known to be the leak source, or other indication). (YES/NO)
SRO DIRECTS RO to start the standby pump and stop CCW Pump "A" per OP-145.
Booth Operator Note:
If requested to remove control power from "A" CCW Pump: Remote Function CCW075 CP_OFF 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 13 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK RO VERIFIES Initial Conditions.
Procedure Note:
Starting the second pump could cause ~P fluctuations across REM-01CC-3501 ASA (BSB) which may shut solenoid valves 1CC-23 and 1CC-40.
Starting the second pump may cause flow oscillations which could shut 1CC-252. Re-opening of 1CC-252 should not be attempted until the second pump is secured.
Procedure Caution: With one CCW pump running and the standby pump capable of an automatic start, ensure a minimum flow rate of 7850 gpm exists as indicated on FI-652.1 (FI-653.1). If both CCW pumps are running OR the CCW trains are separated, a minimum of 3850 gpm per pump is required. This lower flowrate should only be allowed for short durations to accomplish pump swapping or system realignment.
RO At the MCB, START CCW Pump Train B-SB.
RO VERIFY flow is greater than or equal to 3850 gpm on FI-653.1 and FI-652.1.
RO PERFORM one of the following:
SECURE a second CCW Pump using Section 7.1.
RO VERIFIES Initial Conditions.
RO VERIFY OPEN, the following valves:
1CC-99, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER A TO NONESSENTIAL SUP (YES) 1CC-113, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER B TO NONESSENTIAL SUP (YES) 1CC-127, CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO HEADER B (YES) 1CC-128, CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO HEADER A (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 14 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK RO VERIFY SHUT, 1CC-167 and 1CC-147, CCW FROM RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B-SB AND A-SA (YES)
Procedure Note:
If pressure falls below 52 psig, the CCW Pump will restart.
RO At the MCB, STOP CCW Pump Train A-SA.
RO VERIFY the following for Train A:
FLOW stops using FI-653.1 (FI-652.1)
PRESSURE remains greater than 75 psig suing PI-650 (PI-649).
RO CHECK Train B flow rate between 10,000 and 11,000 gpm on MCB indicator FI-663.1.
SRO ENTERS TS 3.7.3 (restore at least two flowpaths to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />).
Evaluator's Note:
When the leak is isolated, the CCW Pumps have been swapped, and the TS declaration is complete, cue Event 4 (Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure).
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 15 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 4 - MAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions:
Actuate ET-4 for the Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
Indications Available: The BOP may recognize a problem before any alarms.
ALB-22-4-3, GENERATOR VOLTAGE/FREQ RATIO/HIGH OR UNDER FREQ ALB-22-9-4 COMPUTER ALARM GEN/EXCITER SYSTEMS BOP RESPONDS to alarms ALB-022-4-3 and 9-4.
BOP ENTERS APP-ALB-022-4-3.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
Alarm ALB-022-9-4 is a computer alarm. ALB-022-4-3 will initiate corrective actions.
The crew may refer to AOP-006 but no actions will result.
BOP CONFIRM alarm using:
AT MCB:
EI-525, Generator Frequency.
EI-520, Generator Phase Volts. (YES-Reports voltage regulation problem)
EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts.
EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current.
AT Gen Protective Relay Panel 1B, Gen Over Excitation Prot Backup Protection relay status flag:
AT Gen Protective Relay Panel 1B, Gen Over Excitation Prot Backup Protection relay status flag.
BOP VERIFY Automatic Functions:
VOLTAGE Regulator Limiter decreases Generator excitation.
IF Voltage Limiter is unable to control excitation increase, a Generator Lockout occurs.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 16 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 4 - MAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE BOP PERFORM Corrective Actions:
CHECK for the following at MCB:
EI-525, Generator Frequency, stable at 60 Hz. (YES)
EI-520, Generator Phase Volts, stable at 22 KV. (NO)
EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts stable. (YES)
EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current stable. (YES)
Procedure Note:
An automatic transfer to manual Generator voltage control is indicated by GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch ON and the GREEN light LIT.
Both the AMBER light and RED light will be OFF.
BOP OPERATE GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV and reduce MVARS.
IF GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch is ineffective THEN PERFORM the following to transfer and maintain voltage manually:
OPERATE the GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER to attempt to zero the REGULATOR OUTPUT BAL VOLT meter.
PLACE GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch in the TEST position and observe AMBER light LIT and RED light OFF.
OPERATE GENERATOR BASE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV.
SRO REFERENCE AOP-028, Grid Instability. (N/A - the problem is not on the grid)
BOP VERIFY Main Generator is operating per the Generator Capability Curve.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
When Main Gen Voltage is under control, cue Event 5 (PRNIS Channel N-43 failure) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 17 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 5 - PRNIS CHANNEL FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions:
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, Actuate ET-5, PRNIS Channel 43 fails HIGH (NIS08C)
Indications Available:
Uncontrolled rod motion and bistable trips.
RO RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolled rod motion.
SRO ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-001.
RO PERFORMS immediate actions.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
A TS declaration (3.3.1 Action 2) is NOT required for this event and the channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario. The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (SG "C" FF Channel failure) after Tavg is being controlled or when AOP-001 is exited.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
If the OWP is implemented: APP-RPS/OWP RP25 TST.
Pause after the first 4 steps.
Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped.
Action RO (YES)
Immediate RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.
Action Immediate RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)
Action SRO PROCEEDS to Section 3.2.
RO CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:
RCS Tavg (YES)
RCS Tref (YES)
POWER Range NI channels (NO)
TURBINE first stage pressure (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 18 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 5 - PRNIS CHANNEL FAILURE SRO PERFORM the following:
IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (N/A)
IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN manual rod control until corrective action is complete.
(YES)
IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN BYPASS the failed channel using OWP-RP. (YES)
Evaluator Note: A High Power Rod Stop is in effect until defeated at the drawer.
RO Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:
Equilibrium power and temperature conditions Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.
RO VERIFY proper operation of the following: (YES)
CVCS demineralizers BTRS Reactor Makeup Control System SRO CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks MOVING OUT. (NO)
GO TO Step 6.
RO CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED:
Unexplained RCS boration Unplanned RCS dilution SRO CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction OCCURRED. (NO)
GO TO Step 9.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 19 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 5 - PRNIS CHANNEL FAILURE SRO EXIT this procedure.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 20 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 6 - SG 'C' FF CHANNEL FAILS LOW Booth Operator Instructions:
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET-6 SG "C" FF Channel fails LO (FT:497)
Indications Available: ALB-014-6-1B, SG C STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH BOP RESPONDS to alarm ALB-014-6-1 B.
BOP Performs actions of APP-ALB-014-6-1 B.
BOP CONFIRM alarm using:
FI-496, FI-497, SG C Feed Flow FI-494, FI-495, SG C Steam Flow Reports FI-497 failed LOW BOP PERFORM Corrective Actions:
IF FCV-498, Feedwater Reg Valve, is NOT controlling SG level, THEN MANUALLY CONTROL FK-498 AND REDUCE feed flow.
DISPATCH an operator to check for indications of feedwater leaks.
Evaluator Note: The SRO may enter AOP-010 based on the flow transient. If so, the outcome will be the same - the associated FRV in MANUAL.
SRO REFERS to OWP-RP-09.
Evaluator's Note:
The crew may swap controlling channels to regain automatic control before the OWP is implemented.
A TS declaration (3.3.1 Action 6) is NOT required for this event and the channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 7 when SG level is being controlled or is in AUTO.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 21 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Booth Operator Instructions:
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET-7 RCP C Locked Rotor (RCS03 PUMP_3)
Indications Available: ALB-011-2-2, REACTOR TRIP LOW FLOW/RCP P8 PERMISSIVE RO RESPONDS to Reactor Trip First Out alarm SRO ENTERS and directs actions of PATH-1.
RO PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-1.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:
AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:
CHECK for any of the following:
Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)
Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)
ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)
NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:
CHECK for any of the following:
ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)
ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)
BOP VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses 1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)
CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (NO) 81 Actuated bypass permissive light 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 22 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ALB-11-2-2 ALB-11-5-1 ALB-11-5-3 ALB-12-1-4 RO SI actuation - REQUIRED (NO)
SRO GO TO EPP-004, "REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE", Step 1.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
Actuate MS Break when EPP-4 is entered: (imf mss11 -
Initial: 40.0 E04, ramp to 4.0 E06 over one minute; imf mss05a - MSIV "A" fails to close; imf mss05a - MSIV "B" fails to close; imf mss05a - MSIV "C" fails to close).
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The crew will perform EPP-4 until the steam break symptoms are evident. Several EPP-4 steps are included in the scenario guide.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
Foldout applies.
SRO Informs Shift Superintendent to evaluate EAL Network Using Entry Point x.
Check SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
BOP Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555 of AND 559 of using Table 1.
Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 of AND 559 of Evaluator Note: The crew may attempt to close the MSIV's to stabilize temperature.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 23 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)
BOP Check Feed System Status:
RCS Temperature ~ LESS THAN 564 of Verify feed reg valves - SHUT Check feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (NO)
BOP Starts MDAFW Pump "B" or initiates FF using FRV Bypass Valves.
CREW Contacts AO to investigate MDAFW Pump "A" failure.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
If dispatched, report MDAFW Pump "A" breaker tripped - cause unknown.
RO Check Control Rod Status:
Check DRPI - AVAILABLE (YES)
Verify all control rods - FULLY INSERTED (YES)
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
At some point the RO will report that PRZ level cannot be maintained and/or the BOP may report indications of a steam break. The SRO should then direct a MANUAL SI and return to PATH-1, Entry Point "A".
SRO Directs a MANUAL SI in accordance with Foldout criteria.
SRO Transitions to PATH-1, Entry Point "A".
