ML072120111
| ML072120111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Technical Specifications Task Force |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2007 |
| From: | Kobetz T NRC/NRR/ADRO/DIRS/ITSB |
| To: | Technical Specifications Task Force |
| Schulten C. S., NRR/DIRS, 415-1192 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML072070202 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC MD5249, TSTF-493, Rev 2 | |
| Download: ML072120111 (17) | |
Text
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RCIC System instrumentation is to initiate actions to ensure adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and normal coolant makeup flow from the Reactor Feedwater System is unavailable, such that initiation of the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) pumps does not occur. A more complete discussion of RCIC System operation is provided in the Bases of LCO 3.5.3, "RCIC System." This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RCIC, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance. The subset of LSSS that directly protect against violating the rReactor cCore Safety Limits or the and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pPressure boundary Ssafety lLimits during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) are referred to as Safety Limit LSSS (SL-LSSS).
10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) requires that TSs include LSSSs for variables that have significant safety functions. For variables on which a SL has been placed, the LSSS must be chosen to initiate automatic protective action to correct abnormal situations before the SL is exceeded.
Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain LSSS defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices...so chosen that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that an SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.
However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.
REVIEW ER'S NOTE ----------------------------------
The term "Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP)" is generic terminology for the setpoint value calculated by means of the plant-specific setpoint methodology documented in a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.
The term Limiting Trip Setpoint indicates that no additional margin has been added between the Analytical Limit and the calculated trip setting.
W here margin is added between the Analytical Limit and trip setpoint, the term Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is preferred. The trip setpoint (field setting) may be more conservative than the Limiting or Nominal Trip Setpoint. W here the [LTSP] is not documented in a column in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the purpose of compliance with 10 CFR 50.36, the plant-BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-1 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 specific term for the Limiting or Nominal Trip Setpoint must be cited in Note b of Table 3.3.5.2-1. The brackets indicate plant-specific terms may apply, as reviewed and approved by the NRC. The as-found and as-left tolerances will apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance.
Licensees are to insert the name of the document(s) controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 that contain the [LTSP] and the methodology for calculating the as-left and as-found tolerances, for the phrase "[a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59]" in the specifications.
BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The [Limiting Trip Setpoint (LTSP)] is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the [LTSP] accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the
[LTSP] ensures that SLs are not exceeded. As such, the [LTSP] meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 1).
Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." Use of the [LTSP] to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the [LTSP] due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the [LTSP] and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the [LTSP] to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-2 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during testing such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP] and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the [LTSP]
by an amount equal to [or greater than] the as-found tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device ensures that an SL is not BASES BACKGROUND (continued) exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval.
If the actual setting of the device is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, then this condition indicates that the instrument is degraded and is not performing in accordance with the setpoint methodology assumptions.
This condition must be entered into the plant corrective action program, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance band, and an immediate determination of operability decision must be made.
If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the device channel would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.
The RCIC System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.
Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of reactor vessel Low Low water level. The variable is monitored by four transmitters that are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic arrangement.
Once initiated, the RCIC logic seals in and can be reset by the operator only when the reactor vessel water level signals have cleared.
The RCIC test line isolation valve (which is also a primary containment isolation valve) is closed on a RCIC initiation signal to allow full system flow and maintain containment isolated in the event RCIC is not operating.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-3 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 The RCIC System also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool, since these are the two sources of water for RCIC operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a RCIC initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the pump suction from the suppression pool valve is open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level transmitters are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close. The suppression pool suction valve also automatically opens and the CST suction valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool (one-out-of-two logic similar to the CST water level logic). To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.
BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The RCIC System provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the high water level (Level 8) trip (two-out-of-two logic), at which time the RCIC steam supply, steam supply bypass, and cooling water supply valves close (the injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valves). The RCIC System restarts if vessel level again drops to the low level initiation point (Level 2).
APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System, to provide makeup coolant to the SAFETY reactor, is to respond to transient events. The RCIC System is not an ANALYSES, LCO, Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety and APPLICABILITY analysis for RCIC System operation. The RCIC System instrumentation satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.