SRO FOLDOUT A applies.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
Crew should brief on the general foldout criteria.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 24 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The following FOLDOUT A criteria apply in this scenario:
ALTERNATE MINIFLOW OPEN/SHUT CRITERIA IF RCS pressure decreases to less than 1800 PSIG, THEN verify alternate miniflow isolation OR miniflow block valves - SHUT RCP TRIP CRITERIA SI Flow> 200 GPM and RCS Pressure < 1400 PSIG SRO Perform The Following:
Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X.
RO VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (YES)
SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)
RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)
BOOTH OPERATOR:
The SRO should dispatch an operator to locally close the MSIV's. Do NOT close the MSIV's until the cooldown rate is evaluated and AFW is throttled in EPP-15.
BOP CHECK Main Steam Isolation:
MAIN steam isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)
BOP/RO CHECK main steam isolation actuation criteria by observing any of the following:
STEAM line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG. (YES)
CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG. (NO) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 25 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT BOP MAIN Steam isolation - REQUIRED. (YES)
BOP ACTUATE MSLI BOP VERIFY all MSIVs and bypass valves - SHUT. (NO)
RO CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (YES)
AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (NO)
Critical Starts AFW Pump "B" before ReS Feed and Bleed Task BOP criteria is met and controls AFW flow in accordance with SG Level criteria EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 6 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.
SRO ASSIGN operator to perform the following:
VERIFY alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS Signals using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", while continuing with implementation of EOPs.
Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
No Table 1 actions applicable due to uncontrolled cooldown and' inoperable MSIV's.
BOP ENERGIZEAC buses 1A1 AND 1B1.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 26 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)
RO CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)
RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)
BOP IDENTIFY any faulted SG:
Check for any of the following:
Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)
Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)
SRO TRANSITIONS to EPP-014.
SRO AT least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
ANY faulted SG or secondary break should remain isolated SRO during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.
SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
An Orange or Red path may develop on RCS Integrity and/or Heat Sink. RCS Integrity actions are similar to those in EPP-015. FRP-H.1 will be exited because procedurally-directed operator actions may have reduced AFW flow.
BOP CHECK MSIVs and Bypass Valves:
VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)
SRO DISPATCHES AO to close MSIV's.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 27 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT BOP VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)
ANY SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (NO)
SRO TRANSITIONS to EPP-015.
SRO Foldout applies.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The EPP-15 Foldout criteria that may apply is:
MINIMUM FEED FLOW IF level in any SG is less than 25% [40 0k], THEN maintain a minimum of 12.5 KPPH feed flow to that SG.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
After the MSIV's are closed, SG pressures will rise and meet EPP-14 transition criteria.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
Close MSIV's "A" and "C" after the cooldown rate is evaluated and AFW is throttled in EPP-15.
BOP CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:
VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)
VERIFY all MSIV Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)
IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, SRO THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG. (N/A - under clearance)
IF local actions are required, attempts to isolate all boundaries SRO of one SG should be completed prior to starting those for another SG.
BOP CHECK Secondary Pressure Boundary for ALL SGs:
VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 28 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP -c: LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT BOP SHUT steam supply valves to TDAFW pump:
BOP VERIFY main steam drain isolations before MSIVs-SHUT: (YES)
SG A: 1MS-231 SG B: 1MS-266 SG C: 1MS-301 VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
VERIFY Main Steam Analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
AS SG pressure and steam flow decrease, RCS hot leg SRO temperatures will eventually stabilize and may increase.
Adjusting feed flow and steam dump will control RCS hot leg temperatures.
CHECK RCS cooldown rate - LESS THAN 100°F/HR (NO)
BOP Reduce feed flow to 12.5 KPPH to each SG.
RO Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING (YES/NO)
Evaluator Note: Several more EPP-15 steps are included in the scenario guide but EPP-14 transition criteria should be met shortly after MSIV "A" and MSIV "C" are closed.
RO Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 GPM.
Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES - A and B)
Check all of the following:
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 29 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTORISTEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)
Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)
RO Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:
Verify power to PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES)
PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)
GO TO Step 6f.
Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)
IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.
PROCEDURE NOTE: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.
BOP/SRO Check Secondary Radiation:
Check for all of the following:
Condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation - NORMAL (YES)
SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES)
Main steamline radiation - NORMAL (YES)
SG activity sample - NORMAL (IF AVAILABLE) (N/A)
Check any RHR pumps - RUNNING (YES)
RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)
RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)
Reset SI.
Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE,.)
Stop RHR pumps. (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 30 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT GO TO EPP-014, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation" in SRO accordance with EPP-015 FOLDOUT criteria when SG Pressure begins to rise.
SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.
BOP CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:
VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT. (NO)
VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)
ANY SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)
BOP IDENTIFY Any Faulted SG:
CHECK for any of the following:
ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (YES-"B")
ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.
(YES - "B")
VERIFY faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT. (YES)
VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT. (YES)
VERIFY MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT. (NO, unless closed earlier)
Critical Closes 1AF-93, MDAFW Pump "8" to SG "8" before 51 Task is terminated.
BOP Shut faulted SG(s) to steam supply valve to TDAFW pump -
SHUT.
SG B: 1MS-70 VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT (YES)
VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT. (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 31 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT.
(YES)
BOP CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%. (YES)
PROCEDURE NOTE:
A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.
SRO CHECK Secondary Radiation:
CHECK for all of the following:
SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)
MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL. (YES)
ANY level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (NO)
RO CHECK if SI has been terminated:
SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)
RO CHECK SI Termination Criteria:
CHECK Subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] - C (YES) 20°F [50°F] - M CHECK secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:
LEVEL in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 250/0 [40%]. (YES/NO)
TOTAL feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH. (YES)
RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)
PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10°A> [30%]. (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 32 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT RO RESET SI.
SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: MANUALLY realign Safeguards Equipment following a loss of offsite power.
RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation Signals.
RO Restore Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment:
Open the following valves:
11A-819 1SI-287 RO STOP all but ONE CSIP.
RO CHECK RCS pressure - STABLE OR.INCREASING. (YES)
CHECK CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST. (YES)
OPEN normal miniflow isolation valves:
1CS-182 1CS-196 1CS-210 1CS-214 SHUT BIT outlet valves:
1SI-3 1SI-4 VERIFY cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT 1SI-52 1SI-86 1SI-107 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 33 of 34 REVISION 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 19 AND GO TO Step 19.
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
High head 51 flow should be isolated before continuing.
ESTABLISH Charging Lineup:
SHUT charging flow control valve:
FK-122.1 OPEN charging line isolation valves:
1CS-235 1CS-238 Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario when normal charging has been established.
2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 34 of 34 REVISION 1
IAppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility:
Examiners:
HARRIS Scenario No.:
Operators:
2 Op Test No.:
2008 NRC Initial Conditions:
IC-9: 51OJ'<> Power, BOL TDAFW Pump cleared and tagged to replace tappet nut on trip valve. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> remaining on TS.
3.7.1.2 Action a 4 GPD tube leakage in SG "C" for past 30 days. Chemistry has CRC-804 in effect.
Radiation Monitor RM-01MS-3592SB, MSL "B" Monitor, was declared inoperable last shift. TS 3.3.3.6 Action c in effect.
Turnover:
The previous shift started MFW Pump "A" following replacement of a bearing and has completed GP-005, Step 134. Resume raising power at 4 DEH units/minute Critical Tasks:
Energize Bus 1B-SB before RCS Feed and Bleed criteria is met Terminate the release via SG "C" PORV before exiting EPP-14 Minimize primary to secondary leakage to prevent a SG "C" overfill Event I
Malf.
I Event I
Event No.
No.
Description Type*
1 I
NIAIN-=-BOP I Raise power SRO R-RO 2
I LT:115 II-RO, I VCT Level Channel 115 fails LOW SRO 3
I XD11121 IC-BOP I MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3)
SRO TS-SRO 4
I SWS07A IC-RO, I Normal Service Water Pump "A" sheared shaft SRO 5
I PT:495 II - BOP I SG "C" Controlling Steam Pressure Channel fails HI SRO TS-SRO 6
I SGN05C C-RO, ISG "C" progressive SG Tube Leak CVC17 SRO FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, fails to respond in AUTO TS-SRO 7
I EP~ I Loss of Off-Site Power DSG01A EDG "A" fails to start Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 RevisionJ Page 1 of 38
I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I 8
DSG06B C - BOP, EDG "B" breaker fails to close SRO 9
SGN05C M-ALL SG "C" SGTR after EPP-1 exit 10 PT:308C C-BOP SG "C" PORV fails to 100 % in AUTO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
The crew assumes the watch having pre-briefed on the procedure to raise power. The Turbine-driven AFW Pump is cleared and tagged for repair of the tappet nut on the trip valve. TS 3.7.1.2.a is in effect. There is a 4 GPD tube leak in Steam Generator (SG)
"C" that has been stable for 30 days. Chemistry is monitoring in accordance with their procedures. The radiation monitor on Main Steam Line "B" failed last shift. TS 3.3.3.6.c is in effect.
When the evaluation team is satisfied that the power change is under control, the Lead Evaluator can cue the VCT level channel failure. Auto makeup will initiate when the channel fails. The crew should respond to alarms/indications in accordance with alarm response procedure and enter AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP.
After the VCT is properly aligned, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of the feeder breaker for both fans on Containment Fan Cooler AH-3. The crew should initially respond in accordance with alarm response procedure and then shift to the Train "B" units in accordance with the system operating procedure but may start a standby unit for the near-term. The SRO should enter TS 3.6.2.3.a.
When Containment Fan Cooler actions are complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue the shaft shear on Normal Service Water (NSW) Pump 1A. System pressure will degrade as the standby pump will not start because the interlock is off of the running pump breaker. The crew should respond in accordance with NSW header pressure alarms on ALB-2 and enter AOP-022, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER. This will direct start of the standby pump. There are no TS's associated with the NSW Pumps.
When NSW is properly aligned, the Lead Evaluator can cue the failure of the controlling Steam Pressure Channel on SG "C". The BOP should respond to multiple SG "C" alarms on ALB-14 and take manual control of the affected FRV in accordance with the alarm response procedures and management guidance for controlling malfunctioning automatic equipment. The SRO should enter the TS for Reactor Trip Instrumentation (3.3.1), ESF Instrumentation (3.3.2), and Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (3.3.3.6).
The crew may elect to shift to another channel to restore the FRV to AUTO. The channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.
When SG level is under control, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of increasing SG tube leakage in SG "C". The RO should recognize an RCS leak trend or may respond to a Pressurizer level deviation alarm since FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, will not be responding properly in automatic. The SRO should enter AOP-016, EXCESSIVE Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 2 of 38
I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE. The crew should maintain pressurizer level by manually controlling charging flow and minimizing or securing letdown. The crew should estimate the leakage to determine the requisite Steam Generator Tube Leakage (SGTL) Action Level and the SRO should enter TS 3.4.6.2 for RCS leakage.
When the SGTL Action Level has been determined and the TS entry is complete, the Lead evaluator can cue the loss of off-site power and resultant automatic reactor trip.
EDG "A" fails to start and EDG "B" starts but the breaker does not close automatically.
The crew will enter PATH-1 and transition to EPP-1, LOSS OF AC POWER TO 1A-SA AND 1B-SB BUSES. EPP-1 will provide direction to energize 1B-SB after which the crew will transition back to PATH-1. After the transition back to PATH-1, the SGTL will become a SGTR on SG "C". The crew may initiate a MANUAL SI or it will occur automatically. SG "C" PORV will fail to close at the automatic setpoint. If operators fail to close it in PATH-1 then the crew will transition to EPP-14, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, and isolate SG "C". The crew will transition to PATH-2, isolate SG "C", then cooldown and equalize RCS and SG "C" pressure. The scenario can be terminated when the BIT flowpath is isolated.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 3 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 SETUP Form ES-D-1 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Clip a copy of GUIDE-1 Attachment 1 (SI Alignment) and Attachment 6 (Safeguards Actuation Verification) to each scenario guide for use by the evaluators.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
IC-9: 51% power, BOL - then start MFW Pump "B" and both HD Pumps and allow approximately 4 minutes for SG levels to stabilize before bringing in the crew Tag TDAFW Pump on the MCB GP-005 completed through Step 133.d Reactivity Plan for intended evolution (Raise power at 4 DEH Units/minute)
Turnover Sheet Ensure rod step counters reset to the correct value PRE-LOAD:
imf cfw01C: TDAFW Pump under clearance irf rms 170: Steamline "B" Rad Monitor failed HI imf dsg01: EDG "A" fails to start imf dsg06b: EDG "B" Breaker fails to close automatically but can be closed from the MCB with the proper interlock satisfied TRIGGERS:
Event 2: imf LT:115 (VCT level fails low - O°A>>
Event 3: xd1i121 (MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips - both fans on AH-3)
Event 4: imf sws07a (NSW Pump "A" shaft shear)
Event 5: imf PT:495 (SG "C" Channel 3 Steam Pressure fails HIGH - 1300)
Event 6: sgn05c/cvc17 (SGTL-60 GPM/FCV-122 fails to track)
Prior to actuating this trigger the Booth Operator must read FCV-122 position off of the summary page and type that value into the FINAL VALUE box.
Event 7/10: imf eps01 (LOOP)/imf PT:308c (SG PORV Setpoint drifts up to 100°A>>
Event 9: TRG= 9 mmf sgn05c (SGTR-420 GPM)
Field actions for GUIDE 1, Attachment 6 irf mss027 to local ops (SG "A" PORV local operation)
. Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 4 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE Indications Available: N/A EVALUATOR.'S NOTE:
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2 (VCT Level Channel failure) when the evaluators have completed their evaluation of the power change.
SRO Provides direction per GP-005, Step 133.e - PROCEED with the load increase by depressing the GO pushbutton.
BOP Informs RO/SRO that turbine load increase is being initiated.
BOP Depresses GO pushbutton.
RO At 55 to 60°A> Reactor power, CHECK the following:
ALB-13/5-3, POWER RANGE UPPER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.
ALB-13/5-4, POWER RANGE LOWER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.
IF either alarm is illuminated, THEN REFER to the APP for appropriate action.
VERIFY Main Feed Pump Recirculation Valves 1FW-8 and BOP 1FW-39 are shut when total Main Feed Pump flow is greater than 8600 KPPH.
BOP Monitors turbine and feedwater system response.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The crew may elect to start a dilution before the power change is initiated. OP-107 is a "Reference Use" procedure. The dilution steps are provided for evaluator use.
DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This RO may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC.
RO SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 5 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE RO SET total makeup flow as follows:
IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.
IF performing ALT DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.
RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
RO PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the ALT DIL position.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:
PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.
ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
EVALUATOR NOTE:
The crew may elect to manually crack open a PRZ Spray Valve to establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRZ/RCS boron concentrations within limits.
OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.
EVALUATOR NOTE:
SRO concurrence should be obtained prior to energizing the BUH in MANUAL.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 6 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE RO START the makeup system as follows:
TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
RO VERIFY Tavg and rod motion responds as desired.
RO VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired quantity has been added.
RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.
RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:
Is in the STOP position.
The green light is lit.
RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.
RO START the makeup system as follows:
TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 7 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 2 - VCT LEVEL CHANNEL LT-115 FAILS LOW Booth Operator Instructions:
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, initiate Event 2 - VCT Level Channel failure (imf LT:115, 00/0).'
Indications Available: ALB-007-4-3, VCT HIGH-LOW LEVEL RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-007-4-3.
RO ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-007-4-3.
Evaluator Note:
The SRO may elect to go directly to AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.
The crew may place the power change on HOLD.
RO CONFIRM alarm using LI-115-1, Vol Control Tank Level (MCB-1A2).
RO DETERMINES LT-115 failed LOW.
RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:
AT 5%
VCT level, the following occurs: (N/A) 1CS-291, Suction from RWST (LCV-115B) opens.
1CS-292, Suction from RWST (LCV-115D) opens 1CS-165, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115C) shuts 1CS-166, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115E) shuts AT 20% VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor Makeup System starts. (YES)
AT 40%
VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor Makeup System stops. (N/A)
AT 800/0 VCT level, 1CS-120, VCT Level Control Vlv, fully diverts letdown flow to the RHT. (N/A)
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 8 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 2 - VCT LEVEL CHANNEL LT-115 FAILS LOW RO PERFORM Corrective Actions:
Procedure Caution: Low VCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIPs.
MATCH charging and letdown flows.
IF charging flow is lost, (NO) THEN GO TO AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions.
Procedure Note:
If either LT-112 or LT-115 fails high, the automatic CSIP suction swapover from the VCT to the RWST will not function if required.
SRO IF EITHER of the following occurs:
VCT level is less than 20% AND automatic makeup is NOT in progress VCT level is greater than 40 % AND automatic makeup is still in progress THEN GO TO AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control.
SRO ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-003.
CREW CHECK instrument air available. (YES)
RO CHECK BOTH LT-112 and LT-115 functioning properly. (NO)
SRO GO TO Section 3.1, LT-112 or LT-115 Malfunction.
REFER TO Attachment 1, VCT Level Control Channels SRO Operation, as necessary to assess the effects of an LT-112 or LT-115 malfunction.
Evaluator's Note:
Crew may brief on Attachment 1.
Procedure Note:
An instrument malfunction may manifest itself as a slow drift rather than a "full high" or "full low" failure. Until the instrument has failed fully high or fully low, all steps should be reviewed for applicability periodically, even if not continuously applicable.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 9 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 2 - VCT LEVEL CHANNEL LT-115 FAILS LOW RO CHECK that LT-115 is FAILING. (YES)
RO MONITOR VCT level using either of the following:
ERFIS point LCS0112 LI-112 (local)
RO CHECK LT-115 FAILING LOW. (YES)
RO PLACE RMW CONTROL Switch in*STOP.
Procedure Note:
Normally, VeT level is maintained between 20 and 400k by auto makeup.
RO CONTROL VCT level as follows:
MAINTAIN level BELOW 70%.
MAINTAIN level ABOVE 20%
OR DESIRED MINIMUM.
RO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5°A>.
Procedure Note:
Lifting leads in the following step will simulate a low-low level signal from the failed instrument. This allows a valid low-low level signal from the good instrument to initiate emergency makeup.
RO CHECK the malfunctioning instrument FAILING LOW. (YES)
SRO DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the instrument malfunction.
SRO CHECK that the instrument malfunction has been repaired.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 10 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 2 - VCT LEVEL CHANNEL LT-115 FAILS LOW SRO WAIT until repairs are complete before proceeding.
Evaluator's Note:
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 3 (MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker failure) when the crew is waiting for the instrument repair.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 11 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 3 - MCC 1A34 FEEDER BREAKER TRIP (LOSS OF FAN COOLER AH-3)
Booth Operator Instructions:
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate Event 3 - MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trip (XD11121)
Indications Available:
ALB-001-6-5, ENGINEERING SAFEGUARD FEATURES SYSTEM TRAIN A BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE ALB-27-8-2, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-3 FLOW LOW OIL RO Responds to alarm ALB-001-6-5.
BOP Responds to alarm 27-8-2.
SRO Enters APP-ALB-001-6-5 and APP-ESF-A-4-1.
RO Reports alarm condition(s) on Engineered Safeguard Feature Bypass Panel A.
RO Refer to APP-ESF-A-4-1 for the window indicated in alarm on ESF Bypass Panel A.
RO/BOP Reports Containment Fan Cooler AH~3 tripped.
BOP Reports no power to 1A34.
SRO Dispatches AO to investigate.
Booth Operator Note: Report 1A34 feeder breaker is open - cause unknown.