Trip Setpoints that directly protect against violating the Rreactor Ccore Safety Limits or the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pPressure boundary Safety Limits during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) are Safety Limit-Limiting Safety System Settings (SL-LSSS). Permissive and interlock setpoints allow bypass of trips when they are not required by the Safety Analysis. These permissives and interlocks ensure that the starting conditions are consistent with the safety analysis, before preventative or mitigating actions occur. Because these permissives or interlocks are only one of multiple conservative starting assumptions for the accident analysis, they are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy, (i.e. the value indicated is sufficiently close to the necessary value to ensure proper operation of the safety systems to turn the AOO). Therefore permissives and interlocks are not considered to be SL-LSSS.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-4 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints withinconservative with respect to the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not withinconservative with respect to its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
Allowable Values are specified for each RCIC System instrumentation Function specified in the table. [Limiting Trip Setpoints] are specified [in a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59]. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceedremain conservative to the Allowable Value with respect to the as-found tolerance band between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. After each calibration the trip setpoint should be reset to within the as-left band around the [LTSP Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but withinconservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable.
The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1 is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that the channel can have when tested, such that a channel is OPERABLE if the as-found setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
As such, the Allowable Value differs from the [LTSP] by an amount
[greater than or] equal to the expected instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device ([LTSP]) will ensure that a SL is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. These uncertainties are described in the setpoint methodology.
Note that, although the channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned (as-found criteria).
If the actual setting of the device is found to be conservative with respect to the Allowable Value but is beyond the as-found tolerance band, then this condition indicates that the instrument is degraded and is not performing in accordance with the setpoint methodology assumptions.
This condition must be entered into the plant corrective action program, the trip setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the as-left tolerance band, and an immediate determination of operability decision must be made.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-5 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel would be considered inoperable. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.
[LTSPs] are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytical limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytical limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The [LTSPs] are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.
Each Allowable Value specified accounts for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the Function. These uncertainties are described in the setpoint methodology.
The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since this is when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for Applicability Bases for the RCIC System.)
The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
- 1. Reactor Vessel W ater Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that normal feedwater flow is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel water level and that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the RCIC System is initiated at Level 2 to assist in maintaining water level above the top of the active fuel.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-6 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Vessel W ater Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
The Reactor Vessel W ater Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is set high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the RCIC System flow with high pressure core spray assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Level 1.
Four channels of Reactor Vessel W ater Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.
- 2. Reactor Vessel W ater Level - High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel.
Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the RCIC steam supply, steam supply bypass, and cooling water supply valves to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). (The injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve.)
Reactor Vessel W ater Level - High, Level 8 signals for RCIC are initiated from two level transmitters from the narrow range water level measurement instrumentation, which sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
The Reactor Vessel W ater Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is high enough to preclude isolating the injection valve of the RCIC during normal operation, yet low enough to trip the RCIC System prior to water overflowing into the MSLs.
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Two channels of Reactor Vessel W ater Level - High, Level 8 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.
- 3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally the suction valve between the RCIC pump and the CST is open and, upon receiving a RCIC initiation signal, water for RCIC injection would be taken from the BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-7 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the RCIC pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.
Two level transmitters are used to detect low water level in the CST. The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.
Two channels of Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.
- 4. Suppression Pool W ater Level - High Excessively high suppression pool water level could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the safety/relief valves.
Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of RCIC from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of RCIC continuing to provide additional water from a source outside primary containment. This Function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)
Suppression pool water level signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool W ater Level -
High Function is set low enough to ensure that RCIC will be aligned to take suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression design loads would be exceeded.
Two channels of Suppression Pool W ater Level - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.
- 5. Manual Initiation BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-8 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 The Manual Initiation push button switch introduces a signal into the RCIC System initiation logic that is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provides manual initiation capability. There is one push button for the RCIC System.
The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the RCIC function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.
There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button.
One channel of Manual Initiation is required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS -----------------------------------REVIEW ERS NOTE-----------------------------------
Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.
A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with BASES ACTIONS (continued)
Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel.
A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 in the accompanying LCO. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-9 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 B.1 and B.2 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the RCIC System. In this case, automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 1 channels in the same trip system are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Action B.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability.
The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped Reactor Vessel W ater Level - Low Low, Level 2 channels in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.
BASES ACTIONS (continued)
Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.
C.1 A risk based analysis was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Ref. 1) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (similar to Required Action B.1), limiting the allowable out of service time if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This Condition applies to the Reactor Vessel W ater Level -
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-10 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 High, Level 8 Function, whose logic is arranged such that any inoperable channel will result in a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability. As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. This Condition also applies to the Manual Initiation Function. Since this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, a total loss of manual initiation capability (Required Action C.1) for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in the safe state for the channel in all events.