Evaluator Note: The SRO should direct the BOP to shift to the Train "B" coolers (AH-1 and AH-4). The following steps should be completed for AH-1 and repeated for AH-4 (in either order) then AH-2 should be stopped.
SRO Directs BOP to shift to Train "B" Fan Coolers.
BOP Enters OP-169, Section 5.0.
Appendix 0 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 12 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 3 - MCC 1A34 FEEDER BREAKER TRIP (LOSS OF FAN COO~ER AH-3)
BOP Verifies Initial Conditions.
BOP Places control switch for both fans in AH-1/AH-4 to LO-SPD.
Evaluator's Note:
Procedure Note indicates the next two steps must be completed without delay to avoid coastdown.
BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to STOP.
BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to HI-SPD.
BOP Places control switches for AH-2 fans in STOP.
BOP Restores normal containment purge:
Opens normal inlet/discharge CP9/CP5 Opens normal inlet/discharge CP6/CP3 Places switch for Normal Purge Supply Fan to START.
Procedure Note:
Controls are now aligned for the fan to auto start if/when CNMT pressure reaches the negative value setpoint.
SRO Contacts Work Control for assistance.
SRO Enters TS 3.6.2.3 Action a. (Restore both trains to operable within 7 days or be in HSB in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />)
Lead Evaluator Note:
Cue Event 4 (NSW Pump "A" sheared shaft) after the fan coolers are aligned in accordance with SRO directions and the Fan Cooler TS has been entered.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 13 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 4 - NSW PUMP "A" SHAFT SHEAR Booth Operator Instructions:
Actuate Event 4 - NSW Pump "A" sheared shaft (NSW07A) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
Indications Available:
ALB-02-6-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR A LOW PRESS; ALB-02-7-1, SERVWTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS; ALB-02-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW PRESS RO Responds to ALB-02 alarms - reports low NSW header pressure with pump running indication.
EVALUATOR NOTE: The ESW Pumps will auto start on low header pressure.
SRO Enters AOP-022, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER.
RO CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING CSIP - MORE THAN 1-minute: (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 2.
SRO CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING EDG - MORE THAN 1-minute: (NO)
BOOTH OPERATOR: There are several points in the AOP where an AO may be dispatched to check for leaks and proper operation of equipment. Report no leaks, no breaker problems but when dispatched to the pump, report that the coupling appears to have failed and request maintenance assistance.
SRO GO TO Step 3.
RO/SRO GO TO the appropriate step as indicated by the parameter LOST:
NSW Pump failure (YES)
NSW Pump loss of flow SRO Proceeds to Step 6 Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 14 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 4 - NSW PUMP "A" SHAFT SHEAR RO CHECK loss of NSW Header due to NSW Pump FAILED or LOSS OF FLOW.
START standby NSW Pump as follows:
VERIFY discharge valve for affected pump is CLOSING by placing affected pump control switch to STOP.
START standby NSW Pump in priming mode by momentarily placing standby NSW Pump control switch to START.
WHEN discharge valve for affected pump is fully SHUT, THEN PLACE and HOLD control switch for running pump to START to fully OPEN pump discharge valve.
RO CHECK ANY NSW Pump - RUNNING. (YES)
SRO GO TO Section 3.2 (page 30).
SRO CHECK Turbine trip required by ANY of the following conditions - EXIST: (NO)
No NSW Pump can be operated Non-isolable leak exists in the NSW system Major isolable leak exists on the Turbine Building NSW Header AND time does not permit a controlled plant shutdown SRO OBSERVE Note prior to Step 13 AND GO TO Step 13.
PROCEDURE NOTE: Steps 13 through 19 address leaks on NSW turbine building header. Leaks on individual components supplied by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps 20 and 21.
CREW CHECK for minor isolable leak on Turbine Building header-ANY EXISTING. (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 20.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 15 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 4 - NSW PUMP "A" SHAFT SHEAR CREW CHECK for leak in an individual component - ANY EXISTING.
(NO)
SRO GO TO Step 22.
CREW CHECK for leak on WPB header - ANY EXISTING. (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 24.
RO CHECK that NSW Pump(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (YES)
CREW
- PERFORM the following for affected NSW Pump(s):
CHECK NSW Pump breaker(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 25.b.
RO/BOP CHECK adequate pump suction inventory EXISTS:
LI-9300.1, Service Water PMP A CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51°/b (ERFIS LSW9300)
LI-9302, Service Water PMP B CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51°/b (ERFIS LSW9302)
LI-1931, Cooling Tower Basin Level, GREATER THAN 31 inches Locally VERIFY the following for the affected NSW Pump per OP-139, Service Water System:
CREW Proper cooling and seal water supply to NSW Pumps.
Proper operation of NSW strainer backwash.
CREW Locally CHECK NSW Pump(s) for signs of damage (shaft shear or other obvious problems).
SRO INITIATE appropriate corrective action for the loss of NSW.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 16 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 4 - NSW PUMP "A" SHAFT SHEAR SRO Completes an Equipment Failure Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance.
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5 (SG "*C" Pressure Channel failure) after assistance is requested or when AOP-022 is exited.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 17 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 5 - SG "C" STEAM PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH Booth Operator Instructions:
Actuate Event 5 - SG "C" Controlling Steam Pressure Channel Fails HI (imf PT:495) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
Indications Available:
ALB-014-1-2 and 2-2 (LOOP A and LOOP B HI STEAM LINE ~P)
BOP RESPONDSto alarms ALB-014-1-2 and 2-2 (LOOP HI STEAM LINE ~P).
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
THE BOP may take MANUAL control of the associated FRV prior to entering the APP.
BOP Enters APP-ALB-014-1-2 and/or 2-2.
BOP PLACES FRV for SG "C" in MANUAL and controls flow.
BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:
If directed to investigate locally on RAB 261 rack, report "PT-495 is not leaking".
SRO REFERS to OWP-ESF-04 to remove channel from service.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The SRO may direct a swap to Channel 4 to regain auto control. The OWP also accomplishes this action.
BOP Selects Channel 4 (PT-496) for control.
SRO CONTACTS work control for assistance.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 18 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 5 - SG "C n STEAM PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH ENTERS TS:
3.3.1.a Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Action 6 3.3.2.a ESF Instrumentation, Action 19 SRO Both require tripping the inoperable channel within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
and 3.3.3.6.a. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation - restore the inoperable channel within 7 days.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
After the FRV is in AUTO and the TS has been entered, the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (SGTL).
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 19 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "C" TUBE LEAKlFCV-122 FAILS AS-IS Booth Operator Instructions:
Prior to actuating this trigger the Booth Operator must read FCV-122 position off of the summary page and type that value into the FINAL VALUE box. Actuate Event 6 (SG "C" Tube LeaklFCV-122 fails to track in AUTO)
Indications Available:
ALB-009-2-2, PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION ALB-10-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE RO Responds to alarms and/or indications of RCS leakage.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
Multiple alarms associated with RCS leakage will direct implementation of AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE. The leak rate is approximately 60 GPM. Letdown will have to be reduced or isolated to stabilize charging flow on scale.
The RO may take MANUAL control of FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, at any point after the failure is recognized.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
This procedure contains no immediate actions.
Throughout this procedure, as well as all AOPs, actions are based on valid alarms and instrumentation. Actions based on invalid indication are not applicable.
When possible (except in the cases of rapidly propagating leaks and leaks approaching Action Level 3), leakage should be qualitatively confirmed prior to declaration of an action level.
Leakage is qualitatively confirmed when two different indications (such as grab samples or radiation monitors) trend in the same direction with the same approximate order of magnitude.
RO/SRO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)
GO TO Step 3.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 20 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "C" TUBE LEAKlFCV-122 FAILS AS-IS SRO REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is performed in Step 16.
RO CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (YES)
PROCEDURE NOTE:
If CSIP suction is re-aligned to the RWST, negative reactivity addition should be anticipated.
RO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5°A>.
SRO GO TO step 10.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
If a Containment Ventilation Isolation signal has occurred, Tech Spec 3.0.3 is applicable, since both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief are inoperable.
SRO CHECK valid CNMT Ventilation Isolation.monitors (REM-3561A, B, C and D) ALARM CLEAR. (YES)
SRO CHECK RM 3502A, RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, ALARM CLEAR. (YES)
SRO CHECK ALL valid Area Radiation Monitors ALARM CLEAR.
(YES)
SRO CHECK valid Stack Monitors ALARM CLEAR. (YES)
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 21 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "c" TUBE LEAKlFCV-122 FAILS AS-IS SRO DETERMINE if unnecessary personnel should be evacuated from affected areas, as follows:
CHECK that an RCS leak outside Containment has caused a valid RMS alarm. (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 14.d.
SRO CHECK that a valid RMS Secondary Monitor HIGH ALARM indicates a SG tube leak may exist. (YES)
RO SOUND local evacuation alarm.
ANNOUNCE on the PA:
"Attention all personnel. High radiation levels may exist in portions of the power block due to SG tube leakage.
Unnecessary personnel evacuate the RAB and Turbine Building, including the Steam Tunnel. Further announcements will be made as surveys are performed."
CREW NOTIFY Chemistry to stop any primary sampling activities.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
If not already done, in the following step the RO should take MANUAL control of FCV-122.
The SRO may direct a reduction in letdown flow in the following step.
RO PERFORM an RCS flow balance calculation as follows:
CONTROL charging flow using FK-122.1, to stabilize PRZ level.
OPERATE the following letdown orifice valves as necessary to maintain charging flow on scale:
1CS-7, 45 gpm Letdown Orifice A 1CS-8, 60 gpm Letdown Orifice B 1CS-9, 60 gpm Letdown Orifice C Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 22 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "C" TUBE LEAKlFCV-122 FAILS AS-IS Evaluator Note: Entering Primary-to-Secondary Leak Action Level 3 is more restrictive than the TS Action Statement and therefore meets the TS action requirement.
When the leak rate is estimated (approx. 60 GPM) the SRO SRO should enter TS 3.4.6.2.b (Reduce to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />).
Evaluator Note: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 7 (LOOP) after the crew has calculated the rough SGTL rate and the TS and/or Action Level entry is declared.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 23 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE BOOTH OPERATOR:
Actuate Events 7 and 10 [imf eps01 (LOOP)/imf PT:308c (SG PORV fails OPEN in AUTO)] on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
Actuate the SG "C" SGTR (imf sgn05c) when the crew enters EPP-004.
INDICATIONS: Multiple alarms/lighting transfers CREW Performs PATH-1 immediate actions.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:
AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:
CHECK for any of the following:
TRIP breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)
TRIP breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)
ROD Bottom lights LIT (No Indication)
NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:
CHECK for any of the following:
ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)
ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (No Indication)
BOP VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses:
1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (NO)
BOP Check AC emergency bus 1A-SA OR 1B-SB - ENERGIZED (NO)
Evaluator Note: The crew may analyze the condition of EDG's "A" and "B", noting that EDG "B" is running with the breaker OPEN but no trip alarms.
Such being the case, the SRO may direct the BOP to close EDG "B" breaker before entry into EPP-001. The breaker SYNCH Switch must be ON to do so.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 24 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE SRO GO TO EPP-001, "LOSS OF AC POWER TO 1A-SA AND 1B-SB - BUSES", Step 1.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip (YES)
RO VERIFY Turbine Trip (YES)
CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)
Check letdown isolation valves SHUT. (NO)
Closes 1CS-1, 1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9 1CS-2 (LCV-460)
VERIFY excess letdown valves - SHUT. (YES) 1CS-460 1CS-461 BOP VERIFY AFW Flow and Control SG Levels:
VERIFY AFW Flow - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH. (NO)
ANY level-GREATER THAN 250/0 [40%
]. (YES)
Maintain 210 KPPH until >25%
in ~1 SG.
SRO EVALUATE EAL Network using Entry Point X.
BOP Verify AC Emergency Bus Cross-Ties to.Non-Emergency AC Buses - OPEN Verify any cross tie to Bus 1A-SA - OPEN (YES)
Breaker 104 Breaker 105 Verify Any cross tie to Bus 1B-SB - OPEN (YES)
Breaker 124 Breaker 125 Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 25 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE BOP ENERGIZE AC Emergency Buses using EDGs:
CHECK EDG 1A and 1B-AVAILABLE EDG emergency trips CLEAR (NOT PRESENT). (1A-NO,1B-YES)
EDG output breakers - NORMAL (NOT TRIPPED).
(YES)
(YES-B)
SRO GO TO Step 7e.
BOP CHECK any AC emergency bus - ENERGIZED:
1A-SA bus voltage (NO) 1B-SB bus voltage (NO)
BOP PERFORM the following:
CRITICAL Energize 1B~SB by closing Breaker 126 before RCS TASK Feed and Bleed criteria is met EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The Synch. Switch must be turned ON to satisfy the interlock for closing the breaker from the MCB.
SRO GO TO Step 7h.
BOP CHECK any AC emergency bus - ENERGIZED:
1A-SA bus voltage (NO) 1B-SB bus voltage (YES)
SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.
SRO Transitions to PATH-1, Step 4.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
Actuate the event trigger for SGTR when the crew returns to performing actions in PATH-1.
EVALUATOR NOTE:
The crew will likely transition to EPP-4 before SGTR symptoms are evident.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 26 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE RO CHECK SI Actuation (NO)
SI Required (NO)
SRO GO TO EPP-004, "REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE", Step 1.
SRO Directs a MANUAL SI in accordance with Foldout criteria.
SRO Transitions (or continues) to PATH-1, Entry Point "A".
SRO FOLDOUT A applies.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The following actions should be taken in accordance with FOLDOUT A criteria during the scenario:
Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block Valves CLOSE when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.
RO VERIF'Y ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (NO-only "B" Train)
SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)
RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)
BOP CHECK Main Steam Isolation:
MAIN steam isolation -ACTUATED. (NO)
BOP MAIN steam isolation - REQUIRED. (YES/NO)
Steam line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG.
CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 27 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE MANUAL closure of all MSIVs AND bypass valves is desired.
RO CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (YES)
AFWflow-AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The crew may identify SG "C" as ruptured at this time and isolate AFW.
BOP CHECK any SG level - GREATER THAN 25%
[40%]. (YES)
VERIFY Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", While Continuing with this Procedure.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment
- 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 6 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of is not predictable.
The crew may recognize that SG "C" PORV is 100 0k open during attempts to control RCS temperature. In that case, he/she may take MANUAL control and close it at any time after the malfunction is determined. If that occurs then a transition to EPP-014 is not required.
Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.
Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 OF AND 559 OF BOP VERIFY AC buses 1A1 (NO) AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 28 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)
RO CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES-All OPEN)
RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)
EVALUATOR NOTE: If the crew has not identified SG "C" PORV as OPEN then a transition to EPP-14 should occur. If SG "C" PORV has been closed in MANUAL then the crew will continue in PATH-1 to the PATH-2 transition.
BOP IDENTIFY any faulted SG:
CHECK for any of the following:
ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "C")
ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)
SRO GO TO EPP-014 BOOTH OPERATOR:
If directed to walk down the system to check for leaks:
Wait 3 minutes and then report SG "C" PORV tailpipe blowing steam.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.
SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.
BOP CHECK MSIVs and BYPASS Valves:
VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 29 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE BOP VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)
ANY SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES, "A" and "B").
BOP IDENTIFY any Faulted SG:
CHECK for any of the following:
ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "C")
VERIFY faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT (NO)
Critical Places SG "C" PORV in MANUAL and closes to Task terminate the release before exiting EPP-14.
VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
VERIFY MDAFW and TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT SHUT faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump
-SHUT Closes isolation from SG "C": 1MS-72 VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT:
VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
BOP CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10% (YES)
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 30 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NOTE:
A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.
EVALUATOR NOTE: The "Check secondary radiation" could be answered YES or NO, depending on the condition of the alarm before SI was initiated.
SRO CHECK Secondary Radiation:
SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)
MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)
ANY level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES, "C")
SRO GO TO PATH-2, Entry Point J.
SRO FOLDOUT C applies.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
No actions should result from FOLDOUT "C" during the remainder of the scenario.
SRO EVALUATE EAL Network using Entry Point U.
SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is initiated.
ANY RCP - RUNNING (NO)
BOP IDENTIFY any ruptured SG:
CHECK for any of the following:
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 31 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
,2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE SG level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "C")
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open.
BOP ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured SG:
ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88°A> (1145 PSIG) AND place in auto.
Places SG "C" PORV in MANUAL and closes. It should NOT be placed in AUTO. If it is placed in AUTO then the operator should determine that it has opened, place it in MANUAL, close it, and leave it in MANUAL.
CHECK ruptured SG PORV - SHUT. (YES/NO)
SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:
MS-70 and 72 are tagged SHUT VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG -
SHUT (YES)
SHUT ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:
SG A: 1MS-231 SG B: 1MS-266 SG C: 1MS-301 SHUT ruptured SG MSIV and BYPASS valve. (SG "C")
BOP Ruptured SG MSIV and bypassed valves SHUT (YES)
SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 8 AND GO TO Step 8.
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
If ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 32 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE BOP MONITOR Ruptured SG Level:
RUPTURED SG - FAULTED (NO)
Level - GREATER THAN 25°A>
Stop feed flow by shutting the MDAFW and TDAFW isolation valves to the ruptured SG.
PROCEDURE CAUTION: The steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to the TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing.
BOP CHECK Ruptured SG(s) Pressure - GREATER THAN 260 PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES)
RO Block Low Steam Pressure SI:
Pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)
Block low steam pressure SI.
PROCEDURE NOTE: After the low steam pressure 51 signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
At least one intact SG - AVAILABLE FOR RCS COOLDOWN (YES)
GO TO Step 11e.
Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured SG pressure:
PROCEDURE CAUTION: IF RCPs are NOT running, an invalid RED or ORANGE condition for RCS INTEGRITY CSF-4 may occur during the following steps. Disregard ruptured SG wide range cold leg temperature until Step 39 completed.
Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 33 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE EVALUATOR NOTE: There is no power to the SG "A" PORV controller. The SRO should direct local operation.
BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE: If directed to control SG "A" PORV locally:
irf mss027 TO LOCAL OPS Dump steam from intact SGs at maximum rate using any of the following (listed in order of preference):
SG PORV's Initiates cooldown using only SG PORV's "A" and "B" GO TO Step 13.
Evaluator Note: The crew will continue with the procedure while the cooldown is in progress. When the CET temperature is less than the target then the crew should terminate the cooldown and continue with the procedure.
RO I Monitor Core Exit TCs While Continuing With This Procedure:
Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (NO)
WHEN core exit TCs less REQUIRED TEMPERATURE THEN do Steps 13b AND c.
13.b Stop RCS cooldown.
13.c Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.
RO Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 GPM.
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
If an AFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signal may be reset to allow restoration of AFW. (An AFW isolation will occur if a main steam line isolation signal is present AND one SG pressure decreases 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.)
If the steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to TDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing SG level, it must be restored to the shut position. (Two out of three SG levels decreasing below 25% will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 34 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE BOP Check Intact SG Levels:
Any intact SG level - GREATER THAN 25%
[4001b]
(YES)
AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)
Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 25% and 500/0 [400/0 and 50%]
Any intact SG level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 16.
RO Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:
Verify power to PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES-one)
Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)
GO TO Step 16f.
Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)
IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.
SRO Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power.
RO Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. (Phase A only is actuated)
RO Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:
Open the following valves:
11A-819 1SI-287 Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 35 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE RO Check RHR Pump Status:
RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)
Stop RHR pumps. ("B")
RO Check If RCS cooldown Should Be Stopped:
Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (YES/NO)
Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.
BOP Check Ruptured SG Pressure Check ruptured SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
GO TO Step 24.