D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic component initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). For Required Action D.1, the RCIC System is the only associated feature. In this case, automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3 channels or two Function 4 channels are BASES ACTIONS (continued) inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability. As noted, Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool since, if aligned, the Function is already performed.
The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.
Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs the intended function of the BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-11 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool).
Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.
E.1 W ith any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately.
BASES SURVEILLANCE -----------------------------------REVIEW ERS NOTE-----------------------------------
REQUIREMENTS Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.
REVIEW ERS NOTE ------------------------------------
The Notes in Table 3.3.5.2-1 requiring reset of the channel to a predefined as-left tolerance and the verification of the as-found tolerance are only associated with SL-LSSS values. Therefore, the Notes are applied to specific SRs for the associated functions in the SR column only. The Notes may be placed at the top of the Allowable Value column in the Table and applied to all Functions with allowable values in the table.
REVIEW ERS NOTE ------------------------------------
Notes 1 and 2 are applied to the setpoint verification Surveillances for all SL-LSSS Functions unless one or more of the following exclusions apply:
- 1. Notes 1 and 2 are not applied to SL-LSSS Functions which utilize mechanical components to sense the trip setpoint or to manual initiation circuits (the latter are not explicitly modeled in the accident analysis). Examples of mechanical components are limit switches, float switches, proximity detectors, manual actuation switches, and other such devices that are normally only checked on a "go/no go" basis. Note 1 requires a comparison of the periodic surveillance requirement results to provide an indication of channel (or individual device) performance. This comparison is not valid for most mechanical components. W hile it is possible to verify that a limit switch functions at a point of travel, a change in the surveillance result probably indicates that the switch has moved, not that the input/output BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-12 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 relationship has changed. Therefore, a comparison of surveillance requirement results would not provide an indication of the channel or component performance.
- 2. Notes 1 and 2 are not applied to Technical Specifications associated with mechanically operated safety relief valves. The performance of these components is already controlled (i.e., trended with as-left and as-found limits) under the ASME Section XI testing program.
- 3. Notes 1 and 2 are may not apply ied to SL-LSSS Functions and Surveillances which test only digital components. For purely digital components, such as actuation logic circuits and associated relays, there is no expected change in result between surveillance performances other than measurement and test errors (M&TE) and, therefore, justification is needed to confirm that comparison of Surveillance results does not provide an indication of channel or component performance.
An evaluation of the potential SL-LSSS Functions resulted in Notes 1 and 2 being applied to the Functions shown in the TS markups. Each licensee proposing to fully adopt this TSTF must review the potential SL-LSSS Functions to identify which of the identified functions are SL-LSSS according to the definition of SL-LSSS and their plant specific safety analysis. The two TSTF Notes are not required to be applied to any of the listed Functions which meet any of the exclusion criteria or are not SL-LSSS based on the plant specific design and analysis.
As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC System instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions 2 and 5; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary.
SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-13 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-14 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1.
SR 3.3.5.2.3 The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints.
The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be re-adjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1.
SR 3.3.5.2.3 for SL-LSSS functions is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis setpoint methodology assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the instrument be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP].
W here a setpoint more conservative than the [LTSP] is used in the plant BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-15 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP], then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable.
The second Note also requires that [LTSP] and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59].
SR 3.3.5.2.4 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.5.2.4 for SL-LSSS functions is modified by two Notes as identified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. The first Note requires evaluation of channel performance for the condition where the as-found setting for the channel setpoint is outside its as-found tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with safety analysis setpoint methodology assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for continued OPERABILITY. The second Note requires that the as-left setting for the instrument be returned to within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP].
W here a setpoint more conservative than the [LTSP] is used in the plant surveillance procedures, the as-left and as-found tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Safety Limit and/or Analytical Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the as-left tolerance of the [LTSP], then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable.
The second Note also requires that [LTSP] and the methodologies for calculating the as-left and the as-found tolerances be in [a document controlled under 10 CFR 50.59].
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-16 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.5.2.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.
The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.
REFERENCES 1. NEDE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.
BW R/6 STS B 3.3.5.2-17 Rev. 3.0, 03/31/04