RO Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 30 of - C (YES)
RO Depressurize RCS To Minimize Break Flow AND Refill PRZ:
Normal PRZ spray - AVAILABLE (NO)
SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 26 AND GO TO Step 26.
PROCEDURE CAUTION The PRT may rupture if a PRZ PORV is used to depressurize the RCS. This may result in abnormal containment conditions.
Cycling of the PRZ PORV should be minimized to avoid the possibility of the valve sticking.
PROCEDURE NOTE: The upper head region may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs are not running. This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZ level.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 36 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE RO Depressurize RCS Using PRZ PORV To Minimize Break Flow AND Refill PRZ:
PRZ PORV - AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE Open one PRZ PORV until any of the following conditions satisfied:
PRZ level - GREATER THAN 75%
[60%]
RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 10°F [40DF] - C Both of the following:
RCS pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SG(s)
PRESSURE PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10% [30%]
Pressure -INCREASING (YES)
Observe CAUTION prior to Step 28 AND GO TO Step 28.
PROCEDURE CAUTION: To prevent overfilling the ruptured SG(s), SI termination should NOT be delayed.
RO Check SI Termination Criteria:
RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 10 OF - C (YES)
BOP Check secondary heat sink using any of the following:
Total feed flow to SGs-AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE Level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 250/0
[400/0]
RO RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
RO PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)
RO Stop All But One CSIP.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 37 of 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE RO Isolate High Head SI Flow:
Check CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST Open normal miniflow isolation valves:
1CS-182 1CS-196 1CS-210 1CS-214 Critical Shut BIT outlet valves:
Task 1SI-3 1SI-4 (No power)
Shuts 1SI-3 before SG "C" level indication reaches 95°k.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when 1SI-3 is SHUT.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 1 Page 38 of 38
I Appendix D l~
Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility:
Examiners:
Initial Conditions:
From IC-27:
Scenario No.:
Operators:
3 Op Test No.:
2008 NRC 4.2%
Plant startup to full power in progress. Perform GP-005 to Step 95.
No equipment out-of-service.
Turnover:
The previous shift continued a plant startup following a short maintenance outage. GP-005, POWER OPERATION, is in progress with Step 94 completed. Continue the startup but maintain steady state power at 9-10%
while I&C Technicians complete testing of the P-7 permissive.
Critical Tasks:
Start CSIP "B" no later than the PATH-1 SI flow verification step Close at least one Phase "A" Isolation Valve in each open line no later than the completion of GUIDE 1, Attachment 6 Event I
Malf.
I Event I
Event No.
No.
Description Type*
1 I
N/A N - BOP, Shift to the MFW Regulating Valves SRO Raise power and stabilize <P-7 2
I HVA04 C - BOP, Loss of Essential Chiller "A" SRO TS-SRO 3
I TI:144 C-RO, Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/Diversion Valve fails to JTB143B SRO bypass demineralizers 4
I RCS09B C-RO, RCP "B" rising vibration SRO TS - SRO 5
I CFW16A IC-BOP, IRunning MFW Pump trips XB11155 I SRO Standby MFW Pump fails to start ZR211158 I
I Both MDAFW Pump AUTO start failure ZR211113 6
I PRS04A M-ALL Small Break LOCA CVC05A CSIP "A" breaker trips 7
I DSG04A C-RO, Sequencer "B" skips CSIP load block SRO Appendix D Page 1 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
~endixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I 8
ZRPK630A C-BOP Same slave relay in each train fails to actuate respective Phase ZRPK630B "A" Isolation Valves l.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor i'
I HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3
SUMMARY
r The crew will assume the watch pre-briefed on the initial conditions and the procedure in effect (GP-005, POWER OPERATION). No equipment is out-of-service but I&C Technicians are performing P-7 permissive testing. Steady state power must be maintained at < 1ooR> power until the P-7 testing is complete. This direction is actually to ensure power is less than 10% when RCP vibration occurs and the running MFW Pump trips.
When the evaluating team is satisfiedwith the power change and the feedwater control valves are in AUTO (so that the BOP can respond), the Lead Evaluator can cue the loss of the running Essential Chiller. The BOP should respond to the Auxiliary Equipment Panel (ALB-23) alarm and report loss of the running chiller. The SRO should enter and conduct AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM. The standby chiller should be started in accordance with OP-148, ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM. The SRO should enter TS 3.7.13.
When an Essential Chiller is started and the TS entry is complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue the Letdown Temperature Controller failure. The crew should respond in accordance with the alarm procedure. The RO should manually bypass the CVC Demineralizers and restore letdown temperature to normal in MANUAL control. The CVC Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an engineering evaluation.
On cue from the Lead Evaluator, RCP "B" vibration will begin to rise. The crew will respond to alarms and/or indications and enter AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. Vibration will continue to rise until RCP trip criteria is met.
Since power is <P-7, the RCP can be stopped without a reactor trip. The SRO should enter TS 3.4.1.1.
When the plant is stable and the RCP-related TS entry is complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of the running MFW Pump. The BOP should report the loss of the pump and/or respond to alarms. The SRO should enter and conduct AOP-010, FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS. Actions will include starting the AFW System and lowering power as necessary to maintain SG levels.
When the plant is stable, the Lead Evaluator can cue the failure open of one PRZR Safety Valve. This will result in a MANUAL or automatic SI initiation. Coincident with the SI, CSIP "A" breaker will trip and the Load Sequencer will skip the CSIP "B" load block. The crew should manually start CSIP "B" to establish HHSI in the early steps of PATH-1. The BOP should close at least one isolation valve in any unisolated Phase "A" line in the process of performing GUIDE-1, Attachment 6. The crew will continue in PATH-1 until the transition to EPP-9, POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND Appendix D Page 2 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
IAppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I DEPRESSURIZATION, occurs. The scenario can be terminated when the first RCS pressure reduction is complete in EPP-9.
Appendix D Page 3 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 SETUP Form ES-D-1 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Clip a copy of GUIDE-1 Attachment 1 (SI Alignment) and Attachment 6 (Safeguards Actuation Verification) to each scenario guide for use by the evaluators.
Clip a copy of AOP-018, Attachment 1 - RCP Trip Limits, to the back of this scenario guide.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
IC-27, 4.2%
power, MOL, Boron 1580 GP-005 completed through Step 94 Reactivity Plan for intended evolution (Raise power to just below 1O°A>>
Turnover Sheet Ensure rod step counters reset to the correct value PRE-LOAD:
imf dsg04a: Load Sequencer "B" skips CSIP load block zrpk630a: Phase "A" isolation slave relay failure zrpk630b: Phase "A" isolation slave relay failure xb1i155: Standby MFW Pump fails to start zr211158/zr211113: MDAFW Pumps fail to AUTO start TRIGGERS:
Event 2: hva04 Loss of Essential Chiller "A" Event 3: tt:144 Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/imf jtb143b FAIL_RESET,FAIL_ASIS Demineralizer Bypass fails to bypass automatically Event 4: rcs09b 30 RCP "B" vibration Event 5: cfw16a MFW Pump "A" trips Event 6: rcs01a SBLOCA.09 severity (450 GPM)/cvc05a TRUE CSIP "A" trips Appendix D Page 4 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE Indications Available:
I EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
Cue Event 2 when the BOP is available to respond to the loss of the Essential Chiller. The best window is after the Main Feedwater Regulating Isolation Valves have been verified.
open and before the shift from the Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves.
SRO Directs BOP to perform Step 95, PREPARE to place the Main Feedwater Regulating valves in service.
BOP PREPARE to place the Main Feedwater Regulating valves in service as follows:
VERIFY the following Main Feedwater Regulating valves are shut with the flow controllers in manual with zero (0 or minimum) controller output:
1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR (FK-478) 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR (FK-488) 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR (FK-498)
BOP VERIFY SHUT the following Main Feed Regulating Block valves:
1FW-130, MAIN FW A BLOCK VLV 1FW-246, MAIN FW B BLOCK VLV 1FW-188, MAIN FW C BLOCK VLV BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:
In the following step, report smooth operation of each FCV.
When requested to verify: report 1FW-136, 1FW-252, 1FW-194 (Main Feed Reg Valve Outlet Isolation Valves) all OPEN.
BOP CYCLE the following controllers to open then shut the flow control valves, while monitoring locally for smooth operation:
1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR (FK-478)
Appendix D Page 5 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR (FK-488) 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR (FK-498)
BOP VERIFY OPEN the following Main Feed Regulating Isolation Valves:
1FW-130, MAIN FW A BLOCK VLV 1FW-246, MAIN FW B BLOCK VLV 1FW-188, MAIN FW C BLOCK VLV 1FW-136, MAIN FEED REG VALVE A OUTLET ISOL 1FW-252, MAIN FEED REG VALVE B OUTLET ISOL 1FW-194, MAIN FEED REG VALVE C OUTLET ISOL WHEN Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve FCV Controller BOP demand is between 70% and 80%, OR when Reactor Power is between 7 and 9%, THEN TRANSFER SG level control to the Main Feedwater Regulating valves as follows:
PLACE the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers in MAN:
1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 BOP PLACE the Main FW Regulating Valve Controllers in AUTO:
1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR FK-478 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR FK-488 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR FK-498 PROCEDURE NOTE:
The following Steps verify the Feed Regulating valves will respond prior to fully closing the Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs.
LOWER the output of the following Feedwater Regulating BOP Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to a position 10% lower than the current output:
1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 Appendix D Page 6 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 PROCEDURE NOTE:
If the demand signal reaches a value of 100/0 with no response from the Feedwater Regulating Valves, it may be necessary to return the FRV controller to MAN to cancel any integrated signal and assess the situation before continuing.
BOP WHEN Feedwater Regulating Valves indicate BOTH of the following responses:
Controller output increasing SG level returning to normal THEN LOWER output of the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to O°A> (Minimum output):
1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 BOP At STATUS LIGHT BOX 1, VERIFY SHUT the following FeedwaterRegulating Valve Bypass FCVs:
A BYP FW-140 (Window 4-1)
B BYP FW-256 (Window 4-2)
C BYP FW-198 (Window 4-3)
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The RO should adjust RCS boron and move rods while maintaining Tavg-Tref within 5 of and power S 10 ok.
The RO should request permission and a peer check from the SRO before making a reactivity change.
RO INITIATES dilution, as necessary.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
OP-107 is a "Reference Use" procedure.
Appendix D Page 7 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This RO may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC.
RO SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.
RO SET total makeup flow as follows:
IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.
IF performing ALT DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.
RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
RO PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the ALT DIL position.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:
PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure NOTE:
SRO concurrence should be obtained prior to energizing the BUH in MANUAL.
Appendix D Page 8 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.
RO START the makeup system as follows:
TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.
RO VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.
IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are RO stepping out to the desired height. (N/A - rod control is in MANUAL)
RO VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired quantity has been added.
RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in AUTO per Section 5.1.
RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:
Is in the STOP position.
The GREEN light is LIT.
RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.
RO START the makeup system as follows:
TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.
Appendix D Page 9 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 2 - RUNNING ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRIP Booth Operator Instructions:
Actuate Event 2-Running Essential Chiller trip (hva04a) on cue from Lead Evaluator.
Indications Available:
ALB-023-1-18, CHILLER WC2-A TROUBLE BOP Responds to Auxiliary Equipment Panel alarm ALB-023-1-18, CHILLER WC2-A TROUBLE.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The crew may immediately enter AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM.
BOP Refers to APP-ALB-023-1-18.
CREW Dispatches an AO to investigate.
BOOTH OPERATOR'S CUE:
When contacted, wait 3-4 minutes then report Compressor 1A-SA breaker tripped on overload and local alarm COMPRESSOR AUTO START FAIL/OVERRIDE, OVERLOADS, GND OR TROUBLE, actuated.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
This procedure contains no immediate actions.
BOP CHECK the in-service chiller RUNNING. (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 3.
CREW DISPATCH an operator to determine the cause of the chiller trip.
SRO PERFORM ONE of the following using OP-148, Essential Service Chilled Water System:
START the Standby chiller. (YES)
RESTART the tripped chiller. (NO)
Appendix D Page 10 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 2 - RUNNING ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRIP SRO Directs BOP to start the Standby Chiller in accordance with OP-148.
SRO CONTACT Maintenance as necessary for troubleshooting and appropriate corrective actions.
BOP Enters OP-148, Section 5.2.
BOP Verifies Initial Conditions:
PROCEDURE NOTE:
It is necessary to shift associated trains of HVAC units when shifting trains of Essential Services Chilled Water.
Service water is being supplied to the non-operating chiller WC-21B-SB.
One train of ESCW is already in operation.
For non-emergency starts the pre-start checks of have been performed and an operator should be present to observe start of chiller.
Section 8.12, Manual Chiller Reset performed if necessary for non-operating chiller.
The L.O. heaters have been in service for twelve hours.
(See Precaution and Limitation 4.0.3 for applicability of this Initial Condition)
PROCEDURE NOTES:
The local alarm indication for low chilled water flow and low chilled water temperature will lock in until manually reset at the WC-2 control panel.
If starting the chiller compressor is delayed following the start of the P-4 Pump in next step, the compressor oil could cool down to the point that the compressor will trip on low oil pressure.
At AEP-1, START the non-operating Chiller WC-2 B-SB Chilled BOP Water Pump P-4 B-SB to establish chilled water flow in the non-operating train.
BOP Contacts AO:
Appendix D Page 11 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008,NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 2 - RUNNING ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRIP At the Local Control panel, RESET the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm using the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP INDICATION RESET push-button.
BOOTH OPERATOR'S CUE:
If standing by in the area to observe the start, wait 30 seconds and report the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm reset.
BOP BOP PROCEDURE NOTE:
BOP BOP Appendix D START the chiller by performing ONE of the following:
At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 B-SB control switch to the START position AND RELEASE.
PLACE additional safety related air handlers in service prior to switchover of the nonessential header.
ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term closure of the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units will not affect operability of the Essential Services Chiller system. The next two Steps will align the NNS AH units however, if it is desired to maintain the NNS isolation valves shut, then steps 5.2.2.5 and 5.2.2.6 may be skipped.
ISOLATE the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units from the train that was already operating by shutting the following valves:
1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 SB) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS CLR ISOL 1CH-116 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL ALIGN NNS AH units to the train that will remain operating by opening the following valves:
1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL.
Page 12 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 2 - RUNNING ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRIP 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL.
1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 SB) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS CLR ISOL 1CH-116 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL BOP Reports Standby Chiller in service.
SRO CHECK EITHER chiller STARTED. (YES)
SRO GO TO Step 16.
BOP VERIFY the following AH units for the operating train chiller are RUNNING:
AH-15, Control Room Normal Supply AH-17, Fuel Vent FP Pump Room Fan Cooler AH-16, Elec Equip Prot Rm Supply BOP VERIFY the following alarm is CLEAR for the running chiller:
ALB-23-1-20, Expansion TK A LO-LO Level (YES)
ALB-23-2-20, Expansion TK B LO-LO Level (YES)
SRO REFER TO Tech Spec 3.7.13.
Enters TS 3.7.13 - With only one Essential Services Chilled Water System loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SRO EXIT this procedure.
SRO If not already done, may complete and Equipment Failure Checklist and contact WCC for assistance.
Appendix D Page 13 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 2 - RUNNING ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRIP EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
Cue Event 3 (Letdown Temperature Controlier/Demin Bypass valve Failure) when the standby chiller is in service and the TS entry has been completed or AOP-026 is exited.
Appendix D Page 14 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 4 - LETDOWN TEMPERATURE CONTROL FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions:
Actuate Event 3 - Letdown Temperature controller failure (tt:144/jtb143b) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
Indications Available:
ALB-007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP.
RO Responds to alarm and enters APP-ALS-007-3-2.
RO CONFIRM alarm using TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature.
RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:
Manually positions 1CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, to divert flow to the VCT.
RO PERFORM Corrective actions:
VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the STRS and Purification Demineralizers.
PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature:
VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)
LOWER letdown flow. (N/A - CCW Problem)
IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:
TAKE manual control of TK-144.
OPEN 1CC-337, to raise CCW flow.
SRO Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
If contacted as WCC or System Engineer: "maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is completed".
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 4 (RCP "B" high vibration) when letdown temperature is under control.
Appendix D Page 15 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 4 - RCP "B" HIGH VIBRATION Booth Operator Instructions:
Actuate trigger for Event 4 (RCS09B) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
Indications Available: ALB-010-2-5, RCP-B TROUBLE RO Responds to alarm ALB-01 0-2-5.
Evaluator's Note:
Crew may enter ALB-01 0-1-5 but will likely go directly to AOP-018 when high vibration is recognized.
SRO Enters and directs actions of AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS.
Immediate RO Perform Immediate Action Action Verifies one CSIP running. (YES)
SRO Inform SSO to refer to PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations.
SRO Proceeds to Section 3.2, RCP High Vibration.
EVALUATOR NOTE:
The answer to the following question may be YES at this time but the limit will be exceeded in short order. This is a continuous action step that should be implemented when the limit is exceeded. The scenario guide is therefore written as if the limit is exceeded when the step is read.
- is attached to the back of this scenario guide for evaluator use.
SRO Check all RCP's operating within limits of Attachment 1.
SRO Check reactor power> P-8. (NO)
RO Check more than one RCP affected. (NO)
Appendix D Page 16 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 4 - RCP "B" HIGH VIBRATION EVALUATOR NOTE:
The SRO may conduct a brief on Attachment 7 before the Rep is stopped.
RO Perform the following:
STOP the affected RCP. (RCP "B")
SRO REFER TO Attachment 7, Operation With Two RCPs.
GO TO Step 11.
RO CHECK all RCPs RUNNING. (NO)
PERFORM the following:
IF RCP A is SECURED, THEN SHUT 1RC-107, PRZ Spray Loop A. (N/A)
IF RCP B is SECURED, THEN SHUT 1RC-103, PRZ Spray Loop B.
BOP VERIFY SG levels being maintained between 52°1'<> and 62%.
RO MONITOR rod insertion limits (Refer to Section F curve from Curve Book).
INITIATE a plant shutdown using ONE of the following:
SRO GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby AOP-038, Rapid Downpower RO CONFIRM the vibration alarm VALID by checking BOTH of the following:
- a. The Green vibration monitor OK light is LIT.
- b. Either of the following conditions exist:
Shaft AND frame vibration are proportionally rising Vertical AND Horizontal vibration are proportionally rising RO CHECK the following parameters normal for the affected RCP (reference HNP POM Group Trends for AOP-018):
All parameters listed in Attachment 6, ERFIS Points for Reactor Coolant Pumps Seal ~P Upper Oil Reservoir level Lower Oil Reservoir level RCS Loop Flow Appendix D Page 17 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 4 - RCP "B" HIGH VIBRATION SRO CONSULT with the Responsible Engineer for recommended follow-up actions.
SRO REFER TO the following Tech Specs: TS 3.4.1.1 is the most limiting: Be in at least HSB within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5 (MFW Pump trip) after the T5 declaration.
Appendix 0 Page 18 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 5 - RUNNING MFW PUMP TRIP Booth Operator Instructions:
Ensure power is < 10% then actuate the trigger for Event 5 (Running MFW Pump trip) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
Indications Available:
ALB-016, FW PUMP AlB HIGH BACK FLOW OR LOW SUCTION PRESS OR TRIP Evaluator Note:
MFW Pump 2 should not be started due to overfeed concerns.
BOP Responds to indication of running Main Feedwater (MFW)
Pump trip and/or multiple alarms.
BOP Reports MFW Pump 1 tripped.
SRO Enters AOP-016, FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION.
BOP Performs immediate actions of AOP-01 O.
CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)
CHECK initial Reactor power less than 90%. (YES)
CHECK initial Reactor power less than 80%. (YES)
PROCEDURE NOTE:
Turbine runback will automatically terminate at approximately 50%
power with DEH in AUTO.
Turbine runbacks are quickly identified by ALB-020-2-2, TURBINE RUNBACKOPERATIVE, in alarm and RUNBACK OPER light LIT as long as the initiating signal is present on DEH Panel A.
BOP/RO CHECK initial Reactor power less than 60%. (YES)
BOP/SRO C.HECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY. (N/A-turbine not on line)
SRO GO TO Step 7.
Appendix D Page 19 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 5 - RUNNING MFW PUMP TRIP BOP MAINTAIN ALL of the following:
At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (NO)
EVALUATOR NOTE:
The crew may start both MDAFW Pumps and the TDAFW Pump in the next block of steps.
BOP PERFORM the following:
IF ANY SG level drops to 30% THEN TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP Path-1.
IF Above POAH AND Reactor power is LESS THAN 10%,
THEN:
INITIATE AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62%.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
Mode change occurs at 5% Reactor power.
RO REDUCE power as necessary to maintain SG level.
SRO IF below POAH, THEN: (N/A)
BOP Starts both MDAFW Pump and adjusts flow using the associated flow control valves.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The crew will continue in AOP-010 but the procedure actions are not intended for this situation. Allow the crew time to match power to AFW capability then cue the next event (LOCA).
Since a shutdown will be in progress for the failed RCP, the SRO may elect to direct a reactor trip rather than to continue keeping the plant at power. If so, then cue the BOOTH OPERATOR to initiate Event 6 (LOCAICSIP Trip) coincident with the reactor trip.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
Be prepared to actuate Event 6 (LOCAICSIP Trip) if the SRO directs a MANUAL reactor trip.
RO Adjust power using MANUAL Rod Control and/or boration as Appendix D Page 20 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 5 - RUNNING MFW PUMP TRIP directed by the SRO.
Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 6 (LOCAICSIP Trip) when the plant is in a stable condition with power matched to AFW capability.
Appendix D Page 21 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE BOOTH OPERATOR:
Actuate Event 6 SBLOCAICSIP "A" trip (RCS01A1CVC05A) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.
INDICATIONS:
RCS Low Pressure alarms/Rapidly Decreasing RCS Pressure and Pressurizer Level EVALUATOR NOTE:
The crew may initiate a MANUAL SI before the AUTO setpoint is reached.
SRO Enters PATH-1 RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:
AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:
CHECK for any of the following:
Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)
Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)
ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)
NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:
CHECK for any of the following:
ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)
ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)
BOP VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses 1A-SA AND 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's. (NO - 1A-SA is dead and IB-SB is powered from the EDG)
CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (YES)
SI Actuated bypass permissive light ALB-11-2-2 Appendix D Page 22 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE ALB-11-5-1 ALB-11-5-3 ALB-12-1-4 SRO Perform The Following:
Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X. (Refer to PEP-110)
SRO Informs Crew Foldout A applies.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The following actions should be taken in accordance with FOLDOUT A criteria during the scenario:
Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block Valves CLOSE when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.
If the crew is slow to start CSIP "B" then RCP trip criteria could be met.
RO Verify ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING.
Critical Starts CSIP "B" by no later than the completion of Task GUIDE 1, Attachment 6.
Reports RHR Pumps running (YES)
SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)
RO Verifies CSIP miniflow valves closed (YES)
RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)
EVALUATOR NOTE:
The crew may manually initiate Main Steam Isolation because Containment Pressure is rising towards the automatic setpoint.
Appendix D Page 23 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE RO/BOP Check Main Steam Isolation:
Main Steam Isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)
RO Check CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (YES)
RO/BOP Check AFW Status:
AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)
EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.
Verify Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", While Continuing with this Procedure.
Critical Closes at least one of the valves in each of the following Task BOP combinations before exiting Attachment 6:
1SP-948/1SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C HOT LEG CNMT ISOL 1ED-94/1ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHA RGE AND closes at least one set of the following:
1SP-16/1SP-939, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL 1SP-916/1SP-918, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL BOP Control RCS Temperature:
Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize RCS temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.
Appendix D Page 24 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1.
RO Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)
RO Check PZR PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
(YES)
RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)
RO/BOP Identify any faulted SG:
Check for any of the following:
Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)
Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)
CREW Check Secondary Radiation:
Check for all of the following:
Condenser Vacuum Pump Effluent radiation - NORMAL.
(YES)
SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)
Main Steamline radiation - NORMAL. (YES)
BOP Any SG with an uncontrolled level increase (NO)
Check for all of the following:
CNMT pressure - NORMAL. (NO)
Proceeds TO Step 44. (Entry Point C)
SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required. (None required)
SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: Foldouts A and B Apply.
Appendix D Page 25 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE Evaluator Note:
The crew may review foldout criteria. Foldout A actions should be complete. No Foldout B actions apply.
The crew should use Adverse Values () when Containment Pressure exceeds 3 PSIG.
RO Maintain RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND 13 GPM.
Any level-GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)
BOP Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 250/0 AND 50% [40%
AND 50%].
BOP Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)
RO Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)
RO Check PZR PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
(YES)
CONTINUOUS ACTION: IF a PRZ PORV opens on high SRO pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.
RO Check SI Termination Criteria:
RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN (YES) 10°F [40°F] - C 20°F [50°F] - M BOP Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:
Level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 25%
[40%] (YES)
Total feed flow to intact SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)
Appendix D Page 26 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE RO RCS Pressure stable or increasing (NO)
SRO WHEN the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO EPP-008, "SI TERMINATION", Step 1.
Check any CNMT Spray Pump - RUNNING. (NO)
RO Check Source Range Detector Status:
Intermediate range flux - LESS THAN 5x10-11 AMPS.
Verify source range detectors - ENERGIZED.
Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale.
RCS Pressure greater than 230 PSIG (YES)
Evaluator's Note:
The evaluation/trend of RCS pressure in the next several steps is dependent on how long it took the crew to reach these steps (Decay Heat/Break Flow/ECCS flow).
RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES/NO)
RO Check for both of the following:
All SG Pressures - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)
RCS pressure - STABLE OR DECREASING. (YES)
RO Establish CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers:
Verify both CCW Pumps running (YES)
Open the following valves: (CCW Return From RHR HX Trains "A" and "B")
1CC-147 1CC-167 Appendix D Page 27 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE RO Verify CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchangers (YES)
Perform one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems:
Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:
1CC-99 1CC-128 Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:
1CC-113 1CC-127 BOP Check EDG status:
Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1B-SB-ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)
Check Bus voltages (Normal)
Verify breakers 105 and 125 closed (YES)
BOP Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-155, "Diesel Generator Emergency Power System", Section 7.0.
SRO RHR system - CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.
(YES).
SRO Check auxiliary AND radwaste processing building radiation -
NORMAL (YES)
SRO GO TO Step 58.
Check for both of the following:
RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)
Any RHR HX headerflow-GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)
SRO GO TO EPP-009, "POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION", Step 1.
SRO Reviews EPP-009 FOLDOUT Criteria (None will require action)
RO Reset SI Appendix D Page 28 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE SRO Manually realign safeguards equipment if a loss of off-site power occurs.
RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals RO Establish Instrument Air and Nitrogen to CNMT Open the following valves:
11A-819 1SI-287 Monitor AC Buses:
BOP Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1B-SB-ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:
Check bus voltages Check breakers 105 AND 125 - CLOSED (YES)
SRO GO TO Step 5e.
BOP Check all non-emergency AC buses - ENERGIZED (YES)
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water level indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered.
RO Secure PRZ Heaters:
Verify control heaters - OFF Place backup heaters in the OFF position.
Verify control heaters - OFF Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered.
(Refer to USER'S GUIDE, "USER'S GUIDE", Attachment 2, Evaluating Pressurizer Water Level Indication.)
RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)
Appendix D Page 29 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)
Stop RHR Pumps BOP Check Intact SG Levels:
Any level - GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)
Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50%
[400/0 and 50%].
PROCEDURE NOTE:
After the low steam pressure 51 signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
RO Check PRZ Pressure:
Pressure - less than 2000 PSIG (YES)
Block low steam pressure SI SRO Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:
Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100
°F/HR RO Check RHR system - OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 1Of.
Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:
BOP Check any intact SG MSIV - OPEN (NO)
Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed in order of preference):
BOP SG PORVs SRO Go to Step 11 SRO Monitor Shutdown Margin While Continuing RCS Cooldown:
a.
Coordinate with plant operations staff AND chemistry to perform the following to obtain primary and secondary samples:
- 1) Operate the primary AND secondary sample panels.
1CC-114 Appendix D Page 30 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE 1CC-115
- 3) Open CCW to GFFD valves:
1CC-304 1CC-305
- 4) Align AND 'obtain activity AND boron samples of the following:
RCS hot legs AIISGs (Refer to OP-101, "SAMPLING SYSTEM", Section 5.0.)
b.
Determine boron required for shutdown margin for anticipated RCS temperatures. (Refer to OST-1036, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATION".)
c.
Check ReS loop boron - GREATER THAN BORON REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN MARGIN RO Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 10 of [40 OF] - C (YES)
SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)
SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 14 AND GO TO Step 14.
PROCEDURE CAUTION:
Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS depressurization. This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZ level.
PROCEDURE NOTE:
RCS depressurization should NOT be stopped if RCS subcooling is lost. Subcooling should be restored as the cooldown continues.
RO Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZ:
PRZ level - LESS THAN 25% [40% ]
Depressurize using normal spray PRZ level - greater than 25% (400/0)
WHEN level greater than 25% [40% ], THEN stop RCS depressurization.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when the depressurization is secured.
Appendix D Page 31 of 31 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 